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Soviet Union

Political Affairs

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Deputies Asked To Predict Congress Outcome

91UN0505A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 16 Dec 90 p 1

["Let Us Try to Predict"—RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
headline]

[Text] The Fourth USSR Congress of People's Deputies opens tomorrow in Moscow. The agenda includes issues whose solutions will influence the fate of the state: On a Union treaty, on the situation in the country....

Aware that predicting the future is a thankless task, we nonetheless asked representatives of the various political forces (and it is just these forces that will determine the course of the congress) to take a little test in prognostication. We gave all of them the same two questions:

1. How do representatives of the republics feel about the new Union treaty?
2. Will the Congress approve the president's program to get the country out of the crisis and, accordingly, will changes be introduced to the USSR Constitution reforming the structure of state power?

AND SO, THE USSR PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES MAKE THEIR PREDICTIONS....

Yuriy BLOKHIN, chairman of the "Soyuz" association of deputies:

We Will Debate, But We Will Not Argue

1. I believe that the new draft of the Union treaty will be approved. Although a heated polemic is taking place concerning the name of the state, human rights which are not clearly written into the treaty, and problems connected with citizenship and with changes in the territorial structure of the republics. The events in South Ossetia will stimulate (and have already stimulated) a polemic around the latter. This is a clear example of the idea that the republics can take care of their own internal regions, and the new draft treaty unties their hands in this sense.

2. That will be the most difficult day. I agree in advance with those deputies who are appealing for people not to rely too much on changes in personnel and structure. Much depends on individuals, but not everything. The "Soyuz" group will propose its own candidates for key posts in the state.

People are talking about the idea of declaring a vote of no confidence in the president. And although we ourselves talked about that recently, I believe the congress will not take such a step. I predict that the main "commotion" will begin with the agenda. I know that several groups of deputies, including the interregional group, are preparing statements and calling for the whole body of deputies to be dissolved and new elections to be

conducted. If we manage to preserve the agenda and hold the congress, then we will be able to achieve concrete results.

Telman GDLYAN, member of the Interregional Group of Deputies:

We Will Be in the Minority

1. The conversation at the congress will take place not so much about the Union treaty as about the form of the Union. It will be about whether we will exist as before, or carry out a small, cosmetic repair of the system, or come to a confederation of Union republics. Personally I have decided to vote for confederation.

I can predict today that Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Georgia will not sign a treaty. Moldova and Armenia are still in question. The Ukraine and the RSFSR are also showing character and presenting their own conditions. The Central Asian republics are voting unanimously for the variant that has been proposed.

2. People are criticizing the president's program, but for different reasons. The majority of the emotion will be suppressed. Unfortunately, the congress has become an obedient tool in the hands of a narrow circle of politicians, and as a result it is being steered. It is a pity that the democratic forces will not be able to put up a united front against the apparat, but we still do not have a united, strong democratic bloc. The MDG [Interregional Group of Deputies] will be in the minority at the congress. As a result we will not be able to introduce many radical changes to the structure of power. We will not be able to surmount the voting barrier.

Veniamin YARIN, member of the Presidential Council and member of the deputy's group of communists:

"I Hope Gorbachev Prevails"

1. The body of deputies will not be able to keep us from our business. The republics will be in favor of the quickest possible conclusion of a Union treaty.

2. The congress as a whole will approve the anticrisis program that the president of the USSR will present. Of course much criticism will be leveled at him personally. I hope very much that it will only be criticism and not malicious, clamorous attacks. We should not forget that this man has begun to build a new society in our country, and across these years no force has been able to stop him. I respect Gorbachev for his firmness and loyalty to that path. The fourth Congress will perhaps be the most difficult experience for him—the proposed reforms have turned out to be too painful for society. But he is a courageous man. I hope from my soul that he prevails.

Anatoliy LUKYANOV, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet:

"I Rely on the Common Sense of the Congress"

1. There is no use rushing events. The republics are just now expressing their views of the Union treaty. For instance, Tajikistan has already approved the draft. At the congress, of course, there will be discussion concerning the concept of the treaty, and it will undergo certain changes in the end. It is still only a draft. I hope we will be able to work in a constructive spirit.

I have had detailed negotiations with the leadership of the MDG, with the groups "Soyuz" and "For Constructive Cooperation," and with deputies from veteran's organizations and from autonomies. Each time we found a common language. We will try to seek out those areas which unite us, not those that divide us. What kind of areas? Primarily preserving the peaceful character of the reform, the creation of a united, all-Union market, and the conclusion of a new Union treaty.

2. As for changes to the USSR Constitution, I can only rely on the common sense of the Congress. If the deputies approve the proposed reform of the organs of power, then the Congress will have to decide whom to elect and when to elect them to the new posts.

Arkadiy VEPREV, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Agricultural Questions and Food Stuffs:

"We Will Begin With the Basics"

1. Many people suppose that we will conclude a Union treaty and then we will breathe freely—that everything will be done.

Personally, such a position disturbs me. The most important document will still not create a sufficiency of food if the land has no master and if we continue to rely on handouts from the West.

In the meantime, however you look at it, we are living on borrowed funds at the expense of future generations. We take oil and gas from them and buy ourselves bread and meat.

2. I would like to see the Congress of People's Deputies take a solid stance on investments for the village. They should be directed at specific programs: For the development of a processing base and for the creation of a social infrastructure.

The last prediction is made by the clairvoyant Bella Davydova:

"For the Sake of Our Common Salvation"

1. The Congress of People's Deputies offers us a chance to save the country from catastrophe. Therefore it should take place successfully, despite all the opposition.

The Union of Republics should be preserved. The Baltic republics are excluding themselves from the Union—but they will ask to be taken back once the Union gets out of the crisis. That is what will certainly happen.

2. It is untrue that there will be famine and civil war in the country. They are evoked in the struggle for power by bad people who profit as things get worse. But the world will help our country survive.

When enmity and dissension reign among the peoples, the earth suffers and cataclysms take place on it.

The peaceful policies of Gorbachev will heal the earth. They are salutary for the peoples and therefore will enjoy tremendous success all over the world. It is in our interests to support the reforms of the president.

New Rector of Moscow Higher Party School Views Responsibilities

91UN0329A Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA in Russian 5 Nov 90 p 2

[Interview with Nikolay Mikhaylovich Blinov, interim rector of Moscow Higher Party School, by Yu. Aydinov, correspondent: "Coming Down From the Throne"]

[Text] *From the beginning of June until September the normally tumultuous political life of the Moscow Higher Party School calms down. Last summer the vacation calm was broken only once, by the news that V. N. Shostakovskiy, rector of Moscow Higher Party School and one of the leaders of Democratic Platform, had been relieved of his duties as rector.*

The rector's forced resignation gave rise to many questions, the most important of which was in what direction a school which has in recent years done a great deal to foster democratization of the party is going to develop now. This was the subject of our correspondent's interview with N. M. Blinov, interim Moscow Higher Party School rector.

[Editor's note: Nikolay Mikhaylovich Blinov is a doctor of philosophical sciences and professor of sociology. He is chairman of the Moscow Branch of the Soviet Sociological Association and an active member of the USSR Academy of Creativity. He is 53 years old and has been Moscow Higher Party School interim rector since August 1990.]

[Correspondent] Nikolay Mikhaylovich, before our meeting today I looked over the new concept for this school adopted by a recent academic council meeting. Its preamble states that Moscow Higher Party School is to develop as a party political science educational institution. Political science is a relatively new science for us. Please tell me in greater detail about this aspect of the school's development.

[Blinov] The main assumption upon which we are proceeding is our conviction that the school should be a more open educational institution. Along the lines of all the political science institutes or free universities which exist around the world. And members of more than just one party should be able to take advantage of the school's

services. We see that the leaders of the Central Committee and the Moscow Party Gorkom also realize that the Moscow Higher Party School cannot be an educational institution which only trains party functionaries.

The school presently belongs to the CPSU, but in a society which has no political scientists and which is creating a law-governed state and striving toward consensus and civil tranquility it would be a luxury to maintain an educational institution with such a large scientific base and physical facilities solely for the benefit of one party. Even now our potential makes it possible for us to train political officials for both soviets and various parties and state organs on a contractual basis.

We are gradually introducing into the curriculum a series of courses commonly accepted around the world, including pure political science courses. We now have departments on the theory and organization of political activity, the political history of the CPSU and the theory of socialism and political science. These replace the traditional departments of party building, CPSU history and scientific communism. We must begin by explaining to our students such elementary concepts of political science as the status of the governing and opposition parties, schools of thought and factions within parties, and party tactics in a democratic society.

[Correspondent] The word "communism" has disappeared from the names of departments and courses. Yet it seems that political turmoil has not shaken your faith in the socialist idea, or has it?

[Blinov] We are not guided by the present-day interplay of forces, but by historical realities. Renouncing socialism and the possibility of realizing the socialist idea is at the least ignorant and politically ambitious. This would be, let us say, neo-Stalinism in reverse. We must not disrupt historical continuity, as was done 70 years ago. Despite all the distortions of the idea and the deformations which led to the creation of a totalitarian society instead of the promised bright future, nevertheless an objective historical process has been underway and a certain degree of social protection for people has been the result.

It would be good to bear in mind that one of the ones who supported the socialist idea was Berdyayev, who is often quoted by the radicals nowadays, as well as Albert Einstein, but they preached social and ethical socialism: liberation of the individual and his intellectual powers, and creation of proper conditions for the all-round development of human beings. One should not think that there was one single true doctrine in the form of Marxism-Leninism. That is ignorance, too. The idea itself is not at all to blame for the fact that we developed a martial-feudal, Arakcheyev-style socialism. And we want our students to have a concept of early socialist doctrines, of the heritage of Kropotkin and Bakunin, and of the Christian-ethical socialism of Tolstoy and Dostoyevskiy.

[Correspondent] Over the past two years the school has become one of the capital's popular social and political centers. And among those attending discussions and roundtables you could find CPSU Central Committee Politburo members, metropolitans and ultra-leftist "informals." Do the Moscow Higher Party School's doors remain open to members of various parties and organizations, including those which oppose the CPSU?

[Blinov] They definitely do, and I think that we are going to open them even wider. We must take advantage of this historic opportunity to make the transition to genuine pluralism instead of contenting ourselves with glasnost within permissible limits. This year as well we are planning meetings with representatives of science, culture and the church. Recently we sponsored a discussion on the spiritual revival of society with Svetlana Nikolayevna Bukharina among the participants. Our school has conducted an all-union seminar for the heads of small enterprises on the subject of the market. That meeting was also attended by foreign experts.

Incidentally, our international contacts are developing quite successfully. Recently we concluded an agreement with the American Association of Teachers of Russian. They are already sending their students and trainees/researchers to us for a semester. Among them are experts on the economy, history and political science. Interest in cooperation with us has been expressed in Italy, Switzerland and Norway, and we have interesting proposals from the Japanese and South Koreans. That means that we are worth something in a political sense.

[Correspondent] Now a question about the views of Moscow Higher Party School students. When they arrive they are surprised to discover that here there coexist representatives not only of different views but even of diametrically opposed views on history and the modern world. One, say, asserts that the past 70 years have been nothing but years of political intrigues and coercion of the individual, while another reads lectures in the spirit of the infamous "Short Course," while yet another feels that both leftists and rightists are all talk, and that the country can only be saved by business people. Pluralism in this school is sometimes manifested in the most diverse ways. For instance, Nikolay Ilich Travkin is quitting the CPSU and establishing a party which makes no secret of its anti-communist orientation. And recently I heard that one of your instructors, unhappy with the school's leftist orientation, stormed out and went over to NASH SOVREMENNİK. How do you like that sort of pluralism?

[Blinov] This school is a microcosm of our society. And it comes as no surprise that we have the most diverse schools of thought represented here. In part this is a result of the lack of clarity within the party itself. But we do not have any political forces here which are blatantly oriented toward the past. The main thing which concerns us is for the school's direction to be progressive and democratic. And I believe we have created a core of instructors who are inclined to acknowledge the priority

of common human values, development of humanism and democracy, and tolerance of dissent. Of course, our staff has been revitalized; some people have been replaced, others have left, but this occurred without any pressure whatsoever on the part of our administration.

[Correspondent] Nikolay Mikhaylovich, one question which we have no right to ignore in this discussion concerns the previous rector. Shostakovskiy's dramatic resignation from the school was clearly inevitable in the wake of his address to the 28th CPSU Congress, in which he stated his intention of founding a new party. Inevitable, since the school belongs to the CPSU. But I would like to hear your assessment of his role in the development of the Moscow Higher Party School and simply of him as an individual.

[Blinov] Vyacheslav Nikolayevich and I have known each other for a long time, going back to when we were in the Komsomol together. We have always worked closely together. It was at his suggestion that I came here as prorector for science. I can see his tremendous personal contribution to the qualitative leap forward which our school has made in transforming itself from an educational institution training party functionaries to a school which is molding future political officials. As you are aware, the Moscow Higher Party School used to be a means for students to enjoy the pleasant life of the capital without expending too much effort.

But each individual chooses his own personal and political fate in accordance with the way he perceives the future development of society. I would not take it upon

myself to make any assessments. I can only say that Vyacheslav Nikolayevich is one of the few genuinely professional politicians.

[Correspondent] Perhaps it is very fortunate for the students that they are at the Moscow Higher Party School at such an interesting time. Though, as Confucius said, one should wish that one's enemy will live in interesting times. And he was obviously correct. As far as I know, the school's graduates are having trouble finding employment. Party committees are looking at them very, very suspiciously. Have you been approached with this sort of complaints yet?

[Blinov] Unfortunately that is true. Our school's graduates are in fact having difficulty finding work nowadays. In some places people feel that thanks to this school they have become Menshevik-like, dissident elements. In other places where radicals call the tune, on the other hand, they are regarded as throwbacks to the conservative party apparatus. Once again, this reflects the contradictory nature of the situation within the party.

I would like to say the following to conclude our discussion. The CPSU will not become a normally functioning political organization if it does not make the transition from the position of an imperial party to that of a governing party or a member of a coalition government, if it does not expand its contacts with other social movements, if it does not cease existing as an "internalized" party, the party of the functionaries. It should pay attention to its social base and to expression of the interests of broader segments of the population so that it will have the kind of cadres who will ensure its civilized, progressive functioning in a way which will not provoke anti-communist hysteria. We are focusing our efforts on training that kind of cadres.

Baltics

Declaration on Future Status of Baltics

91UN0250A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
23 Oct 90 p 1

["Declaration of the Council of Baltic States"—EKHO LITVY headline]

[Text] Positive changes taking place in the world make the restoration of justice, trampled upon in 1939-1940 with respect to the three Baltic republics—the Latvian Republic, Lithuanian Republic, and Estonian Republic—a real possibility in the near future. Evidence to this effect may be seen in the support expressed by representatives of many countries at the recently convened session of the United Nations General Assembly for the aspirations of our states to full restoration of independence.

The Council of Baltic States expresses its sincere gratitude to all who have declared they do not acknowledge the abolition of these states' independence in 1940 and who have expressed solidarity with the struggle of our peoples for full restoration of the state independence of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.

The Council of Baltic States is convinced that the question of eliminating one of the last remaining political consequences of World War II in Europe—the Baltic question—can be resolved through negotiations in just as successful a fashion as was the issue of the unification of Germany.

The Council of Baltic States declares that the Latvian Republic, Lithuanian Republic, and Estonian Republic have no aims other than the creation in their countries of a democratic society of free people, based on commonly accepted norms of international law, and the establishment of mutually beneficial cooperation with all countries.

The Council of Baltic States directs the attention of all countries in the world to the fact that non-acknowledgement of the forcible inclusion of the Baltic countries into the composition of the USSR is incompatible with conclusion with the Soviet Union of bilateral and multilateral treaties regarding—even obliquely—the territory and rights of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, with respect to which the USSR has no sovereign rights whatsoever.

The Council of Baltic States expresses its satisfaction at Resolution 334 of the U.S. Senate, and appeals to all other participants in the treaty on a final settlement with respect to Germany, requesting that the documentation for ratifying this treaty include supplements or resolutions precisely stipulating the legal status of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia as independent states.

[Signed] Anatolijs Gorbunovs, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Republic

Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian Republic

Arnold Ruutel, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Republic

Tallinn, 19 October 1990.

Baltic, Nordic Councils Issue Communiqué

91UN0250B Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
23 Oct 90 p 1

["Communiqué of the Meeting Between the Council of Baltic States and the Nordic Council Delegation"—EKHO LITVY headline]

[Text] A meeting of the Council of Baltic States and the Nordic Council Delegation took place 19 October 1990 in Tallinn.

Participating on behalf of the Council of Baltic States were delegations headed by:

Anatolijs Gorbunovs (Latvia), chairman of the Supreme Soviet;

Vytautas Landsbergis (Lithuania), chairman of the Supreme Council;

Arnold Ruutel (Estonia), chairman of the Supreme Soviet.

Participating on behalf of the Nordic Council were:

Paul Petersson (Iceland), president of the Presidium, member of the Commission on Social and Environmental Issues;

Lilly Gildenkilde (Denmark), member of the Commission on Social and Environmental Issues, Presidium reporter;

Elsi Hetemyaki-Olander (Finland), member of the Presidium, member of the Commission on Culture;

Johann K. Loken (Norway), member of the Judicial Commission;

Mats Niubiu (Finland), member of the Presidium, member of the Commission on Social and Environmental Issues;

Berit Oskarsson (Sweden), member of the Commission on Culture;

Karin Seder (Sweden), member of the Presidium, member of the Economics Commission.

The great significance of this first official contact between the two regional interstate organizations was stressed at the meeting.

The delegation of the Council of Baltic States provided information on the movement of the peoples of the Latvian Republic, Lithuanian Republic, and Estonian

Republic towards restoration of their state independence on the basis of legal succession. Support expressed in the Nordic and other countries for the peoples of the Baltic states was noted with gratitude. Representatives of the Council of Baltic States noted that cooperation with the Nordic and other countries in the most diverse spheres served as a great source of support in the restoration of independence.

The delegation of the Nordic Council cited the communique on the results of the 11-12 September 1990 meeting in Molde (Norway) of the foreign ministers of the Nordic countries, who expressed the hope that negotiations between the Baltic republics and the USSR leadership would facilitate the Baltic countries' attainment of independence to which their peoples are aspiring. The delegation supports this position in every way possible.

From the point of view of independence of the Baltic region, an important role could be played by joint activity with those countries that are close neighbors, including through the Nordic Council, their cooperative organization. This can be done by the Council of Baltic States as well as by each of these states individually.

The Nordic Council delegation provided information with respect to the organization's activity over the course of almost four decades.

In accordance with the basic documents of the Council of Baltic States and of the Nordic Council, the meeting focused on matters of environmental protection and culture in which realistic results might be achieved, proceeding from the sphere of interests of both organizations, and which might contribute to the development of democracy and guarantees of human rights in the Baltic countries.

The nation-participants in the Council of Baltic States expressed their desire to obtain observer status in the Nordic Council.

The Nordic Council confirmed invitations already sent to the parliaments of the Baltic states for their delegations to participate in the seminar to be conducted in November—"The Role of Parliamentary Deputies in Building a New Europe"—and the session of the Nordic Council which will be convened in February 1991 in Copenhagen. These invitations were accepted with gratitude by the member nations of the Council of Baltic States.

Baltic Appeal on USSR Troop Presence

91UN0510B Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH
in Russian 5 Dec 90 p 6

["Appeal to the Population of the Baltic Republics and Soviet Military Servicemen"—SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH headline]

[Text] We, members of the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Republic, the Lithuanian Republic, and the Estonian Republic, having gathered at a joint meeting in the capital of the Lithuanian Republic, the city of Vilnius, declare:

The USSR troops on the territory of the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian Republics are a remnant of the aggression of the Soviet Union against the Baltic states. Therefore the struggle of our peoples for the removal of the Soviet troops is inseparable from their struggle for complete restoration of state independence. Soviet military servicemen in the Baltic countries have become like hostages of the continuing imperialist policy.

At the same time we do not regard each officer and soldier in the Soviet forces and members of their families as personal enemies of our peoples.

We think that peaceful dialogue, which requires patience, opens up greater possibilities than harsh, albeit justified, accusations at the gates of the barracks.

While demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops, we will do nothing that would impeach the dignity and human rights of the military servicemen and their family members. At the same time we cannot take responsibility for and guarantee the satisfaction of the material and social needs of the influx of military servicemen and their families who are not controlled by our states.

We are in favor of negotiations to determine the status of the contingent of USSR Armed Forces temporarily stationed on the territory of the Baltic states on the basis of international legal practice.

We call for USSR military servicemen to observe the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of our countries, to respect our laws, and oppose attempts to use the Army against the peaceful population.

Chairmen of the joint meeting:

—from the Latvian Republic

A. Gorbunovs, chairman of the Supreme Soviet

—from the Lithuanian Republic

V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Soviet

—from the Estonian Republic

A. Ruutel, chairman of the Supreme Soviet

Vilnius, 1 December 1990

Latvian Parliament's Quorum Decision

91UN0285B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
25 Oct 90 p 1

[Article by E. Lapidus, SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA parliamentary correspondent, published under the rubric

"How Parliament Works": "The Opposition With a Noose Around Its Neck, or How To 'Build' a Rule-of-Law State..."

[Text] At a morning meeting on 23 October, to use sporting terminology, the NFL [Latvian People's Front] deputies took the "Equal Rights" faction right out of the game. And they took them out for a long time to come.

This is how a long political struggle ended around the draft bill "On the Introduction of Amendments and Supplements to the Constitution of the Latvian SSR (on Questions of a Quorum)."

The faction defending the interests of the NFL was trying to attain a position whereby laws would be passed if a majority of the deputies taking part in the voting, but not less than a third of all the deputies, voted in favor of them.

I will note that formerly laws, decrees, and other acts of the Supreme Soviet were adopted only by a majority of the votes of the all the deputies elected to parliament.

And now, to understand the underlying reason for the stubborn efforts of the NFL faction it is necessary to study some fairly easy arithmetical computations.

Before 23 October the presence of no less than 101 legislators (out of 200) voting "aye" was needed for a bill to be adopted.

Now (and why the unnecessary complexity?) the procedure has been significantly simplified. For instance, it is possible, if there 70 deputies in the meeting hall and if the majority of those attending support it, for the draft bill to be passed.

It is fully possible that 68 parliamentarians take part in the voting, 67 of them vote in favor, and we are left to carry out the newly made law.

And what if these 67 cannot express the opinion of a majority, never mind all, of the voters of Latvia?

Does it not smack of the theater of the absurd?

One often hears the question, "After all, the NFL deputies are a majority in parliament even without that. Why this legalistic tightrope-walking?"

In the first place it is well known from history that the party possessing power (the NFL in this instance), will never miss an opportunity to broaden its domain.

And in the second place... Before 23 October the parliamentary opposition at least had the constitutional opportunity to somehow influence the decision of parliament and vote down laws infringing on the rights and interests of the Russian-speaking population of Latvia.

Article 173 of the Constitution of the Latvian SSR said that changes in the Basic Law take place as the result of a ruling of the Supreme Soviet which has been adopted

by a majority of no less than two-thirds of the total number of deputies elected to the republic's supreme legislative organ.

We must again resort to figures for the sake of clarity, on the first, second, and third readings, that same draft bill "On the Introduction of Amendments and Supplements to the Constitution of the Latvian SSR (on Questions of a Quorum)" could not collect the 134 "aye" votes needed for adoption of this document. Of course, primarily through the efforts of the opposition.

On the practical level, many draft bills unavoidably entail some interference in the Constitution. Even, for example, renaming Stuchkinskiy Rayon requires an amendment to Article 77 of the Basic Law.

And why is it necessary, time after time, for the majority faction to come into conflict with an opposition defending the will of its voters, who have another point of view? And who now respects the fact that in all democratic states the parliamentary opposition occupies an important place—and not because of voting blocs but thanks to the role it has been assigned by legislative procedure?

Henceforth amendments to the Constitution will be passed by no less than two-thirds of the deputies taking part in voting at a plenary meeting. And the majority supporting the draft law should exceed half of the total sum of parliamentarians.

In this manner the quota of "ayes" is being significantly reduced.

Formerly 134 votes were required; now 101 are enough.

As a result the opposition's opportunities are cut to a minimum.

In fact the opposition is deprived of the right even to somehow influence the results of voting in parliament. Yes, the "Equal Rights" faction may take part in commissions and debates, it may criticize any draft bills, and it may even make inquiries of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, but that is all. Indeed, the message of the NFL is that the opposition is to mind its own business.

And the justification for members of the NFL to pass the draft bill is not a model of originality—it is said that discipline must be enforced among the deputies. What a fine conclusion! Previously it required more votes to pass a draft bill, and now it requires less; this supposedly will sharply raise the level of attendance at plenary meetings. What iron-clad logic...

Incidentally, several statements from NFL deputies who supported the draft bill.

E. Krastins: "The people will not understand us if we take forever to change the Constitution. An opposition exists in the auditorium, and if it is against the draft bill, then it can influence the process..."

Although apparently it would be more accurate to say that it can "try to influence the process."

E. Berklaivs: "Whoever votes against (the draft bill—E.L.) does not want the best for the people of Latvia and should not be in the parliament."

Indeed, they are giving the opposition hell...

V. Alksnis, O. Shchiptsov, V. Zatulyviter, S. Dimanis, and other deputies of the "Equal Rights" faction attempted to caution the parliament against such a clear abuse of the democratic norms accepted in civilized countries and against this movement toward a totalitarian state. But are those who hear only themselves really in a state to listen to the voice of reason?

And should we be surprised that the attempt by Deputy A. Plotnieks to offer a compromise proposal was successfully countered, and that J. Bojars himself was similarly refused?

And J. Dinevics, the leader of the majority, did not care to conceal his true intentions as he gazed with concern around the auditorium prior to the voting. He said, "Within the NFL faction, 90 deputies voted in favor of the draft bill. I remind you of that..."

He said that God forbid if anyone begins to doubt and does not carry out the task at hand! Yes, even the appearance of democracy was abandoned on this occasion. There was no sense in playing games.

Eventually, 135 deputies voted in favor of the draft bill, 46 against, and six abstained. This latest trampling of constitutional norms passed by only two (!) votes.

A. Gorbunovs, I. Godmanis, D. Ivans, and A. Krastins supported the draft bill. J. Bojars and A. Plotnieks abstained.

Now, as one of the opposition deputies said with a bitter smile, we can even vote for Latvia to unite with Australia.

And why not? Does anything really stand in the way?

Latvian People's Deputies Elected

91UN0285A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
30 Oct 90 p 1

[Article by the Department of Soviet Construction and Trade Union Life under the rubric "Some Elections Are Completed and Some Continue": "Two Out of Three"]

[Text] Last Sunday on 28 October elections of people's deputies to the republic's Supreme Soviet from the 44th electoral district and to the Riga City Soviet from the 28th and 103d districts took place.

The elections took place in peaceful circumstances and without any incidents.

Konstantin Konstantinovich Matveyev won the 201st mandate for republic people's deputy in the 44th district. He is a representative of leftist forces—a member of the CPSU and one of the founders of the Center of Democratic Initiative—and he won with a large majority. He garnered more than 53 percent of the votes that were cast as opposed to his competitor, A. Borovkovs, who was supported by the People's Front and only got 44 percent.

In Riga's 28th district Fedor Fedorovich Firsov received a clear majority from the voters in elections for people's deputy to the city soviet. He will fill out the deputy's body of the Riga City Soviet.

The voters of the 103d district, on the other hand, were not lucky. None of the candidates on Sunday gathered the necessary number of votes. Most likely repeat elections will take place in this district in two months. It will again be necessary to nominate candidates with all the corresponding electoral trappings.

Thus, we congratulate Konstantin Konstantinovich Matveyev on his victory to the republic's Supreme Soviet and Fedor Fedorovich Firsov to the Riga City Soviet!

We thank all the voters who listened to the advice of SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA and supported the candidates of the left forces.

Landsbergis Examines Anti-Lithuanian Activities

91UN0200B Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
26 Sep 90 p 4

[Unattributed article: "Vytautas Landsbergis on the Political Situation"]

[Text] Possibly the Kremlin will decide to take a concrete step along the path to negotiations and will not limit itself, as it has so far, simply to inducements to sign one Union treaty or another. That opinion was expressed by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic, speaking at a session of the Supreme Soviet on 25 September.

He stated that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet had recommended to the government the preparation of a joint statement to the effect that Lithuania is unable not only to sign any union treaties, but also to conclude any economic treaties that are long-term or practically unlimited with regard to time, until the political questions have been resolved. He expressed the assurance that the government will support that recommendation.

Speaking about Lithuania's affairs in the international context, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet re-emphasized that we want and are striving to return to the community of democratic countries. The situation is such that many political forces and states that support us in principle, in many respects and on a practical basis both in the political and in other spheres feel that the chief decision must be made in Moscow or somewhere

between Vilnius and Moscow. We can only remind them that it would be more correct not to leave that question only to us, and to hope that the support by public opinion in many countries of the world would be both active and effective.

Vytautas Landsbergis spoke about the broad political and propaganda activities directed against Lithuania both in Lithuania itself and outside its confines. Very tendentious articles have appeared in the West, warning the public that the return of Eastern Europe to Europe, and especially the transformation of the Soviet Union into independent states, can represent an evil and danger. They intimidate the public by saying that these new states—or, in our instance, the states that are being reborn—which the Soviet Union used to govern and administer can be undemocratic ones that violate human rights and therefore they do not deserve aid or their inclusion in Europe. The motivation for this intimidation is the statement that certain republics in the Soviet Union or the liberated Baltic countries intend to create their own systems for guarding their land. These people are thinking little about the rights of nations and they speak from positions that our nation aptly characterizes by the saying "To a hungry person, a well-fed one is no comrade," he said.

Vytautas Landsbergis warned that we are not benefited by any sin of provincial discord or by any political errors. We cannot allow, he emphasized, our path to be distorted by any hypochondria or visibility. As in the previous two or three years, we must continue not to allow ourselves to provoke any discords.

The chairman of the Supreme Soviet recalled incidents linked with the dismantling of certain monuments and their defilement. We do not need confrontation. We need to explain to people the true merits of the particular figure whose monument it has been decided to dismantle, Vytautas Landsbergis emphasized.

Lithuania's Defense Director Interviewed

91UN0255A Vilnius LETUVOS RITAS in Russian
29 Sep 90 pp 5-6

[Interview with A. Butkevicius, general director of the Territorial Defense Department, by G. Vaidila; place and date not given: "If There Is An Army, There Will be Marches"]

[Text] [Vaidila] You mentioned once that persons subject to military service this fall will perform their service in Lithuania in Territorial Defense Department sub-units. But what will actually happen?

[Butkevicius] We are an independent state; therefore, there is no need to serve in the Soviet Army. A document adopted by the republic Supreme Soviet says that youths can decide for themselves what to do. However, now, before going off to serve in the USSR Army, a young person will have to submit a written request for approval to the Territorial Defense Department. No pressure will

be brought to bear on those who do not desire to remain in Lithuania. Up until now, not one person who refused to serve in the Soviet Army has been criminally charged.

As for our draft, in order to call up people into the service, it is necessary to have some serious missions. It is senseless to create an army just for the sake of the idea itself. In the final analysis, Lithuania does not need this.

[Vaidila] Nevertheless, as I heard, you are establishing separate services.

[Butkevicius] We are establishing that which is necessary. One of the services is a border service. We calculated that we will need more than 2,000 persons just for the first stage of border defense—starting with protection of the roads. If these people, or at least a majority of them, will be drafted into the service in accordance with the law on military service obligation, it will just be easier for the state. We will save several million rubles.

[Vaidila] However, you did not answer the question on whether our young men will be obligated to serve in territorial defense units this fall?

[Butkevicius] We will form specific services as early as this fall. The only thing that is not clear is whether they will be formed from young people who have not yet served in the Army, or from those whom we will recall and from paid volunteers.

[Vaidila] What has the Territorial Defense Department already done, and what is it capable of doing?

[Butkevicius] Our main task, which we are already completing, is preparation for negotiations with the Soviet Union. But overall, nothing more has been done. For we started from zero. The main thing was to select the proper path. A lot of effort has been expended on the organization of vitally necessary training courses for specialists and junior officer personnel. However, there are no teachers, but there are problems—economic and other problems. We are compiling general plans, and we have begun negotiations with appropriate services of Latvia and Estonia. We are already thinking about the overall security of the three Baltic states. We will also have to think about the specific forces that would promote the guarantee and maintenance of stability in the region. Otherwise, various groups of political terrorists, in one way or another being urged from without, could emerge who will attempt to destabilize the situation.

[Vaidila] The creation of a border defense service, as you mentioned, is the paramount task of the department. However, any hammering in of border posts (this is confirmed by an incident on the border of Estonia with Russia) will hardly be understood by neighbors.

[Butkevicius] If you recall, there was talk at the very first meetings of the Supreme Soviet of the republic about the work to establish an actual border. Unfortunately, even then such work was associated among some deputies with hammering in posts. But to think this way is a mistake. Lithuania's present borders are a result of

World War II, and they are clearly fixed. The borders are denoted on a large-scale map. The main thing is that the borders that were established on the basis of mutual negotiations do not correspond to what is marked on the map. When we tried to clarify along what line Belorussia saw its boundary, we noted that in places between Lithuania and Belorussia "blisters" are formed with an area of 150 hectares of cultivated lands whose ownership is unknown.

[Vaidila] It seems that the public and the press now and then even encroach on your department. Or am I mistaken?

[Butkevicius] All people support us who think in a statesmanlike way. Unfortunately, and I do not deny this, we sometimes get it. We have to communicate with people who think in stereotypes, and who assert that our defense of the territory does not differ from the Soviet "Iron Curtain." And frequently the sins of the Soviet military are attributed to us. We continuously run into the absolutely primitive behavior of the "Greens" who attack the Territorial Defense Department only because their colleagues in the West are doing the same thing. We also encounter the kind of people who pursue the aim of damaging us, and who are trying to denigrate us and fling mud at us.

[Vaidila] At one time at a news conference you were unable to answer the question as to what border defense would cost the republic. You said that you would calculate this.

[Butkevicius] If we were able to count on three percent of the republic budget, I think that this would fully meet the tasks assigned us.

Prunskiene Comments on Political Attacks

91UN0200C Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 2 Oct 90 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Statement by Prime Minister K. Prunskiene"]

[Text] The Lithuanian Republic is at the halfway point between its declaration of independence and the confirmation of that independence. An official state parliamentary-governmental delegation is meeting with a USSR delegation for consultations concerning negotiations, which we call negotiations concerning independence from the USSR in full de-jure and de-facto content.

On behalf of the government of the Lithuanian Republic and myself, I state that the attacks carried out by certain political groupings against the government and myself—to the effect that by allegedly encouraging the start of the negotiations and by carrying out a corresponding dialogue with the leadership of the USSR and other great world powers we are attempting to turn Lithuania back to the USSR or we are pushing for a new union treaty,

whatever its name may be—are absolutely unfounded and, consciously or not, are deluding the people of Lithuania.

The government has received heaps of angry accusations, most of which deal with the not yet confirmed state system, to economic difficulties, and to violations of law and order, but no attempt is made to analyze the root cause of all of this. People do not want to note that, if we do not decide the political and economic relations between the Lithuanian Republic and the USSR, we shall be under the constant influence of the processes occurring in the Union—economic crisis, political instability, and national conflicts.

Some of the deputies annex themselves to the attacks made by the political groupings, and do not avoid the actions in preparing the situation for a governmental crisis. And yet this is only a manifestation of the crisis in the relations between the Supreme Soviet and the government, in the aggravation of which the government itself has no self-interest. The conscious incitement of the governmental crisis is completed unfounded, and is pernicious for Lithuania. The government cannot and must not become an appendage of the Supreme Soviet. Accountability to parliament is not equivalent to direct subordination to its members or leadership.

Difference of opinions and political discussion are a normal phenomenon in every democratic state. But democracy rests primarily upon the delimitation of authority (legislative, executive, judicial) and upon its independent activity within the confines of its competency.

The government recognizes the just criticism with regard to the fact that the cadres in individual ministries do not conform to the position occupied or with regard to other shortcomings in governmental activity, and it has already begun the second stage of reviewing its structures. In our opinion, it is also necessary for the Supreme Soviet, to the extent possible, to accelerate its political structurization, which would promote the appearance of a more democratic environment.

A tremendous burden has been placed upon the government—the creation of essentially different conditions and guarantees for the function of the Lithuanian economy. We have begun for the first time to practice international relations with many state partners, which relations are oriented toward equivalent commodity exchange and the gradual transition to world-market conditions. The preparation of numerous legislative bills for discussion by parliament, and of programs and mechanisms for reforming the economy, restructuring the economic branches, and providing for people's social protection, is developing into the implementational stage. There has been great interest on the part of foreign partners. The initial guaranteeing of the protection of Lithuania's state borders, and the fight against economic crime, especially speculation, have been begun.

At this moment we need not only declared unity, which, incidentally, can also mean subordination to only a will that is not criticized. We also need constructive dialogue and solidarity for the benefit of Lithuania. I want to note that a revolution can occur not necessarily in the form of a change of the power or leaders. It can also occur by means of a transformation of their interests. We shall attempt to do everything to ensure that the striving for independence does not degenerate into the implementation of power or vanities.

Most of the members of parliament came to work after realistic verifications that were observed by all of Lithuania and by the world. We became members of Sajudis not under the roof of parliament, but much earlier—on the eve of its confirmation. We are implementing its authentic program, which developed into the 11 March decisions, and are doing so without sparing either time or efforts. The equating of the government with the Lithuanian Communist Party, and of the latter with the CPSU, is either political dilettantism, or the deliberate destruction of independence and democratic principles. Both are occurring. Lithuania's state system is still too fragile that, by taking a tolerant attitude or even inciting a crisis of relations between parliament and the government, or antigovernmental activity, we would risk depriving ourselves of the support and trust of the entire world. This is just the thing that the forces that are hostile to the restoration of the Lithuanian state system, the forces that attempting to hinder the negotiations with the USSR, are waiting for. By distrusting one another, we also lose trust from the outside. The Lithuania of the future will not forgive that.

Lithuanian Communist Party Holds Plenum

91UN0200D Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
2 Oct 90 pp 1, 3

[Two-part article, first part attributed to ELTA and second to L. Filipaviciene: "Turn Toward Social Democracy"]

[Text] On 29 September the 6th Plenum of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee was held in Vilnius. A report on the political situation in the republic and the subsequent development of the Lithuanian Communist Party was given by Algirdas Brazauskas, first secretary of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee.

The principles in the political, economic, and cultural activity of the independent Communist Party and questions of its further reorganization and the preparation for a congress were discussed by Povilas Gilis, secretary of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee; Justinas Karosas, chairman of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee's Commission for Analysis of Party and State Policy; and Arvydas Domanskis, chairman of the Commission for Implementing the Lithuanian CP Statute.

The plenum participants passed a resolution concerning the further rate of the reorganization of the Lithuanian

Communist Party, and a statement concerning Lithuanian Communist Party property. It was decided to convoke a special party congress on 1-2 December. It is planned to make corrections to the new Program and the Statute and to form practically a new political organization.

ELTA

At a press conference that was held after the plenum, at which the journalists' questions were answered by Lithuanian CP Central Committee secretaries V. Berezov, Yu. Paleckis, and newly elected G. Kirkilas (whom the next congress will have to confirm), there was a discussion about the plenum's special role. It was decided there to hold the Lithuanian CP Congress in early December of this year, to reconsider the name of the party, to supplement its platform, and to make changes in the party Statute (Rules). As was stated by the party leaders, the plenum participants discussed the holding of a referendum of the party members with regard to these questions. The need for a referendum was rejected, since, in the opinion of the Communists—V. Berezov emphasized at the press conference—they had already defined their position three times with regard to these questions: in discussions of party policy before the 20th Congress, at the congress itself, and when exchanging the party identification cards, when they had decided what party they would remain in—the Lithuanian Communist Party or the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU). It is not precluded that the forthcoming congress will be called not the 21st Congress, but the 1st Congress of the reorganized party. This will be decided by the congress itself, which, for the time being, is being called a "special" congress.

As was demonstrated by a traditional survey carried out before the current plenum, most of the 1300 Communists surveyed feel that there is no need to accelerate the holding of the congress, although they support the correctness of the renaming of the party, since all the program documents of the Lithuanian Communist Party have a social-democratic, rather than communist, orientation.

At the press conference it was noted that the Lithuanian Communist Party has come very close to the point of the creation of factions and that, within the near future, a peasant faction and a liberal faction will officially announce themselves. In the opinion of Yu. Paleckis, in order to consolidate the forces and stabilize the situation in the republic, there is a need not for extremist, leftist, or rightist parties, but for centrist ones. And that is the kind of party that the Lithuanian Communist Party is striving to become.

There was also a discussion of the Law Governing Political Parties that was recently enacted by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. As V. Berezov emphasized, that law, from the very beginning, had an anti-Communist directedness. Representatives of the Christian-Democratic and Communist parties and the party of

democrats consider the formulation of a law to ban the activities of party organizations in labor collectives to be undemocratic.

Participants at the press conference discussed questions of increasing the activity rate of the Lithuanian Communist Party, its relationships (including the problems of dividing property) with the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU), the nature of the work performed by the urban and rayon party apparatuses under the new conditions, and their closer cooperation with the republic's mass media.

L. Filipaviciene

Lithuanian Democratic Party Holds Congress

91UN0200E Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 2 Oct 90 p 1

[ELTA news item: "Democratic Party Congress"]

[Text] A congress of the Lithuanian Democratic Party was held in Vilnius. Deputies from the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic and representatives of other political parties participated in it.

The congress discussed the party's tasks and the immediate prospects for its activities. It was emphasized that the basic trend in the activities of the Lithuanian Democratic Party is the most active promotion of the confirmation of Lithuania's independence. In striving for the attainment of its goal, the Lithuanian Democratic Party will cooperate closely with Lithuania's other political parties.

The congress delegates and guests participated in a solemn ceremony in the Arch Cathedral, where a holy mass was conducted and the DPL [Lithuanian Democratic Party] flag was blessed.

A DPL republic council and presidium were elected. Saulius Peceliunas, deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic, became chairman of the Lithuanian Democratic Party.

Fractions in Lithuania's Parliament

91UN0281A Riga BALTIYSKOYE VREMYA in Russian No 43, 5 Oct 90 p 3

[Interview with Bronislovas Kuzmickas, deputy chairman of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council, by BALTIYSKOYE VREMYA correspondent V. Koltsov; place and date not given: "Fractions Have Appeared. Everything Has Become OK"]

[Text] [Koltsov] Are you concerned about the formation of fractions in the parliament?

[Kuzmickas] No. We approached the formation of fractions in a natural manner. Various points of view came to the fore in the course of parliamentary debates, and subsequently differentiation began... Immediately after we began working, a radical wing emerged which stressed

achieving the independence of our republic and national values, and also another wing, whose members are called "realists" in our republic. They paid more attention to economic and social issues.

At the outset, most deputies either were Sajudis members or enjoyed its support. A club of deputies who supported Sajudis emerged immediately after the elections. It was expected that preliminary discussions of all issues would be held in the club with a view to only the joint opinion of the club being presented at plenary sessions. All of this was done for the first month or two, but subsequently the club ceased to function; this was partially due to the lack of time: Lunch breaks were mainly used for meetings.

Later the 11 March Party was formed (11 March 1990 is the day of restoring the independence of the Republic of Lithuania). At present a considerable number of deputy-members of Sajudis belong to it, and the Sajudis club itself has shifted into its sphere of influence.

The "center" fraction was the first to be formed. Deputies who tried to reconcile the principle of independence with reality grouped there. This is a quite constructive segment of our parliament which is significant both in terms of numbers and intellect. It consists mainly of Sajudis members or deputies whom Sajudis supported during the elections. In particular, the social democrats belong to it. Subsequently the fraction of free democrats was formed. Several communists (from the independent Communist Party) and a number of nonparty member deputies became its members. The main principles proclaimed by the fraction differ little from the principles of the "center."

Quite recently a fraction of "moderate radicals" emerged which left the radical wing. The group of members of the Communist Party on the platform of the CPSU is not formal, but it exists. (Very recently a fraction of the orthodox "left" from the Communist Party of Lithuania also emerged—note by V. Koltsov).

[Koltsov] Do the parliamentary fractions have ties with political parties which now exist in Lithuania? In general do these parties play a serious role in the operation of parliament?

[Kuzmickas] The influence of the parties is not felt in actual parliamentary proceedings. Their role—i.e., the creation of real political concepts—devolves on the fractions. At present the "center" fraction has the greatest political and conceptual influence. Its members work very vigorously.

Lippmaa on Hurdles to Estonian Independence

91UF0174A Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian 5 Oct 90 p 3

[Presentation by Endel Lippmaa: "Is Going Independent Only the Business of Those Going Independent? Asks Endel Lippmaa, Minister, Republic of Estonia"]

[Text] JOURNAL AMERICAN, a reputable U.S. periodical, published on September 24, 1939, an article by Commander S.M. Riis titled "Secret Pact Contains Nazi-Soviet Agreement To Rule the World" that also carried the contents of the secret protocol dividing Eastern Europe, along with a map, and the accompanying article by John Houston Craige titled "Japan and Italy To Get Possessions of England and France" where the plans of the triple treaty between Germany, Italy and Japan were clearly outlined. The information was precise, which is not at all surprising, since the U.S. government already had the text of the secret protocol on August 24, 1939. The smaller states, however, were not given an official warning.

All they received were consoling statements from embassies, and expressions of condemnation from democratic states about the forcible annexation of the Baltic states to the Soviet Union. The USSR government informed the government of the Republic of Lithuania about the content of the secret protocol in September of 1939, but it remained a government secret "so as not to cause anxiety among the people."

Super-states have their own intertests, small nations their own, governments and parliaments yet their own, and people as individuals, each their own. It has always been and likely to remain that way—it's not that easy to change human nature.

We Are In A Contradictory Situation

We have been busy restoring our independence since March 30. We are no longer part of the Soviet Union, nor are we fully independent. To really restore independence, we have to hold negotiations with Moscow. We also have to create and strengthen our ties in the southerly, westerly, and northerly directions. Because our status is that of a Union republic—seen from the East, and that of an occupied country—seen from the West, our approaches are different out of necessity. In the East we cannot hold talks at the level of foreign ministries. In the West, however, we can.

We are in a contradictory situation, and the only neighbors sharing this situation with us are the other Baltic states. To coordinate our activity, the Council of Baltic States was re-established on May 12 in Tallinn. And, contrary to previous practice, those belonging to the Council now include chairmen of the Supreme Soviets as well as foreign ministers of governments, hence representatives of both the legislative and executive branches.

The chairmen of the Baltic states Supreme Soviets, acting as the Council of Baltic States, turned to member states of the European Security and Cooperation Council (CSCE) with a participation request on May 12, and to the Nordic countries in the matter of supporting our independent statehood on June 30, 1990. On the same day, chairmen of the Supreme Soviets took their participation request to the president of Euro-Parliament.

Lithuania, struggling for its independence, was forced to declare a conditional moratorium on all legislation based on its declaration of independence as early as June 27, but no easing of the blockade resulted.

On July 7, the same Council of Baltic States unanimously expressed the protest of its chairmen regarding the blockade imposed on the Republic of Lithuania by the government of USSR. And on July 9 came the executive order from the president of the Soviet Union for holding negotiations with the Soviet Union. Appointed to chair this commission, however, was not the foreign minister but Nikolai Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. As we know, these negotiations never materialized.

Eastern Policy

The Council of Baltic States met again on July 27 in Jurmala, Latvia, where the three chairmen of Supreme Soviets unanimously refused to participate in the preparation and implementation of the new Union treaty for the Soviet Union, and also met with Boris Yeltsin, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. It was decided to enter into bilateral political and economic agreements between all three of the Baltic states and the RSFSR to regulate relations between the states. Prime ministers were also busy. Representatives from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Russian Federation and Moldova, along with those from Moscow and Leningrad, were engaged in solving our problems at a meeting held in Tallinn on August 5 and again on September 27 and 28.

These steps strengthened our stand considerably in relation to the Soviet Union. We became part of the gigantic confrontation between the Russian Federation and the Soviet Union. Conditions have thus been created for successful activity in the future.

On August 7, the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Estonia passed a resolution about its relations with the Soviet Union. It was resolved to abide by the resolution of the Council of Baltic States passed in Jurmala on July 27, 1990, earlier resolutions of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Estonia and, above all, by the peace treaty of Tartu. The 1988 resolution regarding the Union treaty was also annulled.

Results were not long in coming. At the August 16 meeting in Kremlin, that was conducted by Grigory Revenko, member of the presidential council, and attended by USSR Council of Nations chairman Rafik Nishanov and Nikolai Gritsenko on behalf of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, it was decided to appoint fully authorized representatives to continue the negotiations. Negotiations for an "agreement on relations between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Estonia" took place in Kremlin on August 23 and 30, according to a previously approved schedule. These were discontinued by the Soviet Union on September 6, 1990.

The agreement should have been concluded by October 18, 1990, but it wasn't, since the favorable impression needed to pave the way for the Helsinki summit (the basic requirement for the Houston conference!) had already been achieved. We had simply been used, and that was just fine with the the "Two Plus Four." As stated before, the interests of superstates and small states, especially those of the troublesome Baltic states, do not always coincide.

We and the East-West

All this was to be expected. Signs of another case of "forgetting" were already there toward the end of August. The statement dated September 5 issued by the Council of Baltic States, that was signed by chairmen of the Supreme Soviets and the governments—or better known as presidents and prime ministers—clearly emphasizes that the Soviet Union does not represent the Baltic states, that independence of the Baltic states is not an internal matter of the Soviet Union, that restoration of statehood to the Baltic republics is part of the aftermath of World War II, and that restoring statehood to the Baltic republics requires international negotiations with states participating in the "Two Plus Four." Obviously, this position did not draw any enthusiasm from the government of the USSR.

An international propaganda campaign began where quite openly, in speeches and in the media, USSR representatives of authority maintained that all of the Baltic states are participating in the preparation of a Union treaty. To avoid any misunderstanding, the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the Republic of Estonia passed another resolution on September 7 about refusing the Union treaty and reaffirming its course toward fully independent statehood. Same thoughts were contained in the September 8 statement from the chairman of the Supreme Soviet to the Helsinki summit or, more precisely, to both presidents.

However, as said before, the interests of superstates remain just that. Again, they had a need to reach an agreement and to unify Germany, without any particular concern for the Baltic states. An intensive propaganda wave emerged from both the East and the West on the theme—*don't do anything now, because you could jeopardize yourselves*, which actually meant—*don't do anything now, because that could jeopardize our current plans. Naturally, our presence in Helsinki remained inadequate.*

The "Two Plus Four" agreement regarding reunification of Germany was signed on September 12 in Moscow. This agreement was rather neutral regarding our independence but, in connection with it, World War II was declared to be over for both the East and the West. On the very next day, September 13, 1990, an agreement of "Good-Neighborly Relations, Partnership and Cooperation" between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany was already being negotiated. Section 3 of Article 2 of that agreement reads as follows:

"(The Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union) regard the borders of all the states in Europe, for now and into the future, to be firm as they stand on the day this agreement is signed."

United States Senate [letterhead]

September 25, 1990

The President

The White House

Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

The Senate will soon debate ratification of the so-called Two-Plus-Four Treaty on unification of Germany. While, on balance, we believe this Treaty serves U.S. interests, we are concerned about its implications for the Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Our concerns have been reinforced by recent statements from the three Baltic presidents, Arnold Ruutel, Anatolijis Gorbunovs, and Vytautas Landsbergis, alerting us to the dangers of settling the borders of Germany without simultaneously reaffirming America's long-standing recognition of the independence of the Baltic states.

The Baltic people have long, painful memories. They remember that the West's silence at Yalta sentenced them to half a century of Soviet subjugation. They are, therefore, understandably concerned that supporters of Baltic independence make explicit that this new Treaty in no way compromises our policy of non-recognition of Stalin's forcible annexation.

In light of these concerns, we are asking for your assurance prior to Senate action that ratification of the Two-Plus-Four Treaty is fully consistent with our long-standing policy toward the Baltic states.

Respectfully [signed by]:

Paul Simon, Alphonse M. D'Amato, Richard G. Lugar, Bill Bradley, Carl Levin, Claiborne Pell.

I wouldn't say that somebody sold us out. But we got about as much attention as we would have given to fighting the Stalinist genocide policy against Ingrians or to the plight of our Setu-minority.

The most radical of our right- and left-wing movements and groupings didn't even react much. Reaction, however, came from the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Estonia, in its statement dated September 20, and from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the minister's letter to participating countries of the "Two Plus Four" of the same date. Both documents are asking for their help and involvement in Estonia's independence negotiations with the Soviet Union, participation in the CSCE (Helsinki) process, and concrete steps to be taken in the border issue that is so very important to us. Both documents protest against Article 2 of the German Soviet treaty of September 13, pointing out that by signing and ratifying this treaty, at least two of the European superpowers consider the Baltic states to be part of the Soviet Union.

The first to react to our protest was the vice consul of the Federal Republic of Germany in Leningrad, pointing out that we had misunderstood the issue, and citing the first section of Article 2 where it says that *"The FRG and the USSR assume the obligation to unconditionally respect the territorial integrity of all European nations within their present borders."*

The principle is valid, but obviously we are not talking about the same things—as it often happens with complicated issues in diplomacy. What we had feared, had happened. We had lost the first round, and had to get ready for the next.

We Are Not Participating In Paris ...

We had already made our bid for participation in the Helsinki process in Copenhagen, and then again in Vienna this summer, and now at the New York meeting this fall. It was well known that in order for us to participate, either as a member or an observer, we would need the unanimous approval of all the participating European countries. This being difficult to obtain, it was even more amazing to read in our newspapers of October 2 the ASSOCIATED PRESS item by Barry Schweid that had been aired on RADIO FREE EUROPE and that stated, with a reference to anonymous sources, that the government of the United States had given on Monday (hence October 1) its support for the three Baltic states to participate at the European security and collaboration conference, mentioning also that Albania may be permitted to participate as an observer.

This was very good news, indeed. Actually, too good to be true. Especially since the original AP copy did not include the sentence *"The three Baltic states also have the basis and the full right to participate as equal members at the upcoming conference."* In the October 4 issue of the PAEVALEHT, we could already read that *"... hopes were being discussed at the meeting regarding the possibility of a peaceful dialogue between the Soviet Union and the Baltic states. Baker hinted that the United States has never recognized the forcible annexation of the Baltic states to the Soviet Union. The possibility of the Baltic states participating at the Paris summit as observers, however, was given little credence by Baker."*

Thus, we cannot participate, but those who support, understand and console us are more numerous than ever before. It is also true that, in principle, the United States was already supporting our participation in the Helsinki process as far back as Vienna.

"Two Plus Four" Treaty Will Be Ratified Monday?

Parallel to the New York activity, the third round took place in Washington. In response to the appeal from the Baltic States Council to participants of the "Two Plus Four" treaty, a letter was directed to the president of the United States by six U.S. senators, Claiborne Pell, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee among them, asking the president to confirm the consistent application of U.S. policy toward the Baltic states,

and that before ratification of the "Two Plus Four" treaty in the senate. This proposal meant senate control over administration who, under the load of its many urgent problems, was not about to rejoice over it. Or, as expressed in the quote of Toomas Hendrik Ilves in the PAEVALEHT of September 30: *"Nowhere in the world is a parliamentary assembly given the right to conduct its own foreign policy. Foreign relations committees can be in conflict with ministries of foreign affairs, as was the case during the U.S. Vietnam War, but such foreign committees can, even in a situation of conflict, only make inquiries, or suggestions in official reports, but not enter into treaties or negotiations. The fact that this should be explained to some foreign relations committee says everything about the understanding of such a committee about foreign affairs."* Poor Claiborne Pell and other senators. They went even further and prepared for the October 2 session of the U.S. Senate an addendum to the ratification documents of the "Two Plus Four" treaty, worded as follows:

"It is the opinion of the Senate that the president should take adequate steps to guarantee that no government would take advantage of the U.S. side of the "Two Plus Four" ratification act, and of the fixing of borders for the Federal Republic of Germany, for the purpose of lessening or compromising United States policy of not recognizing the forcible incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union." Right at the start of the session, senator Helms said that *"The U.S. has never recognized the incorporation of the Baltic states by the Soviet Union and we do not accept the occupation of their territories by force. However, since the preamble of the "Two Plus Four" treaty refers to the final Helsinki accord, it could create the basis for legalizing the Soviet occupation. The Soviet Union can make immediate use of it against the Baltic nations. We don't want that to happen. The policies pursued regarding the Baltic states should be put on a legal footing."*

The fact that the State Department is against it is of little concern to him, the senator said.

Immediately after that Senator Pell, chairman of the foreign relations committee, remarked that the Soviet Union has announced: we are dealing with the last document putting an end to World War II. The senate should not create a precedent according to which the Baltic states could be considered part of the Soviet Union. A supporting speech was also given by senator Lugar. The firm stand of the senators was sustained by the September 28, 1990 letter from representatives of the Baltic states (E. Lippmaa, A. Krastins and C. Stankevicius) addressed to the U.S. Senate. The letter had been prepared at a special coordinating meeting for independence negotiations held at the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Latvia, in Riga.

Our striving for independence, or regional politics, as seen from the superstate point of view, landed us in the middle of internal political problems of the same superstates. We know quite a bit about problems within the

USSR leadership, about the difficulties of prime minister Nikolai Ryzhkov in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and especially in that of the Russian Federation, where he has been asked to resign his current position.

All of this is normal politics, typical also of the United States. Due to such contradictions, the propaganda mills of both the USSR and the United States have been working full speed, and we have had to send assurances to both sides that we do not intend to participate in the Union treaty, nor in anything else that has to do with the Soviet Union, even if that would provide an elegant solution to problems left behind by World War II. The last assurance from us saying that Senate action is indeed needed, went out from the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the Republic of Estonia on October 3, 1990.

To paraphrase Ostap Bender we can say that going independent is the business of those going independent. They will get help when there is an overlap of interests, otherwise such help will be limited to supportive, hostile or polite statements. And if the U.S. Senate made a mistake by conducting foreign policy in an unacceptable way, and seeing connections where they don't exist (like those between the "Two Plus Four" treaty and the statehood, border and general allegiance issues of the Baltic states), then we can leave it all to the collective conscience of those esteemed senators.

Savisaar Defends Estonian Economic Border

91UN0249A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 14 Oct 90 p 2

["Speech by E. Savisaar on Estonian Radio"—SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA headline; place and date not given]

[Text] Welcome, dear compatriots!

As I was looking through the notes of my previous radio addresses I discovered that I have spoken about the economic borders three times already. This must have been insufficient, as we can see from the events of this past week. These events displayed the variety of opinions which exist among our population regarding the expected measures to protect our internal markets. Primarily I mean, of course, the people living in the border regions. For that reason I want to return to this subject today, but this time I want to discuss it from the viewpoint of recent events.

What has happened? First, the session of the Narva City Soviet passed a number of curious decisions concerning the establishment of economic borders. Among other things there is an appeal to reject them. Then we got access to the address made by several deputies' groups of our Supreme Soviet to the people's deputies of the Russian Federation, of Latvia, and of the Leningrad and Pskov Oblast Soviets. A statement was signed in Leningrad, on 5 October, by the chairmen of the soviets of Leningrad Oblast, of Narva, Sillamae, Kohtla-Jarve, Ivangorod, Kingisepp, and Slantsy. There was also the

fiery speech by V. Lebedev, deputy in the Republic of Estonia Supreme Soviet, there were delegations to A. Sobchak, chairman of the Leningrad Soviet, etc.

