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CONTENTS

21 September 1992

POLITICAL

International Affairs

- Trade Relations With China Analyzed [HA'ARETZ 20 Aug] 1

Internal Affairs

- Sharon Proposes Alternative to Autonomy Plan [YEDI'OT AHARONOT 7 Aug] 1
Previous, Current Autonomy Talks Compared [HA'ARETZ 16 Jul] 4
Questions on Nature of Autonomous Region [YEDI'OT AHARONOT 24 Jul] 6
Ron Nahman on YESHA Council, Autonomy Plan [HAYARDEN 21 Jul] 9
Analysis of Autonomy, Transfer of Jews [YEDI'OT AHARONOT 26 Jul] 11
Rabbi Schach's Influence Reportedly Waning [YEDI'OT AHARONOT 31 Jul] 12
Analysis of Likud's Opposition Tactics [HA'ARETZ 16 Jul] 15
Mota Gur on PLO Law, Golan Compromise, Gaza [HA'ARETZ 16 Jul] 16
Call For Public Ownership of State Land [HA'ARETZ 15 Jul] 18
Transfer of Jews From Territories Analyzed [YEDI'OT AHARONOT 3 Aug] 19
Institutionalization of Settlement Movement [HADOSHOT 13 Jul] 20
Analysis of Nuclear First-Strike Doctrine [YEDI'OT AHARONOT 12 Jul] 24

MILITARY

- Chilean-Israeli Aircraft Ventures Described [Santiago QUE PASA 13 Jul] 24
IDF Said To Be Losing Qualitative Edge [HA'ARETZ 13 Jul] 26
Weapons Procurement Program in Eastern Europe [HA'ARETZ 14 Jul] 27
Head of Homefront Command on Citizens, Defense [BAMAHANE 5 Aug] 28

SOCIAL ISSUES

- Danger of Ideology-Based Streams of Education [HA'ARETZ 24 Jun] 30

International Affairs

Trade Relations With China Analyzed

TA200815292 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
20 Aug 92 p 3

[Article by correspondent Judy Meltz]

[Text] Despite the trade agreement between Israel and China that was initiated yesterday, Israeli economic circles have no expectations for a breakthrough in the scope of Israeli exports to this giant country. True, there are more than 1.1 billion residents in China, but its import totals from around the world only reach \$60 billion per annum—half of what Israel imports, with less than 5 million residents.

The main thrust of Israeli exports to China is comprised of applications and agricultural technologies, and medical equipment. In the last two years, the scope of this export has increased from a few million dollars to about \$30 million. The scope of Israeli imports from China is almost zero. The reason for this is that, until now, China appeared on the Israeli "black list" of countries whose exports are subjected to severe restrictions. Some of the countries on this list are hostile states, and the rest are countries that limit imports from Israel. Within the framework of the agreement, China will be removed from this list. Over the past two years, Israel has concluded similar agreements with most Eastern European countries.

One of the reasons that China was interested in opening negotiations on a trade agreement with Israel was the Israeli free trade agreements with the United States, the European Community, and the States of EFTA [European Free Trade Association]. The United States, for example, posts many restrictions on imports from China—and therefore, the Chinese are searching for alternative ways to enter the American market. Just as Israel can serve China as a bridge to the United States and Europe, the hope in Israel is that China can bridge between Israel and the states of Southeast Asia such as Korea [as published] and Vietnam.

Thus far, the majority of Israeli exports to China have been carried out via Hong Kong. Because of the difficulties inherent in obtaining entry visas to China, language problems, and other reasons, Israeli firms have preferred to work with local agents in Hong Kong, or via Israeli trade companies such as Koor-Trade.

In China today, Koor-Trade represents Scitex, Netafim, ICA Telecom, Orbot Laser Industries, Makhteshim, the Kibbutz Industries, and the Organization of Poultry Breeders. Another factor working for many years toward the advancement of Israeli exports to China is the Eisenberg Group. Today, it represents—among others—the Dead Sea Works, which is the largest exporter to China.

Internal Affairs

Sharon Proposes Alternative to Autonomy Plan

92AE0575A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 7 Aug 92 pp 8-9, 20

[Article by Ari'el Sharon: "Instead of Autonomy"]

[Text] Toward the end of 1977, Prime Minister Menahem Begin ZAL [may he rest in peace] convened the ministerial commission for defense, which at the time was a small, secretive body, and raised the matter of autonomy for the Arab population of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza Strip.

At that meeting I said: This plan is a "Balfour Declaration" for the Palestinians, and if we do not take preemptive measures, this autonomy plan will lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state in addition to the one already existing in Jordan. By "preemptive measures" I meant massive settlement in those areas according to the plan I had submitted to the ministerial commission on settlement which I chaired, on 2 October 1977, and which had been approved by the government. I submitted the settlement plan even before President Sadat's visit, and it was compatible with any possible future political solution.

As we recall, after difficult and exhausting negotiations the Camp David Accords were signed; the accords dealt in great detail with peace with Egypt and very generally touched on the autonomy plan for the Arab population of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, without entering into details. Even then it was clear that that skeleton agreement was subject to an Israeli interpretation on the one hand and a basically contrary Arab interpretation on the other.

All the efforts I made at the time to discuss the "autonomy in all its aspects," a phrase that became a concept, failed. The prime minister, Mr. Begin, categorically refused to do so. I tried to persuade him that he should not sign an agreement that was not clear, that was known from the start to present deep-seated differences between the Israeli interpretation and the Arab-American interpretation. Because of Mr. Begin's refusal then to clarify, at least among ourselves, the various aspects of the autonomy, I refused to join the delegation of ministers which went to the festivities. I expected the worst of the autonomy idea.

Looking back today, after having pored over and thoroughly studied the subject, I understand why Mr. Begin refused to discuss my request. The autonomy portion was nothing but the "fig leaf" that allowed the Egyptians and us to sign a peace treaty. The Egyptians needed that document badly in order to exhibit their "concern" for the Palestinian issue. We were very interested in signing the peace treaty with Egypt and very little interested in changing the status quo in the territories.

Interestingly enough, Mr. Shamir as prime minister never wanted to have a discussion on "Autonomy in all its aspects" as I repeatedly requested. To this day no such debate was ever held.

Over the years autonomy became a magic word, a medicine for every pain and a cure for every affliction. We used the word tirelessly. It appeared in our party platforms for the various elections. It stood there as "the ultimate answer" to all political problems involved in the basic policies of our governments since 1981.

This term has been hammered into our heads for 15 years. "Autonomy," recited our ministers as if nothing else existed, thus exempting themselves from seeking real solutions. And the people began to believe that it was indeed a solution. Opinion polls showed that this creation had a majority. So far so good, or so it seemed. Only one thing was missing—everyone forgot to ask what this autonomy meant. How were we going to live with it? What were its implications?

At this point it may be worth mentioning that the autonomy of Rabin's Alignment and left-wing government bears no resemblance to Mr. Begin's autonomy. Mr. Begin clearly stated that at the end of the interim period we will conduct negotiations on the basis of our positions, beginning with the demand for sovereignty over all of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza. But even so, it was a very dangerous plan from the beginning. The present government, whose demands for a permanent agreement are built on the principle of territorial compromise, is making the autonomy idea assume a different and much more dangerous form. And that is only one of the differences.

In June 1988, when we had a national unity government, I once again brought up the danger of the autonomy plan in the ministerial defense committee. Once again, I stressed the only real solution to the problem, which was the fact that Jordan was the Palestinian state. At the same time, I suggested to the prime minister, Mr. Shamir, to appoint two ministers and perhaps the entire cabinet to discuss my proposal to annex the areas inhabited by Jews to Israel if the government still wanted to pursue the autonomy plan. My proposal was turned down. No discussion was held.

How will the autonomy become a Palestinian state? Granting autonomy (even according to our interpretation) will necessarily weaken our standing in the field. The autonomy will gain international recognition and arouse much interest (something new working against the Jews and Israel). Every self-respecting state will open a representation to the self-government (the new name of the autonomy). In the beginning, it will not be an embassy, of course, nor a consulate. That will come later. Even now foreign consulates in East Jerusalem, including the U.S. Consulate, are working independently in Judaea and Samaria. And we remember the attempt of a foreign consulate to interfere on the side of the Arabs during the "tax revolt" in Bayt Sahur.

Journalists will cuddle up to PLO murderers wrapped in kafiyahs and romantic auras, while the smell of barbecued lamb will waft among the olive trees. Media people from the entire world will be everywhere.

The chairman of the self-government will sit in his office and taking up the entire wall behind him will be the portrait of another chairman, chief assassin 'Arafat. The PLO flag will fly on the front of the building. Representations of the self-government will be opened in the neighboring and Mediterranean countries under PLO flags. And if the self-government will decide to declare itself a state, most of the countries of the world will immediately recognize it.

What will we do in such a case, I asked the late prime minister Mr. Begin more than once, and he answered categorically: "In such a case, we will stop them and put them in jail." At that time it still sounded convincing. Israel was still standing tall. Today, however, when we do not even stop 'Arafat's right hand, Faysal al-Husayni, the head of the military and political arm of the PLO in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza; when we do not deport terrorist leaders; when we do not prevent PLO leaders from operating undisturbed in East Jerusalem; when people responsible for the murder of Arabs and Jews appear as favorite sons in the Israeli media, how will we stop them under the autonomy?

Israel under an Alignment and left-wing government will not do it.

We must stop for a moment to think, to assess the dangers, and to plan the next stage. Otherwise we will lose our direction and control.

What will happen if after the autonomy UN observers, UN forces, or an international force will come as "peace-keeping forces?" We can see such forces in various places in the world. Who can prevent any western leaders, President Mitterrand, for example, from landing in Gaza or in Nabulus and standing bare-chested between terrorist forces and the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] in Khan Yunus? He has already done so in Sarajevo.

We must also remember that both 'Arafat and others, like Ilyas Frayj, have already requested UN forces, in the guise of an Arab "gesture." A "gesture" that will allow the terrorist organizations to continue their actions while taking shelter behind the various UN forces.

Some Israelis claim that if, after our withdrawal, the PLO will continue its terrorist activities, we will go back into the area. Then, add the same "experts," we will have broad international support.

We all know how difficult the decision is to go to war. We have had our experiences with it. There will always be those who will say that we can live with terrorism. They will compare the number of terrorism victims to the possible number of war victims.

But suppose it will be like that—will we open fire on UN forces or multinational forces? Will we blow up Gaza

and Nabulus and shoot at American, French, British, Italian, and Canadian troops while the terrorists are hiding behind them? We will never want to do that, and rightly so. That is why we must preclude such a situation from the start.

Has anyone asked themselves what will happen to Israel from an economic viewpoint if the self-government will one bright day decide to declare itself a "free trade" area? But why go as far as that. Suffice it for them to lower the income tax and VAT [value added tax] while the borders with Israel are open (which is in the interpretation of autonomy). I am not talking about long-term processes. Right now Gaza, Judaea, and Samaria businessmen are in direct contact with the world, and our involvement regarding customs and security controls is being reduced.

If that should happen, our economy will be destroyed. And what if they do not vaccinate their cattle and sheep against hoof and mouth disease and the Israeli milk industry, which is currently first in the world, is affected? Not to mention that if one type of that disease were to spread here, we will be banned, according to existing agreements, from exporting agricultural produce to Europe, including fruits and vegetables.

The ones in a hurry say: "Gaza first" (and we have such people among us, too). "Get out of Gaza." "Who needs Gaza?" Not even talking of the perversity of the idea of "volunteering" to give up parts of the country, something that no sane nation will do, they may perhaps explain how we can live without an area dividing Jewish and the Gaza Strip, populated by some 700,000 hostile Arabs, and Sinai, a plentiful source of terrorism and weapons? Without a bloc of Jewish settlement (Hevel Qatif), who will stop them?

Some say, let us fence the Strip, lay mines, dig a canal, erect obstacles. The main thing is to get out. First of all, no area can be hermetically sealed off. In the past, terrorist squads made it from Gaza to the outskirts of Tel Aviv. But in order to hurt cities in the Negev they do not even need to come out. A Katyusha placed in the Palestine Square in Gaza can easily cause damage in the Muhammad Vth Square in Ashqelon (remember that pathetic national joke?), in Qiryat Gat, Shderot, Netivot, and the fields of kibbutzim and moshavs. What will we do then, how will we act?

And what about the Jewish driver stopped by an Arab policeman in Nabulus or Tulkarm? In the meantime we calmed down somewhat, once Faysal al-Husayni, after his meeting with Jordanian authorities, reported that most of the 20,000 policemen (!) will be PLO men. This police force is in fact an army for all intents and purposes, much larger than all the IDF forces in Judaea and Samaria. And where will he stand trial? Will he be sent to jail in Nabulus? We can imagine what would become of him. Or will we immediately send our elite troops to release him? This kind of thing will cause ceaseless friction.

Anyone who wanted to try to reach a political solution, who had a brain in his head, and was not utterly ignorant, should have hastened to pave detour roads in Judaea and Samaria, rather than stop the construction. Such roads allow Jews not to have to pass through Arab localities.

And what about the return of hundreds of thousands of 1948 refugees, of Palestinians to Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, from where they will flood the places where they used to live until they picked up arms against Israel in 1947-48 and fled or were deported from the country? Even if they only come for a summer holiday and stay. What is happening now, you will ask? Now, when the summer vacations are over, those who did not leave of their own free will are rounded up by the Israeli Civil Administration in cabs, taken to the Jordan bridges, and sent over. What will happen when they are in charge of Nabulus and Gaza, who will send them out then?

And what about the water. We share the management of the aquifers with Judaea and Samaria. Who will stop them from pumping the water and drying out the coastal strip where most of Israel's Jewish inhabitants live?

And how will the defense forces take actions to preempt terrorist actions in the autonomous areas or to catch terrorists after the fact?

And what if they elect a legislative committee for themselves and the committee passes decisions on water, land, or defense? What will we do, go to war?

And who will they elect? Some time ago a student from B'ir Zayt University was asked what in his view will be the Palestinian autonomy leadership like and who will be the main personality who will rule the autonomy.

"The present top leadership is the threshold on the way to independence," he replied. The leadership that will be elected will be made up of the heads of the terrorist organizations in the field according to their various levels," he added. And what will we be able to do about that? We will have to negotiate with those people.

There will be no end to the friction, problems, and dangers. This is simply a bad plan. We must quickly lay it aside. The Arabs do not want it; OK, we will not support it anymore either. We are in a trap from which we must escape.

So what can we do?

Of course, the real and correct solution is that a Palestinian state already exists, and that is Jordan. We should talk with Jordan and only with Jordan about the future of the Arab inhabitants of Judaea and Samaria, who are all of them Jordanian citizens, and about giving Jordanian citizenship to the Arab inhabitants of Gaza Strip. About how they will vote for and be elected to the Palestinian Parliament and Amman, how they will pay taxes, and how they will have access to the ports of Haifa and Ashdod and we to Aqaba on a reciprocal basis.

We will deal with the Palestinian state of Jordan which, as far as we are concerned, can be ruled by King Husayn or anyone else, if that is what they should decide, which is their right and their problem, about the establishment of a common market in the Middle East. We will discuss joint water supply projects (which both countries lack), possible joint development of Dead Sea resources, and about jointly confronting Arab terrorism.

That is the right solution. A pity that since 1922, when the British tore away more than 75 percent of the area of the Jewish National Home and gave it to the Hashemite Dynasty, both major currents of the Zionist Movement—the practical Zionist wing of the left and the political Zionist wing of the right—did not insist: "Jordan is Palestine." The left wing did not do so because of its permanent tendency to concede. Better hold a little, in the hope that at least that will be left in our hands. And the right wing did not out of devoutness to the fact that "We cannot give up Eastern Israel," which almost brought on the establishment of an additional Palestinian state in Western Israel.

To my regret, because of the long time that has passed, because of the fact that aside from a handful of us no one requested this, and because of 15 years of brainwashing about the "miracle solution"—autonomy—now it is very difficult to fight it.

But I would not despair. I would try to go back to the only realistic solution that presents the smallest danger to Israel—Jordan is the Palestinian state.

But if the nation remains captive to the charm of the autonomy idea and if its government does not have the courage, the inner resources, and the political boldness to shed its shackles, it will be our duty to see whether we can reduce its danger. Is it still possible to take certain steps to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state in the heart of the Jewish state?

