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JPRS-UIA-86-032

14 JULY 1986

USSR Report

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

THE WORKING CLASS AND THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

No 6, NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1985

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USSR REPORT
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
THE WORKING CLASS AND THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

No 6, November-December 1985

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language journal RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNIY MIR, published six times a year in Moscow by the Institute of the International Workers' Movement, USSR Academy of Sciences,

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English title : THE WORKING CLASS AND THE CONTEMPORARY
WORLD

Russian title : RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNY MIR

Author(s) :

Editor(s) : I.K. Pantin

Publishing House : Izdatelstvo "Progress"

Place of Publication : Moscow

Date of Publication : November-December 1985

Signed to press : 19 November 1985

Copies : 9,976

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OUR AUTHORS

Moscow RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNIY MIR in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 85 p 192

[List of main authors in this issue, with their positions and titles]

[Text] Kalashnikov, Vladimir Ilich -- first secretary of the Volgograd Obkom of the CPSU

Yanitskiy, Oleg Nikolayevich -- doctor of philosophical sciences, senior scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMRD [World Economics and International Relations Institute]

Timofeyev, Timur Timofeyevich -- USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member, USSR Academy of Sciences IMRD director

Lukinov, Ivan Illarionovich -- USSR Academy of Sciences academician, UkSSR Academy of Sciences vice-president, UkSSR Academy of Sciences social sciences section chairman, UkSSR Academy of Sciences Economics Institute director

Dunayeva, Irina Aleksandrovna -- scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences INION [Scientific Information on Social Sciences Institute]

Mironov, Vladimir Nikolayevich -- USSR Academy of Sciences ILA [Latin American Institute], LATINSKAYA AMERIKA journal department chief

Karlsen, Aksel-Vladimir -- candidate of historical sciences, scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMRD

Yevzerov, Robert Yakovlevich -- doctor of historical sciences, docent, USSR Academy of Sciences IMRD sector chief

Vasiltsov, Sergey Ivanovich -- doctor of historical sciences, senior scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMRD

Kalmykova, Olga Viktorovna -- USSR Academy of Sciences IMRD senior laboratory worker

Adibekov, Grant Mkrtychevich -- doctor of historical sciences, senior scientific associate of the IML [Institute of Marxism-Leninism] at the CPSU Central Committee

Kaufman, Arkadiy Semenovich -- doctor of historical sciences, professor, senior scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute

Mikhaylov, Sergey Vasilyevich -- candidate of historical sciences, senior scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMRD

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CSO: 1807/205

INFLUENCE OF S&T REVOLUTION ON THE WORKING CLASS VIEWED

Moscow RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNIY MIR in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 85 pp 30-42

[Article by Timur Timofeyevich Timofeyev, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member and USSR Academy of Sciences IMRD [International Workers Movement Institute] director, under the rubric "The Scientific-Technical Revolution and Social Progress": "Technological Advances and the Working Class"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics in text]

[Text] The social consequences of scientific-technical progress in conditions of different social systems and the impact of the scientific-technical revolution on development of the working class and its various detachments are drawing fixed attention from researchers of many countries of the world. This subject was the focus of discussion at the 2nd International Forum of Researchers on the Working Class and the Workers Movement, held in Paris in the summer of 1985. Representatives of scientific and workers organizations of different orientations from various countries of Europe, America, Asia, and Africa participated in the forum, held in the UNESCO building. Representing the Soviet delegation at the forum were: Academician P.N. Fedoseyev, vice-president of the USSR Academy of Sciences; Academician I.I. Lukinov, vice-president of the UkSSR Academy of Sciences; T.T. Timofeyev, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and director of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMRD; A.A. Gromyko, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and director of the Africa Institute; Doctor of Economic Sciences A.I. Belchuk, IMRD deputy director; Doctor of Historical Sciences G.G. Diligenskiy, IMRD division chief; and others. Academician P.N. Fedoseyev gave a report entitled "The Scientific-Technical Revolution and the Study of the Working Class" at the first plenary meeting of the forum. Reports and communications by other scientists were heard at other meetings.

* The author's speeches at section meetings and at the final plenary session of the international forum of researchers on the workers movement (held in the summer of 1985 in Paris in the UNESCO building) as well as a report on the corresponding problem area presented at the Forum from the USSR Academy of Sciences IMRD are the basis of this article.

The articles by Academician I.I. Lukinov and USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member T.T. Timofeyev are published in this issue. Other materials from the forum are to be published in subsequent issues of the journal.

Problems related to the impact on the working class of technological advances and changes in the organization of production attract the fixed attention of researchers who represent a broad spectrum of scientific disciplines. Naturally, these problems occupied a very significant place in the work of the 2nd International Forum on Problems of the Development of the Working Class and the Workers Movement. They were specially examined at its third section, where scientists from France, Italy, the United States, Canada, the USSR, Bulgaria, the GDR, Poland, Austria, Great Britain, and other countries gave reports and communications.

Reflecting the nature of the research in this subject area being done in various countries of the world, the discussion focused mainly on several key problems, the following in particular:

- the basic steps in the development of scientific-technical progress and working people: historical trends and certain methodological issues;
- changes in the structure of the working class under the influence of technological changes (in light of national and some international research);
- exacerbation of the problems of unemployment in the capitalist world and the position of workers organizations.

The scientific debate, during which certain aspects of methodological problems were discussed, to a significant degree dealt with identifying the role of the human factor in various stages of scientific-technical progress. In this connection, questions related to defining the very essence of the scientific-technical revolution and the features of its present phase and to evaluating the correlation of its factors, components, and the significance of various links which combine science, technology, and production in the scientific-technical revolution "chain" are also touched upon. Many participants in the Paris forum begin from the notion that man stands at the center of the scientific-technical revolution. That is why the paramount attention of the speakers was precisely on the subject of the man of labor, his needs, changes in the content and nature of labor, questions of improving the qualifications and education of the working class, and the like.

A number of speeches contained critical remarks regarding concepts which do not adequately consider the impact of social factors on the development and consequences of scientific-technical progress. Certain Western authors consider technical progress itself as the main determining factor of the working class's development. However, the impact of scientific-technical changes on the structure, qualifications, and various aspects of the social position of the working class depends substantially on particular historical

conditions and on the society and on the social, above all production, relations in which this class is "included." To be sure, some people are inclined to /reduce/ production relations to the forms of organization and distribution of labor.¹ This is a narrow and one-sided interpretation of the problem: it ignores the role which the type of ownership of the means of production plays in the system of production relations and that determines many practical consequences of technical changes for the working class. In countries where production relations based on private property predominate, such consequences of technical progress as the unstable position of certain strata of the working class in production and mass unemployment become paramount. It is no accident that according to the data of numerous sociological and economic studies, many working people in capitalist countries see the latest technological advances and their consequences as factors that complicate their material and social position.² In contrast to this, in the Soviet Union for example, the fundamental acceleration of scientific-technical progress is considered an important condition and basis of growth of material well-being and the intellectual and cultural level of the people.³ It is not the updating of production technology that leads to dissatisfaction among the workers and in the society as a whole but the sluggish rate of this process, technical backwardness in certain sectors and sections of production, and the perpetuation of low-skilled physical labor in a number of enterprises. The interest of the working people in implementing measures to accelerate scientific-technical progress in socialist society is affirmed by a number of sociological surveys; scientists from the USSR and the GDR referred to the results of these surveys in their speeches at the section. Also instructive in this regard is data obtained during comparative studies done within the framework of the international "Automation and Industrial Workers" project under the aegis of the European Coordinating Center in Vienna on issues of research and documentation in the social sciences field with scientific and trade union organizations from six socialist and nine capitalist states.

It was emphasized at the forum that the technocratic myth of "plants without people" does not stand up to reality, which proves that automation and computerization ("informatization") cannot be developed without laboring people participating and that in themselves technological transformations do not change production relations. The present phase of technological advances reflects not simply the dynamics of material production forces but the entire complex dialectical interrelation between material production and the human factor, or, more specifically, between the complex of production forces and social relations.

Yes, needless to say, new technology as such makes certain changing demands on managing production and organizing labor and on the qualities of the aggregate employee and poses corresponding tasks. But how they will be specifically realized depends on social forces operating in production and in society. Objective researchers now consider the development of technical progress and its consequences for working people as a "field" of various opportunities but by no means a sphere of unequivocal, straightforward dependence of people on technology (as the matter is pictured by the advocates of the theory of "technological determinism"). Speeches at the section emphasized that there are various paths for realizing the demands and tasks mentioned above. Essentially, however, in conditions of capitalism because of the objective

logic of capitalist production relations, any of these possible paths will gravitate toward one of two opposed, fundamentally different variants: /either/ adaptation of all the same unchanged capitalist criteria and management principles to the new technological conditions /or/ a struggle to replace the latter with other principles whose bearers are the workers movement.

This means that technical progress and its directions and pace are indirectly promoted by the impact of the class struggle and its inherent logic. As this struggle develops, for example, the masters try to weaken the force of opposition of the working class and this end is served by those technical innovations and forms of distribution and organization of labor based on them which increase the heterogeneity of the material and social position of the working class and are used to weaken its solidarity. In this sense technical progress has acted and does act in many cases as a means to restrict the autonomy of the labor functions of the worker and thereby increase his objective as well as moral dependence on the master's authority in the very process of production.

To what was the spread of Taylor and Ford systems of labor organization based on specialized machines related? It was related to the strength of trade unions which had increased by the late 19th century, an important source of which was the high qualifications and occupational consciousness of the workers united in them. As Taylor himself acknowledged, the task of the new "scientific organization of labor" was to deprive the workers of this source of their strength -- occupational knowledge -- and thereby lessen their opposition to labor intensification.

The computerization of production often acquires similar social significance in our time. Specifically, it restricts the functions and autonomy of people engaged in actual labor in a similar way and thereby results in the increased power of the management apparatus. In connection with this circumstance, the authors of a study recently published in France observe: "Despite the convictions of technicians, there is nothing more related to power than technology."⁴ The concepts, very widespread in some places, of the "crisis of labor," which cultivate the myth that the working class is somehow "deformed," are supposed to serve as the ideological means of strengthening the proprietary power standing behind technology; this myth is used as yet another means of demoralizing the workers movement.

Monopolistic groups and the neoconservative political circles who express their interests also pursue a similar goal, attempting to propagate the "model" of labor relations in accordance with which automation and computerization must (in the spirit of Taylorism and Fordism) be carried out in conditions and forms which insure, according to their plans, first, even more subjugation of hired workers, including machine operators, to the rhythm of the automated production process and, secondly, deepened specialization and differentiation of labor functions among workers of different levels of qualifications. In other words, corporations try to create a situation whereby the impossibility for workers to carry out intelligent labor activity at their enterprises is supplemented by the weakening of class ties, introducing a spirit of individual social passivity among those engaged in

hired labor and instilling a mood of pessimism, "social impotence," and the like. It is precisely in this connection that certain people who spoke at the 3rd section -- G. Steiner (Austria) and S. LeRoux (France) -- spoke of the moral and sociopsychological consequences of structural unemployment and of the new complex problems which its growth raises for the workers movement.

In the sense mentioned above, assertions of the "erosion" of the working class under the impact of the scientific-technical revolution and the "fading" of social contradictions as capitalism develops in fact belong with the concepts of the "crisis of labor." Most of those participating in the discussion expressed disagreement with such assertions or, at the very least, serious doubts as to their validity. In touching on this theme, some scientists (including scientists from France) pointed out that initially A. Touraine and then D. Bell asserted that the leading sociohistorical role which at times belonged to the working class and the workers movement is now being transferred to other social forces, basing the conclusion of the fundamental difference between the "new postindustrial society" and the capitalist society on their assessment of the new role of information science. In a speech in the section J. Lojkin (France) noted that such theories may be considered an "idealistic interpretation of the information revolution."

However, in itself the theme of the impact of the scientific-technical revolution on the composition and boundaries of the working class was a subject of interested discussion in the section. While one of the reports which P. Boni, a representative of the Brodolini Fund (Italy), gave reflected the hypothesis of the development of a "new proletariat," other participants preferred to speak rather of changing ratios among the various strata of the working class. In connection with the issue of changes in the structure of hired labor and of the dynamics of the boundaries of the working class under the impact of scientific-technical progress, many speeches, among them those by Professor S. Heron (Canada), J. Smith (USA), F. Adler (GDR), and scientists from the USSR, stressed the importance of deeper concrete analysis of the advances in its sectorial, occupational-skill, and age-sex structure. The fruitfulness and promise of such directions of study as identification and analysis of the sources of the formation and reproduction of the working class in the past and in the present and the study of the level of its general sophistication and needs which influence the nature of its adaptation to new technology and the entire range of its reactions to changes in production were noted.

Such a broad historical-sociological approach to identifying the mechanisms of influence of scientific-technical progress on the working class and on its social qualities certainly is very important for the researcher (but, of course, not for one who has earlier "parted" from the working class as supposedly gone or being removed from the historical scene by scientific-technical development, which is fatal to it). This approach is even more important in that some people in the West, referring to the processes of "segmentation" of the labor market now occurring in the world of capitalism, the growth of chronic unemployment,⁵ and the increased number of Lumpenproletarian and declassé elements, are inclined to represent these processes as trends which /fatally/ prepare a stable model of labor relations, suitable to the "powers that be," which is not dependent on ongoing economic

fluctuations. They obstinately construct such a model, attempting to use the environment of the "employment crisis" to achieve a change in the ratio of class forces in their favor. Is it necessary to say that the in-depth scientific analysis of the prerequisites of this development of the working class and its struggle, which would be an alternative to these trends, becomes of such major importance? This also presupposes -- within the framework of an approach to the "technology -- working class" system of relations as an approach to relations of /mutual influence/ -- its comprehensive study not only as an object but also as a /subject/ of technical -- both economic and all social -- development. It is important to take into account in this connection that the influence of workers on technical development is carried out on different levels. Above all, they influence it as a class and a social group which is aware of and protects its interests in the production sphere and in society as a whole. In addition, the historically resulting level of development of the worker as an individual and a person with a particular structure of abilities and knowledge and needs and motives is an important factor.