As you can see the leadership of our republic recently was faced with wide-scale political action. The action was caused primarily by our vital need to take certain economic measures to defend our internal market. But the ultimate goal of the action is to make us quarrel with our neighbors and to render a blow to the main thrust of our eastern policy which aims to establish good-neighborly, contractual, mutually profitable relations with Russia—home of both the Leningrad and Pskov Oblasts.

Why the economic border? It seems clear to any sensible person that we have to take certain measures to defend our internal economic market when all around us we see shortages, disparity in prices in various regions, and uncontrollable economic crimes. In other words, the consumer—i.e. you and I—should be protected. Everybody knows that over R200 million [rubles] worth of goods are taken out of Estonia without control every year. Over 20 million worth of food only. And, imagine, these goods are being sold outside the republic at prices which are not state-set. So, there is an entire assortment of measures directed at market protection and one of them is the establishment of customs control over cargoes carried in or out, in other words, an economic border. I have to admit that this measure is not the most pleasant or most easily realized one. However, this is a recognized way to protect our store shelves from all kinds of shortages. Certain steps to control the inflow and outflow of goods have been already taken in some republics of Central Asia, in the Ukraine, Latvia, and Belorussia. Remember the limitations on the export of raw materials introduced in the Komi ASSR and in Karelia. And I want to say right away that the construction and maintenance of the border control stations will cost us several million rubles, compared with the hundreds of millions we are losing at present.

All of this seems clear and understandable. But it is not. Right away all this triggers a rejection reflex in some of our political leaders. The moment our government or the Supreme Soviet takes some unorthodox or non-political decision it gets interpreted at once as a threat to the non-native population and an infringement on its rights. This same reflex has worked this time. Now they present our desire to protect our market from pilfering as a wicked scheme to "split the country physically"—no more, no less. This I quoted from the address. You, dear radio listeners, could not have read it but if you want to have an impression of the style, terminology, and arguments of this document, read it in the September issue of the newspaper "IZVESTIYA OSTK" [Estonian United Council of Labor Collectives News]: Open Letter to the Councils of Ministers of Union Republics, signed by Deputy V. Lebedev. So, the government of little Estonia decided to divide the country. It is good they do not want to do it to all of Eurasia. And all this can be done just by introducing the economic border. This is all the more

nonsensical because, contrary to the opinion of the authors of the address, most of the economic border will not coincide with the current administrative border, but will be located within the territory of the republic. What physical split of the country can we be talking about?

And another thing: Establishing a certain control over the movement of goods is not a unilateral action. Before it started preparing for the introduction of the economic border, our government began active consultations with the neighboring regions and they are being continued now. This fact was used too. The chairmen of the Leningrad Oblast city soviets as well as the Leningrad Oblast Soviet got involved in the conflict. In this way certain forces united into a kind of joint front aimed at the future isolation of Estonia along its eastern border. And this practically means a blockade. But this is not all either. Something new has appeared in the tactic of confronting the government and that something calls for our concern. Previously things did not go beyond strikes, real or threatened, but now they are openly talking about the inevitable rather than possible conflicts, about their inevitable transformation into interethnic clashes. In this way the ideologists from the north-east reveal their own failure to conduct a sensible policy since they view an open confrontation as the only way out. What have they come to in Narva? In the event the economic border is established they are going to declare a state of emergency in the city, arm the militia, and create workers' defense units. There was a threat addressed to the Supreme Soviet of Russia, and that was new too. The threat did not stem from the economic border idea, it concerned the agreement between Estonia and Russia in general. The statement by city soviet chairmen, addressed to the Russian Supreme Soviet and to the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Estonia, declares that they preserve the right to conduct coordinated actions to defend the residents of their territories in case the leaders of the Supreme Soviets sign the agreement without having considered their opinions. But wait a minute, there is no word here about the economic border at all. It seems, that was only an argument. Here the goal is more distinct—to "sink" the agreement between Russia and Estonia. And on a larger scale it is a blow to the democrats in the Russian parliament. I want to emphasize that it was a coordinated blow. And there is also one more warning about the "unpredictable consequences."

So, I did not make a mistake when I said that a large scale political action is being carried out. The suggested steps are not meant to defend the interests and rights of the respective constituents at all. A wedge is being driven between the Leningrad Soviet chairman and the Leningrad Oblast Soviet chairman, who have signed the basic agreement with Estonia. It is being said that the Leningrad leaders did not sign the document of their own free will, but they were deceived by the manipulators from the People's Front who had enticed them in their show. This is another quote from the address.

I can only feel sorry that all this is being done seemingly in the name of the people or, rather, in the name of 40

percent of it. I can only feel sorry that those 40 percent think, through their deputies, that Russia wants to sign an agreement with Estonia at the expense of the Russians who live here, on the territory of Estonia. It is a pity that the split between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Estonia is the thing necessary to defend the interests and the rights of the Russian-speaking part of the population. And it is also a pity that while some people stage a political show, others take out meat, milk, construction materials, and timber, carrying them in automobile convoys right past the people of Narva and of other cities. This will go on as long as there are things that can be taken out and as long as some political leaders act according to the slogan: "The worse it is, the better it goes."

Thank you for your attention.

See you next time.

Split in Estonian Intermovement Described

91UN0256A Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII
in Russian 25 Oct 90 p 1

[Report on interview with USSR People's Deputy Yevgeniy Kogan, third cochairman of Intermovement, by Yu. Surov; place and date not given: "Cochairmen Run Into a Bomb"]

[Text] Yesterday our newspaper published a paid announcement, signed by the Coordinating Council of Intermovement, that reported in part that Cochairman V. Kiemets had been removed from his position for discrediting the movement and was not permitted to participate in it. Another cochairman, Yu. Rudyak, was also dismissed for gross financial transgressions and loss of trust, and was shifted to the position of candidate member of the Coordinating Council until such time as the financial allegations against him are resolved. It was also reported that Secretary of the Presidium V. Vinogradov was discharged from his position at his personal request.

A torrent of phone calls rained down on the newspaper yesterday. Activists and Intermovement sympathizers were perplexed at the announcement and labeled it a provocation. We have, therefore, sought an explanation of the situation from USSR People's Deputy Yevgeniy Kogan, third cochairman of Intermovement.

[Surov] How would you comment on the published announcement?

[Kogan] As just another spiral in an unscrupulous intrigue being carried out for some time now by a certain group of so-called activists. And I would note that their activity intensifies at exactly those times when things are going well for us, when we are achieving concrete results. You get the impression that we have our own fifth column led by directors who are Intermovement enemies.

On the other hand, the decision cited by the functionary who submitted this announcement is an outright lie. No such decision was made by the Coordinating Council. Several individuals got together—five of the 21 members of the Presidium, if I am not mistaken—and pushed through this decision. This was a clear minority that had neither the authority nor the legal right to act in the name of Intermovement, not to mention the moral right. But even for the participants in this small gathering, the fact of submitting the announcement was unexpected. V. Doroshkevich submitted it to the publication at his personal initiative.

We have assessed this “decision” as invalid. When we found out about it, a group of movement activists assembled and decided to await publication of the information, since we did not know the text of the announcement, nor were we completely certain it would in fact be given to the mass media. But the situation was not a complete surprise to us. A certain group, consisting of A. Panchul, V. Doroshkevich, and S. Miroshnichenko, has promoted scandal at practically every session.

[Surov] Yevgeniy Vladimirovich, the report contains accusations directed towards three leaders of the movement. Tell us about them....

[Kogan] With respect to the accusations against Viktor Kiemets, I am completely unaware of anything and quite surprised. His activity was never discussed in this context. This is the work of the people I mentioned—nothing more than that.

About Rudyak I will say this. He conducted one of the economic operations independently, or more accurately—was conducting it independently. He had organized everything himself, and when the time came to make a decision on financing, he made it himself. We had several audits conducted, and not one made note of any kind of abuse in Rudyak's activity, not to mention the appropriation of funds being alluded to. Rudyak was reprimanded regarding his personal decision with respect to the financial issue. I can only say that Intermovement gained financially from his decision—nonetheless, his arbitrariness was condemned. Regarding V. Vinogradov—the presidium secretary never submitted any request to be released from his position. Right now he continues, as before, to do his job....

I would like to say that these people who initiated the decision did not in any way show their worth earlier in the movement—they geared up sharply just in the past two months.

[Surov] Why?

[Kogan] I think for the following reasons. First, thanks to the “Nadezhda” radio station, we obtained exposure to a broad cross section of listeners. But this group immediately began to object to it—first attempting to change the name, then trying to just keep everything under wraps. And you know, these are not the first renegades we have

had—what can you do?! But they will get their just desserts—you can see what happened to their predecessors....

[Surov] Might one say there has been a split in Intermovement?

[Kogan] Yes.

[Surov] And can we determine now what number of Intermovement activists and sympathizers support Doroshkevich and his people?

[Kogan] I cannot say just yet. But I do not believe the majority will support them, especially since they are not proposing anything new in principle and are just playing a dishonest, dirty game. And they are motivated to accede to power—this can be seen in the words of one of them that they will conduct a coup all the same. This came out several days ago. We are not going to have to be kept waiting—personal ambitions here are very great....

[Surov] What do you intend to do from this point on?

[Kogan] Work.

[Surov] I mean with respect to the existing danger of a split....

[Kogan] For the time being we are discussing the situation on an urgent basis—more than half the members of the Presidium and several members of the Coordinating Council met for this purpose. We decided to have a talk with those who have gotten off track. We have 53 people overall in the Coordinating Council—we will discuss the situation. And if required, we will hold an emergency congress.

But I would like to repeat once again that when we were in a lull, no one attacked us. Just as soon as we see concrete success, when the possibility of our own television broadcasting looms, people stir up problems. The situation is easy to figure out.

RSFSR

Head of Russian Peasant Party Interviewed

91UN0201A Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
25 Oct 90 p 1,2

[Interview with Yuriy Chernychenko, people's deputy of the USSR, publicist and writer, by Vitaliy Korniyenko, MOLOD UKRAYINY correspondent, Moscow: “Party of the Peasant House”]

[Text] There is no need to introduce Yuriy Chernychenko to the readers, especially to those for whom the difficult life of our peasants is more than just a distant abstraction. But those for whom it is an abstraction are decreasing in number, even in the “prestigious” megapolises, because of the ungathered harvest, the empty shelves in bread stores. Hard-working peasant boys, resentful of life and society, are prevented from being

masters on their own land, and, instead, become hired workers in the cities to which they manage to move. These facts and others compel us to grasp the obvious truth: so long as the village remain in ruins and disgrace, we will not find our way out of the abyss. Recently, the establishment of a party of "free labor on free land," the Peasant Party of Russia (SPR), was announced in Moscow. The new political organization is headed by our guest.

[Chernychenko] The point of our activity is to defend the political and economic interests of the peasants, that is, owners. This is the party which defends the house, family and health of the peasant, his future well-being and ability to live at home free from fear. Why is this party so necessary? Because although we live in the country which sows more wheat, sugar beets and other crops than any other in the world, since 1918, when the Socialist-Revolutionary party was destroyed and then its members executed, there has been no political force representing the peasantry. The mythical unity of the hammer and sickle turned out, in fact, to be the hammer striking the sickle and the peasants attempting to stay behind the hammer, in order to be in a safe zone. The result has been artificial urbanization and escape from serfdom in the time-honored way. Only now people flee not into the steppe, but into the city.

If the Russian parliament passes a set of laws relating to the land and village farms, a political force will be needed to bring the laws into life. Because any law is just a an engine, and without a party which acts as the "transmission," the "automobile" can burn gas, but it will never move.

When M.I. Travkin came to congratulate us and tell us about his Democratic Party of Russia, he said, "You fill an 'ecological niche' which so far has been empty, but cannot remain unoccupied. Nobody could ever confuse you with the 'union of collective farm heads' which calls itself the Peasants' Union."

That is a union of conservatism, which aims to save serfdom. And that is perfectly logical. For the burgomaster may be the most disinterested of burgomasters, but he is much more of a landlord than the Paris-educated and expensive-perfume-drenched Count Sheremyetev or Kochubey. The burgomaster has always been the boss and he will always be the boss; he will give everything for these "principles of rule."

We happen to be against the Peasants' Union, but we are for the collective farm system in the sense of the new laws of Russia, according to which collective farms are to be clusters of land parcels and means of production which are voluntarily joined together. These laws should be passed immediately. Thus, let us say I have 20 hectares of land: I can go at any time; at any time I can say "goodbye esteemed head," or something nastier than that. And in order to prevent that from happening, you will listen to me and be afraid that when the elections come around you will be criticized: "Why did I earn only

four percent profit on my shares, when at the neighbouring farm they earned nine?" In the past, you were the "guard of the rayon party committee" and now you are the guard of my money. And I do not care which party you belong to, if you guarantee me that nine percent. But if you squeeze bread from the peasants, you are our opponent and we will not work for you.

That is the nature of our support for the collective farm system. For at present, collective farms are just miserable fragments of the "agroGULAG." A hair cannot fall from the head of a cow without a resolution of the rayon party committee. It is terrible to say, but the biggest landowner in the world is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The collective farm head does not refuse to give land because he himself is against it (although this creates competition), but because the rayon party committee does not allow it. There are 230 million hectares of arable land in the USSR and all of it, to the last hectare, belongs to the CPSU.

This is not something that has just happened recently. It occurred in 1918-19 and at the beginning of the NEP [New Economic Policy]. That is why our party is not the descendant of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. The Socialist-Revolutionaries propagated a populist attitude to the land, but for us, now, land is society's acquisition; it belongs to nobody. These beautiful phrases and romantic metaphors proved very convenient for Stalin: they were the railroad tracks leading to the hell of collectivization.

[MOLOD UKRAYINY] How easy was it for you, a delegate of the 28th Congress of the CPSU, to leave the Communist Party in order to head a new political organization?

[Chernychenko] The process has not yet been formalized. I left the founding convention of the Communist Party of the RSFSR and wrote a letter to I.K. Polozkov, in which I said that he is the most reactionary of all the political figures on the social horizon. As to being leader of the new party, I did not strive for this and will look for an opportunity, once I have done some useful work, to go back to taking care of my immediate duties. I do not want to subject my party to the fire of criticism: "here is a writer dealing with peasant matters." It is just that at present the peasants do not have any deputy who is more or less competent in this type of political activity. That is why all of this has happened.

[MOLOD UKRAYINY] Undoubtedly, reformers have joined the new party.

[Chernychenko] No, ordinary peasants. Here is just one example: I have a friend, Yezhykov, from Yaroslavl. Quite a while ago he became "infected" with the idea of re-establishing the Romanov breed of sheep on the banks of the Volga. This is his passion, business, work, self-affirmation, love. But of course he came up against the powerful party obstacle, which decided that this Yezhykov, although he is still small and weak, must be leveled to the ground. Even though he had obtained permission from M.S. Gorbachev and been granted

seven hectares of land, they ploughed up all those Volga meadows that fed his 200 sheep. And now Yezhykov is besieged. A person like that will harbor the rage of the worker, which is a reflection of the partocracy towards him. His desire is not to get rich, merely to survive. This type of person defends his family, his house, his property.

I have come to the conclusion, as a result of my experience, that the peasant is he who, in caring about his own family, feeds the country. If it works the opposite way, then we have the collective farm worker: morally naked, unshod in terms of ideas, a prostrated man. That is why we should not be surprised that so far, few collective farm workers are joining our party. But people who have gone through social selection, even if they went to the city, got an education, have an overwhelming desire to work independently.

Perhaps our party will have five thousand members, perhaps it will have a million. I think that even if there are five thousand, it will exist. But even if there are a million, we will not change a word of our program.

[MOLOD UKRAYINY] Peasant parties have already been established in several republics of the Union. How do you plan to establish relations with them?

[Chernychenko] After our founding convention, which is scheduled for the beginning of December, we will immediately start to establish contacts with peasant organizations. We will do this without any shadow of imperial inertia, simply in a human, friendly fashion. We have things to talk about: the general effort of the parliamentary battle, common voting in blocs of democratic parties, defense of the economic interests of the peasantry. The more freedom there is in Russia or in the Ukraine, the closer our parties will be to each other.

[MOLOD UKRAYINY] On the agenda at present is the passage of the market economic program, which is known as "Shatalin's plan." The Russian parliament has already passed it. Won't the "Shatalin therapy" hurt the interests of the peasants?

[Chernychenko] At present, the collective farm worker is not a legally and economically independent person. In market conditions, there can be no such thing as collective farm workers. The collective farm is something that is directed by Gosplan, the Agricultural Department of the Central Committee. And without Gosplan, it cannot exist. The independent cooperative, which is managed by its owner-members, is a different matter; it is already not a collective farm. The peasant is a person of the market. He has two "economic faces." One is that of the worker, the other, that of owner. The latter is the one that has been hit over the last 60 years with everything possible, from the fist to the revolver. So, if you revive that second face, what harm can there be for the peasant?

[MOLOD UKRAYINY] In the political history of Russia, peasants always appeared to be an inert mass. If this is the case, where will the agrarian party get its support?

[Chernychenko] Let me give you only one example. In 1906-07, when the first State Duma was being established, half of the elected deputies were representatives of the peasants. In 1917, during the election of the Constituent Assembly of Russia, the majority of those elected were representatives of the peasants. Yes, an absolute majority was obtained by the Socialist-Revolutionary party. That is why the October Revolution took place before the Constituent Assembly was called, and why the sailor Zhelezniak, a classic representative of the military establishment, broke up the Assembly. The documents of the peasant parties, which were published in "Izvestiakh sovietov krestyanskykh deputatov" back in August, 1917, were read out by V.I. Lenin as the Bolshevik decree about land. And Lenin never took bad things from others. He took that which enabled him to stage the instant and, generally, bloodless, October Revolution. However, already within two months everything was changed and besmirched.

Why should I deceive you? The 12 million collective farm workers of our country are mainly people who have been lumpenized. "If Petro is our head, then we must serve him," because on him depends getting shingles, buying a Zaporozhets car, coal. This is why at present those who are becoming real peasants are people from the cities. And it is not surprising. Let us say in the Ukraine, in Donbas, it is common to see a forty-year-old man who has nothing of his own, and he has already moved from the Poltava or Cherkassy area in the hope of having his own property, his own house. This also happens in Western Ukraine, in the Kharkov area. People will gladly go from huge megalopolis if they can have normal conditions of work, if they can earn 1000 rubles per month for 16 hours of work each day. Why should a boy from Odessa flee, at age forty, in order to get 40 dollars per month and get himself a "Sharp," the return home bedraggled, if he can get these things at home? For, at present, people are fleeing from my native Crimea to Tiumen, in order to have their 600-700 rubles; they are not going to see the blue mists.

Give him the possibility in Crimea to work his own two hectares of vineyard and he will not go anywhere. We have made the peasantry the most unfit segment of the population; we have cut through their root. We have created the phenomenon of the Shukshin hero, who wanders around the world "from Moscow to the borders." And if among the Georgians and Estonians there is no such human type, in Russia and the Ukraine he is very common. Up to age 40, 50, he wanders wherever, with no corner of his own. Is this a national characteristic? No, it is a deformation of the national character, its lumpenization. And should we consider this romantic, an achievement of the social system? What an abject lie! People are created in order to truly love their land, their Poltava or Lvov region. And I envy the Uzbek national

character; for an Uzbek to move from Fergana to Urgench is almost impossible, "because I come from Fergana." And yet it is the same distance as going from Poltava to Cherkassy. Yes, through geographic movement, people have certainly gained "enormous" social advantages. They have managed to get permission to live in Moscow or in Kiev, or become semi-lumpen sailors travelling abroad. This is lumpenization, which has become the state policy.

[MOLOD UKRAYINY] But still: will peasantry, work on the land, become the basis of national rebirth?

[Chernychenko] Let me tell you about Pereslavl-Zalesky, a little town near Moscow, from which Alexander Nevsky came and where Peter I founded the Russian navy. Now farms are being established there and people are coming from all over the Union, because an unpopulated area has appeared, a "Klondike" land rush. And they welcome everyone there, from Belorussians to Uzbeks. It is sad that our people from Yaroslavl, with their characteristic accent, are not there. But the truth must be told: a desert has been created, and in the desert, normal trees do not grow. In the area where V. Belov lives, there is no native population which would be capable of returning the Vologda village at least to its 1928 standard. Where V. Rasputin lives, in the villages along the Angara River, there is no native farming population. Where V. Astafyev lives, there are no fields; they have been flooded by the Divnogorsk reservoir. And nothing terrible would happen if for now people were to come to Russia from the northern Caucasus or Western Ukraine in order to establish farms. Would it be for long? In order to keep the land from becoming desolate. And it would be very sad if we began to forbid them entry because of ideas about the "purity of the nation." And this is not happening; Russia is still free of this.

Sobchak Assesses Lensoviet Session

91UN0262B Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 43, 4-11 Nov 90 p 6

[Article by Anatoly Sobchak, chairman of Leningrad City Soviet: "Municipal Government Needs More Power"]

[Text] The second session of the Leningrad City Soviet (Lensoviet) is over. It lasted two weeks instead of the planned seven days, but if we compare it to the spring marathon, this was progress. And at the end, two remarkable documents were adopted, which I just cannot agree with. The first one—about criticism of the Leningrad City Soviet by the mass media. The document is a sad one, like a decree from the time of the Great French Revolution. And the second one—requiring the Lensoviet to meet every month.

Thank God, we had enough common sense not to adopt a decision according to which each of the nearly 400 deputies would have become a professional politician. Only the Executive Committee (EC) and the session, which will control and review the work of the Lensoviet,

will remain as professional organs. It took two days for the deputies to reconsider the decisions of the Lensoviet Presidium adopted between the first and second sessions.

Heated talk is becoming the style of our municipality. This is a result of the fact that we do not have real political parties, and of the monopolism of the Popular Front, or, to be more precise, of several of its activists taking their cue from the monopoly of the CPSU Regional Committee. (I hope this will not happen.)

Still, we are learning to work. Documents were adopted on the zone of free economic enterprise, measures on food problems were taken, the building of the dam has been stopped. The powers were divided between the Council and the Executive Committee, between the Lensoviet and district Soviets. And most importantly, a new EC was formed. The Lensoviet Presidium was filled: Vitaly Vasilyev and Igor Kucherenko, both people's deputies of the Lensoviet and Russia, were elected deputies to the chairman. Vyacheslav Shcherbakov, and admiral and professor, was elected first deputy to the chairman.

Time after time, the same people monopolized the mike during the session. Several functionaries of the Leningrad Popular Front set the tone, and an overwhelming majority of the deputies, people well-qualified and serious, keep silent. It looks like we'll have to set up a permanently acting council of representatives of different political parties and municipal factions. But as the Presidium's functions are limited, since the Chairman of the Soviet has no real power, the weight of responsibility will go to the chairman of the Executive Committee. True, the leaders of the Leningrad law-enforcement organs—both the Militia and the KGB—submit their reports to the Chairman of the Soviet. Still, the Soviet system at the municipal level needs reform: as I see it, it is ineffective and lacking consistency and collective responsibility.

Republican People's Party Congress Held

91UN0282A Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 4 Nov 90 p 3

[Article by I. Losev: "The Republicans of Russia"]

[Text] In April our newspaper wrote about the constituent congress of the Republican People's Party of Russia (RNPR). Yesterday the First All-Russia Congress of the Republican People's Party of Russia opened in the "Proletarskiy" House of Culture. Fifty-four delegates came to Leningrad from Moscow, Saratov, Voronezh, Vyatka, Krasnodar, Chelyabinsk, Vologda, Magadan, Novosibirsk, etc.

The hosts were represented by the Petrograd and Kronshtadt organizations. Members of 30 organizations were invited to the congress as guests, among them there were representatives of the Russian Democratic Party (Zlatoust), the "Narodny Dom Rossii" [People's Home

of Russia] public union (Moscow), the "Soyuz Vozrozhdeniya" [Union for the Revival] (Voronezh), the Fatherland voluntary Russian society in Moscow—in all, 30 organizations.

The chairman of the Republican People's Party of Russia provisional Central Council, N. Lysenko, opened the congress and read a letter of resignation from V. Antonov, who wanted to be relieved of the duties of party council chairman. He had been elected to that position at the constituent congress. After that several presentations were made at the congress: "The Ethnic Problem in Russia," "Political Tactics of the Left Radicals," and "On Russian State and Party Symbols." However, the "Political Report" made by N. Lysenko attracted most of the participants' attention.

In his report the presenter outlined what he considered to be three basic problems characterizing the political situation in our country: "The political collapse of the CPSU; the beginning disintegration of the USSR, propped up with the flimsy sticks of the president's decrees; and the speedy rise in the political influence of the left radical forces as they monopolize the initiative and achieve real power in both capitals and in some other major cities in no time at all."

"Further consolidation of the democratic camp, against the background of the increasing economic mess and the practically paralyzed existing government structures," said the speaker, "is fraught with the possibilities of a left radical coup d'état, of a new totalitarian dictatorship which I would qualify as the dictatorship of 'democratic' fascism."

In N. Lysenko's view, N. Travkin's Democratic Party of Russia could become the core of such a dictatorship. Apart from Democrats, however, the speaker also criticized communists. He called the economic situation in the USSR hopeless because no market is possible under existing conditions. Then the Central Council chairman of the Republican People's Party of Russia stated that the Republican Party "is the one to have the historic honor of becoming the first state and people's party of Russia which has decisively and totally separated itself from the communists. It is the party which has declared that its goal is to revise completely the national economy pilfered by the communists. At the same time the party would wage an uncompromising battle against any signs of the democratic neo-Bolshevism."

The congress agenda also proposes to approve the amendments to the party regulations, to adopt the program, a letter addressed to A. Solzhenitsyn, and resolutions "On the Russian National-State Symbols," "On Restoring the Traditional Cossack Okrugs [districts]," "On the Territorial Integrity of Russia," "On the Monuments to Ulyanov-Lenin and to Other Leaders of Communist Totalitarianism," etc. The agenda also mentions the election of the Central Council and of the Republican People's Party of Russia Coordinating Committee.

It seems that Russia has acquired still another detachment of saviors. If one is to judge by the statements at the congress, the Republican People's Party of Russia stands on the centrist positions and it equally rejects both the communist and the radical concepts. Their actions and time will show whether the Russian Republicans are going in the right direction. All this on condition that the Republican People's Party of Russia would be able to influence the development of events in Russia and that the Russians would want to follow it.

The congress will complete its work today.

Any question you have concerning the Republican People's Party of Russia will be answered if you call 122-48-33, Thursday and Friday, from 5 to 10 PM.

Maritime Kray CP Organization in Disarray

91UN0217A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 1 Nov 90 Second Edition p 2

[Article by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA special correspondent N. Barabash: "Defense Is Inadvisable—Notes From a Maritime Kray Party Conference"]

[Text] Vladivostok—The party conference convened at a difficult time. Its first, spring, stage was viewed by the delegates with hope: It seemed that the approaching party forums and the government program for the transition to a market would help the country extricate itself from the crisis. Today, the hope is much weaker. We have by no means started to live better. To the overall Union troubles—empty store shelves, bread lines, breakdowns in transportation—our own troubles have been added in the maritime area. Two typhoons destroyed a substantial part of the harvest, communications have been disrupted, and the TETs [thermal power station] was damaged. There are stoppages in lighting, prices at the market are exorbitant, and crime has jumped to an unprecedented level—a difficult background for party discussions. Especially if you consider: Many people still attribute all charges on the condition of economic affairs exclusively to the Communist Party, even though authority has been transferred to the Soviets.

Such facts as these, for example, are indicative of the political situation in which communists have to function. Literally on the eve of the conference, malicious anticommunist slogans appeared on the streets of Vladivostok. The CPSU is being blamed for everything and anything in rallies that virtually do not end in the central square!

It is not easy to be a communist today. It is not accidental that since the beginning of the year about 10,000 maritime area residents left the CPSU ranks, and thousands of applications to withdraw are awaiting review. And you cannot reproach ordinary Communists, when among those leaving are 174 secretaries of primary party organizations and 135 members of rayon party committees and city party committees. In the five months between the stages of the party conference, 39 of

its delegates and a quarter of those members of the kray party committee who were just elected placed their party cards on the table! The fact that at the second stage of the conference 82 delegates did not attend without a justifiable reason only extends the lamentable series of figures that attest to the crisis not only inside the country, but inside the party as well.

Incidentally, the delegates did not conceal their anxiety in this regard. I took the figures from the candid and critical report of A. Golovizin, first secretary of the Maritime Kray CPSU committee. And indeed all of those who spoke in the debates started with a "summary of losses" in their party organizations and asked the questions: What is the reason for the outflow, and how do you win firm authority for the Communists? Of course, everyone had different answers to these questions.

It is reasonable to agree with those speakers who asserted: The burden of errors in the past, the worsening economic situation, and the furious attacks of opponents in many ways influence the attitude toward the CPSU. Also leaving the party today are those who expected privileges from it and guarantees of a successful career. Thus, it seems that reasons for the crisis can be sought "in another place." Unfortunately, many of the delegates took this path. Perhaps the central party organs got hell from them most of all. The Central Committee and the general secretary were criticized for inconsistent decisions, floundering, and lack of a precise position and a clear program of action.

Yes, it is easy today to curse everyone and everything boldly; however, is it not more fruitful to "look into oneself," to look at the state of affairs in the kray, the rayon, and in the enterprise? There undoubtedly is a reason for the serious critical analysis among maritime area residents. One frequently heard in the speeches specific remarks and work proposals of a local level. But as for a program of action (which is what the people expect), it was talked about only casually.

...The story of the cruise to Japan, not unfamiliar to the readers, exploded like a bomb a year ago. After learning about the trip there for machines by highly-placed chiefs (of course, at state expense), dozens of Communists handed in their papers to leave the party, or they suspended membership in it, demanding that the guilty parties be severely punished. They were punished. But when on the eve of the conference I asked two elderly workers who came to the rayon party committee to turn in their party cards, while they were doing this, I heard: "Take a look at where these 'guilty persons' are working today."

Actually, they set themselves up pretty well—they became general directors or just directors of large firms with foreign ties. But they are not the only problem. The practice is too widespread in the maritime area of the switch by fined party apparatchiks to commercial firms that were established at one time, not without their

sanctions. Thus, this kind of a departure is very reminiscent of "withdrawal to previously prepared positions." And, you see, no kind of a lesson was learned! Just in recent months there were several new cases. The wedding of a daughter of one of the kray leaders was being celebrated noisily in a hunting lodge not open to ordinary mortals. Yu. Merinov, the first secretary of the Nakhodka CPSU committee is building a plush cottage outside the city. V. Mazur, chief of the "Dalvodstroy" association, has categorically refused to turn over the private cottage that is on the books of the kray party committee, despite a decision of the city soviet executive committee. It is possible, of course, to believe that a trial on these cases is "social terrorism," as, for example, one of the speakers declared at a conference who asserted that the "label of a crystal pure communist is obsolete." But it is impossible not to understand: It is precisely such cases of personal immodesty, albeit isolated, that undermine the authority of the CPSU. Ye. Ivanov, secretary of the party committee of the "Avangard" mine in the city of Partizanska, is correct: "The attitude toward the party depends on the behavior of each individual Communist."

But it is also well-worth agreeing with the idea expressed by A. Golovizin in the report: To be just an honest-minded person today is not enough. "Simply to carry a party card means to be in the opposition." Unfortunately, there are enough such passive "opposers" in the party organizations of the maritime area. Perplexity and apathy have reigned too long in them.

"We did not know what to fight for and how. We handed over the administrative functions, but who needs a party that is concentrated only on its own internal questions that are far from real life? We did not have other work experience. And then also the position of the government itself changes almost several times in a day. It is easy for the party committees, especially the lower ones, to get confused," admitted V. Leonov, the first secretary of Pervomayskiy Rayon, Vladivostok CPSU committee. Therefore, the mood of the conference participants turned out to be decisive: It is time to put an end to disorder and vacillation, and it is necessary to unite and develop a joint program of action.

In fact, the delegates came to Vladivostok for just such a program. And they left disappointed in many ways. On the one hand, the "Political Position" approved at the conference clearly names the most important directions of work. But then S. Lapina, secretary of the party committee of the railroad center of the city of Ussuriysk, came to the rostrum and said: "All of this is good from the standpoint of theory. But what can a 'primary party organization' do, if we do not know how to explain to people what awaits them and where we are headed." T. Chernousova, a member of the Chernigovskiy Rayon CPSU committee, agreed: "I was in 11 party organizations, and everywhere I was asked exactly how the party will fight for the social protection of the workers. But here again we did not elaborate any practical recommendations."

Indeed, today's rules documents need a list of specific real measures. Otherwise, all we get is shop talk. For example, we wrote in the draft "Political Position": The conference deems it necessary to develop broad explanatory work on the problems of the market and the privatization of property. But the spectrum of opinions on this score is so wide-ranging that it is not clear what kind of a position the Communists are supposed to explain.

Many of the delegates think that they can influence life only through the Soviets. It would seem that there are no difficulties. But they complained every now and then that the Soviets are not making contacts. A. Volyntsev, chairman of the Maritime Kray Soviet and until recently the first secretary of the Maritime Kray CPSU committee, is compelled to state: Today, representatives of the opposition movements operate far more precisely and energetically. It is necessary to establish in the kray CPSU committee, he proposed, a department for work with the soviets, to arrange ties between deputy commissions and departments of the kray party committee, and to organize a faction within the Soviets.

Many arguments were also caused by extraparlimentary forms of CPSU interrelationships with other parties and movements. The general position regarding partnership, civil peace, and an aggressive ideological position was given in the summary document. For example, how specifically do you defend an aggressive position? Appear each time as uninvited guests on the rostrum of somebody else's rallies? I. Tumanova, a recent chief of the ideological department of the Maritime Kray CPSU committee, tried to do this, after deciding to argue with V. Novodvorskaya, leader of the "Democratic Union," who was speaking on the main square of Vladivostok. Hefty young men forcefully pulled her down from the platform.

But many "bruises" still have to be inflicted on party workers so that they understand: It is time for the party to shift from the defense to the offense, and to initiate a serious fight for power; to organize its own rallies and conduct its own actions. Otherwise, it will turn out almost like in the anecdotal story of V. Usoltsev, first secretary of the Terneyskiy Rayon party committee, who reported that of 800 CPSU members in the rayon, 200 turned in their party cards, and who added: "But on the other hand, we gained a lot of sympathizers. They come right up to us and say: 'Fellows, we sympathize with you. Hang in there!'"

It seems that the party does not need this kind of sympathy. The main result of the conference seems to be that today the Communists of the maritime area have realistically and soberly assessed the situation in the kray. They have developed an overall line, and they are ready to go on the offense. True, they do not yet have the organizational skill in the development of tactical operations. And therefore, all that is left is to join the appeals

of conference delegate V. Dmitriyev: "In the end, we have to transform ourselves from a party of words into a party of deeds."

'Democratic Russia' Unity 'Superficial'

91UN0262A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 34, 4-11 Nov 90 p 2

[Article by Tatyana Menshikova: "The Congress of Democratic Russia Movement"]

[Text] The constituent congress of the Democratic Russian movement was expected to take place in the Oktyabr (October) concert hall. However, the actual venue of the congress was Rossiya (Russia) cinema. The play on words was unintentional yet perfectly fitting. The delegates didn't mince words speaking about their attitude towards the October revolution and right away announced their role as an opposition to the CPSU.

Can we speak in this connection about the emergence of a legal and united opposition? This question is naive. People watching this congress drew an analogy between this democratic movement and Polish Solidarity; however this analogy is not consistent, since solidarity is something our democratic movement is lacking. The initiators of the congress themselves are aware that the concord reached there is superficial and fragile. The congress adopted the Rules and the Programme of the movement, outlining its principles.

This time, open conflicts (like the ones which undermined last year's attempt to unite the opposition) were avoided. But this doesn't mean that the conflicts just vanished into thin air. An uncompromising attitude was adopted by Nikolai Travkin, leader of the Democratic Russia party, who is in favour of a rigid structure for the party. This contradicts the position of the social democrats and christian democrats who would rather have a more flexible structure for their union.

The controversy seems quite admissible unless we take into account the background. It's an open secret that people's faith in all parties is plummeting. According to surveys only seven per cent of Russia's population have any faith in the CPSU, and only three per cent in the emerging parties which largely remain "dark horses" for the general public. If the democrats are seriously concerned about widening their party's social base, they have to understand that inter-factional strife spells suicide. Having achieved office in Russia, Moscow, and Leningrad, they immediately felt their lack of real power and the pressure brought to bear upon them by the old system, which had managed to regroup its forces. Democrats in the provinces have the worst time. Whereas the right wing in Moscow is limited to publishing topical satires against Gavriil Popov, their counterparts in the provinces still have black lists and militia truncheons. Therefore, a proposal concerning the need to protect participants in the democratic movement recieved the enthusiastic approval of the congress.

Generally speaking, it was no "congress of victors" as was planned this spring. The political alliance between Gorbachev and Yeltsin developed, before our very eyes, a dangerous crack. The congress responded to the times' urgent challenges with hectic discussions of dozens of resolutions. Was the response convincing? It was tough and resolute. The democrats have proved their worth as organizers of rallies, and they can prove their worth as organizers of strikes. The question is: are the civil disobedience campaigns enough to make the democrats a serious rival to the CPSU?

Can their embittered angry "No!"—to the CPSU, Ryzhkov, the Union parliament and government, and Gorbachev—become a basis for achieving power and saving the country? Must a non-communist movement necessarily be anticommunist? As we know, an accord based on the principle of "anti-" is far from viable. It can serve as a show of opposition but it will not beget a coherent constructive opposition. Delegates from the provinces immediately felt this. They called for constructive work. But will their call be heeded?

Here's another "congressional" situation. Who would have foreseen that Muscovites would become a target for criticism there as well? The work to pull the country out of its crisis cannot be done at symposia in New York or Paris. The future of the democratic movement will be determined in Ufa, Novosibirsk, Omsk, and Khabarovsk. But these centres badly need good advice, and intellectual and legal support.

Parliamentarians need close relations with their electorates and campaigners. While engaged in a wrangle on the political Olympus, the delegates have no reliable ties with the grass-roots forces which voted them in.

The edifice of democracy is threatened by cracks even before it has been completed. I mean rifts between leaders and activists, parliamentarians and their electorate, parties, and movements.

This is the result of the Russia's intelligentsia's lack of a basis in the broad public, though they have a powerful vanguard in parliament and many activists outside it. A seemingly paradoxical appeal was launched at the congress: to go to the factories, institutes, and military units. It is easy to label this appeal as a hangover from Bolshevism. But will a broad coalition of democratic forces continue to be supported only by outsiders and "professional revolutionaries"?

Obkom Commercial Activities Discussed

91UN0342A Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 28 Oct 90 p 2

[Interview with CPSU Obkom Secretary V.V. Yashin by unidentified LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA editors; place and date not given: "The Party Committee in the Role of Businessman"—first three paragraphs editorial introduction]

[Text] Where there is no glasnost, there inevitably emerge all kinds of rumors and speculations. Quite a few of them have accumulated in regard to the CPSU's financial and economic activities, which constitute about the last "closed zone" that has existed until recently in our society.

It is not surprising that even the delegates of the recently ended third phase of the oblast conference, where Leningrad party organization's financial affairs have been discussed, have sometimes demonstrated complete ignorance in these issues. Naturally, even more suppositions and "discoveries" in regard to financial and economic activities of the CPSU, including its oblast organization, emanate from ordinary readers. The mass media also adds controversy and confusion to the minds of the readers by covering these issues from often opposing points of view.

In short, we have accumulated many questions in regard to what is really going on in this area. Having culled out the most typical ones, the editors of LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA approached V.V. Yashin, CPSU obkom [oblast committee] secretary, for the answers.

[LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA] Valeryy Vasilyevich, we hear more and more often now about the party's commercial activities... Does this not distract party professionals from their main work: propaganda, organizational matters, etc.? Will the party not follow the fate of Komsomol [Young Communist League], which started with NTTM [Youth Scientific and Technical Creativity] centers and ended up with video salons, losing all its authority in the process?

[Yashin] I will not disclose any secrets if I say that no party can exist without a solid material base. For the CPSU, one of the main sources of income has always been membership dues. There has also been another important and rather constant source: economic activities, including publishing. The latter has been dominated by party-owned enterprises for many years, thus making a substantial contribution to the party budget.

It is also true that primary party organizations, while dutifully replenishing the party coffers with their dues, had been deprived of the means to control the way in which these funds were spent and the way in which the party committees' budgets were put together; as a result, some of them ended up as "rich uncles" while others remained "poor relatives."

Now the situation has changed dramatically. Many people have left the party; a smaller percentage of one's salary is required to be contributed as party dues; and there are other changes in the party rules that reduce party income.

On the other hand, the cost of utilities and other municipal services has gone up, as have taxes on commercial activities. All of this taken together will reduce the Leningrad party organization's income by 25 million rubles this year.

The prognosis for 1991 is even more pessimistic. Income from party dues will be 60-70 percent lower than in 1989, and total income will be 55-60 million rubles less than in 1989.

No help will come from the center, either. A resolution of the 28th CPSU Congress transferred 500 million from the Central Committee reserve to the "Chernobyl Children" fund.

These are the realities we have to deal with.

On a practical level this means, for the Leningrad party organization, that a further 45-50 percent reduction in all levels of the party apparatus will be necessary. But even after these reductions are factored in, all Leningrad Oblast gorkoms [city soviet executive committees] and four Leningrad raykoms [rayon party committees] will need financial support.

I would like to specifically emphasize that total income from party dues will at best cover the needs of primary party organizations, and the CPSU gorkoms and raykoms, if we redistribute this money somewhat.

Besides that, we have to maintain Smolnyy and other party offices; there is some new construction and repairs of old building stock; we have party events, both city-wide and oblast-wide (as you know, we have to pay for everything now). There is no money left from dues income to cover all these.

The conclusion, I think, is clear: either go begging, or earn our own money. We prefer the latter. Therefore commercial activities by the party organizations—strictly within the framework of the law, of course—is not just somebody's fancy, or a preparation of "fall-back airfields", but a harsh necessity.

We have had our first, albeit small, experience in this. In Vyborg, Vsevolozh, and Gatchina Rayons of our oblast, and in October, Petrograd, Moscow, and some other rayons in Leningrad, we have small enterprises, cofounded by the city and rayon party committees. Their equity funds had been provided by the CPSU obkom.

I think that if you look at the direction of the activities of these enterprises, the question of any potential harm to the party's organizational and propaganda work becomes moot. On the contrary, the focus of their work is related in the closest way possible to the concerns of today's communists. Their work includes publishing, information dissemination, education, and personnel training. They also meet the demands of our changing economy. Some of these enterprises act as intermediaries in supplying consumer goods, equipment deliveries, and manufacturing construction materials.

I would like to emphasize that all profits will be retained by the rayons.

The most important goal the oblast party organization pursues in its commercial activities is to make itself fully self-supporting and self-sufficient. At the same time, we

firmly intend to use part of our commercially earned money for cultural needs, charity work, and development of the city infrastructure.

As to the danger of repeating the mistakes made by some Komsomol organizations in their commercial activities, we intend to avoid it by exercising strict control over such activities. This arrangement was supported by the delegates of the third phase of the city party conference. The conference decided to establish a special party obkom commission which will oversee all financial and business activities. The appointments for this commission will be made at the next obkom plenum.

[LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA] Whose money is being invested in new commercial enterprises of the CPSU obkom's administrative department? If it is party dues, you should probably seek the approval of the primary party cells to use the money for these purposes. What is the obkom's responsibility in case some of these commercial ventures go bankrupt?

[Yashin] We use a variety of sources to finance these activities. For example, with the approval of the party's Central Committee, the obkom's administrative department has become one of founders of the "Rossiya" commercial bank. The money for our share of equity capital has been provided by the reserve fund of the CPSU Central Committee.

The party obkom provided money to have small enterprises in the rayons started. These funds did come from the reserves that had accumulated from the party dues and its publishing activities. To be precise, it is that part of the money that was supposed to be transferred to the higher level party organs. We have accepted it as a temporary measure, because the situation demanded that we not procrastinate in our commercial activities. I hope our primary party cells will not judge us too harshly for this. Unquestionably, we should consult with them on such matters, and in the future the direct influence of the elected aktiv on all our financial and business activities should become an inviolable rule.

In short, our commercial enterprises will not remain outside our communists' sphere of control. As to the risk, it is necessary to understand that once we enter market relations, both gains and losses are possible. It all depends on the quality of work.

[LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA] What is this "Rossiya" commercial bank that we are hearing so much about lately?

[Yashin] The CPSU obkom's administrative department is only one of the founders of this bank. Other cofounders include the scientific-industrial amalgamation "Long-Distance Communications," the industrial amalgamation "Leningrad Telephone," the Leningrad Oblast Administration of the Bank for Housing and Municipal Services and Social Development, and other organizations. In June this commercial bank was registered with the USSR State Bank.

To this we should add that "Rossiya" is a member of the Association of Commercial Banks of Leningrad; it is one of the founders of the "Masterpieces of Russian Art" consortium and of the shareholder society "The Neva Perspective." After registration with the RSFSR [Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic] State Bank, "Rossiya" will become a cofounder of a network of information-economic centers and small enterprises established by the city and rayon organizations of the CPSU.

The bank will provide a full range of services for its clients by introducing the most economical forms of credit, financing, and transaction activities, based on the budgets of its client enterprises and prompt reaction to changes in their ability to pay. In the future it intends to conduct, on a contractual basis, credit transactions and other bank operations in hard currency.

In accordance with our share in the bank's equity we will receive part of the profits which will go into the party treasury.

[LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA] Is it true that the hotel "Smolninskaya," previously owned by the party obkom, has been turned over to a joint venture?

[Yashin] More or less true.

In order to more effectively utilize the buildings and other property of the party obkom, a Soviet-British shareholder company has been established on the basis of "Smolninskaya" hotel. It serves both Soviet and foreign visitors, mostly business people, and it has already added, this year, to the income of our party budget. As you probably have deduced, this income is not only in rubles but also in hard currency.

This is not the only solution.

The CPSU obkom's resort in Pushkino has been transferred to the USSR State Committee for Public Education. The state committee is using this facility to establish the International Learning Center. Among its tasks is teaching effective work methods under conditions of a market economy to the upper administrative personnel of Soviet enterprises, colleges, scientific, design, and research institutes, state and party employees, and people's deputies in the soviets of all levels. The needs of the Leningrad region are given priority. In addition, the center will provide management training to both Soviet and foreign citizens, and will teach managers and specialists from foreign companies, banks, and enterprises the specifics of doing business in the Soviet marketplace.

There are other interesting proposals that we give meaning to and export today.

[LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA] Many party employees have been moving over to joint-venture enterprises lately. Do you have exact figures on how many have transferred? Do you not believe that working in

joint-venture companies is incompatible with Leningrad communists' calls to prevent the exploitation of man by man?

[Yashin] I think I sense in your question a hint at the anti-apparat feelings that are being constantly roused in the society. This time it is the rumors of nearly all-out "takeover" of the joint ventures by former party employees.

First of all I want to say that I firmly believe in equal rights for all citizens of our country, without exception (at least this should be our goal in building the rule-of-law state). Among those is the right to a job that matches the capabilities and qualifications of an individual. I have no doubt that many former party employees—who possess both substantial organizational experience and practical knowledge of specific industrial branches—are able to prove their competence and business qualities wherever they go, be it joint ventures or small or large enterprises. The administrators know it well, and that is why they offer jobs to these people. There is no pressure. Those who cannot cope under the new market conditions will not be able to keep their jobs—it is that simple. Therefore I will say this—the future will provide the final accounting, and very soon, as to who goes where and by what right—if this kind of accounting makes sense at all.

Now, about maintaining this sterile purity in regard to exploitation of the workers at joint enterprises. Yes, our party has always taken a stance, and still does, against one person making a parasitic living off another's labor. But life is more complex than that. Slaves on estates are history. Without going into theory and boring readers with banal treatises on the topic of the exploiter state, let us ask the opinion of the workers of, let us say, our "Lenwest." Would they go back to "Skorokhod"? I think the answer is obvious. Therefore, let every person decide where and how he wants to work.

[LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA] VECHERNYY LENINGRAD, in its comment on commercial activities of party organizations, unambiguously accused the party functionaries of having a stake in increased profits since this directly affects their own salaries.

[Yashin] I would advise the VECHERNYY LENINGRAD correspondent to read the CPSU Rules more attentively. It is clearly stated there that its property, including monetary holdings, belong to the whole party. This applies both to income from dues and to profits from commercial enterprises. Everything goes into the party treasury, not somebody's pockets.

I should probably mention once again, since we are discussing this topic, that the rules state that profitable economic activities of the party committees are to be encouraged as long as they do not contradict the direction of its political work.

This requirement of the CPSU Rules is in full compliance with the USSR Law on Public Associations, which

gives them the right to engage in manufacturing and economic activities and to establish enterprises and self-financing organizations with the purpose of the fulfilling the tasks specified in their rules.

[LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA] I seem to recall that the last phase of the oblast party conference raised the issue of every communist's right to part of the profits from commercial activities...

[Yashin] Yes, and the reasoning behind this was, at first glance, well-substantiated. Just think: Is it not true that every party member, especially those who have been members for decades, has made a substantial financial contribution to it? Now these contributions are used for commercial purposes. Would it not be fair to divide the dividends among all members?

The answer to this kind of reasoning is in the same party Rules: the property of the CPSU is a collective property of the entire party. I do not even mention the legal side of this issue. This property has been accumulated through many generations of party members; some of them passed away a long time ago... What do we do with their "share?" And how would we settle accounts with those who have left the party?

I will repeat again: There will be a useful and concrete way to apply all these collective party funds, in the interests of all communists, and I have already discussed it while answering your first question.

In the end, the party conference participants arrived at the same conclusion.

[LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA] We keep talking about commercial matters. In your opinion, how can the primary party organizations, realistically speaking, spend their 50 percent of the dues? Will this new situation not require an additional (and substantial) number of bookkeepers, cashiers, etc.?

[Yashin] The monies that in accordance with the new party rules remain in the primary organization are needed more than ever. They have to pay for everything now: the lease on their offices, speakers, subsidies to party publications. Or, for instance, the organization of election campaigns, which will require substantial means.

Therefore, I do not think there will be a problem of how to use the dues money. As long as we have it in the first place. It will need to be distributed and redistributed fairly (that is unavoidable, since the amounts of dues in the small and large organizations cannot even be compared); this will be done with the help of the gorkoms' and raykoms' financial commissions, with the participation of primary organization secretaries.

The next plenum of the CPSU obkom will consider a temporary statute on financial and economic activities, based on the resolutions of the oblast party conference. We intend to apply it starting 1 November, on an

experimental basis, without waiting for the CPSU Central Committee instructions on this issue which will become effective only in the beginning of next year.

The statute is based on the opinions and suggestions from the primary organizations. It will substantially increase their ability to control the half of the party dues they keep. Although the main part of accounting will continue to be carried out at the gorkoms and raykoms, large primary party organizations will be able to open their own accounts at branches of the State Bank. That means that they will have to do their own bookkeeping. However, I do not think that many will be able to afford the luxury of additional accounting staff. But then, they rule their own roost. When it comes to counting money, the party organizations themselves will have to figure out and decide what is best.

Western Republics

Article by Belorussian Popular Front Leader Provokes Criticism

91UN0535A Minsk ZNAMYA YUNOSTI in Russian
4 Nov 90 p 2

[Article by Semen Bukchin: "But What Kind of Alternative?"]

[Text] NARODNAYA GAZETA (No. 4) carried journalist Aleksandr Lukashuk's interview with Zenon Poznyak, people's deputy of the Belorussian SSR, "There Is Always an Alternative...." The NARODNAYA GAZETA editorial office invited "all who consider it necessary to join in the argument." We accept this invitation in the belief that discussion of the problems broached in Z.S. Poznyak's words will be of interest and importance to all citizens of our republic.

"Zenon is Zenon," an experienced and cautious reader said when I asked him to share his impression of Z.S. Poznyak's program speech in NARODNAYA GAZETA. And, indeed: As always, the leader of the Belorussian People's Front (BNF) is open and direct, does not play about, and does not wrap up his views in cheap verbiage. It was not only for this directness and consistency, most likely, that Vasil Bykov called him an "outstanding son of the Belorussian people." Leading the campaign against a totalitarianism which had enmeshed our entire life and literally defiled the human essence and declaring that there are in our Belorussia, always somnolent socially, but now stupefied even more by the Chernobyl poison, people not disposed to put up with the "order of things," which have, seemingly, been congealed for ages—this required an exceptional person in many respects. The Belorussian People's Front set social life in the republic in motion and helped it cast off the slumberous torpor.

But how quickly the "fine days of Aranjuez" flashed by! The romantic "emigre" congress in Vilnius, marches,

mass meetings, angry speeches.... The newspaper SVA-BODA is freely on sale at "Soyuzpechat" stands. The governing bureaucracy finally grasped that inordinate "impossibles" were only damaging its position. And made a liberal gesture: Write and print what you want. And? Today people are talking about a decline in public assertiveness in the republic, about a loss of the authority of the BNF, about disenchantment.... The voters are not going to the polls, and seats in the republic parliament are empty. Well, ebb and flow in public life is natural. Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, which have acquired freedom, are experiencing the same slump. And in Armenia, where the tune in parliament is no longer called by the Communist Party but by the Armenian National Movement, elections to the local authorities are in danger of being scuppered all on account of that same passiveness of the electorate. There is, most likely, a law of public fatigue. It extends to political movements and their leaders also. But with us the manifestations of this law have their own particular features.

In my view, they are determined by the general social disposition of Belorussians and all citizens of the republic, in which (I have already expressed this idea) not national but social motives are predominant. The national factor united a part of the youth (which part?) around the BNF. The social factor determined the affection for the BNF of broader strata. But the actual course of events in the country—the ethnic conflicts, the firing at people in various republics, the insipid nature of the political transformations, and the threat of total economic catastrophe—has played the part of a kind of social brake, however paradoxical this might appear at first sight. The self-preservation instinct characteristic of our society (whatever it has been like) is at work. It was manifested also on 25 February, when the bureaucracy exaggerated to the utmost the threat of pogroms. And one further particular feature. The most important, perhaps. Our fatigue—under the Chernobyl sign. Bureaucrats, democrats, nationalists, "inters," centrists—let them all go to hell, we are sick of all of them.... What is there to talk about when the right to a future has been taken away? Chernobyl is a tragic issue determining the state of minds and hearts. What will become of us, of our children?

Z.S. Poznyak puts it precisely: "We will be an independent, free democratic state—we will live, grow, and develop."

I also wish to live in an independent and democratic Belorussia. A sovereignty declaration has already been adopted. Keeping up with the Joneses.... But independence and democracy loom indistinctly, as before, like something fantastic, between POLITICHESKIY SOBESEDNIK and a choir chanting "Viva Belarus!" Our declaration is, of course, a paper action primarily. What papers we have "adopted" in our time.... But, for all that, how to become an independent and democratic state? He went to sleep a slave and awoke a free man? Z. Poznyak is precise here also: "An independent state is

the highest manifestation of the historical culture of a nation, the result of the people's historical development...."

So, what: We are already historically mature and "developed"? Can it be that, developing right up to the end of the Brezhnev-Chernenko reign in the direction of "unfreedom," we then concertedly—quick march!—began to develop in the other direction? And the "historical path" is already negotiated, and we are ready to bathe in the waves of independence and freedom, at which we have arrived under the illustrious guidance of the BNF? In such cases experienced people say: We need to confer with the people. But, judging by the 20 or so persons picketing the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet building during the recent session and the reluctance of the masses to go to the polls, "the people are keeping silent." True, silence also is eloquent. And in this case it says a great deal.

Yes, the people are walking in a funeral procession to Kuropaty, protesting against the omnipotence of the partocracy, making the avenue "Chernobyl Highway".... But, further? Is the rest, as Shakespeare has it, silence? Why has the BNF not become the force which might really unite our society? There is the following answer, which has already become a cliché: National lack of awareness is to blame for everything, national feeling has been killed off, and the people have become indifferent to everything. Nonetheless, let us not brush this cliché aside. The problem of national self-awareness in Belorussia has its roots not only in the Stalin-Brezhnev times of the ostentatious-sham building of the national cultures but in more distant eras also. The centuries of religious struggle on Belorussian land (Orthodoxy, Catholicism, the Uniate Church) complicated the process of the shaping of the nation. And when it began to acquire active forms (after the 1905 revolution), history allotted very little time for its maturation. Waves of the socialist religion engulfed the Russian Empire. October 1917 changed the signs—from national-democratic to class-ideological. Not having reached maturity and not having united the people on a genuinely democratic basis, the national idea in Belorussia became a "facade."

But the people were alive! In their apt, colorful speech also. Nor has their heart, kind and long-suffering, been killed. But they have changed, they could not have failed to have changed in the decades of Soviet history, not to mention the times which have elapsed since the first partitioning of the Rzeczpospolita. But our new leaders are forever appealing to the legendary inhabitants of the Grand Principality of Lithuania. "A working meeting at the level of deputies of the Supreme Soviets and representatives of the people's fronts of Belorussia, Lithuania, and the Ukraine, that is, the countries of the former Grand Principality of Lithuania, was held," Z. Poznyak announces, "on 26 April 1990 in Minsk on the initiative of the BNF."

I understand when people write about the "former GDR." But it seems that I have never come across

reports of a meeting of representatives of the "former Austro-Hungary," although this formation is far closer to us in time than the Grand Principality of Lithuania. But our days are truly full of wonders. It is entirely possible that we will witness a meeting of representatives of countries that were a part of the "former Roman Empire." So what took place at the "working meeting?" "The question of the conclusion in the future of a political Baltic-Black Sea Union of the East European states of the Ukraine, Belorussia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia was examined." But what is the point of such a union? Its main purpose, it turns out, would be to neutralize the incorrigible aggressor and enslaver of the peoples—Russia. "I personally," Z.S. Poznyak says, "am 99 percent doubtful that Russia will become a democratic country. It is in its structure, historical traditions, and mental complexes a typical empire of the oriental model which has inherited the essence and methods of the Golden Horde. This country must not remain a monopolist in vitally important fields of international and interstate relations. Otherwise it will realize itself as an empire and channel its advantages not into the internal development of the nation and the state but into external development, that is, aggression.... It is essential to create a civilized cordon for Russia...."

I read these revelations, and my hand automatically reaches for the shelf containing books of papers on World War II. "Plan Ost".... The same vocabulary, the same arguments concerning "vitally important fields" and about the mental complex (only not of Russians this time but of Slavs in general), the same substantiation of the need "to create a cordon" (without the cosmetic "civilized").... Zenon Stanislavovich, what is happening to you? Are you running a temperature? Have you become overheated in the soil of assertive public activity? I agree that the oriental despotic tradition exerted a colossal influence on the development of Russian statehood (this proposition has also become a commonplace in today's current affairs writing, incidentally). But I see also another Russia resisting this tradition. And even if it is allowed that you, Zenon Stanislavovich, have not read Chaadayev and Herzen, whence such arrogance in respect of the current leaders of the democratic movement in Russia, "today's overthrowers," in your ironic observation? What complaints do you have about Sakharov, Afanasyev, Popov, Sobchak, and Travkin? Are they, perhaps, encroaching on Belorussia's independence? Or is it, for all that, the "patriots" from the camp of NASH SOVREMENNİK and MOLODAYA GVARDIYA going on nonstop about the "one and indivisible?" After all, they also give pride of place to "the national self-awareness of the Russian people." And they also, perhaps, would be participants in a Baltic-Black Sea Union, were it not for very strong imperial ambitions. But with you, consequently, Zenon Stanislavovich, all are as alike as two peas, "all cats are gray in the dark...."

