DESERT STORM: Doctrinal Airland Battle Success or "The American Way of War?"
Abstract
The purpose of this monograph is to answer the question, "Did the United States Army use AirLand Battle at the operational level to win the Persian Gulf War?" This research studied the planning and execution, at the operational level, of Desert Shield/Desert Storm to determine if the U.S. Army did use the operational model of AirLand Battle to achieve victory in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The research only focused on the Army performance and did not address in detail the Joint aspect of military operations in the Persian Gulf War. The criteria for analysis was based on selective AirLand Battle imperatives defined in FM100-5, Operations, dated May 1986. Ensure unity of effort, Concentrate combat power against enemy vulnerabilities, and Anticipate events on the battlefield were the three AirLand Battle imperatives used as evaluation criteria. They were selected from the complete list of AirLand Battle imperatives discussed in the manual because they focus on issues called to question on rather AirLand Battle was used to win the Persian Gulf War. The study of Desert Shield/Desert Storm revealed that the U.S. Army did use the three AirLand Battle imperatives of ensure unity of effort, concentrate combat power against enemy vulnerabilities, and anticipate events on the battlefield as a basis to conduct the Gulf War. Mistakes were made in applying these imperatives, however, the ground offensive was planned and conducted in accordance with the Army's AirLand Battle doctrine. The AirLand Battle doctrine that was developed during the decade following the U.S. defeat in Vietnam, and is an application of classic twentieth-century maneuver theory for mechanized forces.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 27, 1999
- Accession Number
- ADA370380
Entities
People
- Robert J. Paquin
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College