Within the framework of the capitalist form of development of production forces, the evolution of production technology is interrelated with the development of the workers organization, the activities of the workers movement, and the working class's struggle for a better standard of living and better working conditions.⁶ To a significant extent forming the particular historical conditions in which the goals of capitalist production are carried out, this struggle thereby has an effect on the choice of the means of realization of these goals and on the technical policy and entire socioeconomic strategy of the ruling class. Consequently, technical innovations must not be considered only as the result of the attempt to increase production efficiency; as was already noted, they also express the response to the demands of the organized working class and the attempt to avoid class confrontation in places where it threatens to be most acute. (Thus the working class's struggle to reduce work time was one of the most fundamental moving forces of technical progress in capitalist industry for a long time). In light of the above, the contradictory, ambivalent nature of the consequences of technical changes for the working class itself is clear. On the one hand, technical progress contains the potential to alleviate and humanize conditions of labor and enrich its content and increase the cultural and intellectual development of workers; the measure to which this potential is used depends on the struggle of the working class. On the other hand, each phase of technical progress creates new opportunities for capital to pressure the working class, deepen its schism, and weaken the social positions of many of its groups and bring about their decline.

Only with the elimination of capitalist relations -- when a fundamental change in the working class's role in society takes place -- are the means and nature of its influence on technical progress transformed and the content of the problems it faces in this area changed. In socialist society forces with an interest in restricting the production functions of workers and conserving unskilled partial labor are lacking; the existence of these types of labor is related only to the level of technical-economic development achieved by the society. The technical creativity of the workers and invention-efficiency activity are becoming an important form of overcoming the restricted nature of

performance-type labor functions and an important form of creative enrichment of labor life in conditions of socialism. For the working class of contemporary socialist society, acceleration of technical-economic progress is the central problem; it represents an essential condition of this class's social and cultural development and for overcoming still very fundamental differences among its separate groups.⁷ As certain researchers demonstrate, differentiation in the nature of labor is interrelated with quite fundamental differences in the level of culture, education, general worldview, and social activism of the workers. Reducing these differences is possible only on the basis of expanding the sphere of the most advanced -- scientific-industrial production.

The nature of labor functions, which is determined by the technology of production and the organization and distribution of labor, has a completely unequivocal effect on the /intellectual and psychological make-up/ of the worker: skilled labor increases the significance of the labor activity in the system of his interests and needs and is frequently a stimulus for the person's self-affirmation and social worth; but the worker frequently interprets unskilled labor, "partial" labor, which is especially characteristic of capitalist large-series, mass production, as a means of earning a living and leads him to focus his interests in the spheres of consumption and leisure.⁸

The question of the nature of labor and labor relations in the system of /social values and ideas/ of the workers and on the types and forms of their /social activism/ is substantially more complex. Sociological research conducted in a number of capitalist countries indisputably proves the reality of this influence: workers involved in different types of production and different types of labor perceive class relations at the enterprise and means of influencing their own economic and social position, and such in certain different ways.⁹ In light of this, however, it is important to take into account that the environment of global updating of production and the conditions and way of life, and new forms of labor activity and material and cultural needs, and the like all reduce those psychological barriers which subordinate the needs and motives of people to the roles and norms dictated by their social position. This phenomenon where needs are "liberated" and rise can be expressed in very different systems of values, orientations, and forms of behavior; however, in the most diverse social situations it increases the person's psychological dissatisfaction with the types of activity he is forced to engage in and stimulates the desire for "free," "creative" types of activity which provide an opportunity for self-manifestation and self-expression. If labor does not provide this opportunity, a person often seeks it in leisure and consumption. Most likely, this is the psychological meaning of the failure of some young working people in the West to adopt the traditional labor ethic -- a refusal to see the person's highest duty in labor, regardless of its content. This position often expresses not so much the so-called "allergy to labor" as an increase in demands for its intellectual, creative content. It can also nourish constructive forms of the person's social activism: a desire to master modern equipment and a desire for education and high, "multidirectional" skills.

The scientific-technical revolution and processes related to it, including those in the social and cultural spheres, influence the development of the workers' intellectual needs, which in itself already brings about substantial evolution of their qualities as subjects of production activity. Also influential here are such factors (in the section this was demonstrated, in particular, in reports presented by scientists of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMRD) as the increased education level and general culture of the masses, the enormous expansion and increased complexity of the economic and sociopolitical information available to them, and, finally, workers' contact with technology based on the highest achievements of modern science. As a result, they are more and more sharply aware of the inadequacy of the purely empirical methods of learning about production and social life which are traditional for the work environment and they experience a growing need to understand mechanisms and ties of both technological and socioeconomic processes which are hidden from direct observation. In point of fact we are speaking of the need for conceptual theoretical knowledge and independent, free use of this knowledge.

Obviously, the forms of expression and development of orientations to a freer and more creative and activist life depend on the measure of satisfaction of this need and on the level of cognitive ability of the worker. Thus, the motives which nourish interest in labor and the person's involvement in labor activity are developed more fully the more they are reinforced by knowledge of the technology of production. And the lack of this knowledge increases psychological alienation from labor.

Similar mechanisms of interrelation of motives and knowledge also affect the worker's comprehension of economic and social relations -- whether on the the shop, enterprise or societal level -- as well as his social activism. Western empirical research often asserts the increased "pragmatism" and "rationalism" in the workers' perception of economic and social life, and these phenomena are considered a symptom of the decline of class consciousness.¹⁰ In reality the "pragmatization" of class consciousness expresses the greater desire of working people to rationally comprehend the problems of their situation relative to the effect of the processes and mechanisms of economic and sociopolitical life. While this desire leads in a number of cases to the acceptance of concepts disseminated by the ruling forces in the society (among them the thesis of the "community" of interests of private business and working people), the explanation for this phenomenon should be sought above all in the shortage of rational social knowledge capable of substantiating the /class/ interests of workers in a crisis socioeconomic situation and thus reinforce the motives and values which express these interests.

Empirical data attests to the fact that any particular labor situation or type of organization of labor makes possible the development of the most diverse and even contradictory social and political orientations¹¹ in the consciousness and behavior of workers and of different types of their understanding their own interests in the system of class relations. Thus, the high occupational consciousness characteristic of skilled workers engaged in preindustrial type labor and labor of the early phases of industrialization can nourish both an orientation to protecting their own interests and autonomy in the struggle against the bosses and hostility toward capitalist private ownership and individualism, corporativism, and social conformism, typical of

the traditional "worker aristocracy." The narrowness of labor functions and their maximal dependence on the labor of "private" workers of the industrial phase engenders consciousness of social impotence, fatalism, and obedience, and the desire for class solidarity and militant and active class consciousness. The data on the consciousness and behavior of workers with contemporary skills involved in automated production reflect the same contradictory picture. New forms of collective consciousness oriented to participation in production management and opposed to the oligarchic authority of capitalist management are developed in this phase in some situations, while in others narrow corporativist consciousness and a tendency toward "social integration" and class cooperation develop.¹²

Works dedicated to studying the influence of "systems of labor" on worker consciousness (among them the works of A. Touraine and authors who share his concept of the "three phases" in the development of these systems)¹³ show that the technology, organization, and nature of labor in many respects result in /concrete opportunities/ for workers to /empirically recognize/ their own social ties, their place in the system of social relations in production, and ways to influence these relations. Nonetheless, these works do not prove, in our opinion, that a certain type of relation to the given social activity, for example, the development of class consciousness or its decline, corresponds to each system of labor. Undoubtedly, the class consciousness of workers involved in different systems of labor is in many respects formed in different ways, and its particular content -- expressing its demands, expectations, and aspirations -- in one way or another reflects the particular features of their position in labor. In precisely the same way, the consciousness of workers oriented to obedience to the boss's authority and cooperation with it can have different psychological and cognitive foundations (for example, a feeling of social impotence or one's own privileged position). Nonetheless, the nature and determinacy and consistency of the /choice/ between collective opposition to the authority of capital and conformism with it and between collectivism and individualism /are not determined/ either by technology or the organization of labor. They depend on many historical and cultural factors, among them the traditions and ideology of the workers movement and the particular correlation of forces between the organized working class and capital in the given country, region, sector, or enterprise. They also depend on the particular experience of the class struggle to which the given worker has become accustomed and on the volume and content of the social information and knowledge which he possesses.

So, the particular ways to realize the demands made by new technology on the management of production, the organization of labor, and the qualities of the aggregate worker are not set by technology itself but depend on the social forces operating in production and in the society; in capitalist society they are an important object of the class struggle, the development of which also represents the working class and workers movement's main method of influencing the development of production forces. Moreover, it may be assumed that changes in the correlation of class forces and in the level of demands of the working class which formed in the environment of the economic growth of the postwar decades were one of the prerequisites of the technological and structural reorganization of production itself occurring in capitalist countries. In the late 1960's and early 1970's trends which some authors

called the "revolution of rising demands"¹⁴ and others -- the crisis of labor relations or "desubordination" began to be manifested more and more clearly in the activities of trade unions and in the social activism of working people and their conduct in production. In addition to increased "traditional" demands -- in the area of wages, social security, and conditions of labor, the working masses began more and more frequently to try to limit the authority of owners and management in production and revise the very principles of the organization and distribution of labor. Therefore, as was demonstrated above, the present reorientation of the structure of production is not only directed at simply economic stimuli and goals -- the desire to increase labor productivity and reduce production costs in conditions of the crisis of the capitalist economy and deteriorated conditions of competition -- but also toward certain social goals, above all the desire of the "powers that be" to realize the model of labor relations which conforms to their interests, and threatens a change in the development of the entire social sphere, which is an extreme danger to the interests of the working class.¹⁵

In their opposition to the negative social consequences of the present technological and structural reorientation of production, workers organizations in a number of cases proceed from the justifiable conviction that technological changes can and must be accompanied by a general increase in the skills of workers, enrichment of the content of their labor through a greater number of functions and a greater share of creative free time as compared to compulsory work time (spent directly servicing machines), and transfer of certain management functions to primary labor collectives which independently organize the entire labor process; all this, however, presupposes a persistent struggle to improve the system of occupational training of workers and expand their labor functions.¹⁶

The mastering of the most diverse levels of knowledge is an important condition of the working class's progressive development in the present stage of the scientific-technical revolution; this means full-fledged scientific-technical knowledge the worker needs to change from an "appendage" of technology and an "object" and victim of technical changes into a conscientious and active participant in the production process; it is also a broad complex of scientific, including economic and sociological, knowledge the workers movement needs to work out an alternative to the model of technical, economic, and social development which creates a threat to the future of millions of people engaged in production. Contemporary trends in the activities of many trade unions attest to the fact that these activities are more and more often not limited only to issues of the struggle for wages and employment. Working persons' organizations are not only developing programs in the field of technical policy and the socioeconomic rights of working people but also in such spheres as the organization of labor and the system of production management, the ratio and content of work and free time, working people's education and culture, and the like. The workers movement's struggle to implement these programs stimulates further development of its social and political activism.

In this connection, the concrete examination to which the response of workers organizations to the consequences of scientific-technical progress, particularly in the employment sphere, was subjected during the section's work

and the analysis of their influence on the duration of work time and on the intensiveness of the workers' labor, and the like are very important. Comments on the evolution of trade unions' positions in various stages of the technological changes and capitalist rationalization of production and the comparative analysis of the approach of working persons' organizations in different regions of the world to technological advances, in particular to the problems of the interaction between new technology and employment, attracted a great deal of attention.

The participants' speeches emphasized the impossibility of explaining the uneven rhythms of economic competition and the alternation of invigoration and crisis by technological changes alone. This is true because the rhythms, phases, and levels of technological development itself are different and uneven; but the point is that within the framework of the same technology and the same prices the structural stability of the process of accumulating capital cannot be maintained when the profit norm declines: in this case as always employers act guided only by their own selfish interests, which ultimately is what prevents solving the problems of conforming production structures to social needs. The employers try to change the technical norms and price levels, reorient organization of labor which does not yield more profits than before, maximally exploit working people, lessen the resistance of the working class in a round-about way, including through the introduction of expensive equipment, and impose inflationary measures. But only the most powerful groups of monopolistic capital which prove to be able to implement substantial scientific-technical innovations in order to win the competition struggle can succeed in this. Therefore, technological advances in conditions of capitalism in fact always result in intensification of the labor of direct producers.

It was noted during the discussion that comparing the struggle of working people to reduce work time and the desire of employers to intensify the workers' labor is very instructive. Official statistics in the West do not distinguish between increase in labor productivity and increase in its intensiveness, which leads to the confusion of different concepts. In this connection, emphasis was placed on the fundamental significance of the circumstance that it is precisely the greater intensiveness of labor which most often compensates the employers for losses from reducing the duration of work time -- and with interest, since it allows many more production resources to be mobilized in their interests under conditions that are otherwise equal. And neither attempts to pass off the results as merely the "natural growth" of labor productivity nor endeavors to embellish and superficially "humanize" measures focused on increasing labor intensiveness (introduction of bonuses, "personalization" of payments, and the like) can either hide or conceal the indisputable fact that even when work time is reduced the main way to increase labor productivity in conditions of capitalist production relations is to increase the exploitation of labor. It is precisely for these purposes that monopolies also use modern equipment and technology, and the workers movement cannot -- and does not -- pass this by, which was seen, in particular, in the positions of West European and American trade unions examined in a number of speeches.