And this is the position of a serious politician? Such games are usually called petty politicking. In fact, Zenon

Stanislavovich, you are "cording" Russia, driving it beyond the Urals even, not allowing it to make a sound. But we have, after all, read repeatedly in various publications about the fact that it is time to come to grips with the question concerning "our Vilni," which Stalin "presented" to the Lithuanians. This is the call of the separatist patriots, so to speak. But there was also an official notice concerning territorial claims on Lithuania in the event of its separation from the Union. And by and by let us begin to clarify with the Ukraine the borders in Polesye. But what if the Poleshuki, in the wake of the Gagauz, conceive a desire to create their own republic? And a map has been published in Lithuania with claims to a sizable chunk of Belorussian soil.... Would it not be necessary to call on Russia for help in resolving these disputes? And what then? The disintegration of the Baltic-Black Sea and the conclusion of a new union—a Neman-Volga Union? There is a bad smell to all this haggling....

So why, then, could Belorussians, Ukrainians, and other fighters for a future Baltic-Black Sea Union become democratic societies, and Russians and the other peoples populating Russia, not? But this question is rhetorical to a certain extent. You are a candid person, Zenon Stanislavovich, and would bring everything to a logical conclusion. Belorussians and Russians, you would explain, although close "in terms of language," belong to "different races, different cultures, and different value systems and have a different historical destiny." In this way is the base put in place.... Of course, the archaeologist has maps to hand also. But it would nonetheless be interesting to know to which different races precisely Belorussians and Russians belong. Negroid has to be ruled out for both peoples, evidently. That leaves Europeoid and Mongoloid. Belorussians should undoubtedly be classified as Europeoid, but Russians as Mongoloid, naturally. There was a good reason why Russians inherited the traditions of the members of the Golden Horde.

So a division along racial lines runs between us brother Slavs. Will there soon be opening beneath the roof of the BNF offices for measuring craniums, Zenon Stanislavovich? I recall that there were such things in the Third Reich....

A notable feature is the BNF leader's consistency. Following the racial revelations, we should take as the norm Z.S. Poznyak's assertion that at the basis of the creativity of Russian writers is "conceited Asiatic chauvinism and a lack of respect for other peoples. All Russian literature is steeped in this disease."

It is for this "chauvinism," evidently, that renown throughout the world has been won by Pushkin and Gogol, Tolstoy and Dostoyevskiy, Chekhov and Bunin, Akhmatova and Mandelshtam.... And how, most likely, the Tatars, Kirghiz, Uzbeks, Turkmen, and Kazakhs living in Belorussia will have rejoiced to have learned from Z.S. Poznyak about their principal trait—"Asiatic chauvinism." The wisdom of the man of state is certainly apparent here. Returning, however, to Russian literature

"steeped in this disease," mention should evidently be made of the fact that the "contagion" has spread to many Belorussian writers (from Yanka Kupala to Yanka Bryl), who have devoted many kind, heartfelt words to the literature of Pushkin and Chekhov. Maksim Bogdanovich undoubtedly merits a special execution. After all, he wrote these seditious words back in 1916: "But we have one further powerful factor uniting the heterogeneous tribes of the Russian Empire, namely, Russian culture. Its imprint lies on the intellectual creativity of any people of Russia and is for them common ground, bringing closer the content of their cultures and their ideological and literary currents." But what is the value of M. Bogdanovich's grateful address to Russian culture! To go by the logic of the leader of the BNF, the author of "The Wreath" is undoubtedly a betrayer of the interests of the Belorussian people. After all, he permitted himself at that time even greater "sacrilege": "Since these peoples live under identical constitutional conditions, are working on their improvement together, are participating together in state building, and know common victories and defeats, they cannot be alien to one another. It is necessary only that the egotistic interests of individual national groups not undermine this natural state cohesion."

What horrors! The beauty and pride of Belorussian literature, Maksim Bogdanovich, at a time when he was by no means being oppressed by gorkoms and obkoms, speaks of his own volition about the "natural state cohesion" of the different peoples of Russia. The 25-year-old poet wisely foresees the misfortunes which could arise on account of the "egotistic interests of individual national groups." He saw them as if on water.

Bogdanovich could, however, be called a Black Hundered and monarchist, as you, Zenon Stanislavovich, called Solzhenitsyn. Just think what sedition the author of "The GULAG Archipelago" permitted himself: He spoke about the blood relationship of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians. No, no, away, as far as possible away from these Russians befouled with "Asiatic chauvinism." How, otherwise, to establish independence, after all?!

But you, Zenon Stanislavovich, have read Solzhenitsyn badly. Of course, his current affairs writing has yet to be published in our country. But you can open issue No. 8 of the journal ZNAMYA and read in Natalya Ivanovna's article: "There is no neighbor before whom we are not guilty," observed Solzhenitsyn, whose name people are attempting to manipulate to champion ideas of state nationalism profoundly alien to the writer. "It is a strange nationalist," Zhorzh Niva comments ironically on this approach, "who demands a departure from non-Russian land, a retreat to the harshest and most thankless part of national territory, the abandonment of any imperialism, and nationwide repentance for sins committed against other peoples!"

Solzhenitsyn repents and calls on others to repent. But you, Zenon Stanislavovich, mutter through clenched

teeth, just like authors of articles of the period of the assault on Solzhenitsyn in our press: "I will explain, incidentally, to Mr. Solzhenitsyn...." And once again about the Grand Principality of Lithuania, about the 16th century.... Open the window, Zenon Stanislavovich, look out into the street! You are carving out maps and creating new unions in a state of rapture and in the spirit of the well-known "street philosophers." But the person standing in line for butter, tormented by the shortages, is not interested in "historical injections." Ripped off, having given all his powers for the 70-year building of a phantom, and having received the Chernobyl plague as wages, he is full of distrust toward the new inviters, brandishing "The Chase," to a "bright future." He is literally being pushed toward the "realm of freedom." But he, indolent and nihilistic, is standing pat for some reason or other. He is meditating, perhaps.... Chernobyl and this entire splendid life he has earned, it transpires, in a collective. But now citizens, if you please, at liberty? And, in fact, why should the Union not set free the Chernobyl "leper?" It is said that the quicker way to a better life is one at a time.... Cure yourselves, citizens! And sustenance God will provide. Why are you panicking? What is the matter with you—is life sweet now in the one and indivisible? And, then, the West will help us! Well, of course, they will with pleasure buy our radioactive potatoes and shortening, of which we ourselves, incidentally, are in short supply. In a word, from the gate of Prince Vitovt forward to a new life!

...Emotional arguments about the golden age of the peoples of the Grand Principality of Lithuania have today become a customary patriotic cliché. But this euphoria is good in historical novels, the verses of young poets and the romances of ornate bards. But life is raw and prosaic. "Five hundred years tell us far more than 200 years of imperial bondage," Z.S. Poznyak declares. Very well, the future Baltic-Black Sea Union allies are at liberty to excite themselves with recollections of the golden times of a quincennial antiquity. But I would venture to observe that the 200 years of joint slavery will not have passed in vain either. This "servile" history cannot be jettisoned overnight, and Z.S. Poznyak himself is a legitimate child of it. The "common victories and defeats" about which M. Bogdanovich spoke long since have had their effect: the "servile" history encompasses the fate of our fellow citizens, the fate of the peoples.

We are different people, and applying arguments from the 16th century to today's life is not serious, to say the least. Neither, equally, is looking enviously in the direction of Lithuania or the Ukraine: How things are spinning there. But in what direction? If crowds of people calling themselves Christians perceive the arrival in Kiev of Patriarch Aleksey as a KGB stunt, in what direction will they go next?

So what form will our revival take? There is no doubt that stretching the cultural thread from the past, a thread linking the times, and thereby restoring the people's memory is a most important undertaking. But there are,

after all, today's realities also. Turning one's back on them and pinning on labels is a dead-end business profitable only to narrow-minded patriots. But what if the labels and grievances and the division into the "nationally aware" and "nihilists" were to be cast aside and a start on the building of a truly democratic society attempted? Perhaps new personalities would emerge on this path, and they would bring new ideas, and then a higher level of culture incorporating Belorussian and Russian and all world values would begin to take shape naturally. Real democracy would reject that which is alien and primitive-patriotic which is today extinguishing broad public assertiveness in our republic. Real democracy has always lent impetus to the appearance of the stratum of intellectuals which creates a great culture and which it itself needs. After all, what an outburst in the national cultures of the peoples of the Russian Empire was evoked by the democratic innovations of 1905!

But democracy is a hard path, a path of self-sacrifice and renunciation of beguiling dogmas. Beating the patriotic drum and indulging in national hysterics is far easier. The results of this path are today obvious: thousands of our compatriots killed (for what?) and hundreds of thousands of refugees (without a war!).

"Life is far richer in contradictions than we sometimes imagine," the creator of the Soviet state wrote to the author of the novel "Mother" long before the revolution. But after October this richness was narrowed down for some reason or other to two or three proletarian slogans. Today's "messiahs" are today offering us doctrines essentially filled with that same Bolshevik intolerance: We will conclude a union with these, in the struggle for living space we will cordon off these. The Bolsheviks gauged Russian literature by a class approach. We are now being offered a new ideological label: "Asiatic chauvinism." The label of "bourgeois consciousness" has been replaced by the label of "imperial consciousness." And that same party arrogance: We alone are the spokesmen for the true aspirations of the people. To the question of the BNF's possible cooperation with the new public organizations Z.S. Poznyak haughtily replies: "This is a party micro-sham and, evidently, lacking in any particular prospects." Ah, how familiar.... "Every intelligent person," Zenon Stanislavovich continues, "should understand that under the current situation it is necessary to come under the roof of the BNF."

But the "unaware" masses are not hurrying under this roof. This should be food for thought for the BNF commanders. But heads are already spinning. Another step... just a small step... and the authorities themselves will fall to their knees. But then.... Then, rest assured, everything has been allotted: where, to whom, and in what way. And for the new "frenzied ones" hiding behind the backs of their leaders the leaders themselves might very soon appear insufficiently r-r-revolutionary and nationally consistent. And a new act of the historical farce would be played out according to the old pattern.

So the question arises: Can Belorussia sail between the Scylla of obtuse bureaucratic omnipotence (albeit mimicking a democratic style) and the Charybdis of nationalism, also arrayed in democratic garb? A certain inter-face, signs of which, despite all the implacability of the leader of the BNF, are in evidence, between the bureaucrats and nationals cannot be ruled out, incidentally. A problem giving rise to a new question: Is it not time for the creation of a Democratic Forum of Belorussia capable of evoking the trust of the majority? The protracted crisis in the republic Supreme Soviet is prompting reflection on this theme.

...Yes, there is always an alternative. But what will Belarus choose? Or, as has been the case repeatedly, will be chosen "for it?"

Social, Ethnic Composition of Belorussian CP Congress Reported

91UN0531A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 30 Nov 90 p 3

[Report of Credentials Commission delivered by M.A. Machulenko to 31st Congress of the Communist Party of Belorussia, held in Minsk 28 November-1 December 1990]

[Text] Dear Comrade Delegates!

Delegates were elected to the 31st Belorussian CP Congress under conditions of the intensifying political and economic crisis in the country, the decline in production and national revenue, general shortages, and the riot of profiteering and the criminal world.

In this atmosphere the polarization of political currents is increasing and anti-communist destructive elements, whose actions are geared to the overthrow of the current system and the forcible removal of the Communist Party from the political life of society, are being stepped up.

Extremist forces have launched a concentrated assault on the CPSU and the Communist Party of Belorussia, are openly calling for their disbandment and the confiscation of party property, are defaming the Communists, and are threatening them with physical reprisals. Outrages and acts of desecration of monuments to Vladimir Ilich Lenin are multiplying on the wave of anti-communism and anti-Sovietism.

Unlawful actions concerning a ban on the activity of party committees and organizations at enterprises and in educational institutions and deprivation of the right to be a member of the Communist Party for people working in the law enforcement authorities and serving in the Soviet Army and border and internal forces are being actively pursued.

In this complex crisis situation some Communists have become faint-hearted and, having failed to cope with the situation, have quit the CPSU. Despite this, there remain in the Communist Party of Belorussia healthy

forces capable of displaying high political steadfastness and organization, defending the party against psychological terror, and upholding to the end the ideas of socialist choice, internationalism, and genuine democracy and humanism.

The Credentials Commission has examined the material received from the oblast party organizations and the Republic Election Commission formed by the 17th Plenum of the Central Committee for organization of the election of delegates to the 31st Congress of the Communist Party of Belorussia and believes that they were conducted universally in accordance with the CPSU Rules and the procedure recommended by the CPSU Central Committee March (1990) Plenum and the republic Communist Party Central Committee 17th Plenum.

Delegates were elected in 648 party electoral districts formed by the local party committees. In ten rayon and city party organizations of Minsk Oblast the elections were conducted directly at rayon and city party conferences. Delegates from party organizations of the Soviet Army and the internal and border forces also were elected at party conferences of the corresponding army formations and military units.

The candidates were nominated in the primary party organizations on a multiple-choice basis, as a rule, in an atmosphere of glasnost and free discussion. This democratic approach evoked great interest among communists and nonparty persons.

For the party organizations and the communists the delegate elections were a good school and a serious test of the ability to operate under conditions of democracy and glasnost. The majority of candidates took part directly in the work of the party meetings which nominated them as candidates for deputy and then held dozens of meetings with the communist electorate. Many critical remarks and proposals addressed to the candidates and the party committees were expressed at the time of the nomination and during the meetings. It is now important to realize them in full.

Some 551 delegates were elected in the first round of the voting, 80 during runoffs and 47 at party conferences directly.

The results of the elections of delegates by electoral district and at city and rayon party conferences were reported everywhere at oblast party conferences which preceded our congress, and the election of delegates for the vacant mandates, the candidates for which had not obtained the requisite number of votes even after a runoff, was completed.

Having analyzed all this, the Credentials Commission reports to the congress that the election of delegates in all party organizations was conducted in accordance with the representation quota established by the Belorussian CP Central Committee: one delegate per 1,000 party members.

As reported at the opening of our congress, 717 delegates were elected altogether. The Credentials Commission has recognized as valid the authority of all delegates to the 31st Congress of the Communist Party of Belorussia.

The numerical composition of the oblast party organizations is as follows: Minsk, 229, including 134 delegates from the city of Minsk; Gomel, 105; Vitebsk, 104; Mogilev, 82; Brest, 80; and Grodno, 78 delegates.

Communists representing all social strata of the Communist Party of Belorussia and various sectors of social production, science, and culture were elected delegates to the 31st congress.

These included 181 delegates or 25.2 percent who work in industry, construction, transportation, and communications and 75 persons or 10.5 percent who are employed in agricultural production.

There are in the composition of the congress delegates 57 workers (8 percent) and 40 kolkhoz members (5.6 percent). But the proportion of workers and kolkhoz members in the Communist Party of Belorussia is far higher.

Communists who are leaders of production associations, industrial enterprises and kolkhozes and sovkhozes and engineering-technical personnel, of whom there are among the delegates 183 persons or approximately 26 percent, are substantially represented at the congress.

Twenty-eight representatives of the scientific and artistic intelligentsia are congress delegates. People working in education and health care are represented by 42 and 19 delegates respectively. Delegates from party organizations of units and formations of the Soviet Army and the internal and border forces constitute over five percent.

The makeup of the party cadres has been renewed considerably and replenished with fresh forces in recent years. There are 227 party officials among the congress delegates. Elective party activists are extensively represented: One out of every two delegates is a member of the central, oblast, city, and rayon committees of the party, and one out of every three is a party group organizer and secretary of a shop or primary party organization.

The Credentials Commission sees as an important sign of the times the fact that 329 delegates or almost 46 percent are people's deputies of soviets of all levels.

Some 68 women or 9.5 percent of the total number of delegates have been elected congress delegates.

Communists of different generations have been elected to the congress. Delegates 40 years and younger constitute 30.8 percent, from 41 to 50, 44.3 percent, from 51 to 60, 22.6 percent, and 60 years and over, 2.3 percent.

In terms of length of party service the delegates are distributed as follows: 45-50 years in the party, four persons, 30-45 years, 64 persons, 30 years and less, 237, and 20 years and less, 412 persons.

The delegates' educational level is high. Almost 88 percent of them have higher and incomplete higher education. Approximately 25 percent have party and political training. Some 45 delegates have a degree or academic title.

Government awards and titles have been bestowed on 68.6 percent of the delegates for combat and labor services. There are among the delegates six heroes of the Soviet Union and heroes of socialist labor and 14 winners of the Lenin and State Prizes.

The composition of the congress delegates incorporates 529 Belorussians, 136 Russians, 31 Ukrainians, 15 Poles and six representatives of other nationalities.

It is significant that 605 persons or 84 percent have been elected delegates to a congress of the republic Communist Party for the first time.

Comrade Delegates!

Some 255 communist guests from the ranks of workers and kolkhoz members and members of elective bodies of the Communist Party of Belorussia and a group of executives of the republic and representatives of science and culture are taking part in our congress.

In the opinion of the Credentials Commission, the composition of the delegates will make it possible, given the constructive work of the 31st congress, to formulate decisions which in this critical period are a good program of the communists' activity for the cohesion of all supporters of the socialist renewal of our society and a stabilization of the social and political situation. It is this which is expected of us by the communists and an absolute majority of the population of the republic.

Congress Participants Surveyed on Issues of Concern

91UN0531B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 1 Dec 90 p 1

[L. Yunchik report under the rubric "The Congress: Day by Day": "What Is in the 'Sociologists' Mirror?"]

[Text] The reference and information service of the 31st Congress of the Communist Party of Belorussia conducted a sociological survey of the congress delegates on the most topical questions of the development of the country and the republic and the situation in the party. What did the sociologists' "mirror" show? How does it show the character of the congress delegates?

Some 700 questionnaires were distributed, and 359 had been returned by the time the poll was collated. This number is perfectly sufficient, by sociologists' standards, for making the intended analysis.

"What do you see as the reasons for the crisis of society in the perestroika period?" was the first question. Some 68.01 percent of those polled pointed to the absence of clearly formulated goals and tasks of perestroika and of

an action program. Over 39 percent of those who filled in the forms mentioned the inconsistent position of the center and the mistakes in implementing the economic reforms.

The following vital problems caused the delegates to the party forum the greatest concern: the weakening of authority in the country (60.8 percent of those polled), the deterioration in the economic situation (58.9 percent), the state of affairs in the CPSU (44 percent), and the progress of perestroika as a whole (36.3 percent).

What is the attitude of the delegates toward the most important issues which are today the focus of the attention of the republic's inhabitants? A certain contradictoriness of views made itself known in the answers to this question, I believe. The bulk of those polled—84.5 percent—supported the socialist path of development, 4.5 percent were opposed. Just under three-fourths of respondents supported public ownership of the means of production, one out of every 10 is of the opposite opinion. Some 22.3 percent of those polled are for private ownership of the means of production, 56.3 percent are opposed; and 39.5 percent of the delegates are for a market economy, its opponents are somewhat fewer—31.4 percent.

The opinions of the congress delegates on the question of the prospects of the USSR were divided. Some 76.1 percent support a renewed federation of Union republics. One out of every eight participants in the poll is for a confederation and the complete independence of the republic. Almost as many respondents are for the preservation of the kind of state that there has been. At the same time, however, the attitude toward Belorussia's secession from the USSR was almost unanimously negative—only four persons were in favor of such a step.

Twenty-three percent of respondents consider interethnic relations in our republic good, 72.2 percent, satisfactory, and 3.6 percent, bad. An absolute majority of them (95.5 percent) is for the preservation of Russian as the medium of interethnic communication. And only four persons are opposed to this.

Some 89 percent of respondents see the Communist Party of Belorussia as the consolidation of all strata of society, 8.1 percent, as the political organization of the working class. In the opinion of the vast majority of delegates, the ideological basis of the Communist Party of Belorussia should be Marxism-Leninism. One out of every nine delegates believes that this teaching is of interest merely as a theory of social development, and three, that it is erroneous altogether.

Serious debate developed at the congress apropos the communists' work in the soviets. As the poll confirmed, there is no unity among the delegates in the approaches to this matter. More than half of them maintains that the deputy's position of the communists should be determined by the wishes of the electorate, 42.6 percent, by

the program tasks of the party, 16.1 percent, by their own vision of topical problems, and 8.1 percent, by decisions of the party group.

The majority of delegates supports the principle of democratic centralism, believing that it should be preserved: 2.9 percent, in unchanged form, 56.3 percent, with increased democratic foundations. One out of every three of those polled is for a transition to principles of democratic unity.

Some 14.2 percent of delegates believes that the communists themselves should determine where they are registered, 4.5 percent advocated the creation of party interest clubs and three-fourths of the respondents support the territorial-production principle of party composition.

A great stir among the journalists accredited at the congress was caused by the results of the answer to the final question of the poll: "Are you satisfied with the content of the material of the mass media?" The highest popularity rating was achieved by *POLITICHESKIY SOBESEDNIK*. Some 38.5 percent of the delegates made a positive assessment of its work. Next came *SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA* (33.3 percent), *ZVYAZDA* (25.51) and *SELSKAYA GAZETA* (16.8 percent).

"In the Communist Party of Belorussia the sociological system is without exaggeration (compared with other republics) the best prepared and most ramified," said I. Kotlyarov, consultant of the Communist Party of Belorussia Central Committee Ideology Department. "We constantly study people's opinion on various issues. We recently conducted a big sociological study in all oblasts of the republic, Brest excepted. We will very shortly be studying questions of the improvement in ideological work, including the influence of the mass media on the shaping of public opinion, in more detail.

"There is an urgent need for this, I believe.

Need Seen For Popularly Elected President In Belorussia

91UN0533A Minsk *SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA*
in Russian 22 Nov 90 p 1

[Article by G. Balabolov, Minsk oblast senior deputy procurator: "The Republic Needs a President"]

[Text] Our society is experiencing a crisis in economics, politics, ecology, and culture... In the political sphere this crisis is being experienced by its nucleus—state power. This is reflected in its inability to normally manage the affairs of state and in the absence of authority of state structures over the citizens. The crisis of state power is the most dangerous for society, since only a strong state can lead this society out of economic chaos and other pitfalls. No other political institution is capable of performing this task.

Will our state power be able to resolve these questions? In the form in which it exists today—definitely not.

What does the draft conception of the Belorussian Communist Party Program propose in this regard? It proposes giving full power and control to the Soviets of People's Deputies, making all state organs answerable to them, and establishing the office of President of the Belorussian SSR.

Thus, the Belorussian Communist Party favors fully empowered Soviets to whom everyone would be subordinate (that is how it is stated in the text), and it also favors a president, to whom we do not know who will be subordinate.

Even if we consider the president to be the highest executive power, although the Program concept draft does not specifically mention this, in this case too his power would be no greater than the existing competence of the republic's Council of Ministers. Once again, this stems from the proclaimed full power of the Soviets. It is specifically to them, and not to the president, that the local executive power would be subordinated. Moreover, we do not know how the government would be formulated and to whom it would be answerable.

Will our wagon of state move pulled by such a harness, and in spite of the current lack of roads?

Today we clearly have a weak executive power, an unprofessional parliament, and a judiciary competence which is expanding slowly, at a snail's pace. Enough has been said and written about the latter (legislative and judicial) powers. Our greatest sore point is executive power. This is evidenced by the reports of mistrust expressed one after another in Molodechno, Brest, Borisov, and Minsk. In some places those who formulated and headed up [this executive power] are retiring. In essence, our executive power is today at a dead end, beginning with the highest and ending with the lowest echelons. Its primary flaw is lack of originality, absence of independence and freedom of action and, as a result, absence of responsibility.

Let us look at local power. It is built on the following principle: The Soviet decides, and the ispolkom and its organs are obliged to carry out the decision. Here is what the Belorussian SSR Constitution says on this matter: "The executive committees of local Soviets of People's Deputies manage state, economic and socio-cultural construction on the basis of the decisions of the Soviets which have elected them" (Article 134). However, the ispolkom does not answer for the essence of the decision, since it did not make it, while the Soviet bears no responsibility for the execution of the decision, since it has neither the capacity nor the obligation to do so.

In order to organize the work of the oblast and rayon Soviets and the superior state organs, to fulfill the edicts of the voters and so forth, presidiums which supplement the subject-sectorial commissions have been created. These presidiums operate on a permanent basis. (The

paradox of the system—to create a semi-professional parliament at the top and a permanently operating mini-soviet at the bottom). If we look more closely, we see that the presidium, by its functions and by the persons who have assumed positions in it, reminds us of the former party committee buro. This permanently acting organ, which has become overgrown with services, narrows the competence of the executive power even more. And since, in the order of control, it may make obligatory decisions which someone else will fulfill, this will even more greatly increase the lack of answerability of the executors, since for them it is no longer necessary to make any effort to achieve results, but it is enough merely to fulfill the assigned directives.

The responsibility of the entire executive power is built on a collegial basis. The ispolkom is answerable to the local Soviet, while the Council of Ministers is answerable to the Supreme Soviet. The formulation of the executive power, however, is built strictly on a personal basis. Only the chairman of the Supreme Soviet or, at his directive, his ministers, may propose the candidacy of Council of Ministers chairman. The candidacies of ministers are proposed by the head of the government. Now let us think: Whose program of transformations will, say, the Council of Ministers fulfill? It does not have its own [program], and if its chairman has one, then by the logic of formulation of the supreme executive power it must satisfy the Supreme Soviet chairman or be part of his program. However, the chairman of the parliament, in fact resolving the question of future transformations and development of the republic and being the head of a legislative organ, is in no way answerable for the realization of these principles. There is not one single law which obligates him to this.

Therefore, the notation in the Constitution regarding answerability to the parliament for the implemented policy not by the government chairman, but by the Council of Ministers as a whole, already seems paradoxical.

If we turn to the history of the process of separation of powers, we will find an interesting regularity. Emerging parliaments, for example the British in 1265, the General States of France in 1311, and the Russian Duma in 1905, won two functions from the monarchs—the issuance of laws and the distribution of funds. Executive power remained with the sovereign and was independent of the representative organ. And only a century later in some countries, as parties became formed, did the parliament begin to directly formulate the executive power. Moreover, the guarantee of its independence was the largest party faction in parliament, which ensured freedom of action of the supreme executive power. And this, perhaps, was the primary meaning of victory in the elections. However, in a multi-party system it makes no sense to formulate a government in order to later mercilessly level criticism in parliament in the name of the majority faction. The winning party and its leaders would discredit themselves and it would be unlikely that

they would be allowed in power again. Many such countries have subsequently become parliamentary republics.

In summary, we may say that the supreme executive power has always been held by the country's leader, be it a monarch of the past, or today a president, chancellor, or prime-minister. This comprised its strength and independence. Secondly, executive power formulated by parliament has travelled a long historical course and has been established in countries with a multi-party system.

Our republic is also related to the parliamentary type. The government is created and is answerable to the Supreme Soviet. However, unlike the above-named countries, we do not have a multi-party system. The largest party—the Belorussian Communist Party—is extremely heterogeneous in its membership and, most importantly, is experiencing a serious crisis. Other parties and movements have not yet been sufficiently formulated and exhibit all the signs of organizational confusion of the initial period. We must also mention the declining interest, as well as the declining trust, of the people toward parties. In this situation the executive power formulated through parliament will find itself under fire of criticism first from the right, and then from the left, and will not be able to guide the legislative activity of the representative organ, as is the case in a parliamentary country. Yet it is specifically the executive power which primarily creates policy, and in principle it must decide the question of emerging from crisis. However, for this it must have a solid footing in the legislative organ and authority among the people. However, the government, the Supreme Soviet and the local ispolkoms do not rest on party factions. Efforts to somehow formulate them by shouting now and then at those who will not obey have not and will not lead anywhere, since (as we have already mentioned) the struggle was waged not between parties and not under party flags, but individually. This leads to the following conclusion—a strong executive power in the republic cannot be created by the parliament. For this we need the creation of a presidential republic. The president must be elected directly by the citizens. This makes him independent of legislative power.

Snegur Interviewed on Moldovan Separatism

91UN0327B Kishinev MOLDOVA SUVERANA
in Russian 27 Oct 90 p 1,2

[Interview with M. Snegur, president of the Moldovan SSR, by IZVESTIYA correspondent E. Kondratov: "What Is Happening Today in Moldova"; date not given; first two paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] Kishinev—The complex sociopolitical situation presently existing in Moldova continues to agitate people. In August the creation of the Gagauz Republic was proclaimed in the steppe rayons of Budzhak, and in September—the Dnestr Republic on the left bank of the Dnestr. As a result, the very existence of the Moldovan

SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] as an integral sovereign republic has been threatened. Tension is increasing and attempts at a dialogue are unsuccessful. The republic's press has published a Law on the Legal Regimen of a State of Emergency and of Special Forms of Administration, and dates have been set in Komrat and Tiraspol for elections to future supreme soviets of republics independent of the Moldovan SSR.

A few days ago the newspapers printed an appeal by M. Gorbachev to the people of Moldova. Will it be a significant factor, one able to help stabilize the situation in the republic? "Common sense tells us that it must be," believes Mircha Ion Snegur, president of the Moldovan SSR, with whom an IZVESTIYA correspondent spoke.

[Kondratov] Upon what is this belief based, Mr. Snegur? After all, Gorbachev's appeal does not say a word about the illegality of forming the Gagauz and Dnestr Republics. They were not even mentioned.

[Snegur] Nevertheless, in my opinion the president of the USSR dashed the hopes of the separatists for support for their claims. He said unambiguously that any problems may only be resolved now by legal means and preservation of the integrity of the republic. This is also what we say—respect for the law and for guarantees of the unity of Moldova—when we try to persuade the separatists to repudiate their divisive ideas. The people of Moldova will never be reconciled with the fact that their country, which has just declared its sovereignty and finally obtained its long-awaited statehood, is again threatened with the dismemberment of its territory, something that has happened repeatedly in its history.

[Kondratov] Several articles in local newspapers affirm that these forces "are directed by the center." But no one has yet clarified what exactly this is—this center which is so opposed to Moldovan sovereignty. However, sometimes Gorbachev's name slips in openly.

[Snegur] The president of the USSR, as I have already stated, has defined his position, and that reassures us. But forces still exist in the country which dream of preserving in inviolability that administrative-political conglomerate that was our Union up until now. The events in Moldova reflect to a certain degree the arrangement of political forces in the country at large. It is no accident that the leaders of the so-called Dnestr Republic include former and present leaders of Union enterprises, for whom the approaching process of denationalization of the economy in Moldova is a bitter pill to swallow. They will fight to the last if only to preserve the former ministerial-departmental and centralized structure of the economy which is leading the country, and Moldova in particular, toward crisis. They have thrown in their lot with this system, and they cannot but help fear for their future. Pursuing their basic interests, they are doing everything they can to agitate the working class; the workers, it would seem, should be interested first and foremost in abrupt socioeconomic changes inasmuch as they no longer wish to live as they have lived until now.

Such antiperestroyka forces exist everywhere. Their basis is the party-economic-bureaucratic bloc which controlled everything and everyone until recently and has now united itself. It is fighting savagely to preserve the most important posts for itself.

[Kondratov] But is this the whole extent of it? It is one thing when there are a few politicians opposing the republic's structures of authority and quite another when they are backed up by thousands and thousands of residents of cities and villages who are concerned less with the fate of the economy than with infringements of their personal rights and freedoms. Let us remember that the troubled days in Moldova began with political strikes caused by language laws which the Russian-speaking population considers discriminatory.

[Snegur] First of all we should essentially analyze just what and whose interests were infringed by the Law on Language which was adopted by the Moldovan parliament. I do not believe that it is fair to regard the requirement which the law makes of leaders—to know Moldovan and Russian—as anticonstitutional. With regard to their subordinates this is quite constitutional. The leaders should also know the state language when dealing with the state organs of Moldova. There can be no talk of retaining attitudes that are discriminatory toward Moldovans, whereby their native language is reserved "for the home and the family" and only Russian is used in the workplace. It is better to sit a few people down over language textbooks. They complain that it is difficult and they do not have the free time. Of course. But it has to be done. For rank-and-file specialists and workers who service the population it is sufficient to know only enough of both languages to fulfill their official duties. And that is fair.

[Kondratov] But at present, as far as I know, too little regard is given to the fact that the language laws allowed five or six years for the transition to real bilingualism. Even now many offices use official documentation that is only in Moldovan. There is still a long time before a language "test for promotion" is set up. And there are already attempts to get rid of specialists who do not speak the state language; even those who have begun to learn Moldovan are giving up their studies because they are convinced that the time period established by the law is only for appearances. And that the law itself is merely a means to drive out non-Moldovans.

[Snegur] How can anyone think that about a law which has inspired the Moldovan people with hope for the restoration of their own language and culture? We know that there are isolated instances of too much haste, and a specially created commission is studying this issue. We will be monitoring it more closely. The "linguistic zeal" about which you speak does not always help matters; it disorients people. We must make this an important issue and not allow our legislative acts to be discredited in this manner. But there is something else that is quite alarming. Many who do not inquire into the heart of the matter refuse outright to obey it. I will say further that

this is not only a matter of taking a stance against the law but of taking a stance against the Moldovan language and those who speak it. After all, there are many instances of defilement of Moldovan schools, signs in Latin script, and monuments to our literary classics.

[Kondratov] But even if the period established by law is observed, is it realistic to expect that in Tiraspol, where the population is nine-tenths Russian-speaking, everyone will begin to speak Moldovan in five years? Everyone knows that Tiraspol does not have the linguistic environment or conditions for learning the state language. Would it not be wiser, in order not to inflame dissatisfaction, to establish special linguistic regimes in several regions of Moldova and to offer some exemptions, especially in the realm of official documentation?

[Snegur] In the realm of official documentation our laws stipulate the use of two languages—simply as a matter of necessity. As for the possibility of amending several provisions of the law, everyone knows that in all democratic countries this is done only by parliamentary means, not through rallies and strikes. Disrespect for the laws inevitably leads to anarchy and to the destruction of statehood.

[Kondratov] Then you do not exclude the possibility of some reasonable compromises in the future? After all, this is just what the president of the USSR requested of the Moldovan people—a patient search for harmony and mutually acceptable resolutions on the basis of equal human rights and freedoms.

[Snegur] Depending on where we may find grounds for compromise. I believe that some causes for opposition will soon disappear by themselves. For example, with the confirmation of a national coat of arms on the state flag of Moldova, there will no longer be grounds to assert that it is the flag of another country. And we have acknowledged the wisdom of not hurrying to convert all the individual Moldovan newspapers to the Latin alphabet—a certain amount of time is needed for such a transition. I hope that the new administrative division of Moldova that is currently being devised will help somewhat to differentiate the regions of the republic—it will be appropriately easier to take into consideration their special features. Incidentally, the creation of an administrative unit with a predominantly Gagauz population where optimal conditions for the development of the language and culture of that people could be created was discussed at a session of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet. Unfortunately, this idea was given a hostile reception by dedicated advocates of autonomy who continue to intimidate people with the specter of the “Romanianization” of Moldova.

[Kondratov] Do you believe that this fear is ungrounded?

[Snegur] You know, demagogues have a favorite device—that of ascribing alien ideas to their opponents and then zealously stigmatizing them. Thus, despite the fact that both I and Prime Minister Mircha Druk have

repeatedly declared that the present leadership of the republic has not raised and will not raise the question of uniting with Romania, it is as though the ideologues of separatism have not heard this. They have one argument: They say that such tendencies have appeared at the congress of the Moldovan People's Front. I am sorry, but such complaints should be presented to the People's Front, not to the leadership of the republic. It is a pity that not everyone in the Dnestr region and the steppes of Budzhak understands today that Moldova does not need “entry,” “merging,” or even “federation.” It needs genuine statehood, that is to say sovereignty of the republic. All of us, independent of our nationality, should aspire to this with all our soul.

[Kondratov] But if you are referring to unity of goals and community of the fate of all residents of the republic—Moldovans, Ukrainians, Russians, Gagauz, Bulgarians, and Jews—then should the priority of the interests of the “indigenous population” be emphasized so often, as it is in the Moldovan press? Non-Moldovans whose ancestors settled here many tens and even hundreds of years ago do not wish to consider themselves inferior newcomers. And even those who arrived quite recently—what are they guilty of? After all, the chief document of the entire democratic world, the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man, affirms the full equality of people of all nationalities and races and the supremacy of universal values over any others. Incidentally, even the very history of Moldova speaks for itself—from time immemorial people of various nationalities have lived here peacefully side by side.

[Snegur] That is correct, of course, and no one can accuse the Moldovans of inhospitality. But no one people should lose itself by dissolving into the melange of tribes and dialects. I will say directly that no one except the Moldovans themselves will care about saving the Moldovan language, culture, and traditions. As a result, in a republic bearing the name of its people, the word “Moldovan” will be pronounced louder and more often than any other. And by rights, neither Russians, Gagauz, nor Ukrainians should be offended by this. Perhaps they are still unaccustomed to this—it was only two years ago that the Moldovans dared to begin talking about themselves aloud without fearing condemnation and retribution from the leading “internationalists.” And it was only very recently that they were permitted to mention aloud their linguistic, cultural, and historic unity with their Romanian brothers across the Prut. One should not condemn people who, at home and on the land of their ancestors, have finally been able to act as their own masters and have begun to create their own laws and rules for living. One must take into account the fact that Moldova is not a territory but is primarily a country of Moldovans alongside whom representatives of other peoples have dwelt, with excellent results up until now. At the same time there is no doubt that both Moldovans and non-Moldovans have equal civil rights and that there are not and cannot be any second-class people.

[Kondratov] However, the residents of the Dnestr region and the republic's south are complaining precisely of infringement of their rights. Referendums which have been conducted there have been declared illegal by the Moldovan parliament. But even if the referendums do not de jure correspond to the constitution of the republic, do not their results express the will of very many thousands of people—not of politicians but of the common people, as they say?

[Snegur] I will answer the question with a question: Is it really possible to decide the fate of the integrity of a sovereign state on the basis of an opinion poll of the residents of any one city or village? And what would happen if we were to conduct a republic-wide referendum today asking whether Moldova should remain united? Is there even the slightest doubt that the overwhelming majority would answer yes? Imagine for a second what would happen if each village soviet were to decide whether it should submit to the laws or rulings of the authorities. The state would simply cease to exist and universal chaos would rule. Only a rule-of-law state, that is one where the laws are respected and observed, is able to guarantee its citizens a normal human life. Referendums and appeals by the leaders of separatists for civil disobedience pursue a different goal—to disorganize society and undermine Moldova's statehood. In short, if they can muddy things up enough, they can turn the clock back.

This is why when I hear references to "the will of the popular masses" I say, let us stop and differentiate interests a little more clearly—what exactly are the sincere aspirations of thousands and thousands of people and what exactly are the political ambitions of their "chiefs," who are using the confusion of perestroika to climb up into leading positions or are thirsting to clamber up into them? I am firmly convinced that the parliament and the government of Moldova will be able to come to a mutual understanding with the residents of the Dnestr region and Budzhak. Of course it will not be an easy journey. But there is nothing to divide us—Moldova exists for all of us. And all of us, irrespective of our nationality, are uniformly interested in making Moldova rich, peaceful, and fortunate. I believe in the wisdom of the peasants, workers, and intelligentsia of the Left Bank region and the steppes of Budzhak. I believe that people's common sense will tell them which is more important today—to fence off abortive borders and republics or to involve themselves with a most vital matter for all of us—the transition to a market. I believe in the ability of the people to make the correct choice and to finally put a halt to the intriguers who are urging them on to very dangerous extremes. And they must do this as soon as possible—unfortunately, there are already too many tragic examples in our country of waiting too long.

Moldovan Decree on State of Emergency

91UN0327A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian 27 Oct 90 p 1

["Decree of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet on the Declaration of a State of Emergency and the Introduction of a Special Form of Administration on the Territory of Individual Population Centers of the Republic's Southern Rayons"—SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA headline]

[Text] The Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet, the president, and the government of the republic, basing themselves on historical truth and taking into consideration the vital interests of all the nationalities residing in the south of the republic, have adopted measures to resolve in a democratic, constitutional fashion the questions raised by the Gagauz; despite these measures, the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet notes that the issue of so-called Gagauz Autonomy is becoming increasingly sensitive. On the territory of Vulkeneshtskiy, Komratskiy, and Chadyr-Lungskiy Rayons the requirements of the constitution and of other Moldovan SSR laws are being crudely violated, the rulings of the republic's Supreme Soviet are being ignored, and various meetings and congresses are being organized which advocate antistate ideas, inflame ethnic enmity and hatred, inspire people not to obey laws, and draw increasingly broader segments of the population of that region and of the whole republic into a dangerous confrontation.

The situation in these rayons was aggravated by the occurrence on 19 August 1990 in the city of Komrat of the so-called First Congress of People's Deputies of All Levels From Territories Densely Populated by the Gagauz, which adopted illegal rulings on the formation of a Gagauz SSR, the establishment of its borders, the formation of temporary parallel structures of power and administration of that republic, the invalidity on its territory of the laws of the Moldovan SSR, the withdrawal of citizens of Gagauz nationality from the jurisdiction of the Moldovan SSR, the creation of armed units, and other measures directed at the forcible alteration of the state structure of the Moldovan SSR and the forcible violation of the integrity of its territory.

A serious destabilizing factor in recent days has been the designation of elections to the supreme organ of power of the so-called Gagauz SSR for 28 October 1990, which is viewed by the overwhelming majority of the population of the republic as an act in pursuit of the goal of a formal and legal consolidation of the organs of power of this anticonstitutional formation—the Gagauz SSR—and a legitimization of a territorial division of the Moldovan SSR. Illegal elections began on 25 October 1990 in individual population centers, and they continue today.

In this complicated situation a number of Moldovan SSR people's deputies and many deputies of the local soviets of people's deputies in the south of the republic as well their leaders, demonstrating political shortsightedness and irresponsibility, have been pulled into a

dangerous political game that paralyzes the activities of the appropriate organs of state power and administration, which are no longer able to control and administer the situation at the local level.

By the designation and the occurrence of illegal elections, the vital interests of the Gagauz are deliberately set against the interests of the majority of the republic's population, and this aggravates interethnic relations to an explosive degree, creates the threat of interethnic clashes, and threatens the lives and security of the citizens. In a number of population centers the separatist forces are openly committing illegal actions: They are blocking roads, arbitrarily stopping transportation, and committing illegal searches and other actions that are insulting and humiliating.

Measures undertaken by the leadership of the republic to resolve the existing problems through dialogue and on the basis of mutual trust and understanding within the framework of the requirements of the constitution and other laws of the Moldovan SSR are being ignored. An intensification of interethnic conflict is putting the situation out of control and is fraught with tragic consequences for the fate of the republic.

In connection with the aforementioned and with the goal of averting interethnic clashes, removing the threat of mass disorder, and ensuring the security and protection of the lives of the citizens, guided by Paragraphs 19 and 24 of Article 97 of the Moldovan SSR Constitution (Basic Law) and Articles 1, 2, and 12-15 of the Moldovan SSR Law "On the Legal Regime of a State of Emergency and Special Forms of Administration in the Moldovan SSR," the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet decrees:

1. To declare an emergency situation and introduce direct administration by the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet on the territory of:

—the villages Avdarma, Kiriye-Lunga, and Chok Maydan of Basarabyaskiy Rayon;

—the settlement Vulkenesht, the villages Yetuliya and Yetuliya Houe, the station Yetuliya, and the village Chishmikey of Vulkeneshtskiy Rayon;

—the city Komrat, the settlement Budzhyak, and the villages Beshalma, Kongazchikul de Sus, Dezgindzhya, Dudulesht, Kirsova, Kongaz, Kotovskiye, Kongazchikul de Zhos, and Tarakliya of Komratskiy Rayon;

—the city of Chadyr-Lunga and the villages of Baurchi, Beshgez, Gaydar, Zholtay, Kazakliya, and Tomay of Chadyr-Lungskiy Rayon;

—the villages of Karbaliya, Kayrakliya, Salchiya, and Chalyk of Tarakliyskiy Rayon;

to last from 26 October to 26 December 1990.

2. To halt the activities of the Komratskiy and Chadyr-Lungskiy Rayon and city soviets of people's deputies and

of the Budzhyakskiy and Vulkeneshtskiy settlement soviets of people's deputies as well as of the village soviets of people's deputies of Avdarma, Kiriye-Lunga, and Chok Maydan of Basarabyaskiy Rayon; Gevenoasa, Yetuliya, and Chishmikey of Vulkeneshtskiy Rayon; Beshalma, Dezgindzhya, Kirsova, Kongaz, Kongazchikul, Kotovskoye, and Sadyk of Komratskiy Rayon; Baurchi, Beshgez, Gaydar, Zholtay, Kazakliya, and Tomay of Chadyr-Lungskiy Rayon; and Budey, Kopchak, Salchiya, and Chalyk of Tarakliyskiy Rayon for the period of the state of emergency and of the special form of administration as soon as this Decree goes into effect.

3. In order to introduce and provide for a special form of administration on the territory of the aforementioned rayons and villages under conditions of a state of emergency, to form a Provisional Committee of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet comprised of:

—**Chairman of the Provisional Committee:**

Andrey Nikolayevich **Sangeli**—first deputy prime minister of the Moldovan SSR

—**Deputy Chairman:**

Ivan Kondratyevich **Chebuk**—first deputy minister of the national economy of the Moldovan SSR

—**Members of the Provisional Committee:**

Aleksey Aleksandrovich **Andriyevskiy**—first deputy minister of culture and religions of the Moldovan SSR

Ivan Vladimirovich **Anton**—deputy minister of justice of the Moldovan SSR

Innokentiy Aleksandrovich **Baltag**—first deputy minister of science and education of the Moldovan SSR

Fedor Spiridonovich **Basarabyanu**—first deputy minister of labor and social protections of the Moldovan SSR

Grigoriy Aksentyevich **Borte**—deputy chairman of the Moldovan Consumer's Union

Nikolay Ivanovich **Dolgiy**—first deputy minister of public health of the Moldovan SSR

Ivan Fedorovich **Kostandolgo**—department head at the Moldovan SSR Ministry of Science and Education

Ivan Grigoriyevich **Kostash**—minister of internal affairs of the Moldovan SSR

Vasiliy Ivanovich **Kukhal**—deputy minister of construction of the Moldovan SSR

Nikolay Ivanovich **Lukyan**—first deputy minister of finance of the Moldovan SSR

Yakov Iosifovich **Maryamis**—first deputy minister of material resources of the Moldovan SSR

Ivan Georgiyevich **Motspan**—deputy minister of trade of the Moldovan SSR

Nikolay Georgiyevich **Osmokesky**—first deputy minister of foreign relations of the Moldovan SSR

Konstantin Leonidovich **Sekriyeru**—first deputy minister of information sciences, information, and communications of the Moldovan SSR

Shtefan Georgiyevich **Sekeryanu**—chief editor of the newspaper TSARA

Vasiliy Vasilyevich **Sturza**—first deputy procurator of the Moldovan SSR

Vladimir Anatolyevich **Florya**—deputy minister of transportation of the Moldovan SSR

Valentin Aleksandrovich **Chumak**—first deputy minister of industry and energy science of the Moldovan SSR.

4. For the period of the state of emergency and of the special form of administration, to grant the Provisional Committee the right to apply the following measures on the territory of the rayons, cities and villages indicated in Paragraph 1 of this decree:

- to bring proposals concerning questions of state, economic, social, and cultural construction of the aforementioned rayons and cities to the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet and the Moldovan SSR Government;
- to subordinate any enterprises, institutions, and organizations situated on the aforementioned territories to the system determined by the Moldovan SSR Government;
- to prohibit assemblies, rallies, street processions, and demonstrations, as well as mass gatherings for theatrical, entertainment, sports, and other purposes, and to monitor the mass media;
- to halt the illegal activities of organizations and amateur associations of citizens or dissolve them;
- to engage citizens for work in enterprises, institutions, and organizations, as well as for eliminating consequences of emergency circumstances;
- to prohibit strikes;
- to introduce a curfew;
- to limit the entry and exit of citizens and to temporarily move citizens from rayons that are dangerous to live in—they will be granted other housing; to compel citizens who are not residents of a given locality to leave it;
- to limit movement of vehicles and to regulate and inspect them;

—to introduce examination of documents and, under the necessary circumstances and when there is sufficient information concerning the presence of weapons upon the citizens and when there is a refusal to hand over a weapon voluntarily, to conduct personal searches of citizens and of their belongings;

—to conduct temporary confiscation from citizens and, under necessary circumstances, from enterprises, institutions, and organizations, of firearms, non-firearm weapons, ammunition, explosive substances and materials, and powerful chemical and poisonous substances;

—to limit or prohibit the use of duplicating equipment as well as radio and television broadcasting equipment, and to introduce special rules for the use of communications.

5. Law enforcement organs, internal forces, and the Moldovan SSR KGB are used in accordance with the law with the goal of eliminating the consequences of emergency circumstances, defending the rights of citizens, and maintaining public order and security of facilities for the vital functions of the population. The internal forces and the Moldovan SSR KGB function on the basis of the Constitution of Moldova and are guided by laws, rules, and this Decree.

6. Persons calling for the violation of public order, disseminating provocative rumors, actively obstructing citizens and officials in the performance of their legal rights and duties, or violating the regime of the state of emergency may be arrested on administrative charges for a period of up to 30 days. These persons may have administrative or criminal action brought against them in accordance with the law.

7. To guard the railways and other routes by calling upon the forces of the Moldovan SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs to ensure the uninterrupted functioning of transportation.

8. For law enforcement and other state organs of the Moldovan SSR to render the local organs of power and administration the necessary aid in implementing the aforementioned measures.

9. For the Supreme Court of the Moldovan SSR to alter, where necessary, the jurisdiction established by law over criminal, civil, and administrative cases in accordance with Article 10 of the Moldovan SSR Law "On the Legal Regime of a State of Emergency and Special Forms of Administration in the Moldovan SSR."

10. For the Moldovan SSR Government, where necessary, to form special temporary organs (committees, staffs, etc.) to coordinate the activities of ministries and departments of the republic to render assistance to the Provisional Committee for the period of the state of emergency and of the special form of administration on the territory of the aforementioned rayons.

11. With the goal of ensuring constitutional law and order in the republic, to propose that the USSR Council of Ministers transfer a militia regiment of the internal forces of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs stationed on the territory of the Moldovan SSR to the exclusive command of the Government of the Moldovan SSR.

12. Paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 of this Decree go into effect at 1400 local time on 26 October 1990 and function until the repeal of the state of emergency and of the special form of administration.

Military Force in Moldova Denied

91UN0325A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian 31 Oct 90 p 1

[Report on interview with Colonel General V. Osipov, commander in chief of Southwest Sector forces and USSR people's deputy, by G. Kozhemyakin under the rubric "Timely Interview"; place and date not given: "Who Profits by it?"]

[Text] Dear Editor! A severe aggravation of the situation has taken place recently in the Moldovan SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]. The opposition of Moldovan and Gagauz armed forces continues. As we have learned from the newspapers, workers detachments have been organized at the enterprises of Rybnitsa and Tiraspol to render aid to the Gagauz. Many of the Republic's mass media are reporting about active involvement in current events by units of the Soviet Army, which are supposedly acting in concert with the Gagauz. Is this true?

M. Kovalchuk, Kishinev

Our correspondent met with Colonel General V. Osipov, commander in chief of Southwest Sector forces and USSR people's deputy.

[Kozhemyakin] Vladimir Vasilyevich, please comment on this letter. Especially since the questions it raises are of interest to many of our readers, as the many phone calls and letters to the editor prove.

[Osipov] Indeed, we—the military—recently have increasingly been accused of supporting the separatists. I will say unambiguously that we stand for a united, powerful Soviet power and for a renewed USSR, and for that reason we are firmly opposed to either Baltic, Caucasian, or Central Asian, as well as Moldovan, separatism; we are opposed to all who agitate for the dismemberment of the Union and its republics.

I wish to remind you of one old truth: A strong power is a strong army. And vice versa.

The accusations against the military of supporting the Gagauz republic are nothing more than an attempt to shift the blame to the very party that has been injured. Once you have reached an impasse there is no use looking for a scapegoat. Let us take an unbiased look at

events. Various political forces are involved in the conflict. On one hand there are the People's Front and representatives of the Moldovan population, and on the other hand there is the Gagauz People's Movement. Under conditions of broadening democracy and the creation of a rule-of-law state, each people has the right to do whatever is necessary to preserve and develop its own language and ethnic culture and education. The right of nations to self-determination is also legal, even to the point of secession from the Union. This right is upheld in the USSR Constitution. But all these issues must be resolved only by constitutional means, not by creating a system that is most favorable for some peoples at the expense of infringing on the rights of others.

History proves convincingly that when politicians begin to play upon the nationalist sentiments of a people or a nation, it never leads to good. We cannot be guided solely by emotions, abandoning the arguments of reason. Remember the recent bloody events in the Transcaucasus region and Central Asia. I believe that part of the blame for the unfavorable development of events in our republic also lies with the government, which did not heed the voice of the Moldovan SSR parliament when the latter called upon it to act with restraint and caution. Instead, it began to create formations that moved to the southern rayons with the goal of hindering elections in the Gagauz republic.

Such issues are not resolved by forcible means. Wisdom, propriety, self-control, and consideration of the interests of all interested parties are needed. Forcible methods, whereby a majority overwhelms a minority, and bloody means have never led to anything good. Judge for yourselves. More than 1,000 people have died in inter-ethnic conflicts in our country over the last two years, about 10,000 have been severely wounded, and the national economy has sustained losses worth billions of rubles.

But apparently these figures have not taught anything to the leaders of the various movements and parties seeking power. Very often it happens that the worse things are, the better it is for them to realize their ambitious goals. Playing on nationalist sentiments, they organize confusion and inflame an already complex situation. Another facet of this is the publication of ill-intentioned rumors and unverified incidents in the mass media designed to defame the Armed Forces and distort their role in the life of the Republic and in the crisis consuming the Moldovan SSR today. How accurate, for example, are the features about the Army that are being broadcast these days on national television? Tanks are shown that are supposedly going to aid the Gagauz; in fact, we are looking at combat vehicles on a training field with forces preparing for the autumn performance evaluation. They showed some sort of duffel bag with explosive packets and signal flares and an armored personnel carrier filmed in Kagul which, as it turned out, belonged to the DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy], not the Armed Forces. Facts are clearly being juggled. It is not so important that

someone be held responsible for it. The main thing is that the disinformation has already begun to work. Scenes taken arbitrarily from the combat training of the forces on the territory of Moldova are presented as preparations for some sort of mythical ill-intentioned plot by the military against the population.

Nor can we be alarmed by inflammatory appeals to picket military units. Last night a group of young people waving flags halted an anti-aircraft battery leaving a training center for its unit. And again the television cameras began to whirl and the shutters of cameras began to click. We should probably expect the next fake television report to show up any time.

Military installations and headquarters are being blocked. Picketers have even assembled around an anti-aircraft missile unit and an electronics post that were on alert. And, as a rule, adults who remain in the background send the young fellows out to picket. And it is young people who are on alert just a few meters from them. Do these behind-the-scenes directors of these actions consider their possible consequences? I wish to say unambiguously that we do not seek conflicts, that we are involved with combat training, and that we are preparing ourselves for the autumn performance evaluation. But our peacefulness probably does not suit those who send youths to the soldiers' barracks. In order to achieve his far-reaching goals someone needs a Moldovan version of a Karabakh or an Ulster or the development of events similar to those in Tbilisi. Do not doubt that these people will not hesitate to sacrifice their countrymen to their ambitious goals. They do this without hesitation, but those who are irresponsibly condemned to death in this fashion, their relatives and their friends, should take the time to consider. Soldiers are not striking miners and starving students. They will carry out their tactical mission with combat weapons.

And God forbid, if someone gives way to a provocation or nerves snap.... Servicemen are asking how long these attacks against the Army in the Moldovan SSR will continue. We demand the adoption of decisive measures against the instigators of the provocations. In connection with this, the command element of the Southwestern Sector Forces and the Military Council intend to make inquiries to both the Moldovan SSR Government and the Union leadership.

[Kozhemyakin] Vladimir Vasilyevich, what solution do you see to the crisis that has arisen in the Republic?

[Osipov] As a USSR people's deputy I believe that all these problems should be resolved at the negotiation table by way of mutual concessions. And many such problems have accumulated. But the main thing is that we must halt the opposition on the border with the area densely populated by the Gagauz as quickly as possible, and return home the thousands of youths that have gathered there. Especially since people are freezing and

difficulties with food and drinking water have cropped up there. Enthusiasm is good when it is controlled and skillfully directed.

I have known the Moldovan people for a number of years and I am firmly convinced that they have enough wisdom and common sense to successfully overcome the crisis and construct fair, equal relations with their neighbors concerning their common home.

Moldovan Officials on Republic Tensions

91UN0375A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
14 Nov 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by TASS correspondents F. Angeli and V. Demidetskiy: "A Minister and a Secretary on the Events in Dubossary"]

[Text] Kishinev, 12 November—At a news conference that took place in Kishinev, I. Kostash, minister of internal affairs of the Moldovan SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], expressed dissatisfaction with the outcry created by the central mass media around the events in Moldova and, in particular, the loss of life at Dubossary.

The minister also criticized the actions of the subunits of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] that were introduced into the southern rayons of the Republic. In his opinion they are not contributing to the implementation of the state of emergency declared here by the Republic's parliament. Major General I. Kostash believes that the introduction of the USSR MVD troops into the rayons of the Left Bank, as the leaders of the Dnestr region wish, cannot stabilize the situation. The leaders of the Dnestr region want this because they want a state of emergency introduced throughout all of Moldova, he said.

At the same time the situation on the Left Bank continues to remain tense, noted the general. The separatists, who have forcibly seized power, are blocking the roads and do not wish to submit to the parliament and Moldovan Government. Their actions, in his opinion, were the main cause of the tragedy in Dubossary. During an operation to unblock the bridge and the city that was being carried out by order of the Moldovan SSR Government, about 1,000 rounds were expended on warning shots.

I. Kostash declared, "I am firmly convinced that conflicts that arise should be resolved through political methods. The Supreme Soviet of Moldova should be the first resort."

However, on the previous day V. Oborok, second secretary of the Dubossary raykom [rayon party committee], telephoned the TASS office in Kishinev; he was a witness to the tragic events, and this is what he said:

"After the first shots were fired at the Poltavskiy Bridge at the entry to Dubossary and 'Cheremukha' was used by the Special Missions Militia Detachments [OMON] and

militia, I drove two wounded people to the 'first aid' station and then to the hospital.

