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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

PARTY, POLITICAL WORK WITHIN ARMY EXAMINED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 2, Feb 82 pp 1-13

[Unattributed article based on the draft of the Review of Party Work and Political Work During the 5 Years from 1975 to 1980 by the Political General Department: "Toward the 5th Congress of the Party: Thoroughly Understanding the Revolutionary Line of the Party and Increasing the Effectiveness of Party Work and Political Work Among the People's Armed Forces"]

[Text] Reviewing party work and political work within the armed forces during the past 5 years, especially reviewing the effort to thoroughly understand the revolutionary line of the party, is an extremely important matter. Because, the past 5 years marked a major change to a new stage of the revolution and were intense and complicated years in the process of continuous development of the Vietnamese revolution. The process of thoroughly understanding the line of the party is the process of continuous sharp struggle between that which is correct and that which is incorrect, between that which is revolutionary and scientific and manifestations of impetuosity, slowness and conservatism; at the same time, it is the process of decisive struggle against resistance by enemies of the line of the party. As a result, conducting a good review will help to increase the effectiveness of party work and political work, accelerate the completion of the tasks of the army and make a practical contribution to preparing for the 5th Congress of the Party. At the same time, it will help to further develop our armed forces' theory of party work and political work and build political agencies that are strong and solid in every respect.

Below are some opinions concerning the following two matters of major importance:

1. Thoroughly understanding the line of the party regarding the socialist revolution;
2. Correctly resolving a number of problems regarding organization in the new situation.

I. Thoroughly Understanding the Line of the Party Regarding the Socialist Revolution

Thoroughly understanding the line of the party regarding the socialist revolution involves achieving a high degree of unanimity throughout the army regarding awareness, viewpoints, thinking and will and turning them into revolutionary actions in order to successfully complete each task assigned to the army by the party and state in the new stage of the revolution. This involves a process ranging from comprehensive, thorough education to the detailed and thorough organization of implementation; coordinating education with the organization of implementation and, through the latter, continuing to provide an education so that awareness becomes increasingly profound, viewpoints become increasingly strong, the level of offensive thinking and will is constantly increased and the ability of party members, cadres and soldiers to take action is increased.

To begin with, importance must be attached to teaching the entire line of the party regarding the socialist revolution while delving deeply into teaching the military line of the party in the period of building and defending the fatherland.

The line regarding the socialist revolution in the stage in which the entire country is advancing to socialism was set forth at the 4th Congress of the Party. It is "an entity encompassing the general line and the specific line regarding each field and sector that is correctly expressed in the form of positions and policies, in the form of the guidelines and tasks of the state plan."⁽¹⁾ Every sector and level must thoroughly understand both the general line and the specific line regarding the various fields and must have a deep understanding of the line that applies within the scope of its sector.

Our armed forces must have a thorough understanding of the general line, the line on economic and cultural construction and development, the international line and the military line. It is incorrect to stop at only teaching the revolutionary line and not delve into the military line. Conversely, it is a mistake to only delve into the military line and not give full attention to teaching the revolutionary line.

Our army is an effective tool of force of our party and state, is the pillar of the national defense system and the people's war to defend the fatherland. Thoroughly understanding the revolutionary line of the party is an issue in the political life of the army. Only by firmly grasping the line of the party regarding the socialist revolution can our cadres and soldiers clearly understand the entirety of our people's revolutionary struggle in the new stage; clearly understand the position, role and responsibility of the army in this overall struggle; see the combat targets of the army in the period of independence, freedom and socialism of the nation; and, on this basis, have the foundation for clearly understanding the military line of the party in the period of building and defending the fatherland and correctly resolve the problems regarding the guidelines concerning the buildup and combat of the people's armed forces,

concerning the building of the national defense system and coordinating the national defense system with the economy. Many problems in the realities of our people's revolutionary struggle in the fields of politics and economics, domestic affairs and foreign affairs, advantages and difficulties and the positive and negative aspects of social life have a strong impact upon the awareness and thinking, upon the private thoughts and feelings of cadres and soldiers. Therefore, it is necessary to give troops a clear understanding of the line and policy of the party before it is possible to resolve the ideological problems arising from these realities, strengthen their working class stand, heighten their socialist awareness, strengthen their confidence in the correct leadership of the party and the bright future of the nation and, on this basis, deepen their socialist patriotism and proletarian international spirit as well as their spirit of being ready to make sacrifices and fight wholeheartedly to fulfill the task assigned by the party.

On the basis of the overall line and not stopping at this line, political and ideological work within the army must delve deeply into giving the people's armed forces a firm grasp of the national defense line and the line on the people's war to defend the fatherland as well as the military task during each period of time in order to successfully implement it and, in this manner, help to concretize and perfect the military line, thereby helping to develop the military science and art of the people's war to defend the fatherland. As Le Duan, general secretary of our party's Central Committee, pointed out: "As the armed forces of the party, our army must consider organizing the successful implementation of the military line and the successful implementation of the military tasks set forth by the party to be its central task." "When talking about ideology within the army, we are, on the one hand, talking about revolutionary ideals, about evaluating the enemy, about the spirit of readiness to fight to defend the fatherland and the sense of discipline, the concept of complying with orders... On the other hand, however, we must also talk about understanding the military line, understanding military theory and science." (2) The problem we face is that we must teach and provide a thorough understanding of both the line on the socialist revolution and the military line in the cause of defending the fatherland to insure that these lines are thoroughly understood and, on this basis, properly resolve the problems involving the awareness and thinking of troops as well as the theoretical and practical problems involved in the buildup of the army, strengthen the national defense system in the revolutionary struggle, in general, and in the cause of defending the fatherland, in particular, build an iron will and develop the abilities needed to fulfill the two strategic tasks.

The teaching of our party's line on the socialist revolution must be closely coordinated with teaching Marxism-Leninism; there must be close coordination between teaching discipline and promptly providing information on the situation and the actual experiences gained in the process of organizing the implementation of the line.

Marxism-Leninism is the ideological foundation of the party. The revolutionary line of the party represents the proper application of the principles of Marxism-Leninism to the specific conditions of Vietnam. For this reason, we must coordinate teaching the line of the party with teaching Marxism-Leninism as this is the only way to clarify the theoretical and scientific base, the base of the world view and methodology of the line and create the conditions for deeply understanding and firmly grasping the line, adhering to it in an unswerving manner and displaying creativity in concretizing the line and organizing its implementation. We should not think that because the line of the party represents creative Marxism-Leninism in Vietnam that it is only necessary to study this line, not necessary to study Marxism-Leninism. At present, teaching Marxism-Leninism in our country, especially in the subjects of political economics and scientific socialism, must involve delving deeply into the theory regarding the period of transition to socialism and must be closely linked to the line on the socialist revolution in our country that was determined at the 4th Congress and has been gradually concretized in other subsequent resolutions of the Party Central Committee. When teaching the revolutionary line of the party, it is necessary to clearly point out its correct and creative nature, as seen in its loyalty and firm adherence to the revolutionary and scientific essence of Marxism-Leninism and its selective incorporation of the experiences of the fraternal parties. We must clearly show that which is universal and that which is special and show that the line firmly adheres to universal truths while displaying a high degree of independence, autonomy and creativity. Attention must be given to forging the Marxist-Leninist method of scientific examination and smoothly applying this methodology in military affairs. The realities of the past several years have shown that some of our cadres and party members have not completely cultivated the method of scientific thinking. The manifestations of examining and analyzing the phenomena in life in a subjective, onesided manner are primarily the result of not having a firm grasp of the Marxist-Leninist method of examining matters. As regards matters pertaining to the present military line of the party, such as the evaluation of the enemy that "China, which is ruled by the Beijing expansionists, is large but not strong," the dialectical relationship between being the masters and taking the offensive, taking the offensive and being the masters, between defense and offense, offense and defense and so forth are all matters regarding military methodology that must be resolved well.

In order for the line and the revolutionary and scientific nature of the line to be thoroughly understood, we cannot stop at simply arming cadres and soldiers with knowledge of theory or general viewpoints regarding the line, rather, we must give them a full understanding of the realities of the country, show them the new problems arising in life and give them an understanding of the advanced model units in the revolutionary action movement of the working people and of the cadres and soldiers in the people's armed forces. Only by establishing close coordination between theory and practice is it possible to have the foundation needed to overcome subjectivism (impetuosity or conservatism) in the effort to thoroughly understand and implement the line. In teaching the party's line on

the socialist revolution and in teaching Marxism-Leninism, importance must be attached to displaying the superior nature of socialism, strengthening and enhancing our unshakeable confidence in the inevitable victory of socialism in Vietnam and throughout the world and adopting the correct attitude in the face of difficulties while firmly adhering to the goals of the struggle.

Teaching the revolutionary line of the party so that it is thoroughly understood must be closely coordinated with deepening knowledge, which includes knowledge of the social sciences, the natural sciences and the technical sciences.

The completion of revolutionary tasks in the various fields requires necessary knowledge of the field in question. Without certain comprehensive knowledge of politics, economics, culture, military affairs, science and technology, the revolutionary line of the party cannot be fully learned and it is impossible to help to concretize this line or organize its implementation in a manner that yields high results. The building of a comprehensive and modern national defense system, the buildup of a regular force and modern people's army and the preparations for and actual conduct of a people's war to protect the fatherland under modern conditions demand that each of us, especially high level and middle level cadres, not only possesses knowledge of modern military science, but also possesses general knowledge.

Party work and political work must involve educational activities in order to help stimulate an intense desire to learn and a thirst for knowledge and inspire the struggle to overcome the thinking of being satisfied with oneself, not being willing to study, wasting time and not regularly deepening one's knowledge in every area. On the other hand, on the basis of the general policy of the party and state, we must research the comprehensive reform of the teaching of the social sciences and natural sciences in terms of subject matter and the methods of teaching, in terms of the organization of classroom and on-the-job education and in terms of the elementary and advanced training of teachers. Plans must be adopted for closely coordinating with the other sectors through the activities of the cultural halls, clubs and the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union, in the press and by means of lively forms of activity consistent with each objective (the various types of cadres, young soldiers and so forth) and in a manner consistent with circumstances in order to universally and systematically provide knowledge of the technical sciences as well as the modern military technical sciences.

The effort to teach and gain a thorough understanding of the revolutionary line of the party must be closely linked to developing upon the working class nature of our army in the new stage.

Our army is organized, led and forged by the party. The specifics of the revolutionary nature of our army are directly determined by the revolutionary line and tasks of the party. Whenever the revolution enters a new stage, the revolutionary line and tasks of the party change and the specifics of the class nature of the army develop accordingly.

Therefore, thoroughly understanding the party's revolutionary line and tasks must be closely linked to developing upon the revolutionary nature of the army in the new stage; we must have a deep and detailed understanding of the revolutionary line and tasks set forth by the 4th Congress of the Party and the various plenums of the Party Central Committee in strengthening and developing the revolutionary nature of our army. This nature must be evident in the combat objectives, the political task, the organizational structure, the military science and art, the political-spiritual qualities and the political relationships of our army in the new stage. At present, on the basis of the political line and the military line of the party, we must teach troops to regularly sharpen their vigilance, display a high will to fight, be determined to win victory over the Chinese expansionists who are collaborating with the U.S. imperialists to commit aggression against and undermine our country's revolution, maintain political security and social order, firmly protect the socialist fatherland, fulfill their tasks to the nation and fulfill their international obligation, thereby contributing to the cause of revolution and peace of the people of the world. Our army must, at the same time, participate in productive labor and economic construction in suitable organizations and by suitable methods; the army must be a great school that forges the generations of youths to be new socialists; the army must heighten its spirit of socialist patriotism, spirit of socialist collective ownership, proletarian international spirit, be absolutely loyal to the fatherland, obey the leadership of the party and unite closely around the Party Central Committee; it must show itself worthy of being the effective and reliable tool of force of the Vietnamese dictatorship of the proletariat state as well as the pillar of the national defense system and the people's war to defend the fatherland; it must be conscious of its blood ties to the working people and achieve one will on the part of the army and the people. Internally, the army must have a single will throughout itself, achieve a high degree of unity and unanimity and love and help one another as blood brothers. As regards our international friends, we must constantly consolidate and further strengthen the special strategic and militant alliance and unity of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea; unite and practice comprehensive cooperation with the Soviet Union; unite and cooperate with the fraternal socialist countries; and unite with and support the revolutionary movement in the world. Our army must have a scientific organizational structure, strict, self-imposed discipline and a regular-force style of work and life; our cadres and soldiers, depending upon their position of responsibility, must firmly grasp and creatively apply Vietnamese military science and art in a people's war to defend the fatherland and be the masters of modern military weapons and technical equipment. All of the matters mentioned above are basic matters with which we all think that we are familiar; however, the specifics involved in these matters have developed and new requirements are faced. In the educational effort to strengthen and develop upon the nature of the army, we cannot be superficial or simplistic, rather, we must delve deeply into clearly analyzing the new specifics involved in these matters and the new requirements that are faced and must adopt a comprehensive plan for guiding actions and forging troops in the realities of every aspect of life.

The process of teaching and thoroughly understanding the revolutionary line of the party and strengthening and developing upon the revolutionary nature of the

army is the process of continuous struggle to overcome the negative phenomena within the army, is the process of resolute struggle to defeat each trick and psychological warfare scheme of the enemy.

The basic attribute of the party is its revolutionary and scientific nature, consequently, the revolutionary line of the party is also revolutionary and scientific in nature.

Therefore, in order to fully understand and unswervingly organize the successful implementation of the party's line in favorable circumstances as well as in the face of complex difficulties, in addition to having a certain knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, of the social sciences, natural sciences and technical sciences, it is also necessary to possess an unyielding revolutionary will and a strong offensive spirit. This is the basis for strengthening one's stand and viewpoints, for displaying creativity; it is also a prerequisite to fully and correctly grasping the realities of life.

The socialist revolution is the most profound and thorough revolution. The realities of the past 5 years have shown that the struggle in the process of implementing the line of the party in order to advance the revolution under the present socio-economic conditions of our country is extremely arduous and complex. In this situation, negative phenomena and deviations have arisen among some of our party members, cadres and soldiers in one field or another, at one time or another, at one place or another. These negative phenomena and deviations have had an inevitable adverse influence upon the effort to thoroughly understand and implement the line. As a result, it is necessary to closely coordinate the teaching of the line, viewpoints and policies of the party in each field and the establishment and enhancement of the thinking of collective ownership with a resolute and continuous struggle waged by many different measures in order to reduce the scope of and eventually overcome negative phenomena so that party members, cadres and soldiers firmly adhere to their stand and viewpoints and possess an offensive will to overcome their difficulties, learn new knowledge and develop their intelligence and creativity strongly.

We are carrying out the socialist revolution and building socialism in a situation in which the country is at peace but must deal with a multi-faceted war of sabotage being waged by the Beijing expansionists and hegemonists collaborating with the U.S. imperialists; at the same time, we face the possibility of the outbreak of a major war.

In their preparations to carry out their basic scheme to annex our country, the enemy is looking for every way to sabotage our country in order to weaken it. On the political front, which is a very important front, their main objective is to erode the confidence in and create doubts concerning the correctness of the political line, the economic line and the foreign affairs line as well as the military line and, on this basis, voicing arguments that provoke and attack the leadership organization of the party. They are always taking advantage of

our weaknesses as well as exploiting the negative aspects of our corps. Therefore, party work and political work must reflect vigilance, respond quickly, take the initiative in exposing to party members, cadres and soldiers and guiding them in thwarting each psychological warfare and spy warfare scheme and trick as well as each distortion and attempt by the enemy to undermine the line of our party in order to protect the line and maintain the confidence of party members, cadres and soldiers.

The struggle against internal negative phenomena and the struggle to defeat the psychological warfare schemes and tricks of the enemy are taking place against the background of our society at this time; however, we cannot adopt a passive, negative attitude and wait for a smooth, overall change to occur, rather, we must take the viewpoint that "the Vietnam people's army is a progressive component of the Vietnamese working class" and display initiative by determinedly taking the offensive and insuring that our army is totally pure and reliable, which will have a good, reciprocal impact upon the other strata of society.

A thorough understanding of the revolutionary line of the party must be manifested by means of real actions in organizing the successful implementation of the line and successfully completing the common tasks of the armed forces and the specific political tasks of the unit.

A deep awareness of, firm adherence to and loyalty to the revolutionary line as well as the determined defense of this line through actions, all of these things must be proven by means of real actions taken during the various periods of time to turn the line of the party into real victory. It is in reality that cadres, party members and the masses will display their creativity in order to successfully resolve the new problems that have arisen and, in this way, help to constantly concretize, develop and perfect the line of the party.

Party work and political work must be deeply involved in such activities of troops as the following: building defense positions, organizing combat readiness and combat, the training of troops, the use and maintenance of technical equipment, productive labor and economic construction, the organizing of the spiritual and material lives of troops, the struggle against negative phenomena and so forth and must, through these activities, examine how well the general line, positions and policies as well as the military line, viewpoints and thinking of the party are understood, praise good innovations, disseminate good experiences, look for every way to increase the number of model units and, at the same time, correct shortcomings and deviations.

Within the general movement and in order for the general movement to be intense and stable, we must launch specific, practical revolutionary action movements within each unit, each branch and each sector. Every movement must have specific contents and objectives (that are closely linked to the task assigned by the upper level) and must achieve results in the following areas:

--Fulfilling the norms, plans and requirements of the task assigned by the upper level;

--Building strong, solid basic units;

--Molding persons who possess good qualities and are competent.

In launching widespread revolutionary movements of the masses, the organizations of the party, the organizations of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union and the Trade Union organizations at the basic units play a very important role if not to say the decisive role. The basic organizations of the party must have close ties with the masses, must know the requirements, aspirations and capabilities of the masses, must accept the innovations and experiences of the masses and must correctly establish the contents and goals of the movement. The Youth Union and the Trade Union must be able to propagandize, teach and raise the socialist awareness of the masses, cultivate and heighten the intelligence while awakening the activism, initiative and creativity of the masses and adopt lively modes of activity suited to objectives in order to rally the masses.

Thus, thoroughly understanding the revolutionary line of the party in the new stage is a broad issue. It cannot be restricted to the scope of education and cannot, in particular, only involve teaching the line, rather, it involves a complete process extending from very comprehensive education to very detailed organization of implementation. Party work and political work must have an impact throughout this process by engaging in educational activities, delving deeply into every activity involved in the organization of implementation by the unit and mobilizing, organizing and guiding the revolutionary action movement of the masses while molding correct thinking, correcting incorrect thinking, waging a determined struggle against the psychological warfare arguments of the enemy and criticizing and overcoming incorrect internal viewpoints and thinking. All of these educational and organizational activities, these activities to mold and combat are closely interrelated, permeate one another and are repeated time and time again within a complete and unified entity in which party work and political work are closely coordinated with the other areas of work.

II. Correctly Resolving a Number of Organizational Problems in the New Situation

The realities of party work and political work have shown that once the correct and suitable policy has been adopted, the organization of guidance, work methods and the work system play a very important role in determining the degree of effectiveness of work.

Looking back over the past several years, we see that party work and political work have involved positive activities based on correct positions and measures; however, their effectiveness has not been high and they have not brought about a strong, stable change in the political and ideological situation of troops. Subjectively speaking, the important cause has been the fact that the revolutionary and scientific nature of the organizational structure and work methods and style is still weak, which is something that we must focus our efforts on correcting.

1. Above everything else, importance must be attached to strengthening the political agencies on the various levels to be consistent with the new requirements.

The major problem at this time is the need to strengthen the system of political agencies on the various levels in accordance with the requirement of improving the organizational structure and the mode of leadership of the party within the army with a view toward insuring that the party's leadership of the people's armed forces is further strengthened. There are three basic problems that must be solved:

To begin with, it is necessary to define the organizational system of political agencies. On the basis of the organizational structure of the army and in accordance with the unified guidelines for building the party organization and building the government organization, it is necessary to determine on which levels political staffs should be organized and to accurately and scientifically define the function and tasks of the political agency on each level, which is extremely important.

Secondly, it is necessary to define the organizational structure of the political agencies to insure that they possess a high degree of dynamism and meet the requirements of guiding the work involved in the performance of the political tasks of the army under normal circumstances as well as when a people's war to defend the fatherland is being fought. The apparatus of the political agency must be streamlined and consist of competent cadres who possess good qualities (based on the standards stipulated for each duty on each level).

Thirdly, it is necessary to define the basic relationships in a manner consistent with the principle: the Party Central Committee, the Political Bureau and the Secretariat provide centralized, unified leadership of the armed forces in terms of politics, ideology and organization and in a manner consistent with the effort to perfect the one-person-in-command system within the army.

Resolving all three of these problems well is the basic prerequisite to creating the strength of the entire organizational system.

2. We must have a firm grasp of the task of foremost importance in party building, namely, building basic party organizations that are truly strong and pure.

The basic party organization is the place that is closely linked to the masses, the place that directly leads the masses in implementing the line, positions and policies of the party and the place that manages, teaches and forces each party member. The important position of the basic organization of the party has developed in accordance with the law: the ever increasing role of the Marxist-Leninist party in the socialist revolution. However, it is necessary to have a new awareness of the leadership task, the specifics involved in leadership

and the mode of leadership of the basic party organization under the circumstances of perfecting the one-person-in-command system. Full importance must be attached to improving the quality of leadership of the basic party organizations so that they thoroughly concern themselves with party work, with mass agitation and with political-ideological education within the party and among the masses outside the party. The basic party organization must create every condition for the commander to fulfill his responsibilities in performing the task assigned by the party and state, in taking the initiative in dealing with every situation, in making accurate, timely decisions and in engaging troops in decisive, urgent action to win victory and excellently complete each task.

The building of basic party organizations must be closely linked to the performance of the political task of the unit. Through the state of combat readiness and discipline of the unit and the results of training and work, it is necessary to inspect and improve the quality of party members, consolidate and strengthen the organization, develop upon positive factors, struggle to overcome negative factors and intensify the political-ideological education of party members and the masses. The basic party organizations within the army must represent the tenacious, indomitable will, the spirit of thorough revolutionary vigilance and a high degree of organization and discipline and must always be worthy of being the stalwart, militant vanguard unit of the working class in the basic unit. Importance must be attached to building the basic organizations of the party in combat units and at schools and national defense enterprises; at the same time, light attention cannot be given to building the basic organizations of the party at command agencies, especially on the campaign and strategic levels.

In the building of the basic organizations of the party, efforts must be focused on increasing the fighting strength, the initiative, the creativity and the degree of uniformity of the basic organizations; there must be firm adherence to the key aspect, namely, raising the level of leadership and increasing the fighting strength of the party chapter. Special concern must be shown for consolidating and strengthening the close relationship between the party chapter and party members, on the one hand, and the masses, on the other hand. The basic party organization and the commander of the basic unit must routinely provide close guidance of Youth Union work.

In the effort to improve the quality of leadership of the basic party organizations, the matter of decisive importance is that of strengthening the basic party committee (beginning by assigning the correct person as secretary) so that it consists of comrades who are truly competent and possess good qualities. The upper levels must adopt a plan for providing regular training in order to constantly raise the qualifications of these comrades so that they meet the requirements of their tasks. It is necessary to improve the work methods of the basic party committees so that these basic party committees are close to reality, close to the party chapters, close to party members and the masses.

In the present situation, in order to concentrate guidance on strengthening party building, it is necessary to research and propose to the Central Committee regulations that define the responsibilities of the secretaries of the basic party organizations of a number of necessary units.

3. As stated above, the key in improving the quality of the work of the political agencies and the basic organizations of the party is improving the quality of the corps of political cadres.

The molding of persons must be based on the requirements of the building of the organization. The corps of political cadres must be built in the manner required by party work and political work, by the building of political agencies and the basic party organizations.

We consider party work and political work to be the science, the art of teaching and organizing persons, teaching and organizing the cadres and soldiers of the new style army so that they are always persons who are absolutely loyal to the goals and ideals of the party, to the revolutionary cause of the people and are ready to sacrifice their lives in combat and work in a selfless manner for the cause of defending the fatherland and building socialism.

As a science, party work and political work are related in many ways to the social sciences and the natural sciences, are based on the achievements of these sciences and apply these achievements in the process of teaching and organizing troops. As a science, the activities of party work and political work have their own objectives, laws and methods which are designed to constantly raise the political-ideological level and help to raise the level of combat readiness and increase the fighting strength of the armed forces. As an art, party work and political work are closely related to psychology and the science of education. They are based on and apply the conclusions of these fields of study in research in order to more deeply understand each cadre and soldier, the world within them and their motives and attitudes in order to teach and forge them in a manner that yields the highest possible results.

Therefore, it is necessary to provide political cadres with comprehensive and highly specialized qualifications in accordance with the requirements of their duties and work and in a manner consistent with the environment in which they are active. There can be no general political cadres or all-purpose political cadres. Every political cadre within the army, every political-military cadre, must, in addition to having a firm grasp of the theory of Marxism-Leninism and the line and policies of the party and possessing the necessary knowledge of the social sciences and natural sciences, must also have knowledge of military science and art and the military technical science in the branch of service in which he serves. And, one other extremely important requirement is that the political cadre possess pure revolutionary qualities, possess the ability to engage in practical activities and know how to perform party work and political

work in a manner consistent with objectives, with the special characteristics of each field, with specific circumstances.

The structure of the corps of political cadres must be reasonable and must reflect balance between cadres who perform party work and political work on the various levels and cadres who conduct research or teach the various social sciences. In order to have enough cadres who possess good qualities to meet the requirements of tasks, the basic issue is the need to adopt elementary and advanced training plans. Besides training new cadres, plans must be adopted for providing advanced training to comrades who are working but who have not received adequate training by appropriate methods. Under the new conditions, requiring a certain level of education is necessary but, in view of the specific circumstances that exist today, we cannot automatically rely on a school diploma, but must also consider the knowledge learned by a cadre through self-study.

4. Codifying the line and positions of the party in the form of statutes, in the form of unified, army-wide regulations and urgently taking determined steps to improve work methods and workstyle.

Codification is a major issue in organizational work and has the purpose of fully implementing the leadership of a party in political power. Codification must be manifested in the both the organization of the state apparatus, in general, and within the army, in particular. A regular force and modern army must have a system of orders, which are laws of the state, to be implemented throughout the army. Party work and political work must also comply with this law in order to achieve a regular-force level of operation and establish a unified organization, a unified mechanism and unified procedures from top to bottom. Only in this way is it possible to insure unified action, insure that all units operate in accordance with specific rules in every situation and under the command of any cadre. Party work and political work cannot be conducted on the basis of personal "innovations" or on the basis of each person having his own "system" or "policy" in the style of the "new official, new policy."

On the basis of the resolutions and the amendments to the Party Statutes that the 5th Congress of the Party will adopt and on the basis of the experiences that have been summarized, it is necessary to formulate the operational regulations of the political agencies, the basic organizations of the party and the basic organizations of the Youth Union and Trade Union. The principles and viewpoints set forth in the documents of the party must be expressed in the form of regulations that are specific but are of a basic, long-range nature and will guide the operations of the various organizations on a routine basis. The subject matter and the methods of operation of party work and political work in various tasks must also be generally stated and recorded in the laws of the army.

In conjunction with building the system of organizations and establishing operational rules, urgent, determined steps must be taken to improve work

methods and the style of work in order to achieve good coordination for the purpose of tapping the capabilities of cadres and improving the results of political work and party work. Efforts must be concentrated on four requirements:

Working in accordance with stipulated duties and work regulations; not working in any manner one sees fit.

Developing the habit of thinking in a practical manner, working in a manner that calculates returns and avoiding ostentatiousness, formalism and the waste of effort, money and time on matters that have little impact.

Working in a detailed, specific and creative style and avoiding being general or mechanical.

Managing the implementation of work programs, conducting inspections, providing supervision and conducting preliminary and final reviews while avoiding leaving things half-done.

The revolutionary line of the party is the origin of each victory of our army and people; it is also the origin of the strength of party work and political work within our armed forces. Thoroughly understanding the revolutionary line of the party is the most important and basic matter in increasing the effectiveness of party work and political work.

A thorough understanding of the revolutionary line of the party must be manifested in both ideological work and organizational work, which must be closely coordinated with each other with a view toward successfully completing the tasks of the armed forces and the specific political task of each unit. In this process, party work and political work as well as political agencies and cadres develop and become stronger. They must struggle to overcome the obstacles faced in the course of development of the army and must overcome their own negative phenomena.

Conducting a good review of the experiences in party work and political work over the past 5 years and increasing the effectiveness of party work and political work are positive contributions to bringing about a new change in both the thinking and the organization of troops, in general, and political agencies, in particular, and accelerating the widespread revolutionary action movement of the masses and the emulation to successfully implement the resolutions of the 5th Party Congress.

FOOTNOTES

1. Le Duan: address during the ceremony to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the founding of the VCP.
2. Le Duan: "Tiep tuc nghien cuu, xay dung ly luan quan su Viet Nam" [Continuing To Research and Build the Military Theory of Vietnam], TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, No 1-1979.

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

GUIDELINES DISCUSSED FOR IMPROVING MILITIA, SELF-DEFENSE UNITS

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 2, Feb 82 pp 26-31

[Article by Hai Duong: "Improving the Quality of Militia and Self-Defense Forces To Meet the Requirements of Being the Masters of the Basic Level, the Masters of the Locality"]

[Text] Being the masters of the basic level, of the locality is an extremely important and large task of the militia and self-defense forces. Only by being the masters of the basic level and the locality is it possible to make a competent contribution to being the masters of the entire country and developing the strategic role of the militia and self-defense forces in the cause of defending and building the fatherland. The present improvement of the quality of militia and self-defense forces must be designed to meet this requirement. From the realities of the buildup of the militia and self-defense forces over the past several years, the following several matters of primary importance can be raised:

1. Building Militia and Self-Defense Forces That Are Fully Capable of Fighting To Defend the Basic Level, Defend the Locality in a People's War To Defend the Fatherland

The militia and self-defense forces are widespread forces that are established at the basic units and in the localities of the entire country. They are very important forces in protecting basic units, protecting the locality and are the nucleus of the people's war on the basic level. Being the master of one's locality means firmly protecting one's locality within the overall defense posture. To accomplish this, it is necessary to adopt combat plans for protecting basic units, protecting the locality in order to win victory over the enemy under the conditions of any area of operation and in any situation that might occur in war. Different combat plans must be adopted for fighting the enemy on land, in the air and at sea, for independent fighting at the basic unit within the general formation of the combat group or district military fortress or for fighting along side regular troops within the locality. On the basis of these combat plans and force capabilities, it is necessary to improve the quality of the militia and self-defense forces in a comprehensive manner encompassing their size, structure and form of organization, equipment and training, politics and morale, art of fighting, leadership and command.

Over the past several years and at present, we have been and are performing many jobs for the purpose of resolving these problems and creating increasingly high quality for the militia and self-defense forces. The various localities have reorganized and strengthened the structure and the form of organization of the militia and self-defense forces at each type basic unit in accordance with the model for the organization of forces and the mode of operation of the district (city) military fortress and the provincial (municipal) combat unit. Extraordinary development has occurred with regard to the equipment and weapons of the militia and self-defense forces. The fighting methods of combat villages, streets, enterprises and worksites, of combat groups and district (city) military fortresses have begun to be researched and defined and have, in a number of localities, gradually been tested through the realities of the fight against the Chinese army's aggression, provocation and encroachment along the border. The local military command agencies and cadres have been further strengthened in accordance with the new requirements in order to command militia and self-defense forces; in general, they have undergone many changes and their quality has been improved. As a result, the strategic role of the militia and self-defense forces has been developed; in many localities, the militia and self-defense forces have recorded significant achievements in being the masters of basic units, the masters of the locality and combating the enemy's sabotage, provocation, attacks and encroachment; they have helped to suppress counter-revolutionaries and maintain order and security while participating in production in coordination with routinely maintaining combat readiness.

In establishing the proper relationship between the development of forces and the strengthening and improvement of forces as well as in strengthening and improving the form of organization of the militia and self-defense units in the border area and the rear area, in agricultural and industrial economic areas, at production units, agencies and so forth, efforts have been made to comply with the combat requirements and task of being the masters of basic units, the masters of the locality and with established combat plans in a manner consistent with actual capabilities. While performing this work, importance must be attached to guarding against such tendencies as building forces that are too large compared to actual capabilities or limiting the size of militia and self-defense forces below capabilities in order to improve their quality as a result of which militia and self-defense forces do not have the troops needed to perform the various aspects of work required to be the masters of the locality. Some localities have advocated organizing militia and self-defense forces on the scale of teams, squads and platoons as was done formerly. Other localities want to increase the scale of organization of militia and self-defense forces to much larger units, such as regiments, divisions and so forth. This situation is the result of not fully understanding the principle that the purpose of the buildup of forces is to fulfill combat tasks and the result of placing heavy emphasis upon form and simply complying with management requirements instead of relying upon a specific combat plan. Thus, when combat occurs, the organization will break down and lose its fighting strength.

When building and improving the quality of the militia and self-defense forces, it is also necessary to constantly be vigilant against and defeat the schemes and acts of sabotage of the Chinese reactionaries against militia and self-defense forces. They are vainly looking for every way to render this strategic force of our people "ineffective." By means of taking educational measures and organizing practical activities, we must constantly improve the quality of the militia and self-defense forces so that they are truly a combat force protecting the basic level, protecting the locality and must guard against and overcome formalism, that is, only having many forces and a large organization while conducting few activities, which are less than effective.

2. Building Militia and Self-Defense Forces That Are Fully Capable of Coordinating and Cooperating in Combat with Main Force Troops

Combat coordination and cooperation between the militia-self-defense forces and the main force troops are one of the basic principles in the military art of the people's war in our country. To implement this principle under the conditions of a people's war to defend the fatherland, we must meet many new, specific requirements when improving the quality of the militia and self-defense forces.

In order to achieve close, dependable and strong coordination and cooperation in combat, every force must develop upon its own strengths. The first requirement of the militia and self-defense forces is that they possess the strength needed to join the local troops in creating an effective and strong battle position of the people's war in the localities, from the villages, streets and enterprises to the districts, provinces and municipalities and on the frontline as well as the rear line. Fighting the enemy in an effective, timely and widespread manner is the strongpoint of the militia and self-defense forces. By developing upon this strength, the militia and self-defense forces will make a decisive contribution and will, along with the local troops, create the strong battle position of the people's war in the localities. In the people's war to defend the fatherland, our militia and self-defense forces have been built and developed and become increasingly strong in the process of strengthening the national defense system. The defense organization on the local level has become increasingly capable of creating the widespread and strong battle position of the people's war. This was proven in the realities of the fight against the Chinese aggressor army in February, 1979. However, the realities of this fight also showed that this widespread battle position must be further improved in order to defeat large-scale aggression by the enemy and, along with the other forces, firmly protect the locality. If we stop at widespread combat operations involving very small and decentralized combat forces, it will be impossible to meet the requirements of the local people's war, impossible to closely coordinate and cooperate with main force troops in the people's war to defend the fatherland.

In the people's war to defend the fatherland, the combat coordination and cooperation between the militia-self-defense forces and local and main force troops were large scale from the very outset and involved the use of much modern equipment and weaponry. This new characteristic demands that the combat quality of the militia and self-defense forces be further raised in all areas: technology

and tactics; command organization; discipline in combat; style of fighting and so forth. Facts have shown that it is necessary to have a correct concept of and see the new aspects that exist in the areas mentioned above in order to be able to define the art of fighting of the militia and self-defense forces when they are coordinating in combat with main force troops. Two incorrect phenomena must be avoided: first, being conservative, not realizing the new demands that exist and maintaining that the combat activities of the militia and self-defense forces still basically involve small-scale, guerrilla operations in the hamlets and villages, consequently, no major changes will occur regarding technology and tactics, command organization or style of fighting; secondly, simply copying the methods of fighting of main force troops.

The combat experience of the militia and self-defense forces in coordinated combat operations with main force troops has shown that it is necessary to raise the level of combat coordination of the militia and self-defense forces in a balanced manner. It is not enough to merely provide training in technology and tactics. There have been many cases in which the militia and self-defense forces have been unable to coordinate in combat well with main force troops because their command organization has been weak, their sense of organization and discipline has been weak or their style of fighting has not been suitable. Deserving of attention is that the "guerrilla style of fighting" of the liberation war period with its liberalism, the habit of doing as one sees fit, the habit of "attacking easy targets while ignoring difficult ones," the preference for independent fighting in teams, squads and platoons, the hesitancy to fight within large-scale, complicated combat formations, the fear of the discipline involved in complying with orders regarding timing, place and so forth is posing an obstacle to the effort to improve the quality of the militia and self-defense forces in combat coordination with main force troops.

In order to improve the quality of the combat coordination between the militia-self-defense forces and main force troops, the various localities must attach importance to continuing to research and properly resolve a number of problems regarding technology and tactics. Training must be provided in the use of the weapons and pieces of equipment that we have now and will acquire and importance must be attached to providing training in combat coordination and cooperation with units of the modern technical branches and services of the main force troops, such as artillery troops, tank troops, air transport troops, airborne troops, engineers, information troops and so forth. The mobile militia and self-defense units must be trained in fighting within combat villages and groups and within combat formations coordinating with main force troops. We must raise the level of centralized, unified command organization and the level of staff work when coordinating in combat with large-scale, main force troops that have many modern technical branches. It is necessary to forge the sense of organization and discipline and a style suited to centralized combat operations in accordance with established regulations, orders and plans. It is necessary to combat the phenomena of being simplistic, doing as one sees fit, localism and nepotism. In actuality, some heavy artillery units of the militia made very simple and

haphazard preparations for combat: they only adopted plans and prepared themselves for the first few phases of firing without determining how they would fight next or to which position they would move.

Many difficulties and complications are involved in correctly resolving the problems mentioned above. In actuality, this is also the essence of establishing "regular-force and modern" units and strengthening the factors of modern warfare in one component of the art of fighting of the militia and self-defense forces in a manner consistent with the new requirements. These are very new requirements to the organizations of the mass armed forces. We must act boldly, not seek perfection and promptly gain experience in order to determine that which is correct and eliminate that which is incorrect. Through practice, we will surely gain a deeper understanding of and better resolve the problem of improving the quality of combat coordination between the militia-self-defense forces and the main force troops in the war to defend the fatherland.

3. Building Militia and Self-Defense Forces That Can Properly Complete the Task of Maintaining Political Security and Maintaining Social Order and Safety

In the past, at present and in the future, the militia and self-defense forces have been, are and will continue to be the competent tool of the revolutionary government on the basic level. They have the task of working with other forces to suppress counter-revolutionaries and put down acts of armed rebellion in order to maintain political security and social order and safety. The militia and self-defense organization is also a form of organization of combat forces which have the purpose of implementing the right of ownership of the masses in the struggle to protect the revolutionary government, protect the life and labor of the people at basic units, in the localities.

In view of the fact that the Beijing reactionaries are scheming to sabotage, commit aggression against and annex our country, the suppression of counter-revolutionaries, saboteurs, spies and hoodlums involves a long and complicated political and social struggle. In order to truly be the competent tool of the revolutionary government and the people in this struggle, it is first of all necessary to strengthen and improve the political and social quality of the militia and self-defense forces. The militia and self-defense corps absolutely must consist of persons who are politically reliable and trusted by society. To insure that this quality is achieved in such a widespread organization of forces such as the militia and self-defense forces, the experience that we have gained to date shows that it is necessary to implement a host of principles and measures, such as strictly adhering to the principles and regulations governing political standards, relying upon the people to select militia and self-defense forces and using the practical activities of the revolutionary movement in the locality to inspect, purify and strengthen the combat corps of the masses. This work can only be performed well when all of the specialized agencies of the state, production units, political mass agencies and military agencies work together under the leadership and organization of the party organization and local government.

In order to develop the role of the militia and self-defense forces in the maintenance of political security and social order and safety, it is also necessary to regularly deepen their knowledge of the law, raise their consciousness concerning the law and improve their ability to act in accordance with the law. Only when the militia and self-defense forces are well versed in the law can they promptly uncover and accurately deal with violations of the law by anyone within their area of management; only in this way can they themselves act in exact accordance with the law, not ignore violations of the law and not adversely influence the right of ownership of the masses.

Knowing the law and acting in exact accordance with the law are an indispensable weapon in suppressing armed counter-revolutionaries and hoodlums who operate outside the scope of the law.

The effort to maintain political security and social order and safety must be under a unified command in order to establish good coordination and cooperation between militia and self-defense units and the other forces. The militia and self-defense forces themselves must know with whom they will be cooperating, must have a firm grasp of principles and methods and must receive practical training in coordination among the various forces in order to maintain order and security well. This unified command can only be achieved when there is a plan for action and a clear division of responsibility for forces within each locality. At present, at many places, the division of labor regarding militia and self-defense forces has not been defined in detail and the plans for using and developing upon the role of militia and self-defense forces in the maintenance of security and social order are still general and simplistic. Some places still incorrectly maintain that because the quality of the militia and self-defense forces is low, they cannot undertake the work involved in maintaining security and social order; some localities see that there is a shortage of forces for maintaining order and security at a time when they have rather large and strong militia and self-defense forces. Some localities make intense use of their militia and self-defense forces for a certain phase of activity but then do not use them again. It is necessary to overcome these incorrect phenomena.

4. Building Militia and Self-Defense Forces in Order To Develop Their Assault Role in Production Tasks and Coordinate Production with Combat Readiness and Combat

The militia and self-defense forces are a mass armed organization that is closely linked to the production installations and administrative and professional agencies in the various sectors of the state on the central and local levels. Every militia and self-defense cadre and member is part of a labor or management organization of an enterprise, agency or locality. The completion of production tasks is not only related to the state plan, but also to the life of each family and each person within the militia and self-defense organization. This is also a very important matter in being the masters of the basic unit, of the locality,

of the entire country. The militia and self-defense forces are able-bodied forces; the majority of them are the main forces in production units; they are organized forces that are trained and commanded in the military style. As a result, the militia and self-defense forces possess major capabilities as regards protecting production and are, at the same time, capable of playing the assault role in production tasks. The local leadership and governmental levels as well as the local military command levels must give full attention to developing the role of the militia and self-defense forces in both of these fields. Facts have shown that every locality, every enterprise that completes its production task well also has good conditions for building strong militia and self-defense forces. Conversely, at those places where the militia and self-defense organization is strong, good conditions exist for accelerating production.

The regular activities of the militia and self-defense forces, such as training activities, patrols and combat watch and the regular activities of production must be closely coordinated.

Therefore, plans must be formulated for coordinating the acceleration of production with the acceleration of the buildup of militia and self-defense forces and coordinating production activities with the routine activities of the militia and self-defense forces. These plans must be consistent with the requirements of the production task and the task of protecting production at the basic unit and in the locality and take the form of regulations and official duties of the various command levels and of militia and self-defense units, which must be trained so that they are able to skillfully implement these regulations and perform these duties.

To implement the assault role in production and coordinate production with combat readiness and the training of militia and self-defense forces, importance must be attached to properly coordinating major campaigns and the construction of major projects, such as water conservancy and communication projects, with regular activities.

With agricultural cooperatives, handicraft cooperatives and enterprises implementing the policies on product contracts and piecework wages, more and more new factors are emerging in production. The mobilization of labor in concerted campaigns is not as easy as it was before. For this reason, attention must be given to developing the role of the militia and self-defense forces in their regular activities while not giving light attention to mobilizing large-scale, centralized forces when necessary; however, these forces must be thoroughly educated and tightly organized to be consistent with the characteristics of the new situation.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

TRUONG SON CORPS COMBINES ECONOMIC, MILITARY WORK

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 2, Feb 82 pp 32-40

[Article by Senior Colonel Phan Quang Tiep: "The Truong Son Military Corps and the Task of Coordinating Economic Construction with National Defense"]

[Text] As it entered the new stage of the revolution, the Truong Son Military Corps, which originally consisted of road construction units that provided strategic communications during the war of resistance against the United States for national salvation, was assigned by its superiors the task of directly participating in the capital construction of the system of strategic bridges and roads supporting the economy and the national defense system; at the same time, when war breaks out, the military corps has the task of providing strategic communications, fighting the enemy and being ready to perform a number of other military tasks.

The above mentioned task of the military corps is not carried out as normal tasks are within a fixed area of operation, rather, the unit is always moving to many different areas of the fatherland and even friendly countries in order to implement the economic cooperation and militant alliance among the three countries of Indochina. The above mentioned task not only points out the broad scope of operation of the military corps, but also defines the characteristics of its operations. These characteristics are economic in nature and military in nature and also reflect the close coordination of these two natures in every job. They also define the position, functions and tasks of the military corps in two situations: when we are not at war, the military corps is a force that constructs strategic roads and bridges and other economic and national defense projects; when war breaks out, the military corps is both a key force that provides strategic communications and joins with the local armed forces to form the combat force that serves as the nucleus in the fight against the enemy within the locality, fights to protect its area of operation and participates in the maintenance of political security and social order and is a mobile force supporting combat. At the same time, the military corps is a force that performs an international task by helping friends build roads and bridges, develop their economies and strengthen their national defense systems.

In the advance from units that operated under the war time supply mode to a military corps operating on the basis of cost accounting and socialist business procedures, the Truong Son Military Corps has encountered very many new problems. The newest and also the most difficult problem has been how to complete their main task very well, that is, the task of building strategic roads and bridges coordinating the economy with the national defense system in accordance with planning and plans and implement cost accounting with increasingly high economic returns while performing a routine task of no less importance and urgency, namely, raising its fighting strength, always maintaining combat readiness and being able to support combat and fight victoriously.

In order to perform the tasks mentioned above, the party committee and headquarters of the military corps set forth the following guidelines for the entire corps: thoroughly understanding the general line, the economic line and military line of the party and the policy of the Political Bureau concerning utilizing the army in economic work in the new situation; being determined to successfully carry out both the economic and the military task in the new situation, both when the country is not at war and when it is at war; building the military corps along regular force, modern lines in a manner consistent with the overall development of the army, with the requirements of the economic construction and combat readiness tasks of the military corps; building the construction forces and the agencies and installations of the military corps so that all of them have a strong, efficient, balanced and well coordinated organization and have the ability to complete their production, work and combat readiness tasks well and building them on the basis of a tightly structured operational mechanism and an industrial style and along the lines of regular force operations and large-scale socialist production; strengthening the corps of command cadres, economic management cadres, supply cadres and production equipment management cadres as well as the corps of persons engaged in scientific, technical, specialized and professional work in accordance with the requirements of assigned tasks; researching and applying economic policies in order to stimulate higher productivity and expressing appropriate concern for the material, spiritual and cultural lives of laborers in a manner consistent with the nature and characteristics of the military corps.

The realities of the past several years have proven that the above mentioned guidelines are accurate. These guidelines are designed to rapidly make the military corps an army unit specializing in economic work that is strong in every respect, that completes its task of building strategic roads and bridges to coordinate the economy with the national defense system in a manner that reflects an increasingly high level of technology, increasingly high productivity, increasingly high quality and increasingly high economic returns and that struggles to perform its combat readiness, combat support and combat tasks.

In accordance with these guidelines and in order to turn these guidelines and the policy of the Political Bureau into actions taken to complete assigned tasks, the military corps has attached importance to resolving the following major problems:

1. Thoroughly Understanding the Line and Position of the Party and the Tasks of the Military Corps and Defining in Detail Both the Economic and the Military Tasks of the Unit

Immediately after the dissemination of the directive of the Political Bureau concerning the utilization of the army in economic work and throughout the process of the corps' operations over the past several years, the corps has always attached importance to insuring that its cadres, soldiers and national defense workers and personnel accept the policy in a voluntary manner and on an increasingly firm basis. This policy is not only based on the general line, the economic line and the military line of the party in the period of building socialism and defending the socialist fatherland, but was also necessitated by the urgent demands of the situation surrounding production, the economy, society and the lives of the people at this time.

The purpose of the army's participation in productive labor in order to help create local sources of supplies and participate in economic construction in accordance with the plan of the state is also an extremely important task, one that reflects the fine nature and tradition of the people's armed forces. Successfully carrying out the task of participating in economic construction is a revolutionary action that reflects a thorough understanding of and strict compliance with the party's line on coordinating the building of the country with defending the fatherland, coordinating the economy with the national defense system. It is also an action of tremendous practical significance on the part of our army in practicing thorough economy with each national defense expenditure, which is an important requirement, a national policy of our party and state at this time. It insures that we can maintain the large troop strength necessitated by the objective requirements of the defense of the nation and reduces the difficulties encountered by the economy and encountered in the daily lives of the people. Through the excellent completion of productive labor plans and norms to improve its own life and participate in economic construction in accordance with state plans, not only will our army, our people's armed forces, make positive and direct contributions to resolving the difficulties and shortages being faced now, but they will also make an important contribution to strongly stimulating the development of the construction of the new economy over the long range in our country.

As a result of thoroughly understanding the policy of the Political Bureau, the cadres and soldiers of the military corps have become increasingly determined to successfully implement each production plan and norm assigned to them and have completed these plans and norms better with each passing year.

The military corps has always attached importance to making increasingly thorough use of its existing assets and the assets it will acquire in both its economic and military tasks. The military corps has very basic strengths in the areas of morale-ideology, the strength of its military organization, its road construction skill, experience and tradition, the new experience and knowledge

gained over the past several years, the stable sources of investment capital of the state, a form of organization that has been gradually built, its existing equipment and the increasingly large number of machines with which it is being equipped. The military corps can organize production in exact accordance with capital construction regulations, complete construction projects at the stipulated rate, practice full-scale cost accounting, use revenues to cover costs, reduce national defense costs and eventually earn a profit, thereby contributing to the accumulation of capital by the state.

With its existing capabilities and the improved capabilities it will acquire in the process of performing its task, the military corps can accept and properly construct ordinary projects and, at the same time, also has the ability to accept projects involving the construction of permanent roads and bridges involving a higher degree of technology in different areas and terrains. Whether it is tasked with building economic projects coordinated with national defense or national defense projects coordinated with the economy in remote, dangerous mountainous forests or in the lowlands, along the seacoast, in the rear or on the frontlines, whether it is involved in a long-range project or building a project in a short period of time, whether it is working under contract or letting part or all of its work out on contract, the military corps can, if it makes a great effort, carry out assigned plan tasks correctly and well.

As regards its combat readiness and combat capabilities, although they are limited, the military corps can, if war breaks out, improve itself to the point where it can complete communications support tasks to meet the requirements of mobile forces and join with the local armed forces to victoriously fight the enemy within the locality.

As a result of many efforts made to gain a thorough understanding of the general line, the economic line and the military line of the party and the party's policy concerning the use of the army in economic work, as a result of a continuous effort to bring about a new and increasingly profound change in every area and as a result of the close leadership and guidance of the party and state, the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee and the Ministry of National Defense as well as the cooperation and assistance of the various agencies, sectors, localities and units of the people's armed forces, the military corps has completed both its economic task and its military task with increasingly high quality.

Over the past 3 years and more, the military corps has fulfilled its annual tasks, plans and norms concerning the construction of strategic bridges and roads, thereby making a certain contribution to the development of the economy and culture, the construction of the country and the effort to support the requirements of military force mobility in a number of important strategic areas. It completed many bridge and road projects within the country and helped friends build thousands of kilometers of roads and bridges and a number of other economic and national defense projects. It has contributed to the state millions of dong and achieved a much larger rate of capital accumulation with each passing year.

As regards its military task, the military corps has endeavored to meet the requirements of combat readiness, combat support and combat in exact accordance with the orders of the Ministry of National Defense. At the same time, it has gradually put every military activity on an increasingly progressive basis and brought about marked changes in many areas.

Closely linked to the achievements mentioned above are the achievements recorded in party building and the building of a military corps that has increasingly matured and made progress in many areas.

However, the achievements that the military corps has recorded are still low compared to requirements, to the effort expended and is now still displaying many shortcomings and weaknesses, especially in its task of economic construction. The shortcomings of the military corps are partially due to the lack of a relatively stable task and production area, to the lack of a well coordinated organization and mode of operation, to the lack of a stable, regular, full and timely supply of the material factors, labor and capital necessary for construction and to leadership and guidance lacking in planning, lacking in centralism, unity and consistency on the part of the upper level. However, besides these objective causes, the military corps has also frequently pointed out its own subjective shortcomings, especially with regard to organizing the buildup of production forces, the economic management guidance apparatus, the production management apparatus and the mode of management based on cost accounting and socialist business, which has not undergone truly strong change.

2. Satisfactorily Resolving the Problems Regarding Organizational Work with a View Toward Insuring that Construction Forces and the Command and Management Apparata Develop in a Suitable Manner in Terms of Their Staff Organization, Function and Tasks as Well as Their Mode of Command and Management

Ever since the military corps was established, together with the changes in direction of the organizational and cadres tasks and work of the military corps, very important initial changes have occurred and several results have been recorded.

The military corps has been and is actively investing labor in the construction of a military corps that is strong and solid in every respect. Regardless of how great the difficulties we face might be, we must endeavor to successfully meet the requirement of improving the quality of the forces, agencies and units throughout the corps in a comprehensive manner with a view toward rapidly bringing about a strong change in quality and laying the groundwork for improving the quality of construction work, communications support, combat support and combat. We must build the construction forces of the corps so that they have a strong, efficient, balanced and well coordinated organization, possess high production capacity, possess a system of rapid and accurate economic information and possess strong basic production units and skilled professional guidance agencies in order to promptly meet the new demands of production and combat readiness.

The building of the organization of the military corps cannot be carried out in a mechanical manner based on the style of organization of a purely production-business unit, rather, the military form of organization must be the basis of the military corps and this must be supplemented with necessary economic management, specialized, technical, professional and other organizations. This is a correct and reasonable guideline for insuring that the military corps has adequate forces for its various tasks, for survey, design, technical, supply, material support, financial and rear service work. Only in this way is it possible to create the structure of a strong organization and gradually perfect this structure to insure that the military corps is fully capable of delving deeply into cost accounting, excellently completing each construction plan and carrying out every military task well. This is the intertwining of the military form of organization and the economic form of organization, is the permeation of one form within the other, is the supplementation of one form by the other with a view toward building an efficient organization to insure the good performance of each economic construction task in accordance with business procedures, the maintenance of a suitable military organization and the utilization of the strength of this military organization in economic work. This is something very new, concerning which importance must be attached to gaining experience in order to constantly improve the coordination between the military form of organization and the economic form of organization within the organization of the forces of the army specializing in economic construction.

In the process of building the organization of the military corps, full concern must be given to researching and promptly, correctly, accurately and reasonably resolving the new problems being faced in order to stimulate the development of the production task. It is necessary to define the staff organization of the units and agencies in a manner consistent with the two political tasks of the military corps and along the lines of reducing the number of organizational echelons and the number of persons on the intermediate and indirect levels while increasing the number of forces engaged in direct production. The command and management apparatus must be streamlined and their function of organizing implementation must be developed as highly as possible. The direct production units must have the number of troops required by their table of organization and must have the ability to complete every production task with high productivity, good quality and low production costs. The table of organization must consist of a reasonable balance between troops specializing in economic work and regular troops performing military tasks and a reasonable balance among specialized cadres, specialized military personnel, non-commissioned officers, soldiers and national defense workers and personnel. This means that we must be determined, on the basis of the viewpoint of coordinating the economy with the national defense system and practicing frugality, to bring all other inefficient forces and organizations within the scope of profit and loss production.

We must research the special characteristics of construction activities, the scale and nature of the labor at capital construction sites building bridges and roads to coordinate the economy with the national defense system and the combat support task of the military corps in order to define and build an organizational

model for such specialized production units as the units specializing in road construction (both highways and railroads), bridge construction and the construction of hydroelectric power projects so as to insure the completion of each construction task when the nation is not at war and insure stability and minimal organizational disruptions when war breaks out. Construction units should be organized as production lines, primarily on the regimental level, so that they can, when we are not at war, complete an assigned road section, can rapidly be separated from a division formation and rapidly open new roads when a mobile combat task arises and can undertake a task in an important area or along an important road as an independent regiment when a communications support task arises.

It is also necessary to research and apply the form of organization of production-business, bridge and road construction and communications support of the communications-transportation sector of the state to the specific conditions and circumstances of the military corps in order to develop the strength of the army organization performing economic work. This form of organization must include the necessary production management apparatus and must creatively, flexibly and effectively apply the enterprise management statutes of the state in a manner suited to conditions. A number of necessary amendments to the task and functions of the director must be made for the commander in order to increase the management responsibility of the cadres on the various levels. Product contracts must be implemented on an increasingly high level with a view toward constantly raising labor productivity and economic returns in production.

Importance must be attached to closely linking the strengthening of the organization to building tightly structured operational mechanisms; we must know how to utilize the position and role of the mechanical engineering, labor wage, financial, rear service and other sectors within a unified and highly effective system. At the same time, we must clearly define the tasks, duties and relationships of coordination and cooperation among the various components, between the upper levels and the lower levels and vertical sectors and horizontal sectors so that they are truly well coordinated as a system that exists when we are not at war and when war breaks out, a system which insures that each organization and each person fulfills the duties, regulations and orders of the army and the economic laws of the state.

3. On the Basis of the Established Table of Organization, It Is Necessary To Supplement, Assign and Train Cadres, Including the Cadres Who Command and Manage the Various Levels and Technical, Specialized and Professional Personnel from the Division to the Company Levels

The general requirements regarding cadre work are to provide command cadres, management cadres, technical cadres and specialized sector cadres for the specialized construction forces and to take the initiative in creating sources of reserve cadres with a view toward insuring the continuity and succession of the corps of cadres. In order to do this effectively, the military corps has begun to standardize the corps of cadres and formulated planning for building and

training the corps of cadres in a manner consistent with the requirements of the development of its construction task over the long range.

It is necessary to insure that command cadres, management cadres, technical cadres and specialized and professional cadres have a full understanding of their economic management, production organization and production management functions and are, at the same time, capable of fulfilling their task of commanding combat and combat support operations. The command and management cadres on every level must possess the knowledge of economic management, the specialized technical skills and the understanding of military affairs required by their assigned duties, possess firm political-ideological qualifications and possess an industrial style and a regular force style.

The pressing problem facing us at this time regarding the cadre work of the military corps is the need to research and establish a model for the elementary and advanced training of the corps of economic cadres, one that is suited to immediate tasks and meets the demands of the development of the economic and military tasks over the long range. This demands that we take very much initiative, be very active and adopt many effective measures. By means of coordinating study and training on the job with classroom study and training we can rapidly raise the qualifications of the existing corps of cadres and, at the same time, quickly create strong sources of reserve cadres and successors. On the one hand, we must rely upon the schools of the state and the army to build the corps of cadres; on the other hand, the military corps must also have enough schools and classes to train a certain number of cadres along comprehensive and highly specialized lines.

Together with building the corps of cadres, the military corps has been and will continue to further intensify the building of the corps of technical personnel in an appropriate, balanced and well coordinated manner, such as the corps of drivers and skilled mechanics, in order to effectively utilize every material and technical base of the military corps.

In conjunction with improving the ability to perform economic work, it is necessary to conduct good military training, forge discipline, establish regular force procedures and insure compliance with the laws, regulations and rules of the army, the regulations and rules of the state governing economic work and construction regulations and codes with a view toward overcoming our weaknesses regarding vigilance and combat readiness, reducing disciplinary violations to the lowest possible level and putting an end to serious phenomena.

4. Attaching Importance to Mobilizing, Cultivating and Utilizing the Abilities and Creativity of All Cadres and Soldiers.

The military corps is always concerned with launching voluntary movements of the masses to eagerly engage in productive labor on the basis of thoroughly understanding the thinking of the Party Central Committee regarding the present economic construction task, namely, "carrying out production better and producing more material wealth with the same amount or less equipment and supplies from the state."

In order to cultivate and tap the abilities and the creativities of the masses, it is necessary to resolve numerous problems regarding leadership, command and the organization of implementation. Regarding this matter, there are two things with which the military corps is especially concerned: molding spirit and thinking in order to turn every activity involved in economic construction into an intense revolutionary action movement among the masses and taking the initiative in creating the material conditions for cadres and soldiers to display their skills and creativity as highly as possible.

The military corps has made an effort to properly carry out the campaign to "display the fine nature and increase the fighting strength" of the people's armed forces and accelerate the emulation movement throughout its agencies and production units. This major campaign is being used to create a new quality for the revolutionary action movement of the masses, discover, mold, train and develop upon positive factors and advanced model units and, at the same time, effectively struggle against negative, backward phenomena and endeavor to complete each task with high productivity, good quality and large economic returns.

The military corps has concretized the norms concerning the emulation to achieve the five objectives of the major campaign in a manner consistent with the functions, tasks and actual situation of each agency and basic production unit. It has established clear targets and specific deadlines for central jobs, key projects, the correction of weaknesses and so forth, thereby laying the basis for creating an intense, uniform and stable revolutionary atmosphere. The center of the campaign is to successfully meet the requirement of making very good use of the labor of cadres and soldiers and very good use of the equipment, supplies and capital assigned by the state and the Ministry of National Defense in order to display self-reliance, overcome every difficulty, practice thorough economy and endeavor to raise labor productivity, improve product quality, reduce production costs and achieve economic returns commensurate with the manpower and money invested.

At the same time, we must accelerate the movement of the masses to make innovations, make technological improvements and rationalize production and work. From the basic production units to the various staffs, from soldiers and national defense workers and personnel to commanders and managers on the various levels, everyone must make an effort to make innovations and contribute to the overall movement of the military corps. We must heighten the sense of ownership and improve the ability to exercise ownership on the part of each person in the management, maintenance, protection and use of equipment, supplies and weapons. We must organize and guide the activities of the Science-Technology Council of the military corps. We must strictly comply with the policies regarding praise and awards and must promptly praise and commend innovations. We must reorganize scientific-technical information activities and promptly disseminate the innovations and scientific-technical advances that can be introduced in the production and other activities of the military corps. We must improve organizational and cadre work so that scientific and technical cadres are assigned jobs in a more reasonable manner and have the means needed to display their talents

and truly become a direct production force, thereby helping to strengthen the movement to make innovations and inventions. We must implement a more dynamic, flexible and effective style of management so that many new factors emerge in the various areas of production and new persons representing the creativity of the masses appear.

We must properly organize material-technical, fuel and raw material support by means of rapidly and systematically taking delivery of all of the supplies provided by the state and the locality. At the same time, we must research the full use of every existing capability and source of materials to insure that units excellently complete their main tasks in exact accordance with the plans and norms assigned to them. We must provide good rear service support, supply goods in exact accordance with standards and troop messing ration quotas, supply consumer goods for troops and, in particular, meet the health and food needs of units operating in remote mountainous jungles which are encountering many difficulties and shortages. We must promptly and correctly implement the new economic policies of the party and state regarding all persons eligible for them. Together with mobilizing the creativity of the masses, we must strictly comply with policies, provide appropriate material incentive and support and maintain the standard of living of troops.

We must practice thorough economy in every production activity as well as in every military activity, considering this to be a standard for evaluating the production results of the unit.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

RIVER CROSSINGS IN MODERN WARFARE DISCUSSED

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[Article by Major General Tran Ba Dang: "River Crossings and Ensuring River Crossings in Modern Warfare"]

[Text]

I

In past wars, in order to maintain and increase the troops' rate of advance it was ordinarily necessary to resolve many problems: the tactical and technical training necessary for combat and mobility; equipping the troops with mechanized facilities and combat engineer equipment; preparing a system of roads and bridges; organizing the overcoming of river and water obstacles, etc. Rarely was there a battlefield on which the troops carrying out offensive campaigns did not have to cross any rivers or streams. In countries with many rivers and streams, the organization of river crossings for troops require even more ability on the part of the command echelons.

Today, the strong development of science and technology and military technology, along with the level of modern and very modern equipment of armies in many countries, have caused modern warfare to develop along the lines of increasing expansion with regard to space and contraction with regard to time. Therefore, ensuring mobility and river crossings has become even more important in increasing the mobility and assault force of the troops, and has created the necessary conditions to ensure that the units can concentrate, disperse, reorganize, change direction, and deploy forces rapidly, promptly, and safely, and attain the element of surprise, in order to do a good job of carrying out tactical and campaign decisions and plans in modern warfare.

In the major campaigns and attacks carried out by the Soviet Red Army in 1944 to annihilate the fascist German troops and liberate areas that been occupied by the enemy it was necessary to cross river and water obstacles. In the offensive campaign in the Ukraine in February and March 1944 the advancing troops crossed the Bug, Dniester, and Prut rivers under the conditions of the enemy having heavily damaged the bridges and roads as they retreated. In addition to the all-out efforts made by the infantry and mechanized troops, the combat engineers, with their modern equipment and technical skills, ensured that the combat arms, especially heavy vehicles and artillery, would not miss the opportunity to annihilate the enemy. When it liberated Petsamo, in the northern part of the Soviet Union, in October 1944 the Red Army had to overcome many difficulties and pass over muddy fields. The troops had to wade through freezing water and advance under very arduous conditions, pulling behind them weapons and facilities. The amphibious

vehicles often became bogged down in the thick mud, etc. In many instances rivers were crossed by means of force en marche, under the support of the air force, artillery, and smokescreens.

Also because of the role of river crossings in modern warfare, many people in military circles have posed the question, "Are river crossings the key to victory on the modern battlefield?" Today, in the modern armies there has appeared not only the widespread capability to cross rivers by force en marche, but also the capability to use paratroops and airborne troops in river crossings, especially to take bridges or river-crossing positions in the enemy troops' line of retreat. The extensive use of helicopters to transport pontoon bridges and other bridge-building equipment to the river-crossing positions has received attention. Efforts are also being made to ensure that after river and water barriers have been overcome it will not be necessary to stop or to consolidate the bridgehead in order to continue to develop and accelerate the attack.

With regard to viewpoints, although river-crossing equipment and capabilities differ from country to country, the common tendency is to seek all ways to use increasingly larger quantities of modern, prefabricated facilities to cross river and water barriers. Such facilities include snorkel-equipped amphibious tanks and armored vehicles, tanks with water ejection systems or equipped to allow them to traverse river bottoms, and armored personnel carriers capable of propelling themselves by turning their treads in the water. They include amphibious tractors, ferries which pull themselves across rivers via cables, mobile assault bridges transported and laid down by tank or trucks, collapsible pontoon bridges assembled by combat engineers, etc. The U.S., West Germany, and England are jointly developing a "bridge and river-crossing facilities for the 1980's" project to create a universal, unified river-crossing system for the armies of the NATO countries. The principal focus of the status is to attain the maximum mobility, reduce the assembly period, reduce the number of operational personnel.

In Vietnam, the road network is not well developed and the density of rivers and streams is great. On the average, for every 10 kilometers a north-south road must cross two rivers, one about 200 meters wide and another about 50 meters wide. Nearly all of the rivers flow from west to east and are clearly affected by terrain and weather. But in the mountain region streams are usually small and narrow and there are many hard rocks. In the midlands region the waterflow rate, depth, and width of rivers change according to the season. The rivers in the lowlands and near the coast are usually broad (one is more than 1,000 meters broad in the rainy season) and are influenced by tides. Their banks are usually sandy and are often marshy. Especially in the mountain region and the midlands region there are often rock cliffs bordering the rivers and the current is swift. In general, rivers and streams in our country reach high levels during the rainy season and fall to low levels during the dry season, and are contained by a system of dikes. Ensuring mobility and river crossings has, of course, become a major content of military art and of the responsibility of command echelons. It is also of principal content of our combat engineers' function, mission, and tradition of "victoriously opening roads."

In two resistance wars against the French colonialists and the U.S. imperialist aggressors, ensuring mobility and river crossings demanded increasingly greater organizational ability on the part of commanders at the various levels. Each developmental step with regard to the army's military missions, organization, and equipment, and the military art and combined arms operational scale of the people's armed forces was a step which required progress in ensuring mobility and river crossings in order to keep abreast of the new requirements. Those requirements belong not only to the tactical sphere but also to the campaign and strategic spheres. It is manifested in the increasingly larger scale of river-crossing forces and the increasingly larger number of combat arms that must be moved across rivers to participate in the fighting, and also in the spacial sphere of the battlefield, in which the river-crossings are increasingly large and the river-crossing time is increasingly limited, and it is often necessary to carry them out under fire or in areas contaminated by enemy chemicals, etc.

The organization of river crossings by boats and rafts, by means of which tens of thousands of people and hundreds of tons of cargo were moved across rivers, during the Hoa Binh campaign (1951-1952); the crossings of the Thao and Da rivers by boats, barges, and pontoon bridges, involving tens of thousands of people, during the Tay Bac campaign (1952); building pontoon bridges across the Van Yen, Ta Bo, and Ta Khoa Hien rivers during the Dien Bien Phu campaign, etc., are recorded in the modern military history of our nation as famous river crossings during the anti-French resistance war (1945-1954).

During the anti-U.S. resistance for national salvation, there were also many instances of advancing troops having to cross river and water barriers. Outstanding features of the organization of river crossings during that war were that the troops crossing rivers included not only infantry but also heavy mechanized artillery, tanks, and missiles, and the river-crossing facilities included on-the-spot means such as boats and rafts but also prefabricated equipment, the various kinds of mobile ferries and pontoon bridges capable of transporting heavy technical equipment across rivers, etc. In most cases river crossings were carried out under conditions of making advance preparations and ensuring the factors of secrecy and surprise in the attacks. In the historic Ho Chi Minh campaign in April 1975, en route to taking the final bastion of the U.S. and its puppets our columns carried out river crossings under differing conditions: some were prepared in advance while others were carried out urgently, sometimes under enemy fire. Many units had to cross large flooded fields. Recently, in the war to defend the homeland against the Chinese expansionist aggressors in the northern and southwestern parts of our country our troops also organized many medium-scale and large-scale river crossings on the lines of advance, etc.

The actual events in those battles confirmed the increasingly important role of the ensuring of mobility and river crossings in our army's offensive operations and modern coordinated combat arms operations. Victory in ensuring mobility and river crossings is an element which contributes directly and decisively to increasing the troops' rate of advance and assault force in modern offensive operations.

II

Our offensive campaigns in war to defend the homeland will above all be campaigns carried out with very resolute objectives and with the participation of increasingly large forces and many modern combat arms and armed forces branches which carry out combined arms operations in large areas at a very urgent pace. Those campaigns may occur in places advantageous to us and in places not advantageous to us. Therefore, ensuring mobility and river crossings for the advancing units under the conditions of modern warfare has become a basic content of our army's the art of organizing and carrying out campaigns, especially offensive campaigns. On the basis of the new requirements of increasing the assault force and the mobility and speed of advancing troops under the modern conditions of war to defend the homeland, and on the basis of the development of our army's table of organization and equipment, as well as the operational capabilities of the combat arms and armed forces branches, with the military knowledge and experience that have been accumulated, we realize that the effective organization of offensive river crossings under modern conditions depends on the following matters:

1. The drafting good plans to organize river crossings.

Each unit and group of units advancing in a direction with river water barriers must have plans to ensure mobility and river-crossing plans. River-crossing plans are part of unified plans to ensure mobility, and are indispensable parts of offensive operational plans under modern conditions.

River-crossing plans must be accurate, specific, and meticulous, especially in the phase of reconnaissance, studying the terrain, determining the river-crossing localities and ferry landings and the works that must be built at the river-crossing localities. They must estimate the river-crossing forces, mode, and time, organize active and reserve specialized forces to ensure river crossings, etc. In the phase of selecting preparatory areas for troops, facilities, and equipment before crossing a river; the approach route to the river crossing; the use of river-crossing materials, equipment, and facilities; the troop assembly areas; the organization of command and coordination among the units, etc., it is necessary to be extremely meticulous and detailed in order to ensure that the river crossing will be rapid, efficient, and safe. Each plan must include not only official parameters for the circumstances that can be foreseen but also contingency parameters for unforeseen circumstances, etc. Thus river-crossing plans include tasks that must be begun in peacetime, carried out completely, and done in such a way as to be useful in the long range. There are also tasks which are carried out only just before or during the fighting, carried out only in part, and carried out on a temporary basis for only a brief period of time. It is also necessary to combine real installations with decoy installations, camouflage, and feints in order to maintain the elements of secrecy and surprise. During peacetime we can, on the basis of the combat missions and plans, carry out in a planned manner the repair and upgrading of existing roads, the building of new roads, the improvement of old ferry landings, and the building of new ferry lands in the various parts of the war theater, in order to enable the network of roads and bridges to both effectively serve economic construction and development and meet the requirements of the military missions and the offensive operation art. It is necessary to grasp and prepare both the river-crossing forces and facilities of the army and the river-

crossing forces and facilities of the economic and communications-transportation sectors in the localities and at the central level, in accordance with unified guidance at each defensive echelon, in order to ensure that the troops in the offensive campaign have the necessary conditions for rapidly and promptly overcoming river and water barriers and increase the assault force and rate of advance. On the basis of the specific circumstances, it is also necessary to prepare river mobility plans. In addition to the above-mentioned tasks, it is also necessary to carry out terrain reconnaissance and the reconnaissance of rivers and streams in a detailed, comprehensive manner. Lack of full, detailed, and accurate knowledge of the terrain, weather, rivers, crossing points, etc. often leads to errors in drafting plans, in preparing and using forces, equipment, and facilities, and in selecting river-crossing organizational methods and forms. Therefore, grasping documentary materials and data regarding terrain, weather, climate, and rivers and streams in the various parts of the war theater must be carried out very strictly. Actual experience shows that in some cases river crossings are not efficient, timely, or successful not because of a lack of facilities and technical equipment but essentially because of carelessness and superficiality in studying and reconnoitering the battlefield. Therefore, if we know how to fully utilize our present conditions of space and time we are entirely capable of drafting good plans to organize and ensure river crossings in offensive campaigns.

However, the effectiveness of river-crossing plans may be consolidated and improved only by practice. By means of practice it is possible to discover and immediately correct irrational elements, point out and rectify the weaknesses regarding river crossings of the units of the combat arms and armed forces branches, and correctly evaluate capabilities and give additional training to combat engineers regarding the necessary subjects in order to ensure river crossings and evaluate the ability of commanders of combined units to organize river crossings.

2. Carrying out a division of labor and decentralization in order to organize river crossings.

Rational and stable division of labor and decentralization among the combat arms, armed forces branches and units not only affect the use of river-crossing forces, facilities, and forms but also ensure that the river crossings are orderly, safe, rapid, and effective. There are permanent, long-range division of labor and decentralization, and division of labor and decentralization during certain periods of time, in each direction of the campaign, and on each battlefield. Division of labor and decentralization encompass both space and time in the organization of river crossings. In all instances, division of labor and decentralization must be based on the requirements of the campaign missions and the capabilities and specific conditions of the combat arms, armed forces branches, units, and battlefields.

Division of labor and decentralization must have the result of determining for each combat arm and armed forces branch with combat engineer forces in their table of organization which rivers they are responsible for crossing, which forces and facilities they must use to cross what types of rivers, and under what conditions and in what cases it is possible to be reinforced by other combat arms, other forces, or upper-echelon forces. By means of division of labor and decentralization it is also possible to indicate the level and form of the units at the tactical and combat levels which can assume responsibility for river crossings in their areas of operation and the conditions that can be ensured by the upper echelon.

On the basis of the division of labor and decentralization, each combat arm, armed forces branch, force, and unit must draft river-crossing plans, prepare river-crossing forces and facilities, determine the scale, select the form, and apply river-crossing tactics and techniques.

The actualities of combat have demonstrated that in order to improve mobility capabilities and the rate of advance, promptly carry out large-scale surrounding and enveloping attacks, take advantage of the opportunity to annihilate the enemy, coordinate the offensive operations with the other operational operations on each battlefield, the best method is for an echelon to organize the river crossings at its echelon, with the upper echelon providing aid only when truly necessary. For example, the infantry division level must and can send infantry carrying light weapons across narrow rivers, principally by means of field expedient facilities, to take objectives and promptly develop the attack. The upper echelon may assume responsibility for moving the division's artillery across rivers. The corps and military region echelons, with the river-crossing combat engineers in their table of organization and upper-echelon reinforcements (if any), may organize river crossings for their echelon, including forces equipped with heavy facilities, equipment, and weapons. Specialized river-crossing units of the combat engineer command are used as mobile forces in the main directions to ensure river crossings for advancing units and reserve units at the campaign and strategic echelons. Depending on the conditions of the missions and terrain, the various echelons and areas may also be capable of mobility on rivers.

To achieve explicit division of labor and decentralization is also to standardize the river-crossing facilities and equipment of each echelon. Therefore, each echelon may take the initiative in planning their use, stockpiling, and repair, and request supplementation in the course of the campaign. That will help the units make good, effective use of the equipment and avoid arbitrariness and the improper use of technical equipment. The distribution and deployment of forces and the supplying of technical materiel for each echelon, combat arm, and armed forces branch in the campaign, and for each unit, will therefore be more rational.

Good division of labor and decentralization will also allow the stabilization of river-crossing support forces in each area and contribute to creating a common battlefield position of people's war to defend the homeland at the defensive echelons and in the strategic and campaign areas of operation. Therefore, each unit may take all-round responsibility and take the initiative in reconnoitering rivers, streams, and roads, in preparing materials, etc., in order to organize effective river crossings during campaigns.

3. Good river-crossing training for troops of the combat arms.

River-crossing training is intended to contribute to improving the units' all-round fighting strength. It is not only appropriate to the requirements of combat coordination among the combat arms and armed forces branches in modern warfare, but also helps the units, whether or not they are assisted by combat engineer troops, be capable of organizing their own river crossings in the course of campaigns and battles.

The mobility, speed, and assault force of advancing troops in war to defend the homeland under modern conditions, demand that the units, especially the commanders and command organs of the corps, be trained in such river-crossing modes as crossing rivers in daytime and at night on many different scales, by means of many different facilities, and in many different kinds of terrain; crossing rivers after preparations have been made and by force en marche; crossing rivers in the course of developing the attack with no time to make preparations; crossing at one point and at many points; crossing rivers under the conditions of the enemy launching air, artillery, and chemical attacks, etc.

Crossing rivers by force en marche is a very complicated combat maneuver. The attacking troops must simultaneously fight and move forces across the river to smash the enemy's resistance or penetrate their defensive line, then continue to pursue the enemy or penetrate deeply to take the designated objectives. In order to win victory in such activities troops must know effective methods for advancing to river and water barriers on a broad front, simultaneously advancing and overcoming those barriers without adversely affecting their rate of advance. If that is to be accomplished, it is not only necessary to be expert in such simple river-crossing operations as swimming, swimming with weapons, and poling bamboo rafts and wooden boats, but also know how to cross rivers by means of such modern facilities as amphibious vehicles, self-propelled ferries, and mobile, portable bridges, as well as airborne landings, etc.

Each combat arm may, on the basis of its organizational characteristics, equipment, weapons, and river-crossing equipment, carry out river crossings in a manner appropriate to their characteristics, nature, and combat missions. Tank troops must be skilled at crossing rivers on submerged bridges and by amphibious equipment. Mechanized infantry and artillery units sent in advance must be skilled at crossing bridges en marche at the bridgeheads. Our troops also have much experience in crossing rivers by means of such primitive facilities as boats, floats, bamboo rafts, and wooden rafts and other on-the-spot floatable materials. It is very necessary that those experiences be brought into play under the new conditions of war to defend the homeland. In order to have good river-crossing capability, a matter of practical importance is that the combat arms and units under training and carry out maneuvers and combined training with the combat engineers in order to ensure river crossings even in peacetime.

When crossing rivers at many different points along a broad front, there are usually separate crossing points for mechanized infantry, for tanks crossing on submerged bridges, and for the various kinds of wheeled vehicles crossing on pontoon bridge. River crossings along a broad front, at the same time and at many different points, are very complicated combat activities. However, only thereby can it be ensured that large forces with many combat arms cross the river in the shortest possible time. At present, in military circles people still mention the case of the units of Marshal Koniev, which crossed the Donets River at 18 different bridgeheads during the Soviet Union's great national defense war. Although seven bridgeheads were wiped out the remaining bridgeheads ensured victory for the Red Army's offensive by forcing the German army to disperse its forces to take up defensive positions at each of the bridgeheads. The success of that river crossing was due not only to the preparatory work and the rational distribution and use of

specialized equipment, facilities, and troops to ensure river crossings but was also dependent to a decisive degree on the ability of the commanders, especially the division, corps, and army commanders, to organize and command river crossing, and on the ability of the troops of the Soviet Army's combat arms to cross rivers.

In crossing rivers, especially broad rivers, when there are many forces and units of the combat arms and armed forces branches, the river crossing regulations, rules, and discipline must be very strictly carried out. The troops of all units must obey the unified direction of the highest-ranking commander at the crossing point. Only thereby can it be ensured that the formation crossing the river does not become piled up and blocked, and that the river is crossed as rapidly as possible.

4. Improve the ability of combat engineer troops to ensure water crossings.

The combat engineer troops are the backbone of forces in river crossings. Therefore, they must continually raise their technical and tactical levels and improve their ability to organize and command river crossings, and improve the coordinated activity ability of each unit ensuring river crossings. It is necessary to prepare all aspects in accordance with a plan and carry out a rational division of labor and decentralization in the combat engineer forces.

With regard to techniques, the military engineer troops ensuring river crossings must not only be skilled in assembling ferries, building bridges, and assembling bridges, but also be skilled in using the various kinds of self-propelled ferries, mobile pontoon bridges, and bridges mounted on tanks and tracked vehicles under all conditions -- favorable, difficult, or complicated -- regarding rivers, streams, weather, and climate. They must not only be skilled in using them separately but also in assembling them in a combined manner to suit the circumstances. It is very important to achieve a certain level of uniformity regarding a number of techniques in each river-crossing combat engineer unit. The combat engineers must be able to use modern river-crossing facilities and equipment expertly, to use them in correct accordance with their intended use of each type, not only in order to ensure river crossings but also to ensure mobility on rivers but also to use them safely and ensure techniques throughout the campaign.

With regard to tactics, the combat engineer troops may carry out river crossings in a flexible manner and in different forms, such as river crossings in daytime or at night, crossing at fords, crossing by means of ferries and pontoon bridges, crossings by small forces and by large forces, crossings that have been prepared in advance and crossings that are carried out en marche, etc.

Our combat engineers have much experience in carrying out river crossings that have been prepared in advance and planned in advance, and with the advance deployment of forces and facilities in the river crossing area. However, the full utilization of that experience to the new conditions of modern offensive warfare in war to defend the homeland demands new innovations on the part of the combat engineers.

Our combat engineers also have some experience in organizing river crossings by means of force en marche. That mode may become a widespread mode for ensuring river crossings in attacks in the path of which there are river and water barriers. The scale and degree of the application of that form are still dependent on the specific developments of each campaign. But it is clear that the combat engineers cannot but improve their abilities so that they are appropriate to the requirement of ensuring river crossings in that form, even under complicated conditions with regard to weather, climate, and fierce opposition by the enemy.

The river-crossing capability of the Command's mobile river-crossing combat engineer units is manifested in their ability to erect floating bridges across medium and large rivers, and in their ability to assemble ferries and to guide ferries carrying mechanized combat facilities and heavy technical equipment across rivers. In that regard, what must be stressed above all is ability to ensure continuous river crossings by the various kinds of mobile pontoon bridges with medium and large capacities.

The river-crossing combat engineer forces of the military regions, corps, and divisions must not only be capable of mastering their relatively modern and modern river-crossing facilities but also be capable of using them in combination with the on-the-spot facilities of the localities in order to ensure river crossings, via bridges or ferries, of the units in the campaign's offensive formation.

The forms and instances of ensuring offensive river crossings demand mobility on the part of the combat engineer troops. That is ability to enter into the campaign and join the formation rapidly and effectively, in correct accordance with decisions and plans, and reach the river crossing location in time. They can thereby ensure that the troops of the combined combat arms promptly cross the river. It is also ability of rapidly change direction, according to the decisions and orders of the combined combat arms commanders, urgently approach the river and water barriers, and ensure river crossings at new locations which are appropriate to the changes in the offensive on the battlefield.

Training to improve the organization and command ability of the combat engineer units ensuring river crossings must not only enable the units to fully understand the operational plans and ensure that the troops cross rivers in accordance with the campaign plan, but also to skilfully organize and prepare all aspects according to the plan; rationally use forces, facilities, and equipment; do a good job of guiding construction at the crossing point and assembling bridges and ferries; expertly command the forces ensuring the river crossing at the crossing location; and maintain discipline and order in the process moving the attacking forces across the river. If that is to be accomplished, of course the commanders and command organs of the combat engineer units must undergo meticulous training and practice. But there must also be extremely close coordination between the combined combat arms command organs and the combat engineer units, and between the combat engineer commander at the crossing point and the commanders of the units crossing the river. Lack of coordination and lack of unified command should not be allowed to create a chaotic situation at the river crossing point, which would reduce the rate of advance of the attacking troops or cause them to miss the opportunity.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

IMPORTANCE OF STRENGTHENING DISCIPLINE EMPHASIZED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 7, Jul 82 pp 32-35

[Article by Lieutenant General Le Quang Hoa: "The Commander and the Strengthening of Discipline"]

[Text] The Vietnam People's Army is a revolutionary army which is made up of the people and fights for the people. Our army, which developed from mass armed organizations in the high tide of uprising, although at first armed with very primitive weapons, under the leadership and education of the party and Uncle Ho and with the all-out support of the people, along with all the people followed a path full of hardship and challenges, defeated all enemies, and fulfilled all missions. Today it has become the powerful, professional, modern revolutionary people's army of an independent, unified Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

Over a period of 38 years of extremely arduous building and combat with many feats of arms, our army created a very fine revolutionary tradition. One of the distinctive features of that tradition is strict, self-imposed discipline.

When it was first formed our army as yet had no comprehensive regulations and statutes, as it has today, but it had 10 pledges and 12 disciplines which all commanders and unit members had to fully observe. They became part of everyone's being. There is harmony from top to bottom and everyone is united in serving the homeland and the people. All orders are strictly carried out, all decisions are carried out voluntarily, and all missions are fulfilled devotedly. There are rarely instances of avoiding difficulties or reluctance to accept losses and sacrifices, even the sacrifices of life. In the units there are never envy, jealousy, competition for credit, fault-finding, etc. Everyone is sincere, faithful, and unselfish. Unit members support one another in thick and thin and in good times and bad, and share with one another. They discuss together, carry out together, and accepted common responsibility for, all tasks, whether small or large. Everyone has confidence in and love one another. The unit members obey and have confidence in the commanders and unit heads. If someone in a unit is ill or tired, whether a commander or a unit member, he is given all-out attention and care, from comforting and encouragement to drinks of water and bowls of rice gruel.

The weapons and equipment of a unit, from daggers and grenades to rifles, are meticulously maintained and stored by our troops. When they go into battle, our troops economize on each bullet and fulfill the requirement of "each bullet killing an enemy."

Our troops love and respect the people. They are ready to sacrifice themselves to protect a small child. They do not hesitate to rush into flames to save the people's property. Even when they are most hungry and thirsty and most deprived, our troops never touch a cup of rice, a vegetable, or a needle and thread, belong to the people. When living with the people, our troops care for all families, and take care of the people's houses, gardens, and livestock as if they were their own. Therefore, wherever our troops live they are respected, loved, and cared for by the people as if they were their own children. The relationship between the soldiers and the people is truly like that of "fish and water." When they go to fulfill international missions fighting alongside the troops and people of Laos and Kampuchea, our troops regard the troops and people of those countries as their blood brothers. Our Vietnam People's Army leaves behind good, long-lasting impressions among the people of the two neighboring countries.

There are many other marvellous stories about Uncle Ho's troops which reflect the fine tradition and strict, self-imposed discipline of our army which would require volumes to relate fully!

How has our army been able to create that fine tradition of discipline? There are many reasons, the most important of which are that our army has a revolutionary nature and has a corps of cadres who are always exemplary of that nature and are models with regard to courage, sacrifice, consciousness of organization and discipline, a sense of responsibility, and love for the lower echelon and the enlisted men.

From the very beginning our army has been a people's army with a working class nature that is under the direct leadership of the party. The revolutionary nature of our party is manifested in many ways, especially in its objective of fighting for the independence and freedom of the homeland and for socialism. That objective is the objective, *raison d'etre*, and motive for fighting of all of our cadres and men. Under the leadership and education of our party, the revolutionary nature of our army is today becoming increasingly strong and is increasingly permeating all cadres and men. That is the most basic factor in continually maintaining, consolidating, and strengthening the discipline of a revolutionary army on the part of all military personnel. As Lenin said, "The heroic spirit of the masses must arise from voluntary sacrifice for the victory of socialism. That is the foundation of the new discipline, of a discipline based on a spirit of democracy within the Red Army, and is the foundation of the restoration, consolidation, and development of that discipline."*

Our army has strict, voluntary discipline because there is a corps of cadres who always manifest that revolutionary nature in managing, educating, and training the troops. The soldiers are good because the cadres are good. In any unit, whether discipline is strict and voluntary or imposed and lax depends to the greatest extent on the cadres, especially the command cadres. If soldiers are fully educated, well managed, and live in a collective full of love and affection, and are cared for as blood brothers, it is certain that there will occur few violations of discipline, and that if they do occur they will be fully and promptly resolved.

* Lenin, "Ban Ve Bao Ve To Quoc Xa Hoi Chu Nghia" [On Defending the Socialist Homeland], Quan Doi Nhan Dan Publishing House, Hanoi, 1976, p. 130

That is an extremely profound lesson that has been learned in the course of several decades of our army's development and combat. That lesson has retained its value, is full of vital force, and must be further developed in the present situation and missions of our army.

The maintenance of strict, voluntary discipline is the combined result of the educational work, the troop management work, etc. It is a science and an art. With regard to cadres, especially command cadres, in thought and action, saying and doing, and studying, analyzing, and resolving problems they must always correctly follow the viewpoints of the party, reflect the army's revolutionary nature, and fully manifest a strong sense of responsibility, profound love, and the ability to act skilfully.

If the events are similar but the manner of speaking, manerisms, and way of explaining things of the commanders differ, the results will differ and will be either good or bad. For example, in a unit a new recruit because of homesickness returns home without obtaining permission from the commander. Of course, that is a serious deficiency and a violation of orders. If, when the soldier returns to the unit, the commander regards education lightly and stresses scolding and punishment, it will be more difficult for the soldier to realize his deficiency and may blame the cadres, become aloof from the collective, and have incorrect concepts regarding his unit and our army. But if the commander calmly talks with him, provides him a good meal, then seeks to discover the reasons for his act, explains his mistake, advises him as a comrade and a fellow unit member and enables him to realize his deficiency, he is certain to exert a strong, very good influence on the soldier.

In general, our soldiers have self-respect, can tell right from wrong, like sentiment, and hope to make progress. If cadres know how to elicit such traits they are certain to help the soldiers to make progress and mature rapidly.

With regard to commanders at the various echelons, in managing units they must first of all correctly fulfill the responsibility assigned them: managing all tasks in the unit in correct accordance with the orders, statutes, and regulations in order to implement the programs and plans approved by the upper echelon and do a good job of fulfilling the missions assigned them. The unit commander is a person who has been assigned managerial responsibility by the party, the state, and the upper echelon and who is responsible for the units over-all situation. In order to do his job the commander must be concerned with the private thoughts, aspirations, spiritual and material lives, progress, and job performance of each cadre and enlisted man in the unit. He must utilize the unit's duty officer and combat alert systems to understand and correctly resolve problems. To manage a unit is to grasp the situation of the people, the organization, and the technical equipment, to grasp the living conditions, and to grasp all tasks. It is necessary to know how to organize information in order to grasp the situation as rapidly and correctly as possible. When a situation or incident occurs, the commander must know how to use his staff (if any) to study, examine, and weigh the problem. When he has the necessary information he must deal with it promptly, rationally, sympathetically, and in correct accordance with the viewpoints of the party and the revolutionary tradition of our army. Commanders at the tactical level must remain in touch with the basic level and with the enlisted men, and must be present on the training

field, in the lecture hall, at the warehouses and workshops, etc., in order to understand the actual lives of the cadres and enlisted men and the actual situation of the units material bases, weapons, and technical facilities. They must regularly carry out inspections and resolve problems on the spot, in order to create the best possible conditions for the unit to fulfill its missions, improve living conditions, and reduce its difficulties.

Remaining in close touch with the unit, the cadres, and the enlisted men, being concerned with each meal, being concerned with all psychological and sentimental needs of the enlisted men, from books and newspapers to stationary, etc., all come under the functions, responsibilities, and love of cadres. If cadres keep in close touch with the lower echelon, are exemplary, are concerned with the unit's living conditions, and resolve incidents that occur rationally and sympathetically, the upper echelon and the lower echelon will "have the same will" and the discipline situation will be better.

Mutual love, assistance, and protection, protection of public property, and protection of the people are both traditions and good methods for preventing disciplinary violations and contributing positively to the fulfillment of all missions.

Bureaucratism, arrogance, abuse of position and authority, unfaithfulness, paternalism, militarism, negativism, are foreign to our army's fine traditions.

Our cadres and men are writing glorious pages in the history of our nation, of the people's armed forces, and of the People's Army. We are determined to eliminate from the lives of our troops everything that could fade or tarnish our army's fine traditions.

"Party members take the lead, the rest of the nation follows"; "If the enlisted men have not yet eaten, cadres cannot complain of being hungry; if the enlisted men have not been able to sleep, the cadres cannot complain of being tired." "An order, whether from an enlisted man or the Commander in Chief, must be obeyed at once"; "Military orders are as unskakable as mountains", etc.

Those were thoughtful admonitions of Uncle Ho, the beloved father of our people's armed forces. We swear that we will always obey his teachings in order to always bring into play the fine nature, glorious traditions, and strict, self-imposed discipline of our army, and rapidly overcome the remaining negative phenomena, in order to fulfill the mission of "developing our army into a revolutionary people's army with an iron-like will to fight and win, tight discipline, a strict work style, an increasingly higher level of professionalism and modernity, an increasingly higher level of combat readiness, and constant readiness to fulfill all missions assigned by the homeland." and set forth in the Political Report of the Fifth Party Congress.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

FIFTH PARTY CONGRESS DECISIONS ON IDEOLOGICAL WORK DISCUSSED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 7, Jul 82 pp 1-10

[Article: "The Fifth Party Congress and Some Problems Regarding the Ideological Work in the Armed Forces"]

[Text] The Fifth Party Congress was very successful. As General Secretary Le Duan said in his concluding speech, the results of the Congress were "the culmination of a process of continuous work throughout a preparatory period of more than a year which combined the intelligence of the entire nation and had the objective of delineating the direction for resolving the great, urgent problems that are being posed in the course of development of our country's revolution."

In the process of preparing for the Congress, the ideological work in our armed forces concentrated on causing the entire army to agree unanimously with the party's evaluation of the country's situation, and to develop to a high degree the sense of responsibility and intelligence of each individual in order to contribute to drafting the agenda of the Congress. After the Congress issued a Resolution the mission of the ideological work was to cause party members, cadres, and enlisted men to have a high degree of unanimity with the great successes of the Congress regarding politics, lines, and organization, and to enable everyone to profoundly understand all of its Resolution, transform it into action, and brilliantly fulfill all missions of the armed forces.

Along with setting forth the strategic line and missions and the specific missions and policies in the actual operational spheres, the Fifth Party Congress also made decisions regarding the major problems of the ideological work and the organizational work, in order to ensure the implementation of the revolutionary line and missions.

The basic mission of the ideological work, as stated in the Political Report, is to "arm our entire party, our entire population, and our entire army with basic knowledge regarding scientific socialism, and create a resolute will, iron determination, and the necessary level of knowledge to fulfill both strategic missions: constructing socialism and defending the homeland."

The ideological work must enable the cadres, party members, people, and enlisted men to be stalwart in the socialist revolution, resolutely promote the struggle between the two paths, successfully build socialism, and be stalwart in the struggle against the expansionism and hegemonism of China, in league with the U.S. imperialists, in order to strongly defend the socialist Vietnamese homeland.

In order to contribute positively to mobilizing and organizing a broad mass revolutionary action movement with the object of transforming the lines and policies of the party into real victories in all ideological spheres and tasks in all sectors and at all levels, it is necessary to firmly grasp the ideological work missions and contents that were set forth by the Party Congress, and apply them in accordance with the specific political situations and situations of one's sector, locality, or unit, to enable the contents of the ideological work to always be lively and practical and bring about real results.

At present, the mission of combat readiness to defend the homeland demands that we continually be on guard against the war plots and acts of the Beijing ruling circles and the bellicose imperialist powers, and that we mobilize the greatest efforts by our entire party, entire population, and entire army to resolutely defeat the enemy's many-sided war of sabotage, while also ensuring that our country is always prepared to defeat enemies under any circumstances.

In order to fulfill those requirements, as stated by the Political Report at the Congress, it is necessary to continue to develop our army into a revolutionary people's army with iron-like determination, tight discipline, a strict work style, an increasingly higher level of professionalism and modernity, and a level of combat readiness that is continually heightened, so that it can always fulfill all missions assigned by the homeland.

In accordance with the direction and missions set forth by the Party Congress, the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee promptly determined the 1982 military missions of our armed forces. The ideological work in the people's armed forces must closely adhere to and effectively serve the fulfillment of those actual political missions.

The Fifth Party Congress affirmed the policy of continuing to implement the line toward the socialist revolution and the line toward the construction of a socialist economy adopted by the Fourth Party Congress. The Congress also clearly indicated the strategic missions, objectives, and principal economic-social missions, as well as the missions regarding the economy, national defense, culture and society, strengthening the state, foreign relations, party building, etc.

In explaining the lines, enabling the cadres and men, especially the cadres, to profoundly understand the common line toward the socialist revolution, the line toward constructing a socialist economy during the period of transition, and the military line in the enterprise of building and defending the homeland, and striving to implement those lines voluntarily, with the supreme enthusiasm of people who are collective masters, is the foremost responsibility of the present ideological task.

The lines and missions set forth by the Party Congress -- the essence of the intelligence of the entire party -- correctly resolved the basic, pressing problems now being posed by the actual situation of the socialist revolution in our country, in the spheres of both socialist construction and the defense of the socialist homeland. Thus the lines, both the common lines and the specific lines, must be fully explained, with no aspect being regarded lightly. Only by grasping the lines -- including the common lines, the economic line, internal policy line, foreign policy line, etc. -- can we fully understand our people's revolutionary struggle in

the new situation and therefore clearly understand the combat objectives, role, and responsibility of our armed forces in the common struggle, and only then can there be a basis on which to profoundly understand the party's military line and military science-technology in the enterprise of defending the homeland and a direction for correctly resolving problems regarding our armed forces' development and combat.

By means of scientific arguments and lively actualities, the ideological work must enable everyone to clearly and deeply understand the party lines, and closely tie in clarification of the lines with explanation of the specific policies of the party and state. It must enable cadres and enlisted men to clearly understand the current situation of our country's revolution; affirm the great victories on the homeland defense front and the accomplishments on the economic construction and social development fronts; enable everyone to be enthusiastic and proud of the victories won by our people, and at the same time deal with the difficulties, scientifically analyze the reasons for the difficulties in production and life, and enable the entire army to contribute, along with the entire party and the entire population, overcome the deficiencies in the leadership and management work. The socialist construction and transformation struggle is a fierce, complicated, long-range class struggle between the two paths. The ideological work must concentrate on enabling cadres and enlisted men to steadfastly maintain a socialist standpoint in that struggle. It must be realized that that struggle in the political, economic, cultural, social, domestic, external, and other spheres strongly and directly affects the consciousness, thought, feelings, and sentiment of the cadres and enlisted men. They must be enabled to clearly understand that the lines, stands, and policies of the party are the most basic and effective means for resolving incorrect thoughts that arise in the course of the actual work, and each individual have a single will, a single voice, and a single attitude toward the party.

If that is to be accomplished, above all immediately after the Party Congress it is necessary to do a good job of carrying out the political education task set forth by the Party Congress, make study of the Congress documents the basis on which to educate cadres and party members regarding the lines and policies of the party, and criticize the incorrect knowledge and thought -- and strengthen the revolutionary will and sense of responsibility of -- the cadres, party members, and enlisted men in view of the new situation and missions.

Of course, on the basis of comprehensively clarifying the party lines, the people's armed forces, a sharp tool of violence of the socialist state, must fully understand and the military line, grasp the military missions, and grasp all stands and policies of the party and state set forth by the Congress in the sphere of national defense and war.

Comrade Le Duan, the party's General Secretary said that "In speaking of ideology in the army ... we cannot but speak of understanding of the military line and of military theory and science,"* for only if they have such knowledge can the armed

* Le Duan, "Continue to Study and Build Vietnamese Military Theory." TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, No 1, 1979.

forces have conditions for fulfilling their central mission and basic function: victoriously implementing the political and military missions assigned by the party and state.

In fact, the clarification of the lines, especially the economic line, during the past 5 years, as recapitulated by the Congress, has not been a simple matter. The weaknesses of the ideological work are that it has not yet enabled the entire party, the entire army, and the entire population to fully understand the lines, have not yet created truly strong unanimity on the basis of having a solid theoretical and practical basis, has not yet strongly criticized the mistaken viewpoints of the party, and has not yet promptly resolved the real, specific problems that have been posed in the process of implementing those lines.

The clarification of lines is not limited to disseminating and bolstering theoretical knowledge and common viewpoints regarding the lines. It is a very necessary task, but is only one aspect. An important, permanent problem that must be posed is closely combining theory and viewpoints with living reality and rich experience in the process of concretizing lines and organizing their implementation.

The clarification of the military line to the cadres and men of the armed forces must be carried out in such a way. Clearly, although training classes regarding the military line during recent years have brought about good results, they have been insufficient. The cadres and men of the armed forces have new awareness of the party's military line during the period of building and defending the homeland, including the line of national defense by all the people and people's war to defend the homeland. The cadres, especially the commanding cadres of the echelons and sectors, have undergone transformations regarding knowledge, thought, and viewpoints regard such major matters as the strategic operational objectives; the military missions in the new period; our people's great combined strength to defend the nation; the nature, objectives, and contents of national defense by all the people; the direction of building the people's armed forces and a professional, modern revolutionary people's army; the strategic guidance mottoes; the war-waging mode; military science and art in people's war to defend the homeland against the war of aggression of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists.

The major aspects of the military line have been and are being applied and gradually concretized, and manifested by many lively means in order to meet the extremely practical problems posed daily and hourly in the course of the military missions. In order to do a good job of clarifying the military line, the ideological work must permeate that process of concretizing and organizing implementation.

In the sphere of military science and art as well as in the sphere of building national defense by all the people and with regard to each armed forces branch, combat arm, and until, nationwide and on each battlefield and in each locality, many varied problems are urgently being resolved. The ideological work must enter deeply into that process, for only by means of the actual implementation of lines can correct knowledge be bolstered and developed, and only then can understanding of lines be increasingly profound, with a rich theoretical and practical basis. Furthermore, only by means of the actual organizational work can the ideological work bring into play the intelligence and creativity of the cadres and enlisted men in perfecting the lines, and only then can there be lively, deep, effective, and highly combative contents.

With regard to the people's armed forces, the backbone forces of national defense by all the people and people's war to defend the homeland, the ideological work must continue to enable the cadres and men to realize with total clarity that the direct, dangerous enemy of our nation are the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, in league with the U.S. imperialists.

During recent years the ideological work has promptly enabled the cadres and men to quickly recognize the new strategic enemy of our country's revolution and the new strategic operational objective of our soldiers and people. However, we must continue to enable the entire army to more profoundly understand the insidious nature, plots, and schemes of the enemy. The reactionary nature of Chinese expansionism and hegemonism has been revealed, but they continue to cloak themselves with Marxism-Leninism and act in the name of revolution. Therefore, the ideological work cannot be subjective and complacent. On the contrary, it must continue to enable the cadres and men to systematically understand the deep historical roots and process of complicated change of Chinese expansionism and hegemonism.

It is necessary to enable everyone to clearly understand that modern-day Chinese expansionism and hegemonism are in nature big-nation chauvinism. Although that expansionism and hegemonism are today camouflaged by all sorts of flashy Marxist terms, they retain the original nature of Great Han expansionism and hegemonism and have not changed very much. Although the reactionaries within the Beijing ruling circles, supported by the U.S. imperialists and the reactionary powers, have been defeated, they are continuing to wage a many-sided war of destruction against our country, while at the same time feverishly preparing large-scale wars of aggression in hopes of weakening and annexing our country, just as the feudal Chinese emperors of the past nurtured insane expansionistic and hegemonistic aspirations toward our countries and the countries on the Indochinese Peninsula.

At present, in concert with their armed encroachment activities on the border, the Beijing reactionaries are waging a war of destruction against our country on the military, political, economic, and cultural fronts by means of many forces and many insidious schemes. They hope to sabotage us with regard to economics, culture, living standards, ideology, and organization, and spread political venom within our ranks, focusing on people who are dissatisfied and people who are still vague and simplistic with regard to awareness and thought in the present struggle between ourselves and the enemy.

Our people's struggle against Chinese expansionism and hegemonism is a long-range, complicated struggle in which no quarter may be given. That struggle is closely tied in with the struggle of the people of Laos and Kampuchea against a common enemy and on a unified battlefield. That struggle cannot be separated from the struggle for peace, national independence, democracy, socialism, and social progress on a world scale. Opposing Chinese expansionism and hegemonism is an urgent, long-range mission of our people and is at the same time an urgent mission of Marxist-Leninists all over the world at present. It is a sacred national mission and is also a noble international obligation of our soldiers and people.

Therefore, the ideological work must concentrate its sharp point on Chinese expansionism and hegemonism, for they were the unchanging core of Maoism in the past and

are the core of present-day "post-Mao Maoism." On the ideological front, the theoretical weapon must be aimed at the core in order to expose, criticize, and condemn it and avoid getting off course. Only thereby can we create a solid basis for hatred of the enemy, a spirit of vigilance, and an unshakable will to win on the part of our cadres and men with regard to Chinese expansionism and hegemonism.

One of the major contents of the ideological work set forth by the Congress was stressing education in Marxism-Leninism, while also positively contributing to bolstering the scientific-technical knowledge, and especially the economic knowledge, of cadres, party members, and enlisted men.

If one does not understand Marxism-Leninism or have the necessary scientific knowledge, one cannot fully understand the lines and policies of the party, or transform those lines and policies into real victories. That is because the party lines apply Marxism-Leninism to the actual conditions of our country's revolution. Marxism-Leninism did not emerge suddenly but arose "from the sum of mankind's knowledge."* In that sense, V.I. Lenin taught that "People become communists only when they fortify their memory by knowing all of the intellectual treasury created by mankind."**

Therefore, our party always regards education in Marxism-Leninism as a basic mission of the ideological work. But study of Marxism-Leninism must not be limited to the concerts, and conclusions that have been accumulated. It is also important to fully understand the scientific knowledge on which those conclusions and concepts are based, and to know how to apply them creatively to the actual day-to-day revolutionary missions. In criticizing the "bookworm" method of studying Marxism-Leninism, V.I. Lenin pointed out that "If a communist presumes that he understands communism because he has studied existing conclusions but has never carried out a major, very serious, and very difficult task and has not studied in order to clearly know what he needs to know, with a critical spirit, he is truly pathetic. And such an aloof attitude is extremely harmful."***

A matter of foremost significance of the study of Marxism-Leninism is equipping oneself with a world outlook and scientific methodology to serve as a compass for all actual revolutionary tasks. In order to improve the quality of Marxist-Leninist education, the ideological work must comprehensively reform education in political theory, as proposed by the Party Congress; change it with regard to contents, methods, the school system, the training and supplementation instructors, etc; and enable study of Marxism-Leninism to better serve the victorious implementation of the revolutionary lines and missions.

* Lenin, "Tuyen Tap" [Selected Works], Progress Publishing House, Moscow, pp 712-713, in Vietnamese.

** Ibid.

*** Op. cit., pp 714-715.

Marxism-Leninism illuminates and guides the sciences but is not a skeleton key that can replace them. Therefore, cadres and party members must understand Marxism-Leninism, but must also have scientific knowledge of the economic, political, military, scientific-technical, literature and art, cultural-social, psychological, and other spheres, and must especially enter deeply into scientific knowledge related to their actual activities. When dealing with the mission of building communism, Lenin paid special attention to improving the scientific knowledge of cadres, party members, and youths. Criticizing people who were satisfied with their understanding of communism but regarded learning lightly, V.I. Lenin admonished them that "communism can only exist on the basis of modern knowledge, without which communism would be only an aspiration."*

If on the economic front the party requires cadres and party members must be qualified in economic leadership, have a mind for business, and know how to calculate effectiveness in order to attain the highest economic benefit, on the military front the party requires cadres and party members to develop the greatest combined strength of each unit in order to defeat the enemy and fulfill missions with the least sacrifice and with the use of the most rational weapons and equipment. If that is to be achieved, cadres and party members in the armed forces must have knowledge of military science and art and the military science and technology of people's war to defend the homeland under modern combat conditions. Depending on their sphere of responsibility, cadres must have knowledge of campaign strategy and art, tactics, techniques, organizational science, the command of combined arms operations, and a great amount of other scientific knowledge regarding staff work, party work, political work, combat support, military psychology, etc. In each armed forces branch, combat arm, or work sector, there are also requirements regarding modern knowledge necessary for the fulfillment of mission.

The ideological work must be extremely responsive to those new demands and promptly fulfill the practical requirements of each type of cadre, step up mobilization and organization, and contribute positively and contribute positively to improving the knowledge of cadres and enlisted men. There must be plans and programs for in-school study and on-the-job study; do a truly good job of the scientific information work, organize specialized guidance, etc.; and closely tie in the bolstering of scientific knowledge with the fulfillment of actual missions.

In addition to education regarding the lines and policies, the ideological work must be strongly oriented toward education to enhance the revolutionary qualities of cadres and party members.

A matter very worthy of pride, as stated by the Party Congress, is that in the face of the fierce challenges of the enterprise of building and defending socialism during the past several years the great majority of the party's cadres and members have clearly demonstrated the revolutionary virtues and creative ability of communists. On the front line of national defense as well as on the front of economic construction and transformation, tens of thousands of cadres and party members have

* Lenin, "Tuyen Tap" (Selected Works), Progress Publishing House, Moscow, pp 714-715, in Vietnamese.

been exemplary in sacrificing themselves and in devoting themselves to the outstanding fulfillment of missions for the sake of the homeland and the people.

However, some cadres and party members have deteriorated with regard to political quality, are undisciplined with regard to organization, have degenerated with regard to their life style, and have become bureaucratic in their work style and conservative in their way of looking at things.

As it enters the new era, the period of building socialism on a national scale and defending the socialist Vietnamese homeland against Chinese expansionism and hegemonism, our party has many advantages but it must also go all-out to overcome great difficulties that are practically unprecedented in our history. That situation demands that our party's cadres and members, on the economic front as well as on the armed struggle front, not only have a new ability to act but also improve their revolutionary virtue and promptly meet the new, very demanding requirements of the new strategic missions.

The party's leadership quality and prestige lie in its correct lines and the effective implementation of those lines. But the quality of cadres and party members is also an important factor in ensuring that the lines are correct and are well implemented. For that reason, the Party Congress requested cadres and party members to retain their revolutionary qualities, oppose individualism, oppose special privilege and special benefit, and oppose degeneration in thought and virtue. Cadres and party members must strive tirelessly for their ideals and be prepared to sacrifice for those ideals, and they must be people who are most exemplary of the new socialist man and a model for the masses to follow.

Decline with regard to quality, degeneration with regard to life style, and the bureaucratization of work style usually arise from individualism. Individualism has increasingly developed due to the effects of bourgeois thought and neocolonialism. It has weakened, and even paralyzed, the revolutionary will of some cadres and party members, and has led them to implement policies incorrectly, tardiness in fulfilling missions, and even to participation in commerce, exploitation, corruption, the appropriation of public property, collusion with dishonest merchants and bad elements, etc.

The individualistic way of life and pursuit of personal benefit will of course place riches and vainglory above ideals, stifle aspiration, and trample man's political life.

For that reason, improving revolutionary virtue, opposing individualism, and opposing special privilege and special benefit, and degeneration with regard to thought and virtue, are also major contents of the ideological work in the people's armed forces. The most noble quality of cadres and men is a resolute fighting will and a spirit of self-sacrifice. That quality is the result of many factors and of a whole process of forging, challenging, and struggling. If cadres and men become degenerate in their lives and pursue the stimulations of the bourgeois, neocolonial way of life, how can they be brave in the face of the enemy, and how can they place the interests of the homeland and the people above individual interests? Virtue in life and the political quality of each person are organically related and

strongly affect each other. Decline in one's daily life is usually the first step and signifies the erosion of will and political deterioration. If they are not vigilant and refuse to steel themselves, cadres, even if they have gloriously overcome challenges and made sacrifices in fighting enemy troops on the battlefield, can still fall before the flirtation and seduction of the bourgeois, neo-colonial way of life.

The negative situation in society and difficulties in life affect the armed forces every day and every hour. The enemy are also seeking all ways to, by all schemes, weaken the will and revolutionary qualities of our cadres and men, and thus to tarnish the tradition, and sabotage the fighting strength, of our armed forces.

The ideological work must clearly realize the new requirements of education to improve revolutionary qualities, and assign it proper importance in the present situation of the fierce, complicated struggle between ourselves and the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists and of the struggle between the capitalist and socialist paths, and endeavor to mobilize, organize, and guide the cadres and men in order to further develop the fine qualities of the cadres and men of the people's armed forces. In that regard, as indicated in the Political Report, we must closely combine ideological education and self-criticism and criticism with the organizational measures, and combine ideological education with the struggle against the negative phenomena in society, in the state organs, and in the army.

Strengthening the ideological front is a very basic and urgent mission at present in order to improve the party's leadership quality and fighting strength. Strengthening the ideological front is also a key factor in bringing into play the fine nature and tradition, and the fighting strength, of our armed forces.

The Party Congress indicated the missions and contents of the ideological work during the coming years for the entire party, the entire population, and the entire army. Those missions and contents manifest the highly scientific, combative nature of the ideological work.

If we fully understand those missions and contents, seek ways to improve the operating mode, fulfill the requirement of the entire army doing ideological work, and create a combined strength on the ideological front, it is certain that the ideological work in the armed forces will be able to bring about real effectiveness and contribute positively to mobilizing and organizing a deep and broad revolutionary action movement throughout the army, in order to victoriously fulfill the great missions assigned to our armed forces by the Party Congress.

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ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

AN GIANG PRAISED FOR ACQUIRING MORE GRAIN EVERY YEAR

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 29 Jul 82 p 2

[Article by Duong Hang of the Ministry of Food: "An Giang Mobilizes More Grain in One Year Than in the Previous Year"]

[Text] In the last few years An Giang Province distinguished itself on the grain-mobilizing front for having quickly increased the volume of grain acquired and always striving to correctly implement policies and procedures.

Quickly Increasing Acquired Volume

In 1978, in the grain-mobilizing task An Giang ranked fifth among the nine Mekong River delta provinces in terms of volume of grain put into storehouses. In 1979 and 1980 it ranked third and fourth and since 1981 has nearly caught up with Hau Giang, which leads the country in terms of total annual volume of grain acquired. In recent years, the rate of increase one year was quite larger than that of the preceding year. The volume of grain acquired in 1980 was 3 times larger than that in 1979 (160,500 tons as compared with 50,900 tons) and in 1981 50 percent larger (250,266 tons as compared with 160,500 tons) than in 1980 and 5 times larger than in 1979. The mobilizing rate as compared with the volume of production was only 10 percent in 1979, with 200 kilograms of paddy acquired in average per hectare; in 1981 this rate was 30 percent, or 3 times larger than 1979, with an average of 1 ton of paddy acquired per hectare, or 5 times larger.

As the grain-mobilizing year of 1982 started, with the 1981 tenth-month rice crop in An Giang showing serious losses, a decrease of nearly 100,000 tons in its volume of production, only 24,000 tons were acquired, or 30 percent of its plan and 63,000 tons less than the quantity acquired in the same crop last year. An Giang concentrated its efforts on stepping up production in the 1982 winter-spring crop, exceeded its goal by nearly 10,000 hectares and obtained an average yield of 4.8 tons per hectare, thus boosting its volume of production by more than 50,000 tons over the winter-spring crop of last year, partially compensating for the losses in the tenth-month rice production and creating a base for achieving the goal of acquiring 160,000 tons of winter-spring paddy, an average of 1.8 tons per hectare and an increase of 40,000 tons over the winter-spring rice crop of last year.

The 1982 summer-autumn crop, which is entering harvest time, is also a successful one and promises to allow mobilization of 70,000 tons; if so An Giang will be able to overfulfill its 1982 plan (250,000 tons) under the conditions of heavy losses in the 1981 tenth-month rice crop.

An Giang has been delivering to the central administration larger and larger volumes of grain. It shipped out of the province in 1978 only 29,206 tons, or 7.6 percent of volume of production and 53 percent of the total volume of grain acquired, but in 1981 up to 197,629 tons, or nearly 7 times the 1978 figure and 26 percent of volume of production and 79 percent of total volume acquired.

Its success in acquiring grain originated from the strong changes the locality had made on the production front, including the positive contributions of the grain sector, which used as a basis for achieving the grain-mobilizing goal the efforts to serve production, to invest in fertilizer and gasoline and oil and to sign two-way economic contracts with farmers. By adopting intensive cultivation and multicropping, An Giang increased the 1981 grain production to nearly double of the 1978 figure (158,800 as compared with 384,700 tons) and by 50 percent over the 1979 figure (535,000 tons); from then on it raised the percentage of grain acquired by means of goods, created favorable conditions for speeding up mobilization and shipped more grain to the central administration.

Implementing Policies, Strengthening Management

Learning from the experience of past years, since 1981, mostly in the first months of 1982, An Giang has made progress in the following aspects: more attention being paid to collecting agricultural tax, purchasing and writing off two-way contracts with producers; limiting purchases with cash at agreed prices or the use of cash and goods for purchases and sales at high prices; and avoiding deliberate raising of prices to make purchases, in spite of the fact that in some border areas some units raised prices to attract more sources. In the winter-spring season of 1982, collection of taxes and debt payments basically satisfied the plan norm; purchases made according to old and new two-way contracts totaled more than 52,000 tons.

An Giang simultaneously applied three measures (economic, administrative and educational) to grain purchases and further overcame the tendency to acquire grain solely by raising prices and using goods and cash. More two-way economic contracts being signed with producers helped to encourage farmers to extend the cultivated area, to grow additional crops and to practice intensive cultivation to raise crop yield. Political and ideological education in the party and among the people received tight leadership and developed the pioneering and example-setting quality of cadres and party members to promote fulfillment of the obligation to pay taxes and to sell grain to the state. Market management was being undertaken from the grass-roots level of villages and hamlets through activities of mass organizations. At the same time, An Giang was using a number of small business people and the rice milling network of those private individuals who do legitimate business to buy

and mill rice for the state, which bought both paddy and rice while the harvesting farmers were in need of cash to spend.

The grain sector effectively resolved the problem of storing paddy in the open and raised the quality of grain put into storehouses. In 1981 sometimes up to 40,000 tons of paddy were left in the open. But in 1982, this phenomenon was basically resolved in April as 100,000 tons of paddy were put into storehouses, with only 2,000 tons of the winter-spring paddy being left outdoors, but still put in large baskets covered with lids. All basic-level units tried to maintain a balance by themselves (the volume of grain acquired was to match with the available storehouses, junks, etc.) and through the "grain-delivery pools" movement fully used the capabilities of means of transportation, packing and loading forces now available among the people. In many localities, junks were used as floating storehouses and space was borrowed in pagodas and temples, association headquarters, schools, etc. to temporarily store grain.

To ensure the quality of grain being put into storehouses was a fierce struggle in the party organization and among the people. Many districts like Phu Tan, Phu Chau, etc. did not want to change their tendency to go after the goal of acquiring fresh paddy to put into storehouses. In the past years, the lowest moisture of paddy was 18 degrees, which has been reduced to an average of 16-17 degrees.

The application of expenditures contracts based on every ton of grain acquired to districts and villages stressed the responsibilities of all echelons and their positive action in encouraging purchases and organizing storage and transportation of grain from villages and hamlets to provincial and district storehouses. As a result, transportation costs and losses of grain were reduced.

An Giang is overcoming weaknesses and striving to score total success in its grain-mobilizing job. In many areas, after the goal of putting grain into storehouses has been achieved, there still remain rather large quantities of commodity grain; rice crop yield and production are not yet estimated at their actual values. Phu Tan and Phu Chau Districts calculate the 1982 winter-spring rice crop yield at the rate of 5 tons, which actually may be 6 or 8 tons. While the yield is calculated at such a low value, the average per capita monthly grain consumption is still 56 kilograms (Phu Chau) and 63 kilograms (Phu Tan) after the grain-mobilizing goal has been achieved. This is an indication that the possibility of purchasing paddy beyond what the obligation calls for is something that still can be achieved.

Among the mobilization norms to be achieved the agricultural tax remains at a low level (in Phu Chau it amounts to only 4.5 percent of the volume of production). Two-way economic contracts are not widely adopted as investment is not yet concentrated on the rice-growing areas of high volume of production resulting from such contracts, tax is not yet fully collected and contracts that have been signed are not totally written off.

As to quality of grain put into storehouses, there must be additional efforts to satisfy the moisture standard and to reduce foreign substances mixed with grain. A basic thing to do is to plant the winter-spring rice early to avoid rains at the time of harvest and to create favorable conditions for planting the summer-autumn rice early to avoid flood.

Expenditures contracts based on every ton of grain are a good managerial formula but there must be careful calculations of the items assigned in the spirit of allowing the right expenditures for the necessary items to avoid making farmers and laborers bear the costs and saving money for the state budget for any items that can rely on the people's efforts, particularly the ones involving their obligation to fulfill toward the state, such as transporting paddy to the village purchase stations, etc.

By correctly implementing policies and strengthening all aspects of management, An Giang Province will fulfill the 1982 grain-mobilizing plan with great economic results.

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ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

GRAIN RESERVES BUILT UP THROUGH ACCELERATED PURCHASES

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 29 Jul 82 pp 1, 4

[Article: "Tien Giang Exceeds by 22 Percent Total Amount of Grain Acquired in the Tenth-Month and Winter-Spring Seasons; Binh Tri Thien, Haiphong Encourage People To Sell More Paddy Beyond Their Obligation; Nghia Binh Reaches the Grain Purchase Goal in the Winter-Spring Season"]

[Text] In the tenth-month and winter-spring seasons this year, Tien Giang Province put into state storehouses a quantity of grain 22 percent larger than its plan called for, with collection of agricultural tax exceeding the goal by 17 percent, showing an increase of 33,752 tons of paddy over the same period last year and the largest volume of grain ever put into storehouses.

Right at the beginning of the season, the provincial grain sector got to know the rice crop yield and output in order to balance again its plan for mobilizing and giving early assignment to districts, cooperatives and production units and closely cooperated with the financial, banking, agricultural and communications-transportation sectors to get money, goods and materials ready for purchases and exchanges of grain. The communications-transportation sector mobilized more than 70 automobiles and nearly 100 junks and assembled nearly 90 percent of the means of transportation cooperatives so as to make warehouses and yards available more quickly, to serve better the purchasing task and milling of grain, to distribute goods evenly in the province and to deliver grain to the central administration in a fast and neat manner. The grain sector also opened 42 grain-purchasing stations to raise the total number of such stations in the province to 96 and at the same time made 200,000 bags and scales ready for farmers to use as they fulfilled their grain obligation and sold paddy to the state.

Tien Giang is encouraging farmers to reduce consumption and to sell more paddy to the state as it is striving to reach the goal of delivering 133,000 tons of grain in the summer-autumn season and to contribute to fulfilling the 1982 grain-acquiring plan.

After having reached the total amount of grain to be acquired in the 1982 fifth-month and spring season, Binh Tri Thien Province and Haiphong encouraged farmers to balance again their food consumption levels and to use the excess grain to sell or exchange as additional contributions to the state.

According to initial data, in this crop season every hectare of cultivated land in the province contributed an average of 411 kilograms of paddy. The province as a whole used money and goods to acquire 2,600 additional tons of paddy through non-obligation sales.

The Municipality of Haiphong sent its cadres to local areas to get to know exactly the state of production and paddy production of every district and cooperative and to draft plans for making purchases at appropriate agreed prices. It put aside tens of millions of dong in cash and industrial goods and sent them in time to its districts for purchases of and exchange for grain. As of 20 July, Haiphong had acquired 1,140 tons of paddy beyond its total goal and later encouraged farmers to review the consumption levels in order to have more grain to sell or exchange as it wanted to acquire 5,000 additional tons in July.

As of 30 June, Nghia Binh Province had put into its storehouses 50,981 tons of grain (including 5,600 tons of subsidiary foods converted to paddy equivalent), thus having reached close to 102 percent of the centrally-assigned goal, or 67.8 percent of the total amount of grain to be acquired in 1982. It also overfulfilled its grain delivery obligation for 1982. Five districts and cities -- Tuy Phuoc, An Nhon, Hoai Nhon, Quy Nhon and Vinh Thanh -- and 163 agricultural cooperatives already surpassed the goals set for them in this season. Vinh Thanh purchased the largest quantity (1,300 tons) of subsidiary food crops (mainly manioc) in the province in the winter-spring season this year.

Because of the fact that weather conditions were unfavorable and some localities did not show good leadership over production yet, the total volume of grain production converted to paddy equivalent showed a drop of 20,000 tons (including 15,000 tons of subsidiary foods converted to paddy equivalent) as compared with the 1981 winter-spring season. However, the province felt that it could still properly carry out the job of mobilizing grain in the fifth-month and spring season if it were able to show the superiority of the new production relationships, in which the agricultural cooperatives serve as the primary-level units to fulfill the obligation to the state. As it organized and assumed strict leadership over purchasing grain, worked neatly in every production unit and cooperative, corrected in time any deviations in connection with product contracts, checked carefully to know exactly crop yield and output and tightly managed the harvested grain, the province was able to mobilize 2,000 tons of grain more than this same season last year.

Nghia Binh is striving to quickly and neatly complete its task of acquiring grain in the summer-autumn season so as to reach and surpass the goal of 75,000 tons set for 1982.

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

EDITORIAL STRESSES USE OF MATERIALS FROM ALL SOURCES

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 29 Jul 82 p 1

[Editorial: "Effectively Exploiting All Sources of Materials"]

[Text] To fully exploit all sources of materials and to put the latter to use in time and most effectively in production and construction is an important part of economic management. Of the materials that now exist in the country, in addition to the principal and largest source which involves being created by production, other sources also contribute quite considerable percentages. These sources involve recovery and full use of all sorts of excess materials, discarded materials and industrial wastes and mobilization of materials that are left idle, moved too slowly and overstocked. In the case of cinders alone, if they are recovered, we will have each year about 400,000 tons, or nearly twice the local cinder production; but currently we are recovering only about one-fourth of that quantity. About discarded oil, if we properly organize its recovery and recycling, each year we can satisfy one-fifth of the planned need; but in the first 6 months of this year, the quantity of discarded oil that was recovered and reused was very small. The materials that were left idle, moved too slowly and overstocked and have so far been put to use do not amount to even one-fourth of the quantities that were found.

A total exploitation of these sources will directly create an important volume of supplemental materials. To do so we must firmly carry out effective policies and measures. As to excess materials, discarded materials and wastes, we must determine the percentages for recovery, adopt rational price policies for their purchases and extend the application of progressive technology for recycling and reuse. These materials must be included in distribution plans to ensure their use for the right purposes and by the right people. To avoid the situation of materials being moved too slowly, all production and construction units are permitted to store materials for use only in the year of their plan and to get prepared for the succeeding year in accordance with the preset level. Any reserves beyond this level are considered idle materials and must be separated from the production and business capital of a unit. It is impossible to accept the fact that a unit keeps for itself a certain kind of material in its storehouse for tens of years without this material being considered idle while other units which need it cannot get it for their production.

Responding to the campaign for practicing thrift, the materials sector, in coordination with the financial and banking sectors and scientific organs, has recently suggested a number of measures which have initially led to rather good results in the exploitation of sources of idle and discarded materials and wastes. After being inventoried, the idle materials are divided into three categories: the good ones are to be put to use without delay to serve production and construction; the ones that need to be added, replaced or processed will wait for contact to be made and contracts signed with a number of production and scientific and technical research installations for them to organize their restoration; and the ones that are beyond repairs and replacement are to be turned into raw materials. In the first 6 months of this year, the materials sector acquired through purchases and exchanges close to 12,000 old truck tires of all kinds, more than 10,000 batteries, 300 electric motors, 9 tons of old ball bearings, nearly 6,000 files of all kinds and more than 18,000 tons of discarded steel, as well as idle goods worth millions of dong, including various kinds of equipment parts, electrical materials, iron, steel, etc. With only some improvement made in connection with a number of measures having to do with purchasing and exchanging methods, prices, lessening of cumbersome procedures and coordination of the economic and scientific sectors concerned, the initial results obtained were already much greater than the ones obtained in the same period last year. That was an evidence of a greater possibility of creating additional sources of domestic goods.

The task of all sectors, units and production installations is to strive to exploit in the best way possible such a possibility so as to help to overcome the difficulties in connection with materials and raw materials and to serve effectively production and construction.

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ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

BRIEFS

HA SON BINH NOMADS RESETTLEMENT--Ha Son Binh Province has provided help for 80,000 people of various nationalities in mountain region to live in resettled farming and resettled life areas. These people have reclaimed 1,300 hectares of land for grain cultivation and are clearing more arable land for agricultural production. The province has invested millions of dong to build three small hydroelectric power stations and other water conservancy projects to help these resettlers promptly stabilize their daily life and engage in production. [BK270855 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0400 GMT 26 Aug 82]

CSO: 4209/472

AGRICULTURE

SRV PAPER ON MARINE COOPERATIVES STATUTE

BK291322 Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 6 Aug 82 p 2

[Unattributed article in 6 August NHAN DAN "Firmly Grasp the Content of the Statute of Marine Products Cooperatives and Correctly Carry It Out"]

[Text] On 17 March 1982 the Council of Ministers issued Decree No 51-HDBT promulgating the statute on marine products cooperatives.

The statute comprises 9 chapters and 33 articles. The Ministry of Marine products has issued directives on implementing the statute. We will present here the basic features of this document.

The Principles of Organization and Operations of Marine Products Cooperatives

In Chapter I, after pointing out the nature and purposes of marine products cooperatives (Article 1), the statute spells out in Article 2 the guiding principles which must be actively and fully applied in the establishment of these cooperatives and in the process of building and strengthening them.

Applicants for cooperative membership must voluntarily submit application forms; voluntarily contribute money, boats, nets and work tools if they have them; voluntarily implement the statute and bylaws of cooperatives; and fulfill cooperative members' obligations.

Concerning leadership and guidance, it is necessary to enable all people to clearly realize the immediate and long-term interests so that they may voluntarily participate in building and strengthening the cooperatives. Administrative orders must not be used and difficulties must not be created to force people to join cooperatives.

In the process of operations, if a member asks to leave his cooperative, the management board concerned must consider his request and must complete the necessary formalities to end his membership within 1 month. However, if this person voluntarily asks to rejoin the cooperative, he should still be admitted if qualified.

Cooperatives must care for the economic interests of their members and improve their material and cultural life. At the same time, they must apply themselves

to accumulating capital and building their material and technical bases to expand and develop production. They must also fulfill their obligation to pay taxes and debts and to sell their products to the state according to two-way economic contracts. On the other hand, they must adequately ensure the interests of those people who contribute their capital and work tools to the cooperatives to develop production. They must uphold self-reliance, discard management based on administrative measures and subsidization, and refrain from depending on the state.

Cooperatives must respect and guarantee the collective mastery of their members. They must create conditions for all members to participate in discussing and deciding on guidelines for production and business operations, the pattern of professions, the targets of the state plan and measures to fulfill them, contract norms, and the income distribution and financial plans of cooperatives and production units.

All violations of cooperative members' collective members are a breach of this statute and must be adequately dealt with.

The cooperative is a unit of socialist collective business. All of its production and business operations must be based on state programs, guidelines and plans, and must be conducted according to the principle of economic accounting to ensure profits. Cooperatives must not deviate from state programs, guidelines and plans to attend to their immediate interests only, since, in doing so, they would harm the common interests and violate the state law.

Authority of Cooperatives (Article 4)

After a cooperative has been recognized by the district people's committee, sponsored by the state in accordance with law and recognized legally to own property, it will become independent in production, business, finance and distribution within the framework of the state policies, systems and laws. Based on the general plans and guidelines of sectors and localities, cooperatives may select and decide production and business guidelines, job and professional structure and proper technical equipment to achieve high economic results. Higher level management agencies may not press cooperatives. If they do and cooperatives incur losses the responsible personnel must compensate for part of or all the losses depending on the specific situation in the cooperatives.

Those cooperatives which have fulfilled their obligations, paid taxes and sold products to the state according to contracts, will be authorized to use, distribute and consume the remaining products. State business agencies must be fair and just in their trade relations with cooperatives.

After paying all debts (if any) to the state, cooperatives may use their capital and funds for production and business or for improving their members' livelihood. Authorities at all echelons and of all sectors and business units may not appropriate cooperatives' funds. On the contrary, they must observe the regulations and help cooperatives, become independent financially.

Cooperatives' property is a socialist asset and belongs to the collectives. Cooperatives' assets including funds may not be used for purposes not related to cooperatives' activities, except in emergency cases as ordered by local

authorities in compliance with Decree No 232-CP dated 21 November 1965 of the government council, now the council of ministers.

Qualifications for Cooperatives' Membership (Article 5)

Applicants for membership must be present when the congress of cooperative members meets to consider and decide on recruitment. Members will be recruited individually and not by families. The recruitment must be balanced with the availability of production means and in accordance with the technical labor norm. Additional members will not be recruited when cooperatives are short of production means.

Former members of cooperatives who return upon their completion of military service will retain their membership. Those who complete their military service and were not former members, will have to be recruited in accordance with regulations if they want to join the cooperatives.

Cooperative members under 18 years old enjoy the same duties and benefits as others but they are not authorized to elect nor stand for elections to management agencies.

Upon joining the cooperatives, every member must contribute their two shares.

One collectivized share is used to purchase production means and the other is used to defray production costs throughout the production process.

Those members who own production means necessary to collectives must deliver them to the cooperatives and may use them as contributing shares. These two types of shares are determined mainly by production requirements. At the same time, the capability of large numbers of members to contribute shares must be also taken into account.

The congress of cooperative members will consider and determine a rational collectivized share by dividing the value of fixed assets necessary to fishery production to the number of cooperative-member fishermen.

The production cost share will be considered and determined rationally by the congress of cooperative members by dividing the production cost requirements of one main crop to the number of cooperative members fishermen.

If cooperatives deal in several jobs and professions, those members engaged in fishery will contribute a unified share. The other members who perform such jobs as processing and salting fish, pushing carts and weaving nets and so on... will have their shares determined by the production and business requirements.

Those cooperatives which previously determined too low shares or incurred losses in their business and currently are short of capital may decide at a congress of members to increase shares. With regard to new members or old members who only pay their shares now, the value of their shares must be commensurate to that of the new assets.

Those who drag on paying their shares, will be disqualified for membership and be removed from cooperatives.

Duties and Benefits of Cooperative Members (Articles 6 and 7)

Besides such duties as going out to sea, producing and repairing boats and nets.... Depending on the specific conditions of cooperatives, their members can practice the family-based economy by raising animals, growing crops, tapping forest products, weaving mats, raising silkworms and so forth. When the sea is rough and boats and nets await repair, cooperative members may use this leisure time to catch marine products along the coast at ebb tide (at authorized places) or to angle. Part of the catch from angling must be delivered to the cooperatives for depreciation and accumulation purposes (depending on the sizes of the catches).

Although the state and cooperatives should promote the development of a family-based economy, cooperative members should not run after their private jobs, nor should they use the boats, nets and time of collectives to seek personal profit and interests which adversely affect the collective production, business and income.

To Withdraw From Membership (Article 8)

Those who withdraw from cooperative membership will be reimbursed their shares and will be paid all debts (if any) which the cooperatives still owe them. However, if the cooperatives incur some justified losses, those who withdraw must also share part of the losses.

This is how to compute loss shares: Divide the annual losses of one year to the total number of working cooperative members of that year. The quotients of such a division made for all the years during which the cooperatives have suffered losses will be added together to make up the loss share to be shouldered by each person who withdraws. After losses have been deducted from the contributive shares, those who withdraw may get the remaining portions--if any--of their shares. On the contrary, if losses are higher than the contributive shares, those who withdraw must make additional contributions to compensate for losses. Only by doing so can the withdrawal from cooperative membership or the transfer to another locality be legal.

Shares of dead members are transferrable to their surviving children if the latter's join the cooperatives. These children still have to make additional contributions if losses (if such is the case) are higher than the contributive shares left behind by their fathers. If the dead members have no surviving children to join the cooperatives, their shares will be transferred to any heir apparents. If the cooperatives incur losses, the heir apparent must compensate for these losses to make up the shares. However, if losses are higher than the contributive shares, they will not have to make additional contributions.

Members who are removed from cooperatives for disciplinary reasons at a congress of cooperative members must still shoulder the losses as in the cases of those who voluntarily withdraw.

There is no question of distributing interests to members leaving the cooperatives because part of the interests has been actually transferred to the accumulation and welfare funds and been transformed into material assets while the rest has been distributed to working cooperative members.

Members Leaving Cooperatives Temporarily (Article 9)

Those cooperatives members who are drafted or assigned temporary duties by the party, administration, people's organizations and village and hamlet authorities, will retain their membership. The time they are temporarily away from cooperatives will be accounted as continuous. These members are still entitled to all welfare benefits but they cannot withdraw their shares nor have they to shoulder losses.

Appropriate jobs must be arranged for those old and infirm or needy members or welfare funds will be used to help them.

If there are no production jobs along the coast for those old members unable to offshore, the cooperatives must arrange traditional jobs along the coast for them. These old members are entitled to the collective welfare benefits of the cooperatives.

Collectivize Production Means (Article 19)

The production means of cooperative members which have been brought to the cooperatives, will be assessed and collectivized. (To be considered as collective property.)

These production means must be evaluated satisfactorily on a voluntary basis which will be beneficial to both collectives and individuals. In evaluating production means, we must refer to the state directed prices and the quality of the items. The remaining use value of the production means will be discussed and determined collectively.

Those production means for which state directed prices are not available will be evaluated and priced in comparison with equivalent commodities for which state directed prices are already fixed.

In those cooperatives where production means have been priced in accordance with interministerial circular No 3 dated 21 March 1979, excluding those production means already paid for, the remaining ones will temporarily be priced threefold higher as directed in guidance No 2108/HTX dated 17 December 1981 of the maritime products ministry.

In those cooperatives where production means have been priced as agreed upon by members, the prices of these production means will not be adjusted in general, except in special cases which call for an adjustment in the prices of the remaining assets. Then the state directed prices will be used to evaluate these assets approximately.

If the monetary value of production means used as contributions to collective shares is lower than that of the shares, additional contributions must be made. On the contrary, if it is higher, the excess will be reimbursed gradually de-

pending on the financial situation of the cooperatives involved, the management committees may recommend a congress of cooperative members to decide the advance of amounts higher than those paid annually.

Withdrawers from cooperatives may not withdraw their production means which have been contributed to the cooperatives and been collectivized. With respect to capital in terms of collectivized production means of the remaining shareholders, the cooperatives will continue to pay both principal and interest to the shareholders in accordance with specified regulations.

If owners of boats, nets and other tools who are now old and weak and cannot go out to sea, volunteer to place these production means in the cooperatives, the cooperatives may either buy them or share them with the owners according to the principle of benefiting both sides.

If those people of other sectors and professions want to invest in the business of maritime products cooperatives, they may do so and share the interests according to the principles to be agreed upon by and with benefits to both sides.

Reorganization of Production (Article 20)

To fully develop their capabilities, sources of profit, and manpower aimed at accelerating production and improving the livelihood of cooperative members on a district or village scale, the cooperatives must, depending on the conditions in each area of the waterways and sandbanks along the coastline or around off-shore islands, combine the development of marine products (exploitation, raising, cultivation, and processing of marine products for export in particular) with the development of agriculture, forestry, salt production, small industry and handicrafts in such organizational forms as:

--Marine products cooperatives with work teams engaged in agricultural, forestry, salt, small industrial and handicraft production. These teams, however, should practice economic accountability separately but contribute to a common welfare fund.

--Agricultural, forestry, salt production, and handicraft cooperatives which can organize work teams to exploit, raise, cultivate and process marine products.

--In villages and at in-shore fisheries, male laborers should be assigned to work in marine products cooperatives while female laborers should join agricultural, forestry, small industrial and handicraft cooperatives.

--In localities where conditions permit, land can be allotted to families specialized in fishery on a loan basis so that they can practice the family-based economy.

Contract and Wage Payment Systems

The distribution of income and payment of wages must be based on the technical skills, labor results and economic efficiency of each production unit and co-

operatives must apply end-product contracts with each production unit or each fishing boat unit under two forms:

1. Contracts under which wages are paid according to the actual income.
2. Contracts under which wages are paid according to the fixed income (based on decision No 16-CP and directive No 494 issued by the Ministry of Marine Products on 6 September 1981).

All cooperatives can depend on their situation to choose one of these two contractual forms. However, they must go by the contract quotas and apply the contract system to give rewards, mete out punishment and distribute income, and must not use the distribution of fish to cooperative members as a substitute for the application of the contractual system.

With regard to indirect laborers such as chairman, vice chairmen and members of the boards of management or chairmen of the control committees, they must spend one-third of their time each year participating directly in production or guiding production at sea. With regard to professional cadres such as accountants, statisticians, storekeepers and treasurers, they should be decided by a congress of cooperative members, depending on the specific conditions in each cooperative. However, if their workload is heavy enough, it is not necessary for them to participate in production at sea anyway.

As for those with good technical skills in catching, raising, cultivating, processing and preserving marine products (especially marine products for export), apart from applying the product contract system, cooperatives are allowed to pay them with unusual favor.

Distribution of Income (Article 25)

The formulation of programs and plans concerning income and distribution must be closely linked with the formulation of the cooperatives' contract plans for each production unit.

The distribution of income within marine products cooperatives must be consistent with the following principle: Production expenses, the costs of depreciation on fixed assets, administrative expenses and payments of interest and state taxes must first be subtracted in full from the gross revenue (all sources of income to be distributed); the remainder is actual income and shall be divided up for inclusion into the accumulation fund, the public welfare fund and the award fund, and for distribution to cooperative members.

The amount for inclusion into the accumulation fund must be adjusted to meet the production situation. When production is low and unstable and the resultant income is too small, the accumulation money may be reduced. In special cases, the accumulation money may be reduced. In special cases, no money is set aside for the accumulation fund in order to ensure the livelihood of cooperative members; but this must be approved by the district marine products committee.

The amounts for inclusion into the public welfare and award funds must also be suitably adjusted according to actual income.

For the part of income targeted for distribution, it is necessary to ensure that the workers are paid in accordance with the man-days they have accumulated and with their technical labor compensation rates.

Persons who do not engage directly in productive labor or who do not work directly in the cooperative do not have the right to participate under any form in the distribution process.

Dissolution and Reorganization of Cooperatives (Article 29)

When a decision to dissolve a cooperative is made, measures must be taken at the same time to reorganize that cooperative in a suitable form and on a suitable scale.

To safeguard the property of the cooperative and the state, the district people's committee must entrust the committees and sectors concerned, the village or city ward people's committee and the cooperative managerial board with the task of making an inventory and appraisal of the property in question and protecting it until a final decision is made concerning its liquidation.

A number of cooperatives are organized in accordance with the high-level format. Now if there arises a need for them to be reorganized into low-level cooperation teams, all the set procedures for such a process must be carried out correctly with unanimous approval by a congress of cooperative members, with the village or city ward people's committee's certification and referral to the district people's committee for decision (pending approval from the marine products sector at the provincial level), and with debts, shares and assets liquidated in accordance with the provisional regulations for low-level production cooperation teams.

The aforementioned principles and procedures also apply to the reorganization and consolidation of some all too weak cooperatives that must rescreen their members and reorganize the work force and their production operations.

If, for some reason, a cooperative is to be dissolved, the district or city people's committee shall order the marine products sector and other sectors concerned, together with the village or city ward administration, to call a meeting of the managerial board or the remaining members of that cooperative in order to make an inventory of its assets and file a report with the district or city people's committee which will decide on all pertinent economic and financial matters in accordance with the regulations, policies and law of the state.

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AGRICULTURE

BRIEFS

FLOODS IN NORTHERN PROVINCES--As a result of heavy rains between 15-20 August, some 77,500 hectares of 10th-month rice in Hai Hung, Ha Nam Ninh, Ha Bac, Ha Son Binh and Vinh Phu Provinces and Hanoi have been affected by floods. Heavily affected provinces are Hai Hung, 20,000 hectares; Ha Son Binh, 20,000 hectares; Ha Bac, 13,000 hectares; and Ha Nam Ninh, 12,000 hectares. [BK260339 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 22 Aug 82]

HA NAM NINH PADDY--As of mid-August, Ha Nam Ninh Province had purchased 23,000 tons of paddy beyond set quota. It is buying 10,000 additional tons from agricultural cooperatives. The province has earlier fulfilled its grain obligation this year and is buying surplus paddy from agricultural cooperatives and peasants. [BK270855 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 26 Aug 82]

DONG THAP 10TH-MONTH RICE--As of 20 August, Dong Thap Province had sown rice seedlings on 95,700 hectares for the 10th-month rice crop, achieving 87 percent of the plan norm. Almost all districts of the province have fulfilled their plan norm in the 10th-month rice planting and peasants are caring for their ricefields and preparing equipment to cope with possible threat by harmful insects. [BK270855 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 25 Aug 82]

MEKONG DELTA IRRIGATION WORK--In 1981 and during the first 6 months of 1982, nine provinces in the Mekong River Delta spent more than 63 million dong from both the central and local funds for the improvement of their irrigation networks. The work, among other things, involved the excavation and embankment of 46 million cubic meters of dirt. [BK271613 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0400 GMT 22 Aug 82]

AN GIANG RICE HARVEST--An Giang Province has harvested 15,300 out of 75,000 hectares of rice planted in this summer-fall crop season, with an average yield of 3.5 tons per hectare. Thanks to the application of the product contract system, tens of cooperatives and production collectives in Phu Tan and Cho Maoi Districts have even attained a yield of 4 tons per hectare. [BK271613 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 18 Aug 82] To date An Giang Province has overfulfilled its grain collection norm for the 10th-month crop and winter-spring crop seasons by 6.5 percent or fulfilled 82 percent of its grain collection norm for 1982. As a result of floods and flash floods, the rice output of An Giang in the previous 10th-month crop season dropped by nearly 100,000 tons. However, thanks to its success in the winter-spring rice crop, the province was able to increase its grain collection norm for this crop season by 200 percent over last year. [BK271613 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0400 GMT 20 Aug 82]

BEN TRE AGRICULTURAL TRANSFORMATION--Ben Tre Province now has 484 production collectives and seven agricultural cooperatives. These production collectives and cooperatives have absorbed more than 19,000 peasant families and taken over the management of more than 12,500 hectares or 13 percent of the total area of cultivated land in the province. Some 204 production collectives and all seven cooperatives in the province have already applied the product contract system. [BK271613 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 19 Aug 82] Over the past 6 months Ben Tre Province has collected more than 14,000 tons of grain, fulfilling 45 percent of the annual plan. The province has turned over to the central government more than 11,000 tons overfulfilling the set target by 1,700 tons. Ben Tre has also purchased more than 24,600 tons of coconut, 21,000 tons of pork, 3,800 tons of marine products and 147,000 tons of sugar. [BK271613 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0400 GMT 21 Aug 82]

MEKONG DELTA WATER CONSERVANCY--The water conservancy sector of provinces in the Mekong River Delta and east Nam Bo recently held a conference to review tasks for the last 6 months. The conference noted that despite numerous difficulties, 99 percent of this year's winter-spring rice area has been irrigated. The conference also discussed measures to accelerate water conservancy projects at various localities to serve agriculture effectively. [BK270615 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 24 Aug 82]

NGHIA BINH WINTER-SPRING RICE--Despite severe floods in the recent winter-spring crop, Nghia Binh Province produced 190,000 tons of grain thanks to efforts contributed by the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union members. The youths helped in accelerating water conservancy projects, producing fertilizer and eradicating harmful insects. [Bk270615 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0400 GMT 25 Aug 82] As of 15 August, Nghia Binh Province had harvested more than 23,000 hectares of early summer-fall rice, achieving almost 50 percent of its plan norm. The average yield is more than 29 quintal per hectare or 2 quintal more than last year's yield. Despite the prolonged drought, the province planted more than 90 percent of the planned area or 4,000 hectares more than last year. [BK270615 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 24 Aug 82]

THUANHAI PADDY DELIVERY--To date Thuan Hai Province has delivered some 5,000 tons of paddy to state granaries. This figure, which represents 23 percent of the planned norm and shows an increase of 2,200 tons over the same period last year, includes 2,260 tons collected in the form of agricultural tax and 1,100 tons purchased under two-way contracts. [BK270615 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0400 GMT 19 Aug 82]

DONG THAP PADDY COLLECTION--By early August, Dong Thap Province had collected more than 140,000 tons of paddy. This figure, which represents nearly 94 percent of the annual plan and shows an increase of tens of thousands of tons over the same period last year, includes more than 22,500 tons collected in the form of agricultural tax. [BK270615 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 18 Aug 82]

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HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

MORE CHEMICALS TO BE PRODUCED FOR USE IN AGRICULTURE

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 29 Jul 82 p 2

[Article by Le Van Dy, chief, Chemicals General Department: "Developing Production of Various Kinds of Chemicals"]

[Text] In the production plans of the last few years and of the coming ones, the chemical products that serve agriculture are of many kinds. Some serve it directly, others indirectly, such as different kinds of tires for Bong Sen plowing machines and large tractors, tires for improved vehicles, different kinds of batteries for plowing machines to serve agricultural mechanization; various kinds of rubber water pipes, belts, elbows and gaskets for pumps used in the water conservancy sector; various chemical products like minerals-rich feed for domestic animals and fowls, fluorine-free phosphate, other phosphatic salts, feed for domestic animals to gain weight and chemicals for getting rid of parasitic worms and flukes in hogs; products manufactured and ordered on a larger scale like various kinds of insecticides, weed killers, fungicides; and fertilizers like phosphate and nitrate fertilizers playing an important role in raising crop yields.

At present, there still are very few products of the chemicals sector that serve agriculture and they do not satisfy the needs for varieties and quantities. The economy in general and agriculture in particular require the chemicals sector to reach forward to satisfy these increasing needs. It must reach forward in a positive manner in the following directions:

- To fully use the existing material and technical bases, to exploit every potential for the purpose of developing most effectively the capacity to produce chemicals used in agriculture and to save foreign exchange, which normally is used to import a number of chemicals that can be produced or ordered domestically. We think that there must be unified policies with respect to the above-mentioned matters so as to exploit early this existing potential.
- To concentrate on in-depth investment and development through improvement of industry and equipment in order to raise producing power and product quality; to

save materials, raw materials and energy; and to increase the number of products used in agriculture. The Chemicals General Department is concentrating leadership on the production installations that make fertilizer, germicide, etc. to urge them to move in this direction. This is the most effective measure, for it requires little investment but products are made quickly.

- To boldly change direction and to reorganize production; to make adjustments for the production installations and the kinds of chemicals that work less effectively in order to switch to new products that society needs and may bring about better results. This policy not only helps to resolve difficulties and confusion in production but also creates favorable conditions for increasing varieties of products and fully using the material and technical base and labor to make more products. For instance, the enterprises that now grind apatite will switch to producing various kinds of more useful fertilizers and chemicals.

- To increase the pace of new construction and to improve and expand such installations as Lam Thao superphosphate plant, apatite mines, minerals-enriching plants, as well as a number of other agriculture-serving installations. The above-mentioned installations have been listed by the state as the key ones. As they are put into operation, they will create favorable conditions for quickly increasing the products used in agriculture.

- To step up scientific research, planning and manufacturing on the basis of resources being available in the country to gradually replace some of the imported raw materials and fuels and to develop new products, thus promoting self-sufficiency in production. While we are still unable to balance our export and import, if we want to be self-sufficient in raw materials and fuels, we must study the use of domestic resources and at the same time have a good control over the productive industries, thus having the right conditions for stabilizing and developing production. By following this direction, the Chemicals General Department recently produced on a trial basis a kind of roasted phosphate fertilizer in a large-output kiln totally using domestic raw materials and fuel. These kinds of kilns were not used before because by design they would need imported fuels. The result of this study will help to boost production of fertilizer for agriculture.

Many other chemical products used in agriculture also are made of domestic raw materials, such as chemicals that help domestic animals to gain weight, promote and regulate growth and kill rats and weeds.

The development of an industrial sector is not achieved solely by this sector but also depends on many factors including the state investment policy and guidelines aimed at making more products for agriculture. This is the only way to promote a synchronized and concentrated development of all agriculture-serving sectors effectively. The fact that the chemicals sector was developed rather slowly in the past years was mostly due to conditions in the country in connection with communications and transportation, energy, fuels, equipment, means, etc. failing to be

resolved in a synchronized manner. Under the conditions of chemical products, mostly fertilizer and insecticide being in short supply, we must take appropriate measures in connection with their use, storage and distribution to get the best results from them, such as what kind of fertilizer and how much to use for a certain kind of soil, a certain kind of crop, etc. This measure has the effect of showing the efficacy of different kinds of fertilizers and saving them.

The waste of fertilizer which is commonplace occurs during transportation and storage. Many localities that do not do this job properly lose up to 30-40 percent of nutrients. We must soon determine regulations that help to overcome the above-mentioned shortcomings.

To serve agriculture is one of the principal tasks of the chemicals sector. The Fifth Party Congress resolution clearly indicates the following: To step up production of (nitrate and phosphate) fertilizers and insecticide to serve agriculture. To exploit and use domestically produced raw materials to produce on a small and intermediate scale the necessary chemicals of various kinds in order to replace in time the imported chemicals. To restore and expand the Lao Cai apatite mine. To prepare for construction of an apatite-enriching plant. To expand the Lam Thao superphosphate plant. To exploit and import pyrite and to produce more roasted phosphate fertilizer to increase the production of phosphate fertilizers of all kinds to 300,000-400,000 tons by 1985. The Chemicals General Department is going to actively carry out the norms set by the party congress. The production of processed phosphate fertilizers alone has increased by 200-217 percent as compared with 1980, but in terms of the need of agriculture this increase can hardly satisfy it all. There must be assistance from all sectors and echelons and proper leadership and investment of the state to allow the chemicals sector to successfully carry out the norms set by the congress and to create a base for stepping up production to serve agriculture in the coming years.

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HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

READER SUGGESTS IMPROVEMENTS IN COAL PRODUCTION, SUPPLY

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 29 Jul 82 p 2

[From Readers' Letters column by Hoang Bich Anh of Quang Ninh Province: "Coal for Industrial Production"]

[Text] Recently the distribution of coal to the industrial, small industrial and handicraft production installations in Hanoi and other localities failed to satisfy their need in terms of quantities and time and thus created great obstacles to production. One of the reasons behind this situation was the fact that the harbors having yards for unloading coal did not operate on a regular basis, with some of them having ceased to operate for repairs, and as a result the quantities of coal unloaded were reduced. At one time Hanoi had to use secondary unloading points like An Duong and Khuyen Luong piers, but still the need for coal to serve industrial production was not fully satisfied.

The quality of coal was also poorer than before. The coal from Vang Danh was in the same situation. Although sorting and grading was done right in the mines, there was no control over selecting for loading and transporting; the percentage of dust coal in lump coal consequently increased considerably (from 40 to 50 percent). With such mixture of coal, enterprises and factories were able to use lumps of 40 millimeters or more in diameter, hence, only 30-40 percent of the coal they had bought. This situation thus involves labor for sorting and waste during transportation.

In my opinion, the harbors must step up repairs of piers and yards to finish them within a short time so as to soon accommodate unloading of coal from barges, get enough unloading equipment ready in the coal storage yards and at the same time improve selection and storage to raise the quality and quantities of coal, thus contributing to stepping up development of industrial, small industrial and handicraft production.

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