

JPRS-UAA-87-003

322077

21 October 1987



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

Soviet Union

***PEOPLES OF ASIA
& AFRICA***

**Reproduced From
Best Available Copy**

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA 22161

19991216 116

10
44
A03

Soviet Union

Peoples of Asia & Africa

No 3, May-June 1987

JPRS-UAA-87-003

CONTENTS

21 OCTOBER 1987

English Summary of Major Articles	1
Author Information	3
West Said To Hinder Tech Transfer to Developing Countries [V. N. Shitov]	4
North Korea's Cooperation With Developing States Detailed [G. D. Toloraya]	7
European, Native African Texts on Continent's History Compared [Yu. N. Zotova]	11
Conference on Study of Cultural Features in Developing States [A. G. Cheremin]	16
Roundtable Discussion of Book on Oriental Societies Concludes	22
Changing Views in Soviet Works on Iranian Revolution Outlined [V. I. Maksimenko]	22
Book on Competition in U.S.-Japanese Trade Reviewed [V. B. Ramzes]	30
Book on Egypt's 'Free Officers' Revolution Reviewed [A. M. Vasilyev]	33
Five-Volume History of Ancient, Modern Kirghiz SSR Reviewed [A. M. Reshetov, Ya. A. Sher]	36
Articles not translated from NARODY AZII I AFRIKI No 3, May-June 1987	40

English Summary of Major Articles

18070399a Moscow *NARODY AZII I AFRIKI* in
Russian No 3, May-Jun 87 pp 219-221

[Text] SOCIALISM AND NATIONAL-LIBERATION MOVEMENT IN AFRICA (1917-1939)

M.Yu. FRENKEL

The article notes that the triumph of the Great October Socialist Revolution had a great impact on the peoples of Africa and made them join the international working class movement. It cites numerous facts demonstrating the response of the African peoples to the historic changes occurring in Russia and the ways the truth of the developments in Russia reached them.

The article deals with the activities of the Communist International in regard of the newly-founded African communist parties. It also dwells on the activities of international anti-colonial organizations, namely the Intercolonial Union, the Anti-Imperialist League (founded in 1927), the International Trade Committee of Negro Workers, the journal "Negro Worker." These organizations and the journal paid a great deal of attention to the propagation of socialist ideas in Africa, status of African peoples, national-liberation movement and the struggle of the young working class.

The article points out that, basically, in the discussed period African communists proved to be staunch and courageous fighters against capitalism and imperialism.

PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF MAGHREB

V.A. MELYANZEV

The article deals with main trends, factors and socio-economic consequences of the economic growth of socialist (Algeria) and capitalist (Morocco, Tunisia) orientation. It analyzes the bourgeois approaches to the economic development of Maghreb. The latter suffer from partiality and conspicuous distortions in case of Algeria.

On the basis of an in-depth analysis of major proportions and indices of the social reproduction within the framework of the so-called post-recovery period the article appraises the performance of these countries in economic and social fields. It points out that forms, scales and tempos of social transformations as well as their efficacy in Maghreb are subject not only to specific conditions of decolonisation and natural resources endowment, but the social and political option made by an individual state and the pursued economic policy.

The article reaches the conclusion that despite problems and difficulties, which have to do with objective hardships of tackling simultaneously the development of an industrial basis and raising the living standard as well as

the mistakes made in administration and planning in the 1970s, the gains of the Algerian people following the revolutionary and democratic path were great in relative terms both in economic and social fields.

In Morocco and, in particular, in Tunisia the implementation of a number of reforms, produced an acceleration of economic dynamics and, to some extent, a modernisation of their social and economic structures. However, the adherence of these countries to capitalist orientation gave rise and attenuated significantly economic imbalances, exacerbated social antagonisms. The latter, apart from producing an adverse effect on the external conditions of reproduction and making these countries more dependent on imperialism, became a major limiting factor both of the national economic growth and social progress.

NIGERIA: MONEY AND POLITICS

I.V. GEVELING

Apart from being a channel linking politics and economy, under certain conditions money used for political ends bridges the gap between economic and political systems. It amalgamates their structure-building categories, i.e. property and power.

Analysing the political and economic scene of the Second Republic (1979-1983), the article argues that money plays a twofold role in the Nigerian politics. In terms of political tactics in the short run, it is instrumental in reinforcing and enhancing the power of those bodies, which are subsidised by and fulfil the will of big political donors. Strategically and in the long run, the expansion of political financing inevitably leads to degradation and ultimately disintegrates the political system. The collapse of the Second Republic is a case in point.

A peculiar mechanism of political financing emerged in Nigeria in the late 1970s. It was a complex system of state and private subsidising of political figures and organisations. The Nigerian model of party financing operated due to the fact that large sums of money were withdrawn from the economy and corruption and crime flourished. The "money factor" in politics gave rise to the most ugly forms of social inequality and differentiation of the Nigerian society. The latter are but slightly related to a genuine class differentiation.

INTERETHNIC CONTRADICTIONS IN ASSAM AND THE QUEST FOR THEIR RESOLVEMENT

A.G. BELSKY, M.M. TARGAMADZE, V.V. CHERNOVSKAYA

The national question in India remains to be one of the most complicated problems. The study of mass movements against "strangers" in the state of Assam will foster a better understanding of all-Indian problems. The article attempts to identify causes of interethnic and

intercommunal contradictions in Assam, examine main stages of the nationalist movement to oust persons of non-Assamese origin and analyze steps taken by the central government to settle the conflict. The study covers the period from 1979 onwards when an All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (OGSP), an alliance of 7 local nationalist parties, was formed. The leaders of this alliance set up an Assam Gana Parishad (AGP), a political party, which won a landslide victory in the elections held December 16, 1985, and formed the government of Assam. A signing of "The Memorandum of Settlement on the Assam Problem" between the central government and the leaders of OAGSP precede the elections held in December of 1985.

Assessing the importance of the Assamese developments from 1979 to 1985, the article reaches the conclusion that a rapid and successful economic development of the state, on the one hand, and taking into account by the AGP government of the demands of the toiling population and legitimate rights of ethnic and religious minorities, on the other, are the only way to the solution of the current political situation in Assam.

EMERGENCE OF MODERN SWAHILI-LANGUAGE LITERATURE

L.E. GANKIN

The modern Swahili-language literature undergoes a period of an accelerated development. Annually, a great number of works of fiction, translations, poems and critical articles is published. Unfortunately, this boom is unnoticed even by scholars of African literature. The modern Swahili literature is little known outside East Africa. A few articles on the subject rather draw attention to the mere fact of its existence than analyse concrete works. At best, they deal with this literature at large.

The modern Swahili literature, however, theoretically, is a most interesting phenomenon. It offers an opportunity to examine the evolution of literary and esthetic phenomena and thus sheds light on some regularities of the literary process, as a whole. The modern Swahili literature, being a product of mass culture, a popular literature widespread in various strata of the society, offers a complete picture of the mass consciousness and its evolution.

The article maintains that occurring social changes gave rise to the modern Swahili literature. Unlike the classical Swahili-language literature, widespread along the coast on the basis of Afro-Moslem culture, the popular literature spans the whole of East Africa. The article analyses its evolution from James Mbotela (1934) to E. Kezilahabi and A.Sh. Adam (the 1970s). It investigates the influence exerted by traditional esthetics, folk-lore and classical literary tradition as well as the contribution made by Shaaban Robert (1909-1962), the founder of the modern Swahili literature.

In the end the article suggests that, as a cultural phenomenon, the modern Swahili literature gradually acquires an international importance and, one may hope, that with the passage of time it will make its own contribution to the world culture.

CONFUCIAN SCHOOLS: PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT AND AUTHORITARIAN TRADITION

Yu.B. KOZLOVSKY

The article uses factual data to analyse the attitude of thinkers of the Confucian schools to the authority of the teacher. It is suggested that the respect paid to the teacher was not only a part of the tradition to pay tribute to wisdom. There existed a need to reproduce the cult of the authority. The article suggests that in the ancient and medieval Far east this need was used as a basis for the evolution of a specific way of thinking and philosophising which took the form of interpretation. This type of thinking was based on a contradictory interaction of the evolution of thought and authoritarian traditions of the Confucian schools enabling thus thinkers of the same school to develop different and even incompatible doctrines. The article demonstrates that the influence of the authoritarian traditions became felt in the relations of the Confucian schools with those of Taoist and Buddhist tradition. Thinkers of certain schools borrowed ideas and views of thinkers belonging to other schools despite incompatible authoritarian traditions. That is why, as the time went by, the medieval Confucian doctrines in China, Japan and Korea absorbed ideas of various schools. On the strength of this observation the article suggests that, strictly speaking, the notions "Confucianism" and "Neo-Confucianism," widely used in literature, had no analogue in reality, for they did not reflect the historical development of thought of the Confucian schools. In this regard the article criticises the myth of the existence of Confucianism during two thousand five hundred years and the concepts identifying Confucian schools with their authoritarian traditions and the existence of Confucianism as an ideology.

FORMATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF FEUDALISM AND THE EAST

L.B. ALAYEV

The Marxist historiography interprets feudalism as a formation, i.e. as a universal stage of development. However, a generally accepted concept of feudalism has been lacking so far. The article is an attempt to probe into the idea of feudalism which K. Marx used as a starting point in formulating his theory of formations. It is the author's contention that this idea included: natural production as a condition of feudal relations development (the article elaborates this thesis by suggesting that the exchange of gifts, being an economic nucleus of the society, gave rise to the system of personal dependency); Gemeinwesen as a characteristic of social structure

(which is deciphered as a total dependency and indivisibility of social functions); land ownership as a combination of the right to land both on the part of the exploiter and the exploited and the power of the former over the latter; rent as an economic content of land ownership.

The discussed idea of feudalism is devoid of such specific characteristics of the European Middle Ages as private seigneur exploitation, hierarchic structure of land ownership, supremacy of the military estate, guild-like structure of artisanry.

The implementation of the above-mentioned idea of feudalism as a paragon is bound to place many European medieval societies farther from the standard feudalism as compared to some Oriental societies. It seems to be logical, for the overcoming of feudal relations in Europe and the transition to capitalism may be regarded as evidence of the marginal importance of the European feudalism in the system of feudal societies and its weakness as a self-sustaining system.

ZEAMI MOTOKIYO. FUSHI KADEN (THE INSTRUCTION ON FLOWER) OR KADENSHO (THE BOOK OF FLOWER)

Chronologically, the Noh theatre is the first Japanese drama theatre which still holds the status of a national theatre together with Kabuki and Bunraku. It originated in the fourteenth century on the basis of the ritual of agricultural games and imbibed numerous elements of the medieval visual and musical forms. The Noh theatre produced a highly artistic drama, elaborated a detailed system of actor training, created an all-embracing esthetical canon of its own codified in secret treatises which belong to Zeami Motokiyo (1363-1443), the actor and one of the creators of the Noh. The "Kadensho" ("The Book of Flower"), written in the fifteenth century, is acknowledged by Japanese scholars as a fundamental treatise on the theatre esthetics and, broadly speaking, on the medieval esthetics, for it deals at length with such categories of traditional esthetics as *monomane* (imitation of things), *yugen* (hidden beauty), *hana* (flower). The treatise consists of an introduction and seven chapters. It includes a teaching on the actor's training and also deals with the influence exerted by age on the actor's technique. For the most part the treatise interprets the art of imitation, the concepts related to the idea of flower in the art of the actor. The treatise also contains a legend telling the story of the Noh theater.

Part 3 selected for the translation is entitled "Question and Answer" (*mondo*). It constitutes a dialogue between pupil and teacher pertaining to the art of the theatre. It refers both to the theory and practice and covers the following problems: the interaction of actor and spectator, the tactics of the actor's behaviour in the competition performance, expediency of borrowing from other actors of high artistic skills, the idea of imitation and the idea of flower as esthetical categories. The translation,

the first of its kind into Russian, is made from the old Japanese of the original Japanese edition entitled "Nihon siso taikai," vol. 24, Tokyo, 1974.

Introduction, Translation from the Old Japanese and Commentary by N.G. Anarina

Author Information

18070399b Moscow *NARODY AZII I AFRIKI* in Russian No 3, May-Jun 87 p 218

[Text] Matvey Yulyevich Frenkel, doctor of historical sciences, senior academic associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Africa Institute.

Vitaliy Albertovich Melyantsev, candidate of economic sciences, academic associate of the Institute of the Countries of Asia and Africa at MGU [Moscow State University] imeni M.V. Lomonosov.

Leonid Vladimirovich Geveling, candidate of historical sciences, laboratory chief of the USSR Academy of Sciences Africa Institute.

Albert Grigoryevich Belskiy, candidate of historical sciences, senior academic associate of the Institute of Scientific Information on the Social Sciences of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Valentina Veniaminovna Chernovskaya, candidate of historical sciences, docent at Yaroslavl State University.

Leonid Emmanuilovich Gankin, candidate of philological sciences, academic associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute.

Yuriy Borisovich Kozlovskiy, candidate of philosophical sciences, senior academic associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy.

Leonid Borisovich Alayev, doctor of historical sciences, professor, laboratory chief of the USSR Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute.

Vladimir Nikolayevich Shitov, candidate of economic sciences, assistant dean of the International Economic Relations Department of MGIMO [Moscow State Institute of International Relations] of the USSR MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs]

Georgiy Davidovich Toloraya, candidate of economic sciences, associate of the Torgpredstvo [Trade Representation] of the USSR in North Korea.

Yuliya Nikolayevna Zotova, candidate of historical sciences, senior academic associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Africa Institute.

Vladimir Ilich Maksimenko, candidate of historical sciences, senior academic associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute.

Nina Grigoryevna Anarina, candidate of Oriental studies, junior academic associate of the All-Union Scientific Research Center of Art Studies of the USSR Ministry of Culture.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki". Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1987

West Said To Hinder Tech Transfer to Developing Countries

18070399c Moscow *NARODY AZII I AFRIKI* in Russian No 3, May-Jun 87 pp 91-95

[Article by V. N. Shitov: "Problems in Democratizing International Technology Transfer"]

[Text] In the struggle of the developing countries for a new international economic order, an important place is allotted to their joint actions aimed at developing and bringing to life democratic principles in the realm of international technology transfer, i.e. the struggle for the granting of patents and licenses for scientific and technical discoveries and improvements, as well as the formulation of prototypes of new technology and the corresponding documentation and the rendering of engineering consulting services, to the developing states on fair terms by the developed capitalist countries. As is well known, the process of international technology transfer in the capitalist world currently not only does not facilitate the independent development of the liberated states, but also serves as an important factor for the preservation of the subordinate status of the latter in the system of the international capitalist division of labor.

The foundation of the organizational force of neocolonialism in the sphere of international technology transfer is the multinational corporation (MNC). The affirmation of relations of inequality and discrimination in international technology transfer are connected namely with their activity. The MNCs transfer technology primarily along intra-firm channels, i.e. offer scientific and technical achievements not to independent enterprises in the developing states, but to their own branches on foreign soil. As a result, for example, the overall amount of annual net receipts to American MNCs for the delivery of technology to these countries increased from 557 million dollars in 1970 to 1.501 million in 1984, i.e. almost triple, while the share of payments of the independent enterprises of the young national states in the given receipts grew only insignificantly over the period cited: from 11.8 to 18.7 percent.¹

The transfer of technology within the firm is undoubtedly the most advantageous form for the utilization of scientific and technical achievements by the MNCs in foreign economic ties. Its realization ensures that the MNCs will receive profits without losing ownership rights over the technology. For the developing countries, technology transfer within the firm is not accompanied in this instance by the actual receipt of foreign technology by national enterprises.

Another aspect of the problem is associated with technology transfer within the firm—ensuring the productive utilization of foreign patents registered in the territories of the developing states. The MNC branches in the developing countries are frequently oriented toward the execution of marketing rather than productive functions. The transfer of technology by the mother companies to these branches pursues only the aim of ensuring the patent defense of the products manufactured using it.

The execution of the MNC patent policy described above is eased by the fact that the fundamental international legal document that regulates patent relations is the Paris Convention on Industrial Ownership of 1883, which defines the main principles for the formulation of national patent legislation and does not envisage a quite effective defense of a country's patent registration from the abuses of patent owners. The convention in general recognizes the necessity of using registered patents in the interests of developing production and in this regard stipulates both the possibility of the compulsory issue of licenses by the patent owner for the productive use of the patent (via the adoption of the appropriate resolutions by the country's state registration organ) and the annulling of a patent if it is not used productively. The realization of the provisions of the convention regarding the compulsory issue of licenses and the annulment of patents, however, is made considerably more difficult by the very procedure for utilizing it that is stipulated in the document. The convention envisages that the question of the compulsory issue of licenses can be posed juridically only four years after the application for a patent or three years after it is issued (depending on which is later). The annulment of a patent can only occur two years after the issue of the first compulsory license, i.e. realistically no sooner than seven years after the patent claim is issued.²

Along with technology transfer within the firm, the MNCs also participate in the process of its transfer among firms, i.e. in the actual buying and selling of scientific and technical achievements accompanied by changes in their ownership. In practice, this technology transfer is accomplished via the conclusion of contracts by legally independent parties on paid technological deliveries. In cases where the terms of the given contracts reflect generally accepted norms of international economic intercourse and provide for the observance of principles of equality and mutual advantage for the parties in them, technology transfer among firms can become an important channel for introducing young national states to progressive scientific and technical knowledge. In the context of the mutual benefit of the enterprises of developing countries with MNCs, however, such technology transfer is accomplished primarily on the terms of limited business practices (LBP), i.e. the employment of discriminatory restrictions which, on one hand, materially limit the rights of the purchasers of the technology to use it and, on the other, expand the possibilities for the seller of the technology to receive additional income.

Such restrictions can be grouped according to the following basic areas: 1) limiting the amount of production and export based on the technology sold; 2) foisting obligatory additional procurements of technology from the seller on the buyer; 3) limiting the execution of research work based on the technology acquired; and 4) limiting the further dissemination of the technology acquired. The employment of these restrictions inflicts great harm on the interests of independent development of the national states. The negative overall economic consequences of the use of discriminatory restrictions herein are intertwined with financial and scientific and technical consequences. The use by MNCs of limitations on product exports with the aid of the technology acquired, for example, undermines the very idea of creating export industries in the developing states, with the expansion of which are connected their hopes for improving their balance of payments and ultimately the reduction of foreign debt. The inclusion by the MNCs of terms that oblige the buyer of technology to make additional procurements of equipment or materials or to turn to them for engineering and consulting services on a paid basis in contracts for technology transfer among firms leads to a considerable and, as a rule, unjustified increase in the cost of the technology acquired. The idea of limitations on research work is to preserve for the buyer of the technology the role of being just a buyer of scientific and technical knowledge in the future as well, dependent on the MNCs on the plane of the technological renewal of its production. As for limitations on the dissemination of the scientific and technical knowledge obtained, the potential capabilities for utilizing the imported technology for overall national development are materially reduced through their application.

The principal manifestations of neocolonialism in international technology transfer also define the chief directions of the struggle of the developing countries for the affirmation of democratic principles in the sphere of international economic relations under consideration. This struggle is currently concentrated around the two main proposals of the developing countries: the development and incorporation into the practice of international scientific and technical ties of a "code of behavior" in the realm of technology transfer and the reconsideration of the Paris Convention on Industrial Ownership. Negotiations on a "code of behavior" have been conducted within the framework of UNCTAD since 1976.

In the opinion of the developing countries, an International Code of Behavior in the realm of technology transfer should:

—first, clearly recognize the right of the liberated states to take steps to regulate the organizational forms of technology transferred to them, as well as all of its technical and financial aspects;

—second, oblige the governments of the industrially developed countries to provide access for the developing countries to progressive scientific and technical knowledge and transfer technology to them on favorable terms;

—third, contain a special section on LBP that reveals the substance of the discriminatory restrictions in technology transfer and declaring them unacceptable in the practice of international scientific and technical intercourse.

The realization of these requirements would create the essential international legal basis so that technology transfer both within and outside the firm is accomplished with full respect for the principles of national sovereignty, equality and mutual advantage.

The striving of the liberated countries to decolonize the process of international technology transfer enjoys the full support of the socialist countries, who clearly set forth their position on this issue as early as 1976 in a joint declaration at the 4th Session of UNCTAD, emphasizing in particular that "technology transfer should not lead to technological dependence."³ The socialist countries have taken part constructively in the negotiations on the code from the very beginning, stepping forth as the objective ally of the developing world at them.

The developed capitalist states are taking a diametrically opposed position at the negotiations. Their obstructionist approach to the issue was displayed as early as in the course of discussion of the very idea of developing a code in UNCTAD. They declared that the preparation of such a document was untimely, referring therein to the supposed lack of adequate information on international technology transfer. When they were ultimately forced to agree to the proposal for the development of a code, they resorted to the tactic of dragging out the negotiations. They rejected the most substantive provisions of the draft code proposed by the developing countries. They do not express overtly that they are against, for example, the fixing in the code of the right of the developing countries to take steps on a national level to regulate the organizational, technical and financial aspects of technology transfer and against preferential terms for this transfer. But at the same time, they impede in every way possible the realization of the proposal of imparting the status of a compulsory legal document to the International Code of Behavior in the realm of technology transfer. The imperialist powers oppose the inclusion of a special section on LBP in the code. They insist, first of all, that the principle of limited business practices not be extended to technology transfer within the firm, since, they say, there exist "special relations" between a mother company and its branches.⁴ In observing this principle, the MNCs would obtain the possibility of linking technology transfer to their branches with all kinds of terms and in that manner hindering, as before, access to it by the enterprises of developing countries.

Second, the developed capitalist states are striving to see that the code section on LBP would include only those restrictions that, in their perception, can contradict the principles of free competition. As a result, the number of restrictions subject to prohibition would be reduced

sharply: the clauses on, for example, the impermissibility of discriminatory limitations on production volume, the banning of further dissemination of technology acquired and a series of others would become unsubstantiated, which would inflict serious harm to the development of the young states.

Third, the developed capitalist states are proposing that they be guided by the general principle of "commercial expediency" with regard to the use of limitations regarding exports, the conducting of research work on the further modernization of technology, obligations to make additional procurements of technology from the seller etc.

