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The Serbo-Croatian War: A Failure of the Principles of War


by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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## **ABSTRACT**

The Serbo-Croatian war was the first in a series of wars that the Serbs would fight following the break-up of Yugoslavia. Analyzing the conflict using the Principles of War provides military planners valuable insight to the structure and capability of an opponent that NATO could face today.

This paper will argue that the inability of the Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA) to develop and execute operational objectives from national strategy resulted in their failure in the 1991 Serbo-Croatian War, even though faced with an inferior Croatian force. It will further argue that the JNA's operational plan violated nearly every Principle of War, but in the process, set the stage for future operations because of a failure to realize the political objective. Finally, it will compare the Serbo-Croatian War to the NATO conflict in Kosovo today and conclude with some operational lessons learned.

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## **Introduction**

Success in military operations begins with a strategy to achieve an objective that supports the political end-state. This strategy is the basis for an operational plan that judiciously melds the ends, ways, means, and risks to realize the strategic objective. Without a coherent strategy or direction, operational plans are bound to be haphazard and out of synchronization with the other instruments of power, and most assuredly, the catalyst to failure.

Military planners and analysts often use the "Principles of War" as part of operational art to develop military plans and synchronize military operations. Today military planners use nine Principles of War: objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise and simplicity.<sup>1</sup> These Principles of War do not guarantee success; rather they provide the framework of doctrine from which military force, when used as an instrument of power, can be a successful element in achieving strategic goals.

This paper will argue that the inability of the Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA) to develop and execute operational objectives from national strategy resulted in their failure in the 1991 Serbo-Croatian War, even though faced with an inferior Croatian force. It will further argue that the JNA's operational plan violated nearly every Principle of War, but in the process, because of a failure to realize the political objective, set the stage for future operations. Finally, it will compare the Serbo-Croatian War to the NATO conflict in Kosovo today and conclude with some operational lessons learned.

## Background

To understand the Serbian objectives in the war we must understand their national strategy. Yugoslavia, a territory consisting primarily of Serbs, Croats, Slavenes, Muslims, Albanians, Macedonians, Montenegrins and Yugoslavs, has historically been prone to ethnic clashes and nationalist movements. The President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, codified the political and multi-ethnic federation of republics and provinces in the 1974 Yugoslav constitution. The constitution provided a basis for individual statehood and political autonomy of each republic (under one economy), but prohibited independence. Tito's suppression of democratic and nationalist movements within the republics by his "rule of law" was the backbone of Yugoslavia's unity during his thirty-four year reign.<sup>2</sup>

Following Tito's death in 1980, internal political and economic conflicts within the republics increased, and Yugoslavia began its self-destruction.<sup>3</sup> In 1986, the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences released the *Serbian Memorandum* that professed the "Greater Serbia" movement that claimed "the establishment of the full national integrity of the Serbian people, regardless of the republic or province it inhabits, is its historic and democratic right."<sup>4</sup> The *Memorandum* was not a strategy or operational plan; rather it served to motivate and mobilize the Serbs and created the mass-psychological preconditions for Serb aggression in Yugoslavia.<sup>5</sup>

In 1987, Slobodan Milosevic emerged as a new political leader in the Communist party of Serbia under the auspices of Serbian nationalism.<sup>6</sup> Milosevic, who had catered to the people's thirst for leadership, sought to create a "Greater Serbia" and centralize the Yugoslav federation in Belgrade.<sup>7</sup> Milosevic charismatically rallied the Serbs, who were

convinced that they had been wronged throughout history, around the nationalistic cause.<sup>8</sup> Milosevic's quest for "Greater Serbia" would foreshadow Serbia's intent of territorial expansion and ethnic homogenization. This movement would have implications in Croatia since "Greater Serbia" included territories in Croatia where Serbs were a minority.

Milosevic was elected President of Serbia in May, 1989. His future success lay in his ability to control the instruments of power within Yugoslavia. While genuinely concerned with the Serbian cause, Milosevic first would use whatever means necessary to retain his power.<sup>9</sup> If policy failed, he could rely on the only remaining instrument of power at his disposal: the military.

It is important to understand the evolution of the Yugoslav military forces since this had a direct impact on the operations that took place during the 1991 war in Croatia. Following World War II, the Total National Defense force (TND) was formed to guard against attack from the Soviet Union. The concept, and hence their doctrine, was based on a team effort against an external force, and was dependent on the mobilization of all cultural, ethnic, societal and military resources within Yugoslavia.<sup>10</sup> TND was a coordinated force consisting of the Yugoslav army, Territorial Defense Forces (TDF), and the local population including the police and border forces. Weapons, ammunition, territorial defense units, and command and control were decentralized and dispersed throughout the republics and communities of Yugoslavia.<sup>11</sup> TDF's were reserve forces comprised of former JNA veterans, while the federal army, known as the Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA), included the active army, navy, and air forces.<sup>12</sup> Mobilization of

the TDF was a regional responsibility and would, by design, reflect the ethnic composition of the local area.

The JNA was a multiethnic force which, historically, had been used as a unifying force within Yugoslavia for national defense and for defense of the communist system.<sup>13</sup> The JNA was a conscription-based army trained primarily in guerilla warfare to challenge threats within the rough terrain of Yugoslavia. Although the troops were ethnically diverse, the Serbs dominated the Officer Corps.<sup>14</sup>

The 1974 Yugoslav Constitution established the command relationships between the federal government and the JNA. In summary, the JNA General Staff took orders from the eight-member collective presidency while the Federal President acted as the commander-in-chief.<sup>15</sup> However, several constitutional amendments enacted between 1988 and 1991 increased the political autonomy of the various regions. This led to the republics exerting greater control of the TDF and JNA units stationed within those regions.<sup>16</sup> With this change, the JNA was no longer a centralized army.

In 1990, a series of events occurred which, when taken cumulatively, led to the Serbo-Croatian war. Following the fall of communism in 1989, Slovenia and Croatia maneuvered for independence. In 1990, multi-party elections were held in the six republics of Yugoslavia. Both Slovenia and Croatia elected democratic governments and within a year voted for independence. Over the next year, Serbian political dominance in Yugoslavia deteriorated. Negotiations between the Serbian, Croatian, and Slovenian presidents for a unified Yugoslavia had failed. On June 25, 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence.



The war between Serbia and Croatia took place between July, 1991 and January, 1992 following Croatia's secession from Yugoslavia. After the conflict, the JNA reorganized several times and is now known as the Serbian army. Appendix A lists the chronological order of the events significant to this paper. Appendix B provides maps to aid in visualizing the events of the conflict.

### **Principles of War**

As stated in the introduction, this paper will analyze the Principles of War as they apply to the Serbs in the Serbo-Croatian war. Due to the scope and limitations imposed on the paper, however, the author will only analyze those six principles that were most significant to the outcome of the war.

**1) Objective.** National strategic objectives are normally determined by the policies of a government and in turn formulate the basis for military strategic and operational objectives. Of the nine Principles of War, "objective" is probably considered the most critical to ensuring success in military operations as it provides the purpose for every military operation. "The purpose of objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective."<sup>17</sup> Thus, accomplishment of the objective should facilitate the strategic objective and the desired end-state. For Serbia, the desired end-state was a "Greater Serbia" and the difference between the military objective and the political end-state was the genesis of their failure.

The JNA, subordinate to the collective presidency of Yugoslavia, was in a precarious situation in early 1991. The presidency could not agree on the Yugoslav end-state. The Croats argued for a loose federation, as they feared Serbian domination, while the Serbs demanded a strong centralized state.<sup>18</sup> Meanwhile, Milosevic had been secretly

planning for the future disposition of the JNA through a select group of Serbian General officers should Yugoslavia crumble.<sup>19</sup> "Defense of Communism" may have been the likely facilitator of Milosevic's influence over some of the General staff. "RAM,"<sup>20</sup> as the plan is now known, is believed to have contained the objectives for the limited territorial expansion of Serbia, as well as a plan to organize the Serbs outside of Serbia and pre-position arms and ammunition for their use.<sup>21</sup> The plan, which has never been published, also involved "ethnic cleansing" of areas where Serbs resided as a minority.<sup>22</sup>

Milosevic had hoped to negotiate a "Greater Serbia" politically by maintaining the unity of Yugoslavia, but that vision failed when Croatia seceded in June, 1991.<sup>23</sup> His only remaining instrument of power was the JNA. Meanwhile, the JNA was apparently planning a military coup in order to "save Yugoslavia."<sup>24</sup> Though not proven, the coup theory is at least partially supported by the difference in objectives. When the conflict broke, the initial JNA operational objectives included the occupation of Croatia and the overthrow of the newly elected government.<sup>25</sup>

There was another difference between Milosevic's objective and that of the JNA. Milosevic's "Greater Serbia" was limited to regions of Croatia where Serbs resided, sometimes in a majority. The JNA's objective, on the other hand, encompassed all of Croatia and did not use a realistic accounting of the ethnic composition of Croatia. Prior to the conflict, Serbs made up only 12% of the Croatian population.<sup>26</sup> With this small minority, one could reasonably expect that Serb occupation would likely result in an uprising of the populace (especially where Croats were the clear majority) and protracted guerrilla warfare (as was shown during the German insurgency in the Balkans during WWII).<sup>27</sup> Additionally, the JNA garrisons of the TDF were located throughout Croatia

and would be a likely target for the resistance. Therefore, the JNA's objective was probably too aggressive and not likely to achieve the desired end-state.

The other issue which affected the objective was that of "plausible denial."<sup>28</sup> A clearly defined and decisive objective infers that military objectives must be in consonance with political objectives. If they are not, there will be an adverse effect on the accomplishment of the overall aims of the war. Milosevic, for a variety of political reasons, denied any involvement in directing the JNA's action.<sup>29</sup> In addition, it is unclear if Milosevic actually had complete control of the JNA, as evidenced by the clandestine development of plan "RAM", or whether this could have been by design. It is possible that Milosevic desired loose control in order to facilitate a policy of plausible deniability. Regardless, there was an apparent disconnect in the political and military objectives which ultimately contributed to failure in the conflict.

**2) Offense.** Operationally, a good offense is the most effective and decisive way to attain a clearly defined objective.<sup>30</sup> As shown in the analysis of "objective," there is considerable doubt as to whether or not the JNA had actually formulated a clear and decisive objective. Therefore, without an objective one could conclude that the JNA had little chance of seizing and exploiting the initiative.

On the other hand, the JNA made strategic preparations for an offensive prior to the war. Between 1990 and 1991 the JNA disarmed the Croatian TDF's and also secretly armed the Serbs in Croatia at that same time. Operationally, the JNA coordinated the paramilitary attacks in central, eastern and southern Croatia (Osijek, Vukovar, Dubrovnic, Zadar and Gospic) until nearly one-third of Croatia was under Serbian control.<sup>31</sup>

There was one attack in Croatia, however, where the JNA took a clear cut offensive. That was on Dubrovnik in southern Dalmatia.<sup>32</sup> The Dubrovnik operation was part of a larger operation that was designed to secure the Dalmatian coast.<sup>33</sup> But this offensive would not last and the JNA was never able to take the city. Instead, this battle was a demonstration of the JNA's willingness to bombard cities into rubble without a plan to actually complete the offensive.

The battle of Vukovar may have been the turning point in the war and therefore is a good illustration of many of the JNA's weaknesses. Vukovar is on the border of Serbian Vojvodina along the Danube River in eastern Croatia, which was just under 40 percent ethnic Serb in 1991.<sup>34</sup> Analysis of this battle reveals that the JNA's objectives revolved around a weak and sometimes non-existent offense.

The battle began in July, 1991 and ended November 18, 1991, but the JNA didn't get serious about an offensive until early October. During the first three months, the JNA surrounded the city and pounded Vukovar with artillery and air attacks. Instead of attacking the city, the JNA avoided a frontal attack and used tanks and artillery to protect the Serbian forces.<sup>35</sup> This strategy was in line with the original function of the JNA, which was to act in a defensive manner. In Vukovar, only about 1,500 Croatian police and National Guard troops held the city against over 30,000 heavily armed Serbian forces.<sup>36</sup> It was only after overwhelming destruction of the city, bitter street fighting and significant Serbian casualties that the city fell.<sup>37</sup> The unexpected defense served to inspire the Croats to the point that there was talk of a "Croatian Stalingrad."<sup>38</sup> Finally, the Croats gained valuable time during the impasse at Vukovar. They succeeded in not

only organizing their forces, but also in shifting units to counter some of the "best" units of the JNA.<sup>39</sup>

Based on the above analysis, it is plausible to conclude that the JNA had trouble with "offense" not only because the objectives were unclear, but also because the defensive mindset of the troops was fostered by their original military doctrine.

**3) Mass.** The JNA had army, naval, and air forces at their disposal from which they could achieve the massing effects of the combined warfare. Numerous degradations in military readiness, however, all but negated the synchronization potential of the JNA.<sup>40</sup> The JNA air force, for example, simply out-classed the Croatian air forces and should have enjoyed air superiority throughout the conflict.<sup>41</sup> However, their performance was dismal, characterized by poor tactics, poor training, poor execution, and even fratricide. In addition, the terrain hampered target acquisition and probably contributed to the high losses of aircraft from ground fire.<sup>42</sup> As a consequence, the air force was of little value in the war effort.<sup>43</sup>

This is not to say the JNA did not attempt to synchronize efforts. The most intense bombing during the war took place during the battle of Vukovar.<sup>44</sup> While the air forces bombed Vukovar, the army pounded the city with artillery. The ill-equipped Croats countered by "digging in."<sup>45</sup> The JNA army was unable to mass enough strength to overcome the Croats until mid-November because of insufficient training, desertion, poor logistics and lack of command and control.<sup>46</sup>

A similar situation to that of Vukovar had developed in the coastal city of Dubrovnic. In October, 1991, the JNA Naval forces had blockaded ports on the Adriatic and the Montenegrin troops of the JNA had surrounded the city.<sup>47</sup> The JNA cut off the

city's electricity and water supplies and shelled the city from the surrounding hills.<sup>48</sup> In this case, however, the Croatian coastal gun batteries were not secured by the JNA and these gun batteries eventually played a role in rendering the naval forces useless.<sup>49</sup> As a result, the synchronization effort in Dubrovnik failed completely and the Serbs never took the city.

By early November, Vukovar had become a political "thorn" to the JNA because the city had not fallen.<sup>50</sup> As a result, the JNA reorganized the Vukovar effort and augmented its forces in order to achieve success.<sup>51</sup> In a little over two weeks the city fell, but the damage had already been done. The JNA had lost "the wind in its sails" when it failed to mass its overwhelming combat power against a far inferior force.

**4) Economy of Force.** The JNA's ability to employ combat power was hampered by a number of factors which included mobilization difficulties and poor command and control.<sup>52</sup> These factors contributed to a failure in "economy of force" in the JNA's overall objective. Ultimately the failure of this Principle of War caused the JNA to modify its objectives and in doing so would allow the JNA to fight another day. In this regard, the JNA actually salvaged a "principle" failure and made it a success.

The JNA's original strategy was to isolate individual regions in Croatia by using its mobile forces to control the transportation arteries.<sup>53</sup> They used the Navy to control the coastline and the army, paramilitary and air forces to occupy the inland regions of Croatia.<sup>54</sup> By October, 1991, the JNA had deployed forces along a 190-mile front from the Adriatic coast to Virovitica, on the border of Hungary.<sup>55</sup> Their extended lines of operation and lines of communication, however, needed support.

Vukovar again best illustrates the JNA's failure to properly allocate combat power. On one hand, the Serbian paramilitary forces enabled the JNA to apply minimum personnel and assets, especially on "soft Targets."<sup>56</sup> This permitted the JNA to concentrate on the principle targets, of which one was Vukovar.<sup>57</sup> The Vukovar operation, however, had been stalled for nearly three months and the problem revolved around forces and command and control.<sup>58</sup> Mobilization, poor command and control, and desertion proved problematic and had a direct impact on the effectiveness of the combat forces.<sup>59</sup>

In Vukovar, conscripts disobeyed orders in the face of battle and officers could not get their men to fight.<sup>60</sup> Mobilized reservists "were fighting an undeclared war and had no clear idea of their purpose" and "there was no clear chain of command."<sup>61</sup> In addition, desertion was reportedly high.<sup>62</sup> In the end, the JNA Army Chief General Kadijevic blamed the failure of the original JNA plan on the "lack of success of mobilization and desertion" and went further to state that the failures "made it necessary to modify the tasks."<sup>63</sup>

The modified "tasks" included a withdrawal of the JNA's equipment from Croatia for redeployment at a future date.<sup>64</sup> Milosevic then protected his limited gains through a negotiated settlement with the Croats via the United Nations.<sup>65</sup>

**5) Unity of Command.** The elements that led to failure in development of the objectives also contributed to the lack of unity of command. Milosevic's plausible denial and the breakdown of the collective presidency could not possibly provide for a unity of effort under one responsible commander. Further, it was unclear who was "driving the train": Milosevic, the JNA, or the paramilitary forces.

There is some evidence of coordination and cooperation between JNA and the paramilitary forces. The paramilitary forces were, as were the TDF's, designed to operate under a decentralized command and control. Milosevic admitted in February, 1992 that he had assisted the paramilitary forces economically, politically, and later, with arms.<sup>66</sup> In addition, part of the JNA strategy was to support the paramilitary units and then move in and assume control.<sup>67</sup>

On the other hand, the very nature of the paramilitary activity clouded the issue of command and control. The structure was confusing even to the combatants.<sup>68</sup> In one case, a brigade commander complained that he had not even been told what the military objectives were and "his unit suffered because of that."<sup>69</sup> At best, there may be an argument that there was a degree of unity of effort. In the end the failure was in unity of command.

**6) Security.** Security was either a complete oversight or a miserable failure in the operational plans of the JNA. When the conflict began, the JNA had a clear advantage over the Croats in terms of firepower and mass. Following the elections in May, 1990 and the installation of the pro-independent Croatian democratic government, the JNA disarmed the Croatian forces (police, territorial defenses and reserves) leaving them "with little more than hunting rifles."<sup>70</sup> Even so, the Croats were still able to acquire arms and mount a respectable defense.

The JNA, on the other hand had thousands of tanks, artillery, armed personnel carriers, tactical aircraft and armed helicopters as well as over 200,000 active-duty personnel (not including reserves). In the early stages of the war, the JNA effectively



used tanks and artillery to protect the Serbian positions from a Croatian response.<sup>71</sup> The JNA soon discovered, however that superior firepower would not guarantee security.

The President of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, aware that his military would be no match against the Serb forces, had successfully avoided all out war up to mid-September, 1991.<sup>72</sup> The Serbian paramilitary forces, backed by the JNA, had succeeded in expanding Serbian territory well into the Krajina Republic, but had not captured the small village of Kijevo. Kijevo was identified as a security risk by the JNA in that it was a Croat village surrounded by Serb-held territory<sup>73</sup>.

On August 19, 1991 the JNA issued an ultimatum to the Croatian police: leave or face attack.<sup>74</sup> The 1,000 or so inhabitants left the village and on August 26 it was leveled to the ground.<sup>75</sup> Not only was this village the first victim of "cleansing" of the ground, but it became a symbol of resistance for the Croats.<sup>76</sup> The "security risk", however, was just a prelude of things to come.

There were several JNA garrisons spread throughout Croatia which were vulnerable to Croatian resistance. The JNA had planned to use these garrisons as part of their offensive action. Two weeks after the savage leveling of Kijevo, the Croats began their first counter-offensive in the war simply by surrounding the JNA garrisons in Croatia.<sup>77</sup> Unfortunately, the Serbs had not dispersed the men or equipment and the garrisons were now useless.

In the author's view, the Croat siege of the JNA barracks would have a lasting impact on the Serb effort and over time gave the Croats an unexpected advantage in three areas. First, they negated a potential JNA threat from the TDF within Croatia. Second, the JNA was forced to relieve garrisons that otherwise could have been used in an

offensive effort. Third, the Croats seized numerous tanks and armored vehicles that could be used to support a counter-offense.

### **Comparison of Conflicts**

At this point one could make a parallel comparison of the Serbo-Croatian war of 1991 to the events today in Kosovo. The parallel, however, should be viewed as a role reversal for the Serbs in that NATO is perceived as the aggressor. Should NATO fight a ground war in Kosovo, there are some lessons from this conflict that are worth consideration.

First, the ground war must be decisive. Historically, conflicts in the region have resulted in guerilla and urban warfare and in this case, NATO will be fighting on "Serb turf." It should also be reiterated that the original fighting doctrine of the JNA was designed around an external invasion. Although the JNA has reorganized and is apparently adept at civil/ethnic conflict, NATO should expect the JNA's old doctrine to be valid. Ultimately, a protracted conflict of guerilla warfare would likely be costly in terms of casualties and hence will raise the stakes on "risk."

Second, we have already shown our cards by conceding that there will be no ground war. In effect, we have given the Serbs a valuable resource - time. Just as the Croats did in battle of Vukovar, the Serbs are already buying time in order to prepare the battlefield to their advantage.

Finally, the strategic center of gravity will likely revolve around the will of the people in one form or another on both sides. The savage leveling of Kijevo served to rally the Croatian offensive. But it was the battle of Vukovar where the ill-equipped Croatian forces were inspired to fight. Against overwhelming odds, the Croats brought

the JNA to its culminating point and ultimately defeated the Serb will to fight. NATO could very well find themselves in the "Serb" predicament if the ground battle inflicts heavy losses. NATO may have the capability to defeat the Serbian army, but they must also defeat the will of the Serbian people before the Serbs defeat the will of NATO.

### **Conclusions and Lessons Learned**

In the end, the JNA was not capable of properly applying the Principles of War in the 1991 Serbo-Croatian War. The Principles of objective, offense, mass, unity of command, and security were complete failures. Economy of force, while a failure, caused the JNA to modify its objectives, and in doing so preserved the force to fight another day. While none of these principles by themselves necessarily accounts for the Serb failure in the war, collectively they illustrate some profound weaknesses in the Serbian ability to formulate an operational plan. Finally, the conclusions drawn from the analysis of the Serbo-Croatian war from a "Principles of War" perspective, provides some valuable lessons learned.

In practice, some Principles of War may be violated without dire consequences. Clearly, the JNA had trouble defining the objective of the war, and the military objective was not in line with the desired political end-state. In addition, the ill-defined objective had a direct effect on the JNA's failure to develop an effective offense and clouded their unity of command. The result was the development of an operational objective that was not attainable. Objectives must be decisive and attainable. Operational commanders must ensure that the military objective and the desired political end-state are one in the same. They should also realize that the operational objectives will likely have an effect on the other Principles of War.

The JNA's original fighting doctrine revolved around the defense of Yugoslavia and as a result, their tactics were never really offensive in nature. In the battle for Vukovar, the JNA's lack of an offense gave the Croats time to build a defense. It was, in part, the Croat defense that led to the JNA's culmination in the war. Time is a valuable resource for both the attacker and defender, but the attacker must manage time in the form of an effective offense. A quick and decisive battle can deny the enemy time from which to react in an orderly manner.

The ethnic composition of the JNA and location of the TDF's within Croatia hampered the JNA's ability to pursue its operational objective. In addition, Milosevic's inability to mobilize sufficient reserves also presented a manpower challenge to the JNA. Finally, the lack of trained personnel, desertion, and poor command and control were the cumulative root causes of the failure of "mass" and "economy of force." Operational objectives should not be built on expectations, but must honestly reflect the capabilities of the forces on hand. If mobilization of forces is required to achieve the objective, then sufficient time should be allotted for mobilization and training or an alternative objective should be pursued.

The JNA had a clear advantage over the Croatian forces in terms of firepower and mass. Their tactic of surrounding towns and villages served to protect the JNA's offensive forces. However, nowhere in the JNA's operational plan did they consider protecting the JNA garrisons inside Croatia. The Garrisons proved an easy target for the Croats that could have been averted. Operational plans must always consider the security of one's forces. Failure to protect friendly forces could limit or reduce offensive effort and give the enemy a moral advantage.

In closing, one must contemplate the centuries of conflict that have plagued the Balkan region. As Clausewitz stated “the result in war is never final” and “the defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in the political conditions at some later date.”<sup>78</sup> In this light, the Serbo-Croatian war can be viewed as just another transitory state from which Milosevic’s negotiated settlement succeeded in setting the stage for future conflict.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> The Principles of War summarized from Joint Doctrine for Operations (Joint Pub 3-0), 1 February 1995,:

Objective. Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective.

Offense. Seize, retain and exploit the initiative.

Mass. Concentrate the effects of combat power at the place and time to achieve decisive results.

Economy of Force. Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.

Maneuver. Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through flexible application of combat power.

Unity of Command. Ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for each objective.

Security. Never allow the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.

Surprise. Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which it is unprepared.

Simplicity. Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders.

<sup>2</sup> Reneo Lukic, The Wars of South Slavic Succession: Yugoslavia 1991-1993, PSIS Occasional Papers, No. 2/93, (Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1993), p. 6.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 9.

<sup>4</sup> Thomas Butler, "The Ends of History: Balkan Culture and Catastrophe," Washington Post, Aug. 30, 1992, C3, quoted in Norman Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia: The policy of "Ethnic Cleansing", (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1995), 23.

<sup>5</sup> Slaven Latic, "Genesis of the Current Balkan War" in Genocide After Emotion: The Postemotional Balkan War, ed. Stjepan G. Mestrovic, (London: Routledge, 1996), 102-103.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 103.

<sup>7</sup> Lukic, 12.

<sup>8</sup> Aleksa Djilas, "A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic," Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, 83.

<sup>9</sup> Rui J. P. de Figueiredo, Jr. and Barry R. Weingast. "The Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict." Columbia International Affairs Online, February 1997, available from <https://www.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/conf/iwp01ag.html>; internet; accessed 13 April 1999.

<sup>10</sup> David C. Isby, "Yugoslavia 1991 - Armed Forces in Conflict," Jane's Intelligence Review, September 1991, 394-395.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 395.

<sup>13</sup> Letica, 105.

<sup>14</sup> James Gow, "The Remains of the Yugoslav People's Army," Jane's Intelligence Review, August 1992, 359.

<sup>15</sup> Isby, 395.

<sup>16</sup> United Nations, Security Council, Annex III: The Military Structure, Strategy and Tactics of the Warring Factions. Final Report, United Nations Commission of Experts, 28 December 1994, available from <http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/comexpert/ANX/III.htm>; internet; accessed 21 April 1999.

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<sup>17</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint doctrine for Operations (Joint Pub 3-0) (Washington D.C.: 1 February 1995), A-1.

<sup>18</sup> Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), 104.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 171.

<sup>20</sup> RAM is an acronym of unknown origin that spells out the word Frame. Additional detail on the plan can be found in Tim Judah's book: The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), 170-171.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 171.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Lukic, 12.

<sup>24</sup> Letica, 101.

<sup>25</sup> Norman Cigar, "The Serbo-Croatian War, 1991," in Genocide After Emotion: The Postemotional Balkan War, ed Stjepan G. Mestrovic, (London: Routledge, 1996), 62.

<sup>26</sup> Lukic, 24.

<sup>27</sup> Milan Vego, On Operational Art, (Third Draft), U.S. Naval War College, September 1998, 23.

<sup>28</sup> Cigar, 61-63. "Plausible denial" was the term used to describe Milosevic's continual denial of Serbia's involvement of the war. He apparently used this "denial" politically to deal with the International community while, at the same time, was directing some part of the Serb war effort through a selected few of the JNA's General officers. It should also be noted that Milosevic was not acting as the commander in chief of the JNA. Stipe Mesic, a Croat, was Yugoslavia's president and the lawful commander in chief.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 63.

<sup>30</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, A-1.

<sup>31</sup> David A. Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda, eds., Yugoslavia and after: A Study In Fragmentation, Despair and Rebirth (London: Longman, 1996), 207.

<sup>32</sup> Gow, 361.

<sup>33</sup> Dyker and Vejvoda, 129.

<sup>34</sup> Cigar, 76.

<sup>35</sup> Milan Vego, "The Army of Serbian Krajina," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1993, 442.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 77.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), 256.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., 69-73.

<sup>41</sup> Milan Vego, "The Yugoslav Air and Defence Forces," Jane's Intelligence Review, July, 1994, 297-298.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., 298.

<sup>44</sup> Tanner, 256.

<sup>45</sup> Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), 177.

<sup>46</sup> Tanner, 256.

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- <sup>47</sup> Ibid., 261.
- <sup>48</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>49</sup> Milan Vego, "The Croatian Navy," Jane's Intelligence Review, January 1993, 11.
- <sup>50</sup> Cigar, 78.
- <sup>51</sup> Silber and Little, 178.
- <sup>52</sup> Cigar, 69-72.
- <sup>53</sup> Ibid., 62.
- <sup>54</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>55</sup> Lukic, 26.
- <sup>56</sup> Milan Vego, "The Army of Serbian Krajina", 439.
- <sup>57</sup> Cigar, 77.
- <sup>58</sup> Silber and Little, 177.
- <sup>59</sup> Cigar, 70-71.
- <sup>60</sup> Silber and Little, 177.
- <sup>61</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>62</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>63</sup> Tanner, 269.
- <sup>64</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>65</sup> Silber and Little, 188.
- <sup>66</sup> Dusan Stojanovic, "Serbian Leader Adopts Tone of Conciliation," The Washington Post, 28 February 1992: A26, quoted in Norman Cigar, "The Serbo-Croatian War, 1991," in Genocide After Emotion: The Postemotional Balkan War, ed Stjepan G. Mestrovic, (London: Routledge, 1996), 65.
- <sup>67</sup> Vego, "The Army of Serbian Krajina," 439.
- <sup>68</sup> United Nations, Security Council.
- <sup>69</sup> Cigar, 72.
- <sup>70</sup> Ibid., 63-64.
- <sup>71</sup> Vego, "The Army of Serbian Krajina," 439.
- <sup>72</sup> Silber and Little, 170.
- <sup>73</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>74</sup> Ibid. 171.
- <sup>75</sup> Tanner, 255.
- <sup>76</sup> Silber and Little, 171.
- <sup>77</sup> Ibid. 173.
- <sup>78</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 80.