Thus, in their reports G. Smith and M. Dubovsky (USA) and S. Heron (Canada) analyzed the response of the North American organized workers movement to scientific-technical innovations (and, in particular, the positions of various strata of working people, women and young people for example). French, Italian, and other researchers devoted their remarks to the impact of technological advances on the levels and forms of the trade union struggle in the countries of Western Europe. In addition to an analysis of the major documents and publications in this problem area prepared by the GCF [General Confederation of Labor] of France (among them -- materials specially devoted to the crisis of "Taylorism" and its consequences and the GCF document "For More Humane Conditions of Labor with Consideration of Present Conditions" and materials from a recently conducted symposium where the positions of the trade unions of France and the United States confronted by technological innovations were discussed), the report by R. Murio (France) also evaluates the significance of a number of particular strikes, specifically in the Renault plants and other enterprises. The general trend is indisputable: an increasingly prominent place is being given in the activities of trade union associations of various orientations to the struggle to satisfy the demands of workers for changes in conditions of labor in connection with changes in its content brought about by the introduction of information technology.

A number of new complicated problems which face the organized workers movement in connection with major advances which have occurred in recent decades as well as problems in the sectorial, social, and occupational-skill structure of the hired work force in the last few years were also pointed out. Some of these problems were touched upon in the remarks by Italian researchers devoted to the processes leading, among other things, to the so-called "tertiarization" of labor conflicts, that is, to the shift of a substantial number of them to nonproduction sectors. The consequences of this phenomenon are unequivocal; they sometimes create new contradictions and difficulties, and hence, questions regarding the specific nature of the struggle of various strata of employees and factory-plant proletarians and various categories of workers in physical and mental labor become increasingly crucial.

An examination of the course of the debate permits certain conclusions and positions to be formulated which reflect the viewpoint of many of those participating in the forum on problems related to the impact of technological advances on the working class.

The forum meetings established that the introduction of scientific-technical achievements into production is a means to increase the dominance of man over nature; but in conditions of a market economy working people are not fully able to utilize the fruits of scientific-technical progress. The little that they are attempting to achieve they try to achieve as a result of a stepped-up struggle. The good which the reduction of work time does in these conditions is frequently reduced to nothing by the increase in labor intensiveness. Therefore, trade unions have also waged their struggle most often in such directions as demands to increase wages and reduce labor intensiveness.

Robotization in general and the latest technological advances as a whole (occurring in conditions where there is no direct correspondence between the

scientific-technical and the social processes) lead in a capitalist enterprise to more complicated problems of employment.

The workers movement, it was said at the forum, proceeds from the assumption that the scientific-technical revolution itself and its consequences have become an object of the class struggle and, moreover, have proven to be its focus. It was noted among other things that the introduction of new technology poses for the organized workers movement the question of expanding working persons' free time. The increase in free time may in turn help increase the needs of workers while the need to satisfy the growing needs related to the personal development of the people of labor makes even more urgent -- and progressive workers organizations pose the question in precisely this way -- the need to expand production and create new work places.

The workers movement also strives to bear in mind certain specific conditions of the struggle between labor and capital which have an effect in various regions of the world capitalist system of economy. Thus, for example, enormous masses of people suffer from hunger in the developing countries, and the overwhelming majority of the population has only very limited opportunities to satisfy the most urgent needs. But industrially developed capitalist states have a substantial number of people (they are, specifically, the unemployed, various categories of working people with unstable employment, and low-paid workers) who are also by no means supplied with opportunities to satisfy primary needs. This also makes the corresponding tasks to activate the struggle paramount. One must not forget that the working class in many countries has a crucial need for the system of health care to be improved and payments for other social needs to be increased. Similar problems are very acute for working people engaged in enterprises of transnational corporations, among them those in a number of Afro-Asian and Latin American countries.

It was repeatedly emphasized at the forum that all the basic demands of the working class invariably encounter the opposition of corporations trying to shift the consequences of the aggravated contradictions and the entire burden of crisis phenomena to the shoulders of working people. This is characteristic of contemporary capitalism, which is permeated with socioeconomic and other antagonisms. While capitalist society demonstrates an inability to solve contradictory problems engendered by technical progress, this opens to question not new technology but the very order which reveals an inability to overcome both old and new contradictions engendered by its development. As a number of speakers noted, unemployment, in particular, generates capitalist production relations rather than new technology per se.

As Professor J. De Bernis (France) emphasized among others, at the same time the experience of socialist states shows that their planned economy creates a different type of link between scientific-technical achievements and employment. Scientists from the USSR presented reports on the trends of the development of the working class in conditions where a course to accelerate socioeconomic and scientific-technical progress, activate the human factor in every possible way in this connection, and develop socialist self-management is being implemented in the country. As researchers from various countries (France among them) noted, the work being done focused on intensifying

production and increasing labor productivity in the socialist states today is arousing great interest in the world.

The following idea resounded clearly at the forum: what the fruits of the scientific-technical revolution prove to be and to what degree their use for purposes of peace and social progress rather than the interests of antiworker, militaristic forces will ultimately be insured is dependent in many respects on the working class itself, the activities of its organizations, and on their effective interaction with other social mass movements -- among them antiwar and ecology movements and the like.

Within the framework of the generally greater significance of interdisciplinary research on the topic area studied in the section, the increased role of the social sciences is indisputable -- this was not only noted in the section but was also demonstrated during its work. In this connection, the following conclusion formulated in an article published quite recently by UNESCO together with the University of Ottawa is very instructive: "The time which remains in this century may prove to be a dangerous period in world history. Everywhere -- whether it is the threat of thermonuclear war or deterioration of the earth's biosphere, or depletion of vitally important resources, or the rapid growth of the population rate, or the food crisis -- mankind is encountering problems of life or death which must not be studied by the physical and natural sciences but which are social and cultural problems. Above all, they are the problems of human behavior, organization, social structures..."¹⁷

The crucial central significance of the human factor in our age is indisputable. This significance appears perhaps especially clearly when the social preconditions and consequences of the scientific-technical revolution and the role of working people in its development are studied, whether it deals with the national or the global aspects of the impact of the working class and the workers movement on technological, economic, and political processes and the solution of the issues of war and peace, or on the rate of social progress on the whole.

FOOTNOTES

1. See, for example: A. Touraine, M. Wiewiorka, and F. Dubet, "Le mouvement ouvrier," Paris, 1984, pp 67-88.
2. See, for example: "Automation and Industrial Workers, Vol 1, London, Pergamon Press, 1979; "Round Table on Microprocessors" (UNESCO House, Paris, 1979), SOCIAL SCIENCE INFORMATION, Vol 19, No 2, 1980, pp 413-465. Communications prepared for the European conference "Employment and Crisis" (Paris, June 1984) by representatives of various institutes and university centers (for example, from France, Great Britain, the FRG, Sweden, Spain, and other countries) which examine the problems of the worker and trade union movements discussed the results of a number of such surveys; the USSR Academy of Sciences IMRD prepared a report in this connection dedicated to the aggravation of crisis processes on the labor market under the influence of the latest technological advances in

capitalist production. (For more details on this, see also: "On Mass Unemployment in the Countries of Capital," RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNIY MIR, No 6, 1984, pp 46-59.)

3. See, for example: "On the Convocation of the Regular 27th CPSU Congress and Tasks Involving Its Preparation and Conduct. A Report by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev" in the book "Materialy Plenuma Tsentralnogo Komiteta KPSS. 23 aprelya 1985 goda" [Materials of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum. 23 April 1985], Moscow, 1985, p 10. See also: M.S. Gorbachev, "Korennoy vopros ekonomicheskoy politiki partii. Doklad na soveshchanii v TsK KPSS po voprosam uskoreniya nauchno-tekhnicheskogo progressa. 11 iyunya 1985 goda" [The Fundamental Question of the Party's Economic Policy. A Report on the Conference in the CPSU Central Committee on Questions of Accelerating Scientific-Technical Progress. 11 June 1985], Moscow, 1985.
4. H. Mendras, M. Forse, "Le changement social," Paris, 1983, pp 121-122.
5. For more details see the book: T. Timofeyev, "Imperializm i proletariat" [Imperialism and the Proletariat], Moscow, 1985, pp 26-31, 308-325, and others, as well as the book: "Puti i pereputya 'poteryannogo pokoleniya'" [Paths and Crossroads of the 'Lost Generation'], A.A. Galkin and T.T. Timofeyev, responsible editors, Moscow, 1985.
6. See, for example: "Mezhdunarodnoye rabocheye dvizheniye. Voprosy istorii i teorii" [The International Workers Movement. Questions of History and Theory], Vols 1-6, Moscow, 1976-1981.
7. See: "Edinstvo mnogoobraziya: sotsialnoye razvitiye rabochego klassa v stranakh sotsializma" [The Unity of Diversity: The Social Development of the Working Class in the Countries of Socialism], Moscow, 1981; The NTR [Scientific-Technical Revolution] and the Make-up of the Working Class, Kiev, 1982.
8. See, for example: H.U. Davis, "Beyond Class Images. Exploration in the Structure of Social Consciousness," London, 1979.
9. See, for example: R.Sainsauliin, "L'identite au travail," Paris, 1977, pp 309-310, 413-415.
10. See: G. Urbani, M. Weber, "Cosa pensano gli operai. Lavoro, economia e politica negli orientamenti operai agli inizi anni ottanta," Milan, 1984, pp 79-80.
11. See, for example: "L'ouvrier francais en 1970," Paris, 1970, p 109; P. Dubois, "Les ouvriers divises," Paris, 1981, pp 167-172; J. Lojkine, "La classe ouvriere et l'automation," LA PENSEE, No 233, May-June 1983, p 18.
12. For more details see: G.G. Diligenskiy, "Rabochiy na kapitalisticheskoy predpriyatii" [The Worker in the Capitalist Enterprise], Moscow, 1969; H.U. Davis, op. cit., pp 102-117.

13. A. Touraine, "L'evolution du travail ouvrier aux Usines Renault," Paris, 1955; same author, "La conscience ouvriere," Paris, 1966; A. Touraine, M. Wiewiorka, F. Dubet, op. cit.
14. See: D. Bell, "The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism," New York, 1976, p 224 ff.
15. See: P. Jardillier, "Le travail et l'emploi," LE TRAVAIL HUMAIN, Vol 44, No 2, pp 337-364; "Le devenir de la classe ouvriere," LA PENSEE , No 233, May-June 1983, pp 3-7.
16. See J.P.Durand, J. Lojkine, and C. Manieu, "Formation et informatisation de la production: le cas de l'industrie automobile." -- CESIP -- Delegation generale a la formation professionnelle, March 1984.
17. "Global Crises and the Social Sciences," edited by John Trent and Paul Lamy. Proceedings of a UNESCO Symposium on the Fundamental Problems of and Challenges for the Social Sciences. Published by UNESCO and University of Ottawa Press, 1984.

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CSO: 1807/205

DEMOCRATIC TENDENCIES OF WORKING PEOPLE OF FRG DISCUSSED

Moscow RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYI MIR in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 85 pp 85-98

[Article by Robert Yakovlevich Yevzerov, doctor of historical sciences, docent, and USSR Academy of Sciences IMRD [International Workers Movement Institute] section chief: "Democratic Tendencies in the Mental Attitudes of FRG Working People"]

[Text] West Germany's development along the path of democracy in the postwar period was a complex and ambiguous process. The West German state which arose on the ruins of Hitler's Reich bore within itself contradictory principles. On the one hand was the trend to restore and develop bourgeois democracy, which was pitted against the fascist regime. On the other was the trend to preserve ties with the past period of dominance of monopoly capital, the anticommunism of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis, and the long-standing authoritarian inclinations and "true German" conservative, apolitical "respectability." And although the first tendency was extolled in every way, in fact under the determining influence of internal and external reaction the second prevailed.

It is noteworthy that upon taking the post of chancellor in 1969, the leader of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) W. Brandt called on West Germans to "dare to move toward greater democracy." He declared: "... We are not afraid to expand democracy..., we are only just beginning to implement it in earnest."¹

The years the SPD was in power in a coalition with the Free Democratic Party (FDP) were a time of a series of democratic initiatives.² Nonetheless, the governmental activities of the SPD were very inconsistent and contradictory. Its positive aspects were exhausted by the second half of the 1970's (in the period of the chancellorship of H. Schmidt). Although this course provoked very sharp protest, even in the ranks of the SPD itself, the situation remained the same.³ All this facilitated a move to the right and the coming to power of the government headed by the CDU/CSU [Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union], which proclaimed a neoconservative course. The tasks of the country's democratic development thereby became even more urgent and at the same time more complex. The realization of these tasks demands genuinely enterprising general democratic action and a predisposition to the broad

masses' participation in this action, depending on their attitude toward the bourgeois-democratic ways existing in the country.

Among the working people of the FRG -- the overwhelming majority of the country's population, the bourgeois-democratic system formed in the FRG, while generally enjoying great respect, at the same time provokes growing dissatisfaction and demands for democratic transformations; this is the result of a number of reasons related, on the one hand, to the existence and nature of the operation of this system and, on the other, to the development of the citizens themselves and their aspirations and attitudes, especially in recent times.

Support for the bourgeois democratic order as opposed to the totalitarian ways experienced in the years of the fascist regime prevails in the broad masses of the FRG population. Correspondingly, the West German political system enjoys broad recognition among the country's population as a democratic system. According to data from the well-known Allensbach Institute of Demoscopy,⁴ the share of FRG citizens surveyed who considered its democratic system to be the best form of state declined to two-thirds in 1976 (in the environment of the developing crisis) but after this, in 1978, reached approximately three-quarters (with young people aged 16-29 -- 64 percent). In late 1979 80 percent of those surveyed considered the existing form of state preferable even taking into account the difficulties which the country was confronting.⁵

Nonetheless, the idea of bourgeois democracy that developed among the FRG population is frequently found to be a very formalistic, vague stereotype. It is instructive that while people hold widespread respect for the Basic Law of the FRG, they have a very rough, if not distorted idea of a number of fundamental precepts in it.⁶ As the group of major signs proposed by the Allensbach Institute associates which characterize its existence in the country attest, the current study of the questions of democracy is based on liberal-bourgeois value guidelines and is concentrated almost exclusively in the political sphere. Certain questions of democracy in economic life are only being posed very vaguely or in a very limited way and problems of antimonopoly development are avoided altogether.⁷ As K. Marx demonstrated long ago, this type of stereotype of the concept of bourgeois democracy that relies on the apparent equality of commodity exchange relations of sellers and buyers of the work force is on the surface of the society while the secret of capitalist exploitation is hidden within the depths of production. All this is manifested in the illusory and limited nature of many of the precepts of bourgeois-democratic political systems which in turn reinforce the fundamental undemocratic nature of capitalist economic ways, while religiously preserving their fundamental foundations.