I raised this proposal many times. Once again I suggest that autonomous Arab districts be established without territorial continuity among them. The local police will operate only within the districts and will not be authorized to operate or move outside their territory. (Other citizens will have no trouble traveling on roads under Israeli rule, even now only the Jews have difficulties doing so).

All areas populated by Jews will be under Israeli sovereignty. This will create a continuous chain of Jewish areas from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River in Judaea and Samaria, and from the sea to the western Negev in the Gaza Strip.

Israel will remain in charge of defense in the autonomous districts. According to this solution, all the Jewish settlements will be under Israeli sovereignty and most of the Arab population will live inside the autonomous districts. The minority that will remain within the limits of expanded Israeli sovereignty will enjoy all the rights, except for the right to vote for the Knesset and the prime

minister. They will be able to vote for the Palestinian Parliament in Jordan. Just like U.S. citizens living in Israel vote in the American presidential elections.

My solution above provides answers to many of the questions. It allows for going from the transitional stage directly to the next one. Whoever wants territorial compromise will go empty-handed. Those who want a settlement with Jordan, the autonomous districts will be their dowry. And those who will want to preserve Menahem Begin's basic principle that Israel will reserve the right to claim sovereignty over the autonomous areas at the end of the transitional period, will also find satisfaction. And all that with a smaller danger to Israel than the present plan.

I am against territorial compromise, but let us be honest with ourselves: autonomy is worse than territorial compromise.

Territorial compromise means a Palestinian state in part of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza.

Autonomy or self-government according to Rabin's plan means a Palestinian states throughout all of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza.

Once again, I urge you to remove the Damocles sword of autonomy from over our heads. Its time has passed. It is the last thing we need.

Previous, Current Autonomy Talks Compared

92AE0521A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
16 Jul 92 p 2

[Interview with Hayim Kuberski, former director of the Interior Ministry and chairman of the Israeli task force at the autonomy talks, in 1979-1982, by Yerah Tal; place and date not given]

[Text] [Tal] Why did the autonomy talks fail?

[Kuberski] The formal reasons for it included, among other things, the argument that broke out at the beginning of 1982 over where the talks would be held. Israel insisted that they be in Jerusalem, but the Egyptians insisted they would not come here. The talks finally died when the Lebanon war broke out in June of that year.

[Tal] Was the real reason the talks failed not the fact that the Palestinians were excluded?

[Kuberski] There is no doubt that the absence of Palestinian representatives from the territories greatly inhibited the talks, and cut down the prospects of reaching a formula that could also be acceptable to the Palestinians.

[Tal] Are the things that were brought up at the talks then relevant to the talks today?

[Kuberski] Absolutely. We came to understandings on many things with the Egyptians and the Americans. Those things definitely can be followed through today. It

will be just a waste if the delegations try to begin everything again from scratch.

[Tal] Over the years, arguments have broken out over the interpretation of the Camp David accords when the character of the autonomy to be begun in the territories is considered. As you see it, are we speaking of autonomy for the residents only, as Menahem Begin interpreted it in his time, and his successor Yitzhak Shamir does now, or perhaps also of territorial autonomy?

[Kuberski] In the guidelines we received from the government, it says clearly that it is not territory being discussed. This was clear also from the fact that the Camp David accords determined that autonomy would be for a transitional period of five years, with negotiations over a final settlement beginning not more than three years after the day autonomy was put into effect.

[Tal] Do you think that the understandings you reached with Egypt and the Americans will be acceptable also to the Palestinians in the territories and their representatives?

[Kuberski] For some things at least, I am convinced the answer is yes. I also know with certainty that the Egyptians passed on all materials to Palestinian representatives from the territories and coordinated actions with them. I am convinced that the Palestinian representatives have a file ready today with all the documents from the first autonomy talks so that they can also do their homework.

[Tal] How can Israel convince her partners at the talks of the seriousness of her intentions?

[Kuberski] If you look closely at the proposals we developed then, you will see that we proposed handing over to self-government by autonomy institutions no less than 25 fields, covering about 80 percent of the fields of activity of a sovereign government. Also from the fact that we agreed that the autonomy settlement should be for a transitional period of only five years, after which a permanent settlement would be arranged for the territories, one can see the seriousness of Israel's desire to reach a solution more or less acceptable to both sides. No arrangement will be completely acceptable to all parties involved. Both sides will have to compromise.

[Tal] What difficulties do you visualize on the way to putting autonomy into effect?

[Kuberski] Difficulties are likely to occur mainly with the status of the Jewish settlements and the movement of IDF [Israel Defense Forces] forces in the territories to be covered by autonomy during the autonomy talks.

I do not believe there is anyone who imagines the path to autonomy will be strewn with roses and free of all

obstacles. But it is also not necessary to take the opposite view, the absolutely pessimistic view. The fact is, that in spite of the difficulties and the extended breaks in the talks then, we still reached understandings with the Arab side, even on topics that were overwhelmingly difficult, like water resources and land. It was none other than Sources Sharon who formulated the most compromising proposals in this area.

[Tal] What practical advice have you for those who will be representing Israel at the talks in the near future?

[Kuberski] Set clear guidelines for management of the talks before they actually begin; put the practical negotiations in the hands of professional task forces, not parliamentary committees; let these committees be manned by professionals at the political level.

The negotiations should be carried out far from the spotlights of the press. Only that way will it be possible to ensure intimacy, and be sure that the sides will be speaking to each other, not to the press.

Another suggestion—deal as little as possible with principles and concentrate more on practical things from the very first stage. If the delegates get bogged down in discussion of principles, there is a chance the talks could run into a dead end.

[Tal] Can Israel dictate to the other side who will run in the elections? And can she oppose international supervision of them?

[Kuberski] Concerning the elections, and who is eligible to present himself as a candidate, we have set clear guidelines based on methods and election laws accepted in the developed countries of the world. For example, someone with a criminal record, and included in this, of course, someone who has been convicted of terrorist acts or membership in a terrorist organization, may not present himself as a candidate. Concerning international supervision, we rejected that demand, but we agreed that the elections be open to broad international press coverage. Such coverage is the best way to supervise the elections.

[Tal] Do you foresee the talks being more successful this time that they were in your time?

[Kuberski] I believe they will be. We must remember that the overall atmosphere in the world and the region is very different from what it was then. Now it is as though everything is permeated with the impulse and the desire to really solve the problem this time. People are tired of the wars and bloodshed. The fact that the Palestinians have entered the cycle of direct talks with Israel eases the process and increases the possibility that this time it will be crowned with success.

Questions on Nature of Autonomous Region

92AE0540B Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 24 Jul 92 pp 1-3

[Article by Roni Shaqed and Aviva Sha'abi: "This Is What Autonomy Will Look Like"]

[Text] This week a big sign was hung above the entrance gate to Qiryat Arba': "Qiryat Arba', a political Zionist settlement that will grow and prosper despite all hardships."

One week after Yitzhaq Rabin's installation, the new winds blowing from the direction of government quarters caused the dread level in the settlements to rise. Construction was stopped on 200 new housing units in Qiryat Arba'. Autonomy is at the door and Attorney Elyakim Haetzani said this was the gate to a terrorist Palestinian state. As far as Haetzani, a former Knesset member [MK] and prophet of doom is concerned, there will be no life after autonomy. We, however, will fight for our own, he adds. There will be no Arab administration in Qiryat Arba'.

Ironically enough, the Palestinian majority agrees with Haetzani. In post al-Najah Nablus people say that with Rabin one can negotiate. Today more than ever before, the Palestinians are willing to accept the idea of autonomy as a transitional stage toward an independent state. This week a Palestinian lottery was opened in Ramallah—yet another achievement of the state in coming, as it was described by Muhammad Sanyah, spokesman of the Palestinian Propaganda Committee under whose aegis the lottery will be operating. Two engineers from East Jerusalem shared the big prize, 14,000 shekels. Altogether 50,000 shekels were distributed and the rest, 150,000 shekels, was donated by the lottery to an educational institution in the territories.

The Palestinians are in a hurry. So much so that they want to hold the first bilateral meeting at the beginning of August in Washington, not at the beginning of September in Rome as had been planned. Something of the Palestinian impatience could be heard in Faysal al-Husayni's comments at this week's meeting with Secretary of State Baker. During the discussion Baker repeatedly urged the Palestinians to hurry up and prepare the agenda for the negotiations. In one earnest weekend, al-Husayni told Baker, we can wrap up the negotiations on transferring the self-administration rights to our hands. The Americans' impression was that the Palestinians are not yet ready for substantial negotiations.

For some years now, the Palestinians have been building the infrastructure for the state in the making. They have a Housing Ministry and Ministries of Health, Propaganda, Tourism, and Education. Those bodies, still devoid of substance for the time being, were designed to take over the authorities of the Civilian Administration with the advent of autonomy. Labor's electoral victory sped up this process. These days 140 academics and experts are preparing working files for taking over the powers of the Civil Administration.

From his tiny office on the third floor of the Guzhah Building in East Jerusalem, Dr. Sari Nusaybah, head of the Palestinian Strategic Planning team, is coordinating the work of dozens of professional committees. Needless to say, Nusaybah's work is done in ongoing coordination with the PLO leadership. Each committee studies another area of daily life in the territories and submits opinions and working papers. Those opinions are designed to help the Palestinian delegation at the bilateral talks with Israel.

The Israeli side thinks that this Palestinian impatience does not take into consideration the complexity of the process. Give us the hospital keys and go, we will manage by ourselves, says Radi al-Jara'i, a member of the Palestinian delegation. Al-Jira'i proudly pointed out that open-heart surgery is successfully done almost daily at the Ramallah hospital.

They forget, said Major General Dani Rotshild, actions coordinator in the territories, that behind that achievement stands a committee of Israeli physicians that decides who will be operated on in Ramallah and who at Belinsohn or Hadassa. Will this committee, inquires Rotshild, continue to work during the autonomy stage? That is one of the questions we will have to consider.

In the meantime, the prime minister's office talks in general formulas. On Wednesday, the team of negotiators at the peace talks led by Elyakim Rubinstein held its first meeting. Rubinstein, still serving as government secretary, is the man who finished off the autonomy talks for Yitzhaq Shamir. While previously Rubinstein conducted a rear party battle, now he will have to break through forward or, according to Rabin's newly coined expression, to make peace instead of participating in the peace process.

Yitzhaq Rabin decided the autonomy framework according to the Labor Party platform and on the basis of the Camp David agreements adjusted to the reality of 1992: Establishment of a self-administration without authority in matters of foreign affairs and defense, which will be achieved at negotiations lasting nine months. The settlements will not be included in the autonomy framework, but a distinction will be made between political and defense settlements. At this stage Rabin is talking only about the transitional period, which will last five years. The decision on the permanent status, Rabin said, will not be taken during the present term. According to him, he was not mandated to take care of the permanent status, only of the transitional period.

According to Health Minister Hayim Ramon, the idea is to return to a mode of coexistence with a view to lowering the hostility level, without a priori dictating the permanent system. We are very comfortable with transferring executive authorities, Ramon said, except for foreign affairs and defense. On the other hand, we do not want the transitional solution to dictate the permanent solution.

The transitional solution stemming from Camp David includes elections for the self-administration authority or the council of administration, a body that will take over the powers of the Civil Administration. The source of the autonomy authority is the key to the entire process. That is the foundation for our presence in the

territories, said Housing Minister Ben-Eli'ezer, which will ensure the existence of Israel's security policy and the status of the Jewish inhabitants in the area.

The Palestinian demand is to hold elections for a legislative body made up of 180 members which will be the source of the legal authority for the autonomy. Rabin is willing to grant the Palestinians the executive power according to Camp David, or something similar. But the source of the legal authority will remain in Israel's hands.

Under the proposed autonomy the Palestinians will be in charge of agriculture, health, religious affairs, labor and welfare, commerce and industry, finances, transportation and communications, education and culture, judiciary administration, and local affairs, including police. The council will have the authority to issue regulations, but not to pass laws.

"Rabin has drawn red lines for us, but he did not draw his green lines," said a member of the Palestinian delegation, Dr. Sa'ib 'Ariqat. "For example," he asked, "under the autonomy, will we be allowed to sell a package of American cigarettes for three shekels, instead of five, as is the case in Israel? What does Rabin mean when he talks of defense or police? What does self-administration mean?"

There is as yet no answer to all those questions. Such questions and similar ones at the detailed level of daily life will be brought to the negotiations table. They will require the establishment of an Israeli-Palestinian coordinating committee whose job will be to provide answers to the issues that will crop up in the field within the framework of an autonomous administrative authority.

This is nothing but playing with words, said Eliyaqim Haetzani of Qiryat Arba'. From day one there will be a state here. We call it autonomy, they call it a provisional arrangement. We will call it administrative council, they will call it parliament. They will be in a position to pass regulations. They will call them laws and those will be laws. Radio Ramallah will go into Arab hands and will become a Palestinian broadcasting station. Are we going to censor them? They will have their own stamps. Will Israel be able to oppose the issue of an 'Arafat stamp? Qalandiyah Airport will fly Air Palestine. And who will open the airport? 'Arafat.

Haetzani does not express only his own thoughts. The Palestinians have already done their homework. Att. Jonathan Kuttab of East Jerusalem has applied to the Ministry of Communication to authorize the opening of a Palestinian television station, the agreement being that the station will be subject to Israeli censorship laws. The Civil Administration was asked to allow the establishment of a radio station, which was denied. Engineer Rami 'Abd-al-Hadi of Ramallah recently completed the plans for Atarot Airport, which will serve as the international airport of Palestinian autonomy. There is already a Palestinian National Soccer League.

The Rabin formula talks of territorial autonomy in the spirit of the Camp David accords, a term that Menahem Begin coined in his interpretation of the accords. Begin did not consider returning the West Bank and Gaza territories, while the Labor position was from the start based on territorial compromise and concomitant security zones. The Labor platform states that once there is peace the Jordan Valley, Greater Jerusalem area, and the 'Etzyon Bloc will remain under Israeli rule. In other words, what is included in those areas is defined as security settlement. Anything outside of those areas is defined as political settlement.

According to Rabin's formula, Elon More near Nabulus, or the Kadim settlement near Janin are political settlements subject to the construction and development freeze. Arik Sharon, as we recall, had other plans. He built settlements in densely populated areas with a view to preventing Palestinian territorial continuity. Some 120,000 settlers currently live in the territories in 145 settlements, including Ma'ale Adumim, which was given city status.

The Camp David accords make no mention of the status of the Jewish settlements in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza Strip. Motta Gur, who is slated to become deputy defense minister, stated that no Jewish settlement will be evacuated under the autonomy or under a permanent solution. The main principle, Gur said, is that the Arabs will get self-administration, under which they will govern their daily lives.

According to Gur, "The problem of a permanent solution is much more complicated, because it cannot ignore issues of principle. In our view, a (independent) Palestinian state cannot be established, and therefore we are talking of a Jordanian-Palestinian state with the capital in Amman. The Arab residents of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza will be citizens of the Jordanian-Palestinian state and the Jewish residents in the territories will be citizens of the State of Israel.

"Under autonomy there is no problem about the settlers. Their fear is that the autonomy authorities will close in on them and choke them. That is a tactical concern. The Arabs fear the same thing. In the realm of principle, the fear is that the autonomy will turn into a Palestinian state. The main problem is mutual fear."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] In other words, if I am a settler, I should conclude that in any case I will be living under foreign sovereignty?

[presumably Gur] "Undoubtedly. The difficulty lies in finding a functional arrangement. The coexistence problem is very complex. This is what the negotiations will be about."

We will never agree to live under Arab rule in whatever form, said MK Ron Nahman, head of the Ari'el Council. Which framework will incorporate the capital of Samaria? In Rabin's view, Ari'el will exist as an enclave inside the Palestinian autonomy, the same as 'Imanu'el,

Qedumim, or Qarney Shomron. The ride to settlements five minutes removed from Kfar Saba will be made on roads policed by Arabs. Nahman said that he did not need autonomy, he needed Israeli law. How, for example, will an MK be elected from an area defined as extraterritorial to the State of Israel?

One of the big land mines on the way to autonomy will be the issue of security. Rabin has already announced that on this issue there will be no compromise. The IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] will continue to sit on the Jordanian border and in the territories there will be joint security activities designed to thwart terrorism, in the assumption that Palestinian terrorism will not disappear. The electronic warning devices installed on hilltops in the West Bank will remain in place.

The chief of staff lately appointed a brigadier general to plan Israel's defense doctrine in the autonomy era. The slot is ready and the plans have been decided, but Brig Gen T. has not yet taken over his new job. There seems to be no getting around the need to appoint a senior officer at the Defense Ministry to take care of the civilian side of the transfer of administrative authorities to the Palestinians.

The Camp David formula talks of a "strong local police force" to take care of internal security and public order. Radi al-Jara'i said that the Palestinians will be content with policemen armed with hand guns for this purpose. Elyaqim Haetzani calls them masked men in police uniforms. Our gate will be closed, said Haetzani; any Arab entering Qiryat Arba' as a guest will do so after depositing his identity card, leaving his weapons, and stripping his uniform. Then he might get a cup of coffee. If a policeman will want to give me a ticket I will not show him my identity card.

Another problem that will be brought to the negotiations table is traffic on the Jordan bridges. The Palestinians talk of severing relations with Israel and strengthening their links to the Arab countries. The bridges are the gate to the Arab world. Who will oversee the crossing on the bridges? Will Israeli troops be posted there, and next to them autonomy customs officers and border controls? What will be the fate of an arms smuggler caught at the crossing? Who will arrest him, who will question him, and what court will handle his case? In what jail will he serve his sentence?

There is one thing for which Rabin should thank Ari'el Sharon, namely for the road system in the West Bank. The Likud Government, under Sharon's orchestration, paved roads across the length and breadth of the West Bank to serve the needs of the Jewish settlements. Alone in the past year 260 million shekels were allocated for paving roads around the intifadah in the territories. There is one road around Tulkarm, one around Nabulus, and one around Qalqilyah, and the longest tunnel in the country is now in the process of being excavated—the road skirting around Bethlehem and al-Duhasayshah—under Mount Gila.

Sharon was pursuing the interests of the settlers. In the Rabin era, on the other hand, the "autonomy roads" will serve as division lines between the Jewish enclaves and Palestinian population centers. Motta Gur referred to this issue saying that within the framework of a functional arrangement it may be possible to pave parallel roads in some places.

A hypothetical question: What will happen in the case of a road accident involving a settler from Yitzhar and a Palestinian from Luban al-Sharqiyah? What law and what traffic regulations will drivers have to obey on the autonomy roads? Who will collect testimonies? To what hospital will the injured be taken?

This week a delegation of farmers from Gaza met with Agriculture Minister Ya'aqov Tzur. The issues raised at the meeting concerned the agricultural trade relations between Israel and Gaza Strip. The farmers from Gaza demanded to be allowed to take produce into Israel and to use the port of Ashdod for exporting agricultural produce. The issue of security controls in the port of Ashdod was brought up. The Gaza farmers agreed to bear the expenses. Tzur, however, did not promise anything. He realizes that this kind of problem and others will crop up under the autonomy and that they must be anchored in prior agreements.

Other possible questions: When goods arrive at industrial plants in the territories through the port of Haifa, who gets the customs money, the Israeli treasury or the Palestinian Autonomy Council? Who will pay for the Israeli electrical power supplied to Gaza, and who will pay for the water reaching Gaza through the national pipeline? The Palestinians also want their own bank and have even decided already on the legal tender: the Jordanian dinar. For that purpose they need the support of the Jordanian Central Bank. Israel authorized the establishment of the Palestinian Bank. Jordan turned it down.

As far as Haetzani is concerned, the Palestinian autonomy is a yet unborn morass. According to him, Judaea and Samaria are not under Israeli sovereignty at all. Consequently, "The State of Israel has no legal rights to cede areas of Judaea and Samaria to strangers, and any action it will take will be illegal and will not be binding on people like me. There is no need to worry about the settlers, they will take care of themselves. We will bring 100,000 people to the area. If Fu'ad cancels the construction of apartments, we will build barracks. Force will be used to rebel against a foreign government attempting to force its orders and laws on us. We have weapons, they have weapons. If they try to rule us by force, it will end in bloody riots."

[box, p 2]

Political, Security

Settlements in the Jerusalem Area

1. Abir Ya'aqov
2. Adam
3. Alon Shvut
4. El'azar
5. Efrat
6. Giv'on Hahadasha
7. Giv'at Ze'ev
8. Har Adar

9. Har Gila 10. Kfar Adumim 11. Kfar Adumim Bet 12. Kfar 'Etzyon 13. Ma'ale Adumim 14. Karmey Tzur 15. Migdal 'Oz 16. neve dani'el 17. Rosh Tzurim.

Security Settlements, Jordan Rift Valley

1. Kokhav Hashahar 2. Rimonim 3. Argaman 4. Bet Ha'Arava 5. Beqa'ot 6. Gilgal 7. Vered Yeriho 8. Hamra 9. Yitav 10. Yafit 11. Bitronot 12. Gitit 13. Hemdat 14. Mehula 15. Mekhora 16. Mitzpe Yeriho 17. Mitzpe Shalem 18. Masu'a 19. Maskit 20. Na'ama 21. Na'aran 22. Netiv Hagdud 23. Patza'el 24. Ma'ale Efrayim 25. Qalya 26. Tomer 27. Shadmot Mehola 28. Ro'i 30. [as published] Mul Nevo.

Jewish Population Centers

1. Ari'el 2. 'Imanu'el 3. Qiryat Arba'.

Political Settlements, Gaza Strip

1. Aley Sinai 2. Bdolah 3. Bney 'Atzmon 4. Gadid 5. Gan Or 6. Ganey Tal 7. Kfar Daaarom 8. Kfar Yam 9. Morag 10. Neve Deqalim 11. Nisanit 12. Netzer Hazani 13. Netzrim 14. Qatif 15. Rafiah Yam.

Border Correction Area on Western Slopes of Judaea and Samaria

1. Bet Arye 2. Hashmona'im 3. Matityahu 4. Sla'it.

Political Settlements, Judaea and Samaria

1. Adora 2. Oranit 3. Itamar 4. El David 5. Elon More 6. Alfey Menashe 7. Elqana 8. Metzad 9. Barqan 10. Bet El 11. Bet El Bet 12. Bet Hagay 13. Bet Horon 14. Bet Yatir 15. Hadar Betar 16. Brakha 17. Bet 'En 18. Gva'ot 19. Qarney Shomror. 20. Ganim 21. Dolev 22. Har Amsa 23. Hever 24. Homesh 25. Henanit 26. Halamish 27. Hermesh 28. Talmon 29. Tene 30. Aley Zahav 31. Yitzhar 32. Kadim 33. Tapuah 34. Karmel 35. Livna 36. Mavo Dotan 37. Mavo Horon 38. Mardalim 39. Mikhmash 40. Ma'on 41. Ma'ale Hever 42. Ma'ale Levona 43. Ma'ale Amos 44. Ma'ale Shomron 45. Qeydar 46. Neve Tzof 47. Nofim 48. Noqsim 49. Nahli'el 50. Nili 51. Na'ale 52. 'Etz Efrayim 53. Susya 54. Omdim 55. Ateret 56. 'Enav 57. 'Eli 58. Almon 59. Ofra 60. 'Atin'el 61. Pdu'el 62. Pisgot 63. Qedumim 64. Qiryat Netafim 65. Qarney Shomron 66. Reyhan 67. Sanur 68. Shavey Shomron 69. Shilo 70. Shema' 71. Sha'arey Tiqva 72. Shaqed 73. 'Itamar 74. Telem 75. Teqoa' 76. Eshkolot.

Ron Nahman on YESHA Council, Autonomy Plan

92AE0585A Tel Aviv HAYARDEN in Hebrew 21 Jul 92 pp 4, 11

[Interview of Ron Nahman by HAYARDEN reporter; place and date not given: "Ron Nahman: Autonomy Without Settlement—Means a Palestinian State"; words in boldface as published]

[Text] In days when caravans in Samaria have stopped transporting buildings to settlements for immigration

absorption and for young couples—a sight that gladdened every good Zionist eye—and when the air is sliced by words such as “drying up,” “freeze,” “cancellation of contracts,” and the like, we went to the mayor of the large city in Samaria, Ari'el, to hear about the feelings about the new situation.

Mr. Ron Nahman, who was just elected to the Knesset on the Likud list, is, of course, not in a festive mood. He, along with the rest of the public in the region, is still in the stage of amazement and expectation of the real field results that will become evident in the very near future. “It is not yet clear,” he says, “what will happen and where.” The basic trends, as declared by the new rulers of Israel, are quite clear. But the resourcefulness and capability of a Yishuv of 120,000 souls (a number twice as large as the entire Hebrew Yishuv at the beginning of the British Mandate in the twenties) is not something that it is possible to neutralize and paralyze arbitrarily. We shall see.“

[HAYARDEN] What will we do in view of the four “thin years” that have been imposed on us by the new government?

[Nahman] Firstly, I do not accept the concept “thin years” with regard to the preceding years. This implies that, as it were, we enjoyed “fat years” here—and there is no foundation for that in reality. The false label of “fat,” that is to say, privileges and pampering, was slapped onto the YESHA [Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza] settlements by hostile media that engaged in incitement accompanied by distortions aimed at making this settlement hateful to the residents of Israel and at the creation of the impression that this entire project was carried out at the expense of more important needs, and mainly at the expense of the distressed strata, as if all of their disadvantages stem from this settlement.

Under the rule of the Likud, as well, these years were years of struggle by the settlers and their representatives over the character and pace of the development of the settlements. True, the national rule opened for us ways of criticizing and an attentive ear for our demands as a factor out in the field. The national rule did not shower us with resources, but instead observed carefully legal and equal criteria between us and every other sector in Israel. It was also necessary to overcome special obstacles that stemmed from the fact that Israeli law was not yet imposed on the territory. But everything that we “received” was actually given also to young couples and new immigrants, as they were entitled to receive in every other development area in the country. And after all, most of the investment was carried out by persons who brought their own money here to acquire housing, to establish enterprises and businesses on their own responsibility and at personal risk. And everything that came out of the crowded and expensive coastal strip only left vital space for others and created more efficient channels of economic development for the state as a whole.

But after 15 years in which we had an address for moving things forward, a governmental and movement address, the great concern is that there will no longer be such an address. At least, not as in the past.

[HAYARDEN] The broader public is used to identifying the settlements in YESHA mainly with the YESHA council, as a podium for Gush Emunim, the religious and the small right-wing movements. Why is the voice of the Likud not heard much?

[Nahman] The YESHA council is perceived as an overall representative factor, on which sit heads of the councils from south Hebron, through Gush 'Etzyon, the Binyamin region, the Samaria regional council and the representatives of all the big settlements, including Qiryat Arba, Efrat, Ma'ale Adumim, Ari'el, Alfey Menashe, etc.

In the Likud there is a "YESHA region" that I managed until my election to the Knesset. 'Etni'el Schneller will serve in my place. And the importance of our people who sit in the YESHA council depends on us.

The secretary-general of the YESHA council is Uri Ari'el, a most capable Entire Land of Israel man, who does not act on behalf of any party. I remember him from 1977, when we carried out the placing of 11 new nuclei on the land and Uri Ari'el led his nucleus.

As for those who speak in the name of YESHA, it should be remembered that the heads of the local councils themselves are interested in giving weight to the spokesmen of the YESHA council as a single united and large body. Now we are about to decide on early general elections ("primaries") to the YESHA council, which was elected 12 years ago. Renewal is necessary. We must grow a new generation of activists. The YESHA council is, from the legal viewpoint, a society. And it must be determined who will vote, who can be elected, which bodies participate, how the chairman will be chosen, how there will be public control and how all the existing forces will find expression.

We are all interested in strengthening the YESHA council. And whoever tries to injure it and even to undermine it harms the entire settlement project from political motives. The settlers themselves must be interested in a representative, credible, and serious council. The local councils are unable to carry out separately what the YESHA council can do. For example, Uri Ari'el is more knowledgeable than any head of a council about the general picture of the situation in the field. The heads of the councils have a lot to do in their own back yards. But it is true that we must come out of the back yard and act in the broader political arena.

[HAYARDEN] During the time of the Likud Government, explicit opposition to the autonomy plan was heard in almost all of the YESHA settlements. Uri Ari'el, the secretary-general of the YESHA council, expressed such opposition strongly. Did he really speak in the name of everyone?

[Nahman] The real problem is whether Jews or Arabs will rule here. Both of them together will not work. The easiest thing is to say "expel." Or, as others are saying, to carry out a transfer on the Jews "voluntarily," "to dry up." This is a contemptible word when it comes from Jews' mouths. The distinction between political settlement and security settlement also leads in effect in the same direction. We have not yet heard that the Americans agree to such a distinction, and certainly not the Arabs. But he who rejects a Palestinian state and proposes Arab autonomy also must know that an autonomy that is not full of Jewish settlement will establish a Palestinian state here. The paralysis of settlement will be completed by terroristic pressure. And the political vacuum will bring about a situation in which the area will be turned over in the end to Arab rule.

In the days of "stockade and tower," they understood that only the settlement presence on the land determines the borders. The kibbutzim and moshavim of today are living testimony to that. Today, they are abandoning the teaching that came from their own school. And who knows better than they where that leads.

Therefore, with regard to autonomy, it is necessary to know first of all what it really is, for the territory or for the inhabitants. Territorial autonomy is another word for "partition." Personal autonomy also could end up as nothing. The Arabs understand well that a settlement freeze is a corridor of weakness that opens the way to their rule. It can simply fall into their hands like a ripe fruit.

What the actual Israeli policy will be we shall see according to the actions, according to who will implement the policy. The Arabs might say, "We accept the autonomy that you propose." And they might say, "If we take it—we will have lost." But on our side they will begin to implement a process in stages, like "Jericho first," on that day the fate will be sealed [as in source]. In every territory that is turned over to the Arabs a state will be declared, which will be immediately recognized by 50 or 150 states.

[HAYARDEN] In short, you are saying that autonomy without settlement means a Palestinian state. Do you negate negotiations over autonomy?

[Nahman] It is necessary to define exactly what is autonomy. What kind of autonomy do they mean, and to judge according to that.

[HAYARDEN] Can the Jewish settlement in YESHA carry out settlement, or expand what exists, under the present government?

[Nahman] If you are hinting at a settlement effort in the time of the British Mandate [as in source], I say that there is no comparison. In the Yishuv of that time, there was a consensus that affirmed settlement. But now, in the absence of a national consensus, there can be a strangulation by a freeze. The thing begins, as it has already begun, by ideological delegitimization of the

settlement here. They will make it free game. And if that is the trend, that there will be empty areas here so that it will be easy to conduct negotiations over them—the direction is clear.

[HAYARDEN] **Has the existing settlement not reached a critical mass so that it is already impossible to “dry up” by a new “White Paper”?**

[Nahman] The situation now could be more serious than the situation in the time of the British “White Paper.” Here the Jews themselves will make the distinction between what is legitimate and what is unacceptable. That is with regard to the government. And if you say private initiative—that, too, requires encouragement. Why should Jews come to places against which there is discrimination? How will young couples, who work all their lives to pay off the mortgage, come precisely here? Settlement today is a function of the state. In the past, in the heroic period of Zionism, there was “illegal” immigration and “illegal” settlement according to the foreign rule. Today, we speak of a government budget for immigration absorption and settlement. We shall see what the budget will be for 1993. Perhaps it will be possible to raise donations abroad, houses could be sold to Jews abroad who do not require public financing. We shall see.

[HAYARDEN] **What is your hope for the near future?**

[Nahman] We are talking about a new and unknown situation. For the moment, it is too early to respond, and we must judge according to the actions. I hope that Yitzhak Rabin will not lend a hand to a transfer of Jews. But there also was once a struggle under Rabin’s rule in 1975. Today, the settlements are dispersed throughout the area. On the other hand, there is in the country a situation of “and Yeshurun grew fat and he kicked.” I have doubts as to the readiness of people to dare and to sacrifice as in the good days. It is more certain that the government will give the 10 billion to the bankrupt kibbutzim....

[HAYARDEN] **Do you not think that today, as well, there will be thousands, if not tens of thousands, who will come to settle without encouragement, who will accept the challenge and will perform an act of pioneering?**

[Nahman] That is not relevant.... If a policy reigns that frightens people with a warning that they are putting their money at risk, then a political struggle will be necessary. Of course, both a settlement struggle and a political struggle, one depends on the other. We will be able to strengthen the settlements despite the decrees, if we act decisively in Israel and abroad, we will be able to create a popular movement that will oppose the policy of the government. Zionist factors should be strengthened abroad, as well, and the positive potential should be sought out even in the midst of a negative situation.

