Using the Same Decisionmaking Process for Joint and Army Operations.
Abstract
This monograph recommends that the U.S. Army adopts the operational planning process, found in Joint doctrine, for decision making at the division and corps level. The operational planning process is compared to the military decision making process. This comparison identifies tasks that are unique to the Joint operational planning process-determine center(s) of gravity and decisive points, conduct a force structure analysis, and determine an operational end state. The impact of introducing these new tasks is that the staff's decision making performance declines. The interaction of feedback and experience on decision making performance is examined. An analysis of the transition between the military decision making process to the operational planning process identifies the demand for the staff to develop experience in these new tasks. Lack of experience not only effects the staff's performance, but also degrades the ability of the chief of staff to improve the staff's performance through feedback. Since the analytical task of the military decision making process are mirrored in the operational planning process, the recommendation to change processes is made in order to satisfy the demands to develop experience.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 27, 1999
- Accession Number
- ADA370347
Entities
People
- Kenneth R. Smith
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College