However, in the FRG the complex of socioeconomic, political, and ideological measures, especially in the period of SPD-FDP rule, and the significant increase in the material level of the life of the working people for a certain period of time promoted the spread of a distorted understanding of the essence of capitalist social relations. Social-statist and social-partner precepts shared by significant strata of the working people developed intensively.⁸ And in answering a question identifying their attitude toward a government that proclaimed that it "wanted to introduce socialism," 51 percent took a

negative position in 1970, while in 1973-1980 the corresponding figure was 64-66 percent; this included 57 percent of the young people and 52 percent of those oriented to the SPD. Only 40 percent of those trade union activists surveyed expressed a readiness to attribute the FRG's development to socialism.⁹ Moreover, the proportion of people who denied that fundamental reforms were needed to overcome the backwardness of the political and social system in the FRG grew under the rule of the SPD-FDP coalition (34 percent in late 1968; 54 percent in 1974). In the crisis year of 1976 more than 60 percent of the active members of trade unions surveyed did not consider fundamental changes necessary.¹⁰

Nonetheless, these types of statements are obviously dictated by the a priori unacceptability of replacing the existing social system in the country and a desire not to lose established bourgeois-democratic ways. When we move to more concrete questions dealing with the direct experience of daily life of the working people, it is revealed that very critical opinions are also "built in" to their social-partner and conformist sentiments. Thus, among trade union activists, 50-57 percent of the members of production councils and trustees directly involved in carrying out the actual social partnership surveyed considered it impossible to implement while 38 percent of rank and file trade union members believed the same. It is also instructive that a very sober understanding of the disadvantageous position of hired workers as compared to employers was observed (90 percent) and of the reasons for it: hired workers do not own the means of production (84 percent), they receive less than they deserve (86 percent), and their political influence is small (72 percent).¹¹

It turned out that although fundamental changes were rejected, at the same time 64 percent of the same members of trade unions, based on the interests of hired workers, considered fundamental democratic reforms of the economic system necessary. Among them, 66 percent supported nationalization of key sections of industry and market-dominating enterprises necessary; 73 percent supported planning all economic life of the entire society; 84 percent supported democratic control and management of investments; and 90 percent supported equalizing the rights of capital and labor through "coparticipation."¹² In this way, most supported the need for a complex of measures which, although they received limited treatment from the leaders of the Association of German Trade Unions, were still preserved in all its fundamental programs starting from the 1949 program up to and including the most recent one, the 1981 program.

The idea of the importance of these reforms was intensified by the economic crisis. In order to overcome or alleviate it, 82 percent of those same people surveyed believed democratic leadership and control in the economic process was necessary and 91 percent believed limiting the power of large concerns was; 66 percent believed that in the FRG associations of employers were the foremost abusers of power. Most (53 percent) noted even in the period of SPD-FDP rule the government's economic policy in conditions of crisis was first of all to the benefit of employers.¹³ This was manifested even more forcefully when the government headed by the CDU/SDU came to power. The crisis, mass unemployment, plans to close enterprises, and the government policy of social dismantling prompted the conclusion: "Democracy is turning into plutocracy!"¹⁴

Of course, the process of rising dissatisfaction of the working people develops ambivalently. In the complex conditions of the structural crisis the differentiation and the contradictory nature of the attitudes of the workers and all working people, even those who support the activities of trade unions, increased. Among the participants in the surveys, the proportion of those who believed that trade unions represent first of all the interests of workers and employees declined from 65 percent (1978) to 55 percent (1982). Correspondingly, more people did not have a definite opinion. Only half of the supporters of trade unions surveyed expected help from trade unions in solving the problems of the crisis and of unemployment, while three-quarters of them put their trust in trade unions' influence on politicians rather than the trade unions' own activities. Opinions also substantially diverged on whether trade unions needed to behave aggressively and militantly or, while maintaining activism, show greater "realism" and perhaps restrict their demands in general. This type of contradiction had an effect on the sentiments of both working people and the unemployed.¹⁵

But nonetheless everyday experience again and again proves to the working people that their specific demands cannot be carried out and cannot be realized in any consistent way without resolving the far-reaching tasks of democratizing economic life. And, as research by West German Marxists confirms, a much more critical and class-defined attitude toward the state is also formed among workers with more experience in the strike movement, which has incidentally had positive results. Demands on the state, in any case in the field of social policy and in questions of employment, education, and insuring peace, are also much more widespread among them.¹⁶ The process of interaction between a skeptical, critical attitude toward the state and increased demands on it, which increases the general level of the masses' democratic demands and their desire to implement them. As V.P. Iyerusalimskiy justifiably notes, this in turn can help the masses to "work out a critical and class-defined view of the state and democracy in a new way."¹⁷

It is instructive that on the question of whether trade unions in the past should have acted more firmly to satisfy the interests of hired workers, 75 percent of the responding students in the trade union educational system indicated a lack of the necessary toughness. These included those who favored more toughness in the struggle for collective contracts (83 percent), for implementing trade union legislation (81-83 percent), for realizing "coparticipation" (85 percent), and for socializing the key sectors of industry (65 percent). Most of those surveyed considered the strike an efficient tool of the struggle and of pressure on employers; more than 70 percent rejected the viewpoint that it is a passe means of struggle.¹⁸ In general, recognition of the importance of the strike, which somewhat declined in the trade union ranks in the late 1970's (1971-1975 -- 80 percent, 1978 -- 73 percent), rose once again later (84 percent in 1979 and 85 percent in 1982).¹⁹

The matter is not restricted to verbal recognition. Encountering difficulties related to the structural crisis and trying to protect and expand their rights, the working people of the FRG are acting more and more energetically

to achieve democracy in the fields of economics and politics. It is characteristic that the desire to strengthen the monitoring rights of trade unions, for "coparticipation" in enterprises, and to limit the freedom of action of employers appeared as early as the 1976-1978 strikes; later this trend intensified and was also reflected in the increasingly frequent seizures of enterprises.²⁰ The powerful strike of metal workers and printers in 1984 revealed the desire of the broad working masses to protect their right to strike, despite the antidemocratic actions of employers who used "cold lockouts" (in sectors of the economy not encompassed by the strike) and despite the support they received from the highest organs of state power.²¹

The 29 September 1983 worker demonstration and rally in Bonn, with 130,000 people participating, was unprecedented in FRG history. It united representatives of the army of labor of many regions of the country and gave an example of combining different forms and demands in the struggle against the government's promonopoly policy. The demonstration and rally grew into a one-hour strike at docks and foundry enterprises; at the same time in the Bundestag the "Greens" criticized governmental policy in the area of steel production. During the demonstration specific demands to preserve the opportunity to work were generalized as slogans: "For a person's right to a job and the right to work!" and "Nationalization of steel production -- jobs instead of missiles!" Speeches were heard saying that the socialization of steel production fully conformed to law but depended on the ratio of forces in society; if employers did not feel obligated to use property for the common good and in accordance with the Basic Law, they must be relieved of it.²²

Certain trends of dissatisfaction are also recorded in the results of surveys conducted by the Allensbach Institute in late 1978 on the existence of major signs of democracy in the FRG, although these results were also distorted by the selection of signs itself.

The largest proportions of those surveyed regarded the following to be attained: freedom of religion, a multiparty system, and democratization of the voting system (80-90 percent); 78 percent felt it possible to freely express their political opinions (in 1978, mainly persons older than 45). However, the proportion of people who found that equality before the law was observed was 55 percent. Less than half believed that workers can "coparticipate" in production. In connection with politicians observing the wishes of citizens as well as regarding the opportunity for the broad masses to participate in policy and in carrying out state decisions, only 26-34 percent believed that these features of democracy were being realized in the FRG.²³ In this way, the bourgeois-democratic order formed in the country reveals its negative sides and arouses the dissatisfaction of citizens even when it is perceived in the limited hypertrophied-representative form cultivated by the elite, with a predominance of formalistic and frequently even individualistically interpreted value guidelines.

While praising the elective system and representative institutions, the founders of Marxism-Leninism repeatedly noted the harmful nature of bourgeois democracy whereby ones elected by the people are not insured of activity in "working" institutions. V.I. Lenin stressed the need to achieve a position so that those elected must themselves work, execute their laws, verify what is

being realized, and be directly responsible to those who elected them.²⁴ The realization of this task is possible only on the paths of the socialist transformation of society. Nonetheless, the processes which nurture such a direction of movement also exist in conditions where there is undoubtedly no revolutionary situation; even developing under capitalism, they are manifested in increased dissatisfaction with bourgeois democracy in the FRG, as in other capitalist countries. Dissatisfaction is intensified by the collision between the increased needs of the citizens of the contemporary capitalist society to develop and implement their rights and to coparticipate at various levels in the work of society and the state and the strengthening of the bureaucratic state apparatus pitted against these processes. The growing "expectations" of citizens regarding the state collide with its intensified bureaucratization and result in their losing trust in politicians and representative democracy. Corruption and scandals where high-ranking representatives of state authority prove to be involved intensify these processes.

The data from sociological surveys shows that such operation of representative democracy arouses even greater dissatisfaction when its organs are found to be independent of the will of voters and even act in spite of them. For a number of years those surveyed were asked to define their position regarding this thesis: "The following opinion is often heard: every year each of us can vote at least once, but really politicians are not at all concerned about this and do only what they want to do." In 1970, when the "great coalition" of the SPD and the CDU/CSU ceased to exist, 22 percent agreed utterly and completely with this opinion and 52 percent partially agreed, 14 percent rejected it, and 12 percent did not define their position. In late 1978 only 18 percent completely agreed, perhaps because working people sympathetic to rule predominated among those who responded, but the proportion of those who partially agreed rose to 64 percent and only 5 percent put down indefinite answers. It may be assumed that the further evolution of sentiments was also unfavorable for those invested with the popular mandate. The general situation in the country speaks of this as do the materials of the responses to the question: "Do you believe that the deputies in Bonn represent the population's interests above all or do they have other interests which are more important to them?" In 1982 only 40 percent of those surveyed believed that the deputies represented the population's interests; 27 percent did not define their position. Many saw the deputies as merely agents of their own personal interests (22 percent).²⁵

The feeling of powerlessness and of the impossibility of influencing the adoption of governmental decisions is no less significant for the FRG citizens. In 1975-1978, 7-9 percent of those surveyed considered their influence adequate. No definite answer was given by 21-25 percent. The number who felt completely powerless declined (1975 -- 55 percent and 1978 -- 48 percent), but taking into account those who considered their influence inadequate, the proportion of those dissatisfied remained almost stable (about 70 percent). If we turn to the activities of representative organs, the predominant part of those surveyed agreed that a deputy should vote for a law (and even more so against it) in accordance with the will of the majority of the people rather than his own understanding (62 percent and 52 percent, respectively, in 1978), but did not see ways to realize this will. About 60 percent of those surveyed in 1978 saw the opportunity for citizens

themselves to pass resolutions on major issues through a plebiscite as one of the main signs of democracy. Working people are indignant (but at times hopelessly acquiescent) at the arbitrary actions by "economically powerful forces" at various stages of the adoption of state decisions and at employer pressure on hired employees, which is exerted even during elections. Of those surveyed in 1979 42 percent believed that there was not a thing to be done to oppose the organs of power when one disagreed with them, or they did not know what to do (67 percent in 1953). But still many FRG citizens put their hopes on utilizing voter rights: 38 percent of the survey participants in 1979 (19 percent in 1953). However, the 1.5-fold increase in 1979 (to 21 percent) of the proportion who put their trust in other ways -- citizens' initiatives, demonstrations, and appeals to deputies and politicians -- was an important symptom.²⁶

As West German Marxist research shows, among workers the possibilities of influencing the state are regarded very negatively. More than half of those surveyed do not see appropriate opportunities or consider them insignificant, believing that they can only vote in elections. Among those who have comparatively more and in addition positive experience in the strike struggle, there are fewer who believe that they are completely or almost completely powerless in political terms (22 percent as compared to 32 percent) and almost twice as many expect to exercise influence through trade unions or party membership (24 percent as compared to 14 percent). Nonetheless, a third of those workers see prospects only in voting in elections.²⁷ However, the survey of students of the trade union educational system showed that most (61 percent) believed that the trade unions' power must be used to realize political demands. These demands include "coparticipation" and improved labor rights (92 percent), economic-political demands in general (81 percent), and detente and disarmament policy (61 percent). Influencing political parties was recognized as the most feasible means of carrying out these types of tasks (85 percent), but organizing demonstrations and meetings (66 percent), and when necessary, strikes (61 percent) was also recognized as feasible.²⁸

The accumulated dissatisfaction of young people is especially significant. According to study data prepared by order of the federal authorities by the SINUS Sociological Institute on the basis of a survey of 2,000 people conducted by the Infratest Institute in the summer of 1982, a majority of the generation of 15-30 year-olds, who show "special sensitivity to the democratic quality of our present system," are not satisfied with it (51 percent). Of those surveyed 70 percent believe that the ever-decreasing possibility of understanding politicians' decisions has become an important problem; this includes 43 percent who assume that this directly affects their own interests.²⁹