On the other hand, I assume that there are things that they will not dare to harm. There are norms regarding security and education for every Jew in every settlement.

My pessimism concerns mainly the thrust of development that will be halted. But, in the final analysis, if immigration resumes, if a million immigrants arrive, they will come this far. To halt and to strangle completely is impossible. There are things regarding which the courts will decide. And there are things that we will do ourselves, including also the improvement of the quality of life in every area, including better handling of persons’ problems. In one word: leadership.

Analysis of Autonomy, Transfer of Jews

92AE0560C Tel Aviv YEDI’OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
26 Jul 92 p 19

[Commentary of Aharon Papho]

[Text] Yitzhaq Rabin’s agreement to hold “elections” for the so-called administrative council of autonomy is an irreversible step toward the implementation of full Arab sovereignty in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, and the elimination of Israeli rule in them. In actuality, such a council would be a legislative body, i.e., a parliament, which would elect an executive body, i.e., a government, from among its members. This council and government would quickly gain control of the water and land in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza. It would receive outside assistance, and it would impose a blockade on the Jewish settlements to weaken them. Moreover, it is almost certain that the council would declare full independence, thus breaching agreements and charters which it would have signed. In making this move, the council would claim that the people—which is the sovereign and accordingly should be the body to determine its destiny—is no longer satisfied with partial independence and demands full disconnection from Israeli rule. It would obtain the support of most of the members of the United Nations, and it would display its own flag. Israel would dare not force its way back into the area militarily because the entire world would accuse it of oppressing a people that had declared its independence. Similar things have happened in history, e.g., in Bulgaria at the end of the 19th century.

And this is not all. Last week, it was reported that the lists that would contend in the elections would be those of the PLO, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Popular Democratic Front, and perhaps Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement] as well. If the Arabs truly wanted democracy, they would organize into political parties. Instead, they will cast their votes for the heads of terrorist organizations. This will be similar to an election contest between Al Capone and Don Corleone [fictional character in *The Godfather*]. It would also set an international precedent for the participation of murder organizations in a political campaign, and this with the Israeli Government’s consent, and perhaps under international auspices, inasmuch as the Arabs are demanding that an international umbrella be provided for the disconnection of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza from Israel.

There is no chance of holding free elections where gangs rule and Arabs murder Arabs, even now under Israel's rule. The al-Najah University incident proves this. There, armed PLO members entered the campus to threaten voters, and this certainly will be the case in general elections as well.

Without free elections, and without democracy in the autonomy, there will be no true peace with Israel, because a characteristically tyrannical, terrorist regime cannot reconcile itself to a Jewish state as its neighbor, and the organizations running in the elections would continue to carry out terrorist activities inside Israel's 1967 borders.

If this were a matter of municipal autonomy, there would be a need to allow the Jews [in the territories] to vote and participate in the self-administration without losing their rights as Israeli citizens. However, this is actually a matter of the granting of political power to the Arabs and of the transfer of Jews. The latter would be left there without rights. The Israeli Government would cause their settlements to dry up. The Arabs would blockade them until they departed. Also, in the new situation, the Arabs would continue to work inside the 1967 borders, arguing that Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza did not offer them adequate livelihood sources. And they would find many defenders on the Israeli left.

The establishment of autonomy would be a consummate gain for the Arabs, a total loss for Israel, and the end of the 2,000-year-old Jewish hope of ruling in the land of Israel.

Rabbi Schach's Influence Reportedly Waning

92AE0560A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 31 Jul 92 pp 12-13

[Article by Bina Barzel]

[Text] On Sunday evening, Rabbi [Eli'ezer] Schach was deeply insulted. The Gur Admor [title of a Hassidic rabbi] and the Vizhnitzer Admor refused to respond to his entreaties that they ask United Torah Judaism [UTJ—a party comprising Agudat Yisra'el and Degel Hatorah] members of Knesset [MK's] to vote against the Rabin government in a no confidence vote. Rabbi Schach, who controlled three haredi parties until the recent elections, had only one remaining loyalist this week, [Degel Hatorah member] Avraham Ravitz.

The recent insult added to previous insults to Rabbi Schach by SHAS [Sephardi Torah Guardians] and [SHAS mentor] Rabbi 'Ovadia Yosef. They decided to ignore Rabbi Schach's authority and join the government. "I did not sleep the entire night because of this disgrace," said one of Rabbi Schach's followers, who added, "A Jew such as him [Rabbi Schach]—who will turn 97 in two months, and is totally holy and free of personal interests—pleas for them to join his fight for principles. And they, the Admors, prefer some letter

which [Shulamit] Aloni [whose appointment as education minister is adamantly opposed by Rabbi Schach] sent to Rabin regarding the preservation of the values of Judaism in education."

"The sorrow can be seen on the faces of Rabbi Schach's students," said a member of the Agudat Yisra'el [AY] directorate, who added, "They pushed back the mourning of the 9th of Av [a fast day marking the anniversary of the destruction of the first and second temples], which is only a week away."

The anger in the Lithuanian camp [Rabbi Schach's camp, the Lithuanian Jewish community being the original stronghold of opposition to Hassidism] also resulted in harsh remarks about the Hassidic Admors regarding their fondness for the trappings of office and their custom of vacationing in Switzerland, as compared to the demonstrated humbleness of Rabbi Schach, "who has never taken one day of vacation in his life."

The new confrontation between the two factions of UTJ (AY and Degel Hatorah [DH]) reminds one of the old dispute between Hassidim and mitnagdim [opponents of Hassidism]. The split is an accomplished fact. Despite the establishment of a unified haredi list, which now numbers four mandates, the institutions of AY and DH have not been unified. Nor has a joint council of Torah sages been formed. Recent events are even likely to lead to a formal dissolution of the list.

[Rabbi Schach] Could Break Apart the Rabin Government

Rabbi Schach is not consulting with anyone. It is not clear how he will behave, for example, if the three AY MK's manage to lead their Torah sages into the coalition. This week, he restrained his confidants' thoughts of revenge. He remained silent, allowing only a gathering of the Torah sages of his party, DH, to discuss events. One of his students said, "He could break apart the Rabin Government if he wanted. It suffices for him to send personal letters to SHAS MK's, in which he instructs them to leave the government."

AY MK's no longer conceal their strong desire to enter the coalition. In contacts with Labor Party representatives, they are openly seeking a way for their rabbis to back off from their adamant opposition to Aloni.

The distribution of political power between the different groups in the haredi world has not withstood the test of democratic elections for 18 years. This distribution is determined by agreements concluded with each new Knesset. The Gur Hassidim are considered traditionally to be the largest Hassidic group. Therefore, their representative merits heading the united list. Representatives of the Lithuanians claim equal status and half of the political representation. However, following previous schisms in AY, which led to the establishment of SHAS and DH, the Lithuanians' political power declined. In

the previous elections, when the Lithuanians ran on an independent list, i.e., DH, they received 36,000 votes, which is two MK's.

Now, there is talk in UTJ of a plan to hold a convention next spring. This would require internal elections and would symbolize the return to the political arena of the Gur Hassidim, who have been paralyzed in recent years due to the prolonged illness of their previous Admor. The new Admor, Pinhas Menahem Alter, was, until his installation, a senior AY activist who headed the directorate of AY's center for more than a decade.

On Sunday evening, Rabbi Schach was still certain that the no confidence motion submitted by UTJ would win the support of all members of the faction. To ensure that the motion would be made, he responded to a request made by the Vizhnitzer Admor by instructing Rabbi Ravitz [DH's lone member of Knesset (MK)] to add to the bill a paragraph addressing the need to preserve the wholeness of the land.

Meanwhile, AY members began to play with different proposals to replace Aloni. [AY MK Menahem] Porush provided an abundance of astounding ideas in the vein of musical chairs, e.g., replacing Aloni with [Housing Minister Binyamin] Ben-Eli'ezer and then replacing [Interior Minister Arye] Der'i with Aloni; or splitting the labor and social affairs portfolio, so that the labor portfolio would be transferred to [Absorption Minister Ya'ir] Tzaban, and the absorption portfolio would be given to Rabbi Schach's representative, [Yitzhaq] Peretz, to appease Rabbi Schach.

However, Ravitz brought his friends back to reality: "Stop being naive and confusing," he told them, "there is no chance that Aloni will concede [the post of education minister]."

Then, an idea was raised which also worked for SHAS, namely that Aloni would provide a letter [stating her commitment not to introduce deleterious changes to the educational curricula dealing with the heritage of Israel in the general educational system]. But on Sunday, at noon, Rabbi Eliyashiv and Rabbi Auerbach determined that such a problem was not to be solved by a letter, but by a no confidence vote.

In AY, they explained the opposition of Rabbi Schach and the other rabbis to Aloni in cabalistic terms, pointing to the war between the right and the left in cabalistic literature, which is like the war between the sons of light and the sons of darkness.

On Sunday, on the eve of the no confidence vote, the AY Torah sages held a meeting. Prior to that, Rabbi Schach sent his confidant, Rabbi Shlomo Lornatz, to the Gur Admor and the Vizhnitzer Admor to remind them of his opinion on the matter.

But the two were not intimidated. The politely told Lornatz that they still shared Rabbi Schach's opinion, but they did not know what the other rabbis would say.

The truth is that, in the 12-member Council of Torah Sages, the Gur and Vizhnitzer Admors, together with the Admor of Arlovi, Rabbi Yohanan Sofer, can pass any decision which they please.

Rabbi Schach was surprised when 'Avishay Stockhammer, the secretary of the AY Council of Torah Sages, called him at home and asked to come over to explain the decision made at the meeting that night—contrary to Rabbi Schach's opinion—regarding the absence of AY members from the Knesset hall during the [no confidence] vote.

Rabbi Schach said nothing. He descended the 60 steps leading from the yeshiva, which is next to his house, and got into his large American car. Rabbi Yehezq'el Issac, the trustee of his household, quickly took the steering wheel. Within minutes, they were on their way to Jerusalem, to the court of the Gur Admor.

When they arrived, Rabbi Schach was told that the Admor was praying. Annoyed and worried, Rabbi Schach then decided to travel to Harnof, where the Vizhnitzer Admor was vacationing. Forty minutes later, Rabbi Schach met with the Admor and failed to persuade him to change the decision. From there, he returned to the Gur Admor. After a half hour, he again threw up his hands. According to reports from the courts of the Hassidim, the Admor told Rabbi Schach that if he (Rabbi Schach) would have agreed in the past to the establishment of a joint AY-DT council of Torah sages, he [Rabbi Schach] would have been able to participate in the meeting and have an impact.

Tense and tired, Rabbi Schach returned to Bney-Braq [a haredi community in the Tel Aviv area] at around 2300 hours. He performed the evening prayer, ate a bit of mashed potatoes that had been warmed for him in the yeshiva's kitchen, studied a bit, and, at 2400, retired for the night. The next day, he was up at 0430 to prepare a lesson.

His followers wept over the insult to their rabbi. They cited the esteemed "stifler," who, a number of years ago, in the period of the split in AY, said, "Let AY be abolished, and the honor of our teacher Rabbi Schach shall not be diminished."

Rabbi Schach's followers hastened this week to mount an impressive response to the AY Admors. They planned to rent the Yad-Eliyahu Stadium and fill it with thousands of haredim, who would declare their faithful allegiance to Rabbi Schach "until the advent of the messiah." However, Rabbi Schach told them, "Do not help me, do not do me any favors," before immersing himself again in the Talmud.

The rend that resulted in the establishment of SHAS and DT was stitched together—albeit partially—through the establishment of the UTJ list, with a view toward the recent elections. However, the creation of the list also bore within it all of the seeds of schism: In the unification agreement, AY and DT virtually failed to agree on

any of the main issues in dispute. Everything was deferred until after the elections.

The complicated agreement on the composition of the list stipulates that, in the event that the faction wins four seats in the Knesset, Rabbi [Shmu'el] Halpert (the Vizhnitzer Admor's representative) shall, after two years, cede his Knesset seat to Rabbi Gafni from DH.

The same agreement stipulates that, in the event that the UTJ enters into a coalition, the first position shall be given to the AY representative, and the second position to the DH representative. In other words, Rabbi Porush (AY) was liable to face a demand to cede the labor and social affairs portfolio to MK Ravitz [DH].

Shapira's Support for the Admor's Son

These two traps are likely to induce AY activists to move toward an official split. This would indeed leave them with a reduced faction of only three MK's [Shapira', Porush, and Halpert], but with plentiful assets and positions.

And indeed, Shapira' and Porush are largely responsible for the contacts regarding AY's entry into the coalition. When Shapira', a veteran Gur Hassid, was selected by the current Gur Admor to represent the latter in the Knesset, Shapira's opponents spoke ill of him, maintaining that he was selected as a reward for his support of the Admor's son eight years ago, when the latter became embroiled in financial matters.

In Bney Braq, Shapira' is accused of being motivated to seek to again chair the Knesset finance committee by his desire to save his enterprises. It is said that his father-in-law, the Admor of Srigora spent many hours in telephone discussions from Switzerland, where he is vacationing, attempting to convince the Torah sages to refrain from voting against the government.

Shapira' responds that these accusations are malicious and false, that his activities are placed openly on the table, and that he is proud to be an industrialist.

The second person on the list, Rabbi Porush, is currently not close to any rabbi or Admor. Years ago, a rift developed between him and Rabbi Schach. He later disobeyed the Gur rabbi by not complying with his directive to leave the Knesset. He was beaten by Gur students and consequently hospitalized. Once, when he was asked with whom he consulted, he reportedly responded, "With the Western Wall."

Porush has been the tireless underminer. Two years ago he was active in efforts to establish a government headed by Shim'on Peres. After failing, he positioned himself again in the Likud's bosom. He enjoys good relations with Labor leaders. Recently, he has seemed more merry and active than ever. Regarding his relations with Shulamit Aloni, he once said, "We know that the distance between us is so great, that we can be close." He even did

not hesitate to initiate a meeting with Aloni to convince her to give up the education portfolio.

90,000 Students

Despite his great anger, Rabbi Schach preferred this week not to deepen the rift. He directed his people not to attack the Hassidim in his newspaper, YETED NE'EMAN. He also said a summit meeting would be held between the AY and DH Torah sages immediately after the 9th of Av fast to prepare additional steps regarding the joint list. In the meantime, he decided to convene a meeting of the DT Torah sages this week.

The haredi public desperately needs lobbyists in key coalition positions to ensure that its needs are met, especially in the areas of education and culture. Just this week, the Vizhnitz court was reported to be in terrible financial straits, with one of its hotels being sequestered.

From AY's perspective, jurisdiction over the independent educational system, which comprises 90,000 students, should not be "abandoned" to the purview of a deputy minister from SHAS. The embedding of SHAS people in the new government at all nodes of contact with the Haredi public—the ministries of finance, education, religious affairs, and housing—puts pressure on the AY, because it places the entire haredi public at the mercy of a competing party.

The contacts [of the haredim] with Labor revealed the haredi public's interest in cooperating with the government. For example, they requested that the construction of haredi settlements on the other side of the green line, e.g., in 'Imanu'el and in Betar, be allowed to continue without being damaged. The response was in the affirmative. Behind the scenes, they attempted to clarify the extent to which [Finance Minister] Beiga Shohat's opposition to the appointment of Shapira' to head the Knesset finance committee is perfunctory. "Without this, there is nothing to discuss," said Menahem Porush this week.

While the government was being put together, UTJ's designated MK's met frequently in Avraham Shapira's large villa in northern Tel Aviv. There, in the library, members of the new list sat next to hospitality [eneq] tables, savoring stuffed fish, pickles, and crackers as they formed their demands of the Rabin Government.

In one of these discussions, Rabbi Gafni turned to Porush and asked, "Tell me, are you cut out to be in the opposition?" Porush responded, "Believe me, from the standpoint of institutions, we have no safety net. We cannot stay outside [the government]."

For their part, Rabin and his people wish to quickly strengthen and consolidate the coalition. But to do so they must surmount the Aloni problem. One AY leader said, "Everything must be done to convince the Torah sages that Aloni will not be damaging to the Haredi public. If the Torah sages see no increase in Sabbath desecration, no drastic measures, and no major

upheavals in the education system, they will likely reconsider their position [on Aloni]." Rabin also instructed MK Avraham Burg to lower his profile in his confrontations with UTJ members, after Burg spoke of "the expected advent of the messiah" in a radio debate with Shapira'. Burg also placed on the Knesset agenda this week a draft law regarding the conscription of yeshiva students, which gave the religious a start.

Moreover, there are internal Labor discussions of a process which in time will result in some MK's of the National Religious Party, and later Tzomet, joining the coalition.

After two weeks of running about and contacting AY MK's on the one hand, and Shahal, Peres, and Eli Dayan on the other hand, it is now clear that the question is not whether the AY MK's will join the government, but when. To prove to their rabbis the extent to which Labor is moving toward them, it was said this week in AY that Aloni had been forced to send the letter in which she committed herself to not introducing deleterious changes to the curricula concerning Israel's heritage in the general education system, a sign that Rabin can be relied upon.

This letter was produced after Shapira' explained to Shahal that AY fears not for the children in the independent educational system, but for all the children of Israel, who are liable to become cut off completely from their Jewish heritage, even from the minimum given to them in the general educational system. Shahal said, I will speak with Rabin about this. On Sunday, Aloni sent the letter to Rabin. It was of course brought immediately to the Torah sages' attention.

The haredim would have of course preferred different wording than that offered by Aloni. Their wording would have the children of Israel continuing to study the heritage of Israel and Jewish consciousness. Aloni did not accept it verbatim. UTJ elements say that when Shahal presented her with the [preferred haredi] wording of the letter, she said, "I am still going to need emergency treatment. What are you doing to me?"

Ultimately, after squirming, the education minister composed a letter in which she commits herself to not introducing deleterious changes to the educational curriculum in the general educational system regarding the heritage of Israel. "We will track this promise," AY members promised.

The haredi activists' very practical negotiations with Labor representatives revealed their operating method: They form an opinion and try to convince the Torah sages of its merit. This time as well, despite the clear veto which the rabbis imposed on joining the government in its present composition, the negotiations continued. Their haredi activists latest innovative idea is to create an educational affairs cabinet through which the AY could preserve its interests regarding independent and general education. Meanwhile, this week, the AY

received its initial compensation for joining the government in the future: The director general of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, Avraham Schwartz, an appointee of Porush, will continue to serve in Rabin's Government. Shapira' himself has already accepted an appointment to be a member on the Knesset finance committee at the expense of the quota of Labor MK's. He will also participate in meetings of the coalition.

This agreement was made with a view toward the no confidence vote this week. Haredi MK's promised to refrain in the future from submitting any no confidence motions. Nor will they participate in no confidence votes without permission from the heads of the Council of Torah Sages.

AY's appetite has been whetted. It is now demanding that the position of deputy minister also be given to Shmu'el Halpert, UTJ's only MK (other than Ravitz of DH) who has yet to receive a slot in the government.

Analysis of Likud's Opposition Tactics

*92AE0521C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
16 Jul 92 p B1*

[Article by Gid'on Alon]

[Text] The leaders of the Likud faction sent out clear signals this week, during the solemn opening session of the 13th Knesset, that they intend to be a militant opposition that will sharply criticize the actions, or the inactions, of the Rabin Government. In effect, all of the Likud speakers made it clear they have no intention of letting Rabin, Peres, Shohat, or their friends have an "easy life,"—and that the entire intent of their struggle will be to "embitter" the lives of the new government's ministers.

There is nothing wrong with a militant opposition. On the contrary, the main function of a legislature is to oversee the activities of the government, draw attention to inappropriate activities or governmental neglect, and insist on their correction. But the criticism should be relevant and stay within the rules of the parliamentary game. The new Prime Minister, Yitzhaq Rabin, also clarified in his inaugural address to the Knesset, that "We are not deluding ourselves. We know well what a tremendous task has been laid on us—nothing is ever done without mistakes. We expect criticism from you, no matter how harsh it may be, just as long as it is constructive criticism, out of concern for the future of this people."

But anyone who listened carefully this week to the music accompanying the speeches of several former Likud ministers, shortly before they took off their suits and ties and vacated their seats around the cabinet table, could not help noticing strident and threatening notes.

Thus, for example, the words of the outgoing Prime Minister, Yitzhaq Shamir—when Shamir declared of the new government, "there is complete alienation from all

national, Zionist, or Jewish content and extreme reaction against all the achievements of the nationalist coalition headed by the Likud," he proved he has still not come to terms with the election results. Shamir is trying to convince us and himself that the majority of voters gave their voices to the movements and parties clearly associated with national coalition the Likud leads. Shamir outdid himself when he declared that the "nationalist public in Israel is strongly opposed to redi-vision of the Land of Israel, and will not allow a government to rise in Israel that will keep Jews from living in any part of the Land of Israel."

The ire next overcame former minister Moshe Katzav, who announced that the Rabin Government supports the establishment of a Palestinian state against the will of the majority of the people. Knesset member Benny Begin also continued along that line: "the ingredient common to the various members of the new coalition is the readiness to hand over at least half of the territories of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza to autonomous Arab rule. And former deputy minister Binyamin Netanyahu, after warning Rabin lest he surrender to Arab arrows and not protect our rights in the Land of Israel, concluded "if you stray from the path—we will fight you, and if you remain on it—we will support you."

That is, there ran like a scarlet thread through the words of the Likud leaders not only a transparent attempt to spark fear in the population that the new government is on the verge of giving up the territories, but also a clear desire to warn Rabin that they will fight him bitterly if he dares to consider giving up an inch of land in the Gaza strip or the Samarian mountains, though Rabin had never made the slightest mention of such a thing in his speech.

But most worrisome were the strident notes crashing from the speech of outgoing Minister of Housing Ari'el Sharon. After proclaiming that the Arabs of Israel do not have, and never will have, national rights, he warned the new government that "woe to it and its leaders if, under the guise of promises of peace and prosperity, they discontinue the settling of all parts of the land of Israel, and lay the foundations for a second Arab state between the sea and the Jordan. We will not accept that, and we will fight with all our strength every action and policy of the Rabin Government that pushes Israel into the path of degeneration into a binational state in the spirit of the false prophesies of the Israeli Left."

What hides behind these warnings? What did Sharon mean when he declared "Woe to Mr. Rabin from us?" Is he trying to suggest that the Likud will not respect political decisions approved by the Knesset through the democratic process? Is Shamir trying to incite the public when he warns that "we will not allow the creation of a government that will prevent Jews from living in any part of the land of Israel"? Is there not in this something of a call to rise against a legitimate government chosen in free democratic elections?

It is incumbent on the leaders of the Likud, whom the electors have sent to the benches of the opposition, to show public responsibility, to guard their tongues, and above all, to show also the same degree of dignity they showed in midweek when they handed the administration over to the new government, when the government and the Knesset authorize democratically arrived-at decisions that depend on concession of territories not vital for defense. "The aspiration to remain in the camp in Lata is not the aspiration of all of us," new Knesset member, Brigadier General (Reserves) Avigdor Kahalani said this week in the Knesset, "and the aspiration to remain in Dir Al-Balah is not the aspiration we all share. The aspiration we all share is to continue living here."

Mota Gur on PLO Law, Golan Compromise, Gaza
92AE0521B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
16 Jul 92 p B3

[Interview with Deputy Defense Minister Mota Gur at home on 14 July, by Re'uven Padhatzur]

[Text] Mordekhay (Mota) Gur would be much more satisfied if Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin had made him defense minister. "It is not clear to me to this day why he is keeping the portfolio for himself," Gur remarks, concealing his dissatisfaction with difficulty, "but the moment Rabin decided that he was keeping the Defense portfolio for himself, I suggested that I be deputy minister."

There have been quite a few deputy ministers in the Defense Ministry, and they can be divided into two groups. The most representative of the first group is Tzvi Dinstein, who served as deputy while Levi Eshkol was defense minister. Dinstein not only ran the office, but also was quite involved in formulating policy. The other group includes former deputy minister 'Ovadya 'Eli, who left the post this week: 'Eli was given responsibility for secondary things and was cut off from the policy-making process. Gur is wary in the meantime of specifying the model he aspires to, but it is doubtful that he will be satisfied with overseeing the supply of gas masks and with responsibility for the rear.

At home in his garden, the day after the government was sworn in, Gur prefers not to spell out his positions on the topics currently before the Defense Ministry, before he studies the material in depth. But he does say decisively that he is in favor of drafting Yeshiva students, and that he thinks "the law forbidding meetings with the PLO is ridiculous, and should be nullified as quickly as possible."

[Padhatzur] Is the fact that you received only a deputy minister's post not a blow to your status? In the past you made it clear that you were in the running for prime minister.

[Gur] I decided to do this because I am interested, in the present situation, in being part of the peace process. And

from the moment Rabin decided that he would keep the defense portfolio to himself, I suggested that I be his deputy.

[Padhatzur] What has Rabin promised you? Have your responsibilities been defined?

[Gur] I have not asked for responsibilities, and I am not going to do that. That will come about naturally, day by day. I do not say there will be no problems. We are talking about very sensitive topics here, and it will not all go smoothly. But I do not need clarifications, promises, or job definitions, because there are no preconditions.

[Padhatzur] Even so, what will be your part in the peace process that you joined the Defense Ministry to help advance?

[Gur] I said to Rabin on Thursday, in answer to his question of what options I am considering, that I could not answer because I did not know how he intends to carry on the negotiations. I said to him that if he wants to run it the way he did in the previous government (1974-1977), that is one option, and if he wants to run it all from the prime minister's office, that is another story. His previous government had a team of ministers that included Foreign Minister Yigal Alon, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, and Yisra'el Gili. As commander in chief, I was like a permanent member of that team. On the other hand, I have also served in governments where you were a rubber stamp for decisions made by a limited group.

I was not party to the talks between Rabin and Peres, and I do not know what was decided, but the example of David Levi, as it was reported, is not encouraging for Shimon. I do not know yet how Rabin will handle the negotiations. So it is really not important whether we are talking about "minister" or "deputy minister." Yitzhaq will determine the direction of the negotiations. He added that I will be regularly invited to the cabinet. I did not know until then that "regularly invited" is a statutory term.

[Padhatzur] Relations between you and Rabin have been tense more than once. And in his book, he also blames you for what happened in the incident of the settlers in Sebastia in 1975, when you were chief of staff, saying that you effectively frustrated the chances of removing the settlers by force. And that you even sent him data that in his opinion were exaggerated, concerning the military force needed to remove them.

When I say we have a working relationship, that does not mean we have never had disagreements. The question that divided us in the case of Sebastia was whether military force was justified. I did not think it was, because this was a sociopolitical movement, and I did not believe it was possible to put an end to it by force. And I also told him that.

The main lesson that comes out of that, from the standpoint of Rabin, is that no matter what the subject of

discussion is—he will always know, without a shadow of a doubt, that he is receiving all information and that I am not part of any alliance against him. That the defense minister (Peres) and myself are not coordinating positions between ourselves on things that he should decide. It is clear to him that I am not a man of "Shirkes."

[Padhatzur] Do you believe Rabin will be able to keep his promise to put the autonomy program into action within six to nine months?

[Gur] I certainly imagine it can be done within nine months. The negotiations on the interim agreement between Israel and Egypt in 1975 began in February, and in September we had already signed it; before we joined the National Unity Government, Rabin said that within six months we would leave Lebanon, and we left. And this was in spite of the opposition of a majority of the Likud ministers.

[Padhatzur] In Sinai, as well in Lebanon, it was a redeployment for the army, but there are thousands of Jews and more than a million and a half Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza.

[Gur] The foundation for autonomy exists—the Camp David accords. It must be decided how to realize the accords. Practical solutions are needed for a whole series of problematic subjects—land, water, law, police, etc. But if the two sides approach it in a pragmatic way, answers can be found for these things. The real obstacle is the internal rivalry among the Palestinians, but none of us is responsible for that.

I believe that the overwhelming majority of the Jewish settlers in the territories will accept the package we bring. In my estimation, if there are no provocations from within—from among us, the Jews—it will be possible to find practical solutions.

Gur emphasizes that the autonomy negotiations should be carried on not by dealing with the overall Palestinian question, but through solving the problems connected with the lives of Israelis and the lives of the residents of the territories. "The autonomy arrangement is an interim arrangement and that is how it should be approached. Completing it will mean a long path of negotiations. That is to say, a process in whose framework it is possible to overcome problems whenever they spring up, until it is completed. Only after the autonomy negotiations are complete and have been in effect for three years, negotiation on a permanent arrangement will begin. So, there are problems that will be brought up for discussion as part of the negotiations for the permanent arrangement, but they should not be dealt with now.

[Padhatzur] Would it be worthwhile to test the autonomy first in Gaza, and only then on the West Bank?

[Gur] Gaza is an inseparable part of the arrangement we are speaking of. So it is not a case of Gaza first, of a

separate solution for Gaza. An interim arrangement should include all the Palestinians in the territories, except Jerusalem.

[Padhatur] Does the solution include dismantling settlements, for example?

[Gur] In the autonomy arrangement we are not speaking at all of dismantling settlements. There is no justification and no need. We are speaking of an interim arrangement and it must give practical answers. In the negotiations that will begin three years after the autonomy goes into effect, there will be a need to provide answers for more acute problems: permanent borders; which territories will remain under our sovereignty; Jerusalem and her environs, etc.

[Padhatur] How will the permanent arrangement look, as you envision it?

[Gur] Anyone who says now that he knows what the permanent arrangement will look like is a liar or an idiot. Since it is impossible to know how autonomy will develop, and how the positions of Jordan and the Palestinians will develop, any commitment beyond the Labor Party platform is a lie, or just foolishness.

When he comments nevertheless on the principles of the permanent arrangement, Gur speaks in general terms of a Jordanian-Palestinian state as a possible solution. An independent Palestinian state is not a solution, because its territory would be small—the Jordan valley, the Jerusalem region, and Gush Etzion region would remain in Israeli hands—a thing that will hamper a solution to the problem of the Palestinian diaspora; and because, according to the Palestinian view, the independent Palestinian state includes Jerusalem as the capital. “A ministate like that would be a point of frustration in an awakening Islamic region and would be more a source of trouble than a basis for agreement,” he says. “The defensive borders needed to guard the security of the State of Israel can be achieved within the framework of a Jordanian-Palestinian state.

[Padhatur] Why not encourage more active cooperation from Jordan in the autonomy negotiations?

[Gur] At this stage, Jordan should be a partner, there is no doubt of that. We have no opposition to Jordanian participation, even at this stage. But we will not agree to Jordan's, if she has reasons for it, trying to prevent autonomy being put into effect.

[Padhatur] Rabin has declared that we will not leave the Golan, even for a peace treaty. Do you feel comfortable with that declaration?

[Gur] Since I am the one who formulated that line in the party platform, I must emphasize that it also says that Israel will negotiate the Golan Heights in accord with resolutions 242 and 338, which imply territorial compromise. This should be seen as a formal basis for beginning talks. But before it is possible to speak of peaceful coexistence with Syria, we must be sure that Syria has

really changed her strategy from war to peace, and that she will be ready to significantly reduce the military threat to Israel by reduction of her weapons of all kinds. We must negotiate with Syria and negotiate autonomy at the same time, at the same time remembering that while autonomy is no threat to Israel, the arrangement with Syria is liable to be complicated and take a long time.

Gur is well aware of the danger inherent in nuclearization of the Near East. In his opinion this is a process Israel will not be able to prevent and therefore, from every practical viewpoint, Israel must go on the assumption that the Near East is likely to enter a nuclear era. Gur believes that Israel will be able to survive in a nuclear Near East if she takes the right actions. “Israel said that she will not be the first to bring nuclear weapons into the Near East—she must not fall behind—if there are reports of developments that could lead to a nuclear Near East, Israel will have to weigh her positions and general policy. And there are several possibilities—disarmament, for example.” Gur is against Israel being the one to initiate an agreement on nuclear disarmament for the Near East.

[Padhatur] What do you imagine the future of the “Hetz” project will be?

[Gur] I have no doubt that both Rabin and myself will be asking long, hard questions on that problem. Rabin will definitely have a difficult time when it comes to that subject, especially since he has declared that the defense budget will not be expanded. The “Hetz” is a very complicated problem, because the project is exceptionally expensive.

[Padhatur] Will you be competing again for the leadership of the party?

[Gur] Yes, when the time comes. Not in the next four years.

Call For Public Ownership of State Land

92AE0541B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
15 Jul 92 p B1

[Article by Efrayim Reiner: “What Is Required Is Controlled Reform”]

[Text] The story is told about Levi Eshkol that he sighed once, on the eve of his approval of the state budget in the Knesset—an inflated, deficit budget—that he was praying that his grandchildren would still get to sell the country for the sums invested in its construction and then buy it back at value. The heads of the Israel Lands Administration are apparently the first to try to realize this hope. In a hurried action on the eve of the elections and with the authorization of the Treasury Minister, Ari'el Sharon, they transferred to the renters of agricultural land the right to change its designation and enjoy the fruits of its enhancement—thus, an agrarian reform, Israeli style.

True, everyone recognizes that the Israeli economy requires structural transformation to bring it into line as much as possible with the economies of the established and developed countries. Furthermore, it is no accident that one of the essential components of this reform is privatization, i.e., the withdrawal by the government from ownership of property and its disentanglement from administrative involvement in businesses. The heads of the economy and the government are agreed on the call to get rid of the "Bolshevik" characteristics of the Israeli economy, as if Israel (and not czarist Russia) underwent a Communist revolution that nationalized the economy, and now the time had come to privatize it.

No Talk of Privatization

Nevertheless, one issue, perhaps the main characteristic of an economy controlled by the political establishment, remains beyond discussion, and that is the privatization of state lands.

There is no other western economy in the entire world whose government owns the overwhelming majority of the land. Still, there is no one asking Israel for an "agrarian reform."

Public ownership of the land is not perceived as a Bolshevik characteristic. Everyone knows that it is actually a national calling card. More precisely, a Zionist one: nationally owned land is at the disposal of the settlement enterprise of Jews in the Land of Israel.

Theodore Herzl established the Jewish National Fund for Israel—the institution entrusted with acquiring control of territory intended for settlement—years before Lenin became a recognized figure. We can assume that he had never heard his name and was not familiar with his philosophy.

Placing Israeli Lands at the disposal of a national redemption enterprise has put them beyond the scope of the "Bolshevik" comparison and freed them from the punishment of the religion of privatization.

Really? It turns out that market forces are stronger than any ideology. The crisis that has occurred in agriculture has turned land rented to settlers on the explicit condition that they not be transferred to others, into marketable property. In devious and indirect ways they are openly traded. In some moshavim, rights to work the entire land surface, which were granted to the settlement as a whole, have been concentrated in the hands of two or three families.

Even more than that: here and there in the Land of Israel Arabs have been returning and taking back land their fathers sold or lost in war. Private land is sold to Arabs despite the protests of those faithful to the national tradition, and lands under control of the Israel Land Administration change hands (national hands) under the table. If land ownership is a national symbol, it faces a serious challenge from market pressures.

The decision of the Israeli Land Administration to free farmers from their obligation to return the land to the Administration if it undergoes a "change in designation" from agriculture to industry, for example, or even from agriculture to home construction is, as we said, a far-reaching decision: Those who hold national land on the strength of the Zionist tradition gain the ability to enjoy personal advantage from the fruits of its enhancement.

Lands belonging to the city of Ashdod were allotted, at times, to 'Oved ben 'Ami, to Shiqun 'Ovdim and to Kelel (City Builders Company, Inc.), who acquired them to design and build the city on a commercial basis. The late Treasury Minister Yehoshua Rabinovitz invested all his prestige in trying to stop this "speculative" arrangement. He was not willing to reconcile himself with having state land enrich private initiative. In the '30's the contractors who built the city of Tel Aviv were condemned as profiteers. Even making a profit on private land was disqualified and considered parasitic.

The Matter Is Worthy of Study

It may be that the settlers are deserving of everything granted them in the above-mentioned decision of the Administration. It may be that the matter is worthy of study. One way or the other, the privatization of state lands must not be carried out absentmindedly. If we stand on the threshold of the post-Zionist era (and, apparently, that is the case), we should enter that era with clear understanding, public control and sound footing.

For years the Israel Land Administration was managed by the Ministry of Agriculture (as a trust for agricultural settlement); later it was transferred to the Ministry of construction and Housing (as a trust to enhance the power of whoever headed it). The time has come to transfer it to the right ministry—the Ministry of Infrastructure. There is such a ministry, and Minister 'Amnon Rubinstein has just now been put in charge of it.

This is a proposal to give the right man the administration of the required reform.

Transfer of Jews From Territories Analyzed

92AE0591B Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
3 Aug 92 p 23

[Article by 'U. Landau: "It Is the Same Transfer"]

[Text] The transfer of Jews—this is the only meaning of the government's policy according to its decisions and its ministers' declarations to this point. It has decided to freeze the vast majority of roads in Judaea and Samaria, canceled contracts for 6,881 apartments, is examining the freeze of thousands of additional apartments, ordered the denial of economic benefits for tens of thousands of residents of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza and dozens of industrial plants, its inspectors threaten private contractors who are building on their own initiative so that they will not continue, Commerce Minister

Harish ordered "not to approve requests for the establishment of plants in the territories," and Health Minister Ramon announced that "Health ministry orders will be transferred from plants in the territories to development towns," and the list goes on.

The government is actively freezing the physical development and is drying up, with smooth talk from its ministers, the residents. Its steps are hard, the purposeful declarations of its ministers are drastic, and over all of them the air of incitement that the government is creating arises like poison around the settlers. The vast majority of them are Israelis like you and I, but they are presented as messianic types and as parasites who are cynically taking advantage of the state treasury at the expense of the development towns.

The truth, that the development towns have received at least the same benefits, interests no one; it makes no difference that the kibbutzim, especially the industrial kibbutzim, have received much more in recent years. What is important is to depict the residents of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza as untouchables.

One kibbutz, for example, Barur-Hayil, received imaginary aid from the state in the framework of an arrangement with kibbutzim to cover 150 million shekels of its debts, while, to all the rest, the public treasury discharged billions. They were deserving of this aid, even if not to such an extent, and no one created a witch-hunt atmosphere. But the residents of Judaea and Samaria have become enemies of the people in the eyes of the Jews, in the eyes of the Arabs they are outlaws, and the government could claim endlessly that it views them as Israelis and will officiate for them as Israelis in all matters. Who would believe it [the government], when it is creating conditions and an atmosphere of pressure around them to move inside the Green Line?

It is ironic, but the government unintentionally adapted Gandhi's "voluntary transfer" to the Jews. The leaders of Peace Now, who have won wide support among coalition members, have already suggested, in newspaper articles, giving monetary benefits to settlers who would agree to leave Judaea and Samaria. And the government ministers, who, in the past, despised Rabbi Kahane as a racist when he went out on a provocative visit to Umm-al-Fahm in order to suggest a respectable amount of money for every Arab who would agree to emigrate, are doing as he did to their fellow Jews.

Rabin did not receive a mandate for this. He also did not receive a mandate to shatter a public norm, and this is a first time in the history of the state for recruiting Arab factions to support the government and its policies, [factions] which want to undermine Israel's foundations as a Jewish state, and for obligating itself to deliver hundreds of millions of shekels per year for the Arab segment in compensation.

His government could cause great damage to the settlement enterprise, but it will not be able to eradicate it.

The opposition against it will be greater than anything that we have ever known in Israel.

Institutionalization of Settlement Movement

*92AE0517A Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew
13 July 92 pp 18-19*

[Article by Shlomo Dror]

[Text] In his house in Hebron, Rabbi Moshe Levinger tells me that the Arabs must be given some form of autonomy. In Beit El, Miri Mas says that most of the residents have come to accept the idea of autonomy. The Council of Settlements in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza has reached a decision to resist autonomy by all lawful means available to the residents. The mood of the settlers has changed from depression the day after the elections to an atmosphere of setting out for battle on a united right-wing front. But signs of confusion have been noted recently. In Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, they are saying that the right-wing politicians' elbows are full of scratches from crawling to the Labor Government. There are even those who say, "They are orphaning us. If they put our backs to the wall, a new underground will spring up. Out of 130,000 residents, we will create a bigger and better underground than the tens of thousands of residents produced 12 years ago." Beyond the pronouncements, however, it is clear that a new underground is not at all their fondest wish. Most residents reject such extremist talk.

Benny Katzover did earn prominent headlines when he announced that the settlers would take up arms, but what he and others meant was that, in the event of autonomy, a clash between settlers and Palestinian policemen would be liable to lead to the use of arms. In reality, his statement contains no threat or change in attitude. Even today, many confrontations between settlers and Palestinians end in shooting, whether by the settlers in response to stone-throwing or by the Palestinians attempting an attack.

Given that, the chances that a new underground will arise are slight. Twelve years after exposure of the underground, the settlers are well established, Jewish settlement in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza has grown tenfold and they boast institutions in numbers it would be difficult to find in venerable settlements within the green line. The feeling that their backs are to the wall does not yet exist.

The members of the Jewish underground have imposed a veil of silence around themselves and would not agree to be interviewed about that period. Someone who was close to the underground says that he does not see a potential for that. "We do not have anyone who would agree to accept the responsibility and organize an underground. Nor is there an atmosphere of approval, legitimation in advance. Clearly, anyone who gives of himself for the general good will find support once he starts, but to do things not recognized as legitimate, that requires special people. And the members of the underground

were not a typical group. Today there is a softness, a sense of statehood and establishment, that throttles initiative."

As he sees it, the settlers do not understand the significance of autonomy. "The Likud sugar-coated the word to prevent a reaction from the right. At least with Rabin, the lines are clear, but Labor also will try to dress it up to fool people. There have already been some discussions between Labor and us. I am not sure what they accomplished, but that is a start."

Miri Mas, who lives in Beit El, is active in a group called "Women of Rahel." The members of this unofficial group set up a tent camp of women near Shilo after Rahel Druck and Yitzhaq Rofe were shot to death in an ambush as they drove to a right-wing demonstration against the Madrid Conference. Ever since the murders, the women have been living in shifts in a tent next to a Nahal [military-agricultural service] base that was established on the spot. Plans have already been approved for establishing a permanent settlement. Construction is supposed to begin soon, but the settlement's fate is now up in the air. The Council of Settlements says that "Every approved settlement will be built and every approved plan will be fulfilled or we will petition the Supreme Court."

Mas says that, deep in their hearts, the residents have reconciled themselves to autonomy; what remains is to struggle so that it will be as limited as possible and will not lead to a Palestinian state. Mas explains why an underground will not arise. "Everyone has a house and a family, we live in well-organized settlements. There is nothing to do, we have become an institution and our methods of struggle have changed."

It is difficult to regard Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza as all of one piece. There are large settlements, like Ari'el, Ma'aleh-Adumim, Alfe-Menashe and others, most of whose inhabitants came looking for homes with a low price tag and a high quality of life. Most of them voted for Likud, some for other right-wing parties, a few for Labor and some even for MERETZ [the joint Citizens Rights Movement-Shinuy-MAPAM [United Workers' Party]].

Then there are the small settlements. They say in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza that their intellectual level is higher because the people who came to live in these settlements did so for ideological and patriotic reasons while sacrificing the comforts and safety of the cities. Most of them voted for parties to the right of Likud, a few for Likud. These are the people who forge the image of settlement and the character of its activities. For example, a number of settlers harassed the Minister of Defense some months ago, chasing him with signs denouncing his handling of the intifadah. The hecklers came from Elon-Moreh and other small settlements. The only one to come to [Moshe] Arens' aid was Ron Nahman, chairman of the Ari'el council.

There are differences, too, among the smaller settlements—between agricultural and communal settlements, secular and religious. But the sharpest difference is between the radical settlements, like Tapuah (an offshoot of "Kahane Lives") or a Jewish settlement in Hebron, and the institutionalized settlements such as Ari'el, 'Ofra, Beit El, and others. The broad spectrum of settlements is opposed to the creation of a new underground. Uri Ari'eli, chairman of the Council of Settlements in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, has said that he does not exclude the possibility that individuals will take up arms against Arabs, but that only fanatics will do so. An underground will not arise, for it would have no legitimacy among the residents.

'Ofra's Ze'ev Erlich (Jabo)—who was the "operations officer" of the settlers who some months back reopened roads that the army had blocked—says that all such remarks are vacuous. "Who can guarantee that autonomy will go into effect? Who would have believed that Europe would not be united in 1992? Just this morning, we heard that Algeria's president was murdered. The dispute in this region is becoming religious, so the chances for settling it depend on whether a leader comes forward to sit down with Hamas. All the others, 'Arafat and the Front, will not bring a solution. When they set cars on fire these days, they do not write Fatah on them, they write Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement]."

Erlich, too, rejects the possibility of a new underground. "The discovery of the underground was a shock. People here know one another, these are your friends. I believe that we will be content with conventional actions. We will try to contain the damage of autonomy by control over sources of water and annexation of government land. We will fight with the tools of the left, through the press and the courts and successive votes of no-confidence."

Erlich believes in the strength of the settlers to get through a Labor government. "Settlement has quadrupled through the four years of the intifadah. The explanation that people are coming here because it is inexpensive is incorrect. What the buyer saves on his house he spends on travel and protection for his car against stones and molotov cocktails. Besides, the people who moved things here were from Mapai [Israel Workers' Party], Yig'al Alon, Moshe Dayan, and Ari'el Sharon. They knew how to keep control."

Levinger also says that the intifadah is continuing because there is no control. Hebron has an active Committee for Safety on the Roads, whose members are summoned after each attack on a Jewish settler for acts of vengeance that leave behind shattered windows and burning shops. The committee's activists are "Kakh" members. Levinger states that he is not thrilled by people taking the law into their own hands but that one can understand people who live perpetually under a sword when the government refuses to use force to impose the

rule of law in the territories. "The Likud sputtered and paid the price for it," he asserts.

Levinger is also calling for the creation of an organization to challenge Gush Emunim. He and Daniella Weiss declare that Gush has become institutionalized and lacks the toughness needed for the struggle to come. The Emuna movement now must see to more than 100 settlements; whoever manages such an economic confederation cannot bite the hand of the system that feeds him. The Council of Settlements will also continue the struggle according to the consensus. It depends on the system for budget allocations and solutions to problems in the settlements; some of its employees receive a salary from the Ministry of the Interior. In the meantime, the system is showing itself so strong that Levinger's call for the creation of an alternative organization to Gush Emunim has not led to concrete steps.

Another body that tempers the settlers is the Council of Rabbis in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza. Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, a figure of great influence, radiates moderation. In fact, there seems at present to be no personality among the rabbis radical enough to lead the settlers to total war.

The most radical circles are "Kahane Lives" and "Kakh," small groups whose strength is in words and not in the use of arms. "Kahane Lives" is composed of people with a messianic faith who follow their leader, Benyamin Ze'ev Kahane, to demonstrations and acts of improvised vandalism. During Purim, "Kahane Lives" caused damage to the mosque in Kfar Qira but not a single shot was fired during the disturbance from any of the guns they had in abundance.

"Kakh" is more organized and better prepared in its activities. Though its members do not burn with messianic zeal, they espouse an extreme nationalistic ideology. But even "Kakh" does not itch to pull the trigger. When their leader, Barukh Marzal, was summoned to court to state why he was unwilling to return a weapon that the army wanted to confiscate, he explained that he had never, ever fired the gun. Apparently, Marzal knew how to create the impression that every second bullet fired in Hebron came from his gun and had himself photographed with it in every conceivable pose, but was wise enough not to incriminate himself by actually shooting it. Such people can carry out isolated actions but they are well known to the security forces. It is reasonable to suppose that the army will keep them under its thumb.

The idea of the settlements drying up brings a smile to the settlers' faces. Housing Minister Sharon is bequeathing a substantial legacy in the territories. New neighborhoods were added to many settlements in the past two years. Most of them were built so far from existing houses that the "Peace Now" movement has argued on many occasions that they represent new settlements. Indeed, what remains for these settlements is to fill in the wide expanses between existing neighborhoods and the additions. The utilities stretching between

them will preserve ownership, land will continue to be cheap and if the government does not care to build, there are always private contractors.

For quite some time, the Council of Settlements in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza has been carrying on a romance with Jewish communities abroad. The community in France, for example, has contributed large sums for construction in Hebron. There are a number of funds sponsored by these communities. The most recent of these, the Benjamin Council Fund, was established a month ago. Aharon Domb, a high ranking official on the Council, launched a fund drive in the communities and has even held fundraisers in support of settlement in the territories. That is how settlements in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza have plenty of money for nongovernmental institutions and expect that the flow of contributions will rise when the question of the settlements comes up for discussion. Whoever speaks about the settlements drying up must consider how to cut them off from other sources of money. From both the practical and the legal angle, however, it is difficult to believe that it can be done, particularly when the government's line is that all money entering Israel is good for the economy. If this money gives the residents of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza the illusion that settlement will not be frozen, it serves as a moderating force.

"People want to feel relaxed and so they look for things that make them feel at ease," says Jabo Erlich. According to Erlich, the government will do all it can to keep things calm; the question is what will happen when autonomy goes into effect. Another resident says that Palestinians already pick up their garbage in Ramala. Autonomy will have to give them more than that. The main thing is that people will feel a prick in their hearts the moment signs of autonomy appear in the territories. "With the army and our government, we had 1,001 road blocks. None of that will be there when we face a Palestinian policeman. The solution is to continue our administration or separate the peoples."

These speakers agree on one thing: the odds of an underground are low. On the other hand, a government ignorant of how to neutralize feelings of frustration, or a sterile contest that will yield no results, may induce someone here and there to acts of extremism. Miri Mas says that the four years of the intifadah and moments of existential danger have so toughened the settlers that they will withstand still more difficult times (such as Arab autonomy). Jabo states that everyone will work in his own way, MERETZ in MERETZ and Tzomet as it wants. "None of this says anything about what is to come. Thirteen people run this country, the judges of the Supreme Court and the government's legal advisor. None of them was elected, they are all appointed. Now we will go over to the methods of the left, we will work as they do. What these people have on their side is the law, not justice."

[Box, p 18]

Article by Hagai Segel: "Hunting Season Has Begun"

It is not easy to recall western opposition assailing the government with such uninhibited expressions of vengeance. In some reports of the victory, one can identify the clear motifs of a blood-feud: freeze, dry up, stop, suspend. The coronation speeches were weak on promises to make the Negev bloom but overflowed with vows to lay waste Samaria. They offered not a pledge to reassure the nation but an oath to wreak havoc on the settlers.

The signs are growing that, in the current hunting season, the old-new coalition has already revived use of the infamous Mapai lexicon: "dissidents" instead of "opposition," "hoodlums" instead of "demonstrators," "fascist demagoguery" instead of "the right of protest." Who knows, maybe they will also bring back the barren term "events" [used for Arab riots during the British Mandate] for the "intifadah" and "self-restraint" in place of "submission to the American plan."

In tandem, a surging wave of purges will begin. The first to walk the plank will be that enemy of the people, Pli'a Albeck [a government lawyer who offered a legal opinion that Arabs were not entitled to compensatory damages for loss of life]. After her will come the turn of Arye Meqel and Shlomo Qur. The purgatory bath will not spare generals who sinned by putting in a good word for the settlers or had the courage to accept in return a token of esteem in trying circumstances. Dozens of nasty functionaries in the Housing and Finance Ministries will pay the price for every square meter they built without permission from "Peace Now." As early as the day after, a senior figure in the Labor Party rang up important officials in the Finance Ministry and threatened them with reprisals if and when it is discovered that they signed a single check at the order of the Housing Ministry after June 23. It would be superfluous to note that the clerks got the message and acted accordingly. They have families to feed.

As I have said, everything will be done within the law, with malice and a heavy hand. Every antidemocratic offense will be anchored in new laws for defending democracy against factions that attempted to impart to it too broad an interpretation. It will fortify those who denied the right of "Kakh" to exist without impinging in the slightest on the parallel right of HADASH [Democratic Movement for Peace and Equality], which will find a suitable legal formulation for muzzling mouths throughout the Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza dialing area. One August night, it will turn out that there is a thorny legal problem with Channel 7. Months later, the Attorney General will snag "Nequda" on his hook, too. The official pretext will be that the organ's editorials border on criminal incitement against the coalition platform and/or provoking strife in the face of the peace process (Rabin, incidentally, once before closed down a

Jewish newspaper in Samaria, "Alef-Yod," until an order of the Supreme Court compelled him to reopen it).

Under the new regulations for times of emergency, Yosi Sarid this week permitted the authorities to unleash on Gush Emunim everything that previously had been forbidden them to do to the soldiers of the intifadah. "If the settlers engage in violent protests," the government's ethics advisor made clear, "we will be obliged to employ force firmly to suppress them."

Listen, IDF [Israel Defense Forces], there is approval from Yosi Sarid to break the fascists' bones. A brigade commander in Samaria can shatter the limbs of Katozers without risk to his rank, or execute mass administrative detentions in Qiryat-'Arb'a without fear of the Supreme Court. To the extent needed, he may also firmly crush any show of resistance by the rabbis of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza.

Meanwhile, until the security agencies are officially bent to the will of MERETZ, circles in the government-elect will have to manage with applying psychological force against the vanquished objects of their hatred. The Sarid-Tzuqer combo is trying to give their recent revolution, a revolution eked out by the grace of Darusha, the image of a post-Ceausescu transformation. Senior economic correspondents were busy this week describing the development drive in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza during the Sharon period as crimes against humanity. Our tattletale ministries are leaking rumors about state-of-the-art paper shredders designed to mask building defects and cover up flaws in road construction. "An IDF company guarded every settlement," a high-level researcher fantasized this week in one of the major newspapers. "Even the people who live here realize how much is wasted." Not much is lacking for "Peace Now" to open a museum displaying a trove of shoes seized at Rabbi Levinger's winter palace beside a collection of dazzling jewelry belonging to Hanan Porat's wife. Grim-faced hostesses will guide throngs of visitors through labyrinths of fabulous prefab asbestos to be brought to the museum from Talmon B, while a sound-and-light spectacular about the southern village's demented people will be shown every hour on the hour.

But a little while longer and Minister of Justice Rubinstein will present the Knesset a draft law for punishing anyone who, between the dates of May 18, 1977 and June 24, 1992, settled for political reasons, gave aid and comfort to settlement or did not prevent others from settling. At a later stage, a state investigating commission will be formed to study the conditions that enabled the founding of Qiryat-'Arb'a and the compromise at Qedumim. Yig'al Alon and Yisra'el Galili will be summoned by the commission's chairman for posthumous testimony and Levi Eshqol will be required to give reasons for his part in the creation of Gush Etzion.

At least some tracks will lead to Yitzhaq Rabin himself. It is well-known that during his time as Prime Minister,

Rabin inaugurated the first political house in Netzer-Hazani, the very first political settlement in the Gaza Strip, and won approval for the creation of Ma'aleh-Adumim and Ari'el, political settlements in their own right. In light of these incriminating findings, there is some basis for hoping that the man will have second thoughts and restrain both Tzucker's cresting intentions for drying up the settlements and Sarid's plotting to suppress them.

Analysis of Nuclear First-Strike Doctrine

92AE0513C Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
12 Jul 92 p 19

[Article by Shlomo Gazit: "Rabin's Nuclear Challenge"]

[Text] In advance of the establishment of the new government headed by Yitzhaq Rabin, there has been a lot of discussion as to whether he will succeed in putting an end to the cycle of wars and paving the way for an Israeli-Arab political settlement. It is clear to every intelligent person that such an agreement, should it be achieved, would, in the best case, be one that the two sides would adopt with mixed feelings—because of the need to concede physical property (which is so important to Israel from a security perspective), for emotional-ethical reasons and because of the uncertainty as to whether it would be applicable to the entire process.

The military threats we face involve a number of cycles of time and power. The most distant threat, 10 years off according to the intelligence experts, is also the most dangerous. I am referring to the Muslim-Arab effort to achieve nuclear potential. According to the publications we have at hand, this effort is being conducted in parallel in Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Algeria. The basic assumption is that at least one of them will certainly reach the objective—nuclear weapons—within the stated time frame.

That will happen, if it happens, long after the new government has completed its tenure. But if the next four years are not exploited for a breakthrough, it is doubtful that the next government in line, the one to be established after the 1996 elections, would still be able to achieve the required agreement.

In June 1981 Israeli Air Force planes destroyed the Iraqi Osiraq reactor and thus delayed Saddam Husayn's nuclear development effort by a few years. I am sure the Prime Minister designate knows that Israel cannot carry out that kind of mission again against every one of the above-mentioned states. Operational restrictions and political considerations prevent us in advance from forcefully blocking nuclear weaponry in the Arab-Muslim states.

We must therefore suppose that in the future we will face a new military-strategic balance. Anyone who tries to compare that with the balance of terror that characterized relations between the two great blocs from the 1950's to the 1990's is mixing apples and oranges. In the

statistics of the Middle East we are talking about a very serious asymmetry from Israel's point of view.

First, there is no comparison between the destructive potential of Arab nuclear weaponry employed against Israel and the destructive potential in the opposite direction. Israel has no prospect of surviving such a scenario; at best we could "do a Sampson" and "take the Philistines down with us."

Second, it is customary to suppose that Israel would also employ weapons of mass destruction to block and frustrate an Arab conventional attack if the latter were to be stunningly successful. But the application of that idea is by no means simple. Both the Arab side and the international arena would deal with such a reaction according to the geography. A reaction to Arab military success in the territories beyond the 1967 lines would be seen in an entirely different light than a reaction to a strike against the "little" State of Israel.

Third, Israeli use of weapons of mass destruction cannot be considered a solution to an Arab war of attrition or a conventional missile attack on population centers.

Fourth, an Israel that tries to reach a political agreement 10 years from now, after balance has been achieved in the ownership of weapons of mass destruction, will be in a bad bargaining position—without most of the cards that she holds today.

All in all, such asymmetry is unacceptable for Israel. On the other hand, since it seems almost unpreventable, the clear conclusion is that it is better to do it now: We have to strive immediately to reach a political settlement. This is the nuclear challenge, and this is the urgent mission of the new government.

MILITARY

Chilean-Israeli Aircraft Ventures Described

92SM0554A Santiago QUE PASA in Spanish 13 Jul 92
pp 21-22

[Article by Grace Gibson: "High-Flying Business"; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Israel has a special place in the trip of General Vega and [Minister of Defense] Rojas. Chile has been silently turned into Israel's principal Latin American associate in the arms field.

It is not easy to establish contact all at once with people like Horacio Portuguez, Oscar Pinochet, or Jose Abayu. Currently as representatives of different Israeli arms companies, they have learned to move with a proper amount of subtlety and efficiency in dealing with the Chilean Army, Air Force, and Navy, so that business transactions undertaken between them and their affiliates will be successful.

And not in vain, since Israel began to see Chile as a good market in the 1970's. The business transactions between the two sides have not been limited solely to the purchase and sale of arms, but also have included a series of joint development projects. This has allowed Chilean defense industry—particularly Asmar [Naval Docks and Yards] and Enaer [National Aeronautical Enterprise]—to enter the difficult field of research and development of high-technology products.

Officially, one of these projects is the principal reason for the stopover in Israel of the trip begun last week by Patricio Rojas, minister of defense, and Gen. Ramon Vega, commander in chief of the Chilean Air Force. The trip also includes the United States, Spain, and Kuwait. The joint project with Israel involves the Tiger III program, which involves the further modernization of aircraft and armaments systems controls of the F-5 E/F jet. The prototype of this new, modernized aircraft, which will be used to train Chilean fighter pilots, has already been exhibited in Tel Aviv. Nevertheless, the most important aspect of this agreement is that, beginning in the second half of 1992, Enaer, working at El Bosque Air Base, will carry out the work of modernizing this type of aircraft.

The success of this defense industry relationship is specifically based on the broad range of possibilities that are opening up to Chile through the agreements it has reached with Israel. The relationships with companies based in Tel Aviv are not limited to the purchase of equipment. Rather, in addition, they make it possible for Chilean engineers to learn and bring back their knowledge to Chile. The objective sought, in addition to reducing costs and achieving a certain degree of independence, is also to change the concept of a defense industry that is focused only on the domestic market to begin to open itself up to other countries by exporting its products.

At the present time, it is significant that Chile's best associate in defense equipment is Israel. Among the evidence that supports this statement is the fact that representatives of the Israeli defense industries now live permanently in Santiago. This is the case with Johannan Rosser, office director of Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI), a holding company located in Providencia, where four people work. Horacio Portuguez, of Israel Military Industries (IMI), has the best contacts with the Chilean Army. Jose Abayu, owner of Sistemas Digitales [Digital Systems Company], has the best contacts with the Chilean Navy. Oscar Pinochet, owner of Emcor [expansion not given], has the best contacts with the Chilean Air Force.

One of the principal characteristics that the representatives of the various Israeli defense companies have in Chile is their prudence in handling their contacts. Unlike the British or North Americans, who work with great ostentation, the Jews avoid all publicity. Furthermore, they develop specific contacts with the countries where

they wish to sell their products. For this reason they have different representatives for each country in Latin America.

The special relationships with Chile arose in the 1970's. Forced to establish contact with countries prepared to sell their arms by going behind the Kennedy amendment, Chile began to establish relationships with suppliers such as Singapore, South Korea, South Africa, and Israel. Nevertheless, the only country that could provide arms with an adequate level of technology was Israel. Then, and particularly at the end of the 1980's, the relationships were strengthened even further. First, because at the international level, the Chilean Armed Forces had succeeded in projecting a "professional" image, a title that few Third World countries have. For example, the Chilean Navy is considered a "Blue Water Force," in military jargon. That is, a high seas force, not merely composed of small ships. Secondly, because until now Chile has been one of the few Latin American countries that has paid all of its purchase commitments on time.

In the case of Argentina, for example, and despite the fact that there is a certain level of interchange, contacts with Israel have not been fruitful. Relationships between Argentina and Israel deteriorated, particularly after the Malvinas war, when certain commitments were not kept. Argentina acquired Skyhawk aircraft in Israel. However, the British succeeded in having the North Americans veto the purchase, even though Argentina had already paid an arm and a leg for them. As a result, trade relations between the two countries deteriorated substantially. Furthermore, during that same post-Malvinas war period some aircraft were sent to Tel Aviv for repair. However, they had to be returned because of further pressure from the British. Meanwhile, the Israelis do not have good contacts with Peru and Bolivia and only have friendly relations with Ecuador, although these relations are not comparable with the relations they have with Chile.

[Box, p 22]

Joint Projects

The following are some of the results that Chile has obtained, thanks to its special contacts with Israeli defense industries:

Chilean Air Force

In 1986, the Chilean National Aeronautical Enterprise (Enaer) undertook Project Pantera [Panther], which involved the modification of the Chilean Air Force's fleet of Mirage aircraft. On the basis of this project, and specifically in the field of electronic warfare and communications, the Israel Defense Industry (IDI) set up a mixed company with Enaer, called DTS (Technologies and Systems Development Limited). This is a private company that specializes in the area of electronics. At present, other projects are being developed, such as the modification of passenger aircraft for air-to-air refueling.

Project Tiger-2 was also undertaken on a joint basis. This involved the modernization of F-5 E/F aircraft. Work is presently being done on Project Tiger-3, which involves the complete updating of work done under Tiger-2. The agreements with Israel are for purchase with offset possibilities for Chile.

Chilean Navy

In 1989, the Chileans bought the Barak system of anti-aircraft missiles, making Chile the first country in the world that dared to do this. The significance of this development was the fact that the Chilean Navy acquired the equipment at a very good price because the purchase was made when Israel had just developed this system. At present, successful operational trials have been made. Furthermore, Asmar is working with Israel on a joint basis on everything involved in electronics warfare (command, radars, etc.).

Chilean Army

One of the first results of the relationship with Israel was the acquisition of M-51 tanks in 1978. These are very similar to the Sherman tanks used by the Allies during World War II. However, the Chilean Army has also acquired high-technology products, as in 1989, when it bought the MAPATS [expansion not given] system. This missile is similar to the TOW missile system, which was used during the Gulf War. The difference is that, instead of being guided by a wire system, MAPATS is laser-guided. Finally, Israel is sufficiently interested in working on the Chilean Army's Rayo [Ray] rocket and on its fire control system in particular.

Among the advantages of the close contacts that Chile has succeeded in developing with Israel are the possibilities of opening up international markets. Aware that the defense industry cannot be limited to domestic production if it does not wish to run the risk of stagnating and dying, companies such as Enaer and, above all, Asmar, are trying with increasing intensity to get into the international market. This is particularly true now, when it is possible to compete with certain advantages, even in developed-country markets, such as Europe and the United States. At present, those industries have been reduced in size by the end of the Cold War. Many companies have even gone bankrupt or have been forced to adapt themselves to the new situation. This is the case with helicopter factories in Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy, all of which had to join together to survive by setting up the Eurocopter Company. As a result, Third World countries can compete, thanks to their cheaper labor costs and because they are increasingly capable of developing high-level technology.

