CINC Control of Forces: An Analysis
Abstract
The threat to the United States since the end of the Cold War has shifted from a single Communist threat to numerous threats of regional conflicts. The subject of "this shift" in U.S. military operations is not a new one. The focus of this paper is on the impending threats that have arisen and the contingency operations that the United States has been involved in since the end of the Cold War. Though the former Soviet conventional threat has disappeared, numerous new threats have been identified that require U.S. intervention. The new threats require the expenditure of funds that were budgeted for other DoD requirements. This two-pronged analysis will not only examine the shift in U.S. operations but also the shift in how DoD responds to the new threats. Since the strengthening of the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act in 1986, a focus on jointness has been created. While the Unified. Commanders in Chief (CINCs) were given increased responsibility through Goldwater-Nichols, the authority of the CINC has not been increased respectively. Though the CINC has operational command of the forces in his theater and is held responsible for their readiness and performance, he bas minimal input to the training and resources of his forces. The Component Commands retain the funding for their respective forces and provide the required level of training as identified by the Component Command. This dichotomy of responsibility and authority creates limitations for the CINC and potentially affects his ability to achieve his operational objectives.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 17, 1999
- Accession Number
- ADA370717
Entities
People
- Karla J. Horn
Organizations
- Naval War College