From the standpoint of the opportunity for political influence, among young people the greatest preference is also attributed to participating in elections (81 percent). Nonetheless, 69 percent note the efficiency of participating in citizens' initiatives and in self-help groups; 67 percent count on participating in the work of trade unions, production councils, and personnel councils; 57 percent assume membership in parties and cooperation with them must be used; 56 percent believe participating in campaigns to gather signatures is important; 45 percent believe participating in

authorized demonstrations is important; and 14 percent believe participating in spontaneous demonstrations is important.³⁰

Assessments of the activities of the Bundestag parties who carry out the policies are a component feature of the position of FRG citizens on bourgeois-democratic ways in the country. Dissatisfaction with the party-political system, which comes out in various forms, is growing. The survey data which showed that 30 percent expressed disappointment with the three main and very different parties (the CDU/CSU, the SPD, and the FDP) in 1982 (only 5 percent more than in 1978), while 46 percent denied it (3 percent more than in 1978), cannot serve as the basis for the conclusion of the Allensbach researchers: "There is no indication of dissatisfaction with the parties."³¹ To a significant extent the very formulation of the question fits within the framework of the traditional rejection of any prospect of fundamental changes in the existing system. In this connection the substantial proportion of people who cannot define their position (24 percent) is significant. In addition, the FRG citizens simultaneously expressed deep distrust of the actions of "traditional" parties on pressing issues of the country's life. The data from the survey on the degree of importance of certain problems and the ability of the two largest parties to solve them was proof of this. Overcoming unemployment was considered important by 88 percent, and 22 percent thought the CDU/CSU would be able to accomplish it while 15 percent thought the SPD would be able to do so. Corresponding figures for lessening inflation were 77 percent, but 17 percent and 12 percent; pension guarantees -- 77 percent, but 34 percent and 25 percent; environmental protection actions -- 64 percent, but 21 percent and 26 percent; politicians being more honest toward citizens -- 56 percent, but 12 percent and 8 percent; and equal rights for women in all spheres of life -- 41 percent, but 9 percent and 14 percent. The state of affairs did not change fundamentally in 1983 either.³² Thus, while high voting activism continues, citizens are becoming alienated from the leading Bundestag parties which operate as as a "privileged state within the state."³³

West German researchers note numerous cases of wave-like growth in dissatisfaction with the FRG party-political system which appeared back in the 1960's but has made itself known with particular intensity since the second half of the 1970's. To a decisive degree it is a result of the degree of concentration of the activities of the CDU/CSU, the SPD, and FDP, despite all their differences, on the competitive struggle for the voter and their evolution into "parties for everyone," into so-called people's parties which lose the specifics of their make-up as the ruling parties become the government party. The electorate of the "traditional parties" is in turn losing its identity in terms of value orientations.³⁴

The FRG citizens are proving to be "election material," which must only be considered to a limited degree, and their expectations and desires are filtered out by the elite party mechanism when they are working out the particular precepts and directions of activity, dressed in broadly disseminated statements in favor of democracy. The alienation of the masses is also reflected in their being uninformed or misinformed, in the "traditional parties'" lack of desire to develop extensive democratic activism, and in the reduction of activism to mostly, if not exclusively,

election support. The changing parties at the helm of government in the bourgeois state in practice emasculate the bourgeois-democratic freedoms which they proclaim; the sovereignty of the people as the bearers of democracy turns into a false ritual of election day.

However, the surveys of public opinion and the conclusions of sociologists confirm that the FRG population's interest in politics has substantially increased. Although fluctuations occur even within a year, the general trend clearly appears. With the almost stable proportion of those who are particularly interested in politics (more than 40 percent; in 1983 -- 37 percent), the number of people not at all interested in politics continues to decline (in 1983 -- 6 percent); having overcome the recession of the 1976 crisis year, interest in politics is increasing (in 1980-1982 -- 48 percent and in 1983 -- 57 percent).³⁵ The existing fragmentary data on surveys among workers shows that this trend appeared with greater force in their ranks, especially among skilled workers and generally among those with a higher level of education. Among groups of workers more active in the strike struggle, a greater "politicization" was observed, although indifference to politics also had an effect, accounted for chiefly by their work overload, inadequate knowledge, and low level of awareness of information.³⁶ The proportion of women interested in politics, which was approximately 25-35 percent of those surveyed in the 1970's, exceeded 40 percent, while among young people the figure was over 50 percent. A positive attitude toward personal, active participation in politics also increased substantially; in 1983 almost half of those surveyed considered it important.³⁷

Dissatisfaction with the FRG party-political system also affects the significant passivity of both members of "traditional parties" of the Bundestag and of their supporters. Sociological research conducted in 1977 and 1982 in the largest state organization of the SPD (North Rhine-Westphal) shows that in a number of organizations there was a decline in the already-low level of party activism. The reasons for this were: dissatisfaction with the party, especially its leadership (16 percent); general political fatigue after three election campaigns (29 percent); and others.³⁸ All this is even more election campaigns (29 percent), and others.³⁸ All this is even more remarkable since the SPD has always been oriented, in accordance with its program documents, to the all-out development of democracy.

Substantial passivity also affected the supporters of all the "traditional parties" of the Bundestag. The greatest desire to be involved was seen in the readiness of over 50 percent to participate in party meetings in 1983, compared to 42 percent in 1980.. It was almost the same for those who supported the "Greens" -- 49 percent. Approximately 20 percent (16 percent -- in 1980) were inclined to support the party position in street debate or at another party's meeting and to help disseminate agitational material, while the figure among supporters of the "Greens" was 32-44 percent. A constant 11 percent agreed to put up party posters (17 percent for the "Greens").³⁹

New trends are appearing mainly among supporters of new social movements and, consequently, of the "Greens" party. Their preferences roughly coincide with those of the entire mass of young people in questions of participating in elections and are slightly higher in regard to joining parties and cooperating

with them and participating in the activities of trade unions, production councils, and personnel councils. Nonetheless, the level of preferences is substantially higher in regard to collecting signatures (65 percent instead of 56 percent) and participating in citizens' initiatives (82 percent instead of 69 percent), as well as participating in authorized demonstrations (58 percent instead of 45 percent) and especially spontaneous ones (24 percent instead of 14 percent).⁴⁰

The development of democratic tendencies in the FRG is also manifested in the movements of nontraditional opposition of the 1970's-1980's. Their experience creates new forms, means, and methods which are supposed to help realize citizens' rights and freedoms and overcome the present condition of bourgeois-democratic ways in the country, which no longer satisfy broad social circles. We cannot undertake a detailed analysis of the new movement of social protest in the FRG, to which a great deal of Marxist research in the USSR and abroad is devoted.⁴¹ We will deal with the problem under examination only through certain features of the new democratic mass activism.

This activism is the response to contemporary state-monopoly development and the functioning of bourgeois-democratic institutions of authority. In the life of the FRG old crucial problems make themselves felt and new ones which by virtue of the antagonistic nature of society are not being solved give rise to dissatisfaction among working people. The political system reveals more and more clearly its inability to adequately reflect and carry out the desires and expectations of the masses and opposes their independent activity and democratic tendency.

The dissatisfaction of the country's population with the state of affairs in economics, politics, and the social and cultural spheres and in the area of international relations finds an outlet in various manifestations of mass activism. The population's dissatisfaction reveals itself in the contrast between the potential of the contemporary scientific-technical revolution and the real, limited opportunities for improvement of the life of the people and the comprehensive manifestation of individual abilities. Infringements on a person's right to live and the threat of mankind's destruction by atomic war provoke sharp protest. The organic link between the humanist and social foundations of human existence is making itself felt with ever-greater force, although sometimes, because of its inadequate realization, the growing needs of people and the need to protect the rights of the individual are manifested on the surface of social life in strictly individualistic forms. The desire for ennoblement and self-realization of the individual is inseparably linked to protecting his rights and opportunities for him to actively influence the existing reality and with the struggle to expand, deepen, and develop these rights and opportunities.

The response to the alienation of the country's political institutions and institutionalized organizations from the very broad group of primary material and "postmaterial" needs of its citizens and the contradiction between the development of imperialism and the political activism of the masses permeate the social protest movements. It is not the first time in postwar West German history that they have manifested themselves; the nonparliamentary democratic opposition of the late 1960's, the citizens' initiatives and action committees

which joined the struggle against the introduction of emergency legislation, the remilitarization of the FRG, and the equipping of the Bundeswehr with atomic weapons can serve as examples of this.⁴² But never before has this type of movement been so massive, many-sided, and active.

The growing distrust of parliament and the "traditional parties," the bureaucratization of the organs of power, and the policies being carried out "despite us" powerfully stimulate the desire to act "despite them" and independently try to solve urgent questions and prove oneself an individual in various social, including the political, spheres. But again this means to do so in a new way, ridding oneself of the rigid confines of traditional customs and institutions and seeking the most adequate and free forms of democratic self-expression without being reduced on the citizens' level merely to participating in election campaigns.

This is also the reason for the shift characteristic of new social protest movements from the line of using existing institutions to a course toward "self-organization" and personal presentation of one's demands and to a movement by-passing and against existing institutions; the proclamation of an antiparty stand or at least of another party differing from the traditional ones; the desire to "avoid politics and the state" and act apart from parliament, but if through it, then only in support of protest movements and their expansion and deepening; attempts to create nontraditional enterprises and forms of nonproduction life or at least, "in the alternative," modify them, and the like. Meanwhile, the creation of the "antiparty party" of the "Greens" and its success in elections in a number of states and in the Bundestag led to the appearance within the walls of parliament of radical-democratic opposition.

Social protest movements in the FRG include a special direction of "citizens' initiatives" which focus their attention on protecting certain particular interests and on opportunities to find new forms of collective activity to satisfy them, new types of social coparticipation, and new aspects of self-government. But all movements as a whole are permeated with civil, democratic initiative. The "alternative" direction, which attempts to find an alternative to the present bourgeois way of life and to its precepts and value guidelines, institutions, and the entire existing bourgeois state system and creates numerous and various operative "alternative projects," is one of the main directions in them. Nonetheless, all the movements as a whole are distinguished by a desire for alternative action with regard to various aspects of the life of the contemporary bourgeois society. Even the seemingly specific feature which dominates the "Greens" as an ecological direction cannot, in the opinion of its supporters, be reduced to environmental issues and also includes the problems of man as the "object of ecological thinking."⁴³ Consequently, the broadly understood ecological focus is also characteristic of other directions of the "new movements."

Contemporary social protest movements in the FRG are above all a democratic phenomenon. This phenomenon is also democratic in the nature of its formation, by virtue of its mass character, by its means and methods of struggle, by the impact on social consciousness, and, the main thing, by orientation: these movements stand for the strengthening and development of

democracy and opportunities for the masses to coparticipate in solving major problems. The antiwar movement, which has been developed and operates in a new way and which actively influences all directions contiguous with it, draws them into its orbit and its ranks, and increases their general democratic, general political orientation, has become paramount in the spectrum of contemporary social protest movements.

After the deployment on FRG territory of American first-strike nuclear missiles, the antiwar movement, which defends man's right to live and acts against the threat of universal atomic destruction, acquired special significance in terms of its general democratic essence, goal, forms, and methods. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of the FRG population is against the deployment of the missiles, but the government does not want to take that into account.⁴⁴ As a result, ever-greater circles of the community are gradually being convinced that under the present bourgeois-democratic system fundamental decisions can be made and carried out despite the opinion of most of the population and, consequently, political activism cannot be concentrated only on questions of elections. The antiwar movement focused in itself and with its activities coordinated the most important general democratic problems. In one way or another it is not only directed against the country's militarization but also against the social dismantling related to it, against the course toward a neoconservative opposition of the individual to society, and against the government's "program of spiritual restoration" which is supposed to erode the humanist ideas, values, and guidelines of peace and social and spiritual progress for the needs of monopoly capital. In practice the struggle exposes the error of opposing the antiwar demands protecting the right to live and the demands of the working class protecting the right to work and reveals their general democratic unity, interaction, and interdependence.

The antiwar movement has enveloped large masses of people and all classes and social groups; people of different orientations and convictions are represented in it. It has become truly a people's movement, not only in composition and scope but also in its community of ideas and the tasks of the struggle for general democratic interests.

Various forms and methods of action have appeared in the antiwar movement: both old ones, which frequently remain on the fringes of election campaigns, and new ones, through which broad circles of the population try to overcome the narrow confines allotted for expression of their will. Demonstrations and rallies, the collecting of signatures and pickets, peace marches and national days of resistance, blockades of missile bases, trade union antiwar initiatives "from below" and "from above," and antiwar congresses and conferences of the intelligentsia have become common, not occasional phenomena. A social referendum said "no" to the missiles and a number of the country's zones were proclaimed nuclear-free zones. Radical-democratic opposition in the Bundestag demonstrates, in the words of H. Mies, the chairman of the German CP, "the parliamentary antiwar struggle and militant democracy in the real sense of the word."⁴⁵

New forms of organization and interrelations are taking shape in the antiwar movement and new methods of influence on the ruling circles, including the

general strike, are springing up. There is a growing tendency to overcome the noninvolvement of the SPD and the Association of German Trade Unions in the antiwar movement; contacts are being arranged between their members and communists. This development is very important in order to unite democratic forces and overcome the split between the economic struggle of substantial masses of organized workers and the antiwar movement. In their unity is the guarantee of success. The antiwar movement, along with the workers movement, is becoming a strong opponent to all types of evolution to the right.

The development of new social protest movements in the FRG is progressing intensively but in a complicated and contradictory way. The ranks of their activists, and especially their supporters and potential participants, have grown rapidly, with millions of people becoming involved. Only with time did the participation of workers and their influence begin to increase in the motley conglomerate of the mass base which took shape mainly from nonproletarian strata. The views and goals supported by these movements are uncoordinated and contradictory and frequently impulsive, but their ideals are often utopian and lead their followers off the main paths of development of mankind and simply turn their glances backward. The demands proposed even on the level of the urgent problems of democratization as a rule are externally radical but include imprints of inconsistency, among them ones that go beyond "communal" transformations. Harmful trends of separatism and claims to exclusivity in representing the democratic interests of the masses affect the activities of a number of leaders of the new protest movements. The general anticommunist atmosphere in the country and measures of the reactionary camp to influence "heretics" also have an effect on the new democratic movements. All this has a negative effect on their development and effectiveness.

However, despite all the contradiction and weakness or error of the positions of the new social protest movements, the main thing is that they represent, as the FRG communists stress, "first of all the various forms of the citizens' desire to express their democratic sentiments and organize democratic forces as a counterpoint to the policies of the governing circles and... parties," and "new elements of the future formation of antimonopoly movements."⁴⁶ Communists justifiably believe that millions of FRG citizens who have joined the ranks of the democratic movements in recent years thereby announced claims to coparticipate in the political process of making decisions.

New democratic movements reflect the sentiments of dissatisfaction of broad masses of FRG working people, even when not all of them agree with the answers proposed to urgent questions or with the forms and methods of solving them. Moreover, the protest movements stimulate activation of progressive democratic development. Passive nonresistance to an antidemocratic, reactionary course is eroding and self-education and self-indoctrination of the masses among active participants in the movement and in the ranks of those sympathizing with it, and in the broader circles of the population subject to the influence of the waves coming from the protest epicenter is taking place. Politicization of the movements is occurring independently of primary plans and desires. One way or another these movements are formulating the problems of changing social relations and have aimed at that, while the experience of the struggle itself, under the appropriate influence of the ideologically mature progressive forces of social development, can lead the participants in

the protest and the masses supporting them to the proper conclusions. While for those participating in the social protest, the very situation in the FRG objectively predetermines the role of the real allies of the working class in the struggle for democracy and against the dominance of state monopoly capital, to an enormous extent the direct experience of the struggle shapes them into such a force. The following conclusion of Soviet researchers seems absolutely obvious: although many of the new social movements still do not clearly show where they are going, "it is absolutely clear that they are not following the path of capitalism."⁴⁷ Countering this, formulas for "incorporating" new social movements into the present bourgeois-democratic system to improve and strengthen it can be encountered in the FRG.⁴⁸ On the other hand, there is still the threat that the movements might use the dissatisfaction they have built up to make a reactionary change and undermine the present democracy.

In general dissatisfaction with the condition of the bourgeois democracy in the FRG frequently gives rise to very contradictory or even opposite tendencies. It can lead to cohesion and the struggle for democratization but also conceals in itself the roots of other phenomena and processes: apathetic "adaptation" and demoralization -- saying "there's nothing to be done"; aggressive despair and political terrorism; individualistic alienation from social problems and nihilism in regard to democratic tasks, if not antidemocratic tendencies; and authoritarian aspirations such as searching for a way to overcome the "troubles" of the democratic system. Just as they existed in Germany a half century ago, such tendencies are found even now and the structural crisis and the growth of unemployment stimulate them. But while 90 percent of those surveyed in principle favor democracy, over 40 percent believe that a dictatorship surpasses democracy at least in one of the following aspects: overcoming unemployment, overcoming crime, in particular terrorism; rapid, effective actions in a crisis situation; or solving the problems of developing countries. They frequently also indicate that there is simply "more order" under a dictatorship.⁴⁹

A study published in 1981 showed that 5 million FRG citizens are inclined to believe the following: "We need to have a fuhrer again..."⁵⁰ In 1982 more than 2,000 criminal acts of a neo-Nazi nature were committed by right extremists in the FRG. Since the 1970's approximately one-third of the participants in the Allensbach survey have stated that Hitler's Reich was not so bad at all and one-fourth or one-fifth could not give a decisive answer. In 1972 only 40 percent expressed readiness to do everything possible to prevent a new national-socialist party from coming to power, 39 percent did not plan to do anything, and 12 percent expressed indifference.⁵¹ By the same token profascist, neofascist sentiments are stimulated.

Revanchiste, militaristic inclinations and "virtues," which are now again being intensively kindled and propagated by the ruling circles in Bonn, get mixed up with them. Those circles are trying to overcome the positive changes in the opinions of citizens who are less and less inclined to call the United States West Germany's "best friend" and show more trust in the peace-loving policies of the Soviet Union. The "union of exiles," according to the data of its leaders numbering 2.5 million people, has stepped up its assaults.

Hostility toward foreign workers living in the FRG has also made itself felt as a manifestation of nationalist tendencies. Back in 1979 two-thirds of them confirmed this. From 50-60 percent of the FRG residents surveyed in 1982-1983 subscribed to an especially important demand: "Make sure that our country doesn't have so many foreigners."⁵² All this contradicts the optimistic conclusion that "after World War II the Germans... so strongly suppressed their nationalist, militarist, and antidemocratic traditions that these traditions are no longer able to exercise a decisive influence on political consciousness in the Federal Republic."⁵³

The development of tendencies toward the democratization of society in the mental attitudes of the FRG citizens is a complex and contradictory process. The condition of bourgeois-democratic institutions and ways in the country not only provokes dissatisfaction and stimulates a desire for further democratization but also puts them within a certain established framework, overcoming "democratic passivity." The many years of activity of the "traditional" parties and organizations fostered this state of affairs and did not promote the masses' broad participation in resolving the tasks the country faces. All this emasculated bourgeois democracy and facilitated the advance to the right. Nonetheless, the sentiments of the masses confirm the substantial opportunities to overcome this situation and to carry on further democratization of the FRG.

FOOTNOTES

1. W. Brandt, "Reden und Interviews," 1971, p 13.
2. For more details see: "Sotsial-demokraticheskiy i burzhuaiznyy reformizm v sisteme gosudartsvvenno-monopoliticheskogo kapitalizma" [Social-Democratic and Bourgeois Reformism in the State Monopoly Capitalism System], Moscow, 1980, pp 264-305; G. Fuelberth, "Leitfaden durch die Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," Cologne, 1983, pp 67-94.
3. For more details see: "Razmezhevaniye i sdvig v sotsial-reformizme: Kriticheskiy analiz levyykh techeniy v zapadnoyevropeyskoy sotsial-demokratii" [Demarcation and Change in Social Reformism: A Critical Analysis of Trends in West German Social Democracy], Moscow, 1983, pp 200-243.
4. While sociological surveys as a rule cannot provide precise absolute data, they do make it possible to identify certain correlations and tendencies. The surveys of the Allensbach Institute usually encompass 2,000 people aged 16 years and older and are representative of the FRG as well as West Berlin. -- See: "Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie (AJD from now on). 1978-1983. Vol 8, Munich-New York-Paris, 1983, pp XLVII, XLVIII; AJD 1976-1977. Vol 7, Vienna-Munich-Zurich-Insbruck, 1977, p XLX.
5. See: AJD, Vol 8, pp 217, 223.
6. For example, regarding the position that the use of property should simultaneously serve the general good, 37 percent of those surveyed in

1979 thought it was taken from the FRG Constitution and 34 percent could not say anything definite. 63 percent attribute lines dealing with the socialization of land, natural resources, and means of production to the FRG Constitution and 23 percent do not know where they come from. About half of those surveyed do not know the Basic Law says: "All state authority comes from the people." Only 29 percent know that in the FRG actions which can disrupt peaceful cooperation among peoples, and in particular, are undertaken to prepare for aggressive war, are declared to be unconstitutional and punishable under law (see AJD, Vol 8, p 221).

7. See: Ibid., p 218.
8. See: AJD, Volume 8, p 338; H. Werner, "Arbeiterbildung und gesellschaftliches Bewusstsein," Cologne, 1979, pp 200-201, 399-401. For more details see: V.P. Iyerusalimskiy, "The FRG Working Class and the Crisis of the 1970's" in the book "Rabochiy klass v mirovom revolyutsionnom protsesse" [The Working Class in the World Revolutionary Process], Moscow, 1981, pp 91-96.
9. See: AJD, Volume 8, p 226; H. Werner, op. cit., p 417. The survey was conducted among 300 workers and employees mainly in the material production sphere who participated in classes of the trade union education system in May-July 1976 and over 60 percent of them performed the functions of trustees and members of production councils and personnel councils and the like, and were activists in trade unions. -- Ibid., pp 96-98, 100, 102, 427.
10. See: V.P. Iyerusalimskiy, op. cit., p 80; H. Werner, op. cit., p 420.
11. See: Ibid., pp 198, 396-397.
12. See: Ibid., pp 304, 413.
13. See: Ibid., pp 394, 395, 412.
14. WELT DER ARBEIT, No 12, 1984, p 3.
15. See: AJD, Vol 8, p 398; "Arbeiterbewusstsein in der Wirtschaftskrise," Cologne, 1981, pp 168, 169, 174; H. Dybowski, J. Golding, and others, "Nicht wehrlos -- doch wohin?", Frankfurt-am-Main, 1983, pp 62-63.
16. J.H. von Heiseler, "Work Consciousness and the State" in: "Der Staat im staatsmonopolistischen Kapitalismus der Bundesrepublik (6/1)," Frankfurt-am-Main, 1981, pp 477-478.
17. V.P. Iyerusalimskiy, op. cit., p 97.
18. See: H. Werner, op. cit., pp 402, 403.
19. See: MARXISTISCHE BLAETTER, No 5, 1983, p 51.

20. See: "Klassy i klassovaya borba v FRG" [Classes and the Class Struggle in the FRG], Moscow, 1978; G. Hautsch, B. Semmler, "Betriebsbesetzung," Frankfurt-am-Main, 1983.
21. See: NACHRICHTEN ZUR WIRTSCHAFTS- UND SOZIALPOLITIK, No 7, 1984, pp 2, 18, 20, 22; MARXISTISCHE BLAETTER, No 5, 1984, pp 67-75.
22. See: UNSERE ZEIT, 30 September 1983.
23. See: AJD, Vol 8, pp 218, 223.
24. See: V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 33, pp 46, 48.
25. See: AJD, Vol 8, pp 225, 235.
26. See: Ibid., pp 218, 225, 236, 341.
27. See: J.H. Heiseler, op. cit., p 479.
28. See: H. Werner, op. cit., pp 405, 406.
29. See: "Die verunsicherte Generation: Jugend und Werbewandel," Opladen, 1983, pp 14, 18, 53, 54.
30. See: Ibid., p 55.
31. See: AJD, Vol 8, p 267.
32. See: Ibid., pp 261, 263.
33. K. Sontheimer, "Der unbehagliche Buerger," Zurich, 1980, p 30.
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CSO: 1807/205

YOUTH AND SOCIETY IN SPAIN WITHOUT FRANCO

Moscow RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNY MIR in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 85 pp 99-115

[Article by Sergey Ivanovich Vasil'tsov, doctor of historical sciences and senior scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMRD [International Workers Movement Institute], under the rubric "Youth: Problems and Perspectives"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics in text]

[Text] Ten years ago the last and one of the oldest fascist regimes in Europe ceased to exist. A country which had experienced a period of intensive social transformation became one of the bourgeois democracies: it reconstructed its political and state institutions virtually from scratch; parties which had partly come through years of underground activity and partly were newly born from small groups of activists searched for their public images; the "modernized" strata of the ruling class which had been liberated from the guardianship of Franco-ism had only just begun to comprehend the science of political (including parliamentary) maneuvering responsive to the spirit of the times, pushing aside the figures of the ruling regime who had departed along with the past from the helm of government. The main mass of the working class, which had formed in the late 1950's-1960's from members of the rural and urban petty bourgeois strata and compensated for the heavy losses incurred by the cadre detachments of the hereditary proletariat in the civil war of 1936-1939, was young. Youth also distinguished the country's entire population, which had recently experienced a demographic "boom"; therefore young people stood out against the background of "aging" Western Europe.

It may be asserted without exaggeration that the history of contemporary Spain will be the history of the social maturation of its present youth. After all, a new "political" generation whose formative period fell at the turn of an age has entered the national arena. Its consciousness and behavior traits reflected both a continuity of development, stretching through the years of dictatorship from the 2nd Republic which was strangled by the fascists, and a decisive break with the almost 40-year-old Franco precepts and traditions, as well as confusion at the contradictory and changeable world in which it was growing up. The young people themselves, without relying on anyone's help, had to understand and suffer through the ordeals which befell them along with the entire country. They could borrow little from the scant experience of their fathers who grew up under Franco-ism. Cast by the turn of historical development into the rapids of bourgeois-democratic changes, they responded to

any turn of the situation more sharply and gave themselves up more fully both to the explosions of enthusiasm which accompanied any step of the reform policy and to the disillusionment which followed these flights. Young people first encountered obvious and hidden obstacles here, more and more often being convinced that it was precisely their own interests which were being sacrificed before others for the salvation and prosperity of Spanish capitalism, exacting enormous costs and straining the forces of their development which were entering a new phase.

The Old and the New in Mass Consciousness at the Turning Point Between Two Ages

The late 1960's and early 1970's were the starting point in the formative process of the contemporary political, including youth, culture. The more decrepit the Franco regime became, especially evident in the last period of its existence, the more often the Spaniards were forced -- regardless of their age or social affiliation -- to ponder the destiny of the society surrounding them and the future of the country. Two feelings coexisted and struggled in their consciousness: the expectation, at times intuitive, of decisive changes able to break down the barrier which separated their homeland from other European countries and closed the path of further progress for it, and the fear, at times irrational, of inevitable social upheavals. The specter of civil war which the right used to frighten and blackmail public opinion still hovered over Spanish society.

Life, however, went on. The regime could no longer keep the thoughts and deeds of people under strict control as it had before. The seeds of new relations sprouted everywhere: parties operated illegally; trade unions, using Franco's "vertical" syndicates as cover, imposed their will on the patronage system quite successfully; the mass media, avoiding the censorship barriers, provided critical materials, "shaking" the conservative stereotypes planted in the heads of fellow-citizens.¹ The halo of being "the chosen one," created in the regime's years around the person of the dictator, faded. And measures to renew it yielded fewer and fewer results. Thus, already in the second half of the 1960's, only one of every four Spaniards -- both young and old -- explained their own conduct in social affairs and still referred (more from habit than conviction) to the will and example of "Franco himself." People, especially young people, saw in the caudillo only an old man who clung to life and power but was helpless to keep one or the other. Blind faith in the immutability of the "social world" whose creation -- as an "antidote against the appeals for social restoration sounding from the opposition camp -- the regime attributed to itself showed more and more cracks, through which the sometimes hidden and sometimes openly impatient expectation of changes penetrated.²

Only one third of the population continued to put their trust in the "eternal nature" of the ways that prevailed around them, agreeing (in 11-18 percent of the cases) that their own destiny and the destiny of the country depended as before on the will and whim of a certain "prominent" person or a person designated by him. And protest against the complete removal of people from the sphere of "making decisions" to determine the nation's future spread among the new generations most rapidly of all. Of young people 47 percent shared

the conviction that "all of us are worried about the political situation in the country and responsible for it." And only in the most undeveloped and downtrodden strata of the country -- among the unemployed, the rural and urban "lower classes," and housewives -- did more than half, from fear, habit, or conviction (it is not always possible to distinguish one from the other), echo the propaganda version repeated since childhood, ordinarily finding around them "fully adequate freedoms."³

/But even the most active and daring in opinions had difficulty imagining what could and should replace the obsolete state system./ People from certain social groups, educated and illiterate, old and still very young, saw "Spain without Franco" in different ways. Frequently their undeveloped political imagination offered the most simplified pictures of the future: to some it seemed a return to Falangism, that is, the most odious form of the same regime; the "triumph of communism" which was at times associated with common anarchy frightened others. And still many (at least 40 percent of the population) already agreed on the main thing, affirming the inevitability of the restoration of democratic freedoms. But an even greater circle of people decided on a different logical conclusion -- "democracy is impossible without parties." To be sure, extremely dim recollections, both personal ones and ones from hearsay, from foreigners' words -- of political organizations which had once existed in their country and whose dissension, as Franco-ism persistently and, one must say, not unsuccessfully proved, led Spain to civil strife. Attempting to define their own positions, most Spaniards preferred to turn to examples taken from outside -- from social realities of states more or less familiar to them and from those of which they had heard or read or themselves became familiar with during trips for seasonal work. At the same time the republican form of rule, including the presidential type on the American model, attracted young people more often than the rest. Young people were prepared to give their sympathies to the social democratic or socialist trends (40 percent and 21 percent of the preferences, respectively). Older people who had already passed age 30 frequently wanted merely to maintain the status quo (22 percent) or predicted a return to one form of monarchy or another (29 percent); Christian democratic organizations like the Italian Christian Democratic Party would satisfy their political tastes. But the generation of 50-60 year-olds was not always resolved yet to break with Franco's National Movement: one out of every five sincerely or with customary caution preferred it, although even in this milieu one out of three had already gotten accustomed to other political forces and most often -- the Christian democrats again.⁴

The dictator's death, which followed in November 1975, removed, as it then seemed, the main obstacle on the path of anticipated changes. The country had to go through a whole number of political campaigns, central among which were the parliamentary elections conducted democratically for the first time and planned for the summer 1977. But the Spaniards did not have a clear idea of things which in general were customary for their Western European contemporaries: what political voting was and what its procedures, goals, and probable results were. And after all, at least 300 parties and groups which had just been legalized or awaited official recognition sought their sympathies and support. And the names taken by these organizations explained almost nothing to the inexperienced local voter and served most often as simple

"labels" which were almost obligated to include the epithets "democratic," "people's," "social," and others. Even well-known rightists tried to keep in step with the times here. It was simply impossible then to understand who was hidden behind these screens. The only exceptions were the Communist Party of Spain and the Spanish Socialist Workers Party [PSOE], of which more than half the citizens had heard. But only 18 percent of the population could say anything definite about Christian democratic organizations, although they were the ones who in the immediate future were to become the core of the Alliance of the Democratic Center [UDC] which came to power.⁵

In the Stream of Social Changes: A Time of Hopes and a Time of Despair and Disappointments

The recent Franco-ist past left the voters with nothing but simplified criteria for an electoral choice, which presupposed above all evaluation of the personal qualities of one political leader or another. An objective need arose for persons endowed with more or less stable charismatic features in the consciousness of their fellow-citizens to appear on the scene. Accumulating by virtue of his real or perceived merits the sympathies of the people, who were deprived of the customary political reference points by the fall of their former idol, and thereby accelerating the process of overcoming the social and political "atomization" which inevitably occurs when obsolete social structures fall, such a historical personage secured -- at times despite the expectations associated with him and at other times a surprise even to him -- the mass base needed to carry out the reorganization and maintained it in a stable condition for the amount of time needed to introduce the citizens to new systems of values and forms of behavior adequate to the needs and institutions arising in the society.

By no means all the politicians well known at that time could make claims to such a role. Ultimately A. Suarez, who was not among the "historical leaders" compromised by participation in the civil war nor a member of Franco's politically bankrupt circle, proved to be the most suitable candidate. Initially he owed his post of chairman of the government only to the personal trust of Juan Carlos the 1st, who had come to the throne. But it was precisely because of such a political "investiture" on the king's part, which many Spaniards took to mean the only legal (in relationship to the fallen dictatorship) power, that Suarez proved to be legitimated in mass consciousness as the almost "natural" head of the new course, even before an electoral mandate was given. Moreover, certain other favorable features, among them the atmosphere of social enthusiasm into which the country plunged as the times of change approached, were also important: Only 18 percent of the Spanish people, as the sounding of mass sentiments asserted, doubted at that time that their lives would soon take a turn for the better.⁶

In people's consciousness, the figure of Suarez was perceived for the most part /emotionally/: a favorable impression was produced by his highly publicized capacity for work (41.6 percent of those surveyed mentioned it) and intelligence (36.6 percent), as well as personal attractiveness which to some (approximately 27 percent of the citizens) seemed the main virtue of a premier. From the viewpoint of almost two-thirds of the population, only he could be at the helm of government at a time so complicated for the country's

fate regardless of which particular party got the most votes in the elections. Elevated on the crest of the people's expectations, the cabinet head thus was beyond any competition for some time after being given a kind of political carte blanche. The only thing was that it was impossible to carry out this mandate of trust individually -- without a far-flung, modern mass organization -- in the new democratized Spain. A. Suarez did not have such a force behind him. It had to be taken from outside, chosen from the mass of bourgeois parties which were actively offering themselves on the political market. So a "marriage of convenience" was arranged between the head of the government which was already in operation and the UDC -- an amorphous coalition, unified mainly by electoral interests, of Christian democrats, social democrats, and liberals who at that time did not even have their own press organ but were ready and able to start cautiously dismantling the political institutions of Franco-ism.⁷

The 1977 elections brought victory to the centrists. They were given preference by 34.7 percent of the Spanish people, mainly residents of backward rural areas. Thanks to elements of majoritarianism included in election law, 47.1 percent of all deputy places were at the disposal of the UDC. But the socialists, who were just 5.5 percent behind in the vote, received 13.4 percent fewer mandates. The rest of the parties proved to be generally outside the real struggle for power. The results of the next vote, held in 1979, also showed a close correlation of forces.⁸

/The UDC's success was not complete. Nor was it final: the uncertainty of the future could be discerned behind the triumph of the moment./ And the problem here was not just the instability of the centrist bloc itself. Its social future was questioned -- young people did not follow the ruling party. The centrists could rely on the support of some 25 percent of the Spaniards between the ages of 18 and 34. But even then, at the start of the electoral struggle, the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] took the relative (though weak) majority of them -- 31 percent; moreover, 14 percent of these voters gave preference to the communists. The lack of development of relations with young people became if not the main and most evident factor, still one which operated continually, which determined along with others the direction and nature of the social maneuvering of the PSOE, and at times its entire destiny.⁹

After all, centrism's own political capital was comparatively small. It had not become firmly interlocked with the socioeconomic structures and by no means definitively gained the allegiance of the ruling class. The internally weak ruling party which was indebted by its state role not so much to the nation's trust as to the personal prestige of the leader accepted "from outside," could not avoid much greater dependence than it would have liked on the state of and changes in the people's sentiments and sympathies. The growing democratic movement compelled it, in order to stay in power, to make more and more concessions. Thus, within the space of 3 years, a negligible time in the measure of history, the political superstructure erected by Franco-ism was dismantled and in its place the erection of a new one which conformed to the general course of changes was begun.

However, the totality of socioeconomic problems which partly arose in the years of centrist rule remained virtually unsolved, with an increasingly oppressive impact on the national situation as a whole as crisis processes in the West intensified. The breakdown of social structures took on a more destructive character in Spain than perhaps anywhere else in capitalist Europe. The level of unemployment there rose to more than five times its former level in less than a decade (1973-1981). But in the leading industrial centers the strata of "superfluous" people expanded even more: for example, in Catalonia it increased to 32 times its former level in the same time period.¹⁰

/And the Spaniards who had just begun an independent life found themselves in the most distressing position./ Today only one out of three among them can be included in social production and become a full-fledged citizen. And the majority find jobs in the services sphere, not in industry, and very rarely in agriculture. The lot of many is work in a small shop or semihandicraft shop, home crafts work, and the like. This often means irregular earnings, making it possible to make ends meet but by no means guaranteeing any stable social position. Thus, of labor agreements concluded in the country in 1983-1984, one out of five was temporary, but one-half of the young people received temporary contracts. But such a meager social prospect is appreciated there -- after all, one-fourth of the young Spaniards are willing to work without any fixed pay at all. Various types of underground businesses which multiplied with the abundance of free hands also exploit their social complaisance. Frequently the opportunity to circumvent the law and pay these workers half or even a third of the agreed amount attracts even fully legally operating employers. But in most cases (62 percent) both groups offer young people nothing but routine labor demanding exclusively physical efforts and elementary skills which has little in common with the education they have received. It is no accident that in 1984 only 30 percent of the young men and women who graduated from higher educational institutions worked in the specializations designated on their diplomas. To be sure, in our day even this is respected as good: two-thirds of the young people surveyed assert that they are completely satisfied with their occupational status.¹¹

This is perhaps one of the distinctive features of the situation experienced by Spain and, incidentally, by the entire zone of developed capitalism, where the main mass of working people (both people quite young and old people) are forced by the pressure of circumstances to reconcile themselves to the conditions of labor imposed on them. The opinion that is winning out -- that the places they occupy are the only ones available now and that there can be no talk of any major improvement in the situation yet -- is now held by 93 percent of Spanish workers -- in mass young people not yet 25 years old. For that very reason 60-80 percent of them greatly appreciate any position offering wages and put up with everything: increasing production rhythms, physical stress, the quality of duties performed, and a great deal else. Partly desensitized, it may be said that the only thing that really worries them is that the enterprises which give them the means of existence -- whatever they may be -- continue to exist, enabling themselves and their families and relatives to wait out difficult times.¹²

As for young Spaniards who are outside of production, their main occupation is most often studies: in the last 20 years alone, the student substrata tripled

in the country. And some people hope to wait out the social decline by prolonging their studies in order to then meet better times already fully armed with a college diploma. But frequently the same thing ultimately befalls them too -- they join the job seekers, or sometimes even their aimless and idle compatriots.¹³

That is how it goes; one out of every two Spaniards who have now become "superfluous" is less than 24 years old. And under their direct influence the entire army of the unemployed is rapidly being "intellectualized": among those with lower school training (or none at all) at least 11-14 percent cannot find a job, while already 31 percent of those in the group of recent graduates of secondary schools cannot find a job; 23 percent of those who have managed to provide themselves with a university diploma also shared their fate. In 1983 1.3 million young men and women, that is, 38.9 percent of all the country's young people, had already made unsuccessful attempts to break out of the impasse. /Spain underwent the unenviable lot of a leader, far outstripping all the other capitalist states of the West in general scope of unemployment, which devastates the younger generations:/ for example, the same indicator for the United States is 16.4 percent at the present time, for France -- 21 percent, for Italy -- 32 percent, and so on. Nor does the forecast promise a speedy turn for the better. As a result, from the temporary condition that unemployment seemed to be and at times really was back in the middle of the last decade, unemployment is becoming a definite form of social existence for new and steadily growing groups of young people condemned to "idleness," half of whom spend 2 years and more looking for a job.¹⁴

Naturally, the material position of young people is extremely unstable. Rare is the person (only 10 percent) who can count on assistance. Expectations of finding extra work are also slight since again only 1 in 10 achieves such a success. Even against the background of the difficulties and troubles which befall many of their peers from other Western countries, such a position seems much too constrained. Thus, the results of a social survey conducted in 1981 in Madrid and New York confirmed: only 13.7 percent of the young residents of the Spanish capital managed somehow to meet their own needs through personal labor while 5 times that proportion of Americans of the same age did so. It is not surprising that the need arises to stay with older people (today 74 percent of young Spanish people remain under one roof with their parents) or simply live at their expense. Some are attracted by this. But others who have gotten into the habit perceive such a position as almost obligatory. And some develop a very "easy" style of existence: if there is no money, they loiter around without any work; but when money appears, they divide their days and nights between discoteques and bars (37.9 percent of the time), going to movies (22.5 percent), and other shows. Self-education and the habit of reading, poorly cultivated since childhood, manage to take up a very small part (only 8 percent) of their forced "free" time.¹⁵

Is it then surprising that the world of adults and the small world of these people who have just begun to live appear more and more alien to each other and their contacts, often unsuccessful -- especially when the time comes for young people to become involved in the production sphere -- can only bring the latter out of spiritual equilibrium, convincing them of their own uselessness,

strengthening the feeling of personal humiliation, and arousing in their spirit a feeling of incomprehensible blame for their environment. Today such types of sentiments are familiar to almost one-third of them and they are frequently transformed into a diligent evasion of any form of political participation. An unusual kind of discrepancy has been sharply revealed -- the divergence between the /proclaimed/ intention to act and the /active struggle/ for their convictions and rights. Interest, often passive, in the events of political life has grown: in 1976-1980 the proportion of young people who showed such an interest increased from 43 percent to 47 percent. But young people's real contribution to solving the problems which touched the interests of the nation has fallen. Thus, while in the 1970's elections approximately one-fourth of the young citizens declined to participate in voting, at the start of this decade almost one-half of them did. Frequently they also avoid contacts with any mass organizations, whether they are cultural, religious, or even sport organizations. Over 58 percent of the young men and women prefer to present themselves as "apolitical" people or demonstrate open hostility toward all parties.¹⁶

/Having experienced the bitterness of failure from their first independent steps, many of them, if they do not break with society (which is not always in their power), try at least to cut themselves off from it./ And frequently such withdrawal into themselves turns into social degradation and leads to the disintegration of the individual.

Even according to official and possibly understated data, in Spain there are now from 100,000 to 300,000 drug addicts, three-quarters of whom are people still under 25 years of age. At least half of the young citizens do not even conceal that at least once they managed to try some "potion." At the same time back in 1976 there were hardly half that number of, if I may put it this way, "neophytes." And today this custom takes root in childhood. For example, from 1973 through 1977 the proportion of those people who were not yet 16 years of age among drug addicts increased and reached 30 percent. But one of the recent surveys of Madrid schools established that familiarity with "grass" begins at 13-14 years of age for some (19 percent) students, and for some even earlier.¹⁷

However, the experience acquired by Spanish society as well as the example of the rest of the Western countries proves: police and purely repressive measures do not do much good here. The efforts of the authorities are increasing -- the attack on drug addiction is expanding. The figures are significant: the amount of hashish confiscated rose to 5 times its previous level in 1976-1982 alone, of cocaine -- to 17 times, and of LSD -- to 19 times. The amounts run not to tens but hundreds of tons. And often this foul habit leads to the person's death: in 1983 alone it cost 77 lives. Nor are there fewer people who are susceptible to the perhaps more traditional but no less serious vices: for example, one out of four young Spaniards drinks, in vain trying to "turn off," if just for a while, the brutal world which surrounds and is indifferent to him.¹⁸

/Even the churches, which even recently kept the main part of the new generations under vigilant control, cannot always fill their lives even with illusory values./ If it is taken as a whole, the youth subculture reveals

more and more secular features here. Devotion to the basic dogma of Catholicism is weakening: less than half of the young Spaniards still have staunch faith in the assertion that the world surrounding them was created by God and do not question the divinity of Christ; only one-third put their trust in the immortality of their souls and expect paradise to exist; only one out of four still believes the biblical legend of the Immaculate Conception, fears retribution beyond the grave in Hell for "worldly affairs," or expects to rise from the dead. In terms of the level of secularization of mass consciousness, including the mass consciousness of the young, Spain, which even recently had the reputation of being the bulwark of Catholic conservatism, has now moved nearer to such countries with historically fixed anticlerical traditions as, for example, France, substantially outstripping the rest of Western Europe in the speed of this process. The strata of zealous Catholics who regularly attend church services is narrowing: in 1963 they encompassed 83 percent, in 1976 -- 40 percent, but in 1982 -- 34 percent of the young people. And the detachment of atheists has increased in the past 20 years more than 8-fold and includes in its ranks 17 percent of the young men and women. By no means all of them now prefer a church wedding. They rarely follow the instructions of clerics on political issues (only in 8 percent of the cases); and, moreover, in general, in the opinion of most (63-67 percent), the church should not interfere in these types of affairs at all. Few Spaniards (10-13 percent) believe it is necessary to resort to the counsel of a priest in personal or intimate life either. Creeping deeper and deeper into their consciousness is the doubt that the church, whatever it might be -- Catholic, Protestant, or any other, is able to explain and embrace in its activities all the complexity of the surrounding world: in 1981 only 12.6 percent of the young men and women had had no such thoughts. But of course, we should not disregard another factor either -- frequently the break with time-honored customs is carried out in word only and does not infringe upon established behavior stereotypes. At times inertia in thought and action still gets the upper hand.¹⁹

/But some of these morally broken young people who have lost faith and become extremely embittered, entering into fierce conflict with their surroundings, begin to search for themselves in a different, antisocial milieu, converging with the criminal world or falling under the influence of extremist or even openly terrorist forces./

The Spanish people have little by little accustomed themselves to the fact that every year approximately 1,300 cases of robbery, theft, and larceny take place around them; that most often they are committed by people who are young but have already managed to fall into despair, almost half of whom are unemployed people who have taken a liking to drugs; and that the total number of crimes related to drug addiction increased 20-fold in the last decade alone. Another sad result is also familiar: socially and morally degraded young people now make up half the people in prison. And things are worst of all in large cities flooded with declassé immigrants from local and newly-arrived groups of the population shaken by crisis: at least 50 percent of all illegal acts happen in Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Sevilla, and Malaga. And 1 out of 10 Spanish people have managed to one degree or another experience for themselves what it means to be a victim or simple witness to a crime. And not only that, they have felt their own complete defenselessness. After all, it is generally known that the authorities are helpless in that area. Rarely

-- in approximately 20 percent of the cases -- do they manage to find the guilty ones. But even then, as one third of the population complains in surveys, the law is often unfair and almost always too slow. For that reason more than half the citizens when encountering criminal activity do not even try to notify the police: it is an empty waste of time, nerves, and effort. But their indignation is most often directed against young people -- not only the criminal ones but anyone young -- who on the whole are accused of all the mortal sins. Estrangement between the generations is increasing.²⁰

But no matter how dangerous open crime against people's property and dignity may be, it alone does not drive a wedge between the young citizens and society. The disintegration of social structures also nourishes the mass base of completely "respectable" /nationalist/ movements, attracting many Basque, Catalanian, Valencian, and other young people searching in the past for the reference point they are losing in this world which is alien and even openly hostile to them. Also among them are those who are approaching the separatist sentiments which are common in certain circles of the local bourgeoisie. It is no accident that 9 percent of the residents of Valencia, 29 percent of the inhabitants of Catalonia, and 43 percent of the Basque Region's population even today dispute that they belong to a united Spanish nation.²¹

But cadres of terrorist organizations are being recruited from among them; these organizations include the unfortunately well-known Basque ETA. The average age of its members is no more than 25 at the time they are recruited into the organization. Approximately 70 percent of its mass are members of the middle strata: children of merchants, craftsmen, and white-collar workers who were born in small Basque cities which still maintain local traditions, customs, and language in everyday life. It was precisely they who accounted for three-quarters of all the political assassinations committed in Spain. Beginning in 1968, 552 people have died at the hands of terrorists (this includes the members themselves who have died in confrontations with security forces), 640 have been wounded, 56 kidnapped, and so on. The fall of the dictatorship did not even stop the wave of armed extremism; at times the struggle against the dictatorship vindicated the ETA in the eyes of the local population. During the years of democratic transformations, the nature and orientation of its actions came into complete conflict not only with the sentiments of the mass of Spanish people but also with the fundamentally modified orientations of the residents of the Country of the Basques itself. Back in 1979 one out of two of its inhabitants considered the extremists a kind of political "idealists" and even "patriots." Now a few, only 13 percent, continue to think so; taking into account those who declined to answer during the surveys, there may be a few more. But the rest directly accuse them of open criminal activity (46.8 percent) and "insane fanaticism" (32.6 percent) which threatens the very existence of the democratic system established with such difficulty.²²

Nonetheless, bloody political extremism remains one of the most dangerous "risk factors" threatening the process of social restoration in Spain. And the point here is not that it undermines normal life in one of the country's main economic centers. The undeclared war which the ETA is waging against the representatives of the army and the police -- who account for more than half

of all the human losses -- along with unemployment of the young and common crime put strong trumpcards into the hands of reaction. Relying on similar cases which multiply day by day and dramatizing them to the utmost, rebellion-oriented circles of the armed forces have already repeatedly tried to urge the hesitant top brass toward decisive actions (among the top brass, as is believed there, they do not even have 10 percent of their consistent supporters) and the officers corps which, incidentally, like the main mass of soldiers, has up to this point remained indifferent to the conspirators' appeals.²³

Such examples are used in propaganda by their civilian confederates, around whom earnestly group not only some marginal elements seeking sympathy but also sons of prosperous parents brought out of spiritual equilibrium and customarily snobbish social apathy by the political advances of recent years. The example of the New Force youth party organization is typical; it has repeatedly taken part in the putsch-types activities of the reactionary military group, whether they were the 23 February 1981 seizure of members of parliament or plans for a "preventive" (which set as its goal establishing the electoral success of the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party]) revolt on the eve of the elections the following year. The main contingent of young people who fought in it -- two-thirds of the 1982 reinforcements, for example -- were 14-16 year-olds, children of state bureaucrats and military who lived with their parents in the best regions of the capital and enjoyed all the privileges and blessings of life. It was not without reason that precisely this ultraright organization was able to gain more sympathy than any other (33 percent) among students of the most expensive and prestigious schools of Madrid, that is, of just that part of the "golden youth" for whom the concepts of "justice," "peace," and "order" were still full of Franco-ist meaning and served almost as synonyms for a totalitarian state system. From this stems the completely fixed character of the acts performed by the followers of the New Force: in 1973-1982 alone no less than 100 armed attacks directed primarily against worker activists were the work of their hands.²⁴

/In general, by the start of the present decade the threat from the right had acquired more real features in Spain than it had since the time of the fall of the dictatorship./ The accumulated weight of unfavorable factors -- economic decline and social disintegration, the spasmodic escalation of mass unemployment, and the degradation of broad strata of young people, as well as the increase in social passivity which alternated with spurts of spontaneously arising excitement -- hung, like a physically tangible threat, behind the political transformations which were being successfully carried out and put their vitality in question. More and more often surveys of people's sentiments recorded a kind of "longing" for the past: some Spaniards (approximately 30 percent) began to contrast the democratic freedoms obtained to what they felt they had lost: personal security and the remembered relative material well-being of Franco's day.²⁵

On New Frontiers of the Social Struggle

Entering at a point relatively far along the path of change, to a certain degree the country exhausted the potential of those reforms which the centrists who had come to power could and intended to implement. And even

Spain itself became different. The stage of reorienting mass consciousness was left behind. The simplified interpretation of social realities moved into the past; it had given way -- to be sure, not finally or universally -- to a system of criteria for political elections which was typical of Western Europe and was based on the population's more or less independent assessment of parties which had managed to reveal their essential features to them: their ideological foundations, proposed programs, traditions behind them, and, the main thing, their actual work. At the start of the democratic reorientation, only 9 percent of the Spanish people (data for 1977) were capable of such independence; at the start of the 1980's, with one of its decisive phases completed, the behavior of at least half of them fit this type of approach.²⁶

All this destroyed the foundations on which the electoral primacy of the ruling party was built. Relying on the personal prestige of A. Suarez which brought it victory in the 1970's elections did not yield more political advantages. The profound socioeconomic crisis which shook Spain stimulated a sharp turn in social sentiments. The charge of dissatisfaction accumulated in the country undermined the authority of centrism's leader, who had only recently commanded general admiration. Everything about him ceased to please and everything annoyed. The questions posed concerning the chairman of the government in the sociological surveys which became more frequent awakened in people's memories recollections of the most unpleasant things, things that were spoiling their lives: unemployment which was in no way checked and the outbreak of terrorism and crime. Spanish people, young and old, rich and poor, those working and those wearing out the thresholds of enterprises, with almost the same sharpness charged him with violating the obligations he accepted, and extreme ambition, and general "contempt for the people," and insincerity... Since the spring of 1978 only 17-20 percent of the citizens have decided to dispute the charges of inertia advanced against A. Suarez. The result of all these changes was the shattering electoral defeat of the Alliance of the Democratic Center in the 1982 parliamentary elections: after mustering only 7.2 percent of the votes and losing almost 5 million supporters, it virtually lost the mass base and soon ceased to exist altogether.²⁷

/Almost one out of five voters who had broken with him moved to the left and turned up in the field of political gravity of the PSOE. Its program precepts corresponded in the best way possible to the sentiments of most of the population of Spain, whose workers movement had been rebuilt, practically from nothing and in extremely unfavorable crisis conditions, on a legal basis. According to the evidence of soundings of mass sentiments, criticism of capitalism which became stronger in the country still as a rule did not go beyond generally establishing its "amorality" and "dishonorable nature." Even the youth and most radically minded people most often (in 70 percent of the cases) confessed to being only "reformists" and adherents of cautious progressive changes. All this moved Spanish people of the most diverse ages toward the socialists, who had proven themselves to be a primarily "left-centrist" force and satisfied the most diverse and sometimes contradictory social orientations of practically all social strata. To some, including 47 percent of its own supporters, the PSOE seemed the main spokesman of the interests of the working people; it impressed others (24.5 percent,

accordingly) with its "moderation" in actions as well as the announcements of its leaders that the socialist party would stop being "purely Marxist."28

Therefore, weighing the chances of the parties long before the trial by election held in 1982, at least two-thirds of the voters were inclined to the belief that it was precisely the socialists who could after winning manage the country with better (or in any case not less) knowledge of affairs. According to their assessments, the PSOE had 2-3 times more chances for success in such fundamental affairs as improving the economy, organizing labor relations, carrying out international policies, and others. The measures it proposed were the most appropriate for treating the chronic social ulcers -- unemployment, drug addiction, crime, and terrorism. It managed to be affirmed as a consistent advocate of local traditions and rights even in the ever-vigilant public opinion of national areas. The socialist party's promise to solve the painful question of Spain's entry into NATO through a nation-wide referendum won an especially favorable response; it was precisely the active opponents of the "Atlantic" obligations which formