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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

**Challenges to Train, Organize, and Equip
the Complete Combined Arms Team:
The Joint Task Force**

D. Robert Worley

PREFACE

This report presents alternatives for the creation of Joint Task Forces to facilitate training, equipping, and experimentation. Most of the work was performed as part of a Central Research Project, *Joint Combat Development Concepts and Processes*. Much of the original thinking expressed here is the product of an earlier effort in support of Task AI5-987 that produced *Time and Command Operations: The Strategic Role of the Unified Commands and the Implications for Training and Simulations*, IDA P-3222, October 1996. As such, the intellectual contributions of the earlier report's co-authors, Michael H. Vernon and Robert E. Downes of A B Technologies, Inc., are heartily acknowledged.

The following staff members at the Institute for Defense Analyses reviewed the report: Mr. Dennis J. Gleeson, Jr., Rear Admiral Robert Hilton, Sr., USN (Ret.), and Dr. Richard J. Ivanetich. Colonel Chip Cobb, USA (Ret.) of A B Technologies, Inc. provided a thoughtful review with respect to special operations forces.

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SUMMARY

The Joint Task Force (JTF) has become the military's instrument of choice for operational command and control. However, JTFs are not standing organizations. They are temporary organizations created in response to an emerging contingency or crisis and stood down upon mission accomplishment. The command team is assembled to prepare a response plan, absorb forces from the Services, deploy, and execute the plan. The commander must overcome organizational and operational obstacles simultaneously.

Because the JTF is created on demand, it does not have its own command and control systems, organizational structure, or procedures. The dominant Service component typically provides these, leaving the other Service components scrambling to integrate. Because the JTF command team is assembled at the last minute, its members are unfamiliar with each other and have not had the opportunity to train sufficiently to develop a close working relationship based on familiarity and trust. Because the JTF headquarters is assembled during crisis response, it has few choices but to accept a traditionally structured Service component-based organization, leaving no opportunity to experiment with novel joint organizations without incurring unacceptable levels of risk.

When faced with a similar situation, each Service formed a standing headquarters trained, organized, and equipped to practice command and control of combined arms. The problems of integrating the breadth of Service capabilities under unified command can be no less daunting than the analogous situation faced by the Services, yet standing joint headquarters are not the norm.

To best meet national security needs, the first recommendation is to determine an appropriate mix of JTF structures as part of the annual and biennial processes that produce the *Unified Command Plan*, *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*, and *Forces For Unified Commands* memorandum. This process is already in place and is derived directly from the *National Security Strategy* of the President of the United States.

A mix of standing JTF organizations is nominated for more rigorous analysis. Two standing JTF headquarters with assigned forces are recommended: one for the US Central Command and the other for US Forces Korea. These allow for the highest level of operational readiness for dangerous and relatively likely contingencies. Other standing JTF headquarters without assigned forces are nominated for a specific range of missions. By building the organizations and *focusing training resources* there, joint commanders and staffs are less likely to suffer the fate of their predecessors in America's first battles where command and control failures have been prevalent.

Furthermore, standing JTFs and standing JTF headquarters would provide a focal point for acquisition of command and control information systems. They would also enable experimentation with new methods of warfare as portended by advocates of a revolution in military affairs. Expectations are high for increased warfighting effectiveness enabled by information technology and precision weapons. Realistic experimentation with these systems and new methods can both expedite and hone emerging capabilities as well as protect us from an over reliance on unproven concepts.

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION¹

The scholarly examination presented in *America's First Battles, 1776–1965*, leads quickly to the conclusion that “more glaring than poorly trained troops as a first-battle problem is the weakness of command-and-control.”² The authors go on to attribute this weakness to “inadequate preparation of commanders and staffs for the real world of combat.”³

In the last decade, the Joint Task Force (JTF) has become the nation's instrument of choice for command and control of military operations at the operational level of war. A wide array of information age systems for command and control is being developed for the JTF. Yet JTFs do not formally exist. Instead, they are typically created in response to an emerging contingency or crisis, seemingly inviting first battle problems.

There appears to be widespread agreement that a JTF headquarters should be formed and maintained prior to crises. The vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph W. Ralston, stated that his experience as a joint force commander convinced him of the superiority of a standing joint force over an ad hoc force.⁴ The commander in chief of the United States Special Operations Command, General Peter J. Schoomaker, said unequivocally that his standing special operations JTF headquarters was essential to mission accomplishment.⁵ The commander in chief of the United States Southern Command, General Charles E. Wilhelm, claimed that if he had a stable command team, the rest was relatively easy.⁶ Given this consistency of opinion at the highest levels of the uniformed military, it is hard to understand why standing JTFs—at least standing JTF headquarters—haven't yet been adopted as the norm.

There are two fundamental objectives to achieve. The first is to improve the nation's ability to respond to crises by staffing and training an organization that can effectively and efficiently bring to bear the full range of capabilities provided by all the uniformed Services—command and control of *combined arms*.⁷ The second objective is to improve

¹ This report is an expanded, revised version of the author's article “Joint Task Forces: Options to Train, Organize, and Equip,” published in the Winter 1999 issue of *National Security Studies Quarterly*, pp. 31–48, © 1999 the National Security Studies Quarterly Association. Portions of the original article reproduced in this report are reprinted by permission.

² *America's First Battles, 1776 – 1965*, edited by Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, p. 328.

³ *Ibid.* p. 330.

⁴ Personal communication, September 8, 1997, at the Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, VA. General Ralston was commenting on his assignment as commander of the Alaskan Command, a subordinate unified command of the US Pacific Command.

⁵ Personal communication, August 27, 1997, at Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. Then Lieutenant General Schoomaker was referring to the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).

⁶ Personal communication, August 9, 1997, Camp Lejeune, NC. Then Lieutenant General Wilhelm was speaking from his position as Commanding General, Second Marine Expeditionary Force and Commanding General, Standing Joint Task Force at Camp Lejeune.

⁷ Combined arms is a term used frequently by ground forces to mean the assemblage of armor, artillery, infantry, engineers, aviation, and combat service support. We use it here more widely to include those combat arms provided by air and sea forces as well.

effectiveness by equipping an organization capable of exploiting the dramatic advances in information technology and the precision weapon systems that they enable.

There are currently several JTFs deployed around the world, but each was created for a specific mission and will be dissolved upon mission accomplishment. These are not the subjects of this study. Rather, the issue addressed here is the nation's ability to respond to future, unplanned contingencies with trained and capable joint forces.

To better meet these future needs, we recommend creation of a mix of standing JTFs, standing JTF headquarters, and strategic reserve JTF headquarters as part of the joint staff's biennial review process that produces the *Unified Command Plan*, the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*, and the *Forces For Unified Commands* memorandum.

The remainder of the report will provide a review of the process of creating joint commands; the players and stakeholders; some historical analogues; a characterization of the dimensions of the solution space; a survey of today's requirements for joint forces; and the rationale for the more detailed recommendations to follow.

CHAPTER 2. JOINT AND SERVICE COMMANDS

There are two chains of command that are relevant to the present discussion—the *producer* and the *user* chains of command. Both chains originate in the National Command Authorities (NCA), i.e., the president and the secretary of defense. From the NCA, the producer chain of command goes to the military departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and to the Department of Defense agencies and field activities. The secretary of a military department is responsible for and is tasked to *recruit, organize, train, and equip* the forces assigned to the combatant commanders, i.e., to *produce* warfighting capability for the commanders in chief (CINCs) of the unified commands to use.⁸ From the NCA, the user chain of command flows directly to the CINCs of the unified commands. CINCs *use* forces and resources to accomplish tasks assigned by the NCA. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) transmits orders from the NCA to the CINCs and is the principal military advisor to the NCA.

The title of this paper deliberately includes the words *train, organize, and equip*—words that are near sacred to the Services. Any attempt from outside the Services to interfere with these Title 10 responsibilities is met with strong resistance. This paper applies those “Service” responsibilities to the JTF, a joint organization.

2.1. The Unified Commands and Their Components

All military operations are conducted under the authority of the commander in chief of one of the unified combatant commands. There are two types of combatant commands, those that have broad responsibilities within geographic regions and those that have worldwide responsibility for a specific warfighting function. The US Atlantic, Pacific, European, Southern, and Central Commands comprise the unified commands with geographic responsibilities. The Special Operations, Strategic, Space, and Transportation Commands have functional responsibilities worldwide. The number of unified commands is not fixed by legislation. Their number, areas of responsibility, and functions may change over time.⁹ The document describing the responsibilities of the combatant commands is the *Unified Command Plan*. A brief review of each unified command and its components is given in Appendix A.

Figure 1 shows the structure of a notional unified command with five component headquarters. Each unified command has component headquarters for Army forces (ARFOR), Air Force forces (AFFOR), Navy forces (NAVFOR), Marine Corps forces (MARFOR), special operations forces (SOF), and other functional forces as appropriate.

⁸ United States Code, Title 10, Sections 3013 (b) and 8013 (b).

⁹ Specified commands are also legally authorized, although none exist today. They are composed of forces from a single Service. The best known and most recent specified commands were the United States Forces Command (FORSCOM), now an Army major command; the Strategic Air Command (SAC), now absorbed into STRATCOM, a unified command; and the Military Airlift Command (MAC), now the Air Mobility Command (AMC), a component of USTRANSCOM.

The diagram illustrates the organizational structure of the Department of Defense, categorized into three main levels:

- Unified Commands:**
 - Supporting Command (multiple instances)
 - Supported Command
 - Principal Staff
 - Staff Cells (multiple instances)
- Components:**
 - ARFOR
 - AFFOR
 - NAVFOR
 - MARFOR
 - Theater Special Operations
- Forces:**
 - Corps (multiple instances)
 - Numbered Air Force (multiple instances)
 - Numbered Fleet
 - Marine Air-Ground Task Force
 - Division (multiple instances)
 - Wing (multiple instances)
 - Task Force, Ready Group (multiple instances)

Arrows indicate the flow of command and control from the Unified Commands level down to the Forces level.

The term *forces* refers to the military units that may be assigned, apportioned, or allocated¹⁰ to unified commands. Examples shown in Figure 1 include Army corps and divisions, Air Force numbered air forces and wings, Navy carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups, and Marine air-ground task forces.

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2.2. The Chairman's Review Process

The *Unified Action Armed Forces* (UNAAF) sets forth principles and doctrine governing the activities of the armed forces of the United States when Services of two or more military departments¹¹ are operating together. It states:

The combatant commanders are responsible for the development and production of joint operations plans. During peacetime, they act to deter war and prepare for war by planning for the transition to war and military operations other than war. During war, they plan and conduct campaigns and major operations to accomplish assigned missions.¹²

The UNAAF includes guidance governing exercise of command by the CINCs and other joint force commanders (JFC). Furthermore, it explains the functions of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and military departments in support of joint operations, furnishes guidance for the military departments and subordinate commands in the preparation of their respective detailed plans, and describes the command functions of joint commands.

2.2.1. The Unified Command Plan

The *Unified Command Plan* (UCP) establishes the combatant commands, identifies geographic areas of responsibilities (AOR), assigns primary tasks, defines authority of the commanders, establishes command relationships, and gives guidance on the exercise of combatant command relationships. The UCP is approved by the president, is published by the CJCS, and is addressed to the commanders of the combatant commands.¹³ The UCP is subject to a biennial review.¹⁴

2.2.2. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

The *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (JSCP) is a capabilities-based joint planning document. The Chairman, through the JSCP, assigns the unified commands missions based on the concerns of the secretary of defense.¹⁵ Those concerns are made explicit in the *Contingency Planning Guidance*, in Presidential Decision Directives (PDD),¹⁶ existing treaties, and related documents that affect the Department for the current and next three to five years.

¹¹ This unfortunate definition of "joint" is not about warfighting. Had the wording been "when forces of two or more Services working together" then naval officers serving in a Navy/Marine Corps operation would have received the joint credit necessary for senior promotions without disrupting their normal career progression, giving them an advantage over Army and Air Force officers.

¹² UNAAF, p. IV-6.

¹³ The UCP is prepared by the Joint Staff's J-5 Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate.

¹⁴ Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 181 of 29 January 1979 implements the procedures for review.

¹⁵ The JSCP is prepared by the Joint Staff's J-5 Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate.

¹⁶ Formerly National Security Decision Directives, or NSDDs.

The JSCP tasks the CINCs to develop regional contingency plans for major theater wars (MTWs) or small-scale contingencies (SSCs), and apportions forces for planning to meet the contingencies.¹⁷ Products of the JSCP are a series of operations plans for possible contingencies in a CINC's area of responsibility. The JSCP fulfills the Chairman's Title 10 responsibilities for preparing strategic plans and joint logistic and mobility plans in support of those strategic plans. The JSCP also reflects DoD concerns for protecting and promoting national interests throughout the world.

2.2.3. The Forces for Unified Commands Memorandum

The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (the Goldwater-Nichols Act) and Title 10 United States Code require that forces be *assigned* to a unified command. Specific forces and resources are assigned by the secretary of defense in his *Forces for Unified Commands* memorandum published annually by the Joint Staff.¹⁸ The respective unified command is given responsibility and authority to train those forces assigned.

2.2.4. Force Assignment, Apportionment, and Allocation

The *Forces for Unified Commands* memorandum assigns specific forces and resources to the unified commands. Generally, forces are *assigned* to the CINC in whose AOR they reside. For example, if a unit is in Hawaii, it is assigned to USCINCPAC; if in Germany, to USCINCEUR.¹⁹

Forces and resources are *apportioned* for deliberate planning by the CJCS in the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*.

Forces and resources are *allocated* for execution by the NCA. This is usually accomplished via a CJCS *warning order* or *execute order*²⁰ as a contingency unfolds. Unified commands may or may not have the same forces and resources allocated as they had apportioned. The decision on which forces and resources to allocate is made at the time of execution. The allocation decision depends on unit readiness and availability and on the worldwide situation at that time.

¹⁷ During the Cold War, forces were "fenced" (dedicated) for CINCs, particularly in the case of Europe. USCINCEUR had certain forces that were fenced for NATO. The end of the Cold War and the publication of the 1993-1995 *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* eliminated fenced forces.

¹⁸ The *Forces for Unified Commands* memorandum is prepared by the Joint Staff's J-8 Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate.

¹⁹ We have found no law or regulation that requires forces to be assigned where they live. It appears to be merely custom. Earlier in the Cold War, some Air Force fighter units resided in the United States but were assigned to the European Command. Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger was concerned that this arrangement might allow CINCEUR to deploy forces from CONUS to Europe without the secretary's approval. The National Command Authorities must approve troop movements, by law.

²⁰ The execute order is prepared by the Joint Staff's J-3 Operations Directorate.

2.3. Joint Task Forces

Large conflicts will be fought by a geographic combatant command, while smaller conflicts are more likely to be fought by a joint task force, subordinate to a geographic command, but temporarily formed for a specific contingency. A major regional conflict in Southwest Asia probably will be fought by the Central Command. US Forces Korea, with the Pacific Command supporting, will fight a major regional conflict on the Korean Peninsula. In other cases, like *Operation Just Cause* conducted in Panama and *Operation Urgent Fury* in Grenada, it is more likely that a joint task force will be formed under the direction of a three-star general or admiral who reports to the appropriate geographic commander in chief.

The unified commands stand up joint task forces. The joint task force is quite often the CINC's instrument of choice for prosecuting the operational level of war. Rather than theater-wide warfare as anticipated in the Cold War, crises erupt throughout a theater of operations independent of each other. The unified command may recommend a course of action to the NCA that requires standing up a JTF. If the course of action is approved, a joint operations area (JOA) and mission will be assigned to a forming JTF. The JTF is responsible for creating a more detailed course of action. Forces will be allocated for execution to the new joint force commander.

The CINC is responsible for the training of forces assigned to him, and he has the authority to assign tasks to subordinate headquarters. United States Code establishes that combatant commanders give authoritative direction to subordinate commanders and forces necessary to carry out the mission assigned, to include authoritative direction of all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics.²¹ Frequently, unified commanders appoint a subordinate joint force commander and form and assign tasks to a JTF for a crisis or for a specified mission and specified time frame.

The current practice is to pre-designate three-star JTF commanders from each of a unified command's Service component headquarters and for each unified command to maintain a core joint planning cell²² around which a JTF can form. These JTF commanders and selected staff are assigned primary duties in their Service component headquarters. A JTF headquarters team is infrequently brought together for a training event. Afterwards, its members disperse and return to their Service component commands. These "trained" JTF headquarters are rarely deployed.

Recall that failures in America's first battles were due to a weakness of command and control of combined arms. The nation's primary tool of command and control of the combined arms capabilities of the four Services, the JTF headquarters, does not exist. The individual designated to command these diverse forces has a primary duty to a single Service component headquarters. The same is true of the JTF staff. The information

²¹ United States Code, Title 10, Section 164 (c). When the Services refer to Title 10 training, they are definitely not referring to the CINC's authority over joint training.

²² The Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC, pronounced dij-a-fac) is becoming the norm although each unified command implements them somewhat differently.

systems they use on a daily basis for command, control, and communications are the systems of their Service, not joint systems.²³

Table 1 below shows a typical designation of JTF commanders. Note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between a unified command's component structure and its designated JTF structure. In general, these JTFs do not exist except when scheduled for a week-long training event. Nor do they have assigned or apportioned forces. Notice, too, that one JTF headquarters is shared by ACOM, EUCOM, and SOUTHCOM, the JTF headquarters at II Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. It will be discussed later in greater detail.

Table 1. CINC Designated JTFs²⁴

Unified Command	Type JTF	Component Base
ACOM		XVIII Airborne Corps III Corps 2 nd Fleet 8 th Air Force II Marine Expeditionary Force
CENTCOM		I Marine Expeditionary Force
EUCOM	HA/DR, NEO Mid to high intensity Maritime, Littoral, NEO HA/DR Airlift Maritime pre-positioned NEO	US Army Europe (USAREUR) US Army Europe (USAREUR) US Navy Europe (NAVEUR) US Air Force Europe (USAFE) II Marine Expeditionary Force Special Operations Command Europe
PACOM	Primary Secondary	I Corps 7 th Fleet III Marine Expeditionary Force Alaskan Command 3 rd Fleet 13 th Air Force
SOUTHCOM		II Marine Expeditionary Force

²³ In Operation Desert Storm Army systems were employed for all ground component commands: specifically Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE). An Army heavy brigade was added to the 2nd Marine Division that did not have MSE. Remarkably, but given the long lead-up time, MSE became the Marine's system of choice.

²⁴ Derived from personal visits to unified commands January through June of 1996.

CHAPTER 3. WHY ALTER THE STATUS QUO NOW?

The previous section identified a fundamental flaw—the lack of a trained command and staff team capable of taking on a wide array of Service forces. This in itself might be adequate justification for formation of standing JTF headquarters. In addition to this fundamental flaw, a variety of trends characterizing the transition from the Cold War argue even more strongly for change.

3.1. Recent History of the Unified Commands

At the peak of US force structure, forces were forward deployed in the planned theater of operations under command of the CINC that would employ them. Reinforcing forces were located in the US on active duty or in the reserves. US-based forces typically had a capstone alignment (were apportioned for planning) with one unified command but could be allocated to another unified command during a contingency.

The end of the Cold War precipitated a rapid and considerable draw down of force structure. A greater and greater fraction of total force structure now resides in the continental US. However, the number of unified commands and their geographic areas of responsibility remain. Fewer and fewer forces are available to meet the CINC's needs. Combat forces, once dedicated to a single unified command, now have many contingency relationships with many unified commands. An army unit formerly trained, equipped and stationed on the German plains prepared to defend against a Warsaw Pact threat is now stationed in the US prepared to fight in the Balkans, Korea, Southwest Asia, Haiti, or Somalia.

The European Command has undergone the greatest loss of dedicated, forward-deployed forces. The Atlantic Command, once predominantly a naval command, has been the greatest recipient of forces as they return to the US. Its geographic responsibilities include the Atlantic Ocean and the eastern seaboard and recently have grown to include the entire continental United States excluding forces located along the US Pacific Coast. The commander of ACOM is sometimes informally and unofficially called CINC America, a departure from the Atlantic naval legacy. The Caribbean and the water surrounding South America have recently been reassigned from ACOM to SOUTHCOM, further shifting ACOM's focus away from geography and toward forces.

Military operations smaller than full-scale warfare do not require the full complement of forces at the disposal of a CINC. The invasion of Panama, *Operation Just Cause*, the air raid on Libya, *Operation El Dorado Canyon*, and the intervention into Grenada, *Operation Urgent Fury*, are examples of operations that do not require a CINC's full resources. Even these cases require a significant and accelerated integration of specialized capabilities. While the CINC will likely prosecute military operations in the Central Command area of responsibility, the commander of a Joint Task Force will conduct most military contingencies. While some standing JTF headquarters exist, most will be *ad hoc* (literally *for this*) when the need arises. A pre-designated three-star JTF

commander will be identified and a JTF stood up composed of the staff and forces appropriate for prosecution of the specific mission.

3.2. Modern Trends Characterizing the Post Cold War Era

The Trend from Permanent to Temporary Commands. The geographic unified commands, as organizational headquarters, have been fairly stable in the second half of the twentieth century. The Service component command headquarters supporting the unified commands have similarly remained stable. These permanent organizations have decades of history working together. The specific Service units assigned to the unified commands have exhibited greater change over this same period; this is particularly true in the European Theater. Even though the relationship between Service units and unified commands changes over time, the Service units themselves—maneuver divisions and fighter squadrons, for example—are enduring organizations. As another example, naval forces, due to deployment cycles, rotate in and out of a unified command's area of responsibility in the short term but are stable in the long term.

The JTF, on the other hand, is a temporary command created as a contingency emerges to command and control operations across a broad range of employments. The command and staff team must be built, a plan constructed,²⁵ tactical forces absorbed as needed, and military operations commenced. Cohesion, familiarity, plans, and systems must be built on short order. (Some JTFs remain operational for extended periods, but enduring and semi-enduring missions are more appropriately the domain of the unified and subordinate unified commands.) As a contingency terminates, the temporary command is stood down.

The Trend from Deliberate to Time-Sensitive Planning. During the Cold War, deliberate planning for general war received the preponderance of attention and resources. Recall the 18-month JSCP planning cycle. All the while, crisis action planning was initiated for innumerable contingencies. A culture of deliberate planning remains in many quarters even though the unified commands have increased their emphasis on time-sensitive planning. The change is most notable at EUCOM, once consumed by deliberate planning for theater-wide warfare but now dominated by contingencies like those in the Balkans, northern Iraq, and Africa. US Forces Korea (USFK) remains focused on a specific major theater war (MTW) supported by extensive deliberate planning. CENTCOM also plans for an MTW, but it must also be prepared to respond to a variety of lesser regional contingencies and missions in its area of responsibility.

The Trend from Theater to Independent Joint Operations Areas. Each combatant commander is assigned an area of responsibility (AOR). The AOR assigned to a unified command is a large *theater of operations*. The AOR assigned to a subordinate unified commander or to a JTF commander is a *joint operations area* (JOA). Warfare, particularly in Europe, was oriented on theater-wide operations. Today's unified commands may have several JOAs within their theater, each JOA potentially

²⁵ In some cases, a contingency plan (lacking specificity and detail) may exist that can be adapted.

independent of the others. The operational level of war links tactical actions to strategic objectives²⁶ and, quite often, the operational level of war is conducted by the JTF.

For example, separate contingencies against separate threats on the Iraqi/Saudi border and at the Straits of Hormuz may require an air-land JTF and a maritime JTF, each with its own JOA. The unified commander would assign priorities, shift resources, and otherwise arbitrate between them. Alternatively, the unified command could conduct the operation as a single contingency within the AOR.

Furthermore, JOAs are frequently in underdeveloped countries without in-place communications, intelligence, and logistics systems. The US relied heavily on host nation infrastructure during the Cold War, particularly in Germany.

The Trend from Assignment to Apportionment. The reduction in forward deployment has resulted in the preponderance of US forces residing in the continental United States. USCINACOM has a large portion of total US forces assigned. The reduction in force structure has resulted in a greater tendency to apportion a unit to more than one unified command under more than one operations plan.

The Trend from Deployed to Deployable Forces. Closely related to the issues of assigned and apportioned forces in the past, large numbers of forces were forward deployed in the theater of operations. Since they lived in a theater, they were assigned to that theater. Today's reality of fewer forces permanently stationed abroad shifts an even greater burden to strategic mobility and rapid planning and execution.

Our allies are also adjusting to the new security environment. During the Cold War, for example, German forces were dedicated exclusively to the defense of their homeland. Their need for strategic sea and airlift, deployable communications and intelligence systems, and deployable base structure ranged from minimal to nonexistent. They are transitioning to a balance between home defense and expeditionary humanitarian assistance forces with the attendant increase in the need for strategic lift and deployable systems. *Our allies are increasingly looking to the United States for strategic lift and deployable support capabilities.*

The Trend from War to Military Operations Other Than War. Each unified command's training program contains exercises that train to MTWs and SSCs but increasingly contains exercises that emphasize and train to things that are not about warfighting.²⁷ More and more, humanitarian assistance, peace operations, and other military operations other than war (MOOTW) have become the norm. Many of these activities do not employ the common force-on-force tactical operations but rather deal with a broader range of issues, including natural and sociological disaster.

²⁶ *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Joint Pub 3-0, February 1995, p II-17.

²⁷ Current guidance is found in *Joint Training Master Plan 1998 for the Armed Forces of the United States*, CJCSI 3500.02A, December 1996. For multiply apportioned forces, CJCS training priority guidance is that units should train to support those plans to which they are apportioned with training emphasis favoring Major Regional Contingency (MRC) training over Lesser Regional Contingency (LRC) training; if apportioned to both MRCs, training should favor the earlier contingency. The terms MRC and LRC have since been replaced by MTW and SSC, respectively.

The Trend of Increasing Reliance on Information Technology. *Joint Vision 2010*, promulgated by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, provides the vision of future joint operations. In it, information superiority is the premier concept espoused. Billions of dollars are being invested in systems for command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. All of these are components of an information system. Many of these ostensibly are targeted for use by the JTF commander.²⁸ Those JTFs that do exist are conducting operations around the world, and have limited ability to generate requirements for or experiment with these new tools and methods.

3.3. The Historical Problem of Combined Arms Command and Control

The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps have all been faced with the problem of forming ad hoc combined arms headquarters at the last minute. All adopted a permanent headquarters out of their existing structure rather than incur the operational penalties associated with ad hoc commands.

In each case, competing needs for efficiency and effectiveness were the root of the dilemma. Great efficiencies can be achieved in garrison by building homogeneous, or pure, organizations. Forming tank-pure battalions allows tank crews, mechanics, repair facilities and parts to be collocated. Logistics flows are greatly facilitated. The same is true of aircraft units—e.g., helicopter, fighter, and bomber squadrons—and ship commands—aircraft carriers, cruisers, and attack submarines. Economies of scale might dominate the thinking behind the structure of this type of organization.

However, the military does not often fight with homogeneous organizations. It *task organizes* before going into battle. That is, it brings together heterogeneous resources into an organization to accomplish a specific task or mission. Bringing together at the last minute well-trained and equipped homogeneous forces into a heterogeneous organization has no rational expectation of success.

The term *combined arms* is used within the Army and Marine Corps to refer to the combining of armor, infantry, artillery, aviation, engineers, and combat support into a combined arms team. The concept can easily be extended to include the vast array of arms provided by the Services. A headquarters that has commanded a single combat arm is not organized, trained, or equipped to command a complex combined arms team. The organization that is *efficient* in garrison is not *effective* in combat.

3.3.1. Marine Corps Air-Ground Task Force

In many respects, the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is a microcosm of the JTF. Its general structure is shown in Figure 2 below. It is most commonly employed in conjunction with a navy Amphibious Ready Group (ARG). Together they

²⁸ For example, the charter of the recently created Joint C4ISR Battle Center specifically states that it is to provide an experimentation environment for the unified commands at the JTF level.

bring together the combined arms of air, ground, and sea. In garrison, battalions are generally pure to achieve efficiencies. For example, infantry battalions, tank battalions, amphibious tractor battalions, and artillery battalions live and train together at home station.




Figure 2. Marine Air-Ground Task Force Structure

When forming a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU),²⁹ a trained infantry battalion is mated with other trained resources to form a battalion landing team. This forms the ground combat element of the MEU. Trained and ready rotary and fixed wing units are collected into an aviation combat element. The MEU would likely undergo training to qualify as special operations capable (SOC). Finally, the MEU (SOC) and ARG marry up to form a potent combined arms team for deployment. All of the pieces were previously trained in the skills of their combat arm prior to assembling into a single, heterogeneous unit. All the pieces, that is, but the command element. And the command element is the organization responsible for integrating the various combined arms into a coherent whole.

In the middle 1980s, the Marine Corps addressed that shortcoming by standing up permanent MAGTF headquarters.³⁰ Today there are seven standing MEU headquarters: three in North Carolina, three in southern California, and one in Okinawa, Japan. In addition, there are three standing Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) headquarters, one each in North Carolina, southern California, and Okinawa.

²⁹ The MEU is the smallest and most common of the MAGTFs. The Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) or, more recently, the Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) is intermediate in size, perhaps based on a regiment. And the MEF is the largest, based on one or more Marine divisions.

³⁰ The permanent MAGTF headquarters concept was approved by General P.X. Kelley in April 1983 and has evolved since.

3.3.2. Army Division and Brigade

Prior to US entry into World War I, the larger Army formations were infantry, cavalry, and artillery regiments. There were no large combined arms units. Divisions were later formed as a combined arms headquarters, and a mix of regiments assigned to them. This addressed the problem of commanding combined arms at the division level, but there remained no easy way to form and command smaller combined arms teams. Again, the solution was to adopt standing combined arms headquarters—the *brigade*—to replace the branch-pure regimental headquarters.

Army divisions now have four combined arms headquarters called brigades. Three of the brigades are trained, organized, and equipped to take on two to five maneuver battalions (armored, mechanized, or infantry), an artillery battalion in direct support, and other units provided by their parent division. The fourth brigade headquarters orients on aviation and cavalry operations, mostly by attack and transport helicopters.

3.3.3. Navy Task Organization

The United States Navy also maintains homogeneous commands. All aircraft carriers belong to a single *type command*. Cruisers, attack submarines, and ballistic missile submarines, etc., each belongs to a type-specific command. The type command is responsible for training the ship and crew before deployment begins and the ship moves from homeport to a fleet at sea. Issues specific to a ship type remain the responsibility of the type command even while deployed at sea. But command during employment is the responsibility of the battle group or task force the ship is assigned to. Battle groups and task forces are heterogeneous organizations that must practice the navy equivalent of combined arms operations.

Bringing a ship into a formation is a complex process and was not well facilitated by the various type commands. During World War II, the Navy adopted a very flexible task force organization to facilitate composition of several ship types into a heterogeneous, coherent whole. The command structure has evolved and remains today.

A task force or battle group commander might choose to reside aboard an aircraft carrier or aboard a ship specifically designed for command.³¹ The commanding officer, most likely a Navy admiral, might choose the carrier for a complex land strike mission. The same admiral, or a Marine general, would most likely choose the command ship option for amphibious operations or humanitarian assistance operations. In any case, the necessary systems for command and control³² are configured in advance aboard ship. Given the expeditionary nature of naval forces, it is too late to equip a command element when a crisis arises.

³¹ The *Blue Ridge* is the command ship class.

³² Information systems for command and control have been referred to by a variety of acronyms. The term currently in vogue is C4ISR, standing for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

3.3.4. Air Force Composite Wings and Multi-Ship Missions

The typical Air Force wing is homogeneous, e.g., a fighter wing. However, there are a small number of composite wings in the Air Force.³³ The 347th Wing at Moody Air Force Base in Georgia is an example of a composite wing. Two squadrons fly the supersonic, multi-role F-16. Another flies the legendary C-130 Hercules propeller driven airlifter, that can move personnel, equipment, and supplies within a theater of operations. A final squadron flies the A-10 Warthog, an attack aircraft. The A-10 is a subsonic, two-engine jet that performs superbly in the close air support role, i.e., firing in direct support of ground forces. A headquarters and an air control squadron (the combat equivalent of civilian air traffic controllers) round out the composite wing.

It is difficult to imagine how such a composite wing would fight together in a separate air campaign. The benefits, however, are obvious when the wing is mated with an Army division. The 347th is located near the Army's 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized)³⁴ at Fort Stewart, Georgia. Their close proximity allows them to train together on a regular basis, greatly enhancing their combat effectiveness. Collectively, an Army division and an Air Force composite wing constitute an impressive combat capability. This mutual support relationship is greatly desired by the ground commander,³⁵ but flies in the face of the Air Force's desire for autonomy from the ground commander. One can easily imagine that a heterogeneous wing is more expensive to operate than a homogeneous wing due to the economies that can be achieved in maintenance and other overhead by supporting only a single aircraft type.

Again, efficiency in garrison versus effectiveness in combat is the issue. It is questionable whether the Air Force will maintain composite wings in their force structure.³⁶

More than wings and squadrons, however, the multi-ship mission is where the Air Force practices combined arms. A mission may draw different types of aircraft together solely for the purpose of a single operation. A large strike mission might be composed of 32 bomb-carrying fighters, 16 fighter escorts, eight Wild Weasel aircraft to destroy enemy radar, four electronic jammer aircraft,³⁷ and 15 tankers to refuel the group.³⁸ An AWACS command and control aircraft may manage this and several other missions in real time. The Air Force has done an impressive job of building this extremely flexible combined arms capability, though some interoperability problems have occurred between the Air Force and naval aircraft.

³³ Three as of June 1995.

³⁴ The recently renamed 24th ID (Mechanized).

³⁵ The Marine Corps is accustomed to this air-ground organization.

³⁶ Since the research for this paper was completed, the Air Force has created an Air (or Aerospace) Expeditionary Force. It is primarily a readiness model adopted and adapted from the Navy to make personnel deployments more predictable. It does have the combined arms flavor of the composite wing, but appears to be more oriented toward separate Air Force deployment than to Army-Air Force deployments.

³⁷ The Air Force has retired its primary jammer capability and has no replacement in sight, thus increasing the burden on the naval services to provide that capability.

³⁸ The same mission might be accomplished with eight stealth F-117s and two tankers for refueling.

3.3.5. Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force

There have been attempts at maintaining a standing JTF.³⁹ The Rapid Deployment JTF eventually evolved into the current CENTCOM. The evolution is instructive for the current topic. The US Readiness Command (REDCOM)⁴⁰ was once a unified command with responsibility for responding to crises around the world and specifically to those areas not part of another unified command's area of responsibility. That area included places as disparate as the Middle East and Alaska. In general, forces based in the continental United States—the strategic reserve—were assigned to REDCOM.

The Arab-Israeli war of 1973 caused, among other things, a worldwide increase in oil prices. That led to a greater focus on US interests in the region. For much of the history of the unified command plan, sub-Saharan Africa has been unassigned. By the middle 1970s, Cuban and Russian presence in the region forced US military thinkers to reconsider our geo-political interests there. The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan found that REDCOM's available air and sealift was capable of deploying only a single battalion to the region. Throughout REDCOM's history, its focus shifted quickly between sub-Saharan Africa, to the Middle East, to Central Asia, and global. Throughout all of this, the European Command remained more capable of deploying air and land forces to the region, and the Pacific Command remained more capable of deploying naval forces.

Several command arrangements were implemented over the years. One such arrangement created a Rapid Deployment JTF as a subordinate to REDCOM for purposes of planning and exercises. When deploying in response to a crisis, the RDJTF would pass to either the European or Pacific command. Another command arrangement, begun 1 October 1981, made the RDJTF a separate command with reporting responsibilities directly to the Chairman and the NCA. By plan, the RDJTF became the US Central Command on 1 January 1983.

REDCOM's responsibilities for CONUS-based strategic reserve forces are now the domain of ACOM. It was often asked, why would one assign forces to a unified command (REDCOM) that will never employ them? We are still wrestling with that question.

3.3.6. Marine Corps Standing Joint Task Force

In July of 1995, the Commandant of the Marine Corps cited the need for a standing JTF (SJTF) headquarters oriented on expeditionary operations. Over the following two and a half years, the headquarters evolved into a proven capability. It supported the European, Southern, and Atlantic Commands at the low end of the conflict spectrum. It augmented real world JTFs, participated in joint training exercises, and occupied its own facility. Future plans included creation of its own communications support element to

³⁹ *A Brief History of the United States Central Command*, United States Central Command History Office, MacDill AFB, FL, February 1995.

⁴⁰ The US Readiness Command descended directly from the US Strike Command (STRICOM) in 1971.

provide dedicated C4I equipment. Difficulty in acquiring the joint staff billets and support of the other Services resulted in the SJTF being ordered stood down.⁴¹

The concept was of a standing JTF headquarters, much like the standing MAGTF headquarters. Forces were to be allocated to the JTF in a crisis rather than permanently assigned. The SJTF was *organized* for a particular portion of the conflict spectrum. It participated in several joint training exercises and remained intact after the exercise. It was thus *trained* for a portion of the conflict spectrum. The SJTF was preparing to acquire the dedicated C4I necessary to be *equipped* to conduct operations in a portion of the conflict spectrum.

The opportunity to have an organized, trained, and equipped JTF headquarters was lost. To respond to a future crisis, an ad hoc organization will need to be formed.

3.4. Conclusions

When faced with the problem of forming headquarters capable of practicing combined arms within their own Service, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps each decided to create a permanent organization rather than attempt to form it ad hoc and at the last minute. These decisions weren't made lightly by the Services. In each case, resources had to be shifted from other activities. These decisions had the support of the Service chief and were institutionalized. The RDJTF on the other hand, had neither Service nor CINC support. In fact, it was in contention for resources with other CINCs. The SJTF had the support of three CINCs but not of the other Services, nor was it able to compete effectively for limited joint staff billets.

⁴¹ "Standing Joint Task Force: Opportunity Lost," Mark T. Goodman and Richard M. Scott, *Marine Corps Gazette*, Vol. 82, No. 9 (September 1998), pp. 38-39.

CHAPTER 4. FACTORS FOR AND AGAINST CHANGE

During and after World War II, Congress criticized the Services for not responding to more opportunities for cooperation and efficiency. Two schools of thought were present. One preferred functional division of worldwide responsibilities; the other preferred geographical division. Drawing geographic boundaries at water's edge preserved Service prerogatives as they stood at the end of the Second World War. The Navy retained authority over the oceans through the US Atlantic and Pacific Commands. The Army retained authority over Europe and Northeast Asia. Little has changed.

In 1947, CINCs were allocated geographic areas of responsibility and the JCS, basically a committee of Service chiefs with no one in charge, determined which Service would be executive agent for that region. The Navy was executive agent for the Pacific and Atlantic commands for obvious reasons. The Army was executive agent for Europe. The respective Service chief selected the CINC. The Service chief assigned executive agency was thus firmly positioned in the combatant chain of command between the president and the CINC.

While the practice of assigning agency has passed, the geographic commands retain strong Service flavors. Service chiefs are now explicitly excluded from the combatant chain of command. The trend is toward greater authority to the CJCS at the expense of the Service chiefs. However, the chairman is not in command of combat forces.

One should expect that the Services would see the JTF as just another layer of joint command above them and resist as they have in the past.

4.1. Component-Based JTFs Preserve Service Prerogatives

Forming JTFs from established component headquarters preserves Service prerogatives. Service-based headquarters are not organized, trained, or equipped to command and control joint forces. However, they are sources of general officer billets and strong seats of power within a CINC's area of operations. *Designating a component as a "joint" headquarters preserves Service warfare at the expense of joint warfare.*

4.2. Filling Joint Staff Billets is Problematic for the Services

Each Service has personnel end-strength limits and is stretched thin as the Defense drawdown continues. The last several years have witnessed a proliferation of joint commands and an attendant increase in joint staff billets. The Services have increasingly complained about staffing joint organizations rather than staffing their own Service organizations. The inability to complete the staff of Camp Lejeune's standing JTF headquarters is due primarily to this problem. Congress has closely monitored and regulated the number of joint staff billets and has set upper bounds. Congressional relief is likely needed to support standing JTF headquarters.

4.3. The Unified Commands Want Their Own JTFs

Each unified command has come to accept that they cannot have the assigned forces they desire. The pool of available forces is simply too small. They must all rely on ACOM to provide trained and ready forces. However, they have not yet come to accept that ACOM will provide joint force commanders and staffs. In short, ACOM can provide forces, but the receiving CINC will provide joint command over those forces.

The exception is that EUCOM and SOUTHCOM have shown a willingness to accept a CONUS-based JTF from ACOM, the standing JTF at Camp Lejeune. II MEF is in the Marine Component structure for all three unified commands. It should be noted that this JTF is not oriented on the more glamorous high-intensity or mid-intensity conflict that attracts resources to the various unified commands. Perhaps that is the explanation for EUCOM's and SOUTHCOM's acceptance of an ACOM-provided joint force headquarters.

The end result could be that ACOM would indeed provide other CINCs with JTFs head to toe. Or, each regional CINC might dedicate resources to standing up true JTF headquarters. The latter might require congressional relief to authorize an increase in joint billets. A third alternative is the status quo, Service component-based JTF headquarters. The third alternative preserves the other unified commands' independence from ACOM and would receive Service support.

4.4. Service Acquisition of C4ISR Assets

The Services have steadfastly guarded their Title 10 responsibilities to recruit, train, organize, and equip forces. They each have invested heavily in information systems for command and control. The unified commands have used a variety of means to obtain command and control information systems that were not forthcoming from the Services.⁴² The unified commands have the advantage over the JTF in that the unified commands exist, are commanded by a respected and powerful general officer, and have legitimacy under law. The JTF has none of these advantages.

4.5. Conclusions

It is unlikely that the Services will support the creation of JTF headquarters, despite efforts like those of the Marine Corps at Camp Lejeune. Staffing joint billets and subordinating their senior component headquarters to yet another joint echelon will be seen as working against their prerogatives.

The unified commands might well support the creation of standing JTF headquarters as long as they are assigned to the unified command and not to ACOM.

⁴² This topic alone would make an interesting study.

It is unlikely that the Services will provide the necessary command and control systems needed by a JTF. Doing so would only erode the Service's power. It is highly unlikely that the Services would support direct acquisition of information systems by a joint organization representing the interests of the JTFs.

Over the years, the various secretaries of defense have exerted little pressure in the unified command plan revisions. General Colin Powell was the first Chairman to use the powers granted by the Goldwater-Nichols legislation to push for major revision of the unified command plan, but was unable to accomplish all of his objectives during his tenure. Congress may ultimately have to exercise its powers to force this type of reform over the objections of the Services.

CHAPTER 5. THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR JTFs

The above discussion has described the status quo in some detail. But what is the demand for JTFs, and what should the Department supply? This chapter first surveys the apparent demand for JTFs, based both on declaratory policy (what we say we'll do) stated in the National Security Strategy and associated documents, and on employment policy (what we actually do) as evidenced in recent history. In this context, this paper is about force development policy (what force we need to support both declaratory and employment policy). Second, it outlines several possible alternative approaches to satisfying that demand. The chapter concludes with recommendations about which alternatives can reasonably meet the demand.

5.1. The Requirements for Joint Forces

Some requirements for JTFs derive directly from US declaratory policy, specifically the National Security Strategy which, since 1962 has emphasized two major theater wars (MTWs).⁴³ Recent strategies have included discussions of small-scale contingencies (SSCs). Our recent employment policy has included a major theater war in Southwest Asia and a long list of SSCs around the world.⁴⁴

Southwest Asia Major Theater War. The Gulf War is still in recent memory, and the possibility of a return to hostility surfaces occasionally. There are several reasonable estimates of the force required to respond to another high intensity crisis in the region. The Bottom-Up Review (BUR)⁴⁵ provides one such estimate. Reviewing that force structure is beyond the scope of this paper. However, this potential major regional contingency will remain a requirement generator for forces in the foreseeable future. Its demands for strategic lift, pre-positioned equipment, and deployable command and control information systems will remain high.

Northeast Asia Major Theater War. Current plans call for a huge strategic lift effort to move ground forces to Korea in the event that hostilities commence between North and South Korea. As most studies conducted outside the Pentagon have concluded, the North Koreans would likely make a desperate lunge toward the South's capital city, Seoul, only a short distance from the border. Such a drive, if successful, would culminate long before any US forces not already in theater could arrive. Only a

⁴³ The National Security Strategy only recently became a legally required document, the first being published under the Bush Administration. Regardless, the US has always had a declaratory policy. In recent history it has emphasized a "two and a half war strategy," a "two wars and lesser included case," and "two nearly simultaneous wars."

⁴⁴ For an excellent survey of JTF operations between the years of 1983 and 1994, see *JTF Operations Since 1983*, by George Stewart, Scott M. Fabbri, and Adam B. Siegel, Center for Naval Analyses, CRM 94-42, Alexandria, Virginia, July 1994.

⁴⁵ The Bottom-Up Review: Forces for a New Era, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, September 1, 1993.

single US division is present currently.⁴⁶ The South Koreans have approximately 20 infantry divisions on active duty with another 20 in reserve available on short notice. Many studies conclude that the US can make its strongest contribution, not with heavy ground forces, but with land- and sea-based air power.⁴⁷ This sort of conclusion does not justify heavy Army force structure, yet the CINC of US Forces Korea has always been an Army general. Current war plans rely heavily on deploying large ground forces.

Small Scale Contingencies. Current military activities include a plethora of operations short of major theater war, what the Marine Corps formerly called small wars.⁴⁸ These operations are often referred to as military operations other than war (MOOTW), and include humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, evacuation of non-combatants during times of civil unrest abroad, peacemaking, and peacekeeping; small shooting wars are also included. The Navy/Marine Corps team and special operations forces consider these to be mainstream missions. Those organizations oriented on big wars find themselves to be ill equipped and trained for such operations. One can expect these types of operations to continue to be frequent, demanding, and on short notice as long as the national security strategy is oriented on strong engagement abroad.

5.2. Dimensions of the Solution Space

Before proposing a set of JTFs, it is worth considering some of the variable characteristics of a JTF: the dimensions of the solution space.

Standing or Sitting Headquarters? The Department currently relies on the ad hoc formation of JTFs around a joint force commander and staff pre-designated from a Service component of the respective unified command. That, clearly, remains an option. A second option is to create standing JTF headquarters. Such headquarters would have a commander and principal staff, a suite of information systems necessary for command and control of joint forces, and access to training resources.

To Assign, Apportion, or Allocate Forces? Another option is to form standing JTFs from head to toe. This option is clearly the most expensive, but it might be expected to provide the most effective joint fighting force on short notice. It is also hard to imagine how to guess at the right assigned force mix to include absent a specific mission against a specific threat. Given the specificity of mission and the availability of forces, the decision must be made to assign forces (standing JTF head to toe) or to apportion forces to a JTF for planning purposes (likely including some units being apportioned to more than one JTF). As a crisis emerges, forces must be allocated, and the forces allocated may or may not be the forces apportioned. It is possible, and perhaps even desirable, that some standing JTF headquarters have neither assigned nor apportioned forces.

⁴⁶ The 2nd Infantry Division is an atypical Army division. It is composed of two tank, two mechanized, and two infantry battalions. A standard heavy division has a mix of 10 tank and mechanized battalions.

⁴⁷ For a recent example of such a study, see "Stopping a North Korean Invasion: Why Defending South Korea is Easier than the Pentagon Thinks," Michael O'Hanlon, *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 135-170.

⁴⁸ *Small Wars Manual, United States Marine Corps, 1940*, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1940.

It has been the habit to assign forces where they live. During the Cold War, significant forces were forward deployed, specifically in Europe. The post Cold War period finds most forces living in the continental United States. Thus, they are assigned to the US Atlantic Command. There is, however, no law or regulation that requires forces to be assigned where they live. The CINC is responsible for the readiness of assigned forces.

It is possible, then, to assign CONUS-based forces to the commands responsible for prosecuting the two major theater wars. Specifically, the political climate prevents us from stationing forces in Southwest Asia, but our principal threat is ostensibly there. The preponderance of forces that would participate in a Southwest Asian contingency resides in the continental United States. So does the unified command headquarters responsible for operations in Southwest Asia, USCINCENT.⁴⁹ Nothing would preclude assigning CONUS-based forces to CENTCOM. A similar argument can be made for CONUS-based forces apportioned to US Forces Korea.

What Range of Motion? At one extreme, a JTF or JTF headquarters could be organized, trained, and equipped for a single mission in a single theater. For example, a JTF could be formed for high intensity air-land combat in Southwest Asia. At the other extreme, a JTF could be formed to prosecute operations across the entire warfighting spectrum. A third alternative might focus a JTF on a tractable range of military operations, e.g., low-intensity conflict (peacemaking and peacekeeping), humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. A JTF could focus tightly on mission or on geography, or it could have a very diffuse focus.

Regional or National Asset? Whatever option is selected from the above set of three, the question remains as to whether a JTF (or JTF headquarters) is a regional or a national asset. In other words, is it an organization *assigned* to the unified command that might employ it, or is it a CONUS-based organization that could be *apportioned* for planning purposes and *allocated* to a unified command when needed? Another way of asking this question is to ask whether to leave JTF issues to the individual CINCs or to treat the issue as one of national importance. Given the preponderance of forces residing in CONUS and the increased competition for those shrinking forces, the issue appears to be a national issue.

Functional or Geographic JTFs? Should JTFs be functionally or geographically oriented? Geographically oriented JTFs have the advantage of being able to familiarize themselves with the languages, cultures, infrastructure, and allied militaries in a specific region.⁵⁰ Geographic JTFs might well preserve Service prerogatives if geographic boundaries are drawn in their favor.⁵¹ However, depending on the functions chosen, a functional JTF might equally preserve Service interests as well. For example, the preponderance of spaced-based assets is in the Air Force's area of interest. In any case,

⁴⁹ The US Central Command is headquartered in Tampa, Florida, at MacDill Air Force Base, along with the US Special Operations Command.

⁵⁰ The Special Operations Command is a functional command with worldwide responsibilities. However, it subdivides the world into regions and develops regional expertise as one would expect of a geographic command.

⁵¹ When congressional district boundaries are so defined, it is called gerrymandering.

the argument over geographic versus functional JTFs should be expected to mirror the 1947 arguments at Key West.⁵²

5.3. Recommended Process

To best meet national security needs, the first recommendation is to determine an appropriate mix of JTF structures as part of the annual and biennial processes that produce the *Unified Command Plan*, *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*, and *Forces For Unified Commands* memorandum. This process is already in place and is derived directly from the *National Security Strategy* of the President of the United States.

5.4. Recommended Joint Structures.

We propose a strawman mix of standing organizations. Clearly, this analysis cannot hope to produce the same results as a thorough Joint Staff review. Specifically, the list is believed to be too long (expensive) and too deep (in strategic reserve). Regardless of those flaws, the entire list is given to show the breadth of options available. A summary is presented in Table 2, and details are provided below.

Table 2. Recommended Mix of JTF Structures

Readiness Category	Forces	Mission Range ⁵³
Standing JTF, Head to Toe	assigned commander and staff, assigned and apportioned forces	(1) Southwest Asia MTW
		(1) Northeast Asia MTW
Standing JTF HQs	assigned commander and staff, apportioned forces	(1) HIC–MIC range
		(3) LIC, HA/DR range
		(1) Strategic Lift
		(1) Coalition Support
		(1) Joint combat development and experimentation
Strategic Reserve JTF HQs	designated commander and staff, no assigned or apportioned forces	(1) HIC–MIC range

⁵² United States Department of Defense, "Secretary Forrestal Announces Results of Key West Conference," March 26, 1948.

⁵³ High intensity conflict (HIC), mid intensity conflict (MIC), and low intensity conflict (LIC) are designations no longer in common usage. They are used here, however, because they best express an intuitive partitioning of the conflict spectrum. The Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) designation is also used.

Two standing JTFs, from head to toe, are proposed. These JTFs would have a permanent commander and staff assigned. Primary forces, too, would be assigned. Other forces may be apportioned that consider a range of responses to the eventual threat.

One JTF is proposed for a Southwest Asia scenario. The JTF would have assigned CONUS-based air and ground forces and rotating naval forces. The CINC that would employ the JTF, CINCCENT, would thus have training responsibility rather than CINCACOM.

A second JTF is proposed for a Northeast Asian scenario, specifically Korea. It would be largely an air and maritime JTF recognizing the considerable South Korean ground capability, long-term defensive preparations, and long deployment delays for heavy forces from CONUS.

Several standing JTF headquarters are proposed. Headquarters would have no assigned forces, only apportioned forces. Forces would be allocated if and when needed. Headquarters could regularly participate in command post exercises without forces and the expenses entailed.

One JTF headquarters would orient on high to mid-intensity air-land combat. The current geo-political environment might not justify such an expense. The JTF might be assigned to EUCOM, or it might be held in strategic reserve by assigning it to ACOM. Should force levels in Europe remain at the present level, it might be prudent to maintain the JTF in Europe from where it might deploy. Should forward deployed troop levels continue to drop, it might make more sense to maintain the JTF in CONUS. Maintaining an additional high to mid-intensity JTF headquarters has the added advantage of providing positions that develop future generations of joint force commanders.

The European, Pacific, Central, and Southern Commands all have continuing requirements to provide assistance at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Three standing JTF headquarters are proposed that focus on this mission area. The Marines and Special Operations Forces have shown capability in this area. The geographic commands have shown less resistance to having ACOM provide these JTFs.

Our allies are increasingly relying on the US to provide coalition support in the way of strategic lift and communications and intelligence resources. It is conceivable that the US contribution to some contingencies might be dominated by these resources and the coalition might provide troops on the ground. This JTF might focus on just the strategic lift role or also include the C4ISR role.

One standing JTF headquarters is proposed for joint experimentation and combat development, traditionally a Service function. Some have proposed a standing JTF, from head to toe for this purpose. Given current force levels and operations tempo, this seems impractical. Much of the joint experimentation with C4ISR can occur in a command post exercise environment, although eventually, experimentation will have to be moved to the field. Forces can be allocated for that purpose when necessary and available.

Finally, we propose some JTF headquarters to be held in strategic reserve. Commander and staff would be assigned, but perhaps as a secondary duty. No forces would be assigned or apportioned. This recommendation is similar to the way JTF

headquarters are currently formed from Service component headquarters. Such JTF headquarters would not participate in training unless, in the Chairman's judgement, the reserve of ready JTF headquarters was nearing depletion. The strategic reserve JTF headquarters might then have their readiness levels elevated through training and staffing.

CHAPTER 6. SUMMARY

The ad hoc nature of JTF creation causes some operational problems and prevents resolution of others. Ad hoc JTF creation causes readiness problems because the combined arms team and headquarters are formed at the last minute. Scarce training resources are squandered on JTFs and JTF headquarters that are not employed. The Joint Force Commander must form a command team at the same time he is forming a response to a crisis and is absorbing forces. The JTF headquarters must effect command and control of disparate forces, yet does not have the command and control tools (C4ISR) to do so, and must use the tools of one of the Services requiring the other Services to solve interoperability problems on the fly. And lastly, new concepts and operational capabilities must be experimented with prior to employment in a real conflict, yet there is no JTF to conduct such experimentation. By creating the right mix of standing joint organizations, several benefits accrue to the nation's readiness.

A standing JTF headquarters with assigned forces for the US Central Command allows for the highest level of operational readiness for a dangerous and relatively likely contingency in Southwest Asia. Similarly, a standing JTF headquarters for Northeast Asia with assigned and apportioned forces, predominately land-based and carrier-based air forces, provides a more tractable contribution to South Korean security. By building the organizations and *focusing training resources* there, joint commanders and staffs are less likely to suffer the fate of their predecessors in America's first battles.

Standing JTF headquarters specializing on a portion of the conflict spectrum and without assigned forces will also improve the nation's ability to respond promptly and appropriately. For example, small-scale contingencies at the lower end of the conflict spectrum are increasingly common and require specialized training. Standing JTF headquarters could be formed to conduct SSCs with combat, combat support, and combat service support forces, or they could be formed solely to provide some combination of deployable C4ISR, strategic and theater mobility, and logistics support. Again, these JTF headquarters must have access to training resources tailored for their portion of the mission space.

Standing JTFs and standing JTF headquarters would provide a focal point for acquisition of command and control information systems. They would also enable experimentation with new methods of warfare as portended by advocates of a revolution in military affairs and the rise of information age over industrial age methods. Expectations are high for increased warfighting effectiveness enabled by information technology and precision weapons. Realistic experimentation with these systems and new methods can both expedite and hone emerging capabilities as well as protect us from an over reliance on unproven concepts.

It is unlikely that the Services and the CINCs will come to an agreement on this reform or its implementation. It is unlikely, absent a crisis, that a secretary of defense or president will expend the political capital necessary to accomplish this reform. Congress will likely need to legislate action.

Appendix A.

THE UNIFIED COMMANDS AND THEIR COMPONENTS

The European, Atlantic, Pacific, Central, and Southern Commands have combatant responsibilities within a specific geographic region. The remaining combatant commands have functional, not regional, responsibilities. CINCs with functional responsibilities frequently enter into supporting relationships with a geographic CINC.

A.1. US European Command (EUCOM)

The geographic area of responsibility of the European Command stretches from the northern tip of Norway to the southern tip of Africa, encompassing 76 countries. It includes the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas and extends into Asia including Turkey, a long-term NATO ally. EUCOM was established on August 1, 1952 to satisfy US treaty obligations to NATO. EUCOM established unified command over the two WW II Service commands, US Army Europe (USAREUR), and US Air Forces Europe (USAFE). Three other components were added later. First the Navy's Mediterranean interests were incorporated under NAVEUR. Currently, Marine Corps (MAREUR) and Special Operations (SOCEUR) components are also in place.

While historically consumed by planning and preparation for high-intensity warfare against Warsaw Pact forces, EUCOM today is responsible for a wide range of activities. The command's Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group conducted a Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation of 2,400 civilians from Zaire and Sierra Leone. It conducted a significant relief action in support of Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq after the Gulf War and flew relief missions in states of the former Soviet Union stricken by the particularly harsh winter of 1991-92. EUCOM forces have represented the United States since July 1990 in the former Yugoslavia. Support missions in the Balkans promise to be a focus of interest to EUCOM for the foreseeable future.

A.2. US Atlantic Command (ACOM)

The Atlantic Command has both geographic and functional responsibilities. Historically a naval command, ACOM has been responsible for maritime operations throughout the Atlantic Ocean. During World War II the military mission included assuring safe passage of allied cargo and troop ships against enemy surface ship and submarine attack. In contrast to the great naval battles in the Pacific, "escort duty" was far less glamorous yet equally vital.

The command kept its formal name—U.S Atlantic Command—but changed its acronymic designation from LANTCOM to ACOM on October 1, 1993. In a dramatic shift, the command retained its Atlantic responsibilities and was given the responsibility for training and readiness of joint units for warfighting CINCs worldwide. This shift is in response to three related forces. The first is the changing security environment that formerly required dedicated, forward-deployed forces in Europe. The second force is the long-term shift toward joint commands at the expense of single-Service commands. And

the third force is the reality of a smaller pool of forces concentrated in the continental United States that must be shared by CINCs worldwide. The 1998 UCP reassigned the Caribbean and the water around South American from ACOM to SOUTHCOM

ACOM's components are the US Navy's Atlantic Fleet (LANTFLT), the Army's Forces Command (FORSCOM), the Air Forces Air Combat Command (ACC), and the Marine Corps' Marine Forces Atlantic (MARFORLANT).

A.3. US Pacific Command (PACOM)

The area of responsibility of the Pacific Command is the most extensive of the geographic commands encompassing about 50% of the earth's surface. The command spans the Pacific Ocean, from the Arctic Ocean in the north to Antarctica in the south, from the US Pacific coast in the west eastward to the coast of Africa including the Indian Ocean, Alaska, and Hawaii.

Three component commands report to PACOM, US Army Pacific, US Navy Pacific, and Pacific Air Forces. US Army Pacific commands forces in Hawaii, Japan, Korea, and Alaska. The 3rd and 7th Fleets report to US Navy Pacific as does Fleet Marine Forces Pacific. Four numbered air forces comprise the Pacific Air Forces, 5th Air Force in Japan, 7th Air Force in Korea, 11th Air Force in Alaska, and 17th Air Force in Guam. In addition to the Service component commands, three major subordinate unified commands report to PACOM, US Forces Japan, US Forces Korea, and the Alaskan Command.

A.4. US Central Command (CENTCOM)

The Central Command is headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. Its combatant responsibilities are centered in Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf region. Command typically alternates between an Army and a Marine general. Established January 1, 1983, CENTCOM's lineage includes the US Strike Command and the US Readiness Command. The Strike Command was established in 1961 and brought together the CONUS-based combat-ready forces of the Strategic Army Corps and the Air Force's Tactical Air Command. It gained geographic responsibilities in 1963 to include the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia (MEAFSA). It was disestablished late in 1971 and its geographic responsibilities assigned to other combatant CINCs. The US Readiness Command was constituted with the responsibility for providing the general reserve of combat-ready forces to reinforce other CINCs. Today, geographic responsibility for Southwest Asia belongs to CENTCOM, while responsibility for readiness of CONUS forces has shifted to ACOM.

CENTCOM's components are US Army Forces, Central Command (USARCENT) headquartered at Fort McPherson, Georgia; US Central Air Forces (USCENTAF) headquartered at Shaw AFB, South Carolina; US Marine Forces, Central Command (USMARCENT) headquartered at Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii; US Naval Forces, Central Command (USNAVCENT) located in Bahrain; and the US Special Operations Central Command (SOCCENT) located at MacDill AFB, Florida.

A.5. US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)

The Southern Command's area of responsibility includes 19 countries of Central and South America, excluding Mexico, encompassing about one-sixth of the world's

landmass. Its history is driven by the security politics of the region dating back to the end of World War II. During the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, the Joint Chiefs of Staff has considered either turning SOUTHCOM into a sub-unified command subordinate to the US Atlantic Command or disestablishing it all together. Instead, in 1998 the US Southern Command added the Caribbean area and the water surrounding South America to its area of responsibility as ACOM, the losing command, increasingly began to look more like a functional command than a geographic command. SOUTHCOM remains heavily involved in counterdrug operations on an interagency basis. SOUTHCOM's components are the 12th Air Force, US Army South, Marine Forces Atlantic (MARFORLANT), and the US Atlantic Fleet (LANTFLT).

A.6. US Special Operations Command (SOCOM)

The Special Operations Command is collocated with CENTCOM at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida, and was established April 16, 1987. It is typically commanded by an Army general, but contains forces from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. SOCOM is responsible for training and for command and control of all special operations forces in the US, approximately 47,000 active and reserve forces. SOCOM has Service-like responsibilities for training, doctrine, and weapon system acquisition for special operations forces and CINC-like responsibilities for planning and conducting special operations if directed by the president or secretary of defense.

A.7. US Strategic Command (STRATCOM)

The Strategic Air Command, SAC, was redesignated as the Strategic Command on June 1, 1992. It is headquartered at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska and is responsible for strategic bomber, land-based intercontinental missile, and ballistic missile submarine forces. The command rotates between the Air Force and the Navy.

A.8. US Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)

The Transportation Command, established July 1, 1987, consolidates strategic lift assets under one commander. TRANSCOM is headquartered at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. The warfighting CINCs rely on TRANSCOM for management of air, sea, rail, and truck assets from bases in the US to delivery to the warfighting CINC's theater of operations. Three component commands are consolidated under TRANSCOM: the Air Force's Air Mobility Command (AMC), the Navy's Military Sealift Command (MSC), and the Army's Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC).

A.9. US Space Command (SPACECOM)

All military space-based assets—e.g., communications, navigation, weather, warning, or intelligence gathering assets—are under a single command, SPACECOM, headquartered at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. The command was established September 23, 1985 to consolidate the Services' military space efforts. The Army, Navy, and Air Force Space Commands comprise SPACECOM's components. SPACECOM is typically commanded by an Air Force general.

A C R O N Y M S

ACC	Air Combat Command
ACOM	US Atlantic Command
AFB	Air Force Base
AFFOR	Air Force Forces
ARFOR	Army Forces
AMC	Air Mobility Command
AOR	Area of Operations
ARG	Amphibious Ready Group
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
BUR	Bottom Up Review
C4I	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence
C4ISR	C4I, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
CENTCOM	US Central Command
CINC	Commander in Chief
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CONUS	Continental United States
DJTFAC	Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell
DoD	Department of Defense
EUCOM	US European Command
FORSCOM	US Army Forces Command
HA/DR	Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
HIC	High Intensity Conflict
ID	Infantry Division
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFC	Joint Forces Commander
JOA	Joint Operations Area
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSOC	Joint Special Operations Center
JTF	Joint Task Force
LANTCOM	US Atlantic Command
LANTFLT	US Atlantic Fleet
LIC	Low Intensity Conflict
LRC	Lesser Regional Contingency
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MAGTF	Marine Air-Ground Task Force
MARFOR	Marine Corps Forces
MARFORLANT	Marine Forces Atlantic
MEAFSA	Middle East, Africa, South Asia
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MEU	Marine Expeditionary Unit
MIC	Mid Intensity Conflict
MOP	Memorandum of Policy

MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MRC	Major Regional Contingency
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MSE	Mobile Subscriber Equipment
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
MTW	Major Theater War
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVFOR	Navy Forces
NCA	National Command Authorities
NSDD	National Security Decision Directive
PACOM	US Pacific Command
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
REDCOM	US Readiness Command
RDJTF	Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SJTF	Standing Joint Task Force
SOC	Special Operations Capable
SOCEUR	Special Operations Command Europe
SOCOM	US Special Operations Command
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOUTHCOM	US Southern Command
SPACECOM	US Space Command
SSC	Small Scale Contingencies
STRATCOM	US Strategic Command
STRICOM	US Strike Command
TRANSCOM	US Transportation Command
UCP	Unified Command Plan
UNAAF	Unified Action Armed Forces
USAFE	US Air Forces Europe
USAREUR	US Army Europe
USARCENT	US Army Central
USCENTAF	US Central Air Force
USCINACOM	US Commander in Chief Atlantic
USCINCEUR	US Commander in Chief Europe
USCINCPAC	US Commander in Chief Pacific
USFK	US Forces Korea
USNAVCENT	US Navy Central
USSOCCENT	US Special Operations Command Central
USSOCOM	US Special Operations Command
USTRANSCOM	US Transportation Command

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE September 1998		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Final	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Challenges to Train, Organize, and Equip the Complete Combined Arms Team: The Joint Task Force				5. FUNDING NUMBERS IDA Central Research Program (CRP) C1057	
6. AUTHOR(S) D. Robert Worley					
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) 1801 N. Beauregard St. Alexandria, VA 22311-1772				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER IDA Paper P-3431	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) 1801 N. Beauregard St. Alexandria, VA 22311-1772				10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; unlimited distribution: 02 December 1999.				12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 2A	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) With the end of the Cold War, military operations planning has shifted in emphasis away from a permanent organization implementing a detailed plan against a known and powerful threat and toward creating a temporary organization and creating a plan in response to a rapidly emerging crisis. That temporary organization is the Joint Task Force (JTF). Thus, readiness to respond to a crisis is dependent on the readiness of Service forces and of an organization that does not exist. The newly appointed Joint Force Commander must overcome organizational and operational problems simultaneously. When faced with a similar situation, each of the Services has opted for an organized, trained, and equipped combined arms headquarters. Not so for the Joint combined arms headquarters. This report covers the history and challenges of forming ad hoc combined headquarters and makes recommendations for a set of standing JTF headquarters and standing JTFs.					
14. SUBJECT TERMS Joint Task Force; Combined Arms; Military Training; Military Organization.				15. NUMBER OF PAGES 54	
				16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL		