The Commander's Estimate of the Situation and Joint Targeting: An Integrated Approach.
Abstract
This paper discusses how to integrate the joint targeting process into the commander's estimate of the situation. Though neither concept is new, joint doctrine treats them as separate processes. This divide has led to a disconnect between the two processes and problems about how to control joint targeting. The paper begins by describing the targeting process and analyzing some deficiencies in the current joint doctrine concerning this process. The paper then reviews an historical case study - Operation Desert Storm. This case study reveals several problems with targeting that have a direct link to the fact that targeting is often treated as distinct from the main planning process. Using the case study, the paper then puts forth the need for integrating the targeting process into the commander's estimate of the situation at the Joint Force Commander (JFC) level. From this logic, the paper goes on to describe how to integrate the targeting process into each step of the commander's estimate of the situation. Finally, the paper reaches several conclusions and advocates recommendations concerning integration of the joint targeting process. The recommendations detail where targeting should fit into the planning process, and how to control the joint targeting process to achieve synchronization among the forces under a JFC.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 17, 1999
- Accession Number
- ADA370660
Entities
People
- Richard P. Mcevoy
Organizations
- Naval War College