"Returning almost immediately to the raykom, I called the telephone number of I. Kostash, minister of internal affairs of the Moldovan SSR. A duty officer of the MVD answered. I asked him to connect me immediately with the minister, since blood was flowing on the approaches to the city and bursts of automatic fire from assault rifles could be heard. I was answered briefly: 'The minister is not here.' Then I asked for any of his deputies. However, I could not speak with them either. When I asked, 'Who can stop the bloodshed?' the guard officer answered that the militia was operating by personal order of Prime Minister M. Druk. A little while later I succeeded in being connected with him, but I had to speak through that same MVD duty officer. And that is the way we conversed: I explained the situation to the militiaman, he transmitted it to Druk, and back again. Via the duty officer M. Druk asked me, 'What is going on there? Are they destroying gardens and schools?' I answered that they were shooting at people on the streets at the entry to the city. 'The people should be staying home,' snapped out the prime minister."

Interethnic Situation in Moldova Viewed

91UN0314A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 16 Nov 90 p 2

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA special correspondents B. Vishnevskiy and A. Khantsevich in the column "The Ethnic Issue": "The Warpath: Who Has Pushed the Residents of Moldova Onto It and Why?"]

[Text] Komrat-Dubossary—Kishinev-Moscow—Family quarrels and conflicts between entire peoples have a lot in common. Alas, the rules are the same in both cases. For example, action equals reaction. President of Moldova M. Snegur stated in an outburst: "No negotiations or concessions to the 'separatists,' the so-called Gagauz and Dnestr Republics." In return, the latter blocked all decisions of the authorities. One side, the Moldovan leadership, despite solemn promises to demilitarize Moldova, feverishly called to arms a 10,000-strong carabineer corps. A parade of "the combat core of the future national army," the first "Tiras Tigina" battalion, was held. So, in Tiraspol, Rybnitsa, and Bendery strong fellows banded together in workers' self-defense detachments. An infamous resolution of the Moldovan Government became a fateful step in this arms race: By Decree No. 407 it called on the people to go to war.

On the morning of 24 October, the first bus with volunteers headed out from the central square of Kishinev, formerly Victory Square, and now the Square of the Great People's Assembly. Several days later, the numbers were in tens and hundreds of vehicles urgently withdrawn from most pressing farm work and urban routes. Convoys dispatched from the square received

motor fuel without hindrance at a time when unharvested tomato fields were being plowed under and capital city and other motor pools were idle because of a gasoline crisis. Money to "the volunteer foundation" was collected in an automatic manner, by payroll withholding. Even tailor shops switched to products of a semimilitary nature. In a way, Moldova is in danger! Everything for the front! Everything for victory! The war cry to which the government also subscribed, following the People's Front, common schools, and uncommon intellectuals, was like a smoldering firebrand tossed onto dry grass. Its methodical propaganda could not but cloud the judgment of trusting, inherently good-natured people. Why are the store shelves becoming barren? Why is the transition of a sovereign republic to a market economy being delayed? Why does the common Moldovan have to tighten his belt more and more along with it? Because a perfidious enemy has appeared, nonindigenous population, "occupiers," "mankurts," and "outsiders," and an image of them was prudently formed in common consciousness.

In a word, the target was marked. "Destructive forces of darkness manipulated from the center" are the enemy of prosperity. Here is a revision of the target, closer and easier to understand for the common people: "Separatists who intend to dismember the long-suffering Moldova" are the enemy. They are "pharisees from Komrat" and "commandos from the Dnestr area." They are the ones "who dislike our laws, our culture, and our language, though they like very much our bread, our wine, and our land."

It is no secret that appeals of this kind immediately fit in the consciousness of philistines, becoming a destructive force. Here are just two pictures for you. When recounting to us the October blockade of the Gagauz area, Deputy Chairman of the Chadyr-Lungskiy Rayon Soviet I. Choban referred to the following detail: "The implacability of the opposite side borders on the absurd. People's guard ["opolchentsy"] pickets in Chimishliya turned back meat, milk, flour, and tobacco that we always sent to Kishinev in keeping with delivery plans. Despite the fact that we remain the main supplier of agricultural products in the republic, this is the explanation they find for the common people: Allegedly, the Gagauz are out to starve your children...." Anatoliy Ladan, secretary of the party committee at the imeni Kirov plant in Tiraspol: "On both my mother's and father's sides, I am a native Bessarabian Moldovan. However, I traveled through the villages and listened to what the politicians said claiming to be concerned about the nation... Here are two adjacent villages, the Gagauz Chok-Maydan and the Moldovan Vashkaliya. For ages, they brought bread from the former to the latter. Everything became topsy-turvy once the government messed things up. I was present when a driver from Chok-Maydan was beaten up by outside volunteers. The car was robbed and the chairman of the rural consumer society, who also was the People's Front representative, pointed to 'the Gagauz enemy.' The bread was brought

in by the military on armored personnel carriers, but they were stoned. This is how far it went! They closed schools down. The schoolchildren were made to watch the roads, write down the numbers of vehicles from elsewhere, and report those suspect to the rural soviet...."

This is what the volunteers came to the square with. Let us not judge them. Now that a potent supply of hatred has been imparted by "the fathers of the nation" to credulous souls, their fingers are itching for weapons. Steel-framework bars, axes, nunchaks, cudgels... In general, they brought anything they could to the buses. "Get out of here before something happens to you!"—this was the usual end of our attempts to understand things and strike up a conversation. On one occasion, when PRAVDA photographer Maya Skurikhina produced her camera carelessly, a whole bunch of journalists had to stick up for her.

We met the volunteers for a second time in Chimishliya. Here, on the doorstep of stubborn Komrat, the capital of the Gagauz area, they could already smell combat in the near future. Warmed up by the mobile wine tanker, they had already managed to share the first portion of dry rations with the Kishinev Special Missions Militia Detachments. We were stopped at the entrance gate. The headquarters in charge of issuing passes was just around the corner. However, what we heard was: "You are the press? Go right back where you came from!" We got out. It was rainy and windy. It was nerve-wracking. We tried to negotiate, but with whom? Civilians in raincoats did not introduce themselves: "We are the people!" We held out our credentials. The people are also behind us—the readers of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, PRAVDA, OGONEK, SOBESEDNIK, SELSKAYA MOLODEZH, and the viewers of Central and Finnish TV.... Having argued for the better part of an hour more, we decided to break through out of desperation. A couple blocks away from the headquarters a truck jam-packed with drunk volunteers caught up with us. There was whistling and hooting... We were backed against a fence... It could have been worse, but this time we got away... with just three hours of detention. Later we heard Prime Minister M. Druk say at a press conference: "You have come here to look for smothered dogs, and disinformation is not what we need...."

It was wound tighter and tighter with every new party of volunteers. Fewer and fewer hours separated us from the blood spilled in Dubossary. At first free-lance troops engaged in minor pranks in villages, plucking the carts that happened by and the chickens of citizens. Subsequently pogroms began. Kagul and Ungeny will remember them for a long time to come. The Bulgarian village of Tvarditsa, through which a detachment, headed personally by Moldova's Minister of Internal Affairs Major General M. Kostash and the indefatigable Prime Minister Druk, forced its roundabout way from the side of the Ukraine, will not recover anytime soon. Peaceful villages posted pickets in order to prevent 80 buses with submachine gunners and heavy equipment

from going to the neighboring Komrat. The warriors had to be content with just apprehending and thoroughly interrogating Chairman of the Sovetskaya Moldavia [as published] collective farm D. Kuru, who happened to inspect his native fields at an early hour. Three truce representatives, Chairman of Chadyr-Lungskiy Rayon Soviet V. Terzi, Deputy V. Kelesh, and Reverend Archpriest of Southern Regions Father Dmitriy managed to convince the detachment to leave peacefully....

One day later, warning shots were fired close to the locality of Kantemir. This time, a border guard post was beating back an attack; they were forced to call to arms their scant personnel and evacuate women and children who were left almost without protection. Should we recall Vulkaneshty? On this occasion, a 5,000-strong rank of outside "liberators" moved against a similar rank of the local people's guard. A small contingent of internal troops provided the sole thin separator. It is scary to think of the number of victims the confrontation could have entailed, had commander of the operational group Major General A. Zaytsev not displayed diplomatic skills, all the more so because the volunteers refused to obey him by order of I. Kostash, with whom the leader of the volunteers had established contact.

A genie let out from the bottle refused to obey. Worked up by free-lance raids in the outlying areas, the detachments returned to Kishinev. Here they were greeted as victors. Their pent-up aggressive mood found an outlet in the city folks who happened by in the heat of it all. However, the blind elements are not all that blind. Of course, "outsiders" who dared to communicate in an alien language got it. The telephone kept ringing at the office of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent: The situation was as tense as could be. However, how could we reassure the people, being aware that but a few dozen of militiamen remained in all of Kishinev. Ministry of Internal Affairs officer in charge, Lieutenant Colonel V. Zaporozhtsev, also acknowledged his powerlessness. "There is nobody to go to the crime scenes and write up reports on the violations of law. Our personnel have been reassigned to the rayons...."

On 1 November, at midnight, a volunteer picket pulled over the car of Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Akhromeyev on the Kishinev- Beltsy highway. The USSR people's deputy from one of the northern okrugs of Moldova was traveling there to resolve a conflict—the blockade of a military installation. However, he had to return to the city empty-handed. So, is the marshal a hostage, too? It looks like the people in uniform who have averted bloodshed in Moldova many times have turned into hostages in the game the politicians play.

Let us recall that the internal troops entered Moldova following an appeal by the Gagauz people, and subsequently by President M. Snegur, to Prime Minister N. Ryzhkov. They handled the dangerous and thankless job of a "soft buffer" quite properly, which we personally witnessed on many occasions. However, there was yet another press conference by Prime Minister M. Druk

and General I. Kostash. Rebukes were voiced: "The troops behave inertly and indecisively. It is hard to understand whose side they are on...." Well, it is easy to rebuke someone, but what about showing a professional attitude yourself? The former Air Force Colonel I. Kostash, who subsequently headed the republic Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy, was propelled to the post of minister of internal affairs by the well-known events. This organization, which requires a particularly careful attitude, may have suffered more than others from "a new cadre policy." Once again transparent hints sounded, though absolutely without proof: Supposedly, the Army is to blame for the bloodshed. The following is from a conversation with Lieutenant Colonel P. Motornyy, deputy commander of the Kishinev Militia Regiment Internal Troops: "By a ukase dated 2 September, the parliament of the republic resolved to 'withdraw' our regiment from Kishinev because it consisted primarily of non-Moldovans. When the mess began, we got our orders: To restore order in the southern sector. The Gagauz greeted us with flowers. I personally saw the people cry. However, it was a different story when we forced our way there from the capital. The picketers blocked our convoys, hacked at the vehicles with axes, and drove lances through the canvas covers of trucks behind which soldiers sat. Captain P. Alpatov suffered a hand wound...."

Such an attitude toward uniformed personnel is nothing short of a provocation. It may seem devoid of all logic only to outsiders. Actually, this is part of an overall scenario entitled "How to Create an Enemy Image." As they say, it does not get any worse than that because the quite official defenders were classified as enemies. In real life, it is the way it is in theater productions: If there is a gun hanging in the room, it means that it will definitely be fired.

The gun was fired indeed. On 4 and 6 November, we published a chronicle of the Dubossary tragedy, eyewitness accounts, and expert opinions.... A commission headed by V. Ilyukhin, senior investigator for particularly important cases of the USSR Procuracy, is working on the basis of the above. Nobody but this commission has the right to name the criminals. However, should the people who have lost the peace of their lives and three of their sons be entitled to see the countenance of a criminal concept that has brought about a bloody impasse in Moldova? It is necessary to stop the escalation of violence today, at present, while there still is an opportunity.

Was this opportunity not wasted by the session of the Moldovan parliament that was held at the time of Dubossary and was content with an absurd behind-the-desk version of General I. Kostash: "They fired only into the air...." However, the present-day parliament is no longer yesterday's "aggressive majority," and this is hopeful. Not only invocatory cries but also tormenting questions are beginning to sound in the auditorium.

What is the way out of the impasse? How is the normalcy of life to be regained? Some turn their gaze to "a salutary Russia" that sent a commission of parliament members here. However, meetings with the commission dashed hopes and gave way to irritation. Yeltsin's representatives brought nothing except for the upbeat and democratic slogan "Russia Will Take in Everybody." Others—there are also those—appeal to the international community. Indeed, participants in the recent conference, "Democracy and Human Rights," in the Romanian city of Timisoara were interested in a report by a Kishinev representative. It was entitled "On a Political Crisis and the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in the Republic of Moldova." However, we doubt that Western rights activists will change the essence of (quoting from the report) "a regime of state terrorism, aggressiveness, and ethnocracy." Under the best (is it really the best?) of circumstances, they will facilitate the freezing of foreign loans and other agreements with the republic.

What remains is the third alternative: to give up illusions concerning "the light from the East or the West," and put faith only in yourself, the only master in your own house. A beginning has been made. The fifth session of the Moldovan parliament adopted a document on withdrawing and disbanding Gagauz formations. It called for the zero option, that is, a moratorium on all decisions that one side or the other views as discriminatory. A coordinating commission began its proceedings, which, if in need of anything at present, needs wisdom and patience. A difficult road lies ahead for the members of parliament. However, it must be traveled without volunteers, workers detachments, pickets, or shots, as is the custom in any civilized state....

Statute on Moldovan Coat-of-Arms

91UN0387D Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian 7 Nov 90 p 1,3

["Statute: On the State Coat-of-Arms of the Moldovan SSR"]

[Text] The state Coat-of-Arms of the Moldovan SSR is a shield intersected horizontally—the upper half is a red field and the bottom half is blue. At the center of the shield there is depicted the head of an aurochs, between whose horns there is an eight-pointed star; to the right of the head there is a five-petaled rose and to the left—a half-moon which is facing and slightly inclined to the right. All of the elements on the shield are golden (yellow). The shield is situated on the breast of an eagle, which is depicted at its natural size and is holding in its beak a golden cross (the eagle is a cross-bearer), in its right claw—a green olive branch, and in its left claw—a golden scepter.

2. In a black-and-white representation the shield and heraldic figures which make up the composition are executed in accordance with the conventional signs used in heraldic science. Correspondingly, the gold (yellow) color is shaded in with a uniform dotted shading, the

red—with vertical lines, the blue—with horizontal lines, and the green—with lines slanted from right to left. The eagle is represented in contour. (This applies to both the colored and black-and-white representations of the State Coat-of-Arms of the Moldovan SSR.)

3. The State Coat-of-Arms of the Moldovan SSR is displayed:

a) On the buildings of the residence of the president of the Moldovan SSR, of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet and the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and of the Moldovan SSR government; on the buildings of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Court and the rayon (city) people's courts of the republic; on the buildings of the local soviets of people's deputies; on the buildings of the diplomatic representations and consular institutions of the Moldovan SSR;

b) In the official offices of the president of the Moldovan SSR, the chairman of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet, and the chairmen of the local soviets of people's deputies of the Moldovan SSR; in the auditoriums where meetings of the Presidential Council, the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet, the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the Moldovan SSR government, and sessions of the local Moldovan SSR soviets of people's deputies are held; in the halls where official meetings of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Court and the rayons (city) people's courts of the republic take place, as well as in buildings where registration of weddings and new births takes place;

c) On stamp dies and on the letterheads of documents of the Moldovan SSR president, the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet, and the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; the Moldovan SSR government, the ministries, departments, and state committees of the Moldovan SSR and other organs subordinate to the Moldovan SSR government; on the stamps and letterheads of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Court and of rayon (city) people's courts of the republic; on the stamps and letterheads of the local soviets of people's deputies and their executive committees, state notary's offices, and enterprises, institutions, and organizations subject to republic and local jurisdiction which, in accordance with legislation of the Moldovan SSR, have been granted the right to use stamps and letterheads with a depiction of the State Coat-of-Arms;

d) On official buildings of the president of the Moldovan SSR, the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet, the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the Moldovan SSR government;

e) On tickets of the republic's prize lottery.

Other instances of the obligatory reproduction of the representation of the State Coat-of-Arms of the Moldovan SSR may be established by legislation of the Moldovan SSR.

4. Reproduction of the representation of the State Coat-of-Arms of the Moldovan SSR, independent of its size, should correspond fully to the proportions of the color or black-and-white representations.

5. Only the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet can grant the right to make use of the representation of the State Coat-of-Arms of the Moldovan SSR to institutions and organizations which are not indicated in this statute.

6. The procedure for printing and circulating representations of the State Coat-of-Arms of the Moldovan SSR as well as for making, using, preserving, and destroying stamping presses with a representation of the State Coat-of-Arms are established by the Moldovan SSR government.

Ukrainian CP Secretary on Party Property

91UN0269A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
2 Nov 90 p 2

[Interview by T. Mayboroda; place and date not given: "Balanced Approach Needed—Interview With Ukrainian CP Central Committee Second Secretary G.P. Kharchenko on the Party Budget and Property"]

[Text] [Mayboroda] Grigoriy Petrovich, conversations have been conducted recently at various levels of our society regarding the party's material base and property. People are interested in what this base consists of, what its dimensions are, and in what way and on what means it was created?

[Kharchenko] The material base of the party began to be established from the day of its founding. With time, there were changes in the structure of party organs, their methods of work, and, with them, the material base as well. Today, it includes administrative, training, and service buildings, motor vehicle transport, press resources and computers, and publishing activities—all that is needed for the work of party committees and the implementation of their ties with the party's masses.

In short, the material base is the foundation for the activity of party organizations. It is not accidental that our political opponents understand this very well, and they are now trying in every way possible, frequently illegally, to deprive the party of property and to make it impossible for it to exist.

[Mayboroda] Tell me, please, from what sources is the budget of the Ukrainian Communist Party formed, who uses it, and how is its use controlled?

[Kharchenko] Despite the noticeable changes in the structure of party organs, the principles of forming a budget are retained in general. The main source of income, as formerly, remains receipts from the payment of party membership dues. Their share in the overall income of the budget constitutes about 77 percent. The second source in size is the deductions from profits from party publications. And a quite insignificant part—about

0.3 percent of the receipts—is obtained from the activity of economic subdivisions and the sale of retired property, motor vehicles, etc. There are no other sources, and, especially, there are no state subsidies.

I would like immediately to put things right with respect to state capital investment. At one time, they were allocated by a decision of the government for the creation and development of a repair-construction base and farm gardens attached to plants. But such means were also distributed to other organizations.

As for the formation of the party budget, up until the present time this work was conducted on the basis of proposals of local party organs, and it was coordinated with the CPSU Central Committee. It was here that the normative funds for wages were also fixed.

It must be said that of the 25 oblast party organizations in our republic, only the Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporozhye, Kiev, Crimea, Lugansk, Lvov, Odessa, Kharkov, and the Kiev City party organizations maintained themselves entirely on their own income and conducted deductions for the budget of the Ukrainian Communist Party. In the remaining 16 oblast party organizations, expenditures exceeded income, and they were allocated subsidies.

Auditing commissions at all levels of the party organization of the Ukrainian Communist Party check on the propriety of budget performance, wages, and the collection and accounting for membership party dues. Moreover, the administrative departments of the Central Committee, of the oblast committees, and of the Kiev City party committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party are charged not only with the function of forming the party budget, but also with the responsibility for a rational and careful expenditure of resources.

[Mayboroda] What are the main trends in the utilization of the party budget?

[Kharchenko] At the present time, the Ukrainian Communist Party budget finances the activity of 723 party committees and more than a thousand party establishments, public political centers, subdivisions for the training of personnel and the active membership, higher educational institutions, party archives, and also the support of more than 12,000 full-time secretaries of primary party organizations.

The aggregate expenditures for the maintenance of party committees and party establishments, including the construction and repair of buildings of party organs and party publishing houses, is fixed at a total of 291.1 million rubles [R]. Ninety-one percent of all expenditures go toward financing the activity of local party organs and party establishments and developing their material base. The expenditures of primary organizations, including funds for wages of full-time workers, constitute a fifth part of them. Wage funds for the

support of workers of all party organs and party establishments of the Ukrainian Communist Party constitute 53 percent of the total appropriations.

[Mayboroda] Grigoriy Petrovich, how was the budget affected by reducing party dues and implementing the Law on Taxation?

[Kharchenko] The income from membership dues receipts will decrease approximately 47 percent. Consideration must also be given to the fact that up to 50 percent of the membership dues receipts will be applied to the needs of the primary party organizations. This will further reduce the volume of financing general party expenditures.

There will also be a sharp drop in party budget income from publishing activity in connection with the introduction of the new procedure for taxing their profits and an increase in payments for social insurance. The overall loss of resources for the party budget will be in the neighborhood of 66 percent from the level of income in 1989. So that we cannot do without a reorganization of the structure of party organs and a reduction in expenditures.

[Mayboroda] What measures have been undertaken to reduce administrative expenditures and to affect savings in resources? What is your attitude toward economic and entrepreneurial activity by party committees and establishments?

[Kharchenko] The situation that has evolved requires that party committees and party establishments at all levels substantially reduce expenditures in all areas of their activity. Besides a reduction of the apparatus of party organs at all levels, a reduction is envisioned in expenditures of up to 40 percent for the support of premises and the acquisition of inventory, appropriations for the support of transport are being cut by more than one-third, and official travel expenditures are being cut by 40 percent. Appropriations for the conduct of other measures are also being reduced.

However, all of these steps will not make it possible to get rid of the budget deficit. That is why party committees must find a capability for acquiring additional budget resources, including the need to engage in entrepreneurial and commercial activity; i.e., to support their work under conditions of self-financing. This kind of activity by party committees is envisaged in CPSU Rules.

[Mayboroda] Reports have appeared in the press that the Ukrainian Communist Party has transferred large monetary sums to a Chernobyl fund and other charitable purposes. Could you talk about this in more detail?

[Kharchenko] Indeed, R100 million have been allocated from the party budget to improve the health of children who live on Ukrainian territory that has been contaminated as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear power station]. The decision to render such

assistance was approved at the last general party congress, and the CPSU Central Committee has allocated R500 million for this purpose. But earlier, R500 million were allocated to increase pension support. And it should be understood that this money was allocated not from some kind of secret Central Committee caches or from Moscow, but from party dues, including dues of the Ukrainian Communists who consider it their duty to assist suffering children.

We studied all of the proposals for optimal use of resources. We decided in favor of the need to invest them in the creation of our own republic diagnostic treatment and rehabilitation centers that would be situated on ecologically clean territory suitable for health improvement. We should not expect it to be possible to treat all children abroad. Indeed, in the opinion of the doctors, a change in climatic conditions, which at times differ sharply from ours, will not promote an improvement in health. Therefore, we proposed using R50 million on the construction of a specialized 500-bed sanatorium for mothers and children in the city of Mirgorod; a 200-bed hospital building, an outpatients' clinic for 600 visits, and a 200-bed boardinghouse for mothers and children of a Ukrainian republic clinic in Pushcha-Vodnitsa for the radioactive protection of the population; a 300-bed diagnostic and treatment center on the basis of the "Znamya" sanatorium in Vorzel; a rehabilitation and treatment complex on the basis of the "Las-tochka" sanatorium in the city of Irpen, and a 144-bed climate-control pavilion on the basis of the children's "Smena" sanatorium in the city of Evpatoriya.

Twenty million rubles are provided for the immediate establishment of an endocrinology clinic in Kiev, Zhitomir, Rovno, Chernigov, and Volynskiy oblasts, and for equipping medical establishments located there with special diagnostic treatment equipment and medical preparations. Five million rubles are being allocated for the improved nourishment of school children and preschool-age children who live there. The remaining resources will be used to pay vouchers, additional holidays, transportation expenditures, and various other needs. It is not ruled out that assistance will also be given to other suffering rayons. Requests have come in from Chernigov and Cherkass.

As for the periods of application of the allocated resources, this now depends first of all on the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], the Ministry of Health, and the republic Ministry of Construction. Control over the use of this money will be exercised by the Administrative Department of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee.

[Mayboroda] Lately, forces opposed to the Communist Party have intensified their demands to confiscate party property; party committee, party publishing house, and training institution buildings, etc. How legal are these demands? What is the legal position of party property?

[Kharchenko] The question about the confiscation of party property today is being raised by our political opponents, and there are even cases in western oblasts of decisions being made by local Soviets to nationalize it. There is all of this. Also, it is in the program of actions of the "Democratic Platform" and of certain other politicized associations. Moreover, a considerable role for imitation is played by those countries where the communist parties have ceased their activity and where the property has been divided. But the Communist Party still exists in our country, it numbers 3.1 million persons, and it is impossible to ignore this.

The question of property, regardless of whom it belongs to—an enterprise, organization, institution, or private citizen—must be resolved in a rule-of-law state only on the basis of the Law.

The party, like any other social organization, has a right to have its own property, and all of the appeals for its expropriation that are heard today aim at only one thing: to deprive the party of the ability to function normally, and to split it.

As is known, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet has instructed the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Justice, the State Arbitration Committee, and the State Committee for Economics to clarify the legal basis of party property, after which the question will be examined by a session of the Supreme Soviet.

[Mayboroda] As a result of the sizable reduction in the party apparatus, some of the party buildings are being released, and the opportunity arises to transfer them to the Soviets. What has already been done and what is planned to be done in this respect?

[Kharchenko] Buildings have been released prior to this. Starting in the 1950's, there were transfers without compensation of 245 administrative buildings valued at R30 million to local soviets for various needs, including 18 buildings with a total value of R5 million in Lvov Oblast alone. These buildings were used as Pioneer Palaces, children's theaters and libraries, museums, schools, vocational training schools, higher educational institutions... Now, considering the critical financial situation of the party, buildings or individual sites being released are not simply being transferred, but rather they are being turned over under contractual lease conditions, or they are sold. In individual cases, they are also transferred without compensation.

The matter is more complicated with those buildings that are in the construction stage. Many of them have been at the center of attention of those social groups who demand their immediate transfer for various social purposes. At the same time, one objective is being pursued: to take them away. But in practice, completion of the construction of a project, as a rule, does not succeed, inasmuch as it is frequently simpler and cheaper to rebuild from the bottom up rather than to reshape and

readapt to new functions a building site that has already been started. The results of such an expropriation most frequently are deplorable.

Now, the program for new construction has been sharply curtailed; however, the fate of previously started building projects should be resolved very competently. We are ready to effect transfers, naturally, with compensation for incurred costs and for individual buildings that are under construction, and over which there have been critical debates about a transfer for several years. But, unfortunately, not one executive committee has yet declared a desire to complete these construction jobs. And this once again attests to the fact that there should be no surrender in any transaction to emotions and unsystematic work. A versatile, balanced approach is needed.

Draft Statute of Ukrainian Democratic Party

91UN0267A Kiev LITERATURNIA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 1 Nov 90 p 5

["Draft Statute of the Ukrainian Democratic Party"]

[Text] October 21, 1990 at a meeting of the Organizational Committee of the Ukrainian Democratic Party, with the participation of authorized oblast association and initiating committee representatives, the following project for a Statute of the Ukrainian Democratic Party was discussed and approved.

We are living in the midst of changing social epochs. The ideological, political and socioeconomic system of "true socialism" is passing. The regime created by the Communist Party, its administrative and political terror, and lack of national rights have led the Ukraine into a national, economic, and ecological disaster.

General Principles

The Ukrainian Democratic Party arose from the unconditional principle that the free individual is of highest value in society. Our system of priorities: individual - family - nation - state. The fundamental duty of the state is to ensure the pre-eminence of laws in the society which conform to generally accepted human norms, as proclaimed by the United Nations Organization and in the traditions of the Ukrainian people.

The Democratic Party institutes as its goal the attainment of national independence for the Ukraine and the establishment within it of a democratic and humane society, where conditions would guarantee prosperity of the people, the rebirth and universal development of Ukrainian and other nationalities' cultures, freedom of world view and religious convictions.

In approving the Ukrainian Declaration of Sovereignty we state our belief that the path to national independence will not be possible without dismantling the autocracy of the CPSU as an instrument of colonial oppression and totalitarianism and without the Ukraine's departure from the USSR.

The Ukrainian Democratic Party will bring its statutory principles to life by actively participating in the socio-political process, cooperating with other parties, community organizations and democratically-oriented movements, winning voter's mandates to positions in national government in free elections, spreading its views through mass communication, participation in community efforts, and with other methods of nonviolent conflict.

The Ukrainian Democratic Party affirms that each Ukrainian citizen is to actively participate in the building of a new Ukraine, regardless of nationality, religious belief, educational level, profession, economic status or job position. Membership in the Ukrainian Democratic Party is open to all citizens, except those guilty of crimes against their nation.

Political System, the State, and Rights

The sources of the Ukraine's political system, toward which the Democratic Party is striving:

- everlasting traditions of the age of kings;
- traditions of the Zaporizian Cossack republic;
- ideas of the age of Enlightenment;
- ideas of the Classicists of Ukrainian Humanism;
- nation-building experience of the Ukrainian State acquired in the first half of the 20th century;
- present-day experience of the Ukrainian people's striving to break the dictatorship of the CPSU;
- the better attributes of current world democracy.

The fundamental principles of the future political system, toward which the Democratic Party is striving:

PERSONAL FREEDOM. Each individual, at birth, acquires certain inalienable rights and freedoms, which the state cannot violate or cancel. Among such rights the Democratic Party recognizes the right to life, the right of freedom, the right of property, and the right to strive for happiness.

EQUALITY. All members of the society are equals before the law. All gender-related, national, religious, or political privileges are eliminated. Equal opportunities for all are guaranteed.

DEMOCRACY. The source of state government is its people, which creates the organ of government through democratic elections.

SOVEREIGNTY. The independent Ukrainian state constitutes one single, indivisible whole.

The Democratic Party is based on the fact that state rule is not a means of political leadership of one class over another, but rather comes about as a result of social agreement between individuals to safeguard their common interests and to defend intrinsic inalienable rights.

The Democratic Party affirms the following constitutional principles of legitimate state structure:

- division of government into legislative, executive, and judicial branches;
- pre-eminence of laws in leadership;
- applicability of regulations to government officials;
- conformity of effective legislation to legal international norms;
- establishment of a constitutional tribunal;
- legally designated limits on government and independent agency authority;
- resolution of elemental questions in the nation's existence by means of plebiscites;
- designated limits on government actions affecting individuals;
- introduction of the principle of personal inviolability;
- rights of citizens for judicial defense;
- independence of the courts. Introduction of trial by jury;
- establishment of administrative justice;
- duty of the state to inform the citizens of their full legal rights, to ensure a high level of legal awareness;
- freedom of press and information, freedom of association, freedom of conscience;
- the Ukrainian Democratic Party supports eliminating partisan politics from the army and other defense organs.

Rights of Individuals, Rights of the State

The Ukrainian Democratic Party believes that the source of government is the sovereign individual, and only the individual can relinquish a portion of his rights to political governmental bodies.

The Democratic Party demands that the Ukrainian Constitution and its legislation conform to the General Declaration of Human Rights, International Treaties on citizen's and political rights, the concluding Act of the Helsinki Conference regarding questions of security and cooperation in Europe, the Summary Document of the Vienna meeting of national representatives regarding security and cooperation in Europe. The political and

legislative system of Ukrainian government should ensure governmental and individual rights.

The Democratic Party defends the right of each citizen for freedom of thought, word and information. Each citizen is guaranteed access to informational media and the dissemination of information, and also protected from disinformation.

The Democratic Party stands behind the right of Ukrainian citizens to freely choose their places of residence and work.

Each citizen has the right to embrace any religion or no religion at all. Each citizen has the right to freely disseminate information about his faith and his convictions.

The Ukrainian Democratic Party supports full rehabilitation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, and other religions, and also peaceful coexistence of all Ukrainian religious faiths.

The rights and freedoms of citizens should not contradict the rights and freedoms of the people and the state. Rights and freedoms of individuals could not be guaranteed without a guarantee of the rights and freedoms of the nation and state.

The Democratic Party supports the rights of national minorities in the Ukraine for unimpeded cultural development and the maintenance of their language, traditions, and religion.

The Ukrainian Democratic Party supports the full rehabilitation of deported and repressed individuals.

Culture, Education, Enlightenment

As a result of long-lasting imperialist colonial policies, the spiritual life of the Ukraine is in a catastrophic state. In order for the rebirth of intellectual and spiritual potential of the Ukrainian people and the national minorities to take place, the united efforts of the state and its citizens are needed, as well as a national protectionist policy in the areas of culture, enlightenment, and education.

Enlightenment in the Ukraine is to proceed in the harmonious unity of general human and national values. The system of education should be humanitarian, free from political and military indoctrination in the schools. The primary task of school is the inculcation of a high level of enlightenment and spirituality.

The Democratic Party believes that freedom of scientific experimentation should be ensured, that government should subsidize fundamental research, direct communication between scientists of the Ukraine with scientists throughout the world, that institutions of higher learning and research institutes should be autonomous.

Economy

The Ukraine has objective possibilities to enter the ranks of the most economically developed nations of the world. To attain a high standard of living for citizens of the Ukraine, the first thing needed is the nationalization of all-Soviet property in the territorial Ukraine, reorientation of agriculture in the republic away from one-sided colonial orientation of developing ecologically damaging types of heavy industry, as well as from a state monopoly of ownership of the means of production.

The economic policies of the Democratic Party are based on the experience of present-day industrial societies and takes into consideration the historical, ethnic and religious characteristics of the Ukraine. We support the creation of a market economy resulting from the denationalization of property and the certification of legal validity of its various forms. The role of government in regulating economic processes will decrease as the impact of the market, of management initiatives by individual producers, companies, and associations, grows.

The Democratic Party believes that as a precondition to ending the Ukrainian economic crisis, Ukrainian economic government institutions must be reestablished - its own banking, financial and credit system, a customs bureau, its own currency, and a pricing and tax policy. Only this will present the opportunity to create a valuable market in the republic, to safeguard it, to carry out our own economic politics in the interests of the Ukrainian people, and, as a result, measurably raise the standard of living of the citizens of the republic.

The Ukrainian Democratic Party supports the privatization of a major portion of government property in the republic within a short time. National ownership of the means of production is relinquished to the Soviets at various levels. Republic and municipal ownership funds are created, which carry out the sale and transfer of property into private ownership by the republic's citizens, with the aid of sales, auctions, etc., with the advantage given to members of labor associations.

Alongside this will be a highly developed market infrastructure - stock, currency, and capital markets, insurance companies, business schools, trade buildings, free economic zones. A National Bank will be established, and the national currency will be fully convertible. The Ukraine joins international economic organizations, the European community. Within the Ukraine are created national markets for goods, capital, educational ideas, labor forces. This presumes the cancellation of the internal passport system and the safeguarding of related rights and freedoms, essential to a democratic country.

The agricultural policies of the Democratic Party are based on the principle that various forms of production can coexist and compete - from private farms to cooperatives. Land can be turned over to the villagers to work and to use, with the right to pass it on to descendants, or it can be sold into private ownership.

Historical experience has shown that the prosperity of a country and its citizens is safeguarded with the freedom to create enterprises, whose activity does not counter the norms and rights of a democratic society; the freedom to produce goods and sell them at market prices; freedom to establish wage rates and investment rates; and also a policy of taxation favorable to profit and individual gain.

Social Policies

The Ukrainian Democratic Party strives for the creation of a state guaranteeing social security to the individual. It opposes social prerogatives and privileges resulting from official rank.

It is necessary to establish an economically justified minimum level of income within the republic, and to publish this data regularly; to introduce a price index and corresponding compensation of inflationary processes. Citizens whose earnings fall below the minimum level of income should receive compensatory assistance.

The Ukrainian Democratic Party supports the creation of independent professional associations, as a means of social and legal protection for individuals.

A program of social security for the unemployed must be established.

An increased role of the family in society and creation of large families should be encouraged by a system of gifts and credits for families with underage children. The Democratic Party insists that raising children be recognized legally as equally valuable to any other employment in the society.

Ecology

The Ukrainian Democratic Party, in the belief that the right to natural surroundings which are safe and favorable to health belongs to the fundamental rights of the individual and all people, supports the primacy of ecological safeguards over economic needs.

Government ecological expertise, supplemented by community ecological control, should be brought in during the planning, construction and existence of all commercial concerns. The standards for the preservation of nature should conform to international norms. Ecological destruction is to be rectified at the expense of individuals or organizations responsible.

It is necessary to create a government and community agency to control product quality. Reports of these agencies should be readily available to all, periodic, and complete.

Defense and Demilitarization

The presence of its own military forces is an inseparable attribute of a sovereign country, and a guarantee of

national independence. The Ukrainian Democratic Party supports the creation of an independent Ukrainian army.

The first step toward this would be the fulfilling of military service by Ukrainian citizens only within their own territory.

The Democratic Party demands that the Ukraine become a nuclear-free zone, and that the preparation, storage, and transportation of weapons of mass destruction be banned from its territory.

We support the creation of a plenipotentiary parliamentary body to verify the proper enforcement of legislation in the Ukrainian Republic regarding military activity.

The Ukrainian Democratic Party supports the demilitarization of the processes of education and teaching.

Aims of Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth Outlined

91UN0273A Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
1 Nov 90 p 2

[Interview with SNUM members A. Besh, S. Romantsov, and O. Marchuk, by T. Kutsay: "We Think of Ourselves as Patriots..."]

[Text] At the recent meeting of Rukh, Ukrainian People's Deputy Mykola Porovskyy, classifying political forces, named SNUM [Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth] as an nationalistic extremist group.

SNUM (or that portion of its membership that refers to itself as the Union of Nationalist Ukrainian Youth), despite the unfavorable attitude towards it, does after all represent the views of a certain percentage of youth.

"I became disenchanted with Soviet rule. My father says that I carry the blood of my grandfather. My grandfather fought in the UPA [Ukrainian Insurrection Army], he was killed" - said Andriy Besh, group leader of the Ternopil city SNUM organization.

"Do not form the impression that we are all grandchildren of UPA warriors" - explained Sashko Romantsov, citywide SNUM leader in Ternopil. - "For example, me - my father is a veteran of the Great Patriotic War."

These youths, like all of us, are children of history.

To proceed, today's discussion participants are the above-mentioned Andriy Besh, Sashko Romantsov, and Oleh Marchuk, a student at the Ternopil branch of Lvov University, also a member of SNUM.

[Kutsay] Is it difficult to become a member of SNUM?

[SNUM] Whereas before acceptance was simplified and primitive, today more is needed than just an agreement. A person who wants to join SNUM is given a copy of the organization's Statute and the catechism of the Ukrainian nationalist (this is a decalogue, 12 character traits

and 44 rules for living). If the candidate abides by all these, then he undergoes three months of training. This resembles the education in the higher party school, or whatever it is called today.

[Kutsay] Do you also give large scholarships?

[SNUM] No, our organization exists on a community basis. There are courses to learn Ukrainian history and nationalistic ideology. Also included is physical training, after all each physically strong person can, at any moment, take a stand in defense of his Fatherland. In other words, we supply a varied, multifaceted educational experience.

[Kutsay] What are the goals of your organization?

[SNUM] That we be the masters of our own land. That the Ukraine be independent. Only if it is independent can such a large nation have the right to a normal life.

[Kutsay] Do you consider yourselves to be followers of UPA traditions?

[SNUM] Of the UPA, and of Mazepa... But in general we oppose any occupation. Although, for example, during the Austrian occupation of Halychyna so many newspapers and magazines were published, that even after 50 years of happy Soviet life such an event remains only a dream for us.

We consider ourselves patriots. We understand the responsibility placed upon us: we should do that which our grandparents and great grandparents were unable to do. And so, our goals are - to win through to independence for the Ukraine. Also - to spread the ideas of nationalism among the youth. Not for the purpose of gaining as many members for our organization as possible. We propagate the ideas of nationalism among the youth, so they will understand the task of the Ukrainian nation.

[Kutsay] You have separated yourselves from the Union of Independent Youth into a Nationalistic group. Was this a calculated move?

[SNUM] Yes.

[Kutsay] Then what, in your opinion, is nationalism?

[SNUM] Nationalism - is when the nation is eminent above all else. This calls for the willingness for self-subjugation. All other interests must stand below those of the nation. In other words, everything should serve for the good of the nation.

[Kutsay] But is this not just another extremism, like the internationalism promulgated not long ago?

[SNUM] No. If a nation is not independent - it is simply a colony. It is one thing to walk around in a horse collar, even if it is a golden one, another - to be a free individual. This is an attainable goal, it is simply difficult to bring it about with Ukrainians.

[Kutsay] Does your Union include faithful?

[SNUM] All of us are faithful. We do not accept atheists as members. The Union's motto - God and the Ukraine. We can see where a lack of spiritualism led. A person who is not guided by higher moral principles cannot be trusted to defend the interests of a nation. If there is nothing holy beyond the soul, then it is capable of betraying the nation at any moment. We accept followers of any faith as members, but they cannot be atheists.

[Kutsay] Do you have any enemies?

[SNUM] Yes, the KGB.

[Kutsay] Some refer to the burning of Komsomol membership cards, which practice is followed by members of your Union, as nothing but an act of vandalism...

[SNUM] This refers to events in Berezhany, in the Ternopil oblast. There an event took place - we called it the ceremonial burial of Communism. But we did not burn Komsomol cards. We built a small coffin, piled our Komsomol card inside, and buried it. That was not vandalism, it was not ruinous, it was simply the preservation of relics for our descendants. And the members of Komsomol should be grateful to us for that preservation. In general, SNUM members do not pay any attention to such comments. They simply leave the Komsomol, because our first requirement for membership is quitting the Komsomol and the Communist Party.

[Kutsay] So you have a definite stance towards the Komsomol?

[SNUM] Yes, we simply ignore it. Today both the Komsomol and the Party are bankrupt. Although the ideas which they promoted may have, in themselves, been good, the methods of establishing them were so discrediting, that to convince someone to join them now... Lies will take you around the world - but you cannot return.

[Kutsay] Does your organization have any potential?

[SNUM] We are a political organization. We do not offer anyone a piece of rotten sausage just for fighting for our ideas. We simply propose an idea and strive to defend it. This should be persuasive. The fact that our youth is not so much apolitical as soul-less is the fault of the system.

[Kutsay] How would you characterize the political life of the Ukraine?

[SNUM] The general Ukrainian population lives under a spirit of provincialism. Many simply cannot visualize life without the "one and only, indivisible"... They do not think about their grandchildren.

[Kutsay] Why do you call Russians Muscovites?

[SNUM] That is their historical name. "Russians" is an artificial name. Until the 17th century this country was called Muscovy.

[Kutsay] If independence is won, will your organization cease to exist, or transform itself into something else?

[SNUM] It will participate in building the nation.

[Kutsay] How?

[SNUM] Raising the spirit of the people, or making certain the nation never loses its status of primacy. So the nation does not become assimilated.

[Kutsay] In other words, you will be some kind of national defenders?

[SNUM] Yes. Because there are many who long for our black earth. There were Germans, and Muscovites, and Poles...

[Kutsay] Does this nationalism not imply superiority over other nations?

[SNUM] For Ukrainians, the Ukrainian nation is the greatest. Similarly, for any patriot, his nation is the greatest. This is completely normal. There is no contempt of other nations. Only contempt of oppressors.

[Kutsay] Are there only Ukrainians in your organization?

[SNUM] Yes. The very name "nationalists" signifies this. Every person can be a patriot of his nation, but he cannot be a patriot of the Ukrainian nation. We have the right to be in the front ranks of the ones seeking Ukrainian independence.

[Kutsay] Which political parties and movements do you support?

[SNUM] In the beginning, SNUM was organized as a youth affiliate of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union. But afterwards the opportunity to think and exist for ourselves led us to declare ourselves an independent organization. Independent of any parties and organizations. But at the present time we are in agreement with the Ukrainian Christian-Democratic Party and to some extent with the Ukrainian Republican Party...

Further Development of Ukrainian Democratic Platform Discussed

*91UN0273B Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
Nov 1 90 pp 1, 3*

[Interview with V.Ye. Khmelko, co-chairman of the Ukrainian Party of Democratic Accord (CPSU Democratic Platform) organizational committee, and doctor of philosophical studies, by Olena Hubina: "When Privileges Appear"]

[Text] A conversation with V.Ye. Khmelko, co-chairman of the Ukrainian Party of Democratic Accord (CPSU Democratic Platform) organizational committee, and doctor of philosophical studies.

[Hubina] Valeriy Yevhenovych, what caused the Democratic Platform to separate itself from the CPSU in Ukraine?

[Khmelko] Even before the opening of the 28th Convention of the Ukrainian Communist Party, several factions had appeared within the Democratic Platform. A survey of the delegates at the Democratic Platform's 2nd Conference had revealed that among them approximately 21 percent were for staying in the CPSU and working toward its democratization, regardless of the decisions of the Convention; another 15 percent thought the opposite, stating it was a waste of time to wait for any kind of decision, inasmuch as the party was not conducive to reform, that it was necessary to leave it and create our own independent party. Fifty-five percent thought it best to make our decision based on the decisions of the CPSU's Convention. In several republics the Democratic Platform's supporters have formulated a series of positions, which, if not ratified by the Convention, would make it impossible to remain in the CPSU. As a delegate at the 28th Convention at the Ukrainian Communist Party, I presented these demands. The first: to condemn all crimes committed in the name of the Party and under its leadership. At the republic's party convention this demand was ratified by a majority vote. But the 28th CPSU Convention refused to even consider the question of responsibility for wrongs inflicted by the party's leaders on the people.

The next demand, which seemed to us to be self-understood,—to create an inventory of the party's property and return to the people that which was wrongfully taken away from them by the previous leadership. We are only now beginning to discover some of these things: for example, many newspapers, sanatoriums, hospitals, which belonged to the state, were simply appropriated by the party. The illusion was put forth that the party's riches were accumulated contributions of its members, and that it wholly supported its own apparatus, and its sanatoriums, and its newspapers. And our demand that appropriated state property be returned is met by the party apparatus, which supports itself at the cost of these holdings, with categorical opposition.

The Democratic Platform declared itself in favor of a change from a mono- to polycentrism, that the party convention elect at least three committees, independent of each other, for organizational-executive tasks, arbitration, and mass communications. The proposal was not accepted. Yet without this there can be no independence of the mass communications sector from the party's administrative committees, its bureau or secretaries, which are in fact command organs.

The principle of direct election of a so-called party parliament was also rejected. The Central Committee cannot be elected by a convention. This is because the delegates simply do not know most of the candidates on the lists. We could mention other demands, but all of them were rejected by both the Ukrainian Communist Party and the CPSU conventions. This is why the

coordinating committee of Ukrainian party clubs, delegates of the party conventions and peoples deputies, who supported the Democratic Platform of the Ukrainian Communist Party, declared their intention to create an organizing committee to prepare a founding convention of a new, independent party.

[Hubina] Organizationally, how is preparation for the convention proceeding?

[Khmelko] The convention will be held in December. Since we all work, and unlike the delegates of the CPSU Convention, we will not be compensated for leave or vacation to attend the convention, we would like to take advantage of time off for holidays. The organizing committee has not taken upon itself the right to decide who may join the new party, and who cannot join. Therefore all supporters of the Democratic Platform, who wish to become founding members of this new party, are registering today under the principles of free expression. Regional organizing committees have been formed in more than 20 oblasts.

[Hubina] Where are the largest organizations?

[Khmelko] In Kharkov, Lvov, Donetsk, Ivano-Frankovsk.

[Hubina] Do many people support you?

[Khmelko] As of the middle of September, over 2500 individuals had registered.

[Hubina] Does this include only those who resigned from the CPSU?

[Khmelko] No, non-party members are also registering for the Democratic Platform. Although the majority, and I think it will continue to be so, are those supporters of democracy, freedom, and justice who had to date been members of the CPSU.

[Hubina] Earlier, even some regional party committee secretaries supported the Democratic Platform.

[Khmelko] I do not know of any such today. At least none of them registered at the 28th Ukrainian CP Convention as supporters of the Democratic Platform. There were 48 Democratic Platform supporters among the 1600 delegates - approximately three percent. If you consider that the party has 1,300,000 members in the republic, then each percent represents 33,000 individuals. I think that after the founding convention our membership should, with time, number 100-150 thousand.

[Hubina] What will this party be called?

[Khmelko] The convention will decide. The republic's organizing committee has decided on a working name - Ukrainian Party of Democratic Accord. This is due to the variety of orientations among the supporters of the Democratic Platform. When it was first proposed, it looked as if it represented mostly persons of a social

democratic orientation. To date supporters of social-democratic ideals predominate. If we are to look to the principles of the international socialist movement, we should consider liberty, equality, and fraternity as equal guidelines. It has become evident that an unexpectedly large number of liberal-democrat oriented members are also leaving the party, and they name freedom as their top priority. It has also become known that among the members of the CPSU, especially in Western Ukraine, there were also religious believers. And so we may also attract supporters of the Christian Democratic orientation. The party could have a wide democratic organization, I believe it could be a humanistic democratic party. If the liberal democratic sector of our party proves to be great enough, perhaps the convention will retain the current working name - Democratic Accord. But if the social democrats predominate, or if the liberal democrats decide instead to join the liberal democratic party which is also being founded now in Ukraine, then it could happen that the convention will accept a proposal to become the Ukrainian social democratic party. There will then arise the problem of uniting with the two social-democratic parties already in existence in Ukraine. But these are all questions of constitution.

[Hubina] To the point, what is your relationship to the CPSU?

[Khmelko] I think our definition of our party as non-communist, but not anticommunist, most adequately characterizes our relationship with the CPSU. We cannot predict how the CPSU will conduct itself towards us. Within the political spectrum, as a party to the left of center we are closer to it than others. But since we are "defectors", the leadership of the CPSU may be more hostile to us, probably, than toward the openly anticommunist Republican party. This could be because we openly declare our opposition to the nomenclature of the CPSU. But we will cooperate completely with the supporters of democracy within the CPSU.

[Hubina] The CPSU was once structured on a class basis. Today the Democratic Platform is supported by skilled workers, the intelligentsia. There are no simple laborers among them...

[Khmelko] There are two questions here. Who supports the party, and whose interests does it seek to represent? In the future, the party will strive to represent not only the interest of a certain class, but the interests of any socialist segments or groups which aspire to effectively work and live in conditions of economic and political freedom, social justice and humanitarian solidarity. Objectively, these interests are closest to the skilled, hired workers, who have not developed mass consciousness, or consumer psychology. Qualified, skilled workers are more certain they will be able to live well under conditions of a free market work force. The ones who do not want to improve their skills are worried. Of course, they will not support our party, but will instead unite with those who for the past 70 years have been promising

them rivers of milk with banks lined with kisel [fruit gelatin dessert] and allowed them to live, almost without working.

[Hubina] How would you define your platform of ideals?

[Khmelko] Detachment from any "isms". Just education and a sound mind. Knowledge of the world in all its movements and expressions. In other words, our party recognizes freedom of ideology. An individual may profess a belief in Marxism or liberalism, Judaism, or Christianity. But if he accepts certain principles of existence of a civilized society, then he can belong to our party.

[Hubina] What about supporters of Leninism?

[Khmelko] I believe we cannot reject any "ism", even Leninism, unless its slogan is used to shield propaganda of coercion and hatred. The very rejection of an "ism" is itself an "ism". Communism is an "ism", but so is anticommunism. If a proponent of Leninism preaches, for example, class warfare, then he cannot belong to our party. But if he understands Leninism as a new point of view on all Socialism, like that preached by Gorbachev, then his views are in no way contrary to ours.

[Hubina] How do you visualize the future Ukrainian government, and what is its prognosis?

[Khmelko] When you speak of the development of social order, this is a complex situation. We, and I include myself in this number, were convinced of the unilinear development of social order, in the reality of its five-member scheme, beginning with the primacy of community and ending with the Communist format. And few noticed that as long as 100 years ago, when Marx was writing his manuscripts, he made the distinction that the way out of the prime condition can take place in various ways. One, where private property predominates, and another, exactly the opposite, where state property predominates. Marx called this the "Asiatic form of production", where exploitation was carried out in the name of the state. Marx's theories on development of systems of private enterprise were fairly good. But little is known of what happens in those where state property predominates. The society in which we are living did not truly develop out of a system of private ownership. State ownership was pronounced here, although at the time of the 1917 revolution it was weakened. Our revolution established state ownership as unquestionably predominant. This ownership, at the cost of millions of victims, safeguarded the concentration of resources for industrialization, for bringing about a commercial revolution in production forces. And guaranteed, possibly, the highest level of exploitation in the world. Today in the capitalist world there is an ongoing process of developing a plurality of ownership forms. If you look closely at this process it is evident that the tendency of socializing ownership predicted by Marx was correct. But as to the concrete terminology, phases, and forms, of course there were quite a few mistakes. I think the social order in which we are today is not capitalistic and not socialistic,

but etatistic ("etat"—"state" from the French). And the one toward which we are striving is pluralistic not only in the political, but also in the socioeconomic sense. Eventually it may acquire a different name, but that is not our concern today. We should strive for a plurality of ownership forms, to equality of competition, so the state is unable to smother any one of them. The state, if it is democratic, should fulfill a social function. It should encourage those forms of ownership that provide not only economic, but also social good, that contribute to the development of individual and societal relationships. Economic means of resolving social objectives are successfully applied by social democrats in the most highly developed countries of Europe, - in Sweden, for example.

[Hubina] Can it be said that the formation of such a society is your program - your "maxim"?

[Khmelko] No, the formation of a society is not our goal at all. I have only described a natural historic process. Our task is to create the political conditions which would allow individuals to create their society in whatever way they wish. Any attempt to design a system, and then to make others carry it out - would be inhuman. That would be the attitude of an inhuman mind, which tried to elevate itself above people.

[Hubina] What kind of political conditions can you create today?

[Khmelko] First is the creation of our party. Only if we unite widely will we be able, at first, to influence the working of the republic's parliament. I support the proposal that we should conduct a referendum to allow the citizens to decide if we need to dissolve parliament and conduct a new election on a multiparty basis.

[Hubina] Do you plan to be a party only at the republic level, or will you become part of some general union-wide party?

[Khmelko] This will be a Ukrainian party, totally independent and not allied with any larger party. But this does not exclude the possibility that if analogous parties are created in the other republics, we will call a congress of all of them and create an informational and consulting office, which would permit us to unite the intellectual resources of all these parties to resolve common problems. We support widespread cooperation of social democratic parties. We expect we will join the Socialist International.

[Hubina] Do you intend to change the democratic centralism as to party discipline and unity? Will your party not soon fall apart in to small subgroups?

[Khmelko] It is very important to understand, that we will not be a party which imposes discipline from above, discipline which does not emanate from the member's own self-interest and desires. Our party will not, in principle, create any organs which can compel anyone to do anything against their will - otherwise even in the name of the best ideals such a party would act as a

quasi-military barrack organization. Open membership, freedom to quit. Instead of unconditional absoluteness of decisions we propose only conditional decisions. Each member of the party has the right to not carry out a decision which does not conform to his convictions or conscience. That is why there would be no need for our party to fall apart. We will operate under a different principle of unity - the principle of democratic unity.

[Hubina] But then this will be a movement, rather than a party...

[Khmelko] I believe our party will be the synthesis of the advantages of the classic parliamentary parties and a political movement. Although, of course, the final decision will be reached at the convention.

[Hubina] I know you do not support the principle of creating a party on a class basis. But could it not happen that in current conditions your members will be socially insecure?

[Khmelko] That is somewhat inaccurate. It is true, we do not support that principle. But that does not mean that our members, who wish to unite within the bounds of their labor collective, cannot do so. That is their right. The proposed statute includes the freedom to unite in any form, and only the territorial one is a requirement.

[Hubina] One more "pointed" question: are you ready to relinquish your share of CPSU property?

[Khmelko] We decided at the very beginning that we would not create any conflicts with the CPSU regarding property. We will immediately relinquish all our partial property claims to the regional and city Soviets - if they believe it to be necessary, they can demand this property for the needs of the population.

[Hubina] Valeriy Yevhenovych, are you not concerned that the Democratic Platform, - the Democratic Accord Party could become a "stepping stone" for some Communists, so they can wash themselves of their ties to the CPSU? In other words, totally self-centered goals...

[Khmelko] Theoretically, it is possible. There are people who want to attain their political self-serving goals with the help of this new party. This is natural and always happens in political life. The question remains, what they can give to the party, and what they will receive in return. For now, those who resign from the CPSU to join our party have the "privilege" of losing their jobs. Therefore, those who aspire to any "graces" cannot expect any from us today.

[Hubina] And in the future?

[Khmelko] That will depend on how the party conducts itself. I expect that with a democratic party structure, there will be no room for secrets - covert decisions and documents. And where there are no secrets, privileges cannot be gained.

Issues Facing Rukh Examined

91UN0354A Kiev KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA
in Russian 31 Oct 90 pp 2-3

[Article by T. Nikulenko: "And Chernyak Personally Gave His Blessing"]

[Text] It did not dawn on me until the last day what the Ukraine People's Movement for Perestroyka [Rukh] Second All-Ukraine Convention was lacking to make the picture complete: Our dear militia that protects us. Between 25 and 28 October, not a single government-issue cap could be spotted in the vicinity of the "Ukraine" Palace. After all, as recently as a year ago, the delegates of the founding convention were guarded by militant militia cordons. However, some of the 15,000 militiamen and Special Missions Militia Detachments massed in Kiev at that time could have been useful to the Rukh people this time, because they were surrounded by a dense circle of not only the followers of the People's Movement of the Ukraine, but also of criminal elements.

A messenger from Poland complained: "Something did not work. This is why Lech Walesa could not send a telegram of greetings to 'the much-esteemed convention' [phrase published in Ukrainian] by telefax." How could he, a person severed from the Ukrainian roots, know that this very expensive device together with a videocassette had mysteriously disappeared the day before. The shake-down inspection of the bags of our and foreign journalists performed by the guards in the best tradition of merchant-detectives did not remedy the situation because on the following day a camera "from the States" evaporated....

However, my journalist brethren were alarmed by a very different disappearance. So, sit down and get hold of your heart medicine and of yourself: A speaker disappeared. They searched for him in vain in the lobbies and hallways. The head of a press center wearily fended off questions: He is not, he was not, he will not be. There was no rough copy left either, because the speech was improvised.

At issue was Aleksandr Savchenko who delivered a coreport with the resounding title, "The Economic Model of a Sovereign Ukraine."

Please note that V. Chernyak himself gazed with favor from the presidium at the debut of a previously unknown candidate. Would he, a doctor of economic sciences and a USSR people's deputy, yield fame and the scientific right of primogeniture to a young colleague for nothing? You would agree that at the time he could kill for it—provided, of course, that the most numerous delegation at the Rukh convention had grounds for reeling off a brown-nosing poem to honor him [published in Ukrainian]:

He is ours, he carries the Lvov seal on him, And he is on the right path. Our greetings to the successor of Masol, Prime Minister Chernyak.

Do not be alarmed if the name cherished by the All-Ukraine Convention is absent from the list of contenders. After all, as the chairman of the Lvov Area Rukh Organization, L. Senik, announced at a press conference, the person elected to this post now will hold on to this position for at best a year. Then, God willing, "one of ours" will be prime minister.

Of course, all of us are interested in knowing by means of what prepared scenarios (apart from the hunger strikes of students and the promised strikes of workers) the opposition intends to overcome a crisis in the Ukraine. Only dimwits would agree to suffer and be patient for another 12 long months without saying a word, if an original salutary concept exists that is, on top of it, altogether devoid of shortcomings, unlike the "closed programs of Abalkin and Shatalin, which the working people do not comprehend" and "the pseudoscientific substantiation of a united economic space" that were scathingly and convincingly criticized in a report by I. Drach. I am prepared to be the first one to go to a rally or demonstration or pitch a tent in the square in the name of such a program—never mind that I am not a Rukh member. This goes without saying for those who have been in the Rukh since day one.

V. Boyko from Ternopol deliberated: "We have captured a substantial segment of deputy mandates in the elections. We have brought in 40,000 volumes by Grush-evskiy. We have displayed blue- and-yellow flags wherever we have been able to. What next?"

K. Matviyenko from Kiev admonished the audience: "It is time to switch from the active negation of existing state and economic structures to vigorously creating them."

The journalists put down the people from Lvov who were carried away by their "march to the east" by means of a tricky question: Would it not be better to use the economic success of democratic soviets for propaganda rather than lecturers and amateur performers?

This was a rhetorical question, judging by the fact that the numerical ratio of "teams" from the western and eastern regions at the second Rukh convention did not at all improve compared to the founding convention. Judge for yourselves: Lvov sent 409 delegates; Ternopol, 273; Ivano-Frankovsk, 268; Donetsk, 32; Zaporozhye, 27; and Lugansk and Nikolayev, 28 each.

V. Sichka representing the Christian Democratic Party reminded them: "We will only be able to say that the Ukraine is one when 'Glory to the Ukraine!' [phrase published in Ukrainian] in a thousand Galician voices is seconded by a thunderous 'Glory to the heroes!' by miners!"

However, the Second Congress of Miners simply did not let much-esteemed Mr. Shvayka [published in Ukrainian] go to the podium, despite all his efforts, the impressive mandate of a people's deputy, and the title of deputy of the Ukraine Supreme Soviet Commission for

the Issues of the Economic Reform. The man from Galicia, whose pride was hurt, did not conceal his resentment and described the defiant proletarian event as being "anti-Ukrainian from start to finish."

Well, the easiest thing is to sulk childishly, stigmatize from the podium "the strong and reactionary stratum of consumer mentality," and put one's faith in exporting revolution to the lagging (also: dormant) regions. However, is it worth it? Our fellow citizens are more familiar than anyone else with a similar scenario dating 70 years back. To be sure, at that time, this looked as follows: "To the peril of all bourgeoisie, we will whip up the flames of a world fire...."

It dawned on one delegate after another: The economy is the cornerstone! One after another, they ignored the brilliant—if we believe S. Golovaty—report on the economic model of a sovereign Ukraine. Apparently, the ingrained habit of grasping programmatic truths exclusively from the lips of number one personalities, be they in the state, the party, or the movement, was a factor. At a minimum, it should have been from the lips of the Council of Collegiums that united the entire scientific potential of the Rukh under the leadership of V. Chernyak, who is already known to us. However, it is not ruled out that the unimpressive age and academic degree of A. Savchenko weakened the impact on the audience. It could be that the audience was not up to the theoretical wisdom he offered, despite the fact that, according to the data of the credentials commission, more than half of the audience have a college education, and slightly fewer than 150 have academic degrees.

This hurt, and this was annoying; after all, in his improvised speech the resident of Kiev managed to all at once cut through the problems that the titans and maestros of Soviet economics have been trying to tackle in vain until now. Please, take into account that the difficulty of his task was multiplied because, as the Rukh chairman stated in his report:

"The economists of the Ukraine have yet to explain by means of precise statistics and calculations (perhaps, mainly to themselves) that Ukrainians are no less able to manage on their own than our distant Papuan brethren. The complication is that before the Ukraine creates a real economic service, it should create a counterintelligence service that will be able to steal in Moscow or at the Ukraine Communist Party Central Committee Politburo complete and trustworthy data on material resource, financial, and all kinds of other economic balances of mutual relations with the imperial center. This is entirely understandable because secret statistics conceal the death of colonialism in the Ukraine, just like Koshchey's death was hidden on the point of a needle."

I am ashamed to admit it, but the author of these lines is likewise not up to giving his due to my fellow Kievan for the originality and brazenness of his ideas. All I understood was that it is better not to ship Ukrainian meat and

grain beyond Mikhaylovskiy hamlet, but to eat it ourselves and that prices should be regulated by a market and taxes should be minimal. In general, it will be more convenient for the republic and it will be better provided for in a common European rather than Soviet economy.

Aleksandr Savchenko assured like-minded people: "We have worked out a specific plan for our transition to such an economy." Further on, I quote as close to the original as possible in order not to put an overly free interpretation on it.

So, the plan provides for three stages.

The first stage is preparatory. In the course of its implementation a number of economic laws will be adopted, economic borders of the Ukraine will be created, the payment of hard currency (and maybe rubles) to the center will cease, and an extensive network of the market infrastructure will be established. The author allows...two to three months for this.

The second stage should be started by radically privatizing state property. The Ukraine's own currency should be introduced in short order, and price and wage controls should cease. A whole (!) month...is allowed for all of the above.

The candidate of sciences with a promise solemnly swore to place the Ukraine on a market footing and lead our people of 50 million to the promised land...within three months.

The speaker outlined prospects with enthusiasm: "At the third stage, we should expect the standard of living to improve. Implement structural changes in the economy at the first stage, make the grivna a convertible currency, join European economic structures, and in time the Common Market. By the end of this stage, the standard of living should come very close to European standards."

Pardon me for repetitions and stylistic shortcomings—I quote verbatim from the stenographic record. Who cares about the beauty of style when brilliant heights open to our gaze? The next generation will live under communism!

Excuse me, I got carried away. It should read: under anticommunism. This is the only way!

However, we cannot disregard problems that will still surface in the course of building the economy of an independent Ukraine. In the opinion of A. Savchenko, these are shortages of currency and experience, plus the inability of "the Rukh people" to explain an obvious truth to the miners. It turns out that if the Donbass joins a unified all-Union market, 95 percent of the mines will go bankrupt within several months. On the other hand, if they establish ties with the Ukraine, 95 percent of the mines will be able to prosper.

Of course, explanations and comments by the author would be very helpful in this instance. For example, what way out is he aware of if, contrary to our expectations,

foreign countries will not help us? However, if you recall, reporters who are fond of sensations did their legwork in vain looking for the hero of the day. All of them became utterly confused when they found out that the broad circles of the Rukh public utterly failed to take notice of the programmatic speech, as if it had been a gust of hot air similar to a rumor circulating in Kiev about the "creme de la creme" of the opposition and the diaspora who were cloistered at a dacha in the country in order to work out an alternative economic program.

In addition, the delegates came down hard on the meeting as either "a festival of the party economic aktiv of recent times" or "an extraordinary congress of messages of greetings and poems."

Perhaps delegates from oblasts in which the Rukh monopoly on power has crowded out the party monopoly were disappointed the most. It looked like they did not believe the explanations of their leaders to the effect that the lack of apparent success in the social sphere was due only to the resistance of the old administrative command system. However, since when is it a novelty to us to ascribe our mistakes to the scheming of the enemy?

V. Boyko from Ternopol blamed the center: "The Council of Collegiums has done virtually no work. We need methodological guides that will outline in detail, for example, how to conduct the privatization of enterprises. We have been losing, and will continue to lose, authority in the absence of this. We are ready to pay for such work, but at a maximum only two months remain to do it."

For his part, V. Klim from Chernovtsy put it as plainly as can be:

"The previous leadership failed to present political and economic programs."

The word "crisis" hung in the air more and more often. It was no accident that V. Klim demanded that contacts between oblasts and the diaspora be established directly rather than through the central apparatus: Supposedly, in this manner a package of laws for the Ukraine could be obtained sooner. Having perceived that rescuing those drowning is up to those drowning themselves, the chairmen of oblast soviets, V. Chernovil and N. Yakovina, united in the Association of Democratic Soviets and Democratic Blocs headed by Sergey Konev.

Thunder struck on day three when the head of the Kiev branch of the Ukrainian student union, A. Doniy, asked to have the floor; he is known as one of the leaders of the recent student hunger strike. In the name and on behalf of the youngest and most impatient delegates of the All-Ukraine Convention, he forced his way to the podium and read a declaration that had been adopted during a break:

"In one year of its existence, Rukh has shown itself to be a viable force that has focused the striving for national

and social liberation. However, almost all of its accomplishments are the result of spontaneous enthusiasm on the part of its rank-and-file activists.

"An economic, social, and political development concept is badly needed for the further effective work of Rukh as an organization, as well as the national democratic movement as a whole. This is precisely what we expected of the Second Rukh Convention. Much to our regret, despite the attempts of some delegates to steer the proceedings in a constructive direction, the convention drowned in the euphoria of self-delight and repetition of well-known truths. The idea of Ukrainian statehood has very often been defeated precisely because of the excessive preoccupation with emotions and the absence of an integral concept. Only a super-new, ready program of actions may now unite all strata of the Ukrainian public with a view to creating a state. It is not words but deeds that define an organization. The young people hunger for an action program, and they will be forced to act on their own if there is no program."

The chairman was taken aback: "This is undemocratic and not nice." However, M. Goryn came to the rescue:

"The situation next to St. Sophia's Cathedral is complicated. The Executive Committee of the Interparty Assembly and the Committee of National Salvation have decided to stay there until morning in order to protect the national holy place against profanation. The Lvov delegation has allocated five buses in order to have a place to get warm during the night."

Having all at once forgotten about the discord, the delegates resolved not to go to the palace next morning, and to go to Bogdan Khmelnytskyi Square to a man instead in order to prevent Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church Aleksiy II from holding a service there through joint efforts. You saw the details of what happened later on TV; KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA also reported on them. Sleeves and pockets were ripped off. In addition, a handful of severed buttons and somebody's hat badly mangled during the melee were found at the location.

Despite the "hated service of the emissary of Moscow" taking place after all, the delegates came back excited and even in high spirits. An improvised press conference, which on this occasion was held in the central auditorium rather than in a small reception room, lasted almost two hours. The smart correspondent of an independent newspaper described with outrage the arbitrary actions of Rukh guards as recently as the day before. They forcibly exposed to light the film on which a clash between delegates during the handing out of the Bibles brought by rich American guests was recorded. This time, having forgotten the wrongs of the past, my colleague angrily stigmatized Special Missions Militia Detachments personnel who dragged him down from a tree and took away his film with priceless pictures with St. Sofia's in the background. Nobody brought up yesterday's differences.

...The delegates of the Rukh Second All-Ukraine Convention went home feeling that they had done their duty.

Return of Tatars Increasing Tension in Crimea

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No 43, Oct 90 pp 6, 7; No 44, Nov 90 p 7

[Article by Lev Korneshov: "Letters from Crimea: The Peninsula is Suffering a Calamity; or, Meditations in Yalta in Bad Weather"]

[No 43, Oct 90 pp 6, 7]

[Text] In his utopian novel, "Ostrov Krym [The Island of Crimea]," Vasilii Aksenov described the flowering and the demise of an exotic state called "Ostrov Krym." In the real Crimean Peninsula that actually exists and is known under the administrative title of "Crimean Oblast, Ukrainian SSR," the time of its flowering, it would seem, has also passed. Surrounded by the waters of the Black Sea, it plies its course at an ever-increasing speed, and bodes no one well...

There was no Autumn in Yalta this year. The season is highly infused with anxiety. The low clouds, the wind and the already dim sun—all this is as usual. In such changeable weather, one sharply senses the aromas of the bountiful earth and the sea, and the plush green of its attire. But just as even in the freshest of air one sometimes senses the bitter scent of a still distant fire, so it is here in the mellow days of Autumn in Yalta that one can sense the imminent approach of the bad weather.

At present there are not that many people in Yalta; the people vacationing there are the ones who cannot afford a Crimean summer. It looks almost like a provincial town, for the basic "contingent" of its Fall guests are people from the nation's peripheral cities and towns.

Yalta today is not much like the "pearl" it has long been called; it is more like an old maid from a broken family, who has lost all hope for acceptable suitors.

Although the charm of its past has not been erased, Yalta is no longer numbered among the world-class resorts. What a pity.

The citizens of Yalta have done a great deal, praise them, to save their city from ecological disasters. The Black Sea noisily beats against the pebble beach in light blue, transparent waves; breathing is easy here, and the cypress and palm trees still bear traces of lasting beauty. Lines form every morning, and the line for newspapers is not the shortest one. In the evenings the video halls show sex and porno films and the like, and the movies are showing "Love Nets," "Let's Make Love," "Love and Trust," "A Short Film About Love," and of course, "Superman." But the program "Vremya" attracts the largest audience.

During times of anxiety there is increased demand for information, not for love.

Although the October temperatures in Yalta are within the average range of many years standing—10-12 degrees, the political atmosphere has become highly charged.

Along the route from Simferopol to Yalta one can see first in one place, then another, hastily-built temporary lodgings made of yellow limestone blocks, some like Caucasian mountain huts, and some like the foundation for a future house. These are the hastily-erected houses of the Crimean Tatars coming back from all over, most of which are erected on land that was taken without authorization. The dwellings are being put up rapidly, often on plowed land, or on plantations where grapes, tobacco and other very valuable crops are raised. All of them are being erected in violation of all norms, to include sanitary norms, without considering the social infrastructure that has evolved, on land the value of which is devilishly high. According to expert estimates, a hectare of Yevpatoria land is valued at about four to five million rubles. The authorities, who have suffered a defeat, are at times antedating the buildings, and are incapable of resisting the pressure.

Self-appropriation [samozakhvat] is a word that openly declares both a challenge and a threat.

Well, what can one say? The nation had endured cruel persecution and oppression, had been driven off its native soil, had been broken up and separated, and during the years of wandering its culture and spirituality began to decline. Now the time has come for the return, and Crimean Tatars are returning, and they are not asking anyone for permission to do so.

Today 96,700 of them are already living in the Crimea. By the end of the year, according to the most conservative estimates, another 11 or 12,000 are expected to arrive—by air, by train, in personal or other motor vehicles. In all, nearly 300,000 people are expected to return. Where shall they live, where shall they work, and where shall they treat and school their children? They do not want to think about this, as one of the participants in a meeting told me: let those who drove us out of the Crimea worry about that. But you see, "those people" are no longer in power for the most part; they are resting in the earth, or all our lives they have been looking down on the meetings and on the Crimean Tatars with the colorless, baleful eyes of old men.

In its decree (of 11 June 1990), the USSR Council of Ministers appropriated 255 million rubles and, as we understand it, planned "immediate measures" for the return of Crimean Tatars to the place of their historical settlement. But that is not even a drop in the bucket; it is incredibly small in comparison with the real needs.

The aid which was rendered from the center has dissipated, just like a very thin layer of butter spread on toast—the aroma is there, but one is still hungry.

And one has to think: I wonder how much the "operation" to deport the Crimean Tatars and other people

which the regime could not tolerate cost then, in those bygone days? There is someone to whom to present the bill, but—there is no one to call to account for it...

The tent villages of the Crimean Tatars at the buildings of the Soviets, state and social organizations—all that is already old hat. They are supposedly illegal, but in order to remove them, one has to use force. However, it was decided not to use force, in order not to inflame passions. In Yalta, local citizens gathered and dispersed the tents at the city Soviet—and the police were forced to protect those who had pitched the tents with a flimsy chain. Here everything was illegal: the appearance of the "village," the pressure on the city authorities by the tent-dwellers and those standing behind them, the many demands and, finally, the method of dispersal. The situation was repeated in various places, and the Crimean police have displayed a marvelous ability to walk the tightrope, while appearing in the dangerous zones of seething passions. The police are in an unenviable position; at times they can be compared with combat engineers working in a field thickly sown with mines of old and new manufacture.

The tent villages are only the above-water parts of the phenomenon. And what lies in the depths, hidden from view for now? The people are talking and thinking about this with caution.

The specific character of the Crimea is commonly known and commonly acknowledged. But it should be born in mind that there is no unoccupied land belonging to no one in the Crimea. Everything here that can be divided has long since been distributed. It is difficult to find a "spot" on which to build a single house, and as for entire settlements which the "returnees" want to occupy immediately? And the workers on the Livadiya Sovkhoz, who once upon a far from pleasant day discovered a tent encampment on the sovkhoz tobacco plantation, and then temporary iron stoves too, have become worried. The tobacco means wages for them, and the land under plantation was at one time the best allocated. On the demand of the local residents, the tents and iron stoves were taken down, but their inhabitants have erected a barbed-wire barrier and have brought in fuel (in order to fill bottles with a flammable mixture?).

Somehow at that time, on 30 September and 1 October, they avoided conflict. Two weeks passed. And then on 15 October the tobacco growers from the Koreiz brigade of that same sovkhoz discovered 22 temporary plywood huts on their 87-hectare plantation, set up apparently overnight by the Crimean Tatars. The losses (the plantation was trampled down) amounted to no less than 70,000 rubles. And it was the tobacco growers who suffered the loss. The people were deprived of not only the wages they earned with their labor, but also their very jobs—the plantation no longer exists. And you and I have been deprived of the finest varieties of tobacco... Is it really possible—I want to reiterate one more time—to restore justice by lawlessness and arbitrariness?

The method of operation here is simple and well-worked out: arrive en masse, carry out a "commando raid" on their beloved land, and demand, and demand, and demand—and the authorities give way, for they have no other choice.

Do not be too hasty to ascribe anti-Tatar sentiments to me: the large Tatar families are in my eyes victims too—of the tactics their leaders have thought out; for with their first step on the land of their forebears, they are doomed to deprivation and suffering. And forgive me for being blunt, but it seems to me that the difference between plank bunks in a boxcar and the cold earth in a thin tent under the Fall winds is not very great.

There are also certain regularities in the seemingly spontaneous influx of "returnees" from Fergana, Kodand, Kuvasay and Nurabad. I am confident that many of those who hurriedly arrived in the Crimea first kiss the land of their forebears, and then weep bitterly over it, and would have preferred to wait a bit in order to avoid deprivation. But something (or someone) is forcing them to hastily get moving, pack up and move away...

And now let us attempt to look at the problem not from the tent villages, but from the ranks of those who are demanding their removal. For them the sovkhoz land has suddenly ceased to be no one's land, state land, and has become their own. Their grandfathers and fathers had worked the land, and the land itself provided their means of existence—in many towns and settlements in the Crimea it is hard to find work. The workers at Livadiya or any other sovkhoz, after seeing them hauling building materials into their plantation and erecting tents there, spoiling their labor, consider this an encroachment on their property, on the land which feeds them... And...they are arming themselves, as in the old times, with staves, sticks and clubs. They are protecting state property as if it were their own...

One must bear in mind that even in imperial-czarist times, land-use discipline in the Crimea was not only strict, it was severe. From the point of view of the sovkhoz workers, who had absolutely nothing to do with the deportation of the nations in the war years, in their eyes an unlawful act is being committed, which, it seems to them, the authorities are indulging. And the authorities are in the clutches of a vice; they are not capable of solving all these problems—and it is useless to expect any help—they keep holding endless meetings in Kiev, and in Moscow, and they adopt countless laws, from which nothing improves, and it is simpler to just live until they disappear.

The hope that things would somehow take care of themselves and that good will would gain the upper hand was not justified. But at first there were not yet opposing sides; on the contrary, there was sympathy for the people for whom justice had begun to dawn after many decades. But the indecisiveness in adopting decisions, and the gap which grew over time between the adoption of the

Declaration of the USSR Supreme Soviet on Deported Nations and the State Program for the Return of the Crimean Tatars, led to a sharp worsening of the situation. A document of enormous legal, ideological and moral value remains merely a declaration, and the billions necessary to implement it have not appeared. Yes, correcting the criminal mistakes of the past costs billions today. But billions aside—what they were capable of doing was not done: if only to halt the exporting of building materials, so badly needed here, from the Crimea. They are shipped in, and then shipped out...

On the surface the conflict in the Crimea looks like an inter-ethnic one: on the one hand, the Crimean Tatars; on the other—Ukrainians and Russians, in short, those who have been living here for a long time: locals. For now this is only on the surface. But barricades with national flags on them are already being built... And those who are building them are trying by every means to ignite the fires of inter-ethnic hatreds.

The populace of the Crimea has always, for centuries, been multinational; Crimean Tatars, Russians, Ukrainians, Karaites, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Greeks, Jews, Georgians and so on used to live here. In the resort seasons (and they extend almost year-around here), the widest variety of people, including "exotic" nationalities would come here, receive treatment and take their leisure here. And even after the revolution, there was civil war here, but not inter-ethnic conflict.

And now, suddenly, there are pamphlets and slogans... "Ukrainians, Remember that you are Ukrainians!" and "The Sovereign Crimea Welcomes the Sovereign Ukraine!" And of course, far from kind words addressed to the CPSU and the USSR. For example, a broad-shouldered youth stands at the "picket" with a banner: "Dyadyu Usachov! Vidkryte khoch odin klas ukrainskoi movi v Yalti!" [Uncle Usachov! Open at least one Ukrainian language class in Yalta] What a rascal and chauvinist, it seems, this "uncle" is—he doesn't want to open "khoch odin klas" and that's that! And how is City Soviet Chairman V.F. Usachev supposed to open one when he receives only five applications from parents desiring in-depth study of the Ukrainian language for their children: three—in elementary school, and two—in kindergarten? Of course, the broad-shouldered youth knows all this, but he stands there anyway, showing off in full view of a bunch of like-minded people with their own "national" slogan... It would be better if they had gone from house to house, to the families, explained the situation and tried to convince them... But one does not gain popularity for that; on the other hand, one can come to the city executive committee, and with slogans!

Funny? Not very. It is bad when political action is turned into a popular game without rules.

And the attempt to blow up Lenin's statue in Feodosia is no longer surprising—the glass flew out of the windows of neighboring houses—nor the incitement to dirty tricks, and the deliberately supercharged hysteria...

I am convinced that what is going on in the Crimea is only outwardly depicted in inter-ethnic colors. Unfortunately the forces here that are making themselves heard the loudest are trying to decorate the struggle for power with a spectrum of national colors.

And you see, the situation can be summed up in a few words: some want to live peacefully, with enough to eat, right where they are living; and others want to live only in the places where their forebears used to live, and from which their fathers and grandfathers were driven.

The pretext for the dispute has become a patch of land, and clearing up the nationality of its owner—and this is the second step...

But here is what I think: Is it not time to put a stop to heating up inter-ethnic passions all the time, in any situation—not only in the Crimea, but all over—and hiding behind the shield of "national" terminology?

The Crimea has been having troubles for a long time, and not just since the return of the first Tatar "returnees." The peninsula has lost its steadying anchors and is drifting into a sea of lawlessness, shortages, speculation, and hopelessness. Resorts which flourished yesterday are falling into disrepair; they have nothing with which to feed the vacationers and there are no medicines. Prices are rising and everyday services are getting worse. Crimean cities are packed with clever young people, who trade, speculate in currency, openly speculate in the most incredible goods, hardly from their own production. There is no dignified work for young, strong, educated people. The economy of many Crimean cities already functions only by inertia. Everything is sold by coupons—it does not make sense for a tourist to buy 500 grams of sugar (coupons allow buying 1.5 kg of sugar, and one kilogram of sausage and meat per person, per month), creamery butter, and buckwheat. And the "savages" completely live up to what was once a humorous nickname—they are getting wilder right before one's eyes. It is now difficult and expensive to come to the Crimea for treatment. And it is dangerous: in the first ten days of October alone, 1,088 crimes were registered in the Oblast.

[No 44, Nov 90 p 7]

[Text] The session of the oblast Soviet of People's Deputies was forced to urgently adopt the resolution, "On the Extraordinary Situation and Necessary Additional Measures; Associated with the Return of the Crimean Tatars," and "On the Basic Principles for the Settlement of Crimean Tatars on Oblast Territory." These are very useful documents, and are based on common sense, and the desire to direct the spontaneous influx of settlers to the Crimea into the channel of existing laws.

Although one of them was titled in a rather bureaucratic manner, "Basic Principles," the problem of where to settle the Tatars has everyone upset, both great and

small. The Oblast Soviet has expressed itself very definitely on this subject. In brief, the question is as follows. The Crimean Tatars could have been resettled on a rational basis in settlements where they had previously dwelt, upon presentation of documentary proof, testimonial evidence or archival materials confirming their deportation, for those directly deported from the oblast or for their next of kin. An exception is made for the southern coast of the Crimea (Alushta, Yalta, Sudakskiy Rayon), the city of Sevastopol, and Bakhchisarayskiy and Sevastopolskiy Rayons, where the high population density, social infrastructure and ecological situation does not all accepting a large number of people. Here it is proposed to settle those who took part in the war and the partizan movement, and specialists needed at the resorts. For others, an altogether proper exchange is offered: Yevpatoriya, Feodosiya, Sakskiy and Chernomorskiy Rayons. As is well-known, they are also part of the resort zone. Allocation of plots of land and bank credits are stipulated for those who decide to settle in Dzhankoy, Krasnoperekopskiy, Razdolnenskiy, Leninskiy, Pervomayskiy and Chernomorskiy Rayons.

It would seem that one could ask for nothing more—save agreement and patience, which are the simplest things but also those which are most lacking... "Only in Yalta..." "Only in Simferopol..." That is what is constantly heard in the Soviets, whose officials have already begun to get the shakes from all these problems.

"Everything, to everyone, right away!"—the return has assumed such proportions that no one can predict how many families will arrive tomorrow or the day after, and from where. Winter is approaching, even if a Crimean winter—and where shall those people live who are now huddling together in temporary shelters? How will they survive the winter? Would it not make more sense to wait out the winter where they are living for the time being? But the dam has already been breached, and a wall of water is coming.

We cannot do a thing, we are not capable of restoring justice in a civilized manner.

And so some are already subscribing to, "We will not bother them, and we will survive," but others are keeping an eye on their belongings...

And among these and others swift figures dart about: on command some of the "returnees" instantly assemble at hot spots; others also sound the assembly and even go to the working collectives and explain: "Do not let your children out in the evenings, such-and-such is expected"... And details follow... Rumors, fears, and false alarms have the Crimea frightened.

The day of 30 September, Sunday, will no doubt be remembered in the modern history of the Crimea; for that was the day that the first warning shots in the air were heard on the peninsula... At night a group of Crimean Tatars had trucked in building materials to the vineyard plantations at the settlement of Krasnokamenka near Yalta. In the morning the local residents,

who first had watched this night "operation" with disbelief, and then—with indignation—ran away. Stakes, sticks and iron bars appeared. And a proven method was put into operation—they blocked the roads to Krasnokamenka and Zaprudnoe, and the Simferopol highway. Leaders appeared in the crowds. People lay down on the asphalt, and for seven and a half hours thousands of other people were prevented from reaching the airport and train stations, or were kept from their own affairs or recreation.

Try to figure out what in this situation is legal and what is not, what is moral, and what is in essence trampling on the law. Judge for yourself: you are faced with the actions of a group of people, who have encroached on your own sovkhoz, and the police are forced to protect them... Many such situations are now springing up; and are they not taking advantage of their nationality to cover up some extremely dubious actions?

The day after these events a crowd pulled down and destroyed the Crimean Tatar's tent city at the Yalta City Executive Committee building: the "cool" confrontation had grown into a "hot" clash. The situation was saved by the very same police, who protected a handful of Tatars with their own bodies, and held off the "attackers." The Presidium of the Yalta City Soviet urgently allocated 150 plots of land for settling Crimean Tatars (prior to 1 January 1991) in addition to the 81 plots already allocated. And this, under circumstances in which local citizens have to wait their turn for decades!

This was a compromise, and it led to what one would expect. The following day, 300 Crimean Tatars gathered at the city executive committee and demanded that all the picketers immediately receive residence permits for Yalta without any restrictions whatsoever, and new plots of land... And in the city, leaflets appeared calling for a political meeting, in order to "defend the Crimea." Today 150,000 people in the Crimea are on the waiting list for housing; of these, 16,000 are in Yalta... But the program for individual construction that was previously worked out has already collapsed. What must a person think and feel, who was just about to receive a plot of land near his home, and suddenly understands that if he does receive it, it will not be soon, and more than likely, two square meters is all he can hope for?

The Bureau of the Yalta Gorkom, Ukrainian Communist Party, appealed to M.S. Gorbachev in a letter: "The acute situation connected with the return of the Crimean Tatar populace has reached its highest intensity." The Bureau has its own view on what is taking place: "The given situation became possible because of the lack of effective legal norms that would have prevented self-appropriation of lands, which does not permit the law-enforcement organs to effectively counter the illegal actions which led to the acute conflict situations..."

Consequently, is the lack of laws to blame for everything?

The public has its own point of view: "We do not trust anyone. No one is doing anything. And they start to do something only when extreme conditions are created, such as blocking the highways, or when strikes begin. The authorities themselves have brought this about..." (quoting from the newspaper SOVETSKIY KRYM).

In other words, the authorities are to blame?

Meanwhile, picketers from Yalta held up slogans at the gorsovet: "Stop the Lawlessness!", and "The people are the owners of the land, and only the people should decide who lives on it."

It is a tragic cycle of misfortune... It is impossible to establish justice while flouting the law; and one must not restore justice illegally, or there will be a breakdown...

If one travels outside of Yalta by way of Livadiya, a few kilometers beyond the famous Livadaya Palace the attentive traveler sees that a fine paved road branches off from the main route. It winds among the villages, and skirts an old church, erected in 1885. The church was richly decorated with mosaics, the work of the Venetian master Antonio Salviati. Anton Pavlovich Chekhov used to attend church there, and on a bench next to the church sat "The Woman with a Little Dog," Anna Sergeyevna, and meditated with Gurov on the eternal and endless movement of life. Later the church was ruined by time and by the people who turned it into a filthy and formless thing, called a warehouse. Through the years, N.S. Khrushchev, L.I. Brezhnev, K.U. Chernenko, and M.S. Gorbachev and their spouses, distinguished visitors of our state, would drive down the road past the former church with its broken crosses and almost totally ruined mosaics.

But the church stands there to this day, maimed and covered with wounds.

I am walking down this road, and walk up to a notice printed in red letters: "Protected Zone. Passage Strictly Forbidden." But I calmly walk past it—the zone is protected, but not strictly, and I say to the kind-hearted policeman in his box: "I wanted to take a look at that," and with a wave of my arm vaguely point to the green slopes of the banks, and the barely-visible roofs of two white marble structures. "Please do," says the policeman without objection. In his own words, he is not here as a guard, but "so that they do not carry things off." And there are things to "carry off"—for a long time the highest leaders of the party and state had vacationed at this former dacha; the last time was, I believe, two years ago. Now there is a "Veteran's" Home here. And it seemed to me that there was a great deal of symbolism in the fate of this "dacha": the flowering and withering of what was at first a noble idea, and its unexpected results. The plan was well-intentioned: to transfer to the veterans the detached houses, the rooms and halls, decorated with marble, walnut and Karelian birch; a peaceful, well-planned park of almost 30 hectares, with fountains, tennis courts, summer houses, pools, a dock and beaches; flower beds, a treatment complex, and a shopping

arcade... Today, 28 veterans live here among all this past splendor, under the care of one doctor and one nurse; for they do not provide treatment at the rest home, they only rest here... And former magnificence because the mark of fading and neglect has already touched everything here, through which the ancient veterans stroll. Shadows in paradise... But then, what kind of means and manpower would the Yalta territorial administration of trade-union resorts have to even properly maintain that which only yesterday was maintained by the entire nation? The paths are becoming choked with vegetation... A great crack has appeared in the white marble of the broad bannistered promenade staircase—it is being held together with wire.

The Crimea is indeed poor if even noble ideas do not suffice for it, if it is growing older and fading before one's eyes, and if the cracks in its brittle structure must be held together with wire...

Of late, the proposal to resurrect the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic is gaining more and more popularity. But it is impossible to predict how implementing this idea would help the Crimea to overcome its most severe crisis. A change in signboards—as the supporters of this high ideal simplify it—would not bring immediate advantages to anyone.

What lies in store for the Crimea in the near future? In order to answer this question, one should know that the numerous appeals by the Crimeans—to the Oblast Soviet, to the President of the USSR, to the USSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers, and to the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers—as yet remain unanswered.

Let someone try to answer why all these distress signals have gone unanswered? After all, this is the Crimea, the Pearl of the Nation, its pride of yesterday, the dream and hope of millions of ailing or tired people—and it is calling for help!

Seventy ministries and 450 powerful enterprises have their own interests and their own properties in the Crimea; but everyone who was able to do so has left the Crimea, abandoning it one by one as its misfortune descends.

The state program for the return of the Crimean Tatars officially goes into effect only after several months. What will happen during that time?

There is yet another reason for alarm: even today, the Crimea and its resort cities are becoming inaccessible for people with average income. Everything—transportation, lodging, treatment—is too expensive. It is as if the Crimean Peninsula is beginning a return to its distant past: it has opened its embrace to foreigners with cash and to native moneybags with their millions. They are already the real masters even now—they are not touched by the problems of those citizens of Yalta for whom cold water is turned on at first light for two hours a day, and hot water once a week. It is not for them that

hundreds of wretched pavilions, stalls, kiosks and hawkers' stands are crowded together, where jaded young people (on far from friendly terms with one another on international soil) offer primitive goods at barbaric prices. And it is not their wives and daughters who are refusing, even under the pressure of the police, to leave the fancy goods store, when they do not even have miserable undergarments; who leave only when they receive the word of honor of both the militia and the storekeepers that in the morning they will sell the delicate goods according to the list.

What is actually not to the taste of the prominent and the rich, and what it is that they cannot "correct" is the fact that the once splendid waterfront and restful squares have, because of those same outdoor tables and boxes at the trade bazaars of the slum regions, begun to resemble the underdeveloped southern parts of the country... But this is something that can be set right: when they buy Yalta, they will set right and improve all this... But do they want to sell their Yalta to its present citizens, as, incidentally, to those citizens from other cities in the country, for whom treatment here once a year—is their only means to escape for a little while the funeral parlor, and the words, "Rest in peace, dear comrade"? They are not the ones lying down left and right on the Simferopol highway. But perhaps even earlier, before such things take place, the burning flame, not of inter-ethnic, but socio-political conflict will be ignited. And then, the Crimean Peninsula, having lost all its anchors, will be inundated by the ninth wave...

Today the Crimea is sending the entire country an SOS signal.

O country, help the Crimea!

Caucasus

Background Experience of Armenian President Ter-Petrosyan Detailed

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[Article by Gevorg Martirosyan, OGONEK correspondent in Yerevan: "An Awaited Leader. Sketches for a Portrait of Levon Ter-Petrosyan Against the Background of People Close to Him and Political Opponents"; passages in boldface as published]

[Text] Today the name of Levon Ter-Petrosyan is on everyone's lips in Armenia: he evokes the highest political rating and the most diverse opinions. Some consider him a national hero, others see him as a minion of fortune suddenly swept up to the summit of a political Olympus by the waves of a democratic storm.

Ter-Petrosyan is 45 years old, with a lean face, penetrating eyes and an easy, unpretentious way of speaking. It is hard to fluster him. I know this from his performance at rallies and in parliamentary clashes. He takes

sharp criticism and even direct attacks with dignity and strives to keep his feelings in check. Only his eyes get more stubborn and the phrases which he hammers like nails into his opponents' objections become shorter.

He devoted himself to the study of a vast area of history and philology: Armenian-Assyrian cultural links. A man with a European education, speaking a good dozen languages, Levon Ter-Petrosyan is a doctor of philology, member of the USSR Association of Oriental Studies and the French Asia Society, author of six monographs and more than 70 papers published in this country and abroad. In the scientific community dedicated to exploring the Christian East he has the firm reputation of a gifted researcher. And now, suddenly, a sharp turn from the musty old manuscripts of the Matenadaran to the restless pursuit of politics.

Science was the main thing in my life, it satisfied all my needs and gave me real spiritual pleasure. I had no inferiority complexes, because I was always pleased with the results of my work and its assessment by colleagues. So if something has forced me to change my lifestyle and forget science for a time, it is only a sense of duty to my people.

I joined the struggle and took my place in the trenches. Fate has ordained that I am now at the head of that struggle. But even now I have not lost the feeling of being a soldier. When I see that I'm no longer suitable for my position I'll quietly return to science or occupy a more modest place in our movement. I think this is true not only of me, but of all my friends. Incidentally, there have never been people with unsatisfied personal ambitions or pursuing selfish aims either in the "Karabakh" committee or on the AOD [expansion not given] board. If that were the case we would have long since lost the recognition of the people.

If Ter-Petrosyan doesn't change his views it will probably be a long time before science gets him back. True, Academician S. Arevshatyan, director of the Matenadaran, where Levon worked from 1978 until his election as head of parliament, is more optimistic. He hopes that his erstwhile senior research associate will find time to help train at least one or two graduate students...

Back when the very first rallies were being held many had accused the members of the "Karabakh" committee of wanting to engineer a coup d'etat. Before me is a long article, occupying almost an entire newspaper page, called "Hour of Trouble and Hour of Responsibility," which was published in December 1988 in newspapers of the republic. The author, who wished to remain anonymous, offered the following assessment: "Political adventurers who stop before nothing in pursuit of their selfish aims have come to the fore. These aims are well known: they aspire to power, pushing people to the last line beyond which inevitable tragedy awaits them."

The entire republic read those words, and the central press quoted the most strident paragraphs. But the committee activists were unable to see their "portraits:"

Two days earlier they had been detained by General Makashov, the military commandant of Yerevan, and delivered under guard to the investigation detention center of Moscow's Butyrka jail.

What preceded the arrest?

...February of the memorable 1988 saw almost all of Yerevan's 1.5 million population spill into the streets. The spontaneous rally went on for several days. Speakers lined up to get to the microphone. The crowd chanted slogans: "The Party! Lenin! Gorbachev!"

That was the Armenian people's response to the decision of the Nagorny Karabakh Oblast Soviet to secede from Azerbaijan and reunite with Armenia. People naively believed that with the proclamation of perestroika all the shackles of Stalin's nationalities policy would fall...

Then there was Sumgait.

Armenia was fated to become the first republic in which perestroika, doled out from above in moderate doses, acquired its true content. For the first time in the country (indeed, in the entire socialist camp!) a wave of mass rallies, demonstrations and strikes swept through Armenia. It was there that the people for the first time rejected this form of struggle in favor of more effective parliamentary struggle. It goes without saying that anti-democratic moves, too, were also first tested here: curfews, repression on the basis of ethnicity, suppression of the Karabakh Armenians' right to self-determination. The system spared no effort to stop the democratic floodwaters in the republic.

The former ruling elite was unable to head the movement. But the fuse of popular anger, insulted feelings and false expectations had already gone off. The "Karabakh" committee was born on the crest of this movement, and it immediately demanded of the central authorities a just resolution of the Karabakh problem and a political assessment of the bloody massacre in Sumgait.

Armenia has been awaiting the answers for almost three years now.

...Prison was not a new experience for Ter-Petrosyan. He had but to recall his first arrest in 1966. True, it was much simpler then. For his participation in student demonstrations twenty-year-old Levon was punished so to say symbolically: ten days' jail—for unorthodox thinking, for attempting to look at his people's history and future not only through the prism of official "proletarian" interpretation. And now, twenty years later, the system again decided to "re-educate" him.

Meanwhile, outside the Butyrka walls the movement in support of the "Karabakh" committee grew. Rallies in Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, Academician Sakharov and the Interregional Deputies Group, the influential Armenian diaspora and democratic forces in the country and throughout the world all called for its liberation.

At one such rally in Yerevan Galina Starovoytova spoke from the stone platform of the Matenadaran (Teatralnaya Square was occupied by troops). She was running for People's Deputy of the USSR from Armenia. Few people in the republic knew her, and a few items in the local press were no firm guarantee of success. But at the rally Starovoytova said something which virtually assured her a seat as deputy: "Together with you, I would like to see here in my place any one of the members of the arrested committee: Levon Ter-Petrosyan or Vazgen Manukyan, Babken Ararktsyan or Ashot Manucharyan, Ambartsum Galstyan or Vano Siradegyan. It is they, I am sure, who are the most deserving representatives of Armenia in the country's parliament."

The central authorities gave in: on 31 May 1989, after six months in detention, the entire committee was freed from jail.

Teatralnaya Square, that Baykonur of Armenia's democratic launches, welcomed the movement's leaders with a sea of raised fists. "Fight! Fight to the end!" Levon Ter-Petrosyan's voice resounded over the square. "Fight to the end!" the square responded.

Shortly afterward the "Karabakh" committee expanded its framework and changed into the AOD—a mass public organization which with redoubled energy continued the struggle for the recognition of the right of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh to self-determination and became a serious opponent of the ruling party.

The AOD board was headed by Levon Ter-Petrosyan.

No ruling party likes its ideology and leadership to be criticized. It resists and, in turn, tries to deliver a counterblow. The relationship between the Communist Party and AOD developed according to this at first glance simple scenario. The confrontation drama resembled a chess game by correspondence. Levon Ter-Petrosyan and his comrades used rally platforms to address the people. Their opponents preferred "work in primary organizations."

The absentee debate fired up the opposition even more, and with each day it expanded its range of criticism: no longer only the much-suffering Karabakh and the plight of refugees, but also the personnel policy of the republic's Communist Party, the anti-Armenian mood of the Center...

Those days visitors to Yerevan were first shown not Echmiadzin or Lake Sevan, as required by established tradition, but Teatralnaya Square. The people had renamed it Freedom Square, and it represented a motley palette of methods of political struggle: groups of people fasting under various slogans; thousands of leaflets and satirical posters pasted on the walls of the Opera, on homemade billboards and even trees; tents of students boycotting classes, and nearby, beneath a plastic shelter, a group of women who had declared a sit-down strike... One builder set a chair in the middle of the square,

carefully hung his jacket with the Gold Star of Hero of Socialist Labor pinned to it, and sat down next to it on the asphalt. To fast.

At times it seemed that Ter-Petrosyan and other AOD leaders could rouse crowds of people to join in demonstrations, picket government buildings or, say, stage a warning strike with a single phrase... And the opposition resorted to such extreme measures, arousing the ire of the Center and highly unsavory interpretations of the Union press.

But the mounting activity of the people yielded fruit. The old Supreme Soviet of the republic recognized 28 May 1918 as Restoration of Armenian Statehood Day and passed a resolution on the reunification of Artsakh (the historic name of Karabakh) and Armenia; it closed down the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant, the ecologically dangerous "Nairit" scientific-production association, and suspended military call-up of young men...

Today the Communist Party is trying to fathom the reasons for losing its prestige, it wants to understand the causes of its election defeat. But even then, during the heady days of popular rallies, it was apparent to the unarmed eye that the party apparatus was skidding, relinquishing the initiative to its opponents without a struggle, and losing even where it seemed bound to win. Either the communists had gotten unused to fighting for power or they were so confident of the entrenched nature of their power...

Last December Levon Ter-Petrosyan addressed a session of the Republican Supreme Soviet with his draft declaration of radical democratic change in Armenia: repeal of Article 6 of the Constitution, introduction of genuine people's power, a new name for the republic—without the words "Soviet Socialist"—etc. However, the Supreme Soviet refrained from passing that declaration.

I consider the rejection of that document a mistake of our opponents and a political victory for the AOD. We showed the people that the Communist Party was no longer capable of responding to national and democratic demands. That it was incapable of changing, in so short a time, a mentality nurtured over decades. We had no totalitarian complexes. It was much easier for us to master modern mentality. Thus new people came to the fore, an entire generation free from the previous regime's dogmas.

And yet, most of Armenia's inhabitants are a moderate democratic majority yearning for change, but extremely fastidious in their choice of means. Of course people reacted sharply to the opposition's mistakes: excessive stridency of statements, uncompromising assessments of the activity of the party, calls for strikes...

Outwardly our struggle appeared to be extremist, our slogans and appeals took the form of acute confrontation, and the authorities classified practical actions as contrary to the law, but behind it all was popular censorship. We always sensed the reaction to our words and deeds and strove to avoid excesses. Sharp confrontation with the

system was a necessary means of political struggle. If we had not distanced ourselves so drastically from the totalitarian regime, if we had not proven its weakness, we not only would not have won, but would, possibly, today be facing tragedy.

At the same time, the revolutionary changes in the Baltic republics, Russia, the Ukraine, and the countries of Eastern Europe inspired hope that a bloodless change of power could take place in Armenia as well. Our political optimism was based on the conviction that the Armenian people absolutely do not accept adventurism and political extremism in any manifestation.

Ter-Petrosyan likes to point to the experience of Eastern Europe, which is why I decided to employ a term from the political vocabulary of that region: "Velvet revolution." Which very aptly characterizes the process of political change in Armenia. The AOD came to power not through violence, but by conventional parliamentary means, and its victory should be treated as natural, not fortuitous.

On 4 August 1990, Ter-Petrosyan was elected Chairman of the Armenian Supreme Soviet. Several days later another leader of the "Karabakh" committee, Vazgen Manukyan, became the republic's prime-minister.

Levon has earned the reputation of a rebel and opponent of the regime. That is precisely what his opponents point out to prove that "anticommunist" Ter-Petrosyan will be unable to establish order in the republic or carry out tangible political, social or economic changes. They quote the following words said by him in the Armenian parliament: "...Can the Armenian people's fate continue to be entrusted to a party whose 70-year criminal activity has brought our republic to the brink of ruin? Actually, this party, formed by alien people and serving alien goals, has nothing in common with our national aspirations and objectives."

When I asked Akop Ter-Petrosyan about the reasons for his son's anticommunism he was genuinely surprised:

"Levon an anticommunist? Levon doesn't belong to the party, that is true, but he is a better communist than you and I, better than many who carry party cards in their pockets. He understands communism as justice and freedom, not the dictate of the party apparat."

One would never call 82-year-old Ter-Petrosyan an old man. He has retained a remarkable youthfulness of spirit, a realistic view of life. And his was rich in events. Akop Ter-Petrosyan was one of the founders of the Communist Party of Syria and Lebanon and member of its politburo, and during World War II he headed the underground party organization in the Syrian city of Aleppo.

"Should a fire happen in the house, the first thing I would take out is my party card," he said, adding after a pause, "To give up your party card today is as despicable

and as much a betrayal as it would once have been to join the party in a dishonest way."

His sons, Telman and Petros, who were sitting there, did not object to their father. I understood from the looks on their faces that such talk is fairly frequent in this house, especially in the presence of the third brother, Levon.

Telman and Petros are veteran communists and experienced managers of major enterprises. Telman is general director of the "Razdanmash" Production Association and, besides, a member of the Central Committee of the Armenian Communist Party and a delegate of its current congress. The noncharter party cell of the Ter-Petrosyan family has not, as is nowadays frequently the case, suspended its CPSU membership. And given the views of the head of the family, Akop Ter-Petrosyan, it is hardly likely ever to do so. It is a remarkably good-natured family, in which the older person's word is honored and the younger person's views are heeded.

Armenia is a collective image of each Armenian family. Personally, I have no objections if it is like the Ter-Petrosyan family: I liked the peace and concord in that house, where different political views live together and where the conscience holds sway over any party uniforms.

Levon Ter-Petrosyan submitted to Parliament candidates for the positions of his deputies: Babken Ararktsyan, a member of the "Karabakh" committee and an AOD leader, and Gagik Arutyunyan, head of a department in the Armenian CP Central Committee. The parliament endorsed his choice. And although the chairman rejected my suggestion that it was a calculated political move, the step was nevertheless understood as a rejection of the policy of confrontation with the communists. It was the only right way to consolidate Armenia not in words but in deeds and to lead it out of the crisis.

In our policy in the interests of the development of the nation we shall be guided by the desire to make use of the abilities of all sections of society, of all political parties. And we shall never, I assure you, give preference to a representative of the AOD if there is a person with better human and professional qualities, regardless of his party affiliation.

Levon Ter-Petrosyan is, in his own words, an adherent of the policy of realism. On its banner is as it were inscribed: "Moderation, tolerance and calculation." The heat of impassioned rallies and extreme radical slogans has been replaced by a positive policy of national consolidation. There are already quite a few communists, including representatives of the party apparatus, in the newly forming cabinet of the Council of Ministers and in the Supreme Soviet's standing commissions.

Levon, who has partaken of the bitter bread of opposition, knows, probably better than others, the importance of having strong political sparring partners. I even sensed in his words a note of nostalgia for a strong opposition corps. The Communist Party has not yet recovered from

its electoral defeat. Other parties and movements are not a serious political force: being in the opposition is, after all, not an art that can be learned by correspondence. But the AOD may, perhaps, become an opposition force in parliament. Immediately after they were elected to their new positions L. Ter-Petrosyan, V. Manukyan and B. Ararktsyan resigned from the AOD board, apparently so as not to be beholden to narrow party interests. And the new AOD leadership may, perhaps, not approve of the chairman's somewhat restrained policy and his already obvious abandonment of rally slogans.

There is some truth in this. But nevertheless, I don't think we will have a destructive opposition. Rather the reverse. Without the keen eye of like-minded people and strict control on their part, we could lapse into stagnation.

Ter-Petrosyan was able to persuade Gorbachev to extend by two months implementation of the decree: "On Banning the Formation of Armed Groups Not Stipulated by USSR Law and the Confiscation of Illegal Weapons." Not least among the arguments that induced the President to make this decision was, apparently, Ter-Petrosyan's assurance that the Armenian authorities were capable of putting their house in order themselves, without outside intervention. This move not only raised Ter-Petrosyan's rating in the republic and the country but also added opponents to him, even in the camp of supporters. For at first glance the promise seemed all but impossible to fulfil.

...Last summer in Armenia was a hot one. Armed clashes along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border drew troops of the MVD and the Armed Forces into an undeclared war. There were wounded and killed on both sides. The central mass media lost no opportunity to report about "Armenian terrorists" sowing terror and death, about their hand-grenades, mortars and ground-to-ground missiles... The original cause of the conflicts was, of course, already forgotten, and even current information was not too thorough. Armenian villages were confused with Azerbaijanian, casualty figures on both sides were quoted arbitrarily, facts were distorted... Try now to persuade Armenians that this was journalistic carelessness: even children here are convinced that the information mayhem is an element in the chain of "Moscow's anti-Armenian policy."

Only recently Yerevan resembled a front-line city. Armed people openly patrolled the streets, motor vehicles without license tags "temporarily" confiscated from the government and private owners raced about at breakneck speed. The nights were pierced by rounds of automatic gunfire... Sensing the inaction of law-and-order agencies, criminals became noticeably more active. Posing as fidains, they entered homes and, taking advantage of national feelings, plundered people, and if people refused to help the "defenders of the motherland" frequently resorted to arms. The people became weary. Of lawlessness. Of fear and violence. Thanks once again to our central press, reports were widely circulated that the Armenian National Army (ANA) operating in the

republic had 150,000 fighters in its ranks. Ter-Petrosyan would later say that the ANA was a myth peddled by its leaders and, especially, those political forces which sought to gain from such a legend. It was necessary to once again reveal to the world the Armenians' "bellicosity," their unwillingness to resolve the controversy with Azerbaijan by political means. The "150,000- strong" army actually numbered several thousand people. Moreover, only a small portion of them were armed.

On August 28, 1990, Vitya Ayvazyan, a deputy of the republican Supreme Soviet, and Geraznik Mikaelyan, commander of a volunteer unit, were killed near the ANA headquarters. They had been sent by the AOD board to investigate the circumstances of a night-time incident at a Yerevan gas station in which ANA operatives had wounded several people. Two more graves were added to the fresh graves of the fidain who had lost their lives in border conflicts...

On August 29, Levon Ter-Petrosyan asked Parliament to declare a state of emergency in Armenia. It was difficult to take such a step: only recently he himself had criticized the authorities for declaring an emergency in Yerevan, calling the decision antidemocratic and antipopular. But there was no other way. A direct confrontation between the armed formations which had pledged their allegiance to Parliament and the ANA was all but imminent.

By a vote of 170 against two abstentions the parliament accepted the chairman's proposal. The ANA was issued an ultimatum: to surrender its weapons and stolen motor vehicles by 10 p.m. on August 29. Otherwise force would be used. The republic waited anxiously...

Fortunately, there was no bloodshed. ANA commander R. Vasilyan laid down arms and appealed over television to units loyal to him. Two hundred troopers holding the ANA headquarters surrendered. The threat of a fratricidal war passed.

It was a victory of common sense, confirmation of the viability of the new authorities and of the resolve and stamina of the head of parliament.

We actually prevented civil war. The former authorities could not have done this—both from a psychological point of view and because of a paralysis in the structures of state. We also averted army interference in our internal affairs. Because if clashes had started in Armenia they would immediately lead to interference by military force from outside. The blood of Armenian people and Russian soldiers would have been spilled. Today this is the movement's greatest achievement. Echoes of civil war continue to be felt hundreds of years later, they painfully affect people's future. That was the fate of the French the October revolutions... If the AOD leaves the political arena today it will, I believe, do so with a clear conscience because, by chance or design, we were able to fulfil our mission.

People mechanically link our policy with fulfillment of the presidential decree. That is not so. Regardless of whether Gorbachev would have issued that decree or not we would have had to do it and we would have done it. It was an inner need of ours, because armed formations destabilized the situation in the republic and hindered the implementation of political and economic programs. And now, they say, the surrender of weapons is proceeding slowly, although already more than 300 have been turned in. People forget that over the previous eight months not a single weapon had been surrendered. Besides, the decree states two tasks. The first is the disbandment of armed groups, the second is the return of weapons in the hands of different people. We have already carried out the first, most difficult task. As for the second, here, too, I hope order will prevail. But in the final analysis, we must be realists: despite all efforts, it will be impossible to collect all weapons on the scale of the Union. The main thing is that we have limited the possibility of their being used.

Life in Armenia is returning to normal. Fear is vanishing, giving way to confidence and optimism. The police have regained confidence and, with the support of special units of volunteers for the defense of the republic and maintenance of public order, they are actively striving to enforce law and order. More than 20 illegally formed armed groups have been disbanded and 500 confiscated cars have been returned to their owners. But it is still too early to speak of complete stabilization.

On August 23, the parliament passed a Declaration of Armenian Independence. It provides for the establishment of republican citizenship, formation of its own armed forces, and direct participation of the republic in the work of international organizations. The document does not specify whether Armenia will remain in the USSR or secede; it simply indicates the commencement of a process of establishing state independence. Ter-Petrosyan sees independence not as a one-time act but as a goal to be pursued. Along this road there is the possibility of the republic joining some alliances. The European Community is his ideal. As for a Union Treaty, Ter-Petrosyan is skeptical.

We regard this treaty as cooperation among peoples. Therefore, firstly, it should exclude provisions for an all-union Constitution or common laws. Secondly, we exclude the existence of a common union government. It is a superfluous agency. And finally, vertical economic ties—that is, ties which extend pyramid-like from the center to the republics—must be eliminated. They must be turned into horizontal relations—based on bilateral treaties between the republics. Under such conditions we may, perhaps, sign a treaty. Shortly after his election Ter-Petrosyan met with Boris Yeltsin. The basis for the dialogue was a good one: Russian builders engaged in restoration work in the earthquake zone sent a telegram to I. Silayev, Chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers: "As a result of the extraordinary measures taken by the new government of Armenia the situation in the republic has improved and is under control. We request that you confirm our firm intention to remain and work

in Armenia. We are convinced that Russian builders must perform their international duty and provide shelter for people dispossessed by the elements."

The two Chairmen also agreed on the need for direct links between the republics. Judging by the correspondence that followed, in the nearest future Russia and Armenia will sign a long-term political treaty. For the majority of Armenians that was good news.

Armenia will shortly sign treaties with Georgia, the Ukraine, the Baltic and Central Asian republics. And what about Azerbaijan? Will there ever be an end to inter-ethnic hostility? Will long-awaited peace come to the homes of the people of Karabakh?

We need negotiations, the Chairman says. Confrontation has exhausted itself. The basis for compromise is the immediate restoration of all local government agencies in Artsakh.

Azerbaijan, however, considers that the issue of Nagorny Karabakh should not figure in any negotiations. But still, the sides are coming to the conclusion that the conflict situation must be settled by peaceful means.

The "initiator and strategist of the Karabakh drama," as Ayaz Mutsalibov, the Azerbaïdjanian leader, has called Ter-Petrosyan, resolutely rejects the view of his opponents, who claim that the AOD leaders used the "Karabakh card" for their election purposes and that now, having come to power, they have relegated this policy to the back burner.

The main thing is to place the rights of Artsakh Armenians under the reliable protection of operating laws. This is task number one. But a political solution of the problem lies in the right to national self-determination. It remains to be hoped that the expansion of the rights of autonomous formations will finally allow Nagorny Karabakh, too, to exercise its political choice in a constitutional way.

Never before has Armenia attracted the interest of the world community so much as in the past three years. The powerful explosion of the Karabakh movement, the devastating earthquake which wiped entire towns and villages off the face of the earth and took the lives of tens of thousands of people, the streams of refugees whose only crime was that they were Armenians, the struggle for democratic change... Three years of pain which have imbibed so much grief and hope, deprivation and joy. The people standing at the helm of Armenia are burdened with a tremendous responsibility. The chairman understands that now a truly popular Armenian parliament must daily pick up speed and open up to the world with good will, concord and readiness for cooperation.

...The gas pipeline blockade went on for more than two months. The republic lived in severe conditions of austerity.

...Some one million victims of the earthquake and deported people will be forced to spend their third winter in a row without a roof over their heads.

...A government commission set up by the Armenian Council of Ministers is considering the possibility of resuming the operation of some production facilities, except for the rubber and latex plants, at the "Nairit" Scientific-Production Association. This is a forced measure prompted by the extremely severe economic situation.

But people do not despair, they have faith that the difficulties will be overcome. Levon Ter-Petrosyan, too, is confident of this.

If only God doesn't turn His back on Armenia!

Yerevan.

Commander Warns Georgia Against Attacks on Military

*91US0175A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
29 Nov 90 pp 1,3*

[Speech by Transcaucasus Military District Commander Colonel General V. Patrikeyev: "Transcaucasus Military District Commander Colonel General V. Patrikeyev's November 27, 1990 Speech on Georgian Television"]

[Text] Dear citizens of the Republic of Georgia!

First of all, I want to express my sincere appreciation to the republic leadership for the opportunity to meet with you and to speak on national television.

My appeal to you today is dictated by the emergency situation that is developing with regard to the army and in particular to each serviceman serving on Georgian territory.

It is no secret that recently cases of attacks against military units and facilities to seize weapons, equipment, and ammunition have become more frequent. During the last three months alone, a whole series of attacks have occurred as a rule against armed sentries and alert-duty personnel at their posts. As a result of these robberies and terrorist acts, many pieces of equipment, several dozen field guns, and more than 3,000 rounds of ammunition of various calibers have been seized. For example, at 22:30 on November 10, 1990, unknown individuals wearing masks conducted an armed attack against a militarized defense post in Khashuri. Having beaten two elderly guards (pensioners), the terrorists seized 20 pistols and escaped. On November 25 at 23:00 hours in the Ponichal area of Tbilisi, unidentified individuals fired at an automobile belonging to a capital garrison military unit which resulted in serious injury to Private Yu.V. Pleshkan, the vehicle's driver, and he has been hospitalized.

Alas, we could continue this list.

Cases of the seizure of buildings belonging to the Ministry of Defense are well-known. Illegal seizure and detention of Kobuletskiy Military Rest Home has continued for a prolonged period of time. A military hunting

society building has been held for a prolonged period of time and the store belonging to it has been robbed. Weapons and other valuables worth more than 180,000 rubles have been stolen.

The Kutaisi Officers Club has been seized twice. Provocations against the Officers Club in Tbilisi have not ceased. We were compelled to post sentries there to guard these facilities and to protect the people working in them. The wave of seizure and theft of military equipment is increasing. During this time, 28 vehicles have been stolen, including more than 50 percent under the threat or with the use of arms.

At the same time, criminals are frequently extremely cruel to servicemen and inflict bodily injury on them. So, in Tbilisi a group of civilians conducted an armed attack against a military vehicle belonging to the military district headquarters security battalion. The driver, Private Burtsev, was severely beaten, is in serious condition with two knife wounds, and is hospitalized. More than 15 such cases have been officially recorded.

There are numerous instances of direct physical assault and moral and psychological terror with regard to individual servicemen and members of their families. In Tbilisi, a group of civilians of Georgian nationality brutally beat Lieutenant Colonel N.D. Bodnar. He is hospitalized in serious condition with a concussion, three broken ribs, a broken lower jaw, and an eye injury.

A group of civilians subjected two headquarters staff officers to a beating for half an hour at the Isani Metro Station on November 4.

On November 12, 1990, the body of Private V.N. Korzyakov was discovered in the center of the capital of Georgia. The investigation is continuing to determine the cause of his death.

The cases I have cited do not have anything in common with rumors, conjecture, or gossip. I am forced to state with a great deal of bitterness that irreversible changes have occurred in the consciousness of a certain portion of the population who traditionally have been distinguished by hospitality and respect for the army toward an inhuman attitude to the men in uniform.

Cases particularly trouble us when the local population conducts agitation activities among servicemen to steal arms and ammunition. So, at Akhalitsikhskiy Garrison, a group of compulsory service soldiers in collusion with civilians stole 580 hand grenades for a large sum of money.

The intensity of agitation is increasing by representatives of certain parties and movements for disposing servicemen of Georgian nationality toward desertion and theft of weapons. Due to their inexperience and falsely understood ideas of patriotism, some young people are succumbing to these political provocations and are resorting to committing acts that are criminally punishable in any society.

You obviously already know about the case of theft of a major shipment of automatic weapons from the Tbilisi Artillery School that was committed by five cadets of Georgian nationality.

Those who committed this serious crime can also cause sorrow in your families: Levan Mamuliyevich Dolidze, Roman Mikhaylovich Buishvili, Mamuka Amiranovich Kavdzharadze, David Shotayevich Kenkadze, and Levan Shotayevich Kenkadze.

The question is reasonably raised: Will those who through their provocations drive these young people to violations of the law and to activities that simply destabilize the situation in the republic and which threaten the lives and safety of dozens of other totally innocent people be held to account. Really in these cases we are not talking about the honor of our dress uniform but first of all about the safety of you, your children, and loved ones. We are not talking about toys but about combat weapons.

I also cannot keep silent about the fact that in contemporary Georgian society which has proclaimed adherence to the ideas of humanity and democracy, we the military have found ourselves to be in the position of total outcasts. We are openly cursed and are called nothing other than "occupiers." We ask ourselves why? We have been deprived of the right to vote. On what basis? They have refused to assign housing to us, families face various barriers to placement in jobs and in schools and preschool institutions. The question arises: How can we live in this situation? What can we do?!

We were compelled to ask the center to assist and support us. We repeatedly insisted that the republic leadership and law enforcement organs take specific steps to prevent such outrages.

We raised these questions during meetings with leaders of various parties and movements and with leaders of the mass media. And today we received the opportunity for the first time to directly appeal to the citizens of Georgia with our alarm, bitterness, and pain.

I want to be understood correctly. **If no changes whatsoever occur after this appeal**, if the provocations, attacks, and terror with regard to servicemen do not cease,—**no other path will remain for us then to defend ourselves**,—which is fraught with unforeseen consequences. This is—not an ultimatum from the military. **This—is an appeal to your common sense, wisdom, and fairness. I express the hope that my speech today will be correctly assessed and correctly understood**, and that reason, common sense, and mutual tolerance, and respect will triumph instead of fanning individual ideas and incidents.

We appeal to the leadership of the republic to put an end to cases of vandalism and robberies against military units, facilities, and servicemen. We demand the immediate return of all seized weapons and equipment to their lawful owners.

I once again stress that this appeal to you is dictated by the main thing: First of all, concern for your safety and your lives. In such situations, I always recall the words of Shota RUSTAVELI: "We have three methods for finding friendship: Do not wish for separation from another—be together with him,—that is one;

"Do not complain or speak from the heart and not just for show;

"Third, rush to help from afar at the needed hour."

Let us all follow these wise words that are so necessary at this hour.

Georgian Defense Commission Chairman Responds to Warning

91US0175B Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
29 Nov 90 p 3

[Reaction to General Patrikeyev's speech by Vazha Adamiya, chairman of the Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet Commission on Defense, National Security and Law and Order: "We—Oppose Destabilization...."]

[Text] Two nights ago panic was introduced to the overwhelming majority of Georgian residents' families via the television screen. The cases cited in Transcaucasus Military District Commander Colonel General Valeriy Patrikeyev's speech have to cause indignation. Evidence of this is the interview with Vazha ADAMIYA, chairman of the Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet Commission on Defense, National Security and Law and Order, and man-on-the-street interviews on Tbilisi streets.

Vazha ADAMIYA: "We Need To Act Strictly Legally"

The Transcaucasus Military District Commander and a USSR Minister of Defense representative recently met with us and we discussed the same issues during our conversation that were touched upon when V. Patrikeyev spoke on "Moamba."

Actually, illegal acts by individual citizens did occur and the theft of weapons also did take place. But I told the military officers that these provocations were not directed against them but against us. As for demands that the Soviet occupation troops leave Georgian territory, we recognize that this issue naturally cannot be resolved on the level of certain marshals and generals or even more so on the level of simple officers and soldiers. I said: "You are soldiers and you carry out the orders of your government. Therefore, this problem must be resolved at the government level and only at that level!" I went on to explain to them that new forces from the national movement assumed power just a few days ago. And, despite this short period of time, we have already managed to conduct our personnel policy in the ministries and in a number of departments and services. The military officers pointed out that the situation had

certainly noticeably stabilized since the new minister had been appointed to the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs].

The deputy corps and the new, still not completely formed government, is actively involved in strengthening law and order in the republic. It is difficult for us to keep track of everything for the time being.... "Therefore, Mr. military officers," I told them, "you yourselves should be concerned about the protection of your equipment! This will also be your assistance to the new government of the Georgian Republic."

In General Patrikeyev's speech, he also touched on the issue about how the rights of military personnel are allegedly being infringed upon and that they have been deprived of the right to vote in Georgia... In answer to his statement, we can only say that the law on elections is the law and it must be complied with just like all other laws. So both Georgia's new parliament and new government, supported by the absolute majority of the republic's population, oppose any illegal acts no matter who initiates them.

We appeal both to military personnel and to all citizens of the Republic of Georgia to preserve the calm and stability and not to yield to any provocations. Destabilization of the situation is not in the best interests of the Georgian people or its government. All issues must only be resolved legally. This must be clear to everyone who feels for the fate of our long-suffering Homeland.

Central Asia

Kazakh Law on State Structure, Changes in Constitution

91US0193A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 22 Nov 90 pp 1, 2

[Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Decree, signed by N. Nazarbayev: "Law of the Kazakh SSR: "On Improving the Structure of State Power and Administration in the Kazakh SSR and Making Changes and Amendments to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Kazakh SSR"]

[Text] In order to improve the structure of state power and administration in the Kazakh SSR and to introduce and develop market relations, and in view of the need to strengthen discipline and order in all areas of state, economic, social and national-cultural construction, the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet decrees:

I. Make the following changes in the structure of organs of state power and administration in the Kazakh SSR:

1. Establish that the President of the Kazakh SSR is the highest executive and management authority in the Kazakh SSR.
2. Create the position of Vice President of the Kazakh SSR.

The Vice President of the Kazakh SSR is elected by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet after selection by the President of the Kazakh SSR.

3. Transform the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers into the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers.

4. Abolish the Presidium of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers, the offices of Chairman of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers, the First Deputy and Deputy Chairman of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers.

5. Create the posts of Prime Minister of the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers and Kazakh SSR state advisors for the basic areas of state, economic, social and cultural construction.

6. The Kazakh SSR Cabinet is formed by the President of the Kazakh SSR and consists of the prime minister, Kazakh SSR ministers and chairmen of Kazakh SSR state committees.

The President of the Kazakh SSR has the right to include in the Cabinet of Ministers state advisors to the Kazakh SSR and managers of other Kazakh SSR organs and organizations.

7. The prime minister and the cabinet of the Kazakh SSR are approved by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet after selection by the President of the Kazakh SSR.

8. Merge the apparatus of the President of the Kazakh SSR and Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers into a single apparatus of the President of the Kazakh SSR.

9. Abolish the Kazakh SSR Presidential Council.

Form, at the office of the President of the Kazakh SSR, a consultative and advisory organ—the Council of the Republic.

The Council of the Republic will include the office of the Vice President of the Kazakh SSR, the Prime Minister of the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers, the chairmen of the oblast and Alma-Ata city soviets of people's deputies and other individuals appointed by the President of the Kazakh SSR.

10. Abolish the people's control organs in the Kazakh SSR.

II. Introduce the following changes and amendments to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Kazakh SSR.

1. In Article 71:

The first section is to read as follows:

"The Kazakh SSR participates in solving problems under the jurisdiction of the USSR, the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR Government and other USSR organs.

The third section is to read as follows:

"Enterprises, institutions and organizations of union subordination can be set up in the republic only with the agreement of the President of the Kazakh SSR, after preliminary agreement with the appropriate soviets of people's deputies.

2. Article 77 is to read as follows:

"Article 77. The Kazakh SSR includes the following oblasts: Aktyubinsk, Alma-Ata, East Kazakhstan, Guryev, Dzhambul, Dzhezkazgan, Karaganda, Dzhyl-Orda, Kokchetav, Kustanay, Mangistauskiy, Ural, Tselinograd and Chimkent.

"Alma-Ata and Leninsk are cities of republic subordination."

3. The fifth section of Article 80 is to read as follows:

"Any official can be dismissed from office before his term expires if he improperly performs the duties of that office or commits crimes or misdemeanors.

"The President of the Kazakh SSR has the right to dismiss, for these reasons, the chairmen of oblast and the Alma-Ata soviets of people's deputies before their terms expire. A decision of the President of Kazakh SSR can be rejected by a majority of at least two-thirds of the deputies in the soviet of people's deputies concerned."

4. Article 81 is deleted.

5. The third section of Article 85 is to read as follows:

"Except for the Prime Minister of the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers, the executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies (other than the chairmen of executive committees), managers of agencies, deputy managers of ministries, state committees and agencies; managers of departments, administrations and other units of executive committees of local soviets and their deputies, judges and state arbitrators cannot be deputies of soviets which appoint or elect them or their subordinates."

6. In Article 97:

Paragraph 6-1 is to read as follows:

"6-1). The Vice President of the Kazakh SSR is elected at the request of the President of the Kazakh SSR."

Paragraph 8 is to read as follows:

"8) The approval, at the request of the President of the Kazakh SSR, of the Prime Minister of the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers and the composition of the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers and changes in it; the approval of edicts of the President of the Kazakh SSR on the formation and abolition of Kazakh SSR ministries and state committees;"

Paragraph 9 is to read as follows:

"9) The election of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet and the judges of oblast and Alma-Ata municipal courts, the

appointment of the Kazakh SSR General Procurator and his deputies, the Chief State Arbitrator of the Kazakh SSR, the approval of the board of the Kazakh SSR Procuracy;"

Paragraph 19 is to read as follows:

"(19) The revocation of decrees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet and decisions of oblast, Alma-Ata and Leninsk city soviets of people's deputies if they conflict with the USSR Constitution, the Kazakh SSR Constitution or laws of the USSR or the Kazakh SSR."

7. The first section of Article 101 is to read as follows:

"The right of legislative initiative in the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet belongs to Kazakh SSR people's deputies, the Chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, its permanent commissions and committees, the President of the Kazakh SSR, the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers, the Kazakh SSR Constitutional Review Committee, the Kazakh SSR Supreme Court, the Kazakh SSR General Procurator, the Kazakh SSR Chief State Arbitrator."

8. Article 105 is to read as follows:

"Article 105. The entrustment of the performance of duties of members of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Court, oblast courts and Alma-Ata municipal courts are within the competence of the Presidium of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet in periods between the sessions of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, with its approval at the next session.

"The Presidium of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet:

"Prepares for sessions of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet;

"Organizes the planning of work on preparing draft laws for the Kazakh SSR and submits its suggestions for examination by the Supreme Soviet;

"Coordinates the activities of permanent commissions and committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet;

"Organizes public discussions of draft laws of the Kazakh SSR and other of the most important state questions;

"Approves the composition of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Court, oblast and Alma-Ata municipal courts;

"Awards qualifications to members of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Court, oblast courts and Alma-Ata municipal courts;

"Appoints and dismisses, at the request of the Kazakh SSR Chief Arbitrator, the state arbitrators of the Kazakh SSR State Arbitration Board;

"Approves the Kazakh SSR State Arbitration Board.

"The Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium passes decrees.

"The Presidium of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet publishes, in Kazakh and Russian, the texts of Kazakh SSR laws and other acts passed by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, the Presidium of the Kazakh SSR, the Presidium of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet and the Kazakh SSR Constitutional Review Committee. It also supports the translation and publication of these acts into other languages used by the majority of the population in some localities of the republic."

9. The second section of Article 109 is to read as follows:

"Approval of the membership of the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers, the election and appointment of officials in the Kazakh SSR Supreme Court, oblast and Alma-Ata municipal courts and Kazakh SSR State Arbitration are confirmed by the appropriate permanent commissions and committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet."

10. The first section of Article 110 is to read as follows:

"At sessions of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet a Kazakh SSR people's deputy has the right to question the President of the Kazakh SSR, the Chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers and heads of other organizations formed or elected by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, and to question the managers of associations, enterprises, organizations and agencies of union subordination located in the Kazakh SSR concerning problems under the jurisdiction of the Kazakh SSR. The organ or official to whom the question is directed must give an oral or written answer at that session of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet. A written answer is to be given within the time set by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, but is not to be more than a month, and is to be made public at the session."

11. In Article 111:

In the second clause of paragraph 2, after the word "edict" the words "decree and order" are added.

Paragraph 3 is to read as follows:

"3) At the behest of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet and at the proposal of at least one fifth of Kazakh SSR people's deputies and of the President of the Kazakh SSR will give the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet or the President of the Kazakh SSR opinions as to the constitutionality (with regard to the Kazakh SSR Constitution) of Kazakh SSR laws, decrees and orders of the President of the Kazakh SSR, orders of the Prime Minister of the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers, decisions of local soviets of people's deputies and international treaties and other obligations of the Kazakh SSR;"

The first clause of paragraph 4 is to read as follows:

"At the behest of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet and at the proposal of the President of the Kazakh SSR, the Chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, permanent commissions and committees of the Kazakh SSR

Supreme Soviet, the Kazakh SSR Supreme Court, the Kazakh SSR General Procurator, the Kazakh SSR Chief State Arbitrator, republic organs of public organizations, and the Kazakh SSR Academy of sciences, will give opinions on the constitutionality (with regard to the Kazakh SSR Constitution) and compatibility with Kazakh SSR laws, of normative legal acts of other state organs and public organizations in relations of which there are no procuracy reviews;"

The fourth clause of paragraph 4 is to read as follows:

"An organ publishing an act will make it compatible with the Kazakh SSR Constitution or laws. If the incompatibility is not eliminated, the Kazakh SSR Constitutional Review Committee will make a representation to the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet or to the President of the Kazakh SSR to revoke the incompatible act of an organ or subordinate official."

12. The second and third parts of Article 112 are to be eliminated.

13. Article 114 is to read as follows:

"Article 114. The President of the Kazakh SSR is the head of the Kazakh SSR, its highest executive and management authority."

14. The fifth section of Article 114-1 is to read as follows:

"The President of the Kazakh SSR has the right to participate in work of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, the Presidium of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet and to chair sessions of the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers."

15. In Article 114-3:

After paragraph 6 add paragraph 7, to read as follows:

"7) The President of the Kazakh SSR manages the activity of the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers;"

Paragraph 7 will become paragraph 8, and will read as follows:

"8) Appoints the Prime Minister of the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers and presents him for approval by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, presents to the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet candidates for Kazakh SSR General Procurator and Kazakh SSR deputy procurator who have been approved by the USSR General Procurator.

Presents to the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet candidates for the post of Chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet and Kazakh SSR Chief State Arbitrator; with representation from the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet makes decisions to dismiss officials, with the exception of the Chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Court.

Dismisses, before the expiration of their term, chairmen of oblast and Alma-Ata city soviets of people's deputies if they do not perform the duties of their office or if they commit crimes or misdemeanors.

Paragraph 8 will become paragraph 9 and is to read as follows:

"9) Presents to the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet questions concerning the resignation of the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers; dismisses and appoints members of the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers, with subsequent approval by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet;"

Paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 will become paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 respectively;

After paragraph 12, paragraph 13 will be added. It is to read as follows:

"13) Forms and abolishes ministries, state committees and other organs of Kazakh SSR state administration.

"Decisions concerning the formation and abolition of organs of Kazakh SSR state administration, the managers of which are in the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers, are presented for approval by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet;"

The previous paragraph 12 will become paragraph 14 and is to read as follows;

"14) Revokes or annuls decrees of the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers, orders of the Prime Minister of the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers, acts of ministries, state committees or agencies if they conflict with the Kazakh SSR Constitution or laws;"

The previous paragraphs 13-17 are to be paragraphs 15-19 respectively;

The following is added to paragraph 20:

"20) Determines legal policy and manages law enforcement."

16. Article 114-4 is to read as follows:

"Article 114-4. The President of the Kazakh SSR has a consultative and advisory organ—the Council of the Republic, the task of which is to develop recommendations on the main areas of internal and foreign political activity of the Kazakh SSR.

The Council of the Republic includes the offices of Vice President of the Kazakh SSR, the Prime Minister of the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers, the chairmen of the oblast and Alma-Ata city councils of people's deputies, and other individuals designated by the President of the Kazakh SSR.

"The Chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet has the right to participate in meetings of this council."

17. Article 114-5 is to read as follows:

"Article 114-5. On the basis of and in accordance with the Kazakh SSR Constitution, the President of the Kazakh SSR publishes edicts, including those of a normative character and passes decrees and orders that have force throughout the republic."

18. Article 114-7 is to read as follows:

"Article 114-7. Upon the full authorization of the President, the Vice President of the Kazakh SSR performs the President's functions and replaces him if he is absent or cannot carry out his duties."

19. The first section of Article 114-8 is to read as follows:

"If, for various reasons, the President of the Kazakh SSR cannot exercise his duties, then prior to the election of a new President of the Kazakh SSR his full authority will be transferred to the Vice President of the Kazakh SSR. If this is impossible it will be transferred to the Chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet."

20. The title of Chapter 13 is to read as follows:

"Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers."

21. Article 115 is to read as follows:

"Article 115. The Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers operates under the leadership of the President of the Kazakh SSR."

22. Article 116 is to read as follows:

"Article 116. The Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers is formed by the President of the Kazakh SSR. It includes the Prime Minister of the Kazakh SSR, the ministers of the Kazakh SSR and the chairmen of Kazakh SSR state committees. The President of the Kazakh SSR has the right to include state advisors and managers of other organs and organizations in the Kazakh SSR."

"The membership of the Cabinet of Ministers is approved by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, upon presentation by the President of the Kazakh SSR."

"The Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers submits its authority to the newly elected Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet at its first session."

23. Article 117 is to read as follows:

"Article 117. The Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers is responsible to the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, the President of the Kazakh SSR and his subordinates."

"The newly formed cabinet presents, for examination by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, its program of activities for the time it is in office."

"At least once a year the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers reports its activities to the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet."

The Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet can, upon its own initiative, at the suggestion of the President of the Kazakh SSR or at the request of the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers, make a decision about its dissolution. A decree on this question must be approved by at least two-thirds of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet."

24. Article 118 is to read as follows:

"Article 118. The Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers has the authority to solve problems of state administration under the jurisdiction of the Kazakh SSR, with the exception of powers that the Kazakh SSR Constitution gives to the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet and the President of the Kazakh SSR."

The Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers has the power to:

1) Support the development of market relations in the republic's national economy; develop and implement measures to increase the welfare and improve cultural standards of the people, to develop science and technology and to rationally utilize and protect natural resources; assist in the implementation of measures to strengthen the money and credit system, to organize state insurance and a unified policy of prices, wages and social insurance;

2) Compile and submit to the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet: current and long term state plans for economic, social and cultural development of the Kazakh SSR, the items in the Kazakh SSR state budget entrusted to it by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet; It can also take measures to implement state plans and the budget and to present, to the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, reports upon plan performance and on the budget situation;

3) Support comprehensive economic, social and cultural development throughout the Kazakh SSR; on questions within the authority of the Kazakh SSR, coordinate and monitor the activities of enterprises, institutions and organizations of union subordination located within the republic;

4) Implement measures to guarantee the rights and freedom of citizens, protect the interests of the republic, and protect property and public order;

5) Within limits defined by the USSR Constitution, take measures to assure state security and the country's defense preparedness;

6) Assure the performance of obligations arising from contracts between the USSR and union republics; take measures regarding relations between the Kazakh SSR and foreign states and international organizations;

7) Manage the activities of executive committees of oblast and Alma-Ata city soviets of people's deputies."

25. Article 119 is eliminated.

26. Article 120 is to read as follows:

"Article 120. Based upon laws of the USSR and the Kazakh SSR, upon other decisions of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, edicts of the President of the USSR, and orders of the President of the Kazakh SSR, decrees and orders of the USSR Council of Ministers, the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers publishes decrees and organizes and reviews their implementation."

"The prime minister signs decrees of the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers and publishes orders.

"Decrees of the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers and orders of the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers are mandatory throughout the Kazakh SSR."

27. Article 121 is to read as follows:

"Article 121. Within the limits of its competence, the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers has the right to revoke decisions and orders of executive committees in oblast and the Alma-Ata city soviet of people's deputies."

28. Article 122 is to read as follows:

"Article 122. The Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers combines and directs the work of ministries and state committees of the Kazakh SSR and other organs subordinate to it.

"Kazakh SSR ministries and state committees manage the sectors of administration of the Kazakh SSR entrusted to them and manage intersectoral affairs, subordinating themselves to the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers."

29. Article 123 is to read as follows:

"Article 123. Kazakh SSR ministries and state committees are responsible for the condition and development of the administrative spheres entrusted to them; within their competence they are to publish acts based upon and in accordance with USSR laws and other decisions of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet, laws of the Kazakh SSR and other decisions of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, decrees and orders of the President of the Kazakh SSR, decrees and orders of the USSR Council of Ministers, decrees of the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers and orders of the Prime Minister of the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers and acts of appropriate USSR ministries and state committees; and to organize and review their implementation.

30. Article 124 is to read as follows:

"Article 124. The competence of the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers, the procedures for its activities and the relations between the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers and other state organizations is determined by the Kazakh SSR Law: "On the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers."

31. In articles 142, 143, 144 and 149 the words: "Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers" are to be replaced by the words: "Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers;" while in articles 143 and 149 the words: "conclusions of the plan-budget and other permanent committees" are to be replaced by "conclusions of permanent committees."

32. Article 164 is to read as follows:

"Article 164. The Kazakh SSR General Procurator and the units subordinate to it are responsible for the precise

and uniform observation of laws by all ministries, state committees and agencies, enterprises, institutions and organizations, executive and management organs of local soviets of peoples' deputies, kolkhozes, cooperatives and other public organizations, officials and citizens within the Kazakh SSR."

33. Article 165 is to read as follows:

"Article 165. The Kazakh SSR General Procurator is appointed by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet after being selected by the President of the Kazakh SSR, upon agreement by the USSR General Procurator. The General Procurator of the Kazakh SSR is accountable to the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet.

"Oblast, rayon and city procurators are appointed by the Kazakh SSR General Procurator and are accountable to him."

34. Article 166 is to read as follows:

"Article 166. The Kazakh SSR General Procurator and the procurators subordinate to him have a five year term of office."

35. Article 167 is to read as follows:

"Article 167. Organs of the Kazakh SSR Procuracy exercise their authority independently of other officials and organs of state power and administration. They are subordinate only to the Kazakh SSR General Procurator."

III. The Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers is entrusted with preparing a draft of the Kazakh SSR Law: "On the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers" and to submit it for examination by the next session of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet.

IV. This law goes into effect the moment it is ratified.

President of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic N. Nazarbayev, Alma-Ata, 20 November 1990

Akayev Decree on Kirghiz Presidential Council

91US0170A *Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA*
in Russian 28 Nov 90 p 2

[Decree signed on 22 Nov 1990 by A. Akayev, president of the Kirghiz SSR: "On the Statute Concerning the Kirghiz SSR Presidential Council"]

[Text] I. General Positions

1. The Presidential Council shall be a collegial organ formed in accordance with the Constitution of the Kirghiz SSR under the President of the Kirghiz SSR. Its purpose shall be to work out measures for implementing the basic directions of this republic's domestic and foreign policy, as well as ensuring the integrity and security of the Kirghiz SSR.

2. The Presidential Council shall coordinate the interests of various groups of the population, public associations and movements; it shall also facilitate the adoption by the President of decisions which have public support.

The Presidential Council shall comprise a structure called upon to connect the presidential power with the civilian society in this republic; it shall ensure civil peace, as well as national and ethnic harmony.

3. The tasks, organization, and operating procedure of the Kirghiz SSR Presidential Council shall be specified by the Constitution of the Kirghiz SSR and by the present statute.

II. Composition of the Presidential Council

4. Members of the Kirghiz SSR Presidential Council shall be appointed by the President of the Kirghiz SSR from among state and public leaders, people's deputies of the USSR and the Kirghiz SSR, economic managers, scholars, and peasants who have experience in political and practical life.

The number of members on the Presidential Council shall be determined and specified by the President.

The chairman of the government of the Kirghiz SSR shall be a member ex officio of the Presidential Council.

5. The President shall have the right to change the composition of the Presidential Council.

Tasks and Operating Procedure of the Presidential Council

6. Headed up by the President of the Kirghiz SSR, the Presidential Council shall perform the following tasks:

a) analyzing the principal trends of this republic's public life;

b) examining and considering problems of the interaction between the highest organs of state power and the administration of the Kirghiz SSR;

c) examining and considering problems of the interrelationships between the Kirghiz SSR and other entities of the Union-level government, as well as those with foreign states;

d) participating in preparing the President's messages and annual reports concerning the state of affairs in this republic and other important matters of state life for the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet;

e) discussing certain laws of the Kirghiz SSR prior to their being signed by the President, as well as draft laws of the Kirghiz SSR which have been prepared in accordance with the procedure of the President's legislative initiative;

f) discussing the President's draft decrees with regard to problems of interpreting the laws of the Kirghiz SSR;

g) examining and considering problems involving the possibility of introducing a state of emergency in certain localities or throughout the republic's entire territory;

h) assisting in the solution of other problems which have been relegated to the President's field of competence.

7. Sessions of the Presidential Council shall be conducted under the chairmanship of the President at necessary intervals but at least once a month.

The chairman of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet shall have the right to take part in the sessions of the Presidential Council.

Decisions of the Presidential Council shall be drawn up in the proper form as minutes, which shall be signed by the President.

8. Members of the Presidential Council shall do the following:

a) take part in sessions of the Presidential Council;

b) at the President's behest, take part in the work of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet, its Presidium, permanent and other commissions, as well as in sessions of the Kirghiz SSR Council of Ministers;

c) at the President's behest, represent him in dealings with Union-level officials, as well as those of other Union republics and foreign states;

d) function with initiative in working out laws of the Kirghiz SSR, decrees [ukazy] of the President of the Kirghiz SSR, and decrees [postanovleniya] of the Kirghiz SSR government;

e) draw up conclusions as to laws of the Kirghiz SSR which have been adopted by the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet and sent to the President for his signature;

f) take part in press conferences and briefings which shed light on the activities of the President, his apparatus, and the Presidential Council;

g) perform other tasks assigned by the President.

9. The task of making sure that the conditions exist for the Presidential Council and its members to carry out their functions shall be assigned to the apparatus of the President of the Kirghiz SSR.

IV. Status of Members of the Presidential Council

10. Members of the Presidential Council shall carry out their functions without a break from their production or official service activities.

11. During the period of the council's sessions, as well as in order to carry out the tasks assigned by the President, the members of the Presidential Council shall be released or freed up from their production or service duties with the retention of their average wages.

State, public, and other organs shall assist the members of the Presidential Council in performing their duties.

12. No member of the Presidential Council can be dismissed from a position which he holds, charged with criminal liability, arrested or subjected to measures of administrative punishment imposed in accordance with a court procedure without the consent of the President of the Kirghiz SSR.

Tajik Official on Union Treaty Draft

91US0173A Dushanbe *KOMMUNIST*
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 4 Dec 90 pp 1-2

[Speech by People's Deputy Kh.M. Saidmuradov, vice president of the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences, member of the group of Tajik SSR authorized representatives for drawing up the Union Treaty: "On the Draft Union Treaty"]

[Text] Comrade deputies!

The draft of the new Union treaty under examination today is a document of primary importance. Adoption of a new Union treaty will entail qualitatively new relations between the Union republics themselves, as well as between republics and the Center, with its Union organs.

A great preparatory effort preceded publication of this draft. It involved the participation of authorized representatives of the Union republics, including Tajikistan.

The following individuals were confirmed by resolution of the Presidium of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet as authorized representatives of the republic for drawing up the Union treaty:

K.M. Makhkamov, chairman of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet (head).

A.A. Samadov, deputy chairman of the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers.

Kh.M. Saidmuradov, vice president of the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences.

R.K. Mirzoyev, chairman of the Council for the Study of Forces of Production of the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences.

A. Imomov, senior lecturer in the State Law and Soviet Structuring Department of Tajik State University imeni V.I. Lenin.

R.K. Rakhimov, director of the Economics Institute of the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences.

R. Masov, director of the Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography imeni A. Donish, of the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences.

A. Abduroznikov, deputy chairman of the executive committee of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies.

D.A. Serebryakov, head of the Law and Administration Department of the Administration Directorate of the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers.

K.A. Aslonov, first deputy chairman of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet, also participated actively in this effort.

The first joint conference with Union republic participation took place 20 June this year in Moscow. A decision was made at this conference to set about drawing up the fundamental principles of the draft Union treaty in the localities, with the aim of discussing these later on at joint sessions.

Later, on 8 August of this year, consultations were held in the Chamber of Facets of the Kremlin between a USSR working group and Tajik representatives (including Comrades K.A. Aslonov, A.S. Samadov, R.K. Rakhimov, and D.A. Serebryakov).

Examined at this session were specific Tajik SSR proposals on the basic, fundamental principles of the draft Union treaty.

Our delegation declared in particular that the Tajik SSR considers it absolutely necessary for the Union treaty to be concluded on a fundamentally new basis of equality and sovereignty of the republics, and for its absolute consent to be given to participation in the signing.

In this regard, the representatives of Tajikistan expressed the desire that the treaty reflect the following basic elements: equal rights and equal representation in all Union organs of state power and government.

In connection with this, a proposal was made to examine the question of forming a new USSR Supreme Soviet consisting of a small group of 450-500 full-time deputies with an equal number of deputies from each republic according to the principle "one republic—one vote." It was later proposed that the procedure for election of the USSR president be precisely defined—on the basis of universal, direct, and secret ballot, on a competitive basis, for a period of not more than 10 years (in two terms).

The Tajik representatives presented a number of proposals directed towards determining the fundamental principles of socioeconomic mutual relations, rights, and obligations of the Union republics and the Union of SSR's.

In particular, we proposed that the Union treaty provide for the establishment of all-Union assistance funds for development of the Union republics and the creation of an effective economic structure for the USSR and Union republics. A firm conviction was expressed that the Union republics must have a high level of independence in the sphere of foreign economic activity. A proposal was also introduced that the Union treaty reflect a new concept: "Union/republic ownership," having such entities in mind here as Union infrastructure, power supply and engineering, mechanical engineering, railroad and air transportation.

Following this, during the period from 30 August through 7 September of this year, a joint conference was conducted in Moscow of USSR experts and those of the republics of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, Turkmenia, Kazakhstan, and Belorussia, where the issues mentioned above were examined in still greater detail and each of the republics presented its draft Union treaty.

The representatives of our republic—Comrades R.K. Mirzoyev, A. Imomov, A. Abdurozikov, D.A. Serebryakov, and I—participated in this work. Many aspects of our version of the draft treaty found support among the Union republics and experts of the USSR.

As a result of all the conferences referred to above, detailed protocols were drawn up, and on their basis the draft Union treaty was prepared that we are now examining.

A significant portion of the proposals made by our republic are reflected in the draft treaty. It appears necessary to us, however, that it be supplemented with certain comments and proposals of principle.

1. The draft stipulates that the highest legislative organ of the Union is the Supreme Soviet, with which we absolutely agree. However, the Supreme Soviet should be unicameral, small in composition (450-500 individuals), and full-time in nature. Here an equal number of people's deputies from each member state should be elected to the Supreme Soviet, regardless of population or territorial scope. This proceeds from Section I of the draft, which states that the republics participate on an equal basis with respect to the exercise of Union authority.

2. Supremacy of republic laws should be established in the territory of the republics and should also extend to matters relegated to the sphere of Union/republic competence.

Union laws must have supremacy only on those questions that are transferred to the Union.

3. Article 4 of the draft must reflect the fact that bilateral and multilateral treaties concluded between

member republics of the Union lie at the basis of their mutual relations. The Union, in the embodiment of its highest organs, does not have the right to repeal treaties concluded between member republics of the Union.

4. The following words in Point 3 of Article 5 of the draft should be interpreted and clarified: "regulation of USSR foreign economic activity and coordination of foreign economic ties of the republics." Here the competence and rights of the Union republics must be stated precisely, and the sphere of questions relegated to USSR competence indicated.

5. It should be stated in Point 7 of Article 5 of the draft that the coordination of interrepublic fundamental scientific research and stimulation of scientific-technological progress take place upon agreement or request of the republics.

6. In paragraph 1 of Article 7, "Ownership," the words "including the assets of citizens and associations of citizens, and state assets" should be omitted, since the text preceding this encompasses all forms of assets.

7. It is necessary in Article 9 to secure not only the right of republics to appeal Union laws if they contradict republic interests; provision should also be made for the right of republics to suspend the validity of Union acts in such instances.

8. It must be established in Article 19 that the state languages of all the sovereign republics constitute the official language of the Union.

The Russian language constitutes the medium of interethnic communications in the Union.

9. The last paragraph of Article 12, "The USSR President," should read as follows:

"The USSR president is elected by citizens of the USSR, exercising a universal, equal, and direct right to vote through secret ballot, for a five-year term."

These are the proposals that the group drawing up the draft consider necessary for inclusion in the final text of a Union treaty.

Conference on Interethnic Issues Assessed

91UN0350A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 46, Nov 90
p 2

[Article by Viktoriya Buryanina: "Russia Up Against a Time Limit? Notes on the Results of One Conference"]

[Text] When R. Abdulatipov, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities, appealed to those assembled at an all-Russia scientific-practical conference devoted to interethnic problems in the RSFSR with a request for assistance, a gentle murmur ran through the room. Someone said distinctly: "We came to him for help, but he is asking it of us. What's going on?"

Truly, a situation which is indeed out of the ordinary and not entirely customary as yet. However, the deputies of the local soviets, the chairmen of the standing commissions and committees for nationalities and scholars of the most diverse specialties were given to understand that the times when they were summoned to such activities to be granted the latest indulgence for the implementation of the latest valuable instructions have passed. From now on everyone must think, propose, act, and answer for his actions: both those in the presidium and those on the floor.

Russia today faces a choice of path by which to proceed further and principles on which to build its national-state policy in order that not one people, large or small, feel themselves hurt and short-changed. Not the easiest of tasks. It is being made harder by both the exacerbation of interethnic relations and the centrifugal trends which have been manifested distinctly in recent months. And although, as R. Khasbulatov, first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, said in his speech, foreign experts were predicting back in the 1960's-1970's that the first onslaught of democratic transformations in the Soviet Union would entail an explosion in interethnic relations, no one in our country could have foreseen such a development of events.

This proposition of R. Khasbulatov's could, probably, be disputed, but it does not alter the heart the matter: On the eve of the conclusion of a federal treaty and the adoption of a new constitution Russia has found itself faced with the most profound interethnic time limit. Not through the fault of its leaders, who have come to power only in the sixth year of perestroika. Through the fault rather of those who failed to determine in good time the correlation and pace of economic and political transformations. And the result is what we have today: The collapse of the economy against a background of democratic institutions of administration which are only just emerging.

Time is needed so that our soviets of all levels, having come through political infancy, finally learn to live by the interests not only of their own rayon, kray, and oblast, but also by common interests. The interests of the republic and the whole country. But there is no time;

disaster is already knocking at the door: the disintegration of Russia and the fragmentation of its values and assets into national apartments.

The parade of sovereignties, the autonomous entities' unilateral elevation of their status—these processes, to judge by everything, are only just gaining momentum. And what consequences this will have for the republic is not known.

The aspiration to economic and political independence, a revival of national culture and an improvement in the well-being of the people residing on one territory or another is understandable and justifiable. But nor can we fail to understand the concern heard at the conference from the mouths of leaders of the Russian parliament: Independence, to which the autonomous entities so aspire, also has a reverse side which threatens not simply a disintegration of economic relations but a collapse of the state itself.

The rapid deterioration in the social and economic situation and the lack of faith in the power of the Union center are prompting the leaders of the autonomous entities to solve local problems thanks to an increase in their influence and a broadening of their rights. But are there today real opportunities to enjoy these rights and "assimilate" them? Frequently, no. Because there is much here that has yet to be enshrined legally, economically, and legislatively. And for this reason the specialists and deputies working on the federal treaty are already encountering tremendous and, at times, insoluble problems.

Who in the present, utterly confused situation should be considered a subject of the federation, who an object, and where are the limits of these subjects' independence? How is the sovereignty which has been proclaimed understood locally? If it is as the unification within a state of sovereign republics with the transfer of certain powers to the center, this is one thing. If, on the other hand, the republics, having fenced themselves off by a palisade, wage an economic war with the center and neighboring formations, this is quite another. And who should altogether be responsible for compliance with the federal treaty—the peoples themselves, the local authorities, or the Russian parliament? It was around these questions that the main debate developed at the plenary sessions of the conference and in the panels, whose work was devoted to the national-state arrangement of the RSFSR.

Despite the quite high standards of the debate, there had also to be extreme opinions, of course. The representative of Ulyanovsk Oblast, for instance, virtually accused the Russian people of having brought all the other peoples of Russia to an impasse. And the adoption of sovereignty, according to him, means the reluctance of these peoples to make themselves dependent on how far the Russians go. A statement was heard also from the representative of Tatarstan on the republic's intention to

secede from the RSFSR and, consequently, on its attendance at this conference as an observer. That was the extent of it, it is true. It was not these two episodes which determined the atmosphere of the discussion. Let God be their judge, as they say. The population of Ulyanovsk Oblast and the peoples of Tatarstan themselves, without intermediaries, are capable of comprehending both their future fate and those who arrogate to themselves the right to speak on their behalf.

A very serious alarm, perhaps, was heard at this conference for the parliament and government of Russia. Everything is leading to a situation in which mistrust of the Union organs of administration and executive authority which will very soon also apply to their Russian counterparts. In fact, this process has already begun. It is explained to a large extent, of course, by a misunderstanding of the complex and strained relations which exist currently between the Russian and Union centers.

"We are tired of waiting for Ivan Ivanovich to make up with Ivan Nikiforovich," one speaker said. But is it really a question of "making up"? The Union center should, obviously, moderate its appetite, recognize the rights which any sovereign republic should possess as belonging to Russia and transfer them to it. And those who are accusing Russia's leaders today of dragging their feet and procrastination, seeing this as some kind of secret design and double game, are most likely failing to take into consideration the actual situation which has taken shape in the country as a whole. It is undoubtedly necessary to make haste, with that same federal treaty also primarily. But what is happening in practice is that it is the hasty ones who by their ill-considered actions and decisions are dragging out the preparation of the treaty. After all, with their help the situation in Russia is changing practically daily. Adopting a crucial document without regard for these changes would mean knowingly burying it.

"Yes, all we peoples of Russia have found ourselves in one big, deep hole," R. Abdulatipov said in his closing remarks. "And it is futile to attempt to jump out of it by first standing on the heads of others. It would not succeed, one would be pulled back by one's legs. Only all together, helping one another, can we climb out of this hole." It is hard not to agree with this.

The conference lasted two days. The plenary meetings gave way to panels. And it was right there that it was possible to discuss more closely and in greater detail the main questions connected both with the present state of interethnic relations and their prospects. And not simply discuss but formulate a whole number of specific proposals pertaining to the national-state arrangement of the RSFSR, problems of the national cultures and languages of the peoples of the Russian Federation and the socio-demographic situation.

Five expert groups, which were headed by scholars and top specialists in their fields, were formed. Each of these groups will interact with local scholars and deputies

dealing with interethnic matters, assemble information, analyze it, and forecast the development of the situation.

Let us dwell a little on the work of the two final panels. There is no need to say what today's state of the national cultures and languages is. There have been practically no changes in this sphere in the five years of perestroika. And in 73 years not only have certain languages and cultures been lost, peoples, their exponents, have disappeared. And this process continues, what is more, particularly in respect of the so-called small peoples and the peoples subjected to mass punitive measures.

The facts cited in the panels are appalling. They testify to the spiritual, cultural, and physical degradation of all peoples residing on the territory of the RSFSR without exception. What needs to be done primarily to at least halt the slide into the abyss? The participants in the panel put forward the following proposals: the adoption of a number of legislative instruments on the languages of the peoples of the RSFSR and on problems of culture; a special conference on peoples of the North; the organization of broadcasts and print organs in the national languages; starting with the school, the introduction of classes on ethnographic education; an early census of the population of the RSFSR and elimination of the shortcomings in the issuance of ID's. The latter recommendations are connected with the fact that certain peoples were not on the last census. And representatives of such peoples as the Itelmeny and the Vod still cannot register their nationality on their ID's. They are considered not to exist.

No less appalling figures were heard in the panel on socio-demographic problems in the RSFSR. Birthrate is declining sharply. Next year we will "reach" the 1970 level. There has been a considerable decline in the number of registered marriages. The level of mortality, particularly infant mortality, has increased catastrophically, and life expectancy has shortened. Mortality in Russia is, as before, higher than it was 20 years ago, and there are 18-19 deaths per 1,000 births. Things are particularly bad in Tuva and among the peoples of the North and the Caucasus. We are today laying the foundations of a weakened new generation, which will in the future encounter even greater problems. Russia's share will gradually diminish.

The migration of the Russian-speaking population, both internal and from the Union republics, is assuming alarming proportions. Russia has found itself totally unprepared for this, and the legal instruments regulating this process to some extent and a law on the status of refugees are lacking. And at the same time an impasse situation concerning the emigres is taking shape. Socio-economic conditions are deteriorating, and it is not simply our compatriots who are going abroad; scientists, engineers, and experienced specialists are leaving. It is essential, those who took part in the work of this panel believe, to immediately create a migration service, a demographic research center, and an information center.

The amount of material prevents us from enumerating even all that was discussed at the conference, but even this would be sufficient for us to understand where we now stand and what awaits us in the future. Is it any wonder, incidentally, that the forecasts which the scientists are making today are most disturbing. Far more surprising was something else: hearing from a leader of the Union parliament the statement that, granted all the negative consequences, deformations, and distortions, we have still created a powerful state with strong potential and that, if it is used in the interests of each people, remarkable successes could be scored in the very near future.

Are not these reassuring evaluations leading to inaction the cause of all our most acute problems?

So, the conference is over. But time does not stand still. The countdown in Russia of the 500 days has begun....

Vilnius Human Rights, Nationality Problems Conference Assessed

91UN0688A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH
in Russian 22 Dec 90 p 3

[Article by Pavel Tyurin, conference participant: "A Condoning with Civic Consent: Thinking Aloud"]

[Text] *The Second Independent International Conference entitled "Human Rights and Nationality Problems" was held in Vilnius from 8 through 10 December.*

It was, most likely, the last conference of this nature—the dominant mood resembled an abandonment of the hopes and illusions that the problems which have encompassed us from all sides can be solved in a civilized manner. Even before the conference began its work it seemed that its participants were weary unto death and were close to the point of ceasing to respect themselves for participating in such fruitless discussions as they had previously had frequent occasion to engage in. The total disenchantment with their feasibility was intensified by the fact that rational and sensible proposals have all-too-often and in a paradoxical manner been transformed into deformed, even ugly, plans and programs. In taking their point of departure from ideas which made common sense, it is as if, in attempting to dot the i's—i.e., to make things more specific and precise—they turn out just the opposite.

Pacifistic attitudes are interpreted by many persons as a kind of camouflaged treachery, whereas caution and patience—which are called for by the democrats—are not to many people's liking nowadays. The majority thirsts, finally, for action, and, moreover, for "direct action," i.e., for a "surgical" intervention into the diseased and painful reality. Everybody has "discussed and debated" so much, complimented each other so much (necessary for allies) and insulted each other so much (necessary for enemies) that now they need to reinforce things by at least some deeds. And inasmuch as, no matter what we do, we only know how to do badly, it is

not difficult to predict how many misfortunes await us when we pass from verbal opposition to actual counter-movement.

It was no accident that the representative of the People's Labor Union of Russian Solidarists noted that many nationals nowadays, just as in 1918, are attempting to throw firebrands from their own houses to the rooftops of their neighbors houses and, after this, to naively think that their own houses would remain safe and secure. The childishness of their behavior is also manifested when they declare the following: "Your problems do not interest us or disturb us. We wish to be independent in everything, but (!) we demand that you grant us our own economic community as independents (?); otherwise we cannot be independent. If you do not do this, we will consider you to be imperialists, the stranglers or suffocators of freedoms, human rights, and the Vienna Agreements." But that same United States grants most-favored-nation trade status to those countries which, directly or indirectly, express or embody their interests, and not just because they are interested in the profits of economic cooperation.

The general atmosphere of this conference may be characterized by the following fragments taken from it:

- either nationalism or national betrayal!
 - which is better: a bad authority or the lack of authority, i.e., chaos?
 - the Ukrainian nationalists guarantee that nationality problems cannot be solved without a bloody slaughter;
 - the national minorities within the republics constitute a "fifth column," a factor hampering independence for the republics and a condition cementing the USSR together;
 - why are the Russian democrats again teaching us how to live?!
 - democracy is an instrument for suppressing national or ethnic values;
 - in the absence of guarantees that human and nationality rights will be observed by the state, we must be prepared for war;
 - a deputy to Lithuania's Supreme Soviet jokingly said that the death penalty for crimes against the state had been instituted by the republic's parliament for the obvious reason that Lithuania has no good prisons, and that it would be more humane to "dispatch" a person to "the other world" than to force him to spend many long years under unhygienic conditions.
- Rare voices such as those heard in the speeches by Aleksandr Osinov and Aleksandr Eliovich, members of the Democratic Union, were received virtually as some kind of scholarly luxury, inappropriate for a situation "on the brink of war:"

- the right to self-determination is a matter for regulations and is not without its limits;
- the nation-state is a cover for forming non-self-determining structures;
- we cannot regard one category of the population as objects, while according to another the status of a subject. Since the time of Kant's formulation of the Categorical Imperative we can no longer regard persons as objects, i.e., as some kind of subordinate material. An attempt by one subject to form a relationship to another as if to an object is an instance of discrimination and a crime;
- he who today seeks justice must, above all, himself act in accordance with the principle of justice;
- nobody dares to insist on changing the nationality or ethnic membership of those peoples which are included in the new state because a state is a community of self-determining citizens.

Therefore, taking into account a trend which is evolving everywhere in the relationships among various different nationality groups, one of the speakers at the conference stated that we should "lease" ourselves and our country, not only economically but also politically, to those who have not lost humanistic ideas regarding the value of human life. We are not yet capable of solving our own problems independently.

If we recognize and admit that nationality or ethnic feelings are uniquely transformed feelings of our own property, then it turns out that the present-day "struggle for nationality rights and sovereignty" is similar, in many respects, to another, analogous task—that of "de-statifying" or removing the state from property. In both cases there is something for the nation as a whole, something for the state. And in both cases there are many claimants to their own share or portion of the general, commonly held property for the purpose of beginning an independent life. And all these variants of the given task can be arranged as follows:

- 1) the "power" principle—let those who have the power (the money) take over (buy up) the state property;
- 2) the principle of "place" or "locality"—let everything remain in the hands of those who, at the time when the state "removes itself" from the property, were at the place where the property is being privatized;
- 3) the "zero" principle—each person now living in the state has equal rights with other persons, regardless of the destiny of the state evolving today. The scope of a person's practical-life possibilities cannot be increased or decreased depending on whether, for innumerable reasons, he is registered in one place or another.

The rejection or abandonment of the "zero" variant—something that is occurring in most cases in the republics—has inevitably given rise to disputes about the priorities of this or that person and has led to quarrels;

the humanistic principles and rights of the specific individual have retreated not just to the background or the shadows—but to non-being. This is also attested to by the fact that certain persons are inclined to so transform their own moral principles as to consider themselves greater subjects in comparison with their own neighbors to their common misfortune. And it is then that there begins that state "project" which is most attractive for all concerned (right down to the notorious cook)—the project of listing who has a right and what kind of right, how many years he has lived there, what kind of moral foundations he has, whether or not his right is fictitious, and so on, and so forth. All "subjects" are becoming judges and comptrollers, i.e., monitors of "rights," whereas the society is being divided into plaintiffs and defendants, accusers and accused, and each person must know where he must respond to which password.

It is obvious that the principal cause of conflicts connected, in one way or another, with the rights category lies in the fact that a person very often exaggerates his own rights. As a rule, he ignores the fact that a right may be declared to anything one pleases, but that none of them can be satisfied unless there is the appropriate opportunity and capacity for this. For example, one can have a right to housing but not actually have even one's own corner; one can have a right to freely express one's own opinion but not have an opinion of one's own (merely the capacity to speak or utter it). In and by itself, the Declaration of Human Rights is nothing but a declaration of man's good intentions. Upon being subjected to verification, the so-called inalienable, inherent human rights turn out to be not too much, or, to put it more precisely, not much at all.

If we attempt to produce an inventory of what a person has a right to, it suddenly becomes clear that his rights to anything are really restricted to or limited by the possibilities which he has, above all, by his own personal possibilities and capabilities. The only thing achievable by him is what he himself can personally accomplish, what he himself can secure and produce by his own efforts. Thus, for example, a person does not have the right to be a machine; he does not have the right to be a dog; he does not have the right to be a woman if he is a man; he does not have the right to be an adult or an old person if he is a child, etc. Nor does a person have inalienable rights to that which is beyond the limits of his personal or available capacities because "to be" and "to have" are categories which mutually condition each other.

Everything that a person has at his disposal above and beyond that which he himself can produce belongs to the sphere of a conditional kind of contractual relationship and to the results of such relationships with other persons, i.e., those who are capable of producing those things which he himself is unable to produce. If these results of a conditional, contractual relationship are obtained by a person not in accordance with a mutual

and voluntary agreement with others, they can be disputed or called into question at any time. And they potentially contain within themselves a threat of conflict, and they could be taken away from its present owner or possessor. Hence it follows that it is inadmissible to take away from a person that which he himself has accomplished by his own efforts, in particular, a person's life, the mode and method of his life, factors which he is capable of providing independently.

Each of us as an individual has merely modest, inalienable, personal rights inherent to ourselves. All remaining rights—those of family inheritance, property, financial...are conditional, contractual rights which we have received from the hands of other persons; they are the rights and obligations toward each other which have been agreed upon or "contracted" in one way or another. They can always be subjected to revision when doubts arise concerning the justice or fairness of the contracts concluded in the past and, in particular, when it is discovered that there is a restriction on the properly

inalienable rights of another person because contracts are never transmitted to the future unchanged.

Rights, the law, regulations, justice, and fairness, rules... A person who insists on some right of his own supposes or assumes that his cause is right, that truth is on his side, that he is demanding and carrying out justice, and so that it is his duty and obligation which will guide and govern him. By whom? Only by himself alone!

It may be that this thought will still succeed in giving pause to those persons who have believed in and been deluded by the idea that their wishes and interests comprise a body of inalienable rights. That is not the case. A person only has rights to himself. And if he continues to think otherwise, then he is doomed to a situation whereby conflicts connected with this delusion will not be "alienated" for a long time. Moreover, as the great wise man from the East (Mao Zedong) said in our own times: "Each generation needs its own war."

Work, Functions of Belorussian KGB Described
90UF0310A Minsk ZNAMYA YUNOSTI in Russian
14 Dec 90 p 1

[Article by Aleksandr Lipay under the rubric "Access Authorized to Outsiders": "How We Interrogated the KGB...."]

[Text] On December 12, 1990, the Minsk and Minsk Oblast KGB Directorate invited workers from our newspaper to visit this department. We met with the heads of subunits and with Directorate Chief Gennadiy Kovalenko, listened to their information about Oblast KGB activities, and visited the Museum of Chekist Fame. We direct our readers' attention to the collection of articles on the information received and also to the notes from the peculiar press conference.

"WE ALWAYS thought that we would find a common language with youth and with the Komsomol. Our agents are basically graduates from the ranks of the Komsomol" (G. Kovalenko).

The KGB Directorate consists of nine administrative organizations in Minsk and 10 in the Oblast. There is one agent in each of the Oblast's 22 rayons. The structure of the directorate is similar to the structure of the republic KGB: Intelligence and counterintelligence subunits, a subunit for protection of constitutional order, and others.

During the recent filming of a movie about the KGB, French TV journalists conducted five mini-interviews near the Belorussian Committee for State Security building. One of the interlocutors expressed distrust of the KGB, one could not answer definitely, and three of those interviewed said that the KGB is the organization which still resolves state security issues.

During recent years, USSR KGB has unmasked nearly 30 foreign state intelligence service agents, among whom were also Soviet State Security agents. The Belorussian KGB has discovered nine intelligence service representatives among those individuals who have visited Minsk and they were first of all intelligence agent-diplomats, foreign experts, and students.

Representatives of terrorist groups, the majority of whom were from Middle Eastern countries, were discovered among foreign students in Minsk.

This year, republic KGB returned seven million rubles to the state due to the seizure of contraband as a result of the directorate's activities.

The Ukrainian KGB assists enterprises—in particular, MAZ [Minsk Automobile Plant] and the tractor plant—with documents and information of a technological and commercial nature. Last year the state managed to save 78 million foreign exchange rubles when it signed a contract with a foreign firm.

On November 18, 320 kilograms of butter were discovered at a dump in Molodechno.

In Directorate Chief G. Kovalenko's opinion, the loss of goods from state stocks occurs:

from enterprises and manufacturers (cooperators buy everything up wholesale, replace labels, and sell goods as their own at prices that are several times higher and also theft from enterprises);

—while being transported; and,

—from the distribution sphere, particularly from sales facilities.

This year, a criminal case on contraband was brought: They attempted to export to Poland televisions, refrigerators, sewing machines, washing machines, and other goods—products from Molodechno Raybaza [Rayon Facility].

KGB agents seized R126,000 while searching a man suspected of being involved in a narcotics ring in Borisovskiy Rayon.

Nearly 17 organized criminal groups, which are primarily involved with extortion, are operating today in Minsk.

[Lipay] Do KGB functions include political investigations?

[KGB Spokesman] There are no political investigations. We do have a subunit for protection of constitutional order. Its function is to prevent the forcible overthrow of power and to combat terrorists. Speaking about extremism, this worries us very much especially when any kind of event consisting of several thousand people occurs in the city—I can cite the following example. On November 3 during the last "Dzyadoy", a man with a weapon was discovered in the crowd. He did not belong to the BNF [Belorussian People's Front], to the Communist Party, or to any other party.

[Lipay] Does the KGB maintain dossiers on anyone?

[KGB Spokesman] What do you mean by that word?

[Lipay] The collection of information about any specific person.

[KGB Spokesman] If this person is a criminal who falls under the Criminal Code, a case file is established on him.

[Lipay] And on leaders of alternative political groups?

[KGB Spokesman] Of course not.

[Lipay] Can you tell me how many KGB agents there are?

[KGB Spokesman] There are nearly as many agents on the entire oblast directorate staff as in any Minsk Militia Rayotdel [Rayon Department].

[Lipay] And how much money do they earn?

[KGB Spokesman] The salary is R230-250 plus an additional allowance for military rank.

[Lipay] Do agents use special stores or special outpatient clinics?

[KGB Spokesman] For all intents and purposes, no.

[Lipay] Does the KGB have a subunit for work with informers among the population?

[KGB Spokesman] That is a delicate question. I would not begin to reveal all of the nuances. The word "informer" itself is not entirely correct....

Here is an example. Four criminals participated in the hijacking of an aircraft to Ordzhonikidze but six people knew about the action being prepared. And no one came forward to warn us about it even though the hijacking could have ended with victims. What do you think, did they behave appropriately?

[Lipay] Do informers receive money for cooperating with the KGB?

[KGB Spokesman] No. Naturally if a man participated in uncovering a crime, we could encourage him by presenting him with a state award or something else.

[Lipay] According to your information, are there millionaires in Minsk?

[KGB Spokesman] Yes.

[Lipay] How many?

[KGB Spokesman] That is hard to say.

[Lipay] Do you monitor telephone conversations?

[KGB Spokesman] Only with regard to specific individuals on whom we have compelling evidence and only with the procurator's approval.

"I DO NOT WANT to exaggerate our importance but people sometimes come into the directorate who think that the KGB is the last echelon capable of helping them. Our directorate annually receives nearly one thousand complaints and statements.... In my opinion, state security organs in Belorussia still enjoy definite trust (G. Kovalenko).

Tajik MVD Minister Appeals to Citizenry for Stronger Law, Order

91US0162A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 24 Nov 90 p 1

[Article by M. Navzhuvanov, Tajik SSR Minister of Internal Affairs, Internal Service Major General: "In the Interests of Each of Us: Tajik SSR Minister of Internal Affairs Addresses the Citizens of the Republic"]

[Text] Respected comrades, fellow citizens!

In Tajikistan, as in the entire country, deep political and socioeconomic transformations are taking place, the process of democracy is becoming broader. Yet affirmation of the new, the progressive is proceeding under conditions that are complicated by the active resistance of the old, the obsolete. Serious economic difficulties and a lack of resolution of acute social issues have been the cause of certain negative phenomena that directly affect society's moral and psychological climate, and that engender in some of the citizens of our multinational republic uncertainty about tomorrow and fear for the safety of their children, relatives and friends.

Knowing well the full complexity and significance of the period that we are living through in the life of our country and republic, the internal affairs staff works purposefully, devoting all of its strength and energy. Despite the extremely alarming and stressful situation during the tragic days in February, the use of significant forces to stabilize the situation and uncover and investigate crimes connected with mass violations of the law, the republic's militia managed to have a noticeable impact on this crime-inciting situation. Growth in the crime rate is decreasing from month to month. Since May there continues to be a steady decrease in criminal developments uncovered by criminal investigation, caused by a noticeable decrease in the number of thefts—of state and public property, as well as citizens' personal property. The fight against economic crime and speculation has become more active. The organs of internal affairs attentively monitor the beginnings of conflict situations between population groups and counter everything that arises from them in order to soften the sharpness of confrontation and eliminate its causes.

In the past year, thanks to the constant attention of the republic's government and the MVD USSR, the material and technical base for the organs of internal affairs has been strengthened. We are deeply grateful to the soviet organs, the enterprise collectives, organizations, kolkhozes and sovkhozes that contributed significantly to the securing of additional personnel for the organs of internal affairs. In the capitol and the republic's oblast centers, newly-created large combat [stroyevye] subunits of the militia have already come to the defense of public order. The number of internal troops serving in the city of Dushanbe has doubled. All of these forces, toughened by complex, extreme conditions, are ready to repulse any encroachments on the constitutional rights

and security of our citizens or illegal criminal acts against the existing order. In this, the people of Tajikistan can rest assured!

Besides this, we cannot help but be alarmed by the fact that certain people are attempting to take advantage of the complexities of the sociopolitical and economic situation to further personal ambitious goals. Destructive elements that do not shrink from any sort of demagogic methods or even from undisguised lies are trying to disgrace the achievements of the Tajik people and the measures that are being taken to provide for its future, and are trying to push the unstable portion of our citizens into rash, illegal acts. And this could lead to very serious, tragic consequences.

I appeal to the older generation—to the keepers of the best and the noble traditions of the Tajik and other peoples; to those whose view on the most urgent problems of public life has always been distinctively sober and healthy. To the mothers, each of whom wishes only happiness and prosperity for her children. To all the workers in the fields, factories and workshops, whose untiring labor creates material wealth. To the large detachment of educators serving the adolescent generation—the teachers and craftsmen in the schools and colleges, the professors and instructors of upper- and mid-level educational institutions. To the creative intelligentsia—the bearers of the ancient, humanist and multi-organ culture of the Tajik people. To the high-school pupils and college students, on whom the future character of Tajikistan is greatly dependent. To the clergy, who bring to people the high, universally human principles of a love of peace, mutual respect and kindness.

I appeal to all healthy-minded citizens of the republic, calling upon them in the interests of the entire people and of each of its individual representatives to display personal responsibility for legality and law and order, for the democratic, mutually acceptable resolution of any problem that should arise, for providing as much help as possible to law enforcement organs in the timely exposure and suppression of illegal acts committed by destructive and antisocial elements. The reliable guarantee for the future of our republic, for the strong protection of the rights and freedoms of every citizen, for the fruitful work of all government organs and public institutes in the name of the construction of a lawful society lies in unity.

MVD Activity Noted in Moldova

91UN0369A Moscow *LESNAYA GAZETA* in Russian
13 Nov 90 p 1

[Article by B. Markin: "Moldova: Difficult Steps Toward Harmony"]

[Text] Representatives of more than 40 nationalities have lived for centuries on the territory of the present-day republic of Moldova without discriminating among themselves by language, faith, or origin. But a fire was

ignited after the adoption by the Moldovan Supreme Soviet of a law on the status of the state language. It officially established the supremacy of Moldovan and virtually limited professions for persons of non-Moldovan nationality.

...The Gagauz, who live for the most part in the southern regions of Moldova, objected to this. They made the decision to create an autonomous Gagauz Republic within the USSR.

But the Moldovans objected to the Gagauz autonomy in turn.

Here is a short chronicle of the conflict:

- In Kishinev and other rayons of the republic, detachments of volunteers began to form with the goal of marching to those places that do not yet fly the tricolor flag of Moldova and forcing the local population to acknowledge its supremacy. A critical situation arose.
- Internal forces of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] were introduced into the republic to protect the peaceful population. Together with local self-defense detachments they organized checkpoints on roads passing through villages.
- A state of emergency was declared in the southern rayons of Moldova.
- Tension grew. Two hostile crowds numbering many thousands met for the first time near the city of Vulkaneshty. Numerous workers of the militia were among the volunteers of the "North." Subunits of special-purpose troops of the internal forces and a group of employees of the USSR MVD arrived to separate the opposing groups.

That time bloodshed was avoided. The restraint, high professionalism, and tact of Major General A. Zaytsev, commander of a front-line group of internal forces of the USSR MVD, and Lieutenant Colonel B. Sibirenko, his deputy commander for political affairs, played an important role.

—Nonetheless on 2 November, a couple of days later, tragedy struck on the bridge near Dubossar. To a great degree it was due to the absence of reliable information and to rumors that agitated the crowd. In particular, people began to talk openly about an alleged armed seizure of the building of the rayon department of internal affairs in Dubossar. A company of OMON [special-purpose militia detachments] and a detachment of workers of the Moldovan militia moved in. And something irreparable happened... Bursts from assault rifles were fired at unarmed people. Three died and others were wounded.

Militia Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Makarov, an officer of the USSR MVD press center, has just returned from a trip to Moldova:

"The actions of the local militia," said Yuriy Olegovich, "which resulted in human victims, cannot be called anything other than illegal. Neither military subunits nor troops of the MVD used their weapons. But we have still to determine who gave the order to fire. At present the situation in Moldova resembles the calm before a storm. The shooting on the bridge near Dubossar is fraught with unpredictable consequences. Although the holidays passed quietly enough in the republic, the conflict is far from over. But for now it is difficult to predict what form it will take in the future."

Draft Law on Acquiring Citizenship in Moldova

91UN0506A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA in Russian 22 Nov 90 p 3

["Draft Law of the SSR of Moldova 'On Citizenship of the SSR of Moldova'"—usage of Moldova and Moldavia as published]

[Text] In accordance with the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova's Declaration of Sovereignty, citizenship of the SSR of Moldova is being instituted within the republic. Dual citizenship is not recognized in the SSR of Moldova.

Citizenship of the SSR of Moldova is an individual's allegiance to the state of the SSR of Moldova.

Citizens of the SSR of Moldova are equal before the law regardless of nationality. Only they have the right to carry out public, civic, and military functions.

Citizens of the SSR of Moldova enjoy the protection of the state of the SSR of Moldova.

The state of Moldova is responsible to its own citizens and citizens of the republic of Moldova are responsible to the state of Moldova.

Citizenship of the SSR of Moldova is acquired by birth, as the result of naturalization (admittance to citizenship), or choice of citizenship.

I. General Provisions

Article 1. Being a Citizen of the SSR of Moldova.

The following are citizens of the SSR of Moldova:

1) Persons who were residing on the territory of Bessarabia or the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic before 28 June 1940, and their descendants residing permanently on the territory of the SSR of Moldova on the day that this Law is passed;

2) Persons who arrived in the SSR of Moldova after 28 June 1940 and who on the day that this law enters into force have been residing permanently for last five years (an alternative version is 10 years) on the territory of the SSR of Moldova who have a permanent place of work or a legal source of income and who submit an official application to be granted citizenship of the SSR of Moldova during the year after this Law is passed;

3) Persons who have been granted citizenship by the SSR of Moldova Supreme Soviet Presidium on an individual basis and who have not forfeited that citizenship;

4) Persons from among the indigenous population of the SSR of Moldova who have resided permanently on the territory of the SSR of Moldova but moved to other Union republics where they are now residing permanently and have a permanent place of work or have served out sentences and who during the two-year period following the entry of this Law into force apply to the state organs of the SSR of Moldova and submit an official application to be recognized as citizens of the SSR of Moldova;

5) Persons who have acquired citizenship of the SSR of Moldova in accordance with this Law.

Alternative Version of Article 1.

Article 1. The following are citizens of the SSR of Moldova:

1) Persons who on the day that this Law enters into force are residing permanently on the territory of the republic and have a permanent source of income;

2) Persons who acquire citizenship of the SSR of Moldova in accordance with this Law.

Article 2. The Document Confirming Citizenship of the SSR of Moldova.

The passport [pasport] of a citizen of the Moldova SSR is the document that confirms citizenship of the SSR of Moldova.

The procedure for issuing a passport to a citizen of the SSR of Moldova is laid down by the government of the SSR of Moldova.

Persons who have attained their majority and during the two years following the entry of this Law into force do not make an official statement of confirmation of citizenship of the SSR of Moldova shall be deemed not to have taken out citizenship of the state of Moldova.

Article 3. Legal Status of a Citizen of the SSR of Moldova.

Regardless of the basis on which citizenship was acquired, citizens of the SSR of Moldova enjoy in equal measure and to the full extent the socioeconomic, political, and personal rights and freedoms proclaimed and guaranteed by the laws of the SSR of Moldova.

Only citizens of the SSR of Moldova have the right to elect and be elected, in accordance with procedure established by law, to the soviets of peoples' deputies and other elected state organs, to be judges and people's assessors [narodnyye zasedateli], to occupy posts in the organs of state power and management, and also to take part in referendums.

Citizens of the SSR of Moldova are obliged to observe the Constitution and laws of the SSR of Moldova, help to strengthen its might and authority, and to be loyal to their republic.

The SSR of Moldova safeguards the legal rights and freedoms of citizens of the SSR of Moldova and guarantees their equality in all spheres of economic, political, social, and cultural life.

Article 4. Retention of Citizenship of the SSR of Moldova in the Case of Contract of Marriage or Divorce.

When a male or female citizen of the SSR of Moldova enters into a contract of marriage with a person who holds foreign citizenship, or with a stateless person, and likewise in the case of dissolution of marriage, this entails no change in the citizenship of the spouse unless international agreements concluded by the SSR of Moldova lay down other rules.

Article 5. Retention of Citizenship of the SSR of Moldova by Persons Residing Outside the SSR of Moldova.

Citizens of the SSR of Moldova residing outside its borders do not lose their citizenship of the SSR of Moldova regardless of the time spent there.

Article 6. State Protection for Citizens of the SSR of Moldova.

Citizens of the SSR of Moldova enjoy the defense and protection of the state and cannot be extradited to another state.

Citizens of the SSR of Moldova enjoy the protection of the state of Moldova on the territory of other states.

The state of Moldova and its diplomatic missions and consular establishments, and also their officials, are obliged to take steps to enable citizens of the SSR of Moldova to have the opportunity to take full advantage of all the rights provided to them by the laws of the country of sojourn, and by international treaties to which the SSR of Moldova and the country of sojourn are signatories, in accordance with procedure established by law to defend their rights and interests protected by law, and if necessary, to restore the violated rights of citizens of the SSR of Moldova.

Article 7. Dual Citizenship.

Citizens of the SSR of Moldova may not be citizens of other states except in cases as provided for by international treaties to which the SSR of Moldova is a signatory.

Foreign citizens may be granted citizenship of the SSR of Moldova in exceptional cases.

Article 8. Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons.

In the SSR of Moldova, persons whose citizenship is registered in any foreign state are deemed to be citizens of foreign states.

Persons who are not citizens of the SSR of Moldova and do not have proof of their citizenship of a foreign state are deemed to be stateless persons.

Article 9. The Legal Status of Citizens of Foreign States and Stateless Persons on the Territory of the SSR of Moldova.

Citizens of foreign states and stateless persons are obliged to respect and observe the Constitution and other laws of the SSR of Moldova. On the territory of the SSR of Moldova, the legal regime for foreigners and stateless persons will apply to them, and they are guaranteed rights and freedoms, including the right to have recourse to the courts and other state organs to defend their legal rights.

Citizens of foreign states who are on the territory of the SSR of Moldova are guaranteed right of access to defense from the diplomatic or consular establishments of their own state.

II. Acquisition of Citizenship of the SSR of Moldova

Article 10. Grounds for Acquisition of Citizenship of the SSR of Moldova.

Citizenship of the SSR of Moldova may be acquired as follows:

- 1) By birth;
- 2) As a result of the granting of citizenship of the SSR of Moldova;
- 3) On the basis of grounds provided for by international treaties to which the SSR of Moldova is a signatory;
- 4) On other grounds as provided for by this Law.

Article 11. Citizenship of Children Whose Parents Are Citizens of the SSR of Moldova.

A child, both of whose parents are citizens of the SSR of Moldova at the time of birth, is a citizen of the SSR of Moldova regardless of place of birth.

Article 12. Citizenship of Children One of Whose Parents Is a Citizen of the SSR of Moldova.

In the event that the citizenship of the parents is different and one of the parents is a citizen of the SSR of Moldova at the time of the child's birth, the child is a citizen of the SSR of Moldova:

- 1) if the child is born on the territory of the SSR of Moldova;
- 2) if the child is born outside the SSR of Moldova but the parents or one of the parents has a permanent place of residence on the territory of the SSR of Moldova.

In the event that the citizenship of the parents is different and one of them has citizenship of the SSR of Moldova at the time of the child's birth and if at that time both parents have a permanent place of residence

outside the SSR of Moldova, the citizenship of a child born outside the SSR of Moldova is decided by the agreement of the parents, expressed in written form.

If at the time of the child's birth one of the parents is a citizen of the SSR of Moldova while the other is a stateless person or of unknown citizenship, the child is a citizen of the SSR of Moldova regardless of the place of birth.

In the event that paternity is established for a child whose mother is a stateless person and the father is deemed to be a citizen of the SSR of Moldova, a child who has not yet attained the age of 14 years becomes a citizen of the SSR of Moldova regardless of the place of birth.

Article 13. Acquisition of Citizenship of the SSR of Moldova by the Children of Stateless Persons.

A child born of stateless persons who reside permanently on the territory of the SSR of Moldova is a citizen of the SSR of Moldova.

Article 14. Citizenship of Children Whose Parents Are Unknown.

A child on the territory of the SSR of Moldova, both of whose parents are unknown, is a citizen of the SSR of Moldova.

Article 15. Retention of the Right to Citizenship of the SSR of Moldova.

The right to citizenship of the SSR of Moldova is retained for persons who moved from the territory of Moldova or left it since 1940, and also for their children and grandchildren.

For others who left Moldavia, citizenship of the SSR of Moldova is recognized if they move to take up residence on the territory of the SSR of Moldova.

Article 16. Granting of Citizenship of the SSR of Moldova.

Foreign citizens and stateless persons may at their own request be granted citizenship of the SSR of Moldova in accordance with this Law regardless of origin, national affiliation, sex, education, language, attitude toward religion, or place of residence.

A person who is granted citizenship of the SSR of Moldova takes an oath to the republic and must meet the following conditions:

- 1) he speaks the official language (except for persons aged 60 or over);
- 2) he has had a permanent place of residence on the territory of the SSR of Moldova for the previous 10 years;

3) he has a permanent place of work or a permanent, legal source of income on the territory of the SSR of Moldova;

4) he knows the fundamentals of the Constitution of the SSR of Moldova.

In individual cases citizenship of the SSR of Moldova may be granted to persons even if the conditions enumerated in the second part of this article are not met.

Article 17. Granting Citizenship of the SSR of Moldova to Persons Who Contract Marriages with Citizens of the SSR of Moldova.

A person who contracts a marriage with a citizen of the SSR of Moldova and lives with that citizen in the married state for one year on the territory of the republic may be granted citizenship of the SSR of Moldova if the conditions set forth in Article 16 (except for clauses 1 and 2) are met and if citizenship of another state is renounced if such citizenship is held by that person.

Article 18. The Oath of Citizenship of the SSR of Moldova.

Persons who are granted citizenship of the SSR of Moldova are required to take the following oath: "I, (name), solemnly swear to observe the Constitution and laws of the sovereign Republic of Moldova and to respect the sovereignty and integrity of the SSR of Moldova and its official language, culture, customs, and traditions, and honestly to fulfill the obligations of a citizen and promote the interests and burgeoning of the state of Moldova in every possible way."

The oath is sworn publicly in a ceremonial atmosphere in the soviets of peoples' deputies of the SSR of Moldova.

A person who acquires citizenship of the SSR of Moldova swears the oath in the official language and signs the text of the oath.

Article 19. Grounds for Refusal To Grant Citizenship of the SSR of Moldova.

The following persons are not granted citizenship of the SSR of Moldova:

- 1) those who have been sentenced to deprivation of freedom for premeditated crimes and who have unpunished or unenforced previous convictions, or against whom a criminal case is pending at the time their applications are considered;
- 2) those who were involved in the repressions during the foreign occupation or during the period of Stalin's cult of personality;
- 3) those who have committed international or military crimes or crimes against humanity;
- 4) those who incite national or racial enmity; those who spread the ideas of fascism, chauvinism, or Stalinism;

5) those who by their activity undermine the foundations of the state or threaten its security, the maintenance of public order, or the health or moral foundations of the population;

6) those who call for violent change or the overthrow of the social system as expressed in the Constitution of the SSR of Moldova;

7) those who are associated with terrorist activity;

8) those who are citizens of other states.

III. Revocation of Citizenship of the SSR of Moldova. Restoration of Citizenship of the SSR of Moldova

Article 20. Grounds for Revoking Citizenship of the SSR of Moldova.

Citizenship of the SSR of Moldova is revoked:

1) as the result of renunciation of citizenship of the SSR of Moldova;

2) when citizenship of the SSR of Moldova is withdrawn;

3) in the event that citizenship of another state is acquired;

4) if for no good reason a person who resides abroad permanently fails to check with the consular register during a five-year period;

5) on grounds as provided for by international treaties to which the SSR of Moldova is a signatory;

6) on other grounds as provided for by this Law.

Article 21. Renunciation of Citizenship of the SSR of Moldova.

In exceptional cases, when there are weighty grounds for it, the President of the SSR of Moldova may grant renunciation of citizenship of the SSR of Moldova to a person who has attained the age of 18 years who:

1) has never been suspected of or charged with any action that entails criminal liability and who has no sentence still to be discharged;

2) does not have material obligations to the state or to any individual or legal entity, or, if he does have such obligations, is discharging them or offers appropriate guarantees that they will be discharged;

3) pledges that after renunciation of citizenship of the SSR of Moldova he will not engage in actions that would be to the detriment of the state and people of Moldova.

Renunciation of citizenship of the SSR of Moldova may be refused if it threatens the security of the state.

Article 22. Deprivation of Citizenship of the SSR of Moldova.

In exceptional cases, with the permission of the President of the SSR of Moldova, deprivation of citizenship of the SSR of Moldova may be invoked for a person who:

1) has acquired citizenship by deceit;

2) committed serious crimes against the state;

3) joined the armed forces of a foreign state;

4) is in the service of another state without the knowledge or consent of competent organs of the SSR of Moldova;

5) has committed crimes against humanity or engaged in genocide.

Deprivation of citizenship of the SSR of Moldova does not affect the citizenship of his (or her) spouse or children.

Article 23. Restoration of Citizenship of the SSR of Moldova.

A person who previously had citizenship of the SSR of Moldova may at his own request have that citizenship restored.

Restoration of citizenship of the SSR of Moldova is permitted on an individual basis by the President of the SSR of Moldova.

IV. Citizenship of Children in a Case in Which the Citizenship of the Parents is Changed, and in Adoption

Article 24. Change of Citizenship of Children in the Case of Change of Citizenship of Both Parents.

If both parents become citizens of the SSR of Moldova or both renounce their citizenship of the SSR of Moldova, the citizenship of their children who have not yet attained the age of 14 years changes accordingly.

If one of the parents loses citizenship of the SSR of Moldova but the other parent is a citizen of the SSR of Moldova, their children aged under 14 years retain their citizenship of the SSR of Moldova.

A change in the citizenship of child aged from 14 to 18 years in the case of a change of the citizenship of the parents, and also in the case of adoption, can be effected only with the agreement of the child, expressed in written form.

Article 25. Acquisition by Children of Citizenship of the SSR of Moldova in the Case of Acquisition of Citizenship of the SSR of Moldova by One of the Parents.

If one of the parents acquires citizenship of the SSR of Moldova while the other remains a foreign citizen, a child may acquire citizenship of the SSR of Moldova at the request of the parent acquiring citizenship of the SSR of Moldova.

If one of the parents becomes a citizen of the SSR of Moldova while the other remains a stateless person, a

child residing on the territory of the SSR of Moldova becomes a citizen of the SSR of Moldova.

If one of the parents becomes a citizen of the SSR of Moldova while the other remains a stateless person, a child residing outside the SSR of Moldova may acquire citizenship of the SSR of Moldova by application of the parent who has acquired citizenship of the SSR of Moldova.

Article 26. Acquisition by Children of Citizenship of the SSR of Moldova in the Case of Adoption.

A child who is a foreign citizen or a stateless person who is adopted by a citizen of the SSR of Moldova becomes a citizen of the SSR of Moldova.

A child who is a foreign citizen who is adopted by a couple, one of whom is a citizen of the SSR of Moldova while the other is a stateless person, becomes a citizen of the SSR of Moldova.

A child who is a stateless person who is adopted by a couple one of whom is a citizen of the SSR of Moldova becomes a citizen of the SSR of Moldova.

A child who is a foreign citizen who is adopted by a couple, one of whom is a citizen of the SSR of Moldova while the other is foreign citizen, becomes a citizen of the SSR of Moldova with the consent of the adopters.

Article 27. Retention by Children of Citizenship of the SSR of Moldova in the Case of Adoption.

A child who is a citizen of the SSR of Moldova and is adopted by foreign citizens or a couple, one of whom is a citizen of the SSR of Moldova while the other is a foreign citizen, retains citizenship of the SSR of Moldova. At the request of the adopters of the child permission may be given to renounce citizenship of the SSR of Moldova.

A child who is a citizen of the SSR of Moldova and is adopted by stateless persons or by a couple, one of whom is a citizen of the SSR of Moldova while the other is a stateless person, retains citizenship of the SSR of Moldova.

Article 28. Retention of Citizenship of the SSR of Moldova by a Child Who Is Placed in Guardianship or Wardship.

If both parents or a single parent of a child residing on the territory of the SSR of Moldova renounce citizenship of the SSR of Moldova and are not involved in the upbringing of a child who has been placed under the guardianship or wardship of a citizen of the SSR of Moldova, at the request of the parents, guardian, or ward the child retains citizenship of the SSR of Moldova.

Article 29. Need for Consent of Children for Change of Citizenship.

Change of citizenship for children aged 14 to 18 years in the event that their parents change their citizenship, and

also in the case of adoption, may follow only with the consent of the children, under the procedure set forth in article 31 of this Law.

V. Procedure for Resolving Questions Pertaining to Citizenship of the SSR of Moldova

Article 30. Procedure for Submitting Statements on Questions Pertaining to Citizenship.

Statements on questions pertaining to citizenship are addressed to the President of the SSR of Moldova through the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs at the permanent place of residence of the applicants, while for persons residing permanently abroad they are submitted through the appropriate diplomatic missions or consular establishments of the state of Moldova.

A person who is a citizen of a state with which the SSR of Moldova has concluded an agreement to ban dual citizenship is obliged to submit a document testifying to the attitude of that state toward the citizen's intention to change his citizenship.

Article 31. Form of Statement in Questions Pertaining to Citizenship.

Applications to acquire citizenship of the SSR of Moldova or to renounce its citizenship are considered at the request of the applicant in written form. Applications regarding persons who have not yet attained the age of 18 years are considered at the notarized request of their legal representatives, while applications from abroad are considered from a request certified by a diplomatic mission or consular establishment of the SSR of Moldova.

When a statement is submitted regarding the acquisition of citizenship, restoration of citizenship, or renunciation of citizenship on behalf of children aged 14 to 18 years, their agreement is obligatory, and this agreement should be expressed in written form and notarized, while statements received from abroad should be certified by a diplomatic mission or consular establishment of the SSR of Moldova.

When an application is submitted regarding renunciation of citizenship of the SSR of Moldova by a child who has not yet attained majority, one of the parents who remains a citizen of the SSR of Moldova should also submit a statement in which the attitude of that parent toward the child's renunciation of citizenship of the SSR of Moldova is expressed. This statement should be notarized, or, if received from abroad, be certified by a diplomatic mission or consular establishment of the SSR of Moldova.

Article 32. Representation for Revocation of Citizenship of the SSR of Moldova.

Representations for revocation of citizenship of the SSR of Moldova are made by state organs of the SSR of

Moldova, and also by diplomatic missions or consular establishments through the SSR of Moldova Ministry of Foreign Relations.

Article 33. Procedure for Registering and Reviewing Statements Pertaining to Questions of Citizenship.

The executive committees of rayon and city soviets of people's deputies and diplomatic missions or consular establishments of the SSR of Moldova are obliged to accept all statements or complaints on questions pertaining to matters of citizenship submitted, as a rule, by individuals. If there are good reasons for them, statements may be passed on via other persons.

Organs that register statements on questions pertaining to citizenship prepare summaries justifying them. The SSR of Moldova Ministry of Internal Affairs, SSR of Moldova Ministry of Foreign Relations, and the SSR of Moldova Committee for State Security send their conclusions on statements pertaining to citizenship and other essential material to the president of the SSR of Moldova.

The SSR of Moldova Ministry of Labor and Social Safeguards [Ministerstvo truda i sotsialnoy zashchity] submits its conclusions to the president of the SSR of Moldova regarding the advisability of granting or restoring citizenship of the SSR of Moldova for each applicant, including opportunities available to that applicant with respect to work, housing, and other arrangements within the republic.

The conclusions on statements pertaining to renunciation of citizenship of the SSR of Moldova also contain information on the presence or absence of impediments as set forth in article 21 of this Law.

Article 34. The SSR of Moldova Presidential Commission Dealing With Questions Pertaining to Citizenship.

An SSR of Moldova presidential commission is set up to conduct the preliminary review of questions pertaining to citizenship. It is also charged with preliminary review of materials pertaining to asylum for foreigners and drawing up proposals on those materials for the president of the SSR of Moldova.

Procedure for the activity of the commission dealing with questions pertaining to matters of citizenship is determined by appropriate resolution.

The commission dealing with questions pertaining to citizenship submits proposals to the president of the SSR of Moldova on each application. The decision of the commission is recorded in a protocol signed by all members of the commission attending the meeting.

Article 35. Decision of the President of the SSR of Moldova on Questions Pertaining to Citizenship of the SSR of Moldova.

The president of the SSR of Moldova issues ukases on the granting of citizenship of the SSR of Moldova,

renunciation of citizenship of the SSR of Moldova, restoration of citizenship of the SSR of Moldova, and loss or revocation of citizenship of the SSR of Moldova, and if applications or representations are refused, provides the justification for that refusal.

Ukases of the president of the SSR of Moldova on the granting of citizenship of the SSR of Moldova, renunciation of citizenship of the SSR of Moldova, restoration of citizenship of the SSR of Moldova, and loss or revocation of citizenship of the SSR of Moldova are published in the MONITOR VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSR MOLDOVA.

Changes of citizenship take effect on the date of publication of an ukase of the president of the SSR of Moldova unless the ukase states to the contrary.

Article 36. Second Review of Statements and Representations on Questions Pertaining to Citizenship of the SSR of Moldova.

Second reviews for persons concerning the granting of citizenship of the SSR of Moldova, renunciation of citizenship of the SSR of Moldova, restoration of citizenship of the SSR of Moldova, and also representations concerning loss or revocation of citizenship of the SSR of Moldova take place one year after the initial decision on the matter.

If circumstances relevant to the matter become known that were not known and could not have been known, a second review can be conducted earlier.

Article 37. Period for Review of Statements Pertaining to Citizenship.

The period for review of statements or representations on questions pertaining to citizenship should not exceed one year.

Article 38. Procedure for Execution of Ukases of the President of the SSR of Moldova in Questions Pertaining to Citizenship.

The SSR of Moldova Ministry of Internal Affairs and its organs are charged with execution of ukases of the president of the SSR of Moldova in questions pertaining to citizenship, while the SSR of Moldova Ministry of Foreign Relations and diplomatic missions and consular establishments of the SSR of Moldova deal with persons residing abroad.

Article 39. Issuance of Passports and Residence Permits.

Persons who have acquired citizenship of the SSR of Moldova under the procedure established by law are given the passport of a citizen of the SSR of Moldova by organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and diplomatic missions and consular establishments of the SSR of Moldova. Documents for children who have not attained the age of 16 years contain an entry stating that they are citizens of the SSR of Moldova.

Persons residing in the SSR of Moldova whose citizenship of the SSR of Moldova is discontinued are issued residence permits by organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Article 40. Monitoring Compliance With Decisions on Questions Pertaining to Citizenship.

Monitoring compliance with decisions on questions relating to citizenship is carried out by the SSR of Moldova presidential commission dealing with questions pertaining to citizenship and also by other organs making decisions on such matters.

VI. Appeals Against Decisions on Questions Pertaining to Citizenship

Article 41. Appeal Against Ukases of the President of the SSR of Moldova in Questions Pertaining to Citizenship.

Ukases on matters pertaining to citizenship issued by the president of the SSR of Moldova may be appealed to the SSR of Moldova Supreme Soviet.

An appeal may be made during the six-month period following publication of an ukase. The permitted period may be extended by the president of the SSR of Moldova and the SSR of Moldova Supreme Soviet if there are good reasons for so doing.

Article 42. Appeal Against Improper Actions by Officials in Questions Pertaining to Citizenship.

Unjustified refusal to accept statements in questions pertaining to citizenship, violation of periods set for their review, and also other improper actions by officials in violation of procedure for reviewing cases pertaining to citizenship and procedure of compliance with decisions in questions pertaining to citizenship may be appealed under the procedure established by law to an official higher than the official in question, or to the courts.

VII. International Treaties

Article 43. Application of International Treaties.

If under the terms of an international treaty to which the SSR of Moldova is signatory rules other than those set forth in this Law are established, the rules of the international treaty shall be applied.

Journalist Calls for Moratorium on Rallies

91US0093A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Nov 90
Second Edition p 4

[Article by Timur Pulatov: "Democracy of the Street and Corridors of Power"]

[Text] Tashkent—As usual, two or three days before the rally in the main square an alarming rumor about impending pogroms circulates from block to block, family to family, and in this way throughout the city. Skeptics recall Fergana, Dushanbe, and Osha for those who hope

that the crowd, after having its full say and purging itself of harmful emotions, will disperse peacefully. All the events in those places also began with a peaceful rally.

But why must everything also end up so tragically in our city? And who is persistently spreading these ill-intentioned rumors? Some assert that the pogroms, so they say, will be arranged at the instigation of local authorities by provocateur-criminals who were released from prison specially for these purposes. What for? Because local authorities fear these rallies more than fire and, wherever possible, try to denigrate the informals in the eyes of the public... Exactly, someone with the next rumor continues to assert, they will arrange a provocation, blame it on the informals, and make them knuckle under.

Another rumor even eclipses this one: It is said that extremists have planned pogroms in order to instill fear in the non-native inhabitants and force them all, down to the very last, as was done at one time with the Meskhetian Turks, to quickly leave the republic. Once again Tajikistan, Kirghizia, and our republic are cited as examples where each day the outflow of "non-natives" increases, primarily highly professional specialists—doctors, power engineering specialists, and aviators who are alarmed by worsening interethnic relations.

But, thank God, this did not happen this time either. The rally about which there were so many gloomy conjectures and rumors ended peacefully. After yelling: "Down with! Resign! Prohibit! Punish! Take to court!" and so forth in the spirit of the verbal cliches of street democracy, the crowd of a thousand people broke up under the grim onlook of special purpose militia with clubs and shields.

Having personally studied the programs of the informal movements of Uzbekistan and other republics, I am familiar with many of their leaders and I am convinced that a majority will be guided in their actions by a sense of responsibility and dedication to a resolution of the complex problems by means of national accord. And "Birlik," the most influential informal organization in the republic, recently called on the Russian-speaking population from the pages of the youth newspaper not to surrender to a sense of fear, not to believe rumors, but to fight together, in a united front of all nationalities, against a system which, as is written in the appeal, "is trying to drive a wedge in the historically evolved good-neighborliness and mutual respect of the peoples of our republic."

The appeal is noble and, I hope, sincere. And still... Why does anxiety overcome the public before the next appearance of a crowd on the square, despite the fact that the "People's Front of Russia," "Rostakhez" in Tajikistan, "Azad" in Kazakhstan, and the "People's Democratic Front" in Kirghizia have disowned extremists and have called on the population of their republics, regardless of nationality, to unite in behalf of the renewal of society across the country—in Moscow and Dushanbe, Kishinev and Baku, Alma-Ata and Tashkent. The people no longer

believe ambassadors of goodwill or appeals, no matter what their origin—the party apparatus or informal associations.

I think that the problem is somewhat different. It is simply that distrust and hatred have now reached a critically dangerous level. Democracy was employed too often in recent years in our country to emphasize repeatedly the differences between groups of people, classes, social conditions, and entire nations, which led to a stratification of harmful emotions, ambitions, and adventurism.

"But what shall we do?" the ardent supporters of street democracy complain. "How do we make ourselves known without rallies and demonstrations? How do we topple the command system if we do not talk frankly about its vices, if we do not name the names of its servants? How do we clear the way to power for the new leaders of the people who will lead a renewed country to radiant heights?"

Indeed, the command system was something of an authoritative structure unto itself for decades, and it nourished only the nomenklatura, which, like a closed caste, was subject to decay. And this is what caused those difficulties that afflict society.

All of this is correct. But why is the arsenal of the "destroyers" of this system so impoverished and imperfect? Why do those who join in "democratic action" recognize only rallies in squares as the most powerful and unfailing form of struggle? Is it not really clear from the history of the democratic development of other countries that street democracy is the very first and the most "primitive" form of democracy? It was used more than once as a weapon against democracy itself, and not only by the military in Chile but in other countries as well.

The biggest flaw in street democracy is deafness, when the arguments of the opposing side or of an opponent cannot be heard, which creates a false sense of rightness in those who are rallying. In such cases, what can be said for diversity of opinions and pluralism? The ralliers hammer away vigorously and massively, yelling themselves hoarse, whistling, and keeping away from the microphone those who hold opinions that differ from the opinions of the aggressive majority. It is not without reason that there is a saying here in Bukhara: There is less truth in Registan Square than on Seven Mills Street, and there is less truth on Seven Mills Street than behind the walls at home. And not because the street is a synonym for all manner of vices: crime, drug addiction, and prostitution. It is simply that the life of an Eastern person takes place in the home, which is blocked off from the street by a solid fence, and this small "territory" also disposes him to meditation and a search for the truth that the crowd lost in its agitation.

But the crowd, following its leader, gathers for a rally, having beforehand brought to the political surface aspects of its resentment and superstitious impulses that

are fed by rumors and dissatisfaction, and it creates a street mythology that is a dangerous contradiction to reality.

In genuine rule-of-law states, authority is not elected or overthrown by street rallies. There are more reliable and tested ways for this. A free press, which brings politics to the masses, television debates, sociological opinion polls and analysis, poster campaigns, and many other things that give the individual person the right to a personal choice that is not incited by passions and the instincts of a crowd that has lost its reason altogether. At that instant, a crowd that is teetering on a shaky borderline between Good and Evil can easily be led to pogroms and murder. It becomes clear from such tragic situations that the crowd is compelled to row against the logical current of society, because it does not sense its scope and outlook, and it wants to get out of its situation now, this minute, at any price...

Most dangerous of all for the democratic development of our society is the fact that this "blind" element actively participates in the creation of new power structures. Street democracy has already ushered onto the political scene those who in the supreme and local soviets operate according to the laws of the agitated, clamorous crowd which drowns out the sober voices of orderly and competent deputies. And here also, in Central Asia, you find that a rather mediocre man of letters, who more than once incited crowds at populous rallies, is running things in a Supreme Soviet committee, slaking a thirst for the national recognition that did not come to him through laborious efforts at literature. Or the rally ringleader who is now a rayon manager, an economist by profession, more accurately someone who taught political economy for many years and who impressed on his ingenuous students the theory of "decaying capitalism brought about by the vicious market system." Now he can hardly wait to be the first, sooner than the republic and the entire Union, to switch his rayon to a market economy that functions according to the laws of the "black market." And the one, a humanist by training, who, on a wave of criticizing all and everything, suddenly became the editor of an economics journal? How, in fact, will this humanist-negativist discover the paths and horizons of the economic sovereignty of the republic?

Drawn into the crucible of street democracy and raised by it to the upper levels of power, it becomes necessary as hostages to fulfill the laws of this "democracy" at all times. At the appearance of any kind of critical social situation, the people, obviously, want a quick and peaceful resolution. To the "captives" of street democracy, the opposition of classes, social groups, and entire nations is advantageous, because it is easier this way to stay in the public eye always, to dictate one's will, and to prove one's right to leadership. Otherwise, the crowd will quickly turn away from them in order to find new leaders who are continuously burning "with the revolutionary flame."

One of the first steps of the recently confirmed government of Uzbekistan, following the example of Latvia, Estonia, and Moldavia, was to prohibit the shipment of field and farm goods outside the republic, which disrupted the natural exchange of goods that had developed in the region and led to an increase in the price of meat and other products. Inasmuch as we were accustomed to believe that all progressive ideas come from the capital of the Union, we were right to expect some kind of an unusual economic solution from the Moscow Soviet which would lead the city out of the difficult situation, and which our republics would adopt immediately as valuable experience. But no, the principle of the old command system reigned here as well. The supply of goods according to identity cards was introduced in order to guard the interests of their own indigenous constituents. Tashkent and other republic capitals also reacted. This is the competition of the isolationists for you on the threshold of a national market. Thus, protecting ourselves from the interests of "strangers" by means of identity cards and local citizenship, are we not moving further and further: from the sovereignty of the republics to the sovereignty of oblasts and cities, and, after that, to squares and streets filled with rallying crowds, in order to discredit decisively the very idea of sovereignty and independence in the eyes of the public?!

And you think: Does the principle itself of nominating sovereigns by means of street democracy not have, among others, this defect as well: That the latter-day leaders have just enough merit to attract the crowd's attention with a passionate tirade at a rally, but not enough for the offices and corridors of power where specific matters have to be dealt with—feeding, clothing, and warming the crowd returning from the cold street?

Why did we find ourselves at the mercy of the elements of street democracy? Why did it more and more persistently dictate its laws to society?

Perestroika was "sent down" to us from above, and a lot of time was required to stir the inert masses. For some of that time the democracy that was presented from above and the democracy that was won by an awakening public from below moved synchronously, supplementing each other, promoting the principle of civic harmony in society. It was at this stage of our advance toward democracy that the voice of the citizens who came out onto the streets and squares naturally joined the general chorus of renewal, without hitting a false note. Enthusiasm was high, and the expectations of quick changes were stirring and naive. Afterwards there came weariness and disappointment in quick changes, which naturally could not have occurred in such an ossified society as ours. The disappointment, accumulating like an irritant, began to "spill out" onto the streets and squares where followers assembled with impatience, malice, and hatred. The synchrony was disrupted, and the situation increasingly began to deviate from the reasonable bounds within which every civic society limits itself.

Much is said now about the lack of political culture in the population, which street democracy exposed. It seems to me that total politicization (by analogy with total collectivization) once and for all will turn people from work, will have a negative effect on their morals, and will arouse in them a false sense of superiority—chauvinism and nationalism. The political itch will urge our citizens en masse onto the street where, through phrase-mongering, new leaders will weave a new mythology to replace the one that was shattered before our eyes. Politics is the destiny of a few. To rid themselves of impatience and malice, the people need a culture that contains a high morality within itself, the culture of Tolstoy, Navoy, Rudaki, Rustaveli, Shevchenko...

The country is heading toward a market. And more and more often the question can be heard in society: Who will the authority be under market conditions? It is obvious that it will not be the party apparatus, and not soviets created in its image and likeness, that immerses new democrats in the corridors of power, forcefully transforming them into officials and bureaucrats whose chief distinction from the "former" officials and bureaucrats is that no one implements their decrees... Then what kind of authority will emerge? The Mafia? Members of the shadow economy? People are not so much afraid of an impending increase in prices or unemployment as they are of anarchy, violence, and interethnic conflicts with a complete paralysis of authority. In this kind of situation the temptation is great in the crowd on the street "to take power" into its own hands. The kind of catastrophe this can lead to is obvious and does not require clarification...

In this difficult and dramatic period the healthy instinct of the people turns it to the idea of civic harmony, which is extremely urgent right now, when new forms of economic relations will be accompanied by radical changes in the social, political, national, and other spheres. Without civic peace, society will not be able to resolve its truly historic tasks.

But the future is also fraught with unpredictable consequences. A temporary worsening in life—an inevitable condition of the transition to a market—can cause desperate crowds to spill onto the streets, and the temptation of individuals to speak in behalf of the people can lead to violence and anarchy. This will decisively disrupt reforms, because rally democracy can become a sacrificial lamb or a victim of its own dark passions, such as, for example, the arson in the case of the party building in Sofia.

In order that no forces are tempted to exploit the street elements to turn democracy sharply to either the right or the left, it is necessary, in my opinion, for the USSR president to declare a temporary moratorium on rallies and processions throughout the country for all parties without exception during the transition to a market economy.

The objection can be made that rallies differ depending on who called the people to the square—conscientious democratic ringleaders or shady politician-adventurers whose rallies end up with programs. It is possible that this is so. But a demonstration like the one that occurred in Moscow on 16 September can only once again agitate society and create the impression that the main force deciding such fateful questions for our country as the transition to a market economy is the “blaring voice” of the streets, and not for the time being the Supreme Soviet, which, granted, in some ways is clumsy and not entirely democratic. It has been a long time since crowds in the street in any democratic country have decided the question of whether a president or a government should be in power. Is it possible that the experience of the

overthrow of the Provisional Government in 1917 to the hooting of the crowd did not teach our “democrats” anything?

Without doubt new forms of democracy will emerge in a free market economy to replace such primitive forms as street democracy. But I think that society is mature enough now to pass resolutely over this first stage of democracy and move to more complex and civilized forms of expressing public opinion and interests...

We paid too dear a price for democracy, and it would be ruinous to turn it over at this critical point to the authority of the street.

**Ukrainian CP Urges Party To Fight Against
'Anticommunist' Press***91UN0612A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
16 Dec 90 p 1*

["On the Mass Media. Resolution of the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress (Second Stage)"—PRAVDA UKRAINY headline]

[Text] The 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress notes that in the political and socioeconomic situation that has taken shape in society, the communist press is becoming an effective means to exert ideological influence on the masses, develop their political awareness, and instigate actions in perestroika processes. The journalists on a number of party publications are today analyzing the complex situation in society more deeply and with a greater sense of responsibility, and are speaking out more sharply against extremist and nationalist-chauvinist forces united under the slogan of direct enmity against the Ukrainian Communist Party and socialism. Today, life itself confirms the fundamental correctness of Lenin's concept of the communist press as an inseparable part of general party affairs and an effective party weapon in the political struggle.

At the same time the congress believes that the potential of the press and of television and radio broadcasting is not being fully utilized. First of all, the position of the Ukrainian Communist Party on the main problems of present-day policy and the important national legislative initiatives of the Central Committee are not being brought to the attention of the masses in any clear-cut systematic way and with a sufficient sense of conviction. On the other hand, imprecision with respect to political positions is often seen in the assessments made by the press of the antiperestroika actions of destructive forces and their leaders, and illusions about the true intentions of present-day "democrats" are tenacious.

The congress calls on party cadres and all journalists to engage in coordinated joint efforts in the struggle against the political extremism that is pushing the Ukraine toward catastrophe. This kind of ideological and creative consolidation, and high effectiveness for propaganda are possible given agreed actions by party committees and their press organs and the final eradication of excessive bureaucratic administration in relations with editorial collectives. The influence of party committees on the position of the editorial offices should be determined through close cooperation with journalists, creative, businesslike, and comradely mutual relations, and the interested participation of the party aktiv in defining the position of a newspaper, while the mutual relations between editorial office and readers should be based on constant work on the political line of the leading party organ. This will all promote a situation in which the press of the Ukrainian Communist Party will be an effective instrument in consolidating the party and strengthening the unity of its ranks. It is essential that party cadres participate actively in the press, regarding it

as an effective method for their own political activity and for polemic with ideological opponents. The party press should not be used as a platform for sociopolitical organizations of anticommunist or antisocialist orientation.

The congress notes that a number of party committees have yielded to demagogic pressure by liquidators and anticommunists, and to speculations on the institutional independence of collectives of journalists presented under alluring slogans of "creative independence," and have virtually abandoned their own press organs.

Practice has shown, particularly in the western regions, that the journalistic independence proclaimed in a declarative way turns on the subordination of press organs to anticommunist groupings. The congress condemns the liquidationist decisions of some party committees regarding their own press organs and rejects the idea being touted by enemies of the Ukrainian Communist Party that the press should be removed from the influence of the party committees or even that party committees should be deprived of their publishing base and the right to publish newspapers and journals. It is considered that a press organ is an inalienable means of a party committee's political work. In accordance with the law on the press and the other mass media, the party committee determines the ideological-creative line of a publication jointly with the editorial collective, and the editor is confirmed using democratic procedures. Under conditions in which press organs with an anticommunist thrust do actually exist, journalists working on Ukrainian Communist Party publications must consistently follow the party line and defend the socialist ideals and positions of their own institutional founder.

The congress draws the attention of Communists working in television and radio, and also in press administration, to the need to oppose firmly and in a principled manner the negative processes that are becoming increasingly widespread in the republic. Convinced of the righteousness of their cause, Communists are ready to engage in discussion with the press of other ideological orientations. However, they decisively reject the methods to which our opponents from Rukh [Ukraine People's Movement for Perestroika], the Ukrainian Republic Party [URP], and other organizations are resorting, namely, supercharging enmity toward political opponents and between particular social groups, developing campaigns of anticommunist hysteria, and issuing calls for unlawful and anticonstitutional actions. The congress appeals to state organs to establish proper control over undeviating observance of the requirements of the USSR law on the press and the other mass media.

One cause of special concern is instances of direct professional unscrupulousness by particular radio and television journalists and by many of the newspapers of soviets in a number of the western oblasts and cities, and rayons in other regions, and their lack of objectivity and political tendentiousness and bias in covering the events

of public life. Reflecting the entire spectrum of sociopolitical thought, television and radio should be primarily the spokesmen and propagandists of state policy and the interests of the people, and journalists, first and foremost those who are members of the CPSU, bear the responsibility for this. They should oppose pressure from extremist forces trying to use these mass media to satisfy political ambitions and achieve their own political aims.

The congress deems it advisable to set up an Association of the Communist Press in the republic, with a fund to provide material support for editorial collectives. Party committees are obliged to provide all-around political and material support for their own press and its subscribers, and also for the newspapers of labor collectives and educational establishments, and to strengthen the material-technical base and extend the economic independence of newspaper and journal editorial offices and their publishing activity. They should take steps to create a new training system for journalists, and raise their professional level.

In the sphere of publishing activity the Ukrainian Communist Party advocates creative cooperation with the soviets and sociopolitical organizations and democratic forces consolidating themselves on the basis of socialism and working for perestroika.

The congress calls on journalists and the founders of publications of all orientation to provide objective coverage of the processes taking place in the republic, and to cooperate constructively for the good of the people of the Ukraine.

Independent Agency Alleged To Have Fabricated Story

91P50068A Kiev *MOLOD UKRAYINY* in Ukrainian
16 Dec 90 p 1

[Article by Bohdan Kushnir in Lvov "'Postfaktum' Disinforms"]

[Text] After reading the report from Lvov in TRUD from December 12 of this year, readers might think that Galicia is preparing for war. This paragraph was also a surprise to Yaroslav Korol, head of the Lvov oblast department of the MVD. The Postfaktum agency, citing him, informed the all-union reader about the large number of confiscated weapons, night training of unidentified individuals in the oblast's forests and attacks on military targets.

However, it turns out that Yaroslav Korol did not give an interview to that agency. Obviously the unknown author, who hid behind the name "Postfaktum", creatively reworked Y. Korol's interview in the newspaper VILNA UKRAYINA. However, there the text concerned the voluntary surrender of weapons and their confiscation from educational institutions, but there was not a single word about attacks on military targets, nor about training in the forests.

The Postfaktum fabrication was picked up not only by TRUD, but also by the television news service. The heads of the oblast MVD lodged a protest and are demanding a retraction of the fabrication. This is not the first instance of disinformation by Postfaktum. One example is starvation in the Lvov party gorkom, which was already "made famous" in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. The Lvov prosecutor's office is investigating the author of this disinformation.

As for the soldiers, as Vyacheslav Chornovil, chairman of the Lvov Oblast Soviet, revealed at his latest press conference, their number is increasing. A regiment arrived unexpectedly in Khirov and a special unit in civilian clothes appeared in Yavorovskiy Rayon. Why?

Moldovan Journalists Seek Protection

91UN0323A Kishinev *SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA*
in Russian 27 Oct 90 pp 1, 3

["Appeal From the Participants of the Moldova SSR Union of Journalists Expanded Plenum Concerning the Situation in Press and the Necessity of Legal Protection for Journalists"—SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA headline]

[Text] Processes of democratization and of national revival are developing rapidly in Moldova, but they also bring certain negative consequences with them. The principles of perestroika are often distorted or compromised and obstacles are being put on our road towards our common European home. In this respect we view the current situation in the press as a distressing symptom of that. The situation, to a large extent, has been created by the hostile attitude that certain soviets, agencies, senior officials, and political groups display towards some publications and journalists.

For instance, local soviets in Tiraspol, Rybnitsa, Kamenka, Komrat, Chadyr-Lung, and Slobozyia broke the existing regulations and appointed editors, therefore violating the decree on the Republic's legislature approval of the rayon and city newspaper editors. Moreover, they fired some editors who did not support the policy aimed at splitting our republic—the policy conducted by self-appointed leaders of the Gagauz and Dnestr areas. These were the editors who remained loyal to our Constitution, our language, and our tricolor flag. That happened to the former editor of the Slobozyia Rayon newspaper I. Koretskiy. G. Beldiman, editor of the Kamenka Rayon newspaper, and A. Steele, editor of the Rybnitsa Rayon newspaper, are being abused or threatened with dismissal. Any attempt at freedom in the rayon and city press of the left bank is being suppressed in a similar way. This press is totally subdued by the antinational regime established in the so-called Dnestr republic. Their newspapers have opened a slander campaign against the legislature, against the state symbols, against the patriotic authors and people involved in culture work.

The only newspaper that is still resisting this attempt to split the Moldovan land is the newspaper of the Tiraspol pedagogical institute, which is being constantly persecuted. Things have gone so far that several times windows in the newspaper office have been broken by thrown rocks.

As we condemn these hostile actions, we condemn just as strongly the attacks on the freedom of press that recently took place in the Republic's capital. About a month ago, a group of hoodlums calling themselves patriots attacked the office of the MOLODEZH MOLDAVII newspaper and made its personnel stop their work. True, the newspaper had displayed certain chauvinistic tendencies; it seldom spared our ethnic pride. However, it should have been a matter for legal proceedings and not for self-appointed judges off the street.

Some time later these uninvited guests also "visited" the office of the VECHERNIY KISHINEV.

There were instances of hoodlums attacking reporters while they were photographing some mass gatherings. The reporters' photographic equipment was taken away from them.

It seems that the former party dictatorship is being replaced by the dictatorship of the street mob and the socialist democracy—by the democracy of a stick and that can cause nothing but indignation.

More sophisticated methods of suppression are being used also. September of this year witnessed the beginning and the end of the weekly KURYERUL published by the writer Kharlampiy Moraru. Materials already set for the first issue were destroyed in a mysterious way by a mysterious someone when they were in the printing shop. The second issue was removed from circulation by the directive of one of the new bosses. It should be mentioned here, that both issues contained some materials critical of certain legislaturearians. So, it follows that the command administrative system is still with us.

The other day our entire country learned about the evening fire that destroyed the fifth floor of the Kishinev House of Press. As a result, work was disrupted in five editorial offices as they lost their working places. This outrage has been directed against us—journalists; it is a blow to the entire press that is trying to gain freedom at last; it is a blow on glasnost and democratization.

All this makes us feel concerned because these facts mean nothing other than an infringement on the freedom of expression and a lack of legal protection for the journalists facing illegal acts.

We demand that the government employ the help of law enforcement organs to ensure that we are assured conditions necessary for our professional activity. This is the rule of any civilized society and should be in accordance with the Law on Press.

Persecution of journalists and moral pressure put on them for not sharing somebody's opinions are incompatible with a civilized society and cannot be tolerated in a country that considers itself one that follows rule-of-law!

Lithuania's Journalists View Ethics Issues

91UN0200F Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 2 Oct 90
p 2

[Unattributed article: "Journalists Discussed Problems"]

[Text] Vilnius, 1 October (ELTA)—On Saturday a two-day conference at the Journalists Union in the capital ended. Participants included the chairmen of the primary organizations and associations, the aktiv of that creative union, which unites approximately 1500 members in many cities and rayons of Lithuania. The participants expressed the opinion that the current journalists organization must be reorganized and must assume the functions of a trade union. After a discussion of questions of journalistic ethics, it was recommended that a journalistic court of honor be created. These and other questions will be discussed at the forthcoming plenum and congress of the Journalists Union.

The conference participants met Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. There was a discussion of the most vitally important questions of domestic and foreign policy and the relations between the authority and the press; the understanding of unity and the paths to achieve it; the question of the independence of the rayon and city newspapers; and the question of political forces and their place in the republic and its parliament. V. Landsbergis emphasized that the press must carry out explanatory work and must consolidate people during this period, which is so complicated for Lithuania. Responding to questions about the meeting that is planned for Tuesday between the delegations from Lithuania and the Soviet Union, the Chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet said that this is not yet the beginning of negotiations, but only the introduction to the negotiations. "Everyone must understand that these are negotiations about negotiations. It is only with the beginning of the real negotiations that our preliminary pledges—the moratorium—will go into effect in Lithuania," V. Landsbergis emphasized.

The republic's journalists also met on Saturday with Lithuanian Vice-President Romualdas Ozolas. There was a discussion of the relations between the executive power and the press; tax policy; problems and importance of creative unions; questions of political and journalistic ethics; etc. "The criterion that must reign again in the Journalists Union is the criterion of truth, not of benefit," R. Ozolas stated. The vice-premier stated that next year only the minimal paper needs will be satisfied, but by the end of the year that problem should be resolved.

The meeting was conducted by Domionas Sniukas, chairman of the Lithuanian Journalists Union.

Independent TV Program Devoted to Economic Issues Planned

91UN0558A Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII
in Russian 1 Dec 90 p 4

[Interview with Aleksandr Tikhomirov, Central Television political commentator and RSFSR people's deputy, by MOLODEZH ESTONII correspondent Ella Agranovskaya in Tallinn; date not given: "Where Does the Water in the Water Mains Come From?"]

[Excerpts] Estonian television continues its series "Without Censorship" (editor—Yelena Chaplygina, director—Leo Karpin). The hero of our next program is Aleksandr Tikhomirov, Central Television political commentator and also a RSFSR people's deputy.

Courtesy of our colleagues, our correspondent Ella Agranovskaya interviewed Aleksandr Tikhomirov who was in Tallinn for taping on Estonian television.

[Agranovskaya] To begin with, a traditional question that I ask every participant of the series "Without Censorship": Do you believe that there really will be independent television in our country? This question is especially relevant to you, since, to a certain degree, you are a victim of your own journalistic independence—if we recall, who was the reason for shutting down the "Seven Days" program.

[Tikhomirov] I am convinced that television will be independent. To be more precise, there will be state television, party television, and independent television, although it is quite expensive because we will have to finance it ourselves. So far the All-Russia Television and Radio Company, which we are in a process of creating now and which will begin broadcasting on 1 January, will be supported out of the Russian Federation budget. We plan to become self-supporting within two years—through selling commercial time and through forming joint enterprises with other republics and with foreign partners. In particular, we are already working on a program that will be called "Businessman Hour." I was recently in the United States and reached an agreement, in principle, that they will make a first time, \$25 million investment in Russian television because this particular program will serve as a basis for a joint American-French-Soviet venture that will combine economic and mass information. That is, this is an attempt, for the first time on Russian territory, to create an organization that will possess a television center and will have a data bank on our internal market. This is precisely the kind of information our partners are interested in possessing.

[Agranovskaya] Are you not concerned that this program will be, on the one hand, oversaturated with commercials and, on the other hand, overly politicized?

[Tikhomirov] No, we are not going to talk about politics there. It is an economic program, and our task is to get any ideology out of economics. I think that at first the program will be centered too much on economics rather

than too politicized. But, after all, we are right now in such situation that if we broadcast economic programs 24 hours a week, millions of people will watch them with interest. Today economics is the most interesting topic: How we will live from now on, what we are going to eat, what kind of pensions will we have, what salaries, how the enterprises that switch to self-financing will survive, how they can avoid bankruptcy, how they can become profitable, etc. At first this will be a one-hour-long daily program, and we intend to make it a bestseller, so that people will not be able to tear themselves away from the screen. Later we will drop it, and it will be moved to the advertisement channel.

[Agranovskaya] In short, you will be conducting a basic literacy course.

[Tikhomirov] Of course. Normal television in general should not talk about economics. A person does not have to know how to grow grain and how good a harvest there will be this year. He should be able to come to the store and buy everything he needs. Just like we never give a thought to where the water supply is coming from—we simply open a faucet. When we achieve this status, we will be able to say that we are safe.

[Agranovskaya] Do you not think that in our society politics has advanced more than economics?

[Tikhomirov] No. The problem is that everybody is busy with politics while they pretend that they are busy with economics.

[Passage omitted]

[Agranovskaya] Since the "Seven Days" program—in which you asked questions embarrassing for the government and the Politburo—has been canceled, do you know now what not to do?

[Tikhomirov] We, the television journalists, often had to endure sermons that we had no right to criticize the government because Gosteleradio is one of the state agencies. To which I always objected that our government takes the money from the taxpayers' pockets, and, therefore, we have a right to know what we are interested in. I still believe that hiding problems that people talk about anyway in waiting lines and in public transportation harms everybody, and first of all those who are trying to hide them. After the cancellation of "Seven Days," I absolutely did not feel like someone being discriminated against, a journalist with his rights violated. On the contrary, I have informed the Gosteleradio leadership that I would write about this in all newspapers and magazines, and in this sense I was the usurper, not the one being usurped. I generally do not like the role of an underdog. It does have certain advantages, and I have lived through the so-called "Yeltsin Effect," when, during my election campaign, the authorities tried to cut off the oxygen; then the people took to the streets demanding that Tikhomirov be given equal chance with other candidates. But, although it brought positive results, I did not enjoy this role. Even as a child, if I took a beating I never told anybody—tried to hide it. But if I beat somebody up, I always bragged about it afterwards.

RSFSR 'Demographic Catastrophe' Blamed on Perestroyka

91UN0586A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 26 Dec 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by B. Khorev, professor and sector chief at Moscow State University Economic Department Center for Population Study, and O. Khoreva, economist in the Demography and Labor Resources Sector of the RSFSR State Committee for Economics Central Economic Research Institute: "Russia's Demographic Anomaly: Postponed Intentions"]

[Text] It is a known fact that twice in this century our country has experienced so-called demographic catastrophes caused by the largest wars conducted within its territory in its history. The population size registered in 1913 was attained once again, within comparable boundaries, only in 1926, and the prewar 1940 population was not restored until 1955. Sometimes there is talk of a demographic anomaly in the 1930's, but the number of those who were executed or died of hunger during that period are currently being excessively inflated; demographic statistics do not contain any data indicating a major "slowdown" in our country's population growth during that period. Between the 1926 and 1939 censuses the USSR's population rose from 147 to 190.7 million, i.e. increased substantially.

During periods of demographic catastrophes our country's human resources were slashed as a result of the tremendous drop in the birthrate and the rise in the mortality rate, with the later greatly outstripping the former, and also as a result of waves of immigration. In our consideration of this question we have not yet separated the territory of the present Russian Federation from the union state, but it was precisely in the Russian Federation that these processes were manifested with the greatest force.

In our opinion a new, third demographic catastrophe in our country is impending and is already being felt precisely within the RSFSR. The following are data on the dynamics of the basic demographic indices, i.e. birth rate, mortality rate and natural population increase, in the RSFSR in the 1980's (expressed in terms of the number of occurrences per each thousand of population per year):

Year	Birthrate	Mortality Rate	Natural Population Increase *
1980	15.9	11.0	4.9
1981	16.0	10.9	5.1
1982	16.6	10.7	5.9
1983	17.5	11.0	6.5
1984	16.9	11.6	5.3
1985	16.5	11.3	5.2
1986	17.2	10.4	6.8

Year	Birthrate	Mortality Rate	Natural Population Increase *
1987	17.1	10.5	6.6
1988	16.0	10.7	5.3
1989	14.6	10.9	3.7
1990**	13.9	11.6	2.3

* the difference between birthrate and mortality rate

** first six months

Notice the 1989-90 period: not just a decrease, but a massive, unprecedented drop in the birthrate, accompanied by a sharp rise in the mortality rate. As a result the index of natural population growth has decreased by a factor of almost two since 1986 and is rapidly approaching zero.

Here are the latest figures on emigration from the USSR (for the Union as a whole): according to official data, whereas 8,000 people left the USSR in 1986, in 1987 this figure was 40,000, in 1988 it was 108,000 and in 1989 it was 235,000. For 1990, based on preliminary figures, this figure will be over half a million. There are another two million of our citizens "sitting on their suitcases," i.e. those who have already requested permission to emigrate and are prepared to take up permanent residence abroad immediately. Furthermore, our comparison of our own estimates for "pure migration" (expressed as the difference between our country's general and natural population growth) with official data for the 1986-89 period, which show that 391,000 people left the country, indicates that the official figure is too low by roughly 116,000. That means that as of 1990 we have already lost half a million, and by the end of 1991 we will have lost a million. It is not difficult to predict what will happen in the future if these trends continue.

The demographic anomaly in Russia has appeared during the past two years. Up until that time demographic development was highly complex and requires some explanation. Back in 1940 Russia had a slightly higher birthrate than the national average, but not by much. The war put the Russians far behind. Other factors had an influence as well. In any case, in 1960 the RSFSR had a lower birthrate than the USSR's national average, and later fell to a level lower than that required for expanded reproduction.

By itself the gradual decline in the birthrate in proportion to society's increasing cultural and educational potential is a commonly observed process of civilization, but in our country from time to time it assumes catastrophic and extreme forms. The effects of the war years are then reflected in so-called "demographic waves" which can be demonstrated using graphs of demographic curves.

Following World War II, during which there was a tremendous drop in the birthrate, a new decline was observed in the 1960's, when young men and women born in the 1940's began to enter customary marriage

age. The overall birthrate declined from 23.2 per thousand in 1960 to 14.2 in 1969, i.e. by a factor of almost two.

What happened then? In the 1970's the birthrate rose slightly and appeared to "freeze" at around 15-16 per thousand, then in the early 1980's rose again. However, the socioeconomic situation in Russia remained essentially unchanged. The reason was that the country had made preparations for a new drop, which by the logic of development of demographic waves—which recur every 20 years—should have taken place in the early 1980's; in 1981 a special pronatalist government decree was issued, providing new benefits for mothers and children. The effects of decisions like these, as demonstrated by experience abroad, are seen during the first few years, because the so-called "postponed intentions" of women wishing to bear children are realized at that time. Then the birthrate drops again, but remains on a higher level than before.

That is what happened: in 1982 the birthrate in Russia was 16.6 children per thousand of population (hopefully the reader will pardon us for this "six-tenths" as applied to children!) and in 1983 17.5, but in 1984-85 a small decrease in the birthrate was observed.

There is no doubt that at first perestroika gave people new hope, and furthermore the July ukase of 1985 ended massive drinking. Both of these factors encouraged a sharp rise in the birthrate during the first two years: from 16.5 in 1985 to 17.2 in 1986 and 17.1 in 1987. Once again women's postponed intentions were realized, this time, it seems, in families falling into the largest category of Russian citizens: "moderate but regular drinkers." Until this time women in those families had been afraid to have more children due to well-known genetic considerations. Incidentally, as a result of the reduction in drinking, albeit a forced reduction, during those years the mortality rate also declined markedly, from 11.3 per thousand in 1985 to 10.4 in 1986 and 10.5 in 1987. Natural population increase rose from 3.9 per thousand in 1985 to 6.6 in 1987. It seemed that we were on the right track.

Then suddenly there was a plunge, and what a plunge!

In 1988 the birthrate fell again, relatively insignificantly, to 16 per thousand, and the mortality rate rose a bit again, to 10.7 per thousand. The decline could be explained (and originally attempts were made to explain it this way) by the fact that a cohort born in 1967-69, at a time when the birthrate was 14.4-14.2, the lowest in the entire postwar period, had just entered active reproductive age. But the plunge of 1989-90 cannot be explained this way, because its rate and depth are breaking all records. In 1989 the birthrate fell to 14.6, and in the first half of 1990 continued to fall to 13.9 per thousand, i.e. to an unprecedented low.

Though data for the second half of the year are not yet in, it is a well-known fact that many maternity homes are literally standing empty! Since 1988 perestroika has

begun to change direction, and it was through demographics that the people spontaneously reacted to this. There are no other reasons except the economic and political crisis which has been unfolding since 1988 to explain this. Most likely it is the people's natural reaction to the "disintegration" and "market" shocks which we have all felt.

Only a crisis situation can account for the recent rise in the mortality rate to 11.6 per thousand as well! A crisis, especially a moral and psychological crisis, a crisis of belief, creates stresses, and people in the older generation die one after another. Shortages of medicine have also had their effect.

A more detailed analysis based on a whole array of special indices still remains to be given in the scientific literature, but the trends of this new anomaly are fairly clear. At no time since World War II has Russia experienced such a low rate of natural population growth, which declined from 6.6 per thousand in 1987 to 2.3 per thousand during the first half of 1990. The second half of the year, data on which will become available during the first few months of 1991, will probably show even lower figures, and in 1991 Russia could already see the mortality rate outstripping the birthrate, or at least with emigration taken into account its population could decline for the first time. Empty store shelves, moral decay in society and the psychological war against our own people on television and radio which has become commonplace in the past two years are destroying people's will to have children who will face an uncertain future.

Nonetheless the main demographic news is to be found elsewhere. Readers, remember that 1990 will go down in the history of Russia's peoples as the first year in reckonings of depopulation processes throughout the entire Russian Non-Black Earth Region. For the first time the mortality rate exceeds the birthrate for the entire region, and natural population decrease has set in at a rate of -0.2 per thousand annually. In the Central Economic Region this happened one year earlier, and the rate of natural population decrease went from -0.3 per to -2.1 during the first half of 1990.

Readers accustomed to emotions in the press will, we hope, forgive us if we dispense with them. The fact remains: a demographic catastrophe has already occurred in the heartland of the Russian state. In peacetime (if the perestroika period, which is littered with thousands of innocent victims, can still be called that), on the threshold of the 21st century.

Demographers, incidentally, have been warning of the danger of depopulation in the Non-Black Earth Region for a long time, and this has in fact been occurring in rural areas in a number of oblasts since the 1970's. The cause is massive migration of the rural population, abandonment of villages and aging of the population. But cities have continued to grow, to a great extent due to an influx of villagers from their own oblasts. In spite

of this entire oblasts near Moscow and Leningrad began experiencing depopulation as far back as 1980: villagers are fleeing not only to cities in their own oblasts, but also to the capitals.

In 1980 depopulation affected six oblasts in the Non-Black Earth Region, and by 1985 this number had risen to eight. Among them were Pskov, Novgorod, Tver, Ivanovo, Ryazan and Tula oblasts. Hence the "successes" in agricultural production in these oblasts, "successes" which now extend to the entire Non-Black Earth Region. Nor has the situation in the cities improved over the past two years. It seems that the so-called market is just now emerging, but the very real "dog's market life" is already well established. Economic catastrophe has not yet culminated, but demographic catastrophe is already in evidence! At least in the Russian Non-Black Earth Region...

The Russian people simply might not withstand a third demographic catastrophe in a century and be "broken" as a nation. Remember this, you citizen reformers who say that you want better things, yet in fact are pushing Russia toward the abyss.

As a friend of ours says: "Unfortunate country: either it has a crop failure, or else reform."

Orthodox Hierarch Discusses New Church-State Relations

91UN0628A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian 29 Dec 90 p 15

[Interview with Vladimir Kirillovich Poyarkov (Yuvenaliy), Metropolitan, Krutiskiy and Kolomna, permanent member, Holy Synod, Russian Orthodox Church, by V. Alekseyev, special correspondent, at the Novodevichiy Convent, Moscow: "The Church Is Open for Goodness"]

[Text] Yuvenaliy, Metropolitan of Krutiskiy and Kolomna (whose secular name is Vladimir Kirillovich Poyarkov), was born in 1935 in the city of Yaroslavl.

During his third year of study at the Leningrad Theological Academy in 1959 he took his vows as a monk and a priest. After completing his secular and spiritual education, in 1962 he became the editor of GOLOS PRAVO-SLAVIYA, the journal of the Central European Exarchate, as well as dean of the cathedral in West Berlin.

During the years 1963-1964 Archimandrite Yuvenaliy served as the head of the Russian Spiritual Mission in Jerusalem.

In 1964 he was appointed deputy chairman of the Moscow Patriarchate's Foreign Church Relations Department, and from 1972 through 1981 he served as its chairman.

He has held the archimandrite rank of ruler [vladyka] since 1965, and since 1977 he has served as Metropolitan of Krutiskiy and Kolomna.

From 1972 through the present time Yuvenaliy has been a permanent member of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church.

For three decades now Metropolitan Yuvenaliy has actively participated in the domestic and foreign affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church, and he is a member of many public organizations.

Metropolitan Yuvenaliy headed up the work done by the Moscow Patriarchate's Commission for Regulating Church Problems in the Ukraine. And, as a result of this activity, decisions were taken with regard to granting the Ukrainian Orthodox Church autonomy and independence in its administration.

[Correspondent] Your High Holiness! The editorial offices of our newspaper more and more frequently receive letters from readers requesting elucidation of certain problems connected with the present-day status of church-state relations, along with the new position of the Church and religious organizations in society. Our readers urge us to direct these questions and requests to you!

[Yuvenaliy] I value the opportunity which you have granted me, in turn, to address the readers of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA KULTURA, and I affirm that there are many timely topics regarding which a representative of the Church has something to say to our fellow-citizens.

Although I do not yet know your questions, I would like to say right at the outset that in my answers I will, of course, acquaint the readers of your newspaper not only with my own personal opinion, but also with the official position of the Russian Orthodox Church. All the more so in that we have recently held our Local and Bishops' Councils, as well as sessions of the Holy Synod, at which we adopted several documents bearing upon vital problems of the Church and society. This makes my task easier here.

[Correspondent] Respected Ruler [Vladyka], as you know, at the beginning of this past October the Union-level law "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations" was published and has finally been put into operation. How notable an event was this in the life of the Russian Orthodox Church? What has been shown by the initial practical experience in applying this new law, and what kinds of reciprocal relations have come about between church and state?

[Yuvenaliy] Let me begin with the commonly known truth that problems of a material nature, for example, economic troubles, can always be corrected more rapidly than spiritual matters. That is because convictions and faith cannot be changed or engendered in the human soul by means of laws or other measures and decrees from the state authority. This has been confirmed by the many centuries of our Church's history and by the experience of recent decades in our country. As a participant in the meeting held on 29 April 1988 by the Most Holy

Patriarch Pimen and members of the Holy Synod with M.S. Gorbachev, I would like to express my conviction that this day marked a precise, historical watershed for the Russian Orthodox Church in its position within the Soviet Union. And October 1990—which you mentioned—was the juridical reinforcement of that positive process whose record began openly and tangibly two and a half years ago. During the above-indicated period there has been a *de facto* implementation in church-state relations and in the activity of religious organizations not only of the formula: "Whatever is not forbidden is permitted," but even "What was forbidden is now permitted." For example, whereas charitable activity used to be prohibited, nor was catechistic and missionary work allowed, during this period such activities were introduced and encouraged.

This was carried out with a broad-based response in the hearts of millions of fellow-citizens, which were opened up to the good news of the Gospels, and with a fundamentally new, favorable attitude on the part of society toward the spiritual values of the Church. Under the conditions of the new political thinking it became possible for the Church and its servants, i.e., the clergymen, to actively join in the process of preparing the new Law on the Freedom of Conscience. Today it is gratifying to note that this was not a *pro forma* process: the voices of the believers were listened to and taken into account. And, in the second place, the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted this law in an atmosphere of unanimity and good wishes toward the Church. We rejoice that the speeches made by the Most Holy Patriarch Aleksiy II—both during the process of preparing this law as well as at the time of its adoption—were met with respect and understanding and were taken into consideration by the legislators. Thus, indeed, this was an important event in the life of the Russian Orthodox Church on the path to comprehending that religious freedom and church activity, as provided for by the USSR Law "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations."

At present, however, it is still too early to talk about any results stemming from the practical application of the new law, inasmuch as the appropriate "mechanisms" for its implementation and functioning have not yet been worked out. But we can already point to a hopeful beginning—people received this legislative act with enthusiasm. In this connection, I would like to emphasize the following point: During the past few decades, you know, there was no steady or equitable application even of the 1929 legislation, which was very hard for the Church. And the position of religious organizations changed depending upon certain ideological circumstances. Nowadays the building of a state based on the rule of law has been proclaimed. May God grant that this circumstance will allow us to regard with optimism the future of the Russian Orthodox Church, taking the new Law into account.

[Correspondent] What fundamentally new things will be introduced in the process of the changing reciprocal relations between church and state by the Law "On the

Freedom of Religious Denominations," as recently adopted by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet? How is it coordinated or how does it harmonize with the new, Union-level Law on the Freedom of Conscience? Are there not contradictions and divergences of views between them?

[Yuvenaliy] Let me point out the main principles, the basic point of view in working out the All-Union and Russian laws: In their fundamental principles they do coincide and are consistent. Furthermore, they both are in line with international agreements: ranging from the earlier Universal Declaration on Human Rights to the more contemporary Paris Charter. In August of this year [1990], on behalf of the participants in the assembly of clergymen and laymen of the Moscow Eparchate, I sent a Message to A. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. In this document I listed more than 10 paragraphs of amendments and proposals. Without taking these into account, as I said therein, the new law would not reflect our expectations. And what happened as a result of this? Except for two amendments, all the remaining ones were incorporated into the All-Union Law. The amendments which were not passed pertained to the following: the proclamation of all-church religious holidays as non-working days, and the observance (as guaranteed by law) of the secrets of the confessional. But these points were incorporated into the RSFSR Law "On Freedom of Religious Denominations." I have the impression that both laws, standing on an equal footing, supplement each other. When comparing them, a person can be convinced that they contain no essential contradictions. There are only three points which do not coincide; they pertain to the procedure for registering charters, the Expert-Consultative Council, and the teaching of religion in school.

Thus, it seems to me that the Church is not affected by the consequences of that "war of the laws" about which one frequently hears talk nowadays.

[Correspondent] Certain clergymen have begun to appear on our country's political stage, for example, the Christian-Democratic Union, the Russian Christian-Democratic Movement, and other political-religious movements. Their leaders and members are now represented even in the organs of the highest state power. How does the Russian Orthodox Church regard them, taking into consideration the fact that it is always calling upon its adherents to observe civil peace and concord, while many clergymen, on the contrary, are whipping up the public psychosis, seeking out "enemies," and thirsting for political "revenge." One example of this was the recent political meeting held on the Old Square in Moscow on 7 November 1990 opposite the buildings of the CPSU Central Committee. Resounding here were anti-communist calls, shouts of accusation directed at the USSR President, etc. A noticeable and active role was played at this political meeting by certain representatives of the Orthodox clergy who had led some of their own parishioners there with gonfalcons [church banners]. What would you say with regard to this matter?

[Yuvenaliy] That is not a simple question, and, most likely, there is no simple, unambiguous answer to it. You were interested in the Church's viewpoint or position with regard to the specific phenomena which you mentioned. But it was clearly specified by the Local Council which took place back in June 1990 and was set forth in its message or epistle. "The changes which are occurring in this country have made it possible for clergymen to participate in public life," it is stated therein. "This activity has historical precedents and has the Church's blessing. Since it is not a political party, the Church, by uniting within itself persons of diverse political views, reminds its members who participate in public life that they are perceived primarily as representatives of the Church, and that their voices should be voices of wisdom and reason, conscience, and reconciliation." Both laws exclude the Church itself from participating in political parties. The Russian Church has not created parties as such, nor does it participate in their activities. As to how certain religious leaders have embodied their own civic right to participate in political life, let the readers and voters judge, and let them make their own appraisals and conclusions. The Holy Synod discussed the problems of clergymen running for the office of people's deputy. According to its decision, it is possible on condition that he obtains the blessing of his ecclesiastical superior for this purpose; for bishops this must come from the Synod; and for clergymen—from his ruling archbishop. The course of our thoughts on this matter are as follows. Church canons prohibit clergymen from engaging in political activity. But proceeding on the basis of historical precedents in the Orthodox Local Churches and, particularly in the Russian Orthodox Church, when its representatives took upon themselves this burden of responsibility in the name of serving the Fatherland and the people during tragic or complicated periods of their life, the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church even now found it possible for our clergymen to participate in such activity. Confidence was expressed—and this was the fundamental cause of the "yea" vote—that such a decision would serve the good of the Church and the various peoples of our country. Now is the time to utilize this opportunity specifically for the good of society and the Motherland. And it is time to begin to evaluate to what extent and for whom we have succeeded in accomplishing this, who has utilized this reality to good advantage and how.

[Correspondent] Yes, it is becoming more and more evident how some Orthodox clergymen are getting more and more deeply involved in politics.... But to what extent does this harmonize with the duty and calling of a pastor and with the precepts of the church fathers? Moreover, does it not seem to you, respected ruler, that strictly spiritual, church values are being sacrificed to politics and to expedient conditions of the moment? For example, is it not a case of such manipulations when there are widely announced intentions by certain clergymen to transfer to the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church abroad? What kind of relations in

general does the Moscow Patriarchate now have with the "Carlovists," and what, in your opinion, are the prospects for them?

[Yuvenaliy] I would not over-exaggerate this problem for the fate of the Church. Although, without doubt, it is a matter which has been troubling all of us for many long years now. Our Church's clergymen and believers pray to God that he instill peace and tranquility in our hearts, that we become united with our likeminded, blood brothers and sisters, wherever they may be. There is no ambiguity here. The viewpoint of the Russian Orthodox Church has been expressed clearly and precisely with regard to this matter on many occasions. It remains unchanged.

As to those few clergymen whom you mentioned, they cannot cast by their activities a shadow upon all the clergy, who are now applying all their efforts and utilizing the new opportunities for their own pastoral service in its many forms—in the area of celebrating the divine service, charity, and mercy, as well as in catechistic and spiritual-educational activities. Their labor deserves the profound gratitude of the many millions of people in their flocks on the vast expanses of our Motherland.

I would prefer not to speak in the pages of the non-church press about the moral features of those persons who have abandoned the Mother-Church which reared them, and who have introduced confusion into the hearts of believers; some of them have been forbidden to conduct holy services and, as it must be said, God will be their judge. But for the broad-based public to understand the phenomena which are going on around the Russian Orthodox Church—phenomena which are connected with the schism and the complicated relations with the Russian Church abroad, I must explain precisely and clearly that this situation has been brought about and supported by political motives rather than church motives. The events in our country which are characterized by freedom and openness toward foreign contacts are being utilized, unfortunately, by the leadership of the Russian Church abroad for non-fraternal purposes. Christ the Savior left us many examples of how to regard the condemnation of those close to us, and this is well-known to everyone. And nowadays a group of bishops from the Russian Church abroad is attempting to play the role of our accusers. It is all well and good for them to talk about courage when an ocean separated them from suffering for their faith, and they did not overcome the distance at that time in order to share the fate of their Orthodox brothers in much-suffering Russia!

At the same time, for the sake of justice, attention should be accorded to the fact that legitimate respect is due to those clergymen who preferred to share the fate of their own people, with their own flock. Like the Old Testament Moses, they preferred to suffer with God's people rather than have temporary, sinful pleasure; they preferred to be reviled like Christ, which brought them

greater riches for themselves than the Egyptian treasures (Hebrews, 11, 25, 26). Against the background of some definite attempts by certain bishops and clergymen of the Russian Church abroad to cast a shadow on the memory of the Most Holy Patriarch Sergey (Starogorodskiy—V.A., I wish to remind you that during the most difficult moment of the experiences which afflicted our people he showed that he was a great head priest or pontiff—a patriot—when, on the first day of the war, he addressed a message to pastors and believers, i.e., to clergymen and laymen alike. This message was disseminated throughout all parishes, and it stated the following: "Our Orthodox Church has always shared the fate of its people. It has undergone harsh experiences together with it and has calmed it with consolations. Nor will it desert its people now.... For us, as pastors of the Church, at such a time when the Fatherland calls upon everybody to make sacrifices, it would be unworthy to look on in silence at what is happening around us. It would be petty of our souls not to encourage people, an insult not to console them, to remind the waverers of their duty and the will of God.... Let us place our own souls together with those of our flock." All of us church people should give some thought to these circumstances and these words during a time which is just as complex and important for the Fatherland. And we should direct all the strength of our souls to create rather than divide, to affirm brotherly love rather than hostility!

[Correspondent] It seems quite recent that the Russian Orthodox Church made a decision to form Ukrainian and Belorussian Orthodox churches with their own synods having the rights of exarchates. But in October 1990 a new decision was made—to grant the Ukrainian Orthodox Church autonomy and independence in its administration. What brought this about? Why was not this decision adopted a year ago?

[Yuvenaliy] In speaking about the purpose of such decisions, the Bishops' Council of our Church in January 1990 pointed out in its determinations that they "will provide the believers with the opportunity to independently build a church life in accordance with their own church and national traditions and will facilitate the development of these churches' spiritual potentials." The Russian Orthodox Church is striving to react in a timely manner to the pastoral and national interests of its own believers. The additional decision with regard to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was a benevolent and rapid response in reaction to an appeal from its bishops. These steps were dictated by the Church's attempt to assist in the national-cultural rebirth of the peoples which belong to it. Sufficient witness to this is also borne by the many visits made by our chief priest or pontiff, the Most Holy Patriarch Aleksiy II to various regions of our country with the intention of bearing the love of Christ, brotherhood, and reconciliation to all peoples within the body of the Moscow Patriarchate.

[Correspondent] Will Kiev—the birthplace of Old Russian Christianity—remain as before a place of pilgrimage for clergymen and their flocks belonging to the Russian

Orthodox Church? What attitude did the other Local Churches take toward the Moscow Patriarchate's granting the Ukrainian Orthodox Church autonomy and independence in its administration?

[Yuvenaliy] The ancient Kievan shrines are commonly shared, Orthodox places of worship regardless of the forms of Church administration. The changes in the internal structures of our unified, autocephalous Church, such as were recently carried out, do not require approval by the other Local Churches. As far as I know, these steps undertaken by the Russian Church were met with understanding in the Orthodox world.

[Correspondent] It is said that Metropolitan Mstislav, who recently arrived from the United States, has been proclaimed the "Patriarch of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church." But to what extent is this in accordance with the church canons? What is the attitude of the other Local Churches to this matter?

[Yuvenaliy] The new political forces in the Ukraine are doing a great deal to utilize, to "adapt" the Church in order to carry out the secular goals which they have set for themselves. Under these conditions they have, on the one hand, appropriate religious "comrades-in-arms," and, on the other hand, there is the use of force and the flouting of the rights of Orthodox believers. This has been manifested with particular vividness in the western oblasts of the Ukraine. I am more than insulted or irritated, I am appalled, at those priests who have betrayed their religious duties and acted in such a way. They have forgotten that Christ the Savior said the following: "Whosoever tempts one of the least of those who believes in Me, it would be better for such a person to tie a millstone around his neck and cast himself into the depths of the sea.... Woe to that person who comes to tempt" (Matthew, 18, 6, 7). And, finally, what observance of canons can be discussed within a schismatic faction when their sin, to use the expression of the Church Fathers, is not to be washed away even with the blood of martyrs?! And the attitude of the Orthodox Churches toward this is an appropriate one.

[Correspondent] Profoundly respected Ruler, there are still quite a few disrupted churches and occasions for sadness in the Ukraine. In the republic's western oblasts, for example, there are unceasing, fierce attacks against the adherents of the Russian Orthodox Church by the Greco-Catholics. You have studied and concerned yourself a great deal with regulating and adjudicating the Uniate problem; you have constant contacts with the leadership of the Roman Curia, and you have had meetings with Pope John Paul II. What has to be done in order to solve this problem as quickly as possible and to return peace and tranquility to people's souls?

[Yuvenaliy] It seems that the Russian Orthodox Church has left no stone unturned in attempting to solve and regulate this problem. Now one gets the impression that our efforts have come up against a wall behind which are politics, irreconcilability, hostility, and brute force. But

what is impossible for humans is possible for God! With this holy faith in God's help, we will continue our labors along these lines. "It is completely evident that only by church means, through sincere dialogue, can this dangerous, inter-confessional conflict be healed" (Determinations of the Local Council of the RPTs 7-8 June 1990, par. 20). And if we are to speak about extra-church conditions which could bring closer a solution to the problems between the Orthodox and the Greco-Catholics in the Ukraine's western oblasts, then we would, first of all, need to free ourselves from the methods of any sort of external pressure. We would have to restore legality and law and order in the Ukraine's western oblasts. If political passions had not forcibly intruded into religious life in the above-indicated region, the leadership of the Roman Catholic and Russian Orthodox churches, along with their believers, would have solved their own, internal problems long ago by Christian, brotherly methods and ways.

[Correspondent] Our society is being rent and torn by contradictions and conflicts. Our particular sore spot is inter-ethnic conflicts. Now under intensive discussion is the matter of concluding a new Union treaty. What is the position taken by the Russian Orthodox Church on all these problems?

[Yuvenaliy] Yes, we have accepted all these sufferings and the people's pain into our hearts, and at our Councils in recent years we have constantly paid persistent attention to these troubles and misfortunes. I would like to point especially to the Declaration on Social Problems of the Bishops' Council on the occasion of the 400th Anniversary of the establishment of the Patriarchate in Russia. The position of the Russian Church with regard to the problems in which you are interested is precisely and clearly set forth here. Upon the decision of our Church, in the divine services conducted at all Orthodox churches, prayers are constantly uttered for reconciling the divisions among the peoples of our Fatherland and the cessation of hatred, hostility, insults, and other instances of lawlessness. And now, having obtained the *de jure* possibility for reviving the traditional forms of its service, the Russian Orthodox Church has actively and with conviction joined in the zealous spiritual and material rebirth of our society. The Church is open for goodness. Although I have already mentioned our Declaration on Public Problems, I consider it appropriate to cite one of its important passages as follows: "We decisively reject all attempts to utilize religion as a means to incite inter-ethnic dissension. We view our own duty as helping to integrate as brothers all people and ethnic groups.... We call upon believers and all citizens to render aid and support to a person of any nationality who is in trouble or misfortune, to perform deeds of mercy, lovingkindness, and brotherly cooperation between all the peoples of our country" (par. 3).

[Correspondent] The Church, spirituality, and culture. How much they have in common! To be sure, there was a period in our recent history when attempts were made to set one against the other. And, of course, nothing good

came of this. In my opinion, it all boils down to a question of correctly correlating one with the other. Today it has become common to blame the decline of spirituality and culture on that crisis and on those persecutions which the Church experienced until quite recently. Many cultural leaders are seeking their own paths toward a dialogue with the Church. But is it not probable that the Church also needs to have a firm alliance with the world of culture? How do you view this alliance? What would you like officials and others in the fields of culture and art to do under the present-day, complicated conditions?

[Yuvenaliy] You are speaking about something that is so close to my heart! Only you should not think that cultural figures and the Church are something organically separate from each other. I am convinced that there are many devoted sons and daughters of the Holy Church among these respected people. And they are prepared to multiply their own, truly sacrificial labors when inspired by practical and spiritual cooperation with the Church. I am gratified to be able to testify that such open and effective cooperation began prior to the celebration of the Millennium of the Baptism of Russia. Three scholarly international church conferences, participated in by outstanding Soviet scholars and cultural figures significantly enriched our festival. And now this cooperation is continuing. New legislation has provided wide scope for this.

All we need do is mention Article 23 of the Union Law, which speaks about the right of religious organizations to engage in cultural and educational activities. The Church needs to revive the role played by the thousand-year-old traditions of monasteries and parishes. For example, the establishment of libraries, there is one task for our cooperation nowadays. And there are inexhaustible opportunities for cooperation in the relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ministries of Culture of the USSR, RSFSR, and those of the other Union republics. Many Orthodox shrines and holy relics, having been returned to their proper places as a result of such cooperation, should serve their original goals and purposes of reviving spirituality and morality. These are only minor examples of our necessary interaction and cooperation. Let me express my own heartfelt good wishes to the leaders of culture and art, and let me invoke God's blessing on their very useful and zealous labors. With your consent, I would like to conclude this interview with an expression of confidence that, inspired and spiritually warmed by cooperation with the Russian Orthodox Church, cultural figures will make an invaluable contribution to the approval and support of their own close associates during our alarming times.

Let me wish everybody a Happy New Year and a Blessed Christmas!

Religious Situation Discussed in Ivano-Frankovsk
91UN0628B Kiev *RABOCHAYA GAZETA* in Russian
19 Dec 90 p 3

[Article by D. Tuz, correspondent: "A Candle in a Cul-de-Sac: An Alarming Situation"]

[Text] A small, thin candle was burning next to the icon which had been set into the corner of the gorispolkom stairway. It was surrounded by a compact ring of persons. They were of various ages but had the same sadness in their eyes. And they were beseeching the Lord and the secular authorities to grant them one thing—a cathedral or church where they would be able to celebrate a service.

This was not a new religious congregation which had originated in Ivano-Frankovsk and come to the gorispolkom to request a church. These were Orthodox believers who had found themselves to be without a House of God. At the end of last year [i.e., 1989] the cathedral where they had prayed and worshiped for several decades was turned over to the Greco-Catholics.

"We were supposed to move over to the Cathedral of the Holy Protectress, but it was occupied by the Autocephalists," I was told by Mikhayl Shuvar, a priest of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. "Those believers who did not wish to join the Autocephalous Movement because of its non-canonicity were left out on the street. For almost a year our congregation frequented the thresholds of the local authorities and wrote petitions; however, nothing produced any results. And, therefore, we were compelled to take the extreme measure of declaring a hunger strike."

As far back as late October in the office of V.O. Pavlik, chairman of the Ivano-Frankovsk Obliskpolkom, I witnessed a conversation about the fasting believers. At that time the chairman said that this matter must be analyzed and help given. It seemed that the conflict would be patched up after this.

"And we believed it when they promised us that on 6 November the City Soviet would resolve this issue. We stopped our hunger strike. And now we are undertaking it again for the third and last time," said Father Mikhayl.

That is the attitude of everyone in the congregation.

"I would not regret dying for true Orthodoxy. It is the faith of my fathers and grandfathers. Why should I have to change it in my old age for something else which happens to be more convenient?" asked V.A. Kushnirenko, wiping away a tear.

The believer O.A. Pyshenko joined the conversation as follows:

"If you only knew what insults we have to listen to. Bogdan Rebrik, a Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, said that we would have to obtain a church beyond the Urals or in Moscow. And they call us 'occupiers' because when

my mother came here from the Chernigov region, she used the teach the local children."

"We are blamed for the fact that the RPTs [Russian Orthodox Church] did not build a cathedral or church for itself. But, tell me, who would have resolved to build a church during those years when even those which were completed were oppressed?" M.I. Krupnik, the chairman of the parish council, also knows well other arguments against their congregation.

As fitting and proper for a representative of authority, Ya.V. Taylikh, chairman of the City Soviet of People's Deputies, attempted to be impartial when speaking about the gist of this conflict.

"The UPTs [Ukrainian Orthodox Church] accuses us of discriminating against its rights, but this is groundless. We have met them part-way every time. We decided to hand over to them the area of the Jesuit Church, where the oblast-level state archives are now situated. And until it becomes free, we have recommended that negotiations be entered into with the congregation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church with regard to conducting their services on an alternating basis in the Church of the Holy Protectress. But this did not work out. Then we proposed that an agreement be signed to make temporary use of a specified area within the Ivano-Frankovsk Art Museum. But the congregation has not agreed to this either. It demands that it be given the entire art museum, which at one time was a Roman-Catholic church. But planned restoration work is taking place there at the present time.

And so it seems that the situation has reached an impasse. The believers do not agree to celebrate their service in an area where hammers are banging, whereas the authorities cannot propose anything else for them.

Like any conflict, this confrontation between believers and authorities is accompanied by reciprocal claims and accusations. And the most important thing—the desire to find a solution, a way out of the cul-de-sac—is being drowned in them. Everybody has been drawn into the dispute with the believers—ranging from the chairman of the Soviet to the gorispolkom's cleaning-lady, who supposedly used to find food leftovers in the trash-bin, and who now says that the hunger strike is not genuine. The newspaper ZAKHIDNIY KURYER, whose publisher is the Ivano-Frankovsk City Soviet of People's Deputies, devoted two whole pages to this event in one of its issues. It tried its best to be objective, and it accorded space to both sides. But it could not refrain from commenting upon the event in its own way as follows: "What the UPTs in Ivano-Frankovsk needed was not so much a church as an occasion for a conflict." The sympathies of this newspaper, and that of the other "democratic" publications, as they call themselves, this time were somehow not on the side of the fasting believers.

History has dealt harshly with the faith of those people who live in or near the Carpathians. Everything has

become so refracted and confused that nowadays it is difficult to distinguish between the Orthodox or Catholic roots in one's own origin, between what was genuine and what was imposed in the religion of our fathers and grandfathers. Each person tries to choose for his own soul that which is closest to him. And the conditions for this would seem to exist. In recent times Ivano-Frankovsk has witnessed the beginning of operations by nine Greco-Catholic churches, one Roman-Catholic church, and one Orthodox Autocephalous church; the Baptists have also acquired a church. And only the UPTs has not found a place. It is reproached for its past prosperity and even for its recent name of "Russian." But wherein are these same Valentina Andreyevna and Mariya Ivanovna guilty before their fellow-townpeople? Why should they now be cast in the role of the persecuted and insulted?

Any religion preaches: "Protect those who are weaker." Such a rule is adhered to even by persons who do not believe in God but who have a conscience. I hope that they would also include those persons upon whom the question depends as to whether the UPTs congregation has a haven or not.

And meanwhile the little candle burns on and on—just like the last hope of the fasting believers.

Future Improvements in Ukrainian Rural Medicine Discussed

91UN0599A Kiev *SILSKI VISTI* in Ukrainian
5 Dec 90 p 1

[Unattributed article: "First Aid' for the Villages"]

[Text] P. I. Vitsyak, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet's Permanent Commission for People's Health, tells about medical aspects of the Law "Regarding the importance of social development of the villages and the agribusiness complex in the national economy of the Ukraine".

Everyone probably knows about the inadequacies of health care in the Ukraine. Improvements in the situation are slow in coming. Even in the recently adopted Law regarding the priority of social development of the villages the words "medical services" are mentioned only once. Space was found to include a clause about payment for labor resources, but not one word was included about the politics of safeguarding the health of these "labor resources". This policy is part of the undefined "sociocultural sphere".

Is this a return to the principle of leftovers? At first glance, it would seem to be so. Even the proposals regarding development of health protection for villages, introduced by deputy/member of the commission during the earlier discussion of the proposed law, were not taken into account. The working group explained this by saying that all aspects of social development in the villages would be brought up later in follow-up legislation and normative acts.

Health care in the villages could be called only conditionally satisfactory. One third of the villages do not even have medical assistance stations, despite the fact that nearly half the villagers in the republic are pensioners and, therefore, require special care. 15,000 population centers without their own medical care stations are located five or more kilometers from such aid stations. Imagine how an elderly person is to receive assistance - considering as well that half the villages without health services also lack public transportation links.

More than a million residents of the republic are essentially deprived of medical services. But even in those places where reports indicate the existence of a "medical facility", it is usually nothing more than a medical assistant/midwife station. There are 16.3 thousand such stations in the republic. Their total, it is true, exceeds the number planned. For example, during the 12th five-year plan 2,900 were projected, and 3,054 were built. But out of 655 outpatient dispensaries only 406, or 61 percent, were opened. In essence, the construction of new regional medical facilities is not planned, instead the material and technical basis of existing facilities is to be upgraded.

What brought about this tendency to provide "mid-level", rather than higher level medical service? First of all - the lack of someone responsible for the level of health care provided in the villages.

Eighty percent of the costs of construction of medical aid/midwife stations, outpatient dispensaries and area hospitals is covered by the collective farms. It would seem that in such a situation the centrally allocated costs should be utilized for mobile forms of medical service, thereby compensating at least partially for the unavailability of fixed facilities. But matters here are not satisfactory. The number of mobile outpatient dispensaries can be counted on both hands. There are 164 stomatological stations, fluoroscopic - 117, 32 diagnostic clinical laboratories. Any commentary is probably superfluous.

The tally of "shortcomings" in medical services in the villages could go on. But most important is not a listing of facts, but concrete actions taken to improve existing conditions. We have a very important assignment - to make it possible for a villager to receive high-calibre medical assistance on the spot, without having to travel to the city. That the village doctor be a true expert in his field and had at his disposal the necessary equipment, appropriate for today's conditions. How can the new law improve this state of affairs?

First of all, it proclaims the full guarantee of capital investment resources in socioeconomic development of the villages, including medical aid for the residents. In conjunction with full economic independence this makes it possible not only to quickly establish medical facility where the labor force feels it is necessary, but also to provide necessary equipment, including imports

(because 80 percent of the cash costs are to be born by the producers in the village).

Article 22 of the new law, which explains the quota for acceptance of students and schoolchildren working in the villages to secondary and higher specialized educational institutions, is very important. We can assume that the effect of this legislation will extend also to the training of medical personnel. After all, today the post of village doctor remains vacant in many towns, and the level of availability of medical personnel in the villages in general is around 70 percent. Whether we can achieve full medical services depends to a great extent on the local Soviets of People's Deputies. Under the new law it is they who will decide on the need for specialists.

We hope that local authorities will not approach this matter in a narrowly pragmatic manner. The agronomist, doctor, and teacher are not just experts with diplomas, they are carriers of culture, of learning, of knowledge. Perhaps it will be possible to again reinstate the concept of "village intellectual", a person of high, humanistic, uplifting stature.

Today major responsibility for developing health services lies with the directors of the republic's agribusiness complex. It is hoped that the new law will allow economists with initiative to decisively and at their own discretion improve conditions in this field. For example, the villages today are to be first to receive building materials. This brings about the real possibility of fully making use of capital investments apportioned for health services. This is because in the 12th five-year plan the sum of 134 million rubles was not apportioned, and that the problem of building such facilities during 1988 - 1989 was discussed eight times by the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers and the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of for Health Protection.

Decisions were handed down from above, which did not help the leaders of the communities, but possibly frightened them or, more likely, indicated that they hold to the following outline: you supply everything yourselves, and we will tell you what to build. In a word, experience in life has shown that good intentions often go to waste as a result of such desires to "improve" from above.

The commission takes such events into account in its activity as well. In developing legislation we strive more toward limiting the influence of incompetents, rather than dictating the direction of activity of village medical personnel and community leaders. After all, they know better, who suffers from what and who should be cared for. Let us, at last, call upon the knowledge and practical experience of experts.

The new Law frees the village from nit-picking guardianship, orders and the incompetence of higher-ups. The people are being given back the right to be masters of their land, a right which they know only from stories. The right to be masters of their own fate is also being granted from this day forward to village doctors, medical technicians, nurses. Under all types of sociopolitical

systems they protect that which is most valuable - the health of the breadwinner, and thereby - the health of the whole nation. Now they will be able to not only maintain this resource, but to multiply it.

Military's Ban of 'Slandorous' Play Detailed

91UN0478A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 47, 21 Nov 90 p 8

[Article by Yuriy Gladilshchikov: "Hostage: What Is Behind the Ban on the Play 'Construction Battalion' at the Central Academic Theater of the Soviet Army"]

[Text] Preliminary self-justifications of the author. In September of this year, namely on 10 September, at a meeting of the troupe of the Central Academic Theater of the Soviet Army [TsATSA] prior to the start of the season, it was announced... (aha!) announced by the chief of the theater, Col G.G. Tomilov (while I hide a note in my pocket, I will explain: he actually is the chief and not the director, but until recently the theater also had a political officer) that the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy [GlavPUR] had banned the play "Construction Battalion" [Stroybat] based on the story by Sergey Kaledin. Without seeing it. A priori. Because of the theme.

Actually, the play was "not recommended" much earlier, back in the spring, when, according to persistent rumors, a notice in the newspaper about it inopportunistically caught the eye of the USSR minister of defense, Marshal of the USSR D.T. Yazov (I do not know if this is true, but I cite rumors as a reflection of the frightened mass consciousness). In any event, it was namely at that time that a threat hung over the recently conceived play, but later it was as if they had permitted it to live. So... Then in June, there was a preliminary run-through of finished scenes. But, as before, no one prepared the scenery. Rumors were going around that the leadership at the GlavPUR was changing, and the probable new head, Col Gen N.I. Shlyaga, would not approve of the play. That is how it turned out: N.I. Shlyaga took over the position—and banned the play. From the lips of G.G. Tomilov. According to rumors: new times. According to rumors: issue an order on the ban signed and sealed by even the GlavPUR, and now it is afraid.

The scandal was written about by IZVESTIYA, KOMSOMOLKA, and the MEGAPOLIS EKPRESS. The point everywhere was this: theatrical Moscow was impatiently awaiting the premiere of "Construction Battalion;" the play turns out to be brilliant; the TsATSA is indignant regarding the ban. Other than the fact that theatrical Moscow was ranting, raging, and waiting (who now would rush to a social performance?), everything else looked absolutely right. A clear and quite simple conflict.

But here, just as you like, an intuition. It appeared that something very important had been kept back. Not everything is so simple... No, the conflict with the

GlavPUR is simple and clear—I also maintain this now. But there is something surrounding it and deeper about which no one has written...

What is the tenseness (nightmare) of the situation? What must be written? The version of Leonid Kheifets. Leonid Kheifets, the head director of the theater, talked confidently and with concentration, and at the same time at length, backing up his every thought with new arguments. Certainly, I thought later, this is how a well-known director should talk (well-known for 25 years now, since the time of "The Death of Ioann the Terrible" at the TsATSA) who only recently became the head of the theater for the first time, who knocked about foreign stages his entire life, and who was always dependent and had become accustomed to thinking out irrefutable arguments to convince those who have the right to say: "No!" The misconnection between the theater and the GlavPUR obviously made Kheifets nervous. "Misha, stop reading, it is hard for me!" he became angry at the producer of "Construction Battalion," Mikhail Chumachenko, interrupting him in mid-sentence.

The main surprise was that there was by no means unanimity in the theater.

Here is what Kheifets said (I am relaying the rough essence): by the will of fate, the TsATSA have become the focus of contemporary social, political, and psychological conflicts. Two times have clashed. Fear is at the basis of the conflict. Ghastly fear. People are afraid of predictions of a possible military coup and, just in case, do not want to damage relations with the army. They are afraid, and this is understandable, to be left without a job, without cachetic food orders (they are given once a week here), without vacuum cleaners and refrigerators.

The theater (Kheifets said) committed three civic deeds. First, it decided for itself to select a new head director, not allowing him to be appointed as he had always been appointed. It is not important that it was Kheifets who was named director. The fact of consciousness is important. The second deed was to put on the play "Pavel I" by Merezhkovskiy. Merezhkovskiy was considered persona non grata 2 years ago. The GlavPUR also did not recommend it, but the theater paid no attention to this. Finally, "Construction Battalion." A year ago, the decision to put on this play was almost unanimous. The theater saw this as its duty—after those lacquered plays about the army which were periodically performed on its stage. Only Vladimir Mikhailovich Zeldin opposed this, saying that the story by Kaledin, by focusing only on the negative, defames the army. A little later, other performers (with various arguments) joined Zeldin, but they still were few in number. Therefore, when Tomilov announced at the troupe meeting that the GlavPUR was closing the play, Kheifets expected an outburst. But no one—not even the young actors, who before were willing for nights to repatriate "Construction Battalion"—no one was outraged. They began to be outraged... that there was a lousy hotel on the tours. And only in the end did three people "get worked up." Igor Vadimovich

Ledogorov (and he did not like the story very much), astonished by the fact that, just as before, it turns out that something can be banned without being seen and without knowing what it is about, stood up and said: art should not depend on whether Shlyaga has come or Shlyaga has gone.

People are sort of ceasing to be afraid, they straighten their shoulders: We were able! We were still able!.. But then the state, the administrative-command system meddles in—and they again shrink and fall silent—for a long time already. The state stifled and stifles attempts. It causes quarrels and breaks between people. Maybe tomorrow everyone will vote for consistency in dialogue with the GlavPUR, but it will not be surprising if only one person raises his hand in favor of "Construction Battalion." People holding similar views yesterday—but today in the hall it is as if someone by chance turned his back, someone sneaked along the wall...

At the Main Political Directorate they told Kheifets: the Soviet Army Theater is a special military subunit. What?! A **military subunit**? he exclaimed. No, do not juggle the facts, he objected. A **special military subunit**. In practice that is what it is. An exotic fact, but typical. The "Mrs America" competition—not the "Miss America" competition in which girls wear bathing suits, but the "Mrs America"—for some reason wished to rent the hall namely from the TsATSA. The theater receives from the Ministry of Defense a quite modest subsidy, much less than the MKhAT [Moscow Academic Art Theater] or the Malyy Theater receive from the Ministry of Culture. The rent which the competition offered—these are intense tours—was for wear and tear. But when the Ministry of Defense found out about this project, they cut it off: No! There would be no "Mrs America"...

In the end, after thinking a bit, Kheifets said: Our theater is now at a turning point. If we lose, it will be thrown back to the previous state of a theater that is controlled, silent, and servile. That is why one can consider that by fate of history its destiny has bordered on the destiny of the country. The future of Russia is being decided: Either it will be thrown back, or it will begin to clamber further...

What must be written. The version of opponents of "Construction Battalion." Conversations with opponents, both those who were involved in the play (Aleksey Krychenkov, Aleksandr Mironov, and others) and those who did not rehearse in it (Vladimir Zeldin, Fedor Chekhanov, and Gennadiy Georgiyevich Tomilov, chief of the theater), went along one scenario. The beginning was different. Someone believed that "Construction Battalion" in and of itself was a truthful thing; someone tried, on the heels of Zeldin, to criticize the play for slandering the army and sarcastically asked: "Would Walesa subsidize a play against himself?" (But why were they silent before? At one time I believed that the author himself, Sergey Kaledin, was partly to blame here, quite caustically talking with the theater's leading actors—he knowingly divided the theater into conservatives and

democrats, and this hurt the performers.) However, then everyone agreed. A second surprise awaited me.

There was no play "Construction Battalion," as such. The play obviously did not turn out. The actors engaged in it were almost relieved to hear about the ban.

"Kheifets planned to produce 'Construction Battalion.' But then he passed the job to two of his pupils, two producers he had put on the staff of the TsATSA—Mikhail Chumachenko and Igor Veller. Together they did not have a common concept; they pulled the play to different sides and completely exhausted the actors. The incident with the ban was exaggerated by Chumachenko, who is making a name for himself and publicizing his unsuccessful and still non-existent work.

Finally, the play could simply have been put on without permission of the GlavPUR. Will they provide money for costumes? Are they deliberately not making scenery? Excuses. Since the play is about the army, adapt the scenery and costumes from other plays as a last resort (this complaint from the mouths of professionals is doubtful, but I heard it more than once). The "Creative Workshops" of the RSFSR STD was willing to finance the play. It would have had super publicity: a play banished from the TsATSA by the GlavPUR! But Chumachenko and Veller did not go for this.

What about Kheifets? First of all, these were his pupils. He wanted to appear bold, young, and progressive in front of them. Second, he does not always trust himself. Chumachenko and Veller were stifling him and forming his opinion.

Did Kheifets come under someone else's influence?

The tragedy of the situation. The author's version. Many contemporary social and psychological problems have really come together at Commune Square. And the longer I think about them, the more I want to take a look at them—through Kheifets. I must write about him. About the director who could not help but end up at the epicenter of the complicated conflict. Not even because it was a civic duty and the like. Everything is inevitable here: since he could not, indeed, live like before, he could not help but take certain steps—as a result, the conflict turned out also to be directed against him. Kheifets ended up in an almost hopeless situation of a voluntary hostage (that is how I could write it: "A Hostage of Fate"—certainly from a writer's standpoint).

Kheifets says of himself that he is not a fighter. In principle. If I understood at least something about him, this is indeed so. The years after his play "Secret Society" was banned in the TsATSA in the 1970's and he himself was banished from the theater (even before that there was the notorious incident when the GlavPUR did not admit his play "Death of Ioann the Terrible"), the years while he was wandering around foreign stages and they did not make for him the simplest scenery, they did not, and did not because all the shops catered to the head

director, taught him to patiently seek irrefutable arguments for those having power. He understood during those years that you can never fight the conditions in which you work—barbarously bad conditions. You cannot permit them to control your consciousness. This is a question of survivability: otherwise you will lose your mind. One must look for a loophole. Work. Just work. Live by working. In the performance and for the performance. He often must have had to forgo pride. He especially tried to save his honor. Even in minute things. He was especially proud that he saved it. I heard how he said in an argument (and it was apparent that it was important for him as professional to live with such a thought): "Yes, I worked during the times when they were giving awards for Brezhnev, but I never lowered myself either to Brezhnev or to Bondarev" (he refused to put up Brezhnev when they were forcing it on him).

Having rushed into the fight for "Construction Battalion," it is as if Kheifets wanted (subconsciously?) to get even for all previous compromises. In doing so, would it be his personal performance—maybe, but it seems to me that he would not be spoiling for a fight. He was spurred on by the thought that his pupils were doing this, that he (now already as head director) did not have the right to demean himself before them and must be persistent, bold, and consistent. He pushed aside rumors that not everything was all right within the play and that the actors were quietly beginning to grumble. They could excuse a coward.

A conflict between the theater and the GlavPUR was unavoidable when staging a harsh play about the army—during these years it would have taken place nevertheless. If it were not over "Construction Battalion," it would have been over something else. And Kheifets could not help getting into this conflict—given the fact that he hates fighting, considering it a waste of creative forces.

Parallel to this, the TsATSA began to gain material independence. Not independence from the Ministry of Defense (what kind of a fool would refuse subsidies?), but independence in finances and projects associated with a huge, neglected building. A mass of projects emerged (their initiator was a good actor named German Yushko): from an underground parking garage and restaurant on the roof to leasing to a South Korean firm a "special box" with a special marshal's entrance from the street and a special bathroom where (in the box) theater performers were categorically not permitted. (A remark aside: today many creative people "have gone mad." The slogan of the day: "Now we will redo everything the way it should be, we will take power, and then..." People have become confused and are not able to understand what they want more: To be free artists and producers, or is it unimportant who they are, as long as they are rich? As a result, there are becoming more producers and owners of newspapers than professional performers, directors, and journalists... But in the TsATSA, any commercial projects originally were creative projects and were prompted by poverty: the theater is poor; the scenery is destitute.)

The organizers could not help but devour the theater, and Kheifets could not ignore them, understanding that when you begin thinking about conditions, you are not in the mood for work.

And here we are coming to perhaps the main point.

The projects evoked distrust among a number of performers. Among them were almost the same three People's Artists of the USSR who now also oppose "Construction Battalion." Of course, both fear and conservatism also had an effect. So did an unconscious irritation: it was the former theater where famous artists determined much. Now, novices have appeared who want to change ("destroy!") everything both within the theater and in its mutual relations with the world (with the GlavPUR), and famous artists are no longer sort of the bosses...

Something else also had an effect. Before the arrival of Kheifets, the troupe was actually split up: Yeremin, Burdonskiy, and Unguryanu—the three directors of the theater each had his own sort of troupe within a troupe. The arrival of Kheifets united the theater. Right after his arrival, the element of faith was very important. Why is it that everyone other than Zeldin supported "Construction Battalion" a year ago, but now some criticize it for its "slandorousness?" Did it infuriate Kaledin? Not just that. Kheifets stood up for "Construction Battalion." They believed Kheifets. But his "third season" in the theater had arrived. According to all laws of the theater, it is a season of trials for a head director. As a rule, it is in this season that discontent begins to manifest itself: the head director did not give someone a part (just try to give everyone a part if there are almost 100 performers in the troupe!), he said the wrong thing to someone... **In such a situation, the struggle for "Construction Battalion," for fairness, which should have sort of united the troupe** (What does it matter! One chief wanted it, it was authorized. Another did not want it, it was banned. Petty tyranny of the first order.), **could not help but cause a quarrel between artists and leave Kheifets "vulnerable."** The version that reached the newspapers (the GlavPUR alone is at fault), where there was not a word about the contradictions within the play itself, contained a small particle of unintentional "lying" that undermined the faith. Chumachenko and Veller, unlike Kheifets, were not schooled in patience (thank God?). They naturally prod Kheifets toward an atrocity, toward worsening relations with the Political Directorate, toward an ultimatum: either "Construction Battalion," or he would slam the door. Such an aggravation can, however, lead Kheifets toward a split with the troupe that can no longer be taken lightly.

Kheifets understood this. And he suddenly said to me: "To boil all this down to the Political Directorate is lying (that is his very word!—Yu.G.). It is not a problem with them; we have a problem, too." And he added something quite unexpected: maybe it is not such a bad thing that the actors said nothing when they were informed of the closing of "Construction Battalion." If they criticize the

play among themselves, but said nothing at the meeting and hit no one, that means they still believe, and there is no serious split in the theater.

Such is the disposition for today. Status quo.

Kheifets is seeking a meeting of the theater with the GlavPUR.

The GlavPUR is keeping silent. Uncertainty.

It seems to me that is why Kheifets is not posing an ultimatum and that he does not relish the thought of slamming the door. The TsATSA is his home theater. Moreover, there will be compromises here or at another place. Here or at another place he is concerned not with wasting time on fuss but on putting on a play. This is a rare director today who wants to put on a play. This is a rare head director who in principle is against firing bad actors and against splits and revolutions in the theater. All splits in the theater, in his opinion, are immoral and destroy the theater (having talked with Kheifets, I, 6 months ago having supported the split in the Yermolovskiy Theater, think: Maybe he is right? In the Yermolovskiy Theater, true, it was quite a different case).

It seems to me that there is no other path for the TsATSA other than a civil reconciliation within the theater (I ask you not to look everywhere for allusions and an excessively global meaning).

The GlavPUR should not terrorize "Construction Battalion" in order that its fate be determined within the theater and the theater itself understand its own contradictions.

The GlavPUR should stand aside.

Postscript. Two entries following the conflict.

1. As regards the problem: "In principle, did the GlavPUR have the right to ban the play?" That is, can a department—as a sign of gratitude for subsidy—ask its departmental theater not to touch upon topics that are painful for the department ("Do not bicker in your own house!")? Certainly, it can. But this is a purely legal problem. The problem is a lack of legal norms. The lack of a contract. Ideally, Kheifets and the GlavPUR should sign a contract. What kind of contract they will sign—that is how it will be in the future.

Let us assume that in the contract the GlavPUR were to demand categorically that Kheifets not put on plays like "Construction Battalion," and Kheifets leaves the theater. After all, it is not likely he would want to constrain himself with a lack of freedom! It will be hard to find a replacement. There are few good, unemployed directors now. The audience may forget the TsATSA altogether—and the theater would shamefully go broke. That means, the GlavPUR is still thinking about what conditions to propose. The problem is decided by the market—by the method of seriously haggling.

2. I would not want this article to be perceived as an article against the GlavPUR. It is not against the GlavPUR, it is for the art of the theater. Here is why the clarification is necessary: rumors are going around (again!) that the Ministry of Defense may abandon the obstinate theater altogether. If, of course, it cannot handle it. It was—and is no more. I want to start a rumor in reply that the author of this article considers such a decision extremely rash and would not wish this article to add fuel to the fire.

Delay in Appointment of Lenin Library Head

91UN0614A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 28 Dec 90 First Edition p 6

[Article by G. Orekhanova: "A Word for the Minister: Who Will Head the Country's Main Library"]

[Text] The story of the dramatic struggle for the survival of the V. I. Lenin State Library of the USSR has reached its culmination. They have found the real boundaries for the plan for reconstruction, but the question of who will head the country's main library will be decided in these December days.

As is known, in August of this year, a competition for filling the vacant post of director of the V. I. Lenin Library was announced. The USSR Ministry of Culture (Minister N. N. Gubenko) set up a vacancy commission for selecting candidates for the post of director of the GBL [State Lenin Library].

The compulsory conditions for the vacancy: age - not more than 55, Moscow [residency] permit, academic degree not lower than candidate of science, published works in the field of humanities, mastery of one foreign language, and work experience in the sphere of library affairs. As already reported in the press, the commission immediately embarked on a violation of the nominating principles. On 22 August, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA published a letter (nearly 100 signatures) in which these violations were told.

What, then, was the final result of the commission's work?

It became known on 23 December, when the candidates recommended by the commission for the post of director were put forward for discussion at a meeting of the GBL

collective. From 27 persons who had presented applications for the vacancy, four were selected, and the Ministry of Culture was ordered to appoint a director from them.

And so, among the candidates were A. D. Mikhaylov, doctor of philosophical sciences, specialist in the field of French literature; S. P. Kapitsa, doctor of physical sciences, well-known to television viewers as the director of the program "Obvious - Incredible;" V. I. Kharlamov, candidate of historical sciences; and M. O. Chudakova, doctor of philological sciences. The last two candidates are especially familiar to the library's collective as colleagues.

We do not intend to characterize the candidates for high office, especially as the newspaper already had to address the story of the M. A. Bulgakov archives, with which the name of M. O. Chudakova is connected. We did not want to note here the tense atmosphere in which the discussion of candidates for the post of director was conducted at the GBL. There appeared, in particular, this disappointing circumstance. I. S. Filippov, born in 1955, who has command of five languages, is chairman of the library's readers' council (his candidacy corresponds to all the vacancy nomination commission's conditions), was removed from the list of candidates.

"It seems a very strange procedure to me," he said, speaking in the capacity of a participant of the discussion, "under which the participants of the competition are not informed of the reasons for declining their candidacy. I have no basis to believe that anyone read my program." The scholar's speech proved that he has thoroughly mastered the most intricate management of the GBL and its needs and how attentively the members of the very complex and highly professional collective of the library fawns upon its opinion. Answering the question of how the fate of the GBL appears to him in the conditions of our social-political situation, I. Filippov answered: "The library must exist in any situation"...

The discussion of the candidates in the GBL collective showed that both the minister and the GBL collective are one in their struggle to bring the country's main library from the breach condition. By mutual decision, the candidacy of I. S. Filippov was also entered into the voting bulletin for the referendum which was to determine the opinion of the GBL collective. As a result of the referendum, completed on 27 December, an overwhelming number of votes were handed in for him (1,012 of 1,593). And so, the last word in deciding the question is for the USSR Minister of Culture, N. N. Gubenko.

We hope it is not necessary to wait for it and that the decision will be dictated by the keen necessity for preserving the national treasure-house of culture.

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