Furthermore, present relations with Israel are even reaching the level of acting together when selling their products in other markets. As it is almost impossible for Israel to enter countries with a large Muslim population, as is the case with some countries in the Middle East and

Africa—which in fact have the greatest potential purchasing power at this time—ways are being studied for Chilean-Israeli private companies to enter these markets. If this new doorway opens up, there is no doubt that the relationships that have been developed at the defense-industry level will be further intensified.

Photo Caption

1. p.21 (lower right): A Mirage fighter aircraft: The process of modernization of the Chilean prototype was the first important transaction between the Chilean Air Force and Israel.

IDF Said To Be Losing Qualitative Edge

92AE0517B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
13 Jul 92 p B1

[Article by Re'uven Pedatzur]

[Text] Examination of *The Middle East Strategic Balance, 1990-1991*, published last week by Tel Aviv University's [Jaffee] Center for Strategic Studies, can be misleading. At first glance, the military balance between Israel and her neighbors does not seem to have grown worse. The numbers are similar to those that appeared in last year's edition. Arsenals of aircraft, tanks, artillery, and ships are almost unchanged. But deeper analysis and dissection of trends in equipment procurement by the region's states paint a different picture.

The quantities are indeed similar but the quality of forces and weapons acquired by the Arab states has changed. More and more advanced weapons systems produced in the West have been integrated this past year into the Arab armies, a development that eats away at the qualitative gap between the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] and its enemies. All the Arab armies are undergoing a comprehensive program of modernization and, except for Syria, are based on western equipment, especially of American manufacture.

What most characterizes the past year has been extensive procurement of arms from the United States. While the American Government is sponsoring the peace process and, as Joseph Alpher puts it in his introduction to the *Strategic Balance*, "The United States has found itself responsible for the most serious and sweeping effort to achieve peace, a wholly American undertaking," it acts at one and the same time as the largest arms supplier to the Middle East. Even as President Bush is formulating an initiative for regional arms inspection arrangements as part of the concept of a world moving towards political agreements, he is approving sales to the Middle East of huge quantities of arms, including the most advanced and sophisticated systems. The "Strategic Balance" reveals that the United States last year sold \$16 billion worth of arms in the Middle East.

To that must be added sales of weapons from Britain, France, China, the Soviet Union (and the republics that inherited its place, particularly Russia), East European

nations and, to a lesser extent, Italy and Germany. All together, these arms deals amount to close to \$30 billion worth of transactions signed in the past year by Middle Eastern states.

These deals enable the Arab armies to replace old equipment and make significant progress in their modernization programs. The emphasis has been on armor and aircraft. Syria is expanding its armored order of battle from 4,200 tanks to 4,800 by adding advanced T-72 tanks. The Syrian air force is about to absorb advanced Sukhoi-24 bombers and a number of MiG-29 fighter planes. Egypt's armored and air forces are completing an impressive modernization program, which includes a qualitative leap forward with the arrival of America's cutting-edge tank, the Abrams M-1 A1. The Egyptian air force's attack formations are composed of American F-16 and French Mirage 2000 war planes.

The most significant quantitative and qualitative improvement was registered in the Saudi army. The Saudis this past year signed contracts for huge arms deals. From the United States, they ordered Abrams tanks of the most advanced models, the A-1 and the A-2; 1,800 armored personnel carriers; and 70 MLRS batteries (multi-barrel artillery that was operated to great effect during the Gulf War). The Saudis are negotiating with the United States for the sale of another 70 F-15's, including the advanced F-15E, which until now has been delivered only to the American Air Force. Similarly, Saudi Arabia is about to buy four more early-warning AWACS planes (apart from five such planes currently in their service). Dozens of F-15's and Tornados have already arrived in Saudi Arabia this past year.

The Saudi Air Force is not one of the region's largest, but the quality of its planes is the best. And when you take into account that flying distances between Saudi air bases and targets in Israel are relatively short, the Saudis could play a key role were they to join other Arab countries in war.

The data appearing in the "Strategic Balance" point up one of the worrying directions of the arms drive undertaken by the Arab states which, to a large degree, must be attributed to the Gulf War—growth in the holdings of ground-to-ground missiles and improvements in their quality. One of the important lessons of the war, as Arab strategists have learned it, is Israel's vulnerability to ballistic missiles. The war therefore added impetus to this arms trend, which has given the Middle East a greater concentration of theater ballistic missiles than any other region.

From North Korea, Syria has received Scud-B ballistic missiles with a range of 600 km. An order for Chinese M-9 missiles is still in the works. Syria also has dozens of mobile launchers. The failure of America's Air Force to destroy the mobile launchers in Iraq's western desert during the Gulf War may provide a glimmer of the grave operational problem that Syria now presents the Israeli Air Force. The Syrians have chemical warheads for their

missiles and even the ability to produce biological weapons. It seems likely that the Egyptians, who are upgrading ballistic missiles with assistance from North Korea, will learn how to make these missiles on their own.

Another serious problem can be seen in the acquisition of ballistic missiles by states on the periphery. Iran and Libya are spending vast sums to buy and develop missiles with an operational range encompassing targets in Israel. Even more worrisome is the drive to produce nuclear weapons. Iran, Algeria, and Libya have started down this path, and the availability of nuclear scientists from the former Soviet Union will surely help them along.

The facts presented in the "Strategic Balance" make clear that the Middle East without a doubt is the most heavily armed region on the face of the earth and that the qualitative gap between the IDF and Arab armies in this region is closing. If there is a lesson to be learned, it is that the balance in the Middle East is approaching parity. Israel's ability to meet conditions of military parity is by no means clear. That is the reason that, at the time of publication, all the scholars at the Center for Strategic Studies emphasized that the solution to the dispute between Israel and her neighbors is political and not military.

Weapons Procurement Program in Eastern Europe

*92P40233A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
14 Jul 92 p 1*

[Excerpt] Last year the defense establishment purchased military equipment from Eastern Europe valued at millions of dollars. The equipment was acquired in three former communist countries and the Defense Ministry is examining additional sources for purchases.

Purchases in Europe are intended mainly to replace weapons systems, tanks, and Soviet-type vehicles that are currently being used in the Israel Defense Forces [IDF]. In the Defense Ministry, they estimate that direct acquisitions in former communist states will lower equipment costs by dozens of percentage points.

The IDF took large quantities of Soviet manufactured weapons as spoils in the Six-Day War, the Yom Kippur War, and Lebanon, and introduced tanks, armored personnel carriers, and other weapons systems into service.

With the collapse of communism, the armies of Eastern Europe began to sell surplus equipment in large quantities and at low prices. Marketing was done through government export companies, which are also involved in marketing civilian industrial products.

Flooding of the market by Eastern European armies has greatly damaged prospects for exporting surplus equipment used by the IDF, but provides an advantage for defense-related acquisitions there.

Acquisitions in Eastern Europe are managed by way of a Defense Ministry delegation in Paris led by Colonel (res.) Re'uvan Hershko, aided by Israeli representatives in Eastern European countries. The equipment is bought through the defense establishment's free budget foreign currency. [passage omitted]

Head of Homefront Command on Citizens, Defense

92AE0585B Tel Aviv BAMAHAHE in Hebrew
5 Aug 92 pp 8-9

[Article on interview of Colonel Yitzhaq Fuchs head of the Defense of the Population Department in the Homefront Command by Yonqi Galanti; place and date not given; "Every Family in Israel Can Prepare a Protected Space for Itself"; first paragraph is BAMAHAHE introduction; words in boldface as published]

[Text] Since the Gulf war ended, the Homefront Command has undertaken various activities with the aim of improving the protection of the homefront. Within the framework of this activity, a new concept was crystallized for the protection of new buildings. Likewise, the various possibilities for improving the protection of existing buildings were examined and recommendations were crystallized for the protection regulations for public construction. Efforts were made to improve cooperation with civilian emergency elements and, at the same time, explanatory work was carried out that included the dissemination of professional publications among contractors and engineers, participation in the protection exhibition at the Israel Construction Center, and more.

[BAMAHAHE] Col. Yitzhak Fuchs, what has changed from the viewpoint of "the small citizen" since the war ended?

[Fuchs] The implementation of the lessons of the Gulf war comprises several layers. It seems to me that from the viewpoint of the citizens, the most essential change is expressed in the crystallization of the new protection concept, which is, in fact, being applied in all the new buildings in the country. As for the existing construction, the command carried out a series of studies and experiments, in the course of which were examined engineering solutions aimed at improving the existing protection. These solutions are simple and inexpensive. Today, every family in Israel is capable of preparing a protected space for itself, even if the reference is to a gradual process—first the windows, and afterwards the doors, the walls, and the ceiling.

[BAMAHAHE] You could not force the citizens to set up protected spaces in their apartments?

[Fuchs] This is required in all the new buildings. Regarding the existing buildings, it was not possible to make it mandatory. In view of this reality, a committee was established in the Ministry of Defense that examined methods of encouraging citizens who want to make

protective improvements in their homes. The committee's recommendations were adopted by the previous minister of defense, and today they are transmitted to the relevant ministries for the purpose of continued attention to them and implementation.

[BAMAHAHE] Do you not think that by this method of action there is a kind of transfer of responsibility to the citizen, in the vein of "be the master of your fate"?

[Fuchs] That is exactly it. We would like to see a large number of persons improving the protection in their apartments in the spirit of the saying 'prepare in peace for wartime.'

It should be noted that the solutions that we are proposing provide an appropriate answer to the 'malfunctionings' that ordinarily occur, such as an accident related to dangerous chemical substances, or even the explosion that occurred in TA'AS [Israeli Military Industries] last week. If the houses in that area had been protected according to the criteria that we established, the damage would have been much smaller.

[BAMAHAHE] The Maj. Gen. of the Homefront Command, Ze'ev Livne, estimated some time ago, in an interview with BAMAHAHE, that only in another 20-30 years would all the population of Israel be protected according to the new concept. The solutions that you [plural] are proposing related to a scenario that could occur also in another two years. Do you not identify a dangerous gap here?

[Fuchs] The protection of the entire population of Israel is a process that will take a generation. It depends first and foremost on the extent of construction in Israel, on the attitude to plans for improving protection that we are proposing, and on the implantation of the concept of the protected space in all the sectors of public and private construction.

In general, our protected space is intended to provide an answer to chemical weapons and future conventional weapons. Future conventional weapons have warheads that are four and more times larger than the warheads borne by the Scuds that fell on us in the Gulf war. Such conventional weaponry, such as the Scud-C, is still not operational in Arab armies, but it is clear that it will be operational before the entire population of the country will be protected from it. The assertion that you make only substantiates the need for a broader response by the public and for the implementation of improvements in protection in the existing construction.

[box, p 9]

The Public's Confidence in the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] and in the Homefront Command Is Still High

The public's confidence in the leadership of the army, in the Homefront Command and in the IDF spokesman is today, about a year and a half after the Gulf war, still at

a high level. This is shown by a survey that was conducted about two months ago by the Behavioral Sciences Department among 1,200 citizens. The data from the survey will be added to the findings of surveys that were carried out during the Gulf war among 7,000 citizens, and together these will become a data base that will serve the entire IDF. With the aid of this data base, it will be possible to learn a number of lessons on everything concerning the behavior of the population in time of emergency and the reciprocal relations between the IDF and the public in time of emergency.

"A number of conclusions arise from the processing of the findings of the surveys," explains Lt. Col. Dr. Avraham Karmeli, the chief of the Research Branch in the Behavioral Sciences Department. "The most important of them is that during all six months of the crisis, the

Israeli public responded appropriately to the events and behaved in a rational manner—there was no panic.

"Another important conclusion is that during the war, the public had great confidence in the leadership of the army, in the IDF spokesman and in what was once HAGA [Civil Defense]. This confidence continues, as was stated, also today, even though it is not at its peak as then. Nevertheless, from a multiyear perspective, we are talking about a high level of confidence. It should be noted that the public's confidence in the protection package that was supplied to it during the war (mask and sealed room) was not especially high, but as the crisis worsened—it rose. Our findings also show that the main damage to the confidence in the protective masks came precisely after the war, with the publication of the report of the State Comptroller.

Danger of Ideology-Based Streams of Education

92AE0486B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
24 Jun 92 p B1

[Article by Nili Mandler: "Instead of Bringing Back to the Fold"]

[Text] "Whoever seeks to take God out of the schools murders Jewish history." This is the way that Minister of Education Zevulun Hammer expressed himself two weeks ago at a national meeting of educators. The meeting was organized by the Education Fund for the Schools, TALI (Reinforcement of Jewish Studies in the Secular Trend), and the Department for Deepening Jewish Education in the Ministry of Education.

"No one has the authority to keep the children of Israel from an acquaintance with the sources of the Jewish people and its tradition for thousands of years," argued Hammer, stressing that the demand for broadening Jewish studies came from the parents themselves, "and it increases every year." The minister of education expressed the hope that the schools in the spirit of TALI will be "the biggest educational system in Israel." In the secular trend, of course.

Data given at the meeting show that 90 TALI classes were active in 1990-1991. Their number was doubled in 1991-1992, and in 1992-1993 there will be 260 classes. Hammer knows well that he will not succeed in bringing back to the fold all the children of Israel, and he is apparently satisfied with splitting the secular trend and turning TALI into its dominant subtrend.

This time, the debate does not center on the issue whether TALI deepens Jewish studies among secular children or teaches them mainly religious texts. The issue is more complex: does the minister of education have the right to disintegrate the state trend. Hammer acted in contradiction to the State Education Law, which was passed on the initiative of David Ben-Gurion in the early 1950's. Ben-Gurion sought to eliminate the sub-trends that had existed in education until then and to impose state supervision and state goals on the educational system, including the integration of Jews of all origins and the destruction of communal-socio-economic barriers. Hammer has recently argued, both orally and in writing, that the work of integration has been completed. We have become a crystallized and stable people. The goal is now pluralism in education.

Alongside the incentives that were given to cultivate TALI in secular education, Hammer announced that he supported community schools, both in the state trend and in the state-religious trend. In other words, the parents must be accommodated, and mainly the NRP's [National Religious Party's] potential voters. According to his conception, a group of parents may pass on to their children their heritage, whether it is expressed in national (and, hence, political) values or in religious values.

Giving parents the opportunity to convert their children's schools to special ones, on the basis of deepening studies in science or the arts, is only the tip of the iceberg of attempts to undermine the state trend. This is also the inspiration for his proposal to the municipality of Netanya to deviate from the registration zones for the schools in the city. In this manner, Hammer exploited also the process that began a few years ago in Tel Aviv, without him—the establishing of special schools for nature and the arts—and, afterwards, elsewhere in Israel, with the encouragement of the previous director-general of the Ministry of Education, Shimshon Shoshani. The process involved deviation from the registration zones, as the special schools are open. In most cases, these are good schools. But they are also elitist and selective and take a disproportionate share of the education budget for all the children in the country.

If Hammer truly supported pluralism in education, he would not have blocked so forcefully the establishing of schools in the spirit of Reform or Conservative Judaism in the state-religious trend. What has been going on for years in the trend with which Hammer and the NRP are identified will, apparently, happen also in the state trend—if the process of splitting it continues. In the state-religious trend there are educational networks such as "No'am," an extremist religious network that is identified with the Mercaz Harav Yeshiva, and there are also high-school yeshivas and institutions for girls that are very selective. There are bitter struggles among the parents in the state-religious trend over the character of the schools.

Under the guise of pluralism, the state-religious trend is encouraging groups in the population that are identified with the right wing of the NRP. This is expressed not only by giving the schools more of a Torah coloring, but also in appointing persons to senior positions in the Ministry of Education and in the educational system. Over the past 15 years, there was generally no chance for persons from the old Hapo'el Hamizrachi or the NRP's left wing to attain key positions in the state-religious trend. Thus, Hammer's pluralism is selective.

Based on the polarization and the bitter struggles in the state-religious trend (and, more than that, in the ultra-orthodox trend, which is splintered into subtrends), one can speculate as to what will occur in the state trend if the deviations from its frameworks continue. The end of the process in the secular trend is liable to be the establishing of schools on an ideological basis, and not only on the basis of special areas of study. We will have schools in the spirit of the values of Tehiya, Moledet, Tsomet, and Maratz.

Going by the political preferences of certain schools in the state-religious trend, it may be expected that preference will be given to schools in the state trend that have certain political tendencies, in accordance with the political identity of the next minister of education. There must be a public debate on the future of this trend immediately after the next kneset convenes.