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THE CINC's RAPID REACTION FORCE


By

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A paper submitted to the facility of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Introduction

The Cold War has ended and we now face a new and emerging set of threats and challenges to peace and security. The National Military Strategy enunciates these threats as regional conflicts and instability, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, asymmetrical challenges and wild cards.¹ The Commanders in Chief (CINCs) of the combatant commands must face these threats on a day to day basis, maintain stability in their region, deter conflicts and react to crisis as they arise. The CINCs do so by using the forces provided to them by the Military Services. Unfortunately, the US Army has not reacted fully in reorganizing its forces to meet the new challenges facing the CINCs. The Army must do a better job of filling the needs of the CINCs to react across the spectrum of conflict. What is needed is the creation of standing rapid reaction forces that, for the purposes of this paper, I will call Mobile Strike Forces (MSFs). The MSF would be a regionally focused, strategically mobile, lethal, self-contained and technologically enhanced and survivable force. No other force in any of the Services would have the same capabilities or offer the CINCs as many options and as much flexibility as the MSF. The MSF would truly become a tool for the CINCs to use within their theaters and across the spectrum of conflict.

It is often said that the Military is in the midst of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Professor Brad Lee points out; "New technology by itself is not sufficient to produce a quantum leap in military effectiveness. The right combination of new technology, organizational innovation, and creative operational concepts is necessary."² For the Army this is especially true. The Army cannot rest on its laurels stemming from victories in the Cold War and in the Persian Gulf War. It cannot depend only on the development of new technology to adapt to the changing strategic and operational requirements. For the Army to

remain relevant to the CINCs across the spectrum of conflict, from major theater war (MTWs) to crisis's short of all out war (small scale contingencies, SSCs), it must not embrace the wrong revolution. It must see the changing environment and operational level requirements and change them.³ The current capabilities offered by the Army do not go far enough in fulfilling the needs of the CINCs and it must find a better way of meeting their requirements. For example "... the U. S. Army can't do what many say is needed right now: Get a strong Armored force to Kosovo quickly, in time to halt the Yugoslav military's bloody offensive against the province's Albanian population."⁴ The development of the MSF concept will fill the need of the operational level commanders better than any organization that currently exists and will support fully the tenets of Joint vision 2010.

The U. S. Army has already started to develop a new organization called the Strike Force based on the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment. However, this concept is a Headquarters element only. General Reimer states, "Initially we will embed very little permanent capability into the Strike Force."⁵ This is a good start but does not go far enough, fast enough, to meet the requirements of the warfighting CINCs. The Marines are experimenting with new capabilities and organizations in their Sea Dragon experiments. The Air force is developing the Air Expeditionary Force concept. This is all in an effort to meet the emerging threats and be able to offer the CINCs more options and better capability than currently exists. The Army must do the same. The future is now, the decisions we make now will take several years to come to fruition and time is going by fast. The MSF can and should be fielded relatively quickly using existing technology and capabilities and modernized based on the emergence of new technology and operational concepts.

The Shortfalls

It is clear to many that the present day military organizations built to combat the threats faced in the Cold War are not as suited for the operational challenges the CINCs face today and into the future. General Reimer is correct when he states, " We need to start looking now for organization designs for the Army After Next."⁶ It is also clear that the changing strategic vision indicates that the smaller number of forward-deployed Army Divisions does not provide the NCA and the CINCs with sufficient flexibility to address the evolving military and political needs.⁷ Why is this so and how can this be true if we are obviously still meeting the mission requirements of the CINCs and still have the best military in the world? Though we do have the best military force in the world, we are seeing signs that it is being stretched and stressed. Recruiting, retention, OPTEMPO, quality of life and readiness are issues which all the Services are having problems. The ability of the military to fight two nearly simultaneous MTWs is also being called into question. It is time to try to do things better, smarter and more efficiently. It is a matter of creating new and different organizations that will allow the CINCs to have more capabilities, flexibility and mobility than currently exist in the military today.

The current method the Army uses to deal with a CINC's operational requirement or crisis is to task a standing organization within the Army, normally one of the 10 Divisions that currently exist within the Army. Depending on the time available to prepare and deploy in response to the mission or crisis, this tasking might go to the 82nd Airborne Division, one of the light divisions or to one of the heavy divisions with a requirement to keep a standing Division Ready Brigade. If more time is available, one of the other divisions that does not have a Ready Brigade may be tasked. Other specialized or supporting organizations are also

usually tasked as the base unit rarely has all the components needed to accomplish the prescribed mission. It is very common to see additional Intelligence, Communications, Fire Support, Logistic, Engineer or Aviation elements tasked to augment the deploying unit. If the full division or Corps is called for then some, but not all, of the ad hoc problem goes away. However, when the crisis calls for less than a division sized force a serious problem exists.

One of the major problems with this system is that it creates ad hoc organizations. Rarely, if ever, does the deploying unit have all or enough of the correct support "slices" or capabilities contained within it. Further compounding this problem, is the command and control organization and structure required for the mission often requires the division or Corps to partition its own headquarters and develop a forward headquarters in the Theater of Operations. The creation of this ad hoc headquarters and command and control infrastructure reduces efficiency and effectiveness at both forward and rear headquarters. It forces a reduced and temporary staff to assimilate other units that have been tasked to support it. For example, a combat brigade, deploying into a peace keeping mission may need civil engineering support and forces, yet the staff would have never met their counterparts within the engineering organization and would certainly not have experience with the planning and coordination of this type of unit. This is a difficult task for even experienced staffs; it is even harder for these ad hoc staffs that are created.

Another major shortfall in the way the Army is organized to support the operational level commander is that the Army only offers either a heavy or light force from which a CINC may choose. There is nothing in between. This problem exists even though it is recognized that, "There is a need for a medium weight force that is deployable within about 96 hours, that has decisive deterrence capability when it arrives in theater."⁸ Current Army organizations do not

provide the CINCs with as much flexibility, as many options or as many capabilities as is possible. This either “all heavy”, or “all light” orientation reduces the CINC’s options and creates tremendous strain on the Army to deploy the correct mix of units needed in crises short of all out war and during the initial deployment for War. This tailoring of units in time of crisis aggravates the problem of ad hoc organizations and staffs.

Generally, the division or brigade that is tasked to support a CINC’s operational level mission is a combat unit focused on a very narrow, tactically oriented, Mission Essential Task List that keeps the unit’s limited and precious training time focused on the development and maintenance of combat skills. There is little experience as a unit with the theater and national level systems such as intelligence, logistics, C4I, and the civil and diplomatic issues that are at the heart of the operational level where the unit will now be employed. This is neither efficient nor effective. I believe there is a better way of supporting the CINCs with greater effectiveness and less impact on the training and readiness of the combat divisions. It is time for the Army to propose and adopt a new operating concept to provide better support and greatly enhanced capability to the warfighting CINCs.

The Mobile Strike Force

Joint Vision 2010 states, “ Accelerating rates of change will make the future environment more unpredictable and less stable, presenting our Armed Forces with a wide range of possible futures.”⁹ It goes on to state, “ Through a rigorous process of experimentation, assessment, refinement, and doctrinal development, we can meet our responsibility to maintain ready forces today while taking steps to transform those forces to be superior tomorrow. This transformation of our forces is not a choice between people or technology, but about how to integrate the strengths of both *to give the nation the best possible military*

capability."¹⁰ (Italics added) There is a way to transform, evolve and improve certain organizations within the Army and provide the nation, through the Operational Commanders, better capability. The Army can do this by creating new organizations that essentially will become the CINC's rapid reaction and stability force. This will be a conventional warfighting force that can defeat or delay a much larger enemy, or be used as the CINC's deep operational maneuver element. It will also be able to handle both peace operations and crisis short of war.

The MSF concept is based on several Brigade (+) sized units located both in CONUS and in selected overseas theaters. They will be regionally focused with a MSF assigned to European Command (EUCOM), Pacific Command (PACOM), Central Command (CENTCOM) and one possibly in Atlantic Command (ACOM). These MSFs will be robust, self-contained, rapidly deployable, lethal, and technologically advanced standing units immediately responsive to the CINCs in time of crisis and conflict. The MSFs will have a Brigadier General in command due to the large, multi-functional staff and expanded span of command and control and increased operational level responsibilities. The MSF can act as a JTF Headquarters and/or can be the CINC's Land Component Commander (LCC). I do not see this force having the capability to do forced entry operations, due to the special training and equipment that is necessary for these type of operations. It is possible that in the future the deployment of an MSF may avoid the need to do forced entry operations. It may deploy fast enough to prevent the enemy from forming a capability that requires forced entry. Forced entry, if necessary, will still have to be conducted by the Marines, Rangers or Special Operating Forces. The MSF as I envision it will flow in immediately after the forced entry operation and take over as the JTF or LCC. If forced entry is not a requirement, the MSF can flow into the theater and begin operations immediately. This will be possible because of the

increased capabilities and that will be inherent to an organization that is experienced, focused, tailored, trained, staffed and equipped for rapid deployment and crisis operations across the spectrum of conflict. In the following paragraphs I will discuss the capabilities that are needed and how they will benefit the operational level commander.

Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C4I)

The first increase in capability should come in the form of a Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) battalion (Bn) that would be organic to the MSFs.¹¹ This C4I Battalion would be a new innovation and provide significantly improved operational level capabilities. It would have Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for over the horizon intelligence. It would also have intelligence collection capability from ground based sensors, including chemical detection capability along with the communications and computer infrastructure to support the MSF in an operational theater.¹² This should include, UHF, SHF satellite communications, tropospheric scatter, VHF and HF radio communications.¹³ This will allow the MSF (and therefore the CINC) to have a standing C4I structure that can be immediately established in a theater of operations. This unit would have the capability, training and focus to be able to interface with joint systems like the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), and the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), or the Navy's program for Space and Electronic Warfare (SEW).¹⁴ Internally the MSF will take advantage of the digitization of the Army that is currently underway. This will allow the operational commander to disseminate information and intelligence quickly to the tactical level and also receive timely battlefield intelligence and information from the tactical level. In addition, this C4I Bn will have the ability to quickly

assimilate the theater level and national C4I assets that may be provided to the CINC in time of crisis. Other advantages are that the MSF will have the benefit of knowing the joint/operational/CINC level standard operating procedures (SOPs) and reporting systems and formats that are generally not now found or known in the units that are deployed for crisis.

As already alluded to, the MSF staff will be fairly robust and more multi-functional than is currently the case. The staff will have the standard personnel, intelligence, operations and logistic staff sections. It should also add staff billets for, Psyops, Civil Affairs, Public Affairs, Civil Engineers, Chaplain and be tailored by the CINC to support his regional requirements. It may be possible to orient the staff along the lines of the operational functions of maneuver, fires, logistics, intelligence and protection. This staff will be capable of planning, controlling and executing across the spectrum of conflict due its size, multifunctional character, increased communications capability and its immediate interface and interconnectivity with operational level and other joint staffs. The benefits to the operational level commander or CINC are clear. He will be able to move the MSF to either a mature or immature theater, knowing this organization can communicate to all joint and theater level systems with a staff structure that is capable and trained to immediately begin operations. This will stop the current ad hoc way of doing business. It will create a better, more effective and synergistic C4I system allowing for the operational commander to begin actual operations sooner and more effectively.

The intelligence capability will be greatly improved. This improved capability will come through the increased situational awareness and communications systems that will be provided by the C4I Bn of the MSF. The increased capability will allow the passing of tactical intelligence up immediately to the operational level staff and commander. It will also be able to disseminate to the tactical commanders the operational and national level

intelligence that is produced. The combination of ground sensors, air assets, UAV and tactical/operational/national level intelligence will give the operational level commander unprecedented capability to know and effect his battle space during the early phases of a conflict or crisis. JV 2010 states, “ The fusion of all-source intelligence with the fluid integration of sensors, platforms, command organizations and logistic support centers will allow a greater number of operational tasks *to be accomplished faster*.¹⁵ (Italics Added) This is precisely what the MSF will be able to do for the operational commander.

Maneuver and Fires

“ There is a need for a medium-weight force that is deployable within about 96 hours and has decisive deterrence capability when it arrives in theater” said Maj Gen Zanini of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command.¹⁶ He goes on further to say that such a Force would combine, “ the very best of our light forces in terms of deployability, and the very best of our heavy forces in terms of lethality and survivability....”¹⁷ As already stated, the current Army organization offers the CINC either a heavy or a light force and nothing in-between. The MSF would bridge this gap. I am advocating the development of a medium weight family of combat vehicles for future equipping of the MSFs. This will include a medium tank or armored gun system along with a medium weight wheeled armored personnel carrier. The development of this capability will allow more flexibility for the operational commander across the spectrum of conflict. It will allow the MSF to rapidly deploy, with reduced requirements for strategic lift. This medium weight class of vehicles will also ensure that the force is mobile, lethal, and easier to maintain and sustain. Though a medium weight class of vehicles is desired, the MSF concept, though improved by it, does not depend on its

development. The MSF can use the technology currently available or soon to be available and still be drastically improved from what we offer the CINCs today.

The MSF should include a mixture of forces. This means incorporating Armored, Mechanized Infantry and Light Infantry Battalions in one organization. These may mean combined armed battalions with Armor and Mechanized Infantry and light Infantry combined into one organization or some variant, and may initially be tailored by the CINC to whom the MSF is allocated. This will allow greater flexibility and capability to react to challenges across the spectrum of conflict. It allows for the synergistic effects that we get through the mixture of such a force and allows us to be more lethal and mobile on the battlefield or in operations other than war.

The fact is that units with quick response missions may have little or no time to tailor the force when deploying to deal with a crisis in a theater.¹⁸ It is well known that the Army sees the need for this kind of mixed force and understands the synergy created by the mixture. This is evident by the constant rotations to the Army's Combat Training Centers where it is common to see a heavy-light rotation to the National Training Center or a Light-Heavy rotation to the Joint Readiness Training center. It is also proven that the ad hoc nature of this last minute tailoring of forces is not as effective as it needs to be. This leads to poor synchronization of the total force and less synergy from the combination of the forces than desired, thus being less effective for the operational level commander. It is only after much hard and difficult training and coaching do these forces learn to operate as an effective fighting force. When the training rotation is complete the relationship ends and the units have to go through the same learning process all over again the next time. This is a real problem

for a force that needs to be able to deploy within 96 hours or less and be combat ready immediately upon arrival in the theater of operations.

FM 100-5 makes it clear that; “ The initial entry of forces into the contingency area could lead immediately to direct combat.”¹⁹ The MSF will provide the CINC with the unprecedented ability to conduct immediate operations in war, crisis and peace operations. The threats that the operational commanders now face will be more along the lines of mid to low intensity conflicts. To meet these threats we must develop a force with mixed capabilities that is trained, equipped and ready for deployment and immediate combat or operations other than war upon arrival in theater.²⁰

This MSF should also have the mobility assets that will allow it to maneuver forces rapidly and therefore increase its flexibility and lethality. The MSF should also have its own organic attack helicopter capability in order for it to begin to shape the battlefield for the operational level commander through the conduct of deep and close direct fires. This will create even more lethality and therefore deterrence capability for the operational commander. It essentially provides for another maneuver element for the close fight, and it also provides the commander with the ability to shape the battlefield throughout his battlespace. This will give the operational commander an immediate ability to rapidly affect the decision cycle of the opposing commander.

The MSF should also organically have a direct support Artillery Bn along with the HIMARS truck mounted Multiple Launch Rocket System. Other capabilities that should be included with these “ Fires” are psychological operations (PSYOPS) along with electronic warfare and both should also be organic to the MSF. This will also assist the operational commander by rapidly shaping his battlespace through both lethal and non-lethal fires. The

MSF, with a mixture of direct fires, indirect fires, deep fires both lethal and non-lethal, along with all the other support and logistic slices will give the CINC or operational commander an extremely lethal and flexible organization.

The MSF will be a tool for the operational commander to deploy and employ immediately upon entering as crisis. It gives the operational commander an ability to deter conflicts, as this will be a force to be taken seriously. The MSF will get to the theater quicker and be so lethal, mobile and survivable that it is possible that an enemy may be prevented from acting. If deterrence fails then the MSF is strong enough to prevent the escalation of a conflict and limit its scope. If this also fails the operational commander has a powerful and sizable force that that can fight and delay the enemy until other forces are deployed.

Protection

Another of the operational functions that the CINC or operational level commander will get greater benefits in is in the area of protection. The MSF will have increased intelligence capability as we have already discussed. This exceptional situation awareness is the foundation of force protection. Combine this with a force that is mobile, both on the ground and by air, and add to this the benefit of Psyops, Electronic Warfare and Civil Affairs capability and we can see that the ability of the operational commanders to protect the force will be enhanced through the assets provided by the MSF. The MSF will need some local air defense capability, initially at least short range, and then be supported by other long range and then eventually theater ballistic missile defense if necessary. It is the synergistic effect of having a MSF that has a full complement of the capabilities that we have spoken about that will greatly enhance the operational commander's ability to protect the force.

There are a couple of recent examples that can illustrate the benefits to the CINCs of having such a force. Had a force like the MSF been available in 1992, it would have been very useful in Somalia. Though the Marines would have entered first as they did, the MSF could have flowed in behind them instead of the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry). One of the causes of failure in the Somalia mission was the use of an improper force to conduct a peace-enforcement operation.²¹ What would have been a better match of capabilities and mission would have been filled by the MSF. They would have had the C4I, fires and maneuver and much better protection necessary for this type of mission. It is questionable that light units are really well suited for a peace enforcement mission due to lack of mobility, protection and sustainability and less deterrent capability and what is needed is some type of medium weight force to initially handle the opening stages of such a difficult task.²²

Another emerging mission that is best suited for a MSF type force that would be beneficial to the CINC is in Kosovo. The EUCOM MSF, since it would be regionally focused could be training, planning and gathering Intelligence right now in preparation for their immediate deployment if the political conditions are set by the bombings. The advantage of such a medium weight, robust and self-contained unit is significant. The building of an ad hoc organization or selecting one that is not suited for this type of mission would be avoided. Upon deployment it would be a cohesive force, trained and ready to start the mission during the first few days of the conflict, the most dangerous part of the mission for such a crisis response force. One reason why the Kosovo mission seems so poorly handled is that, " The Pentagon has no rapid-deployment ground force with firepower enough to have given Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic second thoughts from the beginning."²³ I am sure

that as I write this paper some unit somewhere in the Army has been given a warning order and been told to get ready. I am equally sure that it is in the middle of controlled confusion as they try to organize, equip, train and prepare such an ad hoc force. The MSF would clearly be better.

If, in the future, there is another Major Regional Conflict (MRC) like Desert Shield/ Desert Storm the MSF is well suited to be the first unit in. Instead of sending the 82nd Airborne (as Central Command (CENTCOM) was forced to do due to the lack of any other mobile force and the time constraints involved), the CINC could send the MSF. It would allow the CINC to have a credible fighting force on the ground in a timeframe measured in hours instead of days. It would not be a 'Speed Bump' as the 82nd seemed to be. The MSF could, with probable additional augmentation of Air Force and Artillery Brigade Fires, be a real threat to any potential attack and firmly signal America's commitment to the area we are defending. The MSF would also be useful in the CINC's support of America's 2 MRC strategy as laid out in the National Security Strategy and the National Military strategy. It could be the first unit into the second MRC, designed to support a possible win-hold-win strategy. They would be a major delaying force, again with Air Force and Artillery augmentation. The MSF could form the early part of the "hold" mission for the operational commander in the second MRC.

At no place in the current defense structure do the capabilities that the MSF will have currently exist. The benefits to the CINCs are enormous. The Chief of Staff of the Army is aware of this. Gen Reimer stated, " We have a force structure that was built to win the Cold War. It doesn't always lend itself to packages that are deployable and employable in the post Cold-war world."²⁴ General Reimer also said that the CINCs have told him that they need to be able to call on a Strike Force type unit.²⁵ The Strike Force Headquarters concept is a good

start but does not go far enough as it does not imbed any forces. The Army is heading in the right direction and has the right focus; the needs of the CINCs are paramount. It is time to create the MSF using the equipment and technology available today and not wait for the next generation of technology to come about. The MSF has great utility today and also provides the CINCs and operational commanders more flexibility and options than any organization currently in existence.

The Opposition

Some would say that the division restructuring under Division XXI is good enough. An article in the May-June 1998 Military Review states, "The Army XXI Division provides the Joint Force Commander (JFC) a flexible, combined arms force optimized for offensive operations."²⁶ It goes on to also say..."the division will be capable of conducting a full range of stability and support actions in a joint and multinational environment."²⁷ I do not disagree with these statements or that the Division restructure is needed. I do disagree that it takes the place of a MSF. The Division redesign is basically a moderate adjustment to the Cold War designed force. It will still not have a regional focus. It will still require ad hoc tailoring and experience training difficulties in preparing for rapid deployment missions. The shortfalls we have already discussed do not go away under the Division redesign. The MSF would not replace Divisions. The MSF would go in first, stabilize the situation and then be replaced by one of the redesigned division packages. The MSF would be ready to go immediately upon arrival and buy time for the division to get ready, prepare and deploy for the mission. Once the situation is under control in the Theater of Operations, a conventional force should replace the MSF, freeing it to redeploy and prepare for the next crisis.

Some will also say that the Marines already are a medium-weight rapid reaction force that the CINCs can use. I agree that the Marines have a unique role and they are and should remain the world's premier amphibious force. They will need to do forced entry operations as the MSF is not designed to do this. But the Marines have some limitations that prevent them from filling the MSF role as described. The USMC is a much smaller organization that is well tailored for its current role. However the Marines, "...lack sufficient support units for protracted operations and depend on the Army and the Navy."²⁸ The Marine units would need so much augmentation for a prolonged stay, especially if the mission was far inland, that it is clear that it is just not suited for the role envisioned for the MSF. The Marines are organized and equipped to operate as an organic and complementary element of the Naval force.²⁹ As such, I think this precludes them from meeting the capabilities and benefits that the MSF will have for the operational commander. If the Marines were to significantly alter one of its MEUs to contain the same capabilities as described for the Army, then I think it could also be a MSF and could possibly be focused on the PACOM AOR.

In order to give the CINCs and operational commanders a rapid reaction force that can be effective across the spectrum of conflict it is clear that the development of the MSF concept is needed. We cannot let Service parochialism stand in the way of doing what is right for the CINCs in light of the changes in threats and missions from the Cold War to the threats that we face now and into the future. Gen Rigby the Deputy Commander of TRADOC stated,..."And then you take a look at the requirements that the Warfighting Commanders-in-Chief are asking the Services to provide to meet their warfighting needs-namely the need for enhanced-capability units."³⁰ This is exactly what the MSF is and what the Army should provide to the CINCs.

Recommendation and Conclusion

It is obviously my recommendation that the Army creates and fields Mobile Strike Forces to meet the challenges and threats of today and the future. This is in direct response to the needs of the operational commanders. The current way of organizing and preparing for a contingency or crisis is badly flawed. What is needed is a new way of doing business and a new organization to fill the gap between light forces and heavy forces. The Army needs to provide this type of force to stay relevant to the CINCs and the operational commanders who are facing threats and missions that are different than we faced during the Cold War. JV2010 states, "In sum, the US must prepare to face a wider range of threats, emerging unpredictably, employing varying combinations of technology, and challenging us at varying levels of intensity."³¹ The MSF will be an organization that will be able to have the capabilities to meet this range of threats at all levels of intensity.

There is a lot of work that will go into the actual development and staffing of this type of organization. I have only scratched the surface with a broad-brush approach, and have only talked about the overall operational capabilities and benefits of a MSF. There would have to be a much more detailed approach to determine the right size and mixture of the units and staffs within the MSF. Someone will eventually have to decide how many tanks, trucks and toolboxes will actually be in the MSF. This paper leaves a lot of questions unanswered. But one thing that is not left unanswered is the need for the MSF.

Maj Gen Zanini from TRADOC sums it up perfectly when he speaks of the Strike Force Concept, "It began and remains the Army's concept to fill a void in capabilities available to warfighting Commander-in Chiefs and the National Command Authorities. This requirement is for a rapidly deployable force that has the lethality and deployability to initiate offensive

operations upon arrival in a theater of operations while retaining the ability to respond to stability and support operations requirements.” He further said, “ Current Army force capabilities are not optimized to mitigate this risk.”³² Yet the Army so far has stopped short of creating these MSFs. The time is now, using the troops and technology available today to fill the gap. I volunteer now to be the first member of the first MSF formed, my bags are packed.

NOTES

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