Joint Operations in Canada: Necessary or Merely Fashionable
Abstract
The end of the Cold War has resulted in a new strategic environment. While the threat to national survival has declined for NATO nations, the threats to international stability and prosperity from smaller conflicts have increased. At the same time governments have reduced the size of their armed forces in order to realize a peace dividend. In order to mitigate the reductions, armed forces have adopted the doctrine of joint operations. This monograph examines whether joint operations between Canada's Land Forces and Maritime Forces are necessary for the achievement of Canada's defence objectives. It examines the Canada's strategic context, its defence policy and its doctrine. The monograph also compares Canada's approach to two close allies, Australia and the United Kingdom. The monograph concludes the primary warfighting tasks assigned to the Canadian Forces can be achieved without joint land and maritime operations. There is room for such operations in domestic operations, in evacuation of non-combatants from strife torn areas of the world and in the delivery of international humanitarian and disaster relief. While no direct lessons can be drawn from the United Kingdom experience, a reorientation of the defence of Canadian territory along the lines of the Australian approach, provides room for joint land and maritime operations.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 27, 1999
- Accession Number
- ADA370306
Entities
People
- Paul A. Duff
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College