Among the unresolved issues at the negotiations on the International Code is the procedure for settling disputes that arise in the conclusion and realization of contracts on technology transfer. The resolution of this issue, it is true, is also being slowed by the position of the developing countries. The proposal of the "Group of 77" to fix in the code the right of importer countries to resolve such disputes based on the legislation of those countries puts their partners in contracts on deliveries of technology based on international agreements in an unequal position (in cases where the discussion does not concern technology transfer within firms). Soviet researchers have already directed attention to this circumstance.⁵

Overall responsibility for the fact that a text has not been ultimately agreed upon for this important document as a result of the many years of negotiations within the framework of the UNCTAD International Conference on the code of behavior in the realm of technology transfer nonetheless lies completely on the shoulders of the imperialist states. In taking unacceptable positions on all of the fundamental proposals of the developing countries, they are deliberately bringing matters to a point where all of the work on creating the code is reduced to naught and it is not permitted to become a tool for regulating international scientific and technical ties on a fair and democratic basis.

Since the middle of the 1970s, within the framework of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), negotiations have been underway concerning a reconsideration of the Paris Convention on Industrial Ownership and bringing it into accord with the fundamental changes that have occurred in the life of humanity over more than a hundred years. The proposals of the developing countries are reduced to the fact that the new edition of this document, first, include a well-defined provision on the obligatory productive use of patents, second, simplify the procedure for the issue of compulsory licenses and the annulment of patents and, third, not limit the opportunities of sovereign states to change national patent legislation in the interests of ensuring independent scientific and technical development. By the beginning of the 1980s a certain amount of preparatory work had been carried out associated with a review of the Paris Convention. A detailed report on ways of revising

the convention prepared by a group of legal experts from UNCTAD had been presented for the consideration of WIPO⁶; much has been done to coordinate points of view on issues associated with the reconsideration of the convention by a preparatory committee specially created by WIPO.

At the first conference on the reconsideration of the Paris Convention, held in Geneva in February-March 1980, however, the developed capitalist countries took an obstructionist stance regarding the practical realization of the proposals of the developing countries. The conference concluded without approving a procedure for work on reviewing the convention. The negotiations for the three subsequent diplomatic conferences, although going beyond the bounds of procedural issues, were nonetheless not crowned with the adoption of final decisions. This was to a considerable extent a consequence of the irreconcilable stance of the United States and the other developed capitalist countries.

The struggle of the young national states to eliminate inequality and discrimination in international scientific and technical relations is anti-imperialist in nature. The developing countries comprehend the neocolonialist essence of the policies being conducted by foreign monopoly capital in the realm of technology transfer and are advancing demands for a restructuring of the international technological order that are fair overall. The practical realization of these demands would be a favorable factor for the scientific and technical development of the liberated states.

Accumulated experience, however, is convincing that one should not count on quick success in the cause of making international technology transfer more democratic. The developing countries must still wage a prolonged and dogged struggle for the practical realization of their demands. They can count on the assistance of the socialist countries—objective allies of the forces of national liberation—in this struggle. The unification of their efforts opens up new opportunities for liberating the process of internationalizing the achievements of science and technology from the fetters of neocolonialism.

Footnotes

1. Transnational Corporations in World Development (Third Survey). N.Y., 1983, p 164; Survey of Current Business, Vol. 65, 1985. No 6, June, pp 63-64.
2. See: World Intellectual Property Organization. General Information. Geneva, 1984, p 17.
3. VNESHNYAYA TORGOVLYA. 1976, No 8, p 15.
4. Document UNCTAD TD/CODE TOT/47. 20 June 1985, Appendix A, p 2.

5. "Such a position of the 'Group of 77' can be understood in the event that the discussion concerns strengthening monitoring of deals involving TNMs (transnational monopolies—V.Sh.) that are done by intrafirm operations with branches in the receiving countries, not dealing with their national legislation," notes E.Ye. Obminskiy. "However, when under conventional commercial conditions on technology transfer, equal partners of sovereign states take part, it is namely these parties with a vested interest in the event a dispute arises that have the opportunity, with common consent, to choose the right subject to employment or resort to arbitration." (E.Ye. Obminskiy. The Group of 77. Moscow, 1981, p 138).

6. See: Document UNCTAD TD/237. 29 January 1979, p 13.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki". Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1987

North Korea's Cooperation With Developing States Detailed

18070399d Moscow *NARODY AZII I AFRIKI* in Russian No 3, May-Jun 87 pp 96-102

[Article by G. D. Toloraya: "The Economic Collaboration of North Korea with the Developing Countries"]

[Text] Trends in the development of the world economy in the modern era are objectively facilitating a convergence of the interests of the socialist and developing countries from the point of view of the fight against imperialist exploitation and neocolonialism and for a restructuring of international economic relations on a just basis, as well as creating favorable conditions for an expansion of economic collaboration between them. One important sector of this interaction that has still not been adequately illuminated in the literature is the collaboration of socialist countries with a moderate level of development (they are included among developing countries in UN classifications) with the developing countries.

The socialist Korean People's Democratic Republic is at just this level of development. It is encountering problems that are largely similar to those that face the developing countries. The republic is emphasizing the commonality of its interests with the "countries of the South" in their opposition to the economic expansion of imperialism and are actively pursuing this line within the framework of the activity of the non-aligned movement, UNCTAD and the Group of 77 (a member of the latter since 1976). In international forums (including at the 8th Conference of the Heads of State and Governments of the Non-Aligned Countries in Harare in 1986), the representatives of North Korea are constantly coming out in support of the struggle of the developing countries for economic independence, the establishment

of a just international economic order and a "strengthening of the mutual economic collaboration of the developing countries" (so-called "South—South collaboration"). The fundamental aim of the Labor Party of Korea [LPK] and the leaders of the republic of the utmost development of economic collaboration of the developing countries for the creation of a new international economic order and ensuring their economic progress was fixed in the resolutions of the 6th LPK Congress, subsequent party forums and in the decrees of state organs.¹ The declarations of the leaders of North Korea have repeatedly emphasized the importance of practical steps and the development of joint strategy for the developing countries.²

Clear perceptions regarding specific ways of restructuring the system of international economic relations have taken shape in the republic; they were set forth in particular at a joint session of the LPK Central Committee Politburo and the North Korean Central People's Committee on 20 Jul 1986³ and in the speech of North Korean Vice President Pak Song-Chol at the 8th Conference of the Heads of State and Governments of the Non-Aligned Countries in Harare. The topicality of improving the currency and financial system was singled out first and foremost: liquidating the privileges of the developed capitalist countries and their sway in international financial affairs and ensuring the stability of international accounts, the well-foundedness of currency exchange rates and the just resolution of the problem of the foreign indebtedness of the developing countries. North Korea is in favor of having the developing countries convene an international conference on development problems and currency and finance issues that would become an important milestone on the path to restructuring the system of international economic relations. Expressing concern regarding the worsening problem of unequal trade and growth in the trade deficits of the developing countries, Korean specialists feel it is essential to stimulate the exports of the developing countries; placing hopes on the implementation of an "integrated program" for raw materials via a reinforcement of existing international agreements for basic raw-material commodities and the concluding of new ones, the creation of a general fund for financing reserves and the establishment of fair correlations of prices for raw materials and industrial output. The importance of fighting protectionist limitations established by the developed capitalist countries is emphasized.⁴

The chief efforts of the developing countries, as is emphasized in the official documents and economic literature of North Korea, should not be directed, however, toward achieving any concessions from the Western states. The essence of the problem is the developing countries mobilizing their own capabilities. Only the elimination of the mono-cultural nature of the economy and deep structural transformations in the economy via the creation of sectors for modern production based on national resources in conjunction with socio-economic progress can be a condition for transforming the foreign

economic ties of the developing countries from the channel of an outflow of resources and exploitation into a factor of economic development.⁵

Sharing the concepts of collective self-support that have been widely disseminated in the developing world, Korean political scientists and scholars are linking the mainstream path of economic progress first and foremost with mutual collaboration of the developing countries and "mutually supplemental exchange." If the developing countries, as is noted, for example, in a decree of the North Korean Supreme People's Assembly, "are actively to arrange collaboration and exchange—equipment from whoever has the equipment, raw materials from whoever has raw materials, financial resources from whoever has financial resources—then they will be able to survive entirely through their own efforts and build an independent national economy and will be able to bring to life the requirement to establish an equal and just international order."⁶

The decision of the 8th Conference of the Heads of State and Governments of the Non-Aligned Countries to hold an international conference on issues of implementing such collaboration in Pyongyang in June 1987 was an acknowledgment of the active role of North Korea in the struggle to develop "South—South collaboration."

It was emphasized at the 9th Plenum of the LPK Central Committee that the countries of socialism are the natural ally of the developing countries in the struggle for socio-economic progress.⁷ In commenting on the resolutions of the Plenum, the LPK Central Committee organ NODONG SINMUN noted "the advantage that is brought to the developing countries" "by the recognition of the paramount significance of ties to the socialist market" both on the plane of reinforcing national economies and on the plane of reviving international economic relations.⁸

People's Korea is investing many resources in the sphere of economic collaboration with the developing countries.

In the early period of the existence of North Korea, when the republic was concentrating its efforts on the industrialization of its own national economy, economic contacts with the liberated states were episodic in nature and did not play a particular role in the foreign economic ties of the country (for example, by the end of the 1960s the share of the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America in the foreign-trade turnover of the republic barely exceeded 2 percent⁹). The amount of collaboration started to grow rapidly in the 1970s. The economic and technical assistance granted by the republic to less developed countries, along with traditional commodity exchange, acquired greater significance. The geography of collaboration expanded, first of all through the partners of North Korea among the African states. North Korea concluded agreements with several dozen developing countries in economic and scientific and technical collaboration, trade agreements and the like—

including with India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Thailand, Bangladesh, Nepal, Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Libya, Tunisia, Mali, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Togo, Angola, Senegal, Madagascar, Burkina Faso, Cameroon etc. At the beginning of 1984, the expansion and development of collaboration with the developing countries was declared "a most important area of the development of the activity of the party and the government of the republic" in the realm of foreign trade.¹⁰

The current forms of economic collaboration with the developing countries include both commodity turnover on a conventional commercial basis and the rendering of economic assistance, the transfer of scientific and technical experience, the training of specialists and the implementation of joint ventures. In recent years the greatest dynamism has been typical of economic assistance in the creation of a base for the national economy in a number of young states. According to data published in 1984, North Korea built over 30 plants and mills in 22 countries and irrigation systems in 20 countries, and sent more than 5,000 specialists to over 50 countries.¹¹

The economic and technical assistance of North Korea is concentrated in sectors where the republic has accumulated great experience and has the corresponding resources. This is first and foremost the agrarian sector. Kim Yong-Nam emphasized at a conference of the foreign ministers of the non-aligned countries in Luanda (1985) that "it is necessary first and foremost to impart paramount significance to resolving the food issue and implementing mutual collaboration and exchange in this realm."¹² Representatives of North Korea, at a symposium of non-aligned and developing countries on increasing food and agricultural production (Pyongyang, 1981), noted the importance of creating irrigation systems.¹³ At the 8th Conference of the Heads of State and Governments of the Non-Aligned Countries, they pointed out the expediency of these countries developing the corresponding joint plans (for example, a 10-year plan for irrigation construction in the developing countries, an irrigation plan for African countries) and the creation of organizations coordinating the collaboration.¹⁴ The transfer of experience in employing modern agro-technical methods that have been modified with a regard for the national natural and climatic conditions, especially in the realm of seed production, should become an effective means of raising the productivity of cultivation. Korean specialists feel that the organization of combined facilities on share principles (chiefly grain specialization) that would make use of local land and manpower and would receive irrigation equipment, fertilizers, chemicals etc. from countries that have already accumulated experience. The efforts of the more developed countries can moreover be concentrated on creating the production of agricultural implements and the simplest agricultural machinery in the poorest countries, as well as research bases to develop scientific recommendations in the realm of raising the yield of crops.¹⁵

Irrigation systems have been built in many African countries with the participation of North Korean specialists: Ethiopia, an area of 3,000 hectares, Tanzania, Mozambique, an area of 1,000 hectares, Madagascar, Senegal, Uganda, Burkina Faso, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and Sierra Leone.¹⁶ A conference of irrigation experts from the coordinating countries on issues of food and agriculture from the non-aligned countries (Pyongyang, 1984) recommended in particular the creation of an organization to coordinate technical collaboration in the realm of irrigation with its headquarters in North Korea, which affirms the high reputation of the republic in this area.¹⁷

North Korea is also employing such forms of transferring experience and incorporating progressive agro-technical methods as the creation of "prototype" farms, test stations, laboratories and institutes in the developing countries where North Korean agricultural specialists work. A number of facilities of this type have been created in Tanzania (about 10 agricultural cooperatives and the Chkhollima Institute in Dakawa) where scientists and practitioners from North Korea incorporate high-grade types of corn and wheat and do selective work. A joint Korean-Tanzanian agricultural company was organized in 1986. Korean specialists have assisted in creating an agricultural research institute in Guinea.¹⁸

Assistance is also rendered to the developing countries in the construction of infrastructure facilities. North Korea is on a quite solid footing here—a developed production of building materials (cement, metal structural elements) and the experience accumulated by the republic in productive and non-productive construction. Among the social, cultural and infrastructure facilities built and being built with the aid of North Korea in the developing countries are the Meeting Hall for Government Heads in Guinea, the Konakry National Palace, the Meeting Hall in Batha (Equatorial Guinea), the presidential palace and Pioneers Hall in Madagascar, the Government Hall in Lesotho, a children's center in Somalia, a Youth Hall in Rwanda, a Party Congress Hall in Burundi, an academy in Uganda, a stadium and technical school in the People's Republic of Yemen, a stadium in Sana (Yemen Arab Republic), a "People's Amphitheater" in Burkina Faso, a Culture Hall in Bamako (Mali), a parliament building in the Central African Republic, a monument to heroes of the revolution in Ethiopia, monuments in Togo and Burkina Faso, cultural institutions in Senegal and hospitals, schools and other facilities.

In recent years, collaboration in the production sphere has acquired a certain dynamism, although the scale of North Korean assistance in industrializing the developing countries is still limited and the facilities being built are basically not large. I will cite, for example, the hydroelectric stations in the Gilgel Gibi region of Ethiopia (300,000 kilowatt capacity) and the Kili in Guinea. Enterprises in the machining industry built with the participation of North Korea are intended chiefly for satisfying the needs of the agrarian sector and the

demand of the population: the Akkaki Pump Plant, a wharf in Asebe (Ethiopia) producing small fishing vessels, a printing combine in Benin, the Balada Textile Mill (Somalia), a glass plant and a plant for repairing agricultural equipment in Guyana, an agricultural-implements plant in the Central African Republic, copper mines in Zimbabwe and others.¹⁹

As was emphasized at the 3rd Session of the North Korean Supreme People's Assembly 7th Convocation, the republic is rendering assistance to its partners on extremely favorable terms. In a number of instances, the construction of facilities is done on an uncompensated basis (several buildings for social and cultural purposes in particular were handed over as a gift); in other cases, dedicated-purpose long-term interest-free loans or loans granted for extremely low interest rates are offered in which North Korea supplies the building materials (and, where necessary, various equipment). For example, for the construction of a hydroelectric power plant in Ethiopia, credit of 124 million birr was granted. North Korea usually does not require compensation for the services of specialists on temporary duty or for the transfer of production experience.²⁰

North Korea is aiding a number of developing countries, especially African ones (Tanzania, Zambia etc.) in training national personnel in the realm of agriculture, medicine, journalism etc. They are simultaneously giving free aid to countries that have suffered from natural calamities. Such aid usually includes building materials (cement), medicines and agricultural equipment. In recent years, such aid has been rendered to Bangladesh, Mauritius, Madagascar, the Seychelles, Nicaragua, Somalia, Sudan, Benin and others.²¹

North Korea is energetically participating in the joint activity of the developing countries to solve a complex set of problems that have arisen in recent decades in the realm of international trade and accounts, feeling, as was emphasized by Park Sen Cher in Harare, it is essential "to take steps to animate trade and collaboration in the financial realm" among the developing countries.²² North Korean specialists are pointing out the expediency of establishing a system of benefits and preferences in trade among the developing countries along with the creation of a special international bank to finance mutual accounts. The LPK Central Committee Politburo and the Central People's Committee of North Korea have pointed out the expediency of discussing problems of trade and economic collaboration among the developing countries at the summit level, having in mind therein the development of the appropriate specific recommendations.²³

The expansion of commodity turnover with the developing countries has been advanced as an important task of the national economy in North Korea in recent years. Its resolution is, however, encountering a number of difficulties that are arising, in particular, from the limited nature of the effective demand of the developing

countries for North Korean export products. Foreign trade organizations of the republic are seeking ways of increasing deliveries to the markets of the developing countries of both raw materials and industrial output, including machine tools, agricultural equipment, railroad rolling stock parts, tools etc. The basic export product range includes rolled ferrous metals (including steel sheet), non-ferrous metals, magnesium clinker, cement, coal, maritime products, chemical commodities and others.

The national economy of North Korea, through its trade ties with the developing countries, satisfies its requirements for such important raw materials that are lacking in the republic as oil, cotton, jute, rubber, phosphates, manganese and chrome ores, manioc and several kinds of industrial items and equipment.

A rapid rise in the amount of trade, which fluctuates considerably by years and has recently been 400-600 million dollars, has been observed since the first half of the 1970s.²⁴ According to estimated data, the share of the developing countries in the foreign-trade turnover of North Korea has reached 10-11 percent in the 1980s.²⁵ In some cases, trade is conducted on an in-kind or clearing basis (Egypt, Syria, Bangladesh), but with the majority of the countries, it is calculated in foreign currency, which in the event of a real surplus in the trade balance of North Korea allows it to accumulate additional foreign-currency receipts.

The geographical distribution of trade shows that North Korea currently places the greatest accent on developing trade with the countries of ASEAN, southern Asia and the Near and Middle East. The intensive development of trade with Southeast Asia is explained by geographical proximity and the vested interest of the countries in the region in a number of Korean raw materials. For example, North Korea supplies Malaysia with steel sheet (up to 10,000 tons a year), non-ferrous metals, chemicals and maritime products. The principal commodities that Malaysia exports to North Korea are rubber and palm international; North Korea also intends to procure tin in this country. The amount of trade turnover fluctuates considerably from year to year, however as a rule North Korean exports (2-3 million dollars) are considerably less than imports (10-15 million dollars).²⁶

Indonesia is a major partner of North Korea. Among items delivered there are sheet steel, metal structural elements, chemicals, pumps and compressors and textile equipment. Rubber and coffee (a total of about 12-15 million dollars a year) are imported from Indonesia. Trade with Thailand has also been developed somewhat, where North Korea procures manioc, rubber and tin on the basis of an agreement of 2 Dec 78 and where they sell non-ferrous metals, sheet steel, chemical commodities and some machinery. Trade turnover fluctuates by years: in 1980 it was up to 10 million dollars, in 1984 3 million and has increased sharply once again in 1985-86.²⁷

Hong Kong and Singapore—major re-exporting centers—stand out somewhat among the East Asian partners of North Korea. Some 97 percent of North Korean imports from Hong Kong are re-exports. Typical of trade with it is an excess of imports over exports. North Korea imports machinery and equipment, finished products, chemical products, cotton, petroleum products and vegetable oil from there. On the markets of Hong Kong and Singapore, North Korea sells large lots of rolled ferrous metal, zinc, lead, maritime products, medicinal herbs, chemicals etc. Joint enterprises have begun to be created in recent years, especially with Hong Kong, basically in the sphere of marketing. The Korean company Namkhyn and the Hong Kong firm of Wenfay, for example, have formed a joint company called Namwen that operates in the realm of chemicals and light industry.²⁸

India is singled out among the partners of North Korea in southern Asia. The amount of commodity turnover is not steady from year to year, and averages about 40 million dollars. In recent years North Korea has had a real net surplus trade balance with trade with India, and the volume of exports is 3-4 times greater than incoming deliveries. North Korea ships railroad wheels and axles, cement, silk and silk thread and sheet steel to India.

The product mix of North Korean imports from India includes iron ore, mica, shellac, cotton etc. The exchange of scientific and technical information in the realm of agriculture and electronics is being developed.²⁹ Trade with Bangladesh is conducted on the basis of annual trade protocols. North Korea supplies machine tools, refractory materials, chemical products and glass items and in turn procures jute, sanitary engineering items, furniture etc.³⁰ The republic is also developing trade and economic collaboration with Pakistan.

The trade and economic ties of North Korea with the Near East also have serious economic significance. From Arab countries North Korea obtains, in particular, such important raw materials as international and cotton. For example, according to an agreement with Iran, North Korea delivers cement, fertilizers and technical products in exchange for crude oil, although the shipment of the cargo by ship is complicated by the military activity in the Persian Gulf.³¹ Ties are being expanded with Libya, with which a protocol was signed in June of 1986 on economic and trade exchange. After a fall in the first half of the 1980s, trade with Egypt on a clearing basis is coming alive once again. Foreign-trade ties have also been established with Syria, Algeria, Ethiopia, Sudan, Ghana and several other countries of Africa.

Geographical distance and political competition are hindering the activation of North Korean trade and economic ties with the countries of Latin America. The basis of trade with Nicaragua has been laid, and trade contacts with Peru are maintained.³²

An analysis of the geographical distribution of North Korean economic ties in the developing world shows a quite well-defined differentiation of its forms according to groups of countries. North Korea renders economic and technical assistance on preferential terms chiefly to the less developed countries, first and foremost African ones; its volume and directions are conditioned to a considerable extent by the resources and capabilities of North Korea. At the same time, mutually advantageous commercial relations link North Korea principally to a small group of more developed countries, wherein this sector of the republic's foreign economic ties allows it to resolve important national-economic tasks. The future includes a deepening of the business interaction of North Korea with both groups of countries.

Footnotes

1. See: Report of the LPK Central Committee to the 6th Party Congress. Pyongyang, 1980, pp 109-110. See also: Kim Il Sung. "The Non-Aligned Movement—A Powerful Anti-Imperialist Revolutionary Force of Modern Times." Pyongyang, 1976; et al.
2. See, for example: NODONG SINMUN. 22 Oct 85; 15 Jun, 8 Sep 86.
3. NODONG SINMUN. 21 Jun 86.
4. See: NODONG SINMUN. 21 Jun, 8 Sep 86.
5. See: VNESHNYAYA TORGOVLYA KNDR. 1986, No 5, p 1.
6. NODONG SINMUN. 27 Jan 84.
7. NODONG SINMUN. 11 Jul 84.
8. NODONG SINMUN. 12 Jul 84.
9. Korean People's Democratic Republic. Moscow, 1985, p 166.
10. NODONG SINMUN. 27 Jan 84.
11. Ibid.
12. NODONG SINMUN. 8 Sep 85.
13. NODONG SINMUN. 27 Aug 81.
14. NODONG SINMUN. 21 Jun, 8 Sep 86.
15. NODONG SINMUN. 2 Dec 85; 7 Mar, 21 Jun 86; Foreign Trade of DPRK. 1986, No 6, pp 2-3; VNESHNYAYA TORGOVLYA KNDR. 1981, No 10, pp 2-9, 11-13.

16. IZVESTIYA. 6 Oct 85; NODONG SINMUN. 23 Dec 84, 7 Jan, 7 Feb, 28 Feb, 4 Oct 85; 30 Jun 86; Foreign Trade of DPRK. 1986, No 6, p 3; Age of Ghagusong. 1985, No 4, pp 46-47.
 17. VNESHNYAYA TORGOVLYA KNDR. 1984, No 9, pp 7-10.
 18. NODONG SINMUN. 9 Jan, 4 Mar, 13 Jul, 19 Oct 85; 12 Feb, 4 Aug, 29 Aug 86.
 19. BIKI. 14 Mar 85; NODONG SINMUN. 8 Aug, 3 Sep 84, 3 Jan, 5 Jul, 22 Jul 85; 31 Jan 86.
 20. BIKI. 14 Mar 85; NODONG SINMUN. 26 Jan 86.
 21. NODONG SINMUN. 19 Jul, 28 Oct, 18 Dec 84; 24 May, 22 Jul, 21 Aug 85.
 22. NODONG SINMUN. 8 Sep 86.
 23. NODONG SINMUN. 21 Jun 86.
 24. See: Korean People's Democratic Republic, p 168.
 25. Ibid., pp 159-166.
 26. Commodity Trade Statistics. 1980-1985.
 27. Ibid.
 28. Ibid.
 29. BIKI. 13 Nov 84.
 30. BIKI. 24 Nov 84.
 31. The Korea Herald (Seoul). 12 Sep 84.
 32. Far Eastern Economic Review. Vol. 131, 1985, N 9, p 2.
- COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki". Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1987

European, Native African Texts on Continent's History Compared

18070399e Moscow *NARODY AZII I AFRIKI* in Russian No 3, May-Jun 87 pp 103-109

[Article by Yu. N. Zotova: "Two Approaches to Studying the History of Africa"]

[Text] During the colonial period, the mother countries enjoyed a monopoly on writing African history and propagating historical information about Africa. Both the authors of lecture courses for institutes and textbooks for schools were Europeans—most often serving the colonial administration or people closely associated with it.

The textbook according to which history was studied in Nigerian schools in the 1950s-1960s was written by J.D. Clark, an instructor at the Pedagogical Institute in London, who served for many years as an inspector on educational issues in the colony.¹ Having undergone four reprintings since 1956, this textbook can serve as a visible example of how historical concepts constructed by Englishmen to justify colonization were propagated among the Africans themselves for the purpose of forcing them to believe in the "civilizing mission" of the white man in Africa. Principal attention in the book is devoted to the period of European colonization. Clark tries first and foremost to inculcate African schoolchildren with the concept of the "correctness" and "legality" of the colonizing activity of England and the other imperialist powers in Africa. The chief purpose of the colonial usurpations is declared to be the cessation of internecine warfare, the eradication of human sacrifices and other barbaric customs and, chiefly, to halt the slave trade. Thus, the seizure of Lagos, laying the foundation for the expansion of England on the lower Niger, is not explained in the book by the fact it opened up access to the extensive regions at the lower reaches of the Niger at all. An accusation is made against the ruler in Lagos that he had supposedly "transformed the island into a major slave port on the banks of the Gulf of Guinea and persecuted those who had agreed to halt the slave trade. It was then decided to take action against him: Lagos was attacked by ships of the Royal Navy."² The author asserts therein that aggressive methods were somehow not typical of the policies of England in Africa. In light of this concept, the colonial expansion is treated in the textbook as a "peaceful process," which was accomplished chiefly via the development of so-called legal trade in palm oil, nuts and other African raw materials.³ The military reprisals against the population in Brass, Opobo and other cities in the Niger delta, as well as Lagos, were considered "individual extremes" of colonial policy that were supposedly permitted by the administrative officials without the knowledge of Great Britain.

The principal method for establishing British control, Clark writes, was concluding treaties with local chiefs. The leading role in disseminating English influence to the deepest regions of the lower Niger belonged to the trading companies, among which an especially active role was played by the Royal Niger Company. A special chapter suggests to African schoolchildren that the activity of this company "brought law and order" to Nigeria. The chief administrator of the company, J. Goldie, who had been able to unite the British on the lower Niger in the fight against the French during the height of the competition for dividing up Africa, was praised as "the creator of Nigeria." Especial praise is heaped on a former employee of the company who later became governor-general of the colony, F. Lugard, who introduced "indirect management," an administrative system supposedly summoned to teach Africans the art of managing the country and laying the "foundation for the creation of local government."⁴

The book completely reflects a treatment of the history of the African peoples from a position of Eurocentrism. The creators of this concept disdainfully consider the Africans as "non-historic peoples" that were halted in their development, were unable to repel them and by virtue of this consistently served as "passive objects" for the policies of the great European powers. Holding steadfastly to this point of view, which at the time held sway in the official historical science of England, Clark begins the consideration of Nigeria from the end of the 18th to the 19th centuries, i.e. from the time of the intensive penetration of Europeans to the lower Niger. He is silent about the resistance of the local population to British expansion, and the most serious uprisings of Africans against the colonial yoke, which were widely known, are called "disturbances" directed against the "progressive" measures of the colonizers. The leaders of these uprisings are depicted in the textbook as "blood-thirsty" tyrants and slave traders. The use of the armed forces of England against them is considered to be a "necessary evil" justified by the "crimes" of the Africans.⁵ National heroes of Africa, who fought long and hard against the alien colonizers, are not even mentioned. At the same time, whole chapters are devoted to local rulers who, in the words of Clark, "helped to build Nigeria," i.e. went into the service of the colonizers and were used in the "native" administration.

In the second half of the 1960s, after the fall of the colonial empire, a new stage in the study of African history began. A characteristic feature of it is the fact that the description of African history ceased to be the monopoly of European scholars. In 1966 a new textbook came off the presses for Nigerian schoolchildren that was written by a Nigerian, Rex Akpofure, a history instructor at Ibadan University and a lecturer at Lagos University, in co-authorship with British historian M. Crowder.⁶ The textbook first and foremost completely disposes of the theory of the Africans as "non-historic" peoples. The third part of the materials included in it is devoted to a history of the African peoples before the coming of the European colonizers. The medieval "empires" of the west Sudan, the city-state of the lower Niger in the 17th-18th centuries and the caliphate of Sokoto in the northern part of modern-day Nigeria, created at the beginning of the 19th century, are reviewed in detail. The original nature of the states that arose long before the coming of the Europeans is revealed through the inclusion of local archives and data from oral traditions. The authors do not therein reduce the formation and development of these states to the influence of external factors and contacts, as was done by Clark.

Roughly the same space is allotted to the colonial period in the book. A new approach to the processes of development of the African peoples in the 19th-20th centuries was expressed in the authors' review of the earlier treatment of British colonization. Many justifications that had been advanced by the official historiography of the mother country for the purpose of justifying colonial

expansion were rejected. The decisive significance of England's aspirations to seize the sources of raw materials and to ensure favorable terms for English trade are noted. The squadron and troops were used not so much to halt the contraband shipping of slaves as they were to protect English traders that bought palm oil, cotton, copra and other valuable raw materials. The seizure of Lagos was caused, as Akpofure emphasizes, not at all by the fact that it was supposedly a center for the slave trade; the English had a vested interest in the strategically placed island, whence British traders moreover dispatched large lots of cotton to Liverpool. The book also reflects several changes in official British historiography, which under the influence of contemporary events in Africa was forced to modernize a number of former justifications for expansion.⁷ Thus, in evaluating the colonial policies of England in Africa at the end of the 19th century overall, the authors allocate an important role to considerations dictated by European policies. They write that Great Britain seized the colony first and foremost out of a desire "not to be shortchanged" under conditions of extremely acute rivalry with France and Germany for the partition of Africa.⁸

The textbook nonetheless reconsiders from new points of view not only the goals of colonial policies, but also the very methods and forms of colonization. Following in the footsteps of leading Nigerian historians such as K. Dike and J. Anene, the authors of the book reject the concept of "peaceful colonization." The materials they cite testify to the fact that military force was the determining factor in the affirmation of British sway in Africa, and the usurpation of the power of African chiefs via the foisting of unequal treaties on them transpired under the muzzles of the guns of the English squadron, and Great Britain used not only naval forces, but large land armies as well, in Africa.⁹ It should be emphasized in this regard that the Africans are presented not as a passive party unable to develop independently, but rather as the creators of their own fate, and first and foremost active fighters against colonization. The textbook relates the fight against English expansion of the peoples of the eastern delta headed by the ruler Opobo Ja-Ja, who strove to forbid the Europeans access to the deeper regions of the lower Niger, as well as the war waged against the Royal Niger Company by the residents of Brass, offended by the extortions and excesses of its agents and the like.

The rise of the anticolonial movement and the struggle to achieve independence is considered in the two concluding sections of the text. Unfortunately, the description of the forces and organizations that fought against British colonial rule in the latter two stages (1918-1945 and 1945-1959) that is given in these sections is fragmentary; the popular uprisings of the first three decades of the 20th century caused by the introduction of "indirect rule," taxes and the forced mobilization of the local population for construction work are not shown at all, for example. Several fabrications brought into Nigerian history by official British academics are also retained.

Thus, the military attack on Brohemi and the destruction of this city-state (located on the right bank of the Benin River) was nonetheless supposedly motivated by the fact that "the ruler Nana was carrying out slave trading in secret."¹⁰ The authors clearly overestimate the benefits obtained by Nigeria as a result of the socio-economic shifts brought on by colonization. The conclusions they draw are resonant with the theory of the "progressivity" of European colonization advanced at one time by such "classic" representatives of official British historiography as M. Perham, W. Hailey et al.¹¹

At the end of the 1970s, almost a decade and a half after the publication of the textbook of R. Akpofure and M. Crowder, another history text was published in Nigeria. It was written by Nigerian historian Guda Abdullahi and co-authored by M. Crowder.¹² Well-known African historians took part in preparing it, the authors of much research that was reflected in individual chapters.¹³

The new text differs considerably from preceding ones. Chief attention in it is devoted to the pre-colonial era, i.e. the history of the peoples of the lower Niger before the coming of the Europeans. Some 16 of the 25 chapters are devoted to this period. This approach is typical of contemporary African historiography, which is striving to show that Africa had a glorious past of many centuries, trampled by the colonizers and falsified by bourgeois European academics.

A material feature in the textbook is the use of a new type of sources. This was noticeably reflected in the chapter on the so-called pre-history (very ancient and ancient history) which was written to a considerable extent based on the results of recent archaeological excavations on Nigerian territory. The archaeological material was used to date the Paleolithic era, to determine the period of transition from hunting and gathering to cultivation and to consider the question of the independent development of the technology of iron melting.¹⁴ Data from oral traditions was used more widely to evaluate the social organization of African society in its early stages, before the creation of states and especially in the period of the birth of statehood among the local peoples. The content of the book's chapters devoted to these issues testifies to the fact that the fight within African historiography to debunk the myth that the African peoples had not created their own culture and civilization before European colonization is growing stronger. "The whites, beginning with racial prejudices and supposing that people with black skin were not able to found a state on their own," were powerfully deluded, Guda Abdullahi emphasizes, describing the system of state formations that arose in western Africa long before the coming of the Englishman. Referring to special research, he notes that the appearance of states in western Africa occurred in different geographical zones and was of an original nature, and moreover whether in the savannahs of the north or the forest regions of the south, the processes of state formation transpired separately and independently from each other.¹⁵

The textbook devotes particular attention to the great "empires" of West African medieval times that arose in the "savannah" belt on the border with the Sahara—Ghana, Mali, Songay, as well as the state of Kanem, which formed at the end of the 9th and beginning of the 10th centuries on the territory of modern Nigeria itself (northeast of Lake Chad). The processes of state formation are considered in no less detail in the southern forest zone of the upper Guinea, where Yoruba city-states were created—Ife and Oyo, as well as the Edo power of Benin. The precise dates of the founding of these states are not cited in the book, insofar as there are none and they cannot be found in the legends and myths that were at the basis of the description of the processes of the taking shape of statehood in the southern regions of the upper Guinea. The authors nonetheless emphasize that Ife was the oldest center of the Yoruba culture, having arisen long before the 15th century.

The slave trade, as is well known, played a special role in the history of western Africa in the 15th-18th centuries. A special chapter is devoted to it in the text. It is small in size and written from sources that have already become traditional.¹⁶ Nonetheless, the approach to the resolution of this nonetheless acute problem in African studies is new. The authors refrained from an exposition of the history of the European trans-Atlantic slave trade, the 400-year period of which was considered in detail in preceding textbooks. The attention of pupils is concentrated chiefly on the consequences of the slave trade—social, economic and political. The text emphasizes that the export of slaves led to an outflow of the most productive human resources from Africa: over 10 million strong and healthy men and women were sent across the ocean and "had to work on plantations as slaves."¹⁷ The hunt for slaves, and is further justly noted, provoked fratricide, massacres and wars, which powerfully weakened the African peoples and the states they had created.

At the same time, with the retention of the negative approach to the treatment of this problem overall that is typical of contemporary African historiography, the text makes a noticeable attempt to diminish the catastrophic consequences of the slave trade for Africa. This is being attempted first and foremost via a decrease in the numbers of human losses, as well as through an augmentation of the "stimulating influence" of the trade in slaves on the processes of state formation, for example in the Niger delta, etc. In economic effect, slave trading is compared with the "Industrial Revolution." The authors enumerate herein in detailed fashion the new objects of trade that appeared during that time and the food crops imported into Africa. Thus, by degrees, the perception is inculcated of a known benefit from the slave trade, albeit, as the authors indicate, a minimal one.

The causes for the prohibition on seizing and exporting slaves from Africa are illuminated in the textbook from an objective point of view. After the fashion of Adu Boahen and other West-African historians, the authors stress that it was not philanthropic motives at all that led

to the cessation of slave trading.¹⁸ Whereas the slave trade and slavery make it possible for Great Britain to flourish in the 18th century, they write, "they later began to limit its development." The rejection of trade in people met the interests of "those individuals who wanted to export from West Africa its natural rather than human resources."¹⁹ Colonial expansion and partitioning of Africa drew closer.

The history of European colonization, as well as the trans-Atlantic slave trade, are given extremely limited space in the new textbook. This is a manifestation of yet another specific feature of the modern development of African historical thought. Interest in the colonial past has declined considerably today. This is undisputed testimony to the process of spiritual decolonization as expressed in this instance in the "Africanization" of history. The history of Africa should be the history of its peoples, even when the basis of the topic of study is European "contacts" with the African countries. It is namely from this point of view that the authors of the book under consideration approach the illumination of the colonial period. There is in essence no history of European conquests in Africa in it. At the same time, the preconditions and consequences of the imperialist partitioning of the African continent are investigated in detail. It was chiefly the economic needs of Europe that were at the foundation of this process, to wit the search for markets for mill and plant products and rivalries for sources of raw materials. The most reliable means of overcoming a rival, as is emphasized in the text, is the "occupation of territories in which the imperialist states had a vested interest."²⁰ Such is the authors' conclusion.

The chapters on the colonial period nonetheless repeat erroneous positions as well. Considerations of prestige, the authors assert, played a large role in the pursuit of colonies. Referring to well-known scholars representing official bourgeois historiography, they write that "many European countries could not have become great powers without (colonial—Yu.Z.) empires."²¹ Another conclusion of bourgeois studies reflecting neocolonialist tendencies also does not pass unnoticed. The discussion concerns the quite widely disseminated thesis that the European states obtained the opportunity of solving their own internal problems, as well as foreign-policy ones, at the expense of Africa.²² The population of Europe at that time was growing rapidly, and the governments, as the textbook emphasizes, were trying to pump the excessive number of poor people across the border to the African continent.

The authors devoted intensive attention to the consequences of European colonial sway in Africa. It should be emphasized that the book has no mention of the theory of "the white man's burden in Africa" that was earlier widespread in bourgeois historiography, according to which colonization supposedly gave the African peoples "unity, law and order" and brought in economic development and modern social structure.²³ Making use of materials from one of the principal works of African

scholars devoted to West Africa,²⁴ the authors describe colonialism as a destructive force. The imperialists considered the colonies only as the suppliers of raw materials for their industry and as consumers of industrial products produced in the mother country, it is emphasized in the text, and therefore "for the colonial period it is more correct to speak of economic exploitation than economic development."²⁵ The authors cite a multitude of facts. The colonial powers encouraged the development only of those sectors of agriculture whose products went to exports, and displayed no interest whatsoever in local commercial crops. The mining sectors, which were entirely in the hands of European companies, grew rapidly, while the development of the machining industry, into which national entrepreneurs had begun to penetrate and whose products could have competed with European goods, was constantly limited. The infrastructure had a one-sided nature. Harbors, ports, railroads and highways, as well as other means of communication, were built first and foremost to support foreign rather than domestic trade. They were moreover built, as the text emphasizes, using the funds of local tax collections and using the forced labor of Africans. Over the whole course of this period between wars, "Great Britain invested very little capital in the economic development of West Africa."²⁶

Social changes in African society are described quite briefly and frequently imprecisely in the book. The effect of the elitist sociological theories that rule European bourgeois historiography can nonetheless be felt. Thus, in the words of the authors, the idea of national self-awareness was born in the environment of the educated elite. The authors do not show the social differentiation that was noted in the years following the Second World War, ignoring the fact that the mass base of the liberation movement was already made up of the middle-class urban segments, peasants and workers.

The history of the anti-colonial struggle is considered in this book, as opposed to the two preceding ones, in quite detailed fashion. Four chapters are devoted to it. This topic, a powerfully falsified bourgeois historiography which has for decades propagated the myth of the lack of resistance to colonization on the part of the African peoples, is attracting the steadfast attention of national historians today. They are seeking their own approach to its resolution and are first and foremost repudiating the groundless theory of the local population as the passive object of the policies of the European powers. The textbook emphasizes the ceaseless nature of the anti-colonial struggle. Making use of the research of well-known national historians,²⁷ the authors delineate several stages of resistance. In the first stage, at the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th, they place the reaction of the local peoples to the European incursion in direct dependence on the level of socio-economic development of local society. At the same time, they emphasize that the degree of resistance to colonization was conditioned not only by the internal political situation, but also by the foreign policy of African states. That is

how it was in the caliphate of Sokoto (in the northern part of contemporary Nigeria), in Benin and Oyo and in the southern and southwestern regions of the lower Niger.

The authors direct especial attention to the second stage—from the beginning of the First World War to the world economic crisis of 1929-1933. They note the mass nature of the anti-colonial uprisings in those years, stress the continuity of these demonstrations with the anti-colonial movements of the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th and point out their primarily spontaneous nature. At the same time, other, organized forms of the national-liberation struggle were also typical of the period between the two world wars. The authors relate in detail the appearance of the first anti-colonial resistance organizations: the National Congress of British West Africa, the Nigerian National-Democratic Party, the Nigerian Youth Movement and others. The years of the Second World War are singled out as an especial boundary in the history of the national-liberation struggle. The end of the war signaled the beginning of a cardinal overall turning point in the fate of the African peoples caused by the disintegration of the colonial system. In the words of the authors, this was "the turning point in the history of Nigeria, which opened up the way for it, as for the other African countries, to independence."²⁸ Special sections of the textbook, written largely based on the research materials of Nigerian scholar G. Olusanya,²⁹ are devoted to the socio-political consequences of the war for the local population. They discuss the unprecedented national awakening of the country, which led to the formation of mass political organizations that joined the struggle against the British administration. The first such organization was the Nigeria-wide party National Council of Nigerian Citizens, which headed the movement for the liberation of the country from alien domination. The achievement of independence was the result of the anti-colonial struggle, the authors stress in conclusion, expressing complete solidarity with the positions of the leading Nigerian historians.

The materials of the textbook testify to the fact that Nigerian historiography has achieved significant successes. A large historical school has taken shape in the country, in essence the only one in sub-Saharan Africa. New textbooks are coming out prepared by African authors and based on the achievements of Nigerian researchers. At the same time, as the Africans themselves acknowledge, historical truth has still not yet been completely restored in these publications.

Footnotes

1. J.D. Clark. *A Visual History of Nigeria*. London, 1956.
2. *Ibid.*, pp 20, 24.

3. Ibid., p 26. See also: A. Burns. *The History of Nigeria*. London, 1929, pp 140-156, 171-181; W. Geary. *Nigeria under British Rule*. London, 1927, pp 68-121.

4. J.D. Clark. Op. cit., pp 28, 34. It is typical that 1960 is noted in official British historiography for the appearance of a series of books on the creators of the colonial empire in Africa (see, for example: M. Perham. *Lugard. The Years Authority*. London, 1960; J. Flint. *Sir George Goldie and the Making of Nigeria*. London, 1960).

5. J.D. Clark. Op. cit., pp 24, 30-31.

6. R. Akpofure, M. Crowder. *Nigeria. A Modern History for Schools*. London, 1966.

7. See, for example, the works of the co-author of this textbook. M. Crowder. *Story of Nigeria*. N.Y., 1962 et al.

8. R. Akpofure, M. Crowder. Op. cit., pp 145-150, 159-163.

9. Ibid., pp 131-133, 143, 156. See also: K.O. Dike. *Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta*. London, 1956, pp 204-207, 218; J. Anene. *Southern Nigeria in Transition*. Cambridge, 1966, pp 182-184.

10. R. Akpofure, M. Crowder. Op. cit., p 125. Analogous formulations are given in the works of M. Crowder (see, for example: M. Crowder. *A Short History of Nigeria*. New York—Washington, 1966, pp 199-203).

11. See, for example: M. Perham. *Native Administration of Nigeria*. London, 1937, pp 12-15, 61-80; W.M.H. Hailey. *An African Survey*. Pt 3. London, 1939, pp 1-2, 23-24, 109.

12. Guda Abdullahi, M. Crowder. *Nigeria. An Introduction to its History*. London, 1979.

13. See, for example: Adu Boahen. *Topics in West African History*. London, 1966; Ade Ajayi, M. Crowder. *History of West Africa*. Vol. 1. London, 1974; vol. 2, 1977.

14. Guda Abdullahi, M. Crowder. Op. cit., pp 15-23. See also: Th. Shaw, Igbo-Ukwu. *An Account of Archaeological Discoveries in Eastern Nigeria*. Vol. 1-2. London, 1970.

15. Guda Abdullahi, M. Crowder. Op. cit., pp 29-30. See also: J. Egharevba. *A Short History of Benin*. Lagos, 1934 (2nd ed., 1960); J.A. Atanda. *The New Oyo Empire*, London, 1973; A.F.C. Ryder. *Benin and the Europeans. 1485-1897*. London, 1969.

16. See, for example: J. Barbot. *A Description of the Coasts of North and South Guinea...*, London, 1746.

17. Guda Abdullahi, M. Crowder. Op. cit., p 58.

18. See: Adu Boahen, Y.B. Webster. *History of West Africa*. N.Y., 1970, p 73.

19. Guda Abdullahi, M. Crowder. Op. cit., p 130.

20. Ibid., p 137.

21. Ibid. See also: L.H. Gann, P. Duignan. *Colonialism in Africa. 1870-1960*. Vol. 1. Cambridge, 1969.

22. See, for example: *Journal of African History*. 1969, No 2, pp 254-255, 265-275.

23. See, for example: W.M.H. Hailey. *An African Survey*. London, 1939; W. Geary. *Nigeria under British Rule*. London, 1927.

24. See: *History of West Africa*. Vol. 1. London, 1974; vol. 2, 1977.

25. Guda Abdullahi, M. Crowder. Op. cit., p 163.

26. Ibid., p 164.

27. See, for example: R.A. Adeleye. *Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria. 1804-1906*. London, 1971; S.A. Akintoye. *Revolution and Power Politics in Yorubaland. 1840-1893*. London, 1971; K.K. Nair. *Politics and Society in South Eastern Nigeria*. Cass, 1972.

28. Guda Abdullahi, M. Crowder. Op. cit., p 180.

29. See: G.O. Olusanya. *The Second World War and Politics in Nigeria*. Lagos, 1973, p 160-161.

30. See, for example: T.N. Tamuno. *Nigeria and Elective Representation. 1923-1947*. London, 1966, pp 121-122.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki". Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1987

Conference on Study of Cultural Features in Developing States

18070399f Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 87 pp 124-131

[Article by A. G. Cheremin and N. N. Zarubina: "The International Conference 'Cultural Processes in the Developing Countries'"]

[Text] The conference, which was held 25-28 Nov 86 at the Oriental Studies Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, devoted much attention to a consideration of the principal tasks of cultural studies in studying the processes transpiring in the liberated countries. USSR Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member Ye.P. Chelyshev emphasized the topical nature of the development of cultural-studies research and the importance of studying the profound processes that are characteristic of social creation. The report of B.S. Yerasov noted that the broad development of cultural-studies research requires

the development of the theoretical aspects of this discipline. Understanding culture as a process and the product of spiritual production makes it possible to overcome the limited nature of its treatment as a sphere of artistic creativity and to reveal its significance in social production overall. As the experience of the 1960s through the beginning of the 1980s has demonstrated, culture is a no less important component of the social life of these countries than economic or socio-political factors, and it largely determines the nature of the self-determination and evolution of these countries. The role of culture has also increased in the relations of the liberated countries with the outside world. On one hand, their new status in the international arena has led to an expansion of cultural ties and they have become an important factor of world policy. On the other hand, the role allotted to dedicated cultural influence on these countries by the capitalist powers has also grown. The resolution of complex domestic tasks and altering the positions of these countries in the system of international relations cannot be achieved without a restructuring of culture in these countries and their interaction with the outside world. The countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America are encountering extremely difficult problems in transforming national cultural property and adapting it to contemporary requirements. Culture is closely intertwined with politics and ideology and also has an effect on the nature of production.

Principal attention in the report of A.T. Tursunov was devoted to methodological problems of Oriental cultural studies and the necessity of improving its conceptual apparatus. The turning of culture to the general aspects of cultural development common to mankind is acquiring especial significance. Contemporary contradictions of a global nature cannot be resolved without a methodological re-orientation of human thought in general and academic knowledge in particular. Insofar as academic knowledge empirically fixes a multitude of contradictions in the modern world, but loses sight therein of the mosaic of the whole, modern academics must concentrate its efforts on studying the general values of mankind. In the channel of such a re-orientation, a consideration of the unity of the world in its specifically human form, and namely a study of spiritual and cultural constants that ethnically and ideologically unite separate peoples into a single whole, is required of cultural studies. An important step in this direction is the formation of an "ecology of awareness," i.e. a cleansing of the moral atmosphere of the world of "pollution" of a spiritual nature and of nationalistic egoism and culture-centered prejudices. Cultural studies are called upon to play an important integrating role in resolving global problems.

The topical nature and high academic value of cultural-studies research was emphasized in the presentation of V.Ye. Davidovich, who noted that the importance of a cultural-civilization approach to researching social processes in our time is explained by the fact that its principal topic is the socially significant values that directly motivate the activity of people.

Another important aspect of researching methodological problems in the cultural studies of the liberated countries is the substance of the sociology of culture. The report of B.S. Starostin singled out the potency of sociological studies of the culture of various groups and segments. He noted that a specific feature of post-colonial societies is not only that their macrostructure includes divergent formations in formational and civilization terms, but also that these formations are also heterogenous, i.e. are smaller entities, each of which in turn has a complex inner structure and functions in accordance with an intrinsic cultural and social program, albeit one that changes under external influences. The modernization of socio-cultural heterogeneity will be implemented via the renewal, first and foremost, of its forms, and then its substance. Expanding the socio-cultural field of the individual will become an important mechanism of change. The sphere of "hybrid" culture based on an intertwining of traditional and contemporary forms of vital activity will be expanded both in the city and in the town. It is possible that this process will be accompanied by outbursts of "retraditionalization" in ideology and mass consciousness.

V.N. Shevelev noted that a sociological approach makes it possible to uncover both the state and the dynamics of the shifts that are occurring in the sphere of culture. The sociology of culture in the liberated countries studies existing systems for the creation, dissemination, preservation and consumption of spiritual values; analyzes the socially significant functions of various components and segments of culture; the conditions that facilitate growth in the cultural needs of the masses; the academic management of cultural development and cultural activity; and, planning and forecasting culture. Concrete sociological research has an important role to play in the study of these issues.

Another set of problems that was discussed at the conference was the problem of correlating traditions and modern times and directing the spiritual evolution of the liberated countries. V.L. Sheynis emphasized that capitalist tendencies are growing stronger in many Third-World countries, which is leaving its imprint on both the economy and on other spheres in the life of society. They will, however, suffer the effects of the reciprocal influence of socio-cultural factors existing there. The profound contradictions between Western and non-Western societies reflect discrepancies in the socio-cultural features characteristic of them. Under modern conditions, it is necessary to verify in the developing world the undisputed power of reaction in rejecting principles for the organization of society typical of the West, which has taken a different path of historical development. In essence, we are encountering various types of universalism. The processes of interaction will undoubtedly be exceedingly prolonged and, in any case, will not proceed from the conflicts and reaction of rejection that have arisen and brought out the dead-end nature of capitalist development. The dissemination of modern productive forces poses extremely severe imperatives for social

organization and the orientation of society. It is not enough to be limited to ascertaining the synthesis or conflict of diverse elements in various spheres of social life. The convergence and repulsion of different cultures and civilizations occur simultaneously. The discovery of the principal direction of the evolution of non-Western societies is extremely problematical in nature.

L.S. Vasilyev adheres to another point of view and noted that the Orient is not only not overtaking the developed countries, but is largely not going in the same direction at all, as was earlier felt to be undisputed. The Third World has borrowed much from the West, but notwithstanding that fact, the countries belonging to the Third World, with the exception of Japan, have not taken the path customary for European societies. Moreover, in a number of instances they have decisively demonstrated their enmity toward alien influences and have conducted not just an anti-colonial and anti-capitalist policy, but an altogether anti-Westernization one as well. As L.S. Vasilyev notes, this is in a certain sense a general law manifested in extremely varied forms, from weak ones (Negritude, Islamic nationalism) to extremely strong ones, as in contemporary Iran. Its essence is not only to defend one's national self-worth in the process of inevitable synthesis, but also to affirm the primordial foundations of accustomed existence, i.e. ultimately an intrinsic religious and cultural tradition, highly esteemed and even deliberately opposed to the "dissolute" and "materialistic" West, the civilization of the ancestors, which according to many parameters (aside from material and consumer ones) is known to be preferable, at least for the majority. One must not underestimate this type of processes, which are taking place in our time. In the opinion of L.S. Vasilyev, the key to a correct understanding of them is deep study of the civilizations of the Orient and the roles, forces and thrusts of the religious and cultural traditions customary to Oriental peoples.

L.R. Polonskaya emphasized the obvious nature of the fact that in the course of modernization, Oriental culture preserves its substance and will not be displaced by Western culture. Elaboration of the question of the correlation of culture and religion has great significance here, and well-defined indicators have yet to be developed. Be that as it may, this correlation turns out to be contradictory and flexible, changing in accordance with the historical situation. In the opinion of A.Kh. Vafa, much remains to be explained in the dynamics of Oriental culture and an adequate determinant explanation for everything still cannot be found. It is necessary to take historical circumstances into account in the aggregate, along with the role of spontaneity. Concrete historical explanations are nonetheless inadequate, and one must strive to discover the general laws of development of Oriental cultures.

The report of L.S. Vasilyev demonstrated that the modern stage of development of cultural-studies research requires the development of problems of civilization in relation to the formational approach. V.Ye. Davidovich,

defining the essence of methodological problems of cultural studies in the liberated countries, noted that the formational approach taken overall without regard for cultural and civilizational features does not always work well apropos of the group of regions called the Third World. The problem of a correct correlation of the formational and civilizational approaches and a determination of the actual places where they are contiguous occupies a special place herein.

A group of scholars adheres to the opinion that formation and civilization are categories that relate to different ways of analyzing the all-round historical process. V.L. Sheynis noted that civilization expresses a qualitative distinction of a socio-cultural structure of society and the history of mankind that can be presented not only as the consistent replacement of formations, but also as the development of a number of base cultural and historical communities with intrinsic integrity that encompass major regions. The accumulated socio-cultural fund of every civilization and the forms of its transformation under conditions of interaction with other civilizations therein are factors, the effect of which, in the opinion of the speaker, is comparable to socio-economic factors.

B.S. Yerasov substantiated the necessity of introducing the concept of "civilization" by the fact that it facilitates, via the inclusion of the subjective factor, the formation of the principal types of the division of labor, as well as resolves such specific tasks as the removal of contradictions among various ethnic and cultural groups, between the alienated essence of power and the need for social regulation etc. It is widely recognized that it is namely civilization that solves the problem of continuity, and a type of determination moreover arises that is the converse to that which exists in the formational model: in the former instance, from spiritual production to material, and in the latter, vice versa. The formation reveals the synchronic dependence of the components of social life, while the civilization reveals the diachronic, directed from the past toward the future. B.S. Yerasov noted that in a manner similar to the way political economy is a component of formational theory, cultural studies are a constituent element of the civilizational approach. Civilization, however, is not reduced to culture, insofar as civilization includes not only spiritual factors, but political and material ones as well. The further development of a cultural-studies approach requires the development of the theory of civilization.

M.A. Cheshkov criticized the treatments of the correlation of the formational and civilizational approaches that are widespread in scholarly literature, insofar as in this instance the worldwide historical process is devoid of integrity, while the formational approach is distorted, since it is reduced to a description of the mode of production. The correlation of these two can be understood only based on the principle of the historical approach. M.A. Cheshkov draws this picture: formationality as a means of development by virtue of the evolution of social production ceases to be the principal

means of the development of society in the liberated countries (and in world society overall). A transition occurs from a formational type of development to a non-formational one, and thus movement beyond the framework of formation theory and a search for explanations in other theories (sociological, anthropological or cultural-studies) is essential but, in order to reach new heights of theoretical thinking on the developing countries as a worldwide historical community, it is essential not to reject formation theory, but rather, based on it, to move to a higher level of summarization.

A number of other conference participants (V.S. Khoros, V.I. Maksimenko, L.B. Alayev) spoke in favor of a broader treatment of the formational model and the surmounting of the limited nature of the customary schemes. V.I. Maksimenko noted in particular that K. Marx understood the socio-economic formation and the approach to historical development associated with it in different ways at different stages of his creative work in resolving various academic problems. He did not seek a super-historical "master key" to social processes and turned not to some universal schemes, but rather to an analysis of the specific historical conditions. In the opinion of L.B. Alayev, the formational approach is not reduced to an economic one. The socio-economic formation is a complex phenomenon that includes both economics and culture, and the formational approach therefore does not contradict the cultural-studies one. The formational methodology consists of studying the stages of the development of society, including culture, and is employed on the scale of all mankind. The cultural-studies approach is thus a formational approach from the point of view of the stages of development and a cultural-studies one in the intrinsic sense of the word from the point of view of types of development.

Another aspect of the problem of civilization was touched on in the theme of the presentation of Yu.M. Kobishchanov. He noted that many pre-colonial African societies did not achieve the level of civilization, since they lacked such elements of it as, for example, a unified world religion, city building and writing. Yu.M. Kobishchanov suggested that these cultures, historically "on the eve" of civilization, be called "proto-civilizations."

An important problem touched on in the course of discussion at the conference was the problem of workers' interpretations of socialist ideas in developing countries (in its cultural aspects). S.G. Nam noted that it is possible to find preconditions for socialist ideas in traditional Oriental cultures that have existed from time immemorial in the form of the concepts of equality, justice etc. B.S. Yerasov stressed that socialism affects the liberated countries both with its spiritual values and ideals and with real achievements in building a new society.

The work of the section "Education and Cultural Progress in the Developing Countries" transpired in the form of a discussion on problems of education in the

developing world as a cultural phenomenon, i.e. from the point of view of cultural studies. This approach is new to Soviet Oriental studies. An economic approach (1950s and 1960s) had earlier predominated in the study of educational issues in the developing countries, and accent was later placed on social aspects (1970s to the beginning of the 1980s).

A cultural-studies approach to education assumes the consideration of education first and foremost from the point of view of its effect on the individual and the spiritual world of the person. This approach begins to be actively manifested in connection with the increasing attention in Soviet academics to the person and with the development of cultural-studies research.

The participants in the discussion made note of the potential capabilities of the cultural-studies approach in studying the educational problems of the developing countries. It permits a deeper penetration into the educational processes in the contemporary developing world, as well as problems associated with the participation of the USSR in the training of personnel for the developing countries.

At a session of the section, the opinion was expressed that academics on the developing countries should without fail advance cultural-studies research more determinedly among priority areas, putting it in the same rank as the study of economic and socio-political problems. Unfortunately, such a trend is not being observed and cultural-studies research in Oriental studies remains in a secondary position.

Education plays a most important role in the cultural progress of the developing countries. It is namely with the aid of education that the two principal tasks of cultural transformations in these countries are resolved: ensuring the mass literacy of the population and creating a national intelligentsia. Only the achievement of these goals can permit the developing countries to accomplish the transition to a state of maturity and join the contemporary civilized world. Thus the indicators typifying the degree of education of the population in the developing countries are a most important criterion not only of the cultural progress of these countries, but of their overall maturity as well.

Some of the developing countries have come close to the developed countries in indicators of access to primary and secondary education for the younger generation, while others are rapidly eliminating existing backwardness. If one considers literacy to be one of the criteria of the level of maturity of a society, the developing world will be comparable to the developed world in this trait in the near future. If one compares the absolute indicators for the whole developing world with the developed one in their increasing intellectual potential, the developing world was comparable to the developed world in the middle of the 1960s, and currently surpasses it by a factor of 2.8.

The lag of the developing world continues to be considerable in the realm of higher education and in the training of highly skilled personnel. The ratio here is 2:3.

According to the results of the work of the section, a series of recommendations was developed. It would be expedient for the institutions of the USSR Academy of Sciences and other academic organizations and institutions of higher learning to advance socio-cultural problems determinedly among the topical objects of research on the developing world, including issues in the education and training of national personnel in the developing countries and the training of specialists for them both in the USSR and in other socialist states.

The "Cultural Changes in the Liberated Countries" section discussed the following problems: general laws and specific features of cultural processes in the developing countries; the state and cultural policy; and, Islam and culture. The report of section leader R.N. Ismagilova considered general theoretical aspects of cultural changes in the developing countries, as well as the correlation of culture and ethnicity in Africa. Africa provides extremely rich material for researching ethno-cultural processes, insofar as not only are the most varied of types represented here, but so are various stages of consolidated, integrated and accumulated processes, as well as various forms of ethnic communities, from tribes to mature nations.

Integrated processes, being a result of the interaction of cultures of various ethnicities, are observed in many countries. These processes, conditioned by the socio-economic and political development of society, lead to the gradual formation of new cultures within state boundaries. They are often called national cultures. In reality, the discussion can only concern the formation of a common state culture, not the formation of cultures of separate nations, since national processes are still far from completion in the majority of the African states.

The concept of a unified nation that is accepted by many African states poses great danger for ethno-cultural processes. According to this concept, only a single nation can supposedly exist within state borders. The ethnic processes transpiring in Africa, however, testify to something else: several ethno-social communities are forming in the majority of the countries that with time could be transformed into nations.

The development of society and scientific and technical progress are leading to an ever greater narrowing of the sphere of manifestation of the ethnic features of a culture and an ever greater leveling of specific ethnic features. The culture of an ethnic community, however, in the face of all of the diversity of external influences and interaction with other cultures, possesses a relative independence and stubbornly retains the specific features of

the traditional culture. It is namely this specific feature of cultures that makes it possible for them to fulfill their ethnic functions—ethno-differentiation and ethno-integration.

Those who spoke noted that the cultural process in Africa overall is directed toward surmounting the limited and closed nature of ethnicity as expressed in the specific local nature of the cultural legacy and toward forming larger cultural complexes and syntheses of cultures. There is not and never has been, however, a unified African culture. The same way as there is no unified Asian or European culture, although there can be quite a few similar traits. There are cultures of different ethnic groups which, interacting among each other, are drawn ever more into integrated processes in the sphere of culture.

The paper of J. Kalinovskiy (East Germany) considered in detail such problems as the dialectical interconnection of culture and the socio-economic development of society. In the opinion of L. Grebichek (Czechoslovakia), culture is an exceedingly important and highly sensitive means of integrating society. It affects it at all levels.

Papers and presentations gave an analysis of state policy in the realm of culture. The specific features of this policy in states that are developing along the capitalist path and in socialist-oriented countries were illuminated (V. Atanasova, Bulgaria; R.U. Khodzhayeva, O.L. Nikolayeva, B.V. Chukov etc.) based on the examples of various countries (India, Egypt, Algeria, Guinea, Tanzania, Angola and others). The role of the intelligentsia both in cultural processes and in the development of society overall was analyzed using a number of countries as examples.

Although many successes have been achieved in the socialist-oriented countries, the participants in the discussion emphasized that the practice of cultural transformations should be considered more objectively (L.E. Gankin, A.D. Savateyev, N.A. Sosnovskiy). The opinion was expressed that there are still no grounds to assert that a national-democratic cultural revolution is occurring in these African countries. It is evidently more correct to speak of cultural transformations and the creation of preconditions for such revolutions (R.N. Ismagilova).

A number of presentations were devoted to the important problem of the role of Islam in modern cultural processes (D.M. Anarkulova, R.U. Khodzhayeva, A.D. Savateyev et al), the use of Islam as a cultural legacy and the Islamization of nationalism. In determining the tasks of future research, the necessity was noted of continuing the study of such issues as cultural legacy; the culture of individual ethnic groups; integrated cultural processes and the formation of new cultures within state borders; culturological processes; the policies of states of varying socio-political orientation in the realm of cultural development; and, cultural nationalism.

The section "The Interaction of Cultures in the Modern Era" concentrated the attention of conference participants around the problems of: the policy of "cultural imperialism" and the interactions of cultures. The essence of the policy of "cultural imperialism" which, as A.S. Mulyarchik noted, is carried out under the slogan of "free cultural exchange," consists of refusing equal cultural contacts, seizing the "cultural markets" of other countries, destroying their national and cultural originality and manipulating the consciousness of the population of developing countries for the purpose of creating and consolidating pro-Western socio-political, ideological and moral concepts. One urgent task of researchers is the need for a comparative analysis of the "multi-plane" culture of the West and the traditions of Soviet culture to discover both fundamental discrepancies and points of agreement within the framework of spiritual values common to all mankind.

V.A. Verbenko dwelled on the "Democracy" plan that has been implemented by the Reagan administration since 1982. There are currently more than 50 programs underway within the framework of this plan, planned for 20 years, that pose an overt or indirect threat to the sovereignty of the developing countries. Almost 2 billion dollars have been allocated for the modernization and expansion of the whole system of American foreign radio broadcasting, the output of American propaganda literature has been increased sharply, various types of "training programs" have become more active and the like.

The report of A.G. Cheremina illuminated the goals and structure of American cultural policy in the developing countries. The cultural and ideological expansion of the United States in these countries takes place on many levels, including both official and unofficial cultural policy. Along with government institutions, the "philanthropic funds" and various private organizations play a large role. The expansion of American multinational corporations occupies a special place.

D. Bellman (East Germany), in considering several aspects of the cultural situation in the Arab countries and the policy of "cultural imperialism," noted that the influence of bourgeois thought is great in the Arab countries today. It is thus possible to speak of the beginning of a new stage in the animation of imperialist theories of culture. This is a natural result of the creation of solid political and economic positions by imperialism in North Africa and the Near East. The cultural process, however, is developing in both conservative and progressive directions.

As T.A. Rassoshenko noted, Japan has made its cultural policy considerably more active in the countries of Asia and Africa in the last decade, which has been caused by a number of economic, political and ideological factors. Under conditions of a strengthening of national self-awareness, the search for originality and hopes of resurrecting Oriental civilizations, the concept of the "Japanese development path" is acquiring particular significance for the developing countries.

The report of Yu.G. Cheremisinov was devoted to the problem of French "cultural imperialism" in sub-Saharan Africa. The conducting of a language policy became a most important component of the French "cultural offensive" at the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s. The strategy of "informational imperialism" in the developing countries was described by S. Goranov (Bulgaria). One of the most important objectives of the cultural expansion of the West is the formation and organization of academics in the developing countries. The goal of cultural policy in this realm, noted O. Yarovaya, is to preserve the subordinate position of the developing countries in the world capitalist system, including in the system of world scientific production, and to foist on the developing countries a model of peripheral science (which the imperialist states are also trying to take under their control), avert the "threat" of scientific and technological self-sufficiency and preserve sales markets for obsolete technology.

Much attention was devoted to the influence of the countries of socialism on the culture of the developing countries. As the speakers noted (M. Shakhidi et al), there is unfortunately little research on this topic and it has not reached the requisite level, although actual practice is quite profound and diverse.

In discussing the problems of "dialogue and the interaction of cultures," a number of speakers noted that along with problems of "cultural imperialism" and "conflict" in the clash of cultural complexes, it is essential to devote attention to the process of mutual enrichment, which is transpiring especially fruitfully in the literatures of the developing countries. This was demonstrated in the paper of S.V. Prozhogina using the example of French-language literature in the Maghreb countries. The fact of the continuing bilingual development of literature in the Maghreb countries is testimony to the real possibilities of dialogue with world culture and a truly implemented interaction of national and traditional forms and ways of artistic expression in resolving intrinsic national tasks and incarnating national substance.

N.D. Gavryushina, using the example of English-language Indian literature, illustrated the enormous possibilities of a synthesis of the achievements of national and world culture. The national legacy of the developing countries, noted A.V. Gordon, includes anti-bourgeois potential that could be realized only in combination with progressive world culture, including the best examples of socialist culture with a humanist and anti-imperialist thrust. The experience of the cultural construction of the socialist countries, especially in the Eastern region, attracts attention in the developing countries and to a certain extent hinders the execution of the cultural policies of the imperialist states in these countries.

The papers and presentations of the participants in the "Processes in Artistic Culture" section were marked with interest in theoretical, methodological and ideological problems and an attempt to elucidate the essence of

the processes typical of the contemporary artistic culture of the developing countries, their link with the world historical process and the ideological struggle in the modern era and their place and role in the development of contemporary world artistic culture.

The greatest number of papers and presentations was devoted to musical-studies problems. Methodological problems in studying the modern musical culture of the Afro-Asian countries in the context of world development of musical culture were considered by D.K. Mikhaylov. They turn out to be largely identical to the problems in studying other realms of the contemporaries in studying the modern musical culture of the Afro-Asian countries any artistic culture of the Afro-Asian habitat, which makes it possible to pose the question in the future of the development of unified methodological principles of the study of the contemporary artistic process in the developing countries.

Among the general methodological problems that face researchers in various spheres of artistic culture in the developing countries can be noted such problems as the low level of development of terminology along with the unsatisfactory nature of the models proposed by Western researchers in both the terminological and conceptual regards. The reports of Ye.V. Vasilchenko, M.I. Karamygina and B.A. Avramets thus consider interesting factual material in close interaction with a complex of social and cultural contexts.

In the discussion, typological parallels in the development of musical and literary forms in the socialist countries and the socialist-oriented countries were noted, which bring about a commonality of the functions of various types of art under conditions of socialist construction and the educational and propagandistic thrust of artistic creation.

The paper of V.B. Mirimanov "The Formation of Urban Artistic Culture in the Countries of Sub-Saharan Africa" considered the principal features of the artistic culture in the transitional period.

The conference demonstrated the need for a comprehensive analysis of cultural processes in the developing countries along with a regard for cultural and ideological factors, as well as improvements in coordinating the work of academic institutions, institution of higher learning and practical organizations in the realm of cultural-studies research.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki". Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1987

Roundtable Discussion of Book on Oriental Societies Concludes

18070399g Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 87 pp 146-161

[Editorial Report] Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian Number 3, May-June 1987 carries on pages 146-161 the conclusion of a discussion/review of a 1984

book, "The Evolution of Eastern Societies: Synthesis of the Traditional and Contemporary." Responsible editors of the book are L.I. Reysner and N.A. Simoniya. The authorial collective consists of Z.N. Galich, A.V. Gordon, A.V. Zhuravskiy, A.I. Ionova, A.M. Petrov, Ye.B. Rashkovskiy, L.I. Reysner and N.A. Simoniya. The previous sections of the discussion appear in NARODY AZII I AFRIKI Number 1, January-February 1987 and NARODY AZII I AFRIKI Number 2, March-April 1987. [For summaries see JPRS Report: Soviet Union JPRS-UAA-87-001 and JPRS-UAA-87-002].

Discussants include A.S. Agadzhanian, Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences; B.I. Slavniy, Institute of the International Workers' Movement of the USSR Academy of Sciences; A.S. Martynov of the Leningrad Branch of the Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute; and G.I. Mirskiy, Institute of the World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Changing Views in Soviet Works on Iranian Revolution Outlined

18070399h Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 87 pp 162-172

[Article by V. I. Maksimenko: "Analysis of the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 in Soviet Oriental-Studies Literature"]

[Text] Soviet literature on the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 numbers over twenty serious works published in 1979-86,¹ but up until the present time many important aspects of this revolution have remained in dispute and even a mystery. This survey article does not pretend to an exhaustive summary of everything written by Soviet scholars on this topic: its purpose is rather to attempt to uncover more fully those issues that are faced by academics in this "unique phenomenon of the last quarter of the 20th century."²

The works that have come out over the last seven years have revealed the disparity in the fundamental evaluations of the topic by their authors: was the Iranian Revolution bourgeois or not? was it Islamic? what made the "thousand-year empire" of the shah a colossus with feet of clay? what inflicted the decisive blow on the shah's regime—the lumpen, paupers and rural migrants or the organized working class of the major industrial enterprises? what happened to the revolutionary nature and "progressive potential" of the clergy? what is the tragedy of the leftist forces in Iran? A historiographical tradition of analyzing the Iranian Revolution has moreover not yet taken shape: practically every new point of view is expressed as if the points of view before it, including opposing ones, did not exist, while the latest turn in the policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran is submerged in the non-existent past of the evaluations of two and three years ago. And the misfortune is not that changes in the course of events force changes in evaluations (this is quite normal), but rather that yesterday's

evaluations are often considered as not being subject to academic criticism and are rather forgotten and ignored as if they had never existed.

I will cite one expressive example. In 1982 R.A. Ulyanovskiy proposed that the Shiite clergy, although fighting for its privileges, nonetheless came forward "in the name of all the traditional, semi-traditional and marginal segments (and also a portion of the modern industrial proletariat) with a vested interest in the free and independent development of the country." As a result, the slogan "Islamic revolution" "could become and really did become the banner of nationwide struggle against internal and external reaction."³ In three years, in 1985, this same author came to quite a different conclusion: the clergy in Iran was "conservative" and it had been able to "bring to a halt the social revolution," that this was its "deep and insidious intent," since in point of fact the clergy was associated with "bourgeois business and the large landowners."⁴

In 1982 R.A. Ulyanovskiy felt that in the Iranian Revolution "religion was the organizational and ideological basis of the nationwide striving for freedom."⁵ In 1985 the opinion of the author on this same topic was replaced with the opposite one: the "spirit of freedom" that had been born in the revolution was "bound by chains whose name was Muslim fanaticism."⁶ It is clear from the 1982 article that after the resignation of Bazargan in Iran, two lines were in opposition: the advocates of "the preferential utilization of the achievements of revolution in the interests of the trade and entrepreneurial bourgeoisie" and "the most consistent representatives of the so-called popular trend of Islam."⁷ In 1985 there was no discussion of this: after the resignation of Bazargan, wrote R.A. Ulyanovskiy, "political despotism was autocratically affirmed" in Iran.⁸

Whatever the difficulties that arose in the efforts to investigate the existing disagreement in opinions, I will nonetheless try to fix and group the principal views in Soviet literature on the following issues: 1) the causes of the revolution and the nature of it; 2) the role of the Shiite clergy; and 3) the fate of the leftist forces.

As is well known, the term "Iranian Revolution" was advanced and put into circulation by Khomeini in the first days after the February victory. Soviet researchers differ sharply regarding the correctness of the use of this term. S.M. Aliyev as early as 1980 came forward with a critique of the topic of the "Islamic nature" of the revolution as erroneous at its core: the mass demonstrations of the Iranian workers, he wrote, "cleared the road for democracy" and were aimed against development "according to the Western model."⁹ At the same time, however, S.M. Aliyev felt that as early as the by the fall of 1978, the Shiite clergy in Iran had been able to become "the recognized leader of the popular movement."¹⁰ The opinion that the revolution in Iran was not Islamic was also shared by M.I. Krutikhin, an eyewitness and

researcher of the Teheran uprising, who noted that the slogan "Death to the Shah!" was practically the sole political slogan of the uprising that made everyone united and cohesive.¹¹

The description of the revolution of 1978-79 as Islamic was most consistently defended by A.B. Reznikov and S.L. Agayev. "The integrating ideology of the revolution," wrote Reznikov, "was Islam; the Shiite clergy accomplished political leadership with it; the slogan of the revolution was 'a just Islamic structure'; the chief organizational cell where the masses underwent ideological and political training in an anti-regime spirit was the mosque; the political organizations of the bourgeoisie openly acknowledged the hegemony of the clergy—all of this gives grounds to feel that an 'Islamic revolution' had occurred in Iran."¹²

In this regard, Reznikov also substantiated another position as well: the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 was not bourgeois. Here is his reasoning: "The development of Iran along a bourgeois path was not accelerated at all as a result of this revolution, and the bourgeoisie did not come to political power at all, and it did not even have political leadership of the revolution. The ideology of the revolution furthermore contained a much more powerful social charge on a mass level, a much clearer rush toward social changes, a restructuring of society, than had occurred in bourgeois revolutions of the past."¹³

And so, according to Reznikov, the Iranian Revolution was not bourgeois, but popular, and its leader was the clergy. The viewpoint of S.L. Agayev was formulated at the same time or somewhat earlier. Being convinced that this revolution was Islamic and popular, he feels at the same time that it was still bourgeois (bourgeois-democratic).¹⁴ Agayev later refined his position with additional delimitations: an Islamic revolution "in form" and "in substance." The revolution in Iran was Islamic in form in 1978 to February of 1979, and in substance became such in the course of events of 1979-83, when the Iranian clergy "completely consolidated its state monopoly in the form of the first Shiite theocracy in the world."¹⁵

"The most important specific feature of the contemporary Iranian revolutionary phenomenon," is considered by Agayev to be the fact that the bourgeois social substance of the revolution "was realized in a struggle of three, not two, basic entities": the liberal bourgeoisie, the clergy and the working masses. Right after the February victory, he wrote, the revolution, diverted by its leadership—the clergy—entered a period of prolonged crisis, in the third stage of which (after the removal of President Bani-Sadr), the Islamic revolution "fully revealed its bourgeois social essence," and thus was already a "bourgeois counter-revolution."¹⁶ In this manner, the transformation of the revolution from an Islamic one "in

form" into an Islamic one "in substance" paradoxically coincided with the full disclosure of its bourgeois essence (unclear until then) and its resurrection in counter-revolution.

L. Ye. Sklyarov formulated his position somewhat differently. He strove to show that "earlier... several months after the victory of the revolution, the general line of the religious figures was fully manifested: to rule the bourgeoisie politically but to deprive it of its opportunity of reproducing its economic sway."¹⁷ Sklyarov's position is distinct from the others in that he strives to delineate more consistently "the complex relations of confrontation and collaboration"¹⁸ that developed simultaneously on two intersecting planes: the interaction of the clergy and the large Iranian bourgeoisie, first, and the clergy and the working masses, second. Sklyarov tried to trace the dialectic of this "confrontation-collaboration" by analyzing the revisions of Shiism carried out by Khomeini,¹⁹ by describing the "bazaar,"²⁰ and by describing the sharp internal political struggle on the fundamental issues of the distribution of power and ownership in post-revolutionary Iran (in connection with draft legislation on the nationalization of foreign trade and the division of large land holdings).²¹ The general conclusions of Sklyarov, however, do not correspond to the breadth of his view of the current history of Iran, being more meager and internally contradictory than the concrete analysis he did. These conclusions can be reduced to the fact that the Shiite clergy stood "on guard for the interests of the large landowners" and "large private trade of capital," having therein the goal of "possessing the whole range of state power for the sake of satisfying their own religious-corporate interests" and using as a means for this "the attraction of the petty-bourgeois masses to its side."²²

In concluding the grouping of views on the nature of the Iranian Revolution (Islamic—not Islamic, bourgeois—not bourgeois) that has taken shape in Soviet literature, I will cite two more examples. They are later ones (1986), but time, it seems, does not help resolve the dispute with truth, and the facts of the Iranian Revolution meticulously and identically serve all points of view.

V.G. Khoros, in his review of Agayev's book, reproaches the latter for the fact that to the extent of the development of Iranian events, he "begins... to alter his evaluation of them in favor of the 'bourgeois nature' of the Iranian Revolution." This, in the opinion of the reviewer, is in no way justified: "The rule of the mullahs created a situation in the country that little favored the functioning of the bourgeois mechanism of economic operation and ensuring the rights of private ownership. On a political plane, the revolution in Iran produced nothing "bourgeois-democratic" (aside from the overthrow of the monarchy, replaced by a dictatorial theocracy)."²³

And so, the revolution produced nothing that was bourgeois-democratic. We will compare this opinion with the point of view of A.Z. Arabadzhyan. "The time," he

wrote, "that has passed since the revolution of 1978-79 in Iran leaves no doubt that it produced in essence nothing for the broad masses—at least compared to the pre-revolutionary period." The motif is the same as for Khoros—the revolution "produced nothing"—but in a different sense. Both before and after the overthrow of the monarchy, Arabadzhyan notes, "the strongest" class in the country "was and remains the bourgeoisie," and the Shiite clergy, as the leaders of the revolution, usurped its fruits for its own class-corporate purposes. From all of this, it follows that "the Revolution of 1978-79 in Iran is a historical fact; the 'Islamic regime,' the theocratic dictatorship with a capitalist essence that took the place of the Pahlavi monarchy, is also a historical fact; the 'Islamic revolution' is, however, just a label."²⁴ But if the revolution "produced nothing" for the broad masses, if the bourgeoisie in Iran is the same as it was, while the theocracy simply "replaced" the shah's dictatorship, specially filled in with a "capitalist substance" for this purpose, then what, according to Arabadzhyan, are the lessons of the revolution?

At least one of them can be formulated in this manner: the level of development of capitalism and the maturity of the proletariat created "an objective basis for the country's entry onto the path of genuinely progressive transformations," but "the profound lack of correspondence between the subjective and objective factors" also hindered this. As a result, "the workers, and first and foremost the proletariat, let slip a unique opportunity to direct the social movement of the country into the channel of genuinely anti-imperialistic and democratic development."²⁵ But even this declaration is not sufficiently clear: in the event of a maturity of the contradictions of capitalist society and the main revolutionary class of that society, "the path of genuinely progressive transformations" indicated by Arabadzhyan should evidently signify a socialist revolution, but this is not directly stated in the article. It is therefore difficult to understand what are the author's criteria of "genuineness" in the aforementioned progressive transformations. The deciphering of the "subjective factor" herein is also inadequate, which is revealed to be (as always happens when euphoria gives way to disillusionment) "not corresponding" to objective conditions. But again, how are we to understand this lack of correspondence if the proletariat both in its place in the social structure and in ability to inflict "a decisive blow to the monarchy" through strikes²⁶ was seemingly up to the task? By whom then, and why, was this "unique opportunity" allowed to pass (if it really existed)—an opportunity, if we call things by their right names, to transform one of the mightiest democratic revolutions of the century into a socialist revolution?

We turn now to the same authors' evaluation of the causes and chief motive forces of the revolution. There are at least two important points here regarding which all are in agreement: 1) the revolution "from below" of 1978-79 was a reply and reaction to the "white revolution" of the shah "from above"; and 2) the clergy was the leader of the popular revolution.

S.L. Agayev defined the cause-and-effect link of events in the Iranian Revolution most laconically: "Opposition to the shah's policies of accelerated capitalist transformation of Iranian society along Western lines."²⁷ "Iran," he wrote, "is a shining example of how the broadest masses of the countries of the Orient reject the path of bourgeois social modernization and the Westernization of their original lifestyles that was foisted on them."²⁸

A.Z. Arabadzhyan accents the link between the "white revolution" and the revolution of 1978-79 differently. Whereas Agayev stresses the rejection of "bourgeois modernization," Arabadzhyan sees in the anti-monarchical revolution first and foremost evidence of "a sharp worsening of specifically capitalist contradictions." The sharpness of the worsening, however, and the unresolved nature of "a whole aggregate of problems... that are usually resolved in the course of bourgeois-democratic revolution" was not at all "an indicator of the limits and possibilities of capitalist development of Iran."²⁹

All of the authors, in speaking of the causes of the revolution, direct attention toward the economic disproportions that had arisen as a result of accelerated modernization, the deepening of social inequities, corruption in the state apparatus, the yoke of dictatorship, the arbitrariness of the police and the like. As Reznikov justly notes, however, the same things happened in other countries, but revolution did not occur there. The shah's modernization, moreover, "notwithstanding the terrible price—the lives of others,"³⁰ was progress from the point of view of the development of productive forces. A mighty power was on the side of this progress. Why then, asks Reznikov, was there a "misfire?"

The question is very important. Reznikov himself associated the answer to it with discovering the role of the Iranian clergy, singling out such features of Shiite doctrine as anti-tyrannical and sacrificial principles. "The spiritual code of Shiism," he wrote, "inculcated hatred of the tyrant... The Iranian Revolution could not have been so furious, the behavior of the masses could not have been so selfless, without the staggering force of the demonstration of respect for those fallen in the fight for a just cause, without the aspiration to take on the martyr's crown."³¹

"The clergy," notes Agayev as well, "came to lead the revolution in Iran not only because it was able to fill a political vacuum... not only because it was able to give the movement organization and an anti-tyrannical ideology, but chiefly because, by virtue of its specific position, it was able to express more fully, determinedly and consistently at that stage those needs of the revolutionary struggle that arose from the objective social existence and subjective social aspirations of the traditional segments."³² Khomeini always appealed first of all to the poorest and most deprived, the masses that "had lost faith in the promises of the shah and the bourgeois progress in the Western style he had introduced." Khomeini "spoke their language"—they were *his* deprived.³³

According to the data of Ye.A. Doroshenko, by the 1970s there were 180,000-200,000 people in Iran who could have been numbered among the upper, middle and lower reaches of the clergy and comprised a hierarchical and far-flung structure.³⁴ Being a particular class (corporation), the clergy monopolized the treatment of the Koran and canonical Muslim law, the propagation of the faith from the capital to the most distant settlements, teaching in the maktabakhs, medreses and worship centers of Qom and Meshed, care for the mosques and other religious institutions, the administration of the vakf (property bequeathed for charitable purposes and not subject to alienation or the imposition of taxes) etc.

The Shiite clergy in Iran traditionally had sources of income that were independent of and jealously guarded from the state. Since the end of the 19th century, the upper reaches of the clergy had occupied a solid position among the major landowners and trade bourgeoisie of the country, having at their disposal such class privileges as engaging in any activity without the imposition of taxes. Many mujtahids (the highest segment of the Shiite clergy) created "private armies" around themselves that consisted of theological students and mullahs. It was namely according to this principle, Doroshenko feels, that the detachments of pasdars and Revolutionary Guards were created in post-revolutionary Iran.³⁵

In noting the heterogeneity of the Shiite class and the link of its upper reaches with the large land-holding interests, Doroshenko at the same time emphasizes that the most numerous portion of the clergy (the mullahs and the witnesses prayer at urban apartment and rural mosques), not having large land holdings and other solid sources of income, were closely allied with the urban dregs and the peasantry and largely lived their lives, constituting in that manner a connecting link between the Shiite upper reaches and the mass Iranian population.³⁶

What pushed this authoritative, influential and conservative class with developed traditions into the position of leader of the revolution? The shah's agrarian reform, sharply limiting land ownership and depriving the clergy of its former rights to vakf lands (which were distributed among the peasants) inflicted an appreciable blow to the property interests of the whole class. Another serious blow was the 1971 creation of the Body of the Faith in accordance with the shah's firman, whose members were called "mullahs of modernization" by the shah, who hated the "black reaction" (the clergy) at least as much as the "red revolution," and were called upon to intercept the traditional influence of the Shiite upper reaches.³⁷

The effort of the shah's regime to "suppress the living religious ideology that nourished the clergy"³⁸ was, however, most important in advancing the clergy into positions of revolutionary leadership, as Reznikov writes. The blow of the "white revolution" to the traditional clergy class was really a blow to the most important principles of popular life. The conditions under which

the clergy preserved its power and authority were "precisely the same conditions (my emphasis—V.M.) that were, for the vast majority of the population of Iran, subjectively and objectively much more acceptable than those of the 'great civilization' being proclaimed by the shah."³⁹

This link between the clergy class, authoritative among the masses, and the living conditions of the masses themselves were, in Reznikov's opinion, most profound substantiation of the fact that "conservatism... was a powerful weapon in the revolutionary political struggle,"⁴⁰ while the segment that conservative in a social regard became the radical leader of a nationwide political revolution.

Reznikov unfortunately did not try to determine how the conditions of reproduction of the clergy as a class in concrete terms objectively coincided with the material living conditions of the vast majority. The idea expressed by him turns out to contradict directly the thesis of Arabadzhyan on the revolution of 1978-79 as the product of "a sharp worsening of specifically capitalist contradictions." In Reznikov's idealized picture of a "living religious ideology," there is no place for one important phenomenon noted by Arabadzhyan: the shah's reforms of the 1960s and 1970s and the policy of accelerated modernization "put various segments of the bourgeoisie (large, medium, petty) in very different positions," tying up "a complex knot of contradictions among the different groups of capital."⁴¹

Who besides this "leader" was active in the revolution? This question is answered most decisively by Agayev and Ulyanovskiy, whose positions on this point practically coincide. First of all, "the lumpen and the rural migrants" that comprised the "main strike force of the mass movement"⁴² and, second, the subsegment of "petty and middle trade and entrepreneurial capital."⁴³

The dual nature of the petty-bourgeois and lumpen social mass, in Ulyanovskiy's opinion, served as a source "to differentiate the extremely theoretical and relative unity of the political forces of revolution."⁴⁴ The power of the Shiite clergy, Agayev feels, consisted of the fact that it was able to advance a program that expressed "in the form most accessible to the mass consciousness the most immediate demands of the national-democratic struggle"—a program that was Islamic-integrationist in political content and petty-bourgeois-populist in social orientation."⁴⁵ Agayev describes this program in more general terms as "populist-integrationist."⁴⁶

The authors that specially researched the Teheran uprising (M.I. Krutikhin, L.Ye. Sklyarov, A.B. Reznikov) are not inclined, as are S.L. Agayev and R.A. Ulyanovskiy, to see "the main strike force" of the revolution in the lumpen and rural migrants. The immediate initiator, guardian and vanguard of "one of the most major uprisings of the century,"⁴⁷ as Krutikhin notes, was first and foremost the homafar units (the ground-services

personnel of the Iranian Air Force, equivalent to junior officers) and armed detachments of the Marxist "Iranian People's Partisan-Fayadin Organization." Some authors (Sklyarov) also note the role of the progressive Islamic ("Islamic-Marxist," in the shah's description) "Iranian People's Fighters-Mujahedin Organization."

A.P. Shestakov, having studied the political role of the junior officers in the Iranian Revolution, emphasized that the homifar institute, founded in 1968 in connection with the program to modernize the shah's army, opened up the path to a privileged officer's subsegment for "emigres from practically all segments and social groups of Iranian society."⁴⁸ The junior-officer and sub-officer contingent of the air force was formed principally from the non-wealthy educated urban citizens with a large share from the graduates of higher technical institutions and secondary schools with a technical bent.

A description of the other force that played a decisive role in the February victory of the Iranian people—the Marxist Organization of Fayadin—gives a clear representation of their "minimum program" that was published in one of the capital's newspapers two days after the uprising had concluded and set forth by Reznikov. The program demanded the immediate implementation of a whole set of radical measures aimed at deepening the victorious political revolution and transforming it into a social revolution and, namely, to break up the old state machinery, create a new army on the basis of the armed organizations of the masses, break unequal imperial agreements and nationalize the property of the Pahlavi dynasty, as well as large foreign and local capital, with the transfer of rights in administering national property to committees of workers and employees, form workers' councils, carry out democratic land reforms, introduce complete freedom of speech, press, assembly and political activity, grant rights to all national and religious minorities in Iran etc.⁴⁹

Evaluations of the motive forces, including the vanguard ones, of the revolution are expressed in the literature under review in such a way that they almost contradict each other. One position is "The majority of the participants in the revolution were the dark and ignorant masses."⁵⁰ The other position is "The most telling blow against the forces of the monarchy" was inflicted by the plant and mill proletariat, which played a "decisive role" in the fall of the old regime.⁵¹ Both of these views seem compatible: the proletariat in the vanguard, it inflicted decisive blows, but the petty-bourgeois-lumpen masses were dark and ignorant, while the clergy was influential and had great experience in demagoguery, and thus overthrew the shah with the support of the people, and they then betrayed the people, dealing by turns with all who were not with them, and at the same time with those who, like the Iranian People's Party (IPP), steadfastly declared their verity to "the popular line of the imam" and, ultimately, established a theocratic regime.

But even with such a theoretically "happy" way of making ends meet, the "cursed" questions remain: where did the class might of the organized Iranian proletariat, which discovered its power to paralyze the monarchical regime and the economic life of the country in the fall 1978, disappear to after the victory of the February armed uprising? How were the bloody reprisals of the victors, not against the monarchical counter-revolutionaries but their comrades-in-arms for victory—the tens of thousands of Iranian democrats and Marxists, as well as those who, right up until 1982, had called steadfastly for following the "popular line of the imam Khomeini,"⁵² and those who as early as August of 1979 had warned that the "clouds of fascism" were gathering over the country,⁵³ and which latter in the summer of 1981, having despaired from its doom, gave battle to the Islamic regime,⁵⁴—prepared and how did they become possible?

A single answer is given to these questions: "...relations among the three principal detachments of the leftist forces (the IPP, the Fayadin and the Mujahedin—V.M.) were characterized by an absence of any official contacts or tactical unions and by mutual alienation and sometimes hostility."⁵⁵ But is this answer adequate today? It is enough to say that the "two opposing policies regarding the clergy" that had already been defined in the leftist camp as early as February of 1979 arose from differences of opinion regarding whether the clergy had fully retained its progressive potential or not?⁵⁶

These "two courses" were described extremely substantively in one of the articles of S.L. Agayev.⁵⁷

The IPP, immediately after the February victory, placed at the heart of its policies unconditional support for the "revolutionary and anti-imperialist course of the imam," having in mind the leader representing the "popular majority."⁵⁸ The party left behind the idea of the actual identity of the religious concept not shared by class conflicts "of a homogeneous society" and the Marxist ideal of a classless society.⁵⁹ For their part, the organizations of the Fayadin and the Mujahedin, not sharing this position, supported the program of the opposition left-centrist National-Democratic Front created in March of 1979, which the communists did not join.

In August of 1979 the regime inflicted the first serious blow to the leftist forces. The advocates of the Ayatollah Behesti of Hizbullah (Party of Allah) destroyed the headquarters of the Fayadin organization, also attacking the accommodations of the IPP and the Mujahedin. At the same time, over 20 leftist, liberal and other non-religious newspapers (including two belonging to the communists) were closed.⁶⁰ "After the August strike against the leftist and liberal forces..." Agayev writes, "a chasm opened up between the leadership (of the Islamic Republic of Iran—V.M.) and the people,"⁶¹ which did not, however, have any effect on IPP policy.

In September of 1979 the ban on the activity of the IPP was removed, and it became the "sole officially legalized leftist organization."⁶² At the same time, the Mujahedin and the Fayadin went underground. The constitution adopted in December of 1979 "actually established a theocratic regime in Iran,"⁶³ but the communists felt as before that the main thing was "not the religious form of the revolution, but its social substance, being popular."⁶⁴ In the second half of 1981, when the Mujahedin answered the elimination of President Bani-Sadr with a wave of anti-government terror and, in essence, declared war on the regime, while the authorities rained down blows on them that "surpassed in scale and number of victims all of the analogous campaigns undertaken up to that time,"⁶⁵ the IPP relegated the Mujahedin—as "leftist opportunists"—to the counter-revolutionary camp, abandoning the "unity of action of the Muslim fighters—followers of the line of the imam Khomeini and true adherents of scientific socialism."⁶⁶

The stabilization of the theocratic regime in Teheran in 1982, Agayev writes, occurred under the sign of cleansing "members and advocates of all leftist organizations... from the administrative apparatus and the more or less important posts in industry, higher education and the like."⁶⁷ In October of that same year, however, in the declaration of the IPP Central Committee, the theme of a unity of "revolutionary Islamic forces supporting the line of the imam, with all other revolutionaries, especially with the advocates of scientific socialism" was advanced as before.⁶⁸ The activity of these latter had been cut short several months earlier, in February-May 1983, when, having arrested thousands of members and advocates of the IPP, the regime inflicted a conclusive blow to the remnants of those leftists that were still operating legally. It is asked whether there are grounds to describe all of this (as early as 1985) as a "sober evaluation" by the leftists of the actual situation in the face of the "tactical and strategic miscalculations" that took place?⁶⁹

The questions remain, they do not leave one's mind, they demand a search for answers...

In conclusion, several short observations on what seem to the author of this survey to be typical errors in evaluating the course of the Iranian Revolution and the gnosiological roots of these errors.

It is possible with hindsight to reproach the Iranian leftists for their lack of unity; it is possible to regret that the leadership of the revolution was not taken by the liberals and the "straight thinkers," and the shortsightedness and fanaticism of the mob did not permit Bakhtiar-Kerensky to realize the chance given to him; it is also possible to believe that Islam, through the will of Khomeini and those around him, was magically transformed from a toll for expressing popular will into a tool of theocratic dictatorship etc., but all of this leaves aside the main question (also containing the possibility for

extracting the main lesson): how could it happen that a nationwide upsurge for freedom and the winning of freedom in revolution was turned into the mass terror of fanatical mullahs?

Many in Soviet literature have pointed out, and more than once, the inseparable link between the shah's revolution from above and the 1978-79 revolution. But, perhaps, it is not enough to limit the analysis of the dialectical pair "revolution from above—revolution from below" only to categories of a philosophical nature ("basis," "superstructure," "formation")?

It seems apparent that revolution from above is the **antithesis of revolution**, the wrong side of it, the counter-offensive of the upper reaches in the worsening class struggle, when the "form" and "substance" are altered by the places and revolutionary substance becomes formalistic, while the reactionary form is substantive. The utopia of the "great civilization" hit a brick wall, possessing the awareness of the crowned revolutionary, whoever the shah, and the utopia of universal prosperity within the framework of the "Islamic state." Much could be said about the clash of these two utopian designs and their power over minds, but we are engaged in something else today.

The "white revolution," as any revolution from above, strove to be a social and fundamentally apolitical revolution. The price of rapid social renewal undertaken "at the top" and conducted from above in the shah's Iran was the repressive suppression of any "deviating" political behavior. The revolution from above is a reactionary utopia for transforming the people without their demand or participation. The Iranian upheaval of 1979 was not the implementation of a plan to "drag" the authoritarian superstructure toward a liberal (capitalist) basis, and it was not a spontaneous mechanism for such a movement: this was a historical retribution for the anti-popular, reactionary utopianism of the upper levels of the shah's regime, for that political marasmus into which the country had been pulled by the transforming energy of the crowned revolutionary. "From above" in Iran was the revolutionary repression of 15 years; "from below" was the reciprocal outburst of the political energy of the masses (accumulated, by the way, in the cracks of the shah's transformations), a powerful but extremely brief revolutionary holiday, limited by no one and nothing in its readiness to destroy and take vengeance.

It seems that in our literature the question of hegemony has been garbled. The leader of the revolution can only be a revolutionary class, and not any old social group. Hegemony is accomplished when and only when this class is developed over the whole course of socio-economic and socio-political development. We are confusing hegemony with political leadership, which can be accomplished (in the absence of a revolutionary leader) by the intelligentsia, the clergy and certain types of revolutionary minorities.

The problems of "state and revolution," assuming an analysis of how the issue of power, this root question of any revolution, stood *before* and *after* the February victory, which continues to be the deepest dividing line in the whole Iranian revolutionary process, have dropped completely out of the works of Soviet authors in considering the events of 1979-83 in Iran. At this juncture of the two aspects—state and revolutionary—the "division of unity" is subject to analysis, when two states come into view (the old that is being overthrown and the new post-revolutionary one) as do two revolutions (the revolution that storms the old regime and the revolution that peacefully or non-peacefully instills relations of power and ownership on new—post-revolutionary—class grounds).

There is another such paradoxical group of "social conservatism—political radicalism" that is revealed in revolution by the clergy that cannot be analyzed apart from the **civil war of the classes** that was unleashed in Iran by the February victory. Operating at first with concepts of "integrationism," "populism" and the "popular line of the imam," then "specifically capitalist contradictions," we in both cases combine the living history with diagrams. It must be acknowledged that we do not have a conceptual apparatus at our disposal that would make it possible to analyze an archaic class of pre-capitalist society (the Shiite clergy) at the same time in two dimensions, when this class is able to behave both as a class whole and be distinctly differentiated **within itself** according to the laws of modern class and political demarcation (for example, as was done after February 1979 on issues of "velayat-e faqih," or the supreme rule of the clergy, the nationalization of foreign trade, agrarian reform, freedom of the press etc.). In the same way, we experience definite difficulties when the facts clearly demand a description of one of the most important institutions of modern Iran—the "bazaar"—not as an inclination of the "traditional," but as a genetically archaic, structurally complex and multi-institutional social formation that functions not according to the laws of "capitalism in general," but rather namely according to the laws of the Iranian capitalist economy.

Finally, the widely disseminated method of projecting the result (for example, a theocratic dictatorship) onto the whole process that preceded it is seriously hindering us in understanding the Iranian Revolution. In cases where the outcome is clear, it is represented in commonplace awareness as a given from the beginning, and moreover given, as a rule, exclusively by the actions of those forces that at the current moment are politically predominant (thus, for example, many authors describe the process of the creation of the "theocratic system of rule" in Iran).

It could be assumed (on the order of a hypothesis requiring more substantive factual confirmation that what we have at our disposal) that the revolution of 1978-79 in Iran was a **popular bourgeois-democratic one**,

which, like any revolution of this type with the participation of the working class and its party, carried the seeds of two tactics, the choice of two paths; this was also such a revolution, the achievements of which were turned against the people and against democracy in the process of the civil war of the classes in post-revolutionary Iran. But how and when this outcome became inevitable remains an open question for the historian.

Footnotes

1. See, for example: S.L. Agayev. "Iran: rozheniye respubliki" [Iran: Birth of a Republic]. Moscow, 1984, 336 pp; idem. "Iranskaya revolyutsiya, SShA i mezhdunarodnaya bezopasnost'" [The Iranian Revolution, the United States and International Security]. Moscow, 1984, 278 pp; idem. "Leftist Forces and Islamic Revolution in Modern Iran."—"Revolutionary Democracy and Communists of the Orient. Moscow, 1984, pp 331-372; idem. "The Concept and Essence of 'Islamic Revolution.'"—AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA. 1984, No 5, pp 27-31; idem. "The Zigzags of the Iranian Revolution."—VOPROSY ISTORII, 1985, No 1, pp 43-59; S.M. Aliyev. "Anti-Monarchical and Anti-Imperialist Revolution in Iran."—NARODY AZII I AFRIKI. 1979, No 3, pp 45-47; idem. "The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 and the Working Class."—RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYIY MIR. 1980, No 5, pp 104-111; S. Aliyev. "Problems of Political Development in Iran."—AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA. 1980, No 11, pp 15-19; A. Arabadzhyan. "The Iranian Revolution: Causes and Lessons."—AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA. 1986, No 3, pp 32-36; No 4, pp 19-22, 38; Ye. A. Doroshenko. "Shiitskoye dukhovenstvo v sovremennom Irane" [The Shiite Clergy in Contemporary Iran]. Moscow, 1985, 229 pp; M.I. Krutikhin. "The Teheran Uprising of 9-12 February 1979."—"Iran: History and Modern Times." Moscow, 1983, pp 152-170; A.B. Reznikov. "Iran: padeniye shakhsogo rezhima" [Iran: The Fall of the Shah's Regime]. Moscow, 1983, 160 pp; L.Ye. Sklyarov. "The Emergence of New Organs of Power in Iran."—"Iran: History and Modern Times." pp 197-218; R. Ulyanovskiy. "The Iranian Revolution and Its Specific Features."—KOMMUNIST. 1982, No 10, pp 106-116; idem. "The Fate of the Iranian Revolution."—KOMMUNIST. 1985, No 8, pp 104-110; A.P. Shestakov. "The Political Role of the Junior Officer Corps in the Iranian Revolution (The Example of the Iranian Air Force)."—"Iran: History and Modern Times," pp 219-229; et al.
2. S.L. Agayev. "Iran: Birth of a Republic," p 18.
3. R. Ulyanovskiy. "The Iranian Revolution and Its Specific Features," p 108.
4. R. Ulyanovskiy. "The Fate of the Iranian Revolution," p 109.
5. R. Ulyanovskiy. "The Iranian Revolution and Its Specific Features," p 110.
6. R. Ulyanovskiy. "The Fate of the Iranian Revolution," p 104.
7. R. Ulyanovskiy. "The Iranian Revolution and Its Specific Features," p 112.
8. R. Ulyanovskiy. "The Fate of the Iranian Revolution," p 108.
9. S.M. Aliyev. "The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 and the Working Class," p 108.
10. Ibid., p 107.
11. M.I. Krutikhin. Op. cit., p 170.
12. A.B. Reznikov. Op. cit., p 155.
13. Ibid., p 156.
14. See, for example: S.L. Agayev. "The Concept and Essence of 'Islamic Revolution.'" p 27.
15. Ibid., pp 27-31.
16. Ibid., p 31.
17. L.Ye. Sklyarov. Op. cit., p 209.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., p 198.
20. Ibid., p 206.
21. Ibid., p 216.
22. Ibid., pp 216, 217.
23. V.G. Khoros. (Review of:) S.L. Agayev. "Iran in the Past and Present." Moscow, 1981; idem. "Iran: Birth of a Republic." Moscow, 1984; idem. "The Iranian Revolution, the United States and International Security." Moscow, 1984.—VOPROSY ISTORII. 1986, No 6, p 124.
24. A. Arabadzhyan. Op. cit.—AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA. 1986, No 4, pp 22, 38.
25. Ibid., p 38.
26. Ibid.
27. S.L. Agayev. "The Concept and Essence of 'Islamic Revolution,'" p 27.
28. Ibid.
29. A. Arabadzhyan. Op. cit.—AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA. 1986, No 3, pp 33, 35.

30. A.B. Reznikov. Op. cit., p 140.
31. Ibid., p 19.
32. S.L. Agayev. "Iran: Birth of a Republic," p 331.
33. Ibid., p 316.
34. See: Ye.A. Doroshenko. Op. cit., p 16.
35. See: Ibid., p 28.
36. See: Ibid., pp 14-38.
37. See: Ibid., p 179.
38. A.B. Reznikov. Op. cit., p 135.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., p 137.
41. A. Arabadzhyan. Op. cit.—AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA. 1986, No 3, pp 34, 35.
42. S.L. Agayev. "The Zigzags of the Iranian Revolution," p 44.
43. S.L. Agayev. "Leftist Forces and the Islamic Revolution in Contemporary Iran," p 360.
44. . Ulyanovskiy. "The Iranian Revolution and Its Specific Features," p 110.
45. S.L. Agayev. "Leftist Forces and the Islamic Revolution in Contemporary Iran," p 332.
46. Ibid., p 336.
47. M.I. Krutikhin. Op. cit., p 121.
48. A.P. Shestakov. Op. cit., p 220.
49. See: A.B. Reznikov. Op. cit., pp 128-129.
50. R. Ulyanovskiy. "The Fate of the Iranian Revolution," p 104.
51. See: A. Arabadzhyan. Op. cit.—AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA. 1986, No 3, p 34.
52. See: S.L. Agayev. "Leftist Forces and the Islamic Revolution in Contemporary Iran," pp 341, 353, 361, 364.
53. See: S.L. Agayev. "Iran: Birth of a Republic," p 230.
54. See: S.L. Agayev. "Leftist Forces and the Islamic Revolution in Contemporary Iran," pp 358-359, 362-363; L.Ye. Sklyarov. Op. cit., p 215.
55. S.L. Agayev. "The Zigzags of the Iranian Revolution," p 47.
56. See: R. Ulyanovskiy. "The Fate of the Iranian Revolution," p 109.
57. S.L. Agayev. "Leftist Forces and Islamic Revolution in Contemporary Iran."
58. Ibid., p 340.
59. Ibid.
60. S.L. Agayev. "Iran: Birth of a Republic," pp 232, 240.
61. Ibid., pp 280-281.
62. S.L. Agayev. "Leftist Forces and Islamic Revolution in Contemporary Iran," p 349.
63. Ibid., p 352.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid., p 359.
66. Quoted from: Ibid., p 361.
67. Ibid., p 363.
68. Quoted from: Ibid., p 364.
69. R. Ulyanovskiy. "The Fate of the Iranian Revolution," p 106.
- COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki". Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1987
- Book on Competition in U.S.-Japanese Trade Reviewed**
18070399i Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 87 pp 179-183
- [Review by V. B. Ramzes of book "Yaponiya i SShA. (Problemy trgovoy konkurentsii)." [Japan and the United States. (Problems in Trade Competition).] by V. K. Dermanov, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya Publishing House, 1985, 191 pp]
- [Text] When you first take this book in hand, you involuntarily experience a guarded feeling: its topic is already too "popular" and "used up." It is no secret that Japanese-American foreign-trade contradictions are frequently the object of attention only because the problems associated with the state and evolution of them make it possible to pelt the reader with streams of superficial if sensational material. Fortunately, this is in no way true of the work of V.K. Dermanov, to the extent

that the deeper we get into it, the more obvious it becomes that we are dealing with truly serious, substantive and, most important, original research.

It seems to me that the author was able to achieve such significant results thanks to the determined advance to the forefront of a strictly political-economic analysis of the problem supported and made specific by a purposeful analysis of most extensive information in the realm of the competitive struggle of Japanese goods and services with American ones. In other words, the theoretical conclusions obtained by the author are reliably supported by concrete calculations. The subject of the book is arranged in essence around one, albeit complex and multifaceted, category—market competitiveness. But in order to imagine the striking amount of “labor expenditures” by the author to the proper extent, it is enough to state the circle of factors on which it intrinsically depends, which are illuminated in the different chapters. They are the currency exchange rate, proportionate expenditures of manpower, the correlation of prices on the internal market, management methods, the dynamics of labor productivity, marketing, state regulation, product quality and norms of accumulation (p 137). The book contains subtle and non-trivial observations reinforced by independent calculation and clear, carefully thought-out conclusions on literally every one of the cited factors of market competitiveness and many attendant instances. The compositional approach of a periodic return to considering individual factors from various perspectives, at various levels of abstraction and on ever widening spirals of the research spiral is successful and widely utilized throughout the work.

Dermanov proceeds quite justifiably, from the very beginning directing us toward an evaluation of the categories of inequality. “Equating the levels of economic development in the United States and Japan,” he writes, is a process that predetermines overall the nature of the economic relations between these countries, as well as being a deep foundation for strengthening the competition of their national capital” (p 7). Equating, naturally, does not signify the appearance of any sort of identity. It is visibly demonstrated in the book how the basic coincidence of the private-ownership principles of the economy, monopolistic structures and value relations on the internal and foreign markets do not exclude, but rather assume, the presence of such constructive disparities in the national economies of both countries that ensure appreciable “comparative advantages” to one or the other participant in foreign-trade exchange.

In point of fact, in both Japan and the United States the orientation of retail prices toward current (i.e. worst) conditions of production puts monopoly capital in an especially privileged position, allowing it to pick up a sort of “margin” that is itself the difference between retail prices and the lower industrial costs of the monopolies. In Japan, however, the conditions of production in the world of small business, where retail prices are made

equal, are clearly worse than the corresponding indicators for the United States (although the author exaggerates somewhat, in my opinion, the stagnation in the truly vast spaces of the Japanese monopolistic periphery). The large amount of monopoly profit coming into the hands of the Japanese industrial elite is becoming a consistent outcome of this correlation. In shifting from a nationwide plane to a sectorial one, Dermanov points out the more considerable differences in Japan among the average indicators for labor productivity for the whole machining industry and the indicators for individual sectors, which, naturally, serves once again as a source of differing profitability. Abundant factual materials which, by the way, describe the functioning of the law of value in its international form in a convincing fashion, testifies eloquently in just what manner these discrepancies are reflected in the sphere of foreign trade.

By way of example, in 1978 labor productivity in American agriculture was 83 percent of productivity for the economy overall, and 41 percent in the Japanese economy. The corresponding indicators for the machining industry of both countries are equal to 114 and 118 percent. Simple calculations show that foreign-trade supremacy in agricultural production belongs to the United States ($0.83:1.14=0.73$), and not Japan ($0.41:1.18=0.34$), while for industrial production it belongs to Japan ($1.18:0.41=2.88$) and not the United States ($1.14:0.83=1.37$). And as could be expected, in the aforementioned year—1978—1/3 of Japanese imports went for the products of American agriculture and 1/5 for American industrial products. In American imports from Japan, the share of industrial output reached 85 percent, while agriculture was 1 percent (pp 52-54).

Comparisons of the scale of increases in labor productivity in the sectors of the machining industry in Japan makes it possible to discover immediately and without error those of them that have at their disposal material opportunities for successfully promoting their products outside national borders. Among those falling into this circle are first and foremost electrical- and transport-machine building, the steel industry and general machine building, where from 1960 through 1980 labor productivity increased by 15, 10.5, 8.6 and 8.3 times respectively. Against this background, even a triple growth in productivity, achieved, say, in the forest-products or paper-and-pulp industries, cannot be considered a solid foundation for export market competitiveness. If one correlates the enumerated indicators with the analogous American ones (roughly a twofold increase in productivity in electrical- and transport-machine building, growth of 1.0-1.4 times in ferrous metallurgy, metalworking and the leather industry), then even with a regard for the sharp discrepancies of the points of departure on the vertical axis, a reinforcement of the foreign-trade beachheads of Japan overall, including in the markets of the United States itself, must be asserted (pp 55-57).

Labor productivity is exceedingly important, but is far from the only indicator of economic efficiency and,

consequently, of the market competitiveness of goods and services in the international arena. This efficiency is characterized no less completely by the materials- and capital-intensiveness of social production. Studying their levels and dynamics in Japan and the United States, the author demonstrates the multifaceted nature of market competitiveness and its extremely unstable and mobile composition noted by the clash of forces moving in different directions, which ultimately engenders a certain similarity of the resultant force. In reality, whereas the state of labor productivity in Japan unambiguously strengthens the advantages of Japanese products in the face of foreign ones, the state of affairs with regard to materials- and capital-intensiveness is not as clear and definite at all. The dynamics of proportionate expenditures for raw and other materials in Japan, devoid of any reliable reserves of minerals whatsoever, constantly suffer the dual effects of rationalization measures aimed at the all-round economizing of elements invested in the production process, on the one hand, and world prices for power carriers and raw resources on the other.

In the period to which Dermanov devotes the most fixed attention (beginning of the 1970s to the beginning of the 1980s), these expenditures declined, nonetheless remaining higher than those for the United States. Thanks to the trend, i.e. a prolonged and steady increase in the value of the national currency, however, Japan has obtained the opportunity of handling the increase in import prices and raising export prices to a lesser extent than the yen exchange rate has grown. Whence follows the reasonable conclusion that "the ability of the Japanese economy to restrain growth in export prices has to a considerable extent strengthened the market competitiveness of its export products" (p 82), i.e. the negative effect in principle of the cost of the raw-material component on market competitiveness is being surmounted. This conclusion unfortunately does not correspond to Dermanov's conclusion in another part of the book on page 146 where, regarding this period, he writes: "The higher materials-intensiveness of Japanese products compared to American ones under conditions of an increase in prices for raw-material commodities has become a serious negative factor reducing the growth rate of production efficiency and limiting the ability of the Japanese monopolies to restrain growth in their export prices."

Barely perceptible fluctuations in the author's position also exist in the course of analyzing the role of capital-intensiveness. Tracing the movements of composite and sector capital-intensiveness factors in Japan and the United States, Dermanov unambiguously indicates that the Japanese variant of reproduction is more capital-intensive and emphasizes the inverse proportionality between the levels of capital-intensiveness and profitability, as well as noting the limitations imposed by the latter on price flexibility in the sphere of foreign trade. At the same time, he also leaves no doubt that "higher capital-intensiveness is the flip side of higher growth rates in the capital-labor ratio, and correspondingly, of

labor productivity. Insofar as new capital investment is used, as a rule, to raise the efficiency of the productive apparatus, it ultimately leads to a reduction in overall spending for the manufacture of a unit of product. The higher capital-intensiveness of Japanese products compared to the United States does not therefore have a negative effect on the competitive positions of the Japanese exporters" (p 88). After such a justly categorical statement, the following vaguely diplomatic remark is quite unexpectedly heard: "...by virtue of the immediate influence of the given factor (capital-intensiveness—V..), we cannot say that the higher capital-intensiveness of Japanese products reduces, and that correspondingly the low capital intensiveness of American products increases, the market competitiveness of Japanese and American products" (p 147).

A visible place in the book is occupied by an analysis of the participation of the wage factor in delimiting the boundaries of market competitiveness. The author at once chooses the most reliable way of uncovering export supremacy in this realm. The principal objectives of Japanese-American overall economic and sector comparisons are not done by him in absolute magnitudes of wages cited in a single currency, but in "relative magnitude, i.e. proportionate expenditures of labor per unit of product output" (p 67). The carefully selected factual material, in which information borrowed from monographs and periodicals is combined harmoniously with the results of laborious calculations done by the author himself, gives an exceedingly clear picture. The essence of what has transpired is a steady increase in proportionate spending on manpower in Japan with, however, a persistent lag behind the American level. Over the 1970s, the indicated spending increased from 50 to 70 percent of the American level in the Japanese machining industry, while for 1960-80 the analogous indicators were from 48 and 34 percent to 82 and 65 percent for Japanese electrical- and general-machine building respectively. It also follows from the data cited by Dermanov that the schism in wage levels between Japan and the United States is greater than the schism in labor productivity between them, i.e. that the relative price of labor in Japan is lower and that on this plane Japanese products still retain a definite, albeit diminishing, competitive advantage over American ones (pp 69-76).

Only one instance in the section under review could be considered doubtful, and this is namely the reference to the time sequence, whether taken from calculations or from other sources (Table 7 Supplement on page 100 has no explanations on this score), of the quantitative indicators of the degree of exploitation. There is no dispute, the relative price of labor has a direct connection with the degree of exploitation, but the greater magnitude of the latter in Japan could be irrefutably proven without quantitative calculations by means of qualitative analysis and expert opinion alone. All efforts that have as yet been undertaken to come out with a "number" herein have furthermore been recognized as incorrect in one way or another in view of the inevitable narrowness of

the base statistical data, the poor representativeness of existing components for calculation, the excessive nature of the necessary assumptions and the like. The lack of the essential substantiation forces one to assume with certainty that Dermanov's effort will not distinguish itself from the crowd.

On the other hand, the author achieves undisputed success when he advances and develops a theory according to which "the causes of the high market competitiveness of goods is concealed not so much in the specific features of the pattern of production costs as it is in the value evaluation on the world market of the activity of the national monopolies" (p 89). The task of reinforcing this theory required multivariate comparisons of pricing structures in Japan and the United States and the discernment of general laws in the changing behavior of currency exchange rates. Making use of relative price indices (the ratio of the price index of an individual sector to the price index for the whole machining industry), Dermanov proves, first of all, the greater intensiveness of price changes in the Japanese machining industry compared to the American one and, second, the more rapid price reduction in the highly productive Japanese sectors (first and foremost in electrical- and transport-machinery building) compared to American ones. He further proves that Japanese export prices lag in growth behind wholesale process both in Japan itself and in the United States.

Finally, he succeeded in gracefully tying price dynamics with currency-exchange rates and establishing that the cyclical fluctuations in the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s in general were favorable to Japan overall. The products of those sectors of Japanese industry whose export prices have declined compared to American wholesale prices on a greater scale than the exchange rate of the yen relative to the dollar have reinforced their competitive positions. An erosion of the market competitiveness of products whose export prices have fallen compared to American wholesale prices to a lesser extent than the yen has risen against the dollar has occurred in parallel fashion. The exchange rate consequently fulfilled (and continues to fulfill) the function of a selective breeder, stimulating a continuous restructuring of export patterns in the direction of growth in the proportionate share "of that portion of social capital which at the given instant has the lowest production costs" (p 109).

Closely "contiguous" with these functions, as, naturally, with the whole process of cost evaluation of the foreign-economic results of the work of the national productive mechanism, is the regulatory policy of the bourgeois state. Dermanov describes it based on two key postulates: 1) foreign and domestic economic regulation in Japan constitutes a unified and indivisible complex in which both aspects are the logical continuations of each other; and 2) state-monopoly regulation is aimed at shifts in the comparative advantages of the Japanese economy and in the comparative costs of production. The analysis in the book of the role of the state as the organizer of the

flow of capital is thus organically combined with an analysis of its customs and foreign-exchange policies. The author feels that protectionism is the defining feature of all state-monopoly policy in Japan, "encompassing the whole chain of the reproduction process, beginning with the regulation of investment processes and ending with influencing export prices" (p 170). I can agree with this conclusion, emphasizing much more energetically than was done in the book, however, that thanks to protectionism various sectors in various periods have in turn been advanced to the level of international standards, but this in no way signifies the formation of the notorious export enclaves in Japan whose products are not accessible to the country's population on the "local shelf." It is namely on the domestic market and the saturation of domestic demand, eliminating whatever shortages, that all of the leaders of Japanese foreign-trade expansion begin their way (textiles, steel, passenger cars, electrical equipment), whose successes in the competitive struggle with American products have been treated on many levels in consolidated fashion in the research of V.K. Dermanov.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki". Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1987

Book on Egypt's 'Free Officers' Revolution Reviewed

18070399j Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 87 pp 183-187

[Review by A. M. Vasilyev of book "Revolutsiya 'Svobodnykh ofitserov' v Yegipte" [The "Free Officers" Revolution in Egypt] by O. V. Kovtunovich, Moscow, Oriental Literature Section of Nauka Publishing House, 1984, 165 pp]

[Text] Time not only softens passions, not only helps us to distribute the accents more correctly from the vantage point of the present day, but also brings new sources that make it possible to uncover unknown phenomena or see well-known events in a new perspective. This relates fully to this work as well, in which the author was able to demonstrate his own views on things, include a number of new and first of all Arab sources, especially the rich material of memoirs. O.V. Kovtunovich comes forward in the role of academic historian, but his personal observations of the events in Egypt at the beginning of the 1950s, where he had been in the capacity of a diplomat, also have an effect on him. We are warned in advance that the socio-economic roots of the revolution of 1952 were not the central topic of his research, but rather serve as the background for the principal portion, which could theoretically be called political science. Having noted this fact, we will turn namely to the serious and original conclusions that were made by the author.

A study of the genesis of the revolutionary-democratic experiment in Egypt that is connected with the name of Gamel Abdel Nasser has not been the topic of special

consideration in Soviet academic literature. The significance of Kovtunovich's work is that, thanks to him, it is possible to trace the preconditions of many specific features and trends in the Egyptian revolution, both positive, which were prominently manifested later, and negative, which led ultimately to the bloodless Sadat counter-revolution.

"The Egyptian revolution of 1952 was one of the most significant events in the history of the developing countries in the middle of the 20th century," writes the author. "Its course and development contain many features that are typical of revolutions in many countries of the world that entered at that time onto the path of liberation from colonial dependence and the execution of progressive socio-economic reforms. At the same time, the Egyptian revolution has a number of features that are characteristic of it alone" (p 149).

The years that have passed since the events being analyzed have allowed the author to make a more balanced evaluation of the role and place of the Wafd Party in Egyptian society at the beginning of the 1950s. He was able to refrain from clichés of the "reactionary bourgeois-landowner party" type and to find the correct perspective for its description. Agreeing with the opinion of a number of scholars that Wafd was in essence not a party in the modern conception, Kovtunovich at the same time notes that "in the strict sense of the word, Wafd was not a national front, which assumes the existence of political forces of various classes that place unified goals before themselves. This party was sooner the embodiment of a gigantic union of the oppressed majority of the Egyptian people, hostile to imperialism and the monarchy" (p 22). And further: "As it seems, many researchers, touching on issues of the state of Egypt before the 1952 revolution, are inclined to give too harsh a description of Wafd policies, accusing its leadership of being corrupt and lacking principle, as well as the fact that coming to power was the main thing for it, for the sake of which it entered into a deal with the palace and the British" (p 23). The author analyzes objectively the reasons that motivated the Wafdists to conclude an unequal treaty with the British in 1936, noting that this treaty, from the point of view of the Wafdists, was in fact the lesser of two evils, chief of which for Egypt was the danger of falling under the influence of the Axis powers, especially fascist Italy. The author naturally mentions that this party, and first and foremost its leaders, actually expressed primarily the sentiments of bourgeois-landowner circles.

The activity of the Muslim Brotherhood is also illuminated in quite a bit of detail, but Kovtunovich's evaluation of this movement provokes a desire to argue with him. He feels that the Muslim Brotherhood was undoubtedly a reactionary and even pro-imperialist movement. Avoiding the attachment of labels when he discusses the Wafdists and the Free Officers, the author cannot restrain himself when the discussion comes to the Muslim Brotherhood: "British intelligence doubtless

understood that the arch-reactionary Muslim Brotherhood organization, disciplined and fanatical, had every chance of being transformed into a major political force, which by its very nature would come out against the progressive national-liberation movement... It also does not evoke doubt that the colossal financial resources and large stores of weapons that were at the disposal of this organization were obtained by it from Egyptian reaction—the large bourgeoisie and the landowners—and possibly from the royal palace. The genie, released from its bottle, however, turned on its masters" (p 29). Usually basing his judgments on documented facts, the author in this instance uses the phrase "does not evoke doubt that..." without reference to any sources.

The following should be noted in evaluating the Muslim Brotherhood. Several trends of socio-political thought were developing in Egypt that corresponded to various forms of political organizations. Under the conditions of a multi-institutional society, where class boundaries were not always well-defined, and sometimes erased, the same social segments and classes frequently expressed their interests and aspirations in political organizations that had a popular political orientation. Egypt had not only a liberal-bourgeois trend, which could theoretically be associated with the Wafd, and a revolutionary-democratic trend of the Nasserites and the leftists continuous with it, but also a number of trends of traditionalists (fundamentalists), chief among which was the Muslim Brotherhood. Dreaming of a return to the "golden era" of Islam, this movement included an eclectic mix of both unconditionally reactionary and relatively progressive aspirations. It oddly combined the egalitarian sentiments of the masses and the interests of the exploiting classes. The Muslim Brotherhood movement was the expressor of views and sentiments associated with the traditional social structures of the popular masses, through which capitalist pseudo-modernization was implemented and which by their very nature should be against it. The anti-imperialist potential of the Muslim Brotherhood was always quite great: their condemnation of Camp David and position against American sway in Egypt testify to this. Such tendencies, however (the more so as elements of xenophobia are discernible in them) ruled out neither the possibility of compromise of the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood with right-wing parties nor their taking of reactionary positions on a series of issues in domestic and foreign policy. In any case, this movement was larger and more complex than the label that is usually stuck on it.

Kovtunovich gives a convincing treatment of the famous Cairo fire of 1952, noting that it was caused by a combination of conspiracy from above and spontaneous actions from below. The author can be reproached for the fact that, in describing these events, he did not make use of the special works of the well-known Egyptian historian Muhammed Anis. At the same time the reviewer, having been a witness to the events of January 1977, involuntarily projects them onto the fire of 1952. And this comparison leads one to conclude that the element

of spontaneity was the decisive one in the fire, when the white heat of hatred toward the British and the power of the haves was expressed in arson and vandalism. A careful analysis of the objectives of these actions shows that they were aimed namely against the British and the prosperous classes, to whom the burned houses, casinos, theaters, stores, major hotels and foreign banks belonged.

The book cites interesting new facts concerning both the activity of the Free Officers group and the characteristics of its individual members. The shame is that not all of these facts are documented. The author shows in realistic fashion and without embellishment the evolution of the Free Officers organization, the indeterminate nature of its political ideology and the vacillations in the sympathies of its members on a spectrum from the Muslim Brotherhood to communist organizations. The considerable role of the communist Hadeto organization in preparing the revolutionary uprisings is illuminated in detail. The events associated with the preparation and course of the coup are set forth in detail and on the basis of a careful verification of the facts. (By the way, this part of the historical drama has been described with an emotional intensity unusual for an academic historiographer.) For the first time in Soviet literature, the author has analyzed the social composition of the Free Officers. The social psychology of its members is also researched, especially the desire to get rid of the inferiority complex that was engendered in Egyptians by the corrupt aristocracy and British domination.

Kovtunovich gives an evaluation, balanced to the highest degree, of the nature and specific features of the revolution. Having noted that almost no resistance was made to it, he explains this by the fact that the "monarchical regime had lost so much authority by that time that even those circles that were largely indebted to it felt it was impossible to come actively to its defense. The aspirations of various political parties and groupings along with individual figures representing the circles of the largest landowners and bourgeoisie were directed exclusively toward seizing cushy jobs in the government and state institutions and the opportunity to take bribes and be engaged in embezzlement. And these aspirations led to endless discord among all of these groups. As a result, their joint position, even in view of the danger that threatened the whole structure, was not sustained, although the officers that rose up were an insignificant minority of all the army officers, among whom there were adherents of various political parties" (p 88).

The author draws the important conclusion that the coup of 1952 was transformed into a genuine revolution only in the course of further events and that the composition of the Free Officers group itself there were both potential opportunities for movement along the path of revolution and a tendency toward the establishment of a reactionary military dictatorship. It was extremely difficult to make an overall evaluation of the nature of the new regime at the time. It has deceived not only the

diplomacy and political science of the West, but some Soviet researchers as well. Today, having a greater quantity of facts at our disposal, it is possible to say that the contradictory nature of the evaluations was inevitable because the Free Officers coup reflected different social tendencies that represented different members of the leadership of this organization. The author justly writes that "...the Free Officers carried out a coup; they did not at first intend to carry out a revolution, at least by themselves. The truthfulness of the first declarations and communiques of the new regime cannot be doubted" (p 89).

Kovtunovich elucidates with great subtlety the question of how the Free Officers were able to confuse both the British, for whom two hours would have been quite enough to occupy the Egyptian capital, and the Americans on the score of their true intentions. It would be worth noting that the contacts of Nasser and his group with the Americans after the coup were of a tactical nature. Anti-imperialist sentiments in Egypt, as well as in many other Arab countries, in those years were first and foremost of an anti-British and anti-French rather than anti-American thrust, because the United States had practically no colonial interests in the Near East and North Africa. The so-called "American dream" was alive among the intelligentsia of the developing countries, which associated America with democratic ideals. Only political practices revealed to the Free Officers the imperialist essence of the policies of the United States and pushed them into opposing imperialism, including American imperialism. But the desire to collaborate with the United States was constantly present around Nasser and was manifested after his death.

One can share completely the author's idea that the coup of June 23 was of a purely military nature and, moreover, it was an officers' coup, while the soldiers participating in it knew nothing of the goals of the uprising, and the masses of the Egyptian people remained passive. The author justly notes the "mistrust of the leaders of the coup in the working masses" and a definite underestimation of their role and inability to bring them over onto their own side, which undoubtedly "weakened the position of the revolutionaries" (p 96). One also cannot fail to agree with the conclusion that "the army and the old police apparatus that was quickly taken in hand by the Free Officers was the effective force on which the revolutionary regime was based. The revolution was at first an unconcealed military dictatorship of a group of officers without organized mass support" (p 97).

Kovtunovich notes that the genuine leftists, including the socialists, were persecuted, became isolated and to a considerable extent lost their influence in the country after the revolution. This was the principal mistake of Nasser: he tried to build a socialist society in the country without the socialists. He furthermore strove to unite that which could not be united: to reinforce his dictatorial power and at the same time dress it up in democratic clothes. These characteristic features of the regime were

preserved throughout its existence. They defined its internal contradictory nature, obvious weakness and fragility. A real revolutionary organization with a well-defined ideology was not created and close ties between the revolutionary regime and the masses were not achieved. Even though its socio-economic and political measures met the interests of the broad working masses, the masses themselves did not participate in working out solutions and determining its policies. The Free Officers organization, which could have been the core of a party, was disbanded by its leadership. Various elements of the military and state apparatus were formed on the basis of the selection of personnel according to personal loyalty. All of this led to the fact that after the death of the eminent revolutionary democrat Gamel Abdel Nasser, the continuity of policy was not assured.

"The Free Officers... did not trust the masses—moreover, they feared their political activeness," writes Kovtunovich. "In this regard, all efforts to create a revolutionary regime of mass political organizations, beginning with the Liberation Organization and ending with the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), were either doomed to unconcealed demise or at best led to the creation of an inefficient and bureaucratic apparatus that was just a makeweight for the state machinery and was called upon to impart the appearance of democracy to the regime" (p 109). And further: "In the first years after the revolution, the Free Officers tried to climb above classes and class struggle, propagating 'class harmony.' Objectively they were fulfilling the tasks of the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution, and they could have found support therein among broad progressive and democratic circles. But they did not do this by virtue of a number of subjective (lack of a well-defined ideology, sufficient political experience and the like) as well as objective (the splintered nature of progressive organizations, the spirit of rivalry that prevailed among them) reasons" (p 111).

The period of revolutionary-democratic development of Egypt is inseparable from the name of Gamel Abdel Nasser. Thanks to his leadership talents, understanding of the aspirations of the people and personal charm, Nasser was transformed into a charismatic leader and the idol of the popular masses in the whole Arab world as well as Egypt itself. "For the first time in history," writes Kovtunovich, "the leader of the Arab countries began to appeal directly to the people. His reputation was founded on the fact that he correctly chose the main historical tasks that faced Egypt and the other Arab countries—the struggle against imperialism and neo-colonialism, local reaction and the remnants of feudalism and for genuine independence and the utmost economic, social and cultural development. The enormous contribution of Nasser before the world national-liberation movement was the conscious and consistent policy of reinforcing and developing ties with the natural and powerful ally of the peoples liberated and being liberated from the fetters of imperialism—the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community" (p 156).

Reconstituting a genuine and balanced picture of the recent past of Egypt, this book makes possible a better understanding of it today as well. Studying the genesis of the revolutionary-democratic experiment in Egypt has still more academic and political value because Egypt was a pioneer of many socio-political processes that are typical of other developing countries as well. Egypt was one of those countries that turned sharply to the left at the end of the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s. It was also among those countries that turned no less sharply to the right at the beginning of the 1970s. Many problems—the emergence of revolutionary democracy, its mutual relationships with the communists and Muslim traditionalists—researched by O.V. Kovtunovich using the example of Egypt are also useful in analyzing the situation in other countries.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki". Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1987

Five-Volume History of Ancient, Modern Kirghiz SSR Reviewed

18070399k Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 87 pp 198-202

[Review by A. M. Reshetov and Ya. A. Sher of book "Istoriya Kirgizskoy SSR s drevneyshikh vremen do nashikh dney. V pyati tomakh. T. 1. S drevneyshikh vremen do serediny XIX v." [History of the Kirghiz SSR from Ancient Times to the Present Day. In Five Volumes. Vol. 1. From Ancient Times to the Middle of the 19th Century]. Frunze, Kyrgyzstan Publishing House, 1984, 798 pp with illus. and maps]

[Text] The newly published first volume of the "History of the Kirghiz SSR" is more evidence of the development of historical sciences in the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. With the aid of central academic institutions, and first and foremost in Moscow and Leningrad, a large contingent of scholars has been formed here—historians, archaeologists, ethnographers, Oriental-studies scholars etc. They have created a considerable quantity of scholarly works that reconstitute the historical past of the peoples and the regions.

This volume, well illustrated and published at a high level of printing technology, was written by associates of the Institute of History of the Kirghiz SSR Academy of Sciences with the participation of scholars from other academic centers, a shining example of the creative collaboration of the archaeologists and historians of Frunze, Moscow, Leningrad and Novosibirsk.¹ It unfurls a broad panorama of historical events and traces socio-economic, cultural and historical features beginning with the first traces of settlement of the valleys and foothills of Kirghizia by ancient man up until the time the first legal documents were composed by the Kirghiz people accepting Russian citizenship.²

This volume differs advantageously from the preceding edition of the "History of the Kirghiz SSR" that came out (first edition) over thirty years ago³ through a considerable quantity of new observations and facts, both archaeological and historical. As a result of widespread excavations of ancient sites that were carried out on the territory of the republic over the last one and a half to two decades, many new discoveries and finds were made, which are reflected in the corresponding chapters of this work. Hitherto unknown original literary sources and archival documents that gave historians new material for deepening historical development were detected and researched over the same period. An important innovation compared to the previous edition is a special section devoted to a survey of sources. The work of the Kirghiz researchers, who sought out and collected old manuscripts and printed historical and literary materials, should be regarded in a positive light in this regard. The store of historical sources is being materially enriched to the extent of their textual and source study.

The primitive era occupies a large place in the book (Chapters 1, 2 and to a certain extent 3). It describes in detail the ruins and individual finds relating to the Stone Age era. Along with already well-known materials that were earlier placed in academic circulation, these chapters give a description and analysis of new sites and finds that have been researched in comparatively recent times, especially as a result of the work of the newly organized archaeological expeditions of the Institute of History of the Kirghiz SSR. In reviewing the materials recovered from the pre-Mousterian, Mousterian and Upper Paleolithic periods, the authors note the specific features of the technology of manufacture of stone tools, which makes it possible to correlate them with other Paleolithic cultures, especially the Paleolithic period in Indostan. In somewhat brief materials from the Neolithic period, the similarity with the Hissar Neolithic culture of southwestern Tajikistan is appreciable.

The sections devoted to the Bronze Age are also enriched with considerable new material compared to preceding editions. The overall scheme for the articulation of the cultures of the Bronze Age into grazing-cultivating (steppe) and settled-cultivation, it is true, remains unchanged. At the same time, new material and research based on it has made it possible to make corrections in the chronology of the sites of Andronovo culture; the dating of the Fedorovka stage in the 14th-13th, rather than 17th-14th centuries B.C. as it seemed earlier, has turned out to be better substantiated. The book includes new data on the history of the mining and metallurgy of the Andronovo tribes that has made it possible to draw conclusions about the dispersion of the bronze trade at that time.

New and interesting material has also been accumulated on the settled-cultivation cultures of south Kirghizia. The results of excavations at the Osh settlement should especially be noted among them. In the very center of the

city of Osh, at the foot of the well-known Suleiman Mountains (Takht-i Suleiman), an ancient settlement was discovered with the remains of dwellings located on terraces. The absolute dates obtained through carbon dating testify to the fact that the Osh settlement was already functioning at the end of the 2nd millennium B.C.

The process of the disintegration of primitive communal institutions and the formation of early classical society across the whole Eurasian zone of the steppes and the foothills transpired under similar natural and socio-economic conditions. The materials extracted on Kirghiz territory show that a new economic and cultural type—nomadic animal husbandry—was gradually forming here during this time. "Horizontal" migration predominated in the open steppe, while "vertical" predominated in the mountains and foothills. This was a new type of economic, socio-economic and cultural life that imparted further acceleration to the course of historical processes. In this book, the era of the establishment of classical society is shown using considerably more material than in the preceding editions, material that was found and studied over the last 10-15 years. Especially interesting finds were made in the large-scale excavations of the burial mounds of early nomads in the Ketmen-Tyube Valley. Many of them are represented by color inserts in the book. This material makes it possible to pose the question of the specific local features of the material and spiritual cultures of the Saka tribes and inhabitants that settled Tyan-Shan, Priisyykkulye and the Chuysk and Talasskaya valleys in subsequent historical periods. It is true that this approach is only projected in the book, but it is evidently already possible to speak of the specific features of the culture of the Saka of Ketmen-Tyube and Issyk-Kul and the specific features of the Kenko, Karabulak and other cultures. The periodization and chronology of the settled-cultivation cultures of the Fergana, as opposed to the preceding edition, is shown in greater detail: Eylatan, Shurabashat and Markhamat periods. The authors propose that the strong and independent kingdom of Davan, well known according to Chinese chronicles of the 2nd and 1st centuries B.C., arose here long before it became known to Chinese emissaries. The Great Silk Route, one branch of which passed through the western Fergana to Baktriya, had much attention at that time.

A prolonged ripening process for early feudal relations had led by the 6th century to the appearance of such state formations as the Turkic khanate. Practically the entire remaining portion of the book (chapters 4 to 11) is devoted to the era of the establishment and development of feudalism in Kirghizia, insofar as feudal relations in Kirghizia were preserved in one form or another right up until the second half of the 19th century, after which their rapid disintegration occurred.

Beginning with Chapter 4, i.e. the history of the early feudal states, the nature of the exposition changes appreciably. It becomes more narrative, and considerably

more space is occupied by facts and events of socio-economic and political history, and the opportunity of citing the names of historical figures appears. Whereas in the preceding chapters the authors had been supported almost exclusively by archaeological material, in the fourth and subsequent chapters the historical-source base at their disposal makes possible the more detailed illumination of various aspects of the historical process.

The authors are creating a broad canvas of the realities of various eras. In Chapter 4, for example ("Early Feudal States of the 6th-10th Centuries"), the discussion chiefly concerns the ancient Turkic state formations: the first and second Turkic khanates and the formation, destruction and renaissance of the Tyurgesh khanate and the state of the Karluks. A number of special sections set forth external political events—the battle with Tan China, resistance to Arab conquest—and reviews the ethnocultural ties with the Sogdians, Karluks and Kirghiz. A large section is devoted to socio-economic relations in this era. Sources make it possible to reconstruct the process of the formation of early feudal relations and their specific features, on the one hand, in the urban and settled-cultivation rural environment, and on the other, in the patriarchal-clan society of the nomads.

In the second half of the 20th century, a considerable portion of the territory of Kirghizia was part of the state of the Karakhanids, whose power then extended to the Fergana and Maverannakhr. Chapter 5—"The Development of Feudal Relations from the Second Half of the 10th to the Beginning of the 13th Centuries"—is devoted to the events of this period. The processes of property and social differentiation were further developed under the Karakhanids. Various forms of land ownership took shape. Concepts arose that fixed various levels of social status, which was reflected in the poem of Yusuf Balasagunskiy, "Kutadgu Bilig" ("Abundant Knowledge"). The division of labor is strengthened, crafts and trade are developed and the transition of nomads to settled cultivation is continued.

The achievements of the culture of the peoples that settled Kirghizia in the early Middle Ages were major, and the authors have acted correctly in devoting a special section to them—"The Culture of Kirghizstan in the 6th-12th Centuries"; it would evidently be more precise, however, to call it "The Culture and Daily Life..." insofar as many places in this chapter are devoted to the day-to-day details of the life of the ancient Turks, Sogdians and other inhabitants of early-Middle-Age Kirghizia. This chapter, as opposed to preceding summary works on the history of Kirghizia, has much new material from various sources, and the historical background is depicted much better. A separate review of the culture of the nomad and settled populations, justified in principle, could at the same time engender in the reader, especially the non-specialist, a not quite adequate representation of the degree of interconnection of these two varieties of the culture of the Central-Asian peoples. The real historical process is unified, and nowhere, even in

Pamir and Hindu Kush, are there "pure" cultures of nomads that contain absolutely no elements of a settled culture. And the converse: neither in Fergana nor in Khorasan were there "purely" settled cultures that did not feel at least some effect from the nomads. This specific feature of any region of Central Asia (as well as other countries) should probably have been shown more distinctly.

Chapter 7 of this book—"Kirghizstan in the 13th-15th Centuries"—relates one of the most gloomy periods in the history of Central Asia. At the very beginning of the 13th century, the territory of Kirghizstan was seized by the hordes of Genghis Khan and became part of the Chagatai ulus. Aside from the misfortunes visited on the inhabitants of the settlements and cities under the first strikes of the invaders, no less damage was inflicted by the endless internecine warfare of the heirs of Genghis Khan—the Genghizids. The feudal infighting continued practically through the whole 15th century, until the Mongol emirs were forced to unite against the invasion of the Oyrot Mongols, and at the same time or shortly thereafter there appeared once again on the territory of northern Kirghizia the Kirghiz tribes that had migrated east.

As has already been noted, many chapters of this volume go beyond the bounds of Kirghiz studies themselves in the scope of the material, the circle of problems under consideration and the significance of the summaries and conclusions. They undoubtedly include those such as Chapter 8—"Early Ethnic Processes and the Formation of the Kirghiz Nationality"—devoted to one of the most important and, at the same time, practically the most complex, problems—the origins of the Kirghiz peoples. The problem of ethnogenesis is also touched on in the Introduction, and not only on a historiographical plane (pp 47-50), but as "the contemporary resolution of the ethnogenesis of the Kirghiz people" (p 50) as well. The topic of the ethnic history of the Turkic peoples, and first and foremost the Kirghiz, is considered in the book incomparably more fully than in all preceding histories of the Kirghiz.

The authors, following other Soviet ethnographers, specially engage in a typology of the ethnic commonalities and most important elements that define this or this nationality, considering language and material and spiritual culture, as well as ethnic self-awareness, including ethnic names.⁴ All of these traits are traced to one extent or another in linguistic, anthropological, archaeological and ethnographic materials, although, of course, to differing degrees apropos of different historical eras. The principal conception was formulated in the following manner: "The sources of the ethnic history of the Kirghiz go back to deep antiquity. The Kirghiz nationality took shape chiefly on the basis of ancient and Middle-Age tribes and tribal associations of the Tyan-Shan and Priytyshan. The tribes that resettled here in the 15th century from Priirtyshia and Altay also played a definite role in its formation" (p 408).

In describing the ethnic processes in ancient times, the authors point out the continuity in the development of individual components that constitute the specific features of this or that people. Certain firm facts, however, that would indicate a direct continuity of ethnic processes, beginning from the early periods and at least to the Middle Ages, are still lacking. It is well known that in the middle of the 1st millennium B.C., Iranian-language tribes with an Indo-European appearance inhabited the territory of Kirghizia. The Turkic language of the Usuns has yet to be proven, as does the Turkic-language of the Kenkols.

Mongoloidism, which had already become noticeable among the ancient inhabitants of central Kirghizia as early as the middle of the 1st millennium B.C., who were Iranians by language, although an important trait, cannot have decisive significance in this instance, since it was not characteristic of the Kirghiz alone. Many elements of the material culture of the nomads (utensils, weapons, harness) had already undergone powerful diffusion in antiquity and thus in and of itself, without linguistic, anthropological, folklore and particular (i.e. characteristic of the Kirghiz alone) data, cannot serve as sufficient reference points in the search for the sources of ethnogenetic processes. One can thus speak with confidence only on the time beginning in the 6th century B.C., when an obvious proto-Turkic ethnolinguistic substratum with a clearly Mongoloid look and definite elements of material and spiritual culture was taking shape on the territory of Kirghizia.

While recognizing the role of the Yenisey group of Kirghiz in the ethnogenesis of the contemporary Kirghiz, the authors emphasize first and foremost the significance of the autochthonous tribes and tribal associations in this process. They demonstrated that there was no direct link between the Yenisey Kirghiz (the ancestors of the Hakkas) and the Kirghiz of Tyan-Shan. They were able in particular to trace how the ethnopolitical term "Kirghiz," fixed in the later Middle Ages for some Turkic-language tribes of Altay and Priirtysh, became in the 14th-15th centuries the designation of that group of Turkic Altay tribes that spoke one of the Kipchak dialects and that had migrated to Central Asia, which term was shifted to include the aboriginal population as well. The fact that a broad circle of phenomena of the political, social and cultural history of the Turkic-language peoples, which had an influence on the direction of ethnogenetic processes, is considered closely linked with the ethnocultural interrelationships with various central- and middle-Asian ethnic groups, and first and foremost the Sogdians, can be recognized as a significant achievement of the authors' collective and Soviet historical science overall.

The authors carefully take into account the seven principal, in their opinion, points of view on the problems of ethnic history and hypotheses on the origins of the Kirghiz people. According to the point of view of Ch. Valikhanov, supported today by A.Kh. Margulan, the

Kirghiz lived on the Yenisey from time immemorial, even before the time of Christ. N.A. Aristov felt that the Kirghiz lived in Tyan-Shan well before Christ, being known under the name of "Usuni." Major Soviet archaeologist A.N. Bernshtam developed the idea of the resettlement of some of the Kirghiz from the Yenisey to Tyan-Shan in the 1st century B.C. or on the threshold of the first millennium A.D. as part of the Huns. V.V. Radlov, and O.K. Karayev after him, proposed that the Yenisey Kirghiz, having resettled in Tyan-Shan in the 9th-10th centuries, constituted the basis of the formation of the Kirghiz. V.V. Bartold and G.Ye. Grumm-Grzhimaylo assumed that the Kirghiz resettled in Tyan-Shan later—during the Mongol invasion in the 13th century or even later. Soviet historian and Kirghiz scholar K.I. Petrov delineated three ethnic components that constituted the Kirghiz nationality in Tyan-Shan. The participants in a special academic session on the problems of the ethnogenesis of the Kirghiz (Frunze, 1956) substantiated the idea of the formation of the Kirghiz nationality in Tyan-Shan with the participation of the local population and Central-Asian tribes. Strangely and unjustifiably absent from this quite complete list of the names of major Soviet ethnographers that made the most material contributions to the development of the problems of Kirghiz ethnography is S.M. Abramzon,⁵ although his works are doubtless well known to the authors (see p 49).

This volume is also not free of a number of other shortcomings. It seems to us, for example, that the sources that have no direct relation to the history of Kirghizia, especially Avestu and the works of Herodotus and Strabo, hardly should have been described in such detail. At the same time, it would have been expedient to give, aside from the written sources, a survey of the archaeological materials, especially those that were accumulated since the publication of the "History of the Kirghiz SSR" in 1968, and there are, as is well known, quite a few of them.⁶

Finally, one cannot help but notice that the authors of the first chapters do not always take into account the distinction between history and archaeology. The sections devoted to the primitive era basically contain not so much historical information about the tribes that inhabited the mountains and valleys of Kirghizia in antiquity as they do a description of archaeological sites and finds. These descriptions are sometimes excessively detailed. They would be pertinent in reports on the excavations or in archaeological publications, but in this instance they overload the basic text of the book, which is a work of history. The specific features of the forms and details of stone implements, for example, are described very extensively and using specialized terminology. The same approach is also characteristic of the chapters devoted to the Bronze Age. The authors' excessive increase in typological and other exclusively archaeological descriptions of the materials, necessary in other publications, here only makes the perception and interpretation of the overall historical process more difficult.

Diverse indices and bibliographical lists always strengthen the merits of a work, but completeness and precision are an indispensable requirement of them. We unfortunately discovered individual inaccuracies in these sections. In the text of the book, for example, the names "Isfayram-say River" (p 79) and "the city of Takht-i-Suleiman" (p 121) are encountered, but they are missing in the index of the principal geographical and topographical names. The article of S.M. Abramzon and L.P. Potapov that was published in SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA (1975, No 6) is not called "National Ethnic Names as a Source" (p 739), but rather "National Ethnic Names as One Source in Studying Ethnic and Social History (Using Materials of the Turkic-Language Nomads."

This volume overall is a sound summary work whose significance is in no way diminished by Kirghiz and Central-Asian problems. It plays a positive role in the further development of problems of the ethnic history of the Turkic peoples and—on a broader plane—the political, social and cultural problems of the peoples of Central Asia.

Footnotes

1. The editorial collegium of the first volume: V.M. Ploskikh (Editor-in-Chief), V.P. Mokrynin (secretary), M.B. Dzhangerchinov, O.K. Karayev, V.M. Masson. Authors: V.D. Goryacheva, M.B. Dzhangerchinov, B.A. Dyusheyev, Yu.A. Zadneprovskiy, O.K. Karayev, I.K. Kozhemberdiyev, V.M. Masson, A.M. Mokeyev, V.P. Mokrynin, A.P. Okladnikov, K.I. Petrov, V.M. Ploskikh, M.B. Yunusaliyev. In the writing certain individual chapters, materials were also used from B. Alagushev, V.Ya. Galitskiy, N.G. Galochkina, Ye.Ye. Kuzmina, B.O. Oruzbayeva, G.P. Suprunenko, E.R. Tenishev. The chronological index was compiled by B.A. Dyusheyev, the bibliography by G.P. Suprunenko, the historical maps by A.D. Degtyareva, M.B. Yunusaliyev, V.P. Mokrynin, K.I. Petrov, V.M. Ploskikh, and the indices by G.P. Suprunenko, V.N. Glushkova, L.Ye. Semenchenko; special editor of the volume, S.G. Klyashtorny, and literary editor, E.I. Andrusenko.

2. The summary nature of the research is emphasized in the first reviews that have appeared. See: B. Stavitskiy. "A Valuable Work on the History of the Kirghiz SSR."—KOMMUNIST KIRGIZSTANA. Frunze, 1985, No 5, pp 93-96; B.I. Iskandarov, V.A. Ranov. "The New Edition of the 'History of the Kirghiz SSR.'"—IZV. AN TADHZSSR. OTDELENIYE OBSHCHESTV. NAUK. 1985, No 3, (121), pp 117-118; A.L. Narochitskiy, S.G. Agadzhanov, G.A. Fedorov-Davydov. (Review of:) History of the Kirghiz SSR.—VOPROSY ISTORII, 1986, No 4, pp 109-112.

3. History of Kirghizia. Frunze, 1956; History of the Kirghiz SSR. 2nd Edition. Vol. 1. Frunze, 1963; History of the Kirghiz SSR. 3rd Edition. Vol. 1. Frunze, 1968. 4. See, for example: Yu.V. Bromley. "Ocherki teorii

etnosa" [Sketches in the Theory of Ethnic Groups]. Moscow, 1983, 412 pp. 5. For more detail see: S.M. Abramzon. The Kirghiz and their Ethnogenetic, Historical and Cultural Ties. Leningrad, 1971. 6. See: Remnants of the Culture and Art of 1983.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki". Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1987

Articles not translated from NARODY AZII I AFRIKI No 3, May-June 1987
18070399/ Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 87 pp 1-2

A Policy of Collaboration and Peace (pp 3-10) (Unattributed)

Socialism and the National-Liberation Movement in Africa (1917-1939) (pp 11-21) (M.Yu. Frenkel)

Problems in the Economic and Social Development of the Countries of the Maghreb (pp 22-32) (V.A. Melyantsev)

Nigeria: Money and Politics (pp 33-43) (L.V. Geveling)

Inter-Ethnic Contradictions in Assam and the Search for Ways of Overcoming Them (pp 44-55) (A.G. Belskiy, M.M. Targamadze, V.V. Chernovskaya (Yaroslavl))

The Emergence of Contemporary Swahili Literature (pp 56-66) (L.E. Gankin)

Confucian Schools: Philosophical Thought and Authoritarian Traditions (pp 67-77) (Yu.B. Kozlovskiy)

Formational Features of Feudalism and the Orient (pp 78-90) (L.B. Alayev)

"The Instruction on the Flower" (Fushi Kaden), or "The Book of the Flower" (Kadensho) by Zeami Motokiyo. Introduction, translation from old Japanese and commentary by N.G. Anarina (pp 110-123)

The Academy of Ethiopian Languages (pp 132-134) (S.V. Balashov)

International Colloquium in Rabat (pp 138-137) (R.G. Robertov)

Chronological Notes (pp 138-145)

Roundtable Discussion of Book on Oriental Societies Concludes (Participants: A.S. Agadzhanov, B.I. Slavnyy, A.S. Martynov (Leningrad), G.I. Mirskiy) (pp 146-161)

Review by L.I. Reissner of R.N. Dolnykova's "Methodology and Technique for Forecasting the Foreign Policy of Non-Socialist States (Experience in the Systemic Organization of Concepts) (pp 173-178)

Review by V.K. Shokhin of F.B.J. Kuiper's "Works on Vedic Mythology." Translated from English. (pp 187-192)

Review by Yu.L. Krol (Leningrad) of A.F.P. Hulsewe's "Remnants of Ch'in Law. An Annotated Translation of the Ch'in Legal and Administrative Rules of the 3rd Century B.C. Discovered in Yun-meng Prefecture, Hupei Province, in Review by R.G. Landa of V.I. Gusarov's "Labor Resources and Social Problems of Tunisia" (pp 203-204)

Review by V.G. Erman (Leningrad) of "Indian Texts of Central Asia." 1st Ed. Publ. of texts, research and commentary. (pp 205-206) (G.M. Bongard-Levina and M.I. Vorobyevoy-Desyatovskiy)

Review by V.Ye. Sukhinin of Pak Syyon's "Experience in the Development of a National Language" (from Korean) (p 207)

Review by V.N. Timoshenko of "Drought and Hunger in Africa: Denying Famine a Future." Ed. by M.H. Glantz. (pp 208-209)

The Problem of the Ancient Indian Commune (pp 210-213) (A.A. Vagasin)

Obituary of Academician Andrey Nikolayevich Kononov (pp 214-216)

Obituary of Avrora Ivanovna Falina (p 217)

END

10

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, economic, military, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available source; it should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated. Those from English-language sources are transcribed, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names which are rendered phonetically or transliterated by FBIS/JPRS are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in 8 volumes: China, East Europe, Soviet Union, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Africa (Sub-Sahara), Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically. Current JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcovers or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. DOD consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate

command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.) For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (703) 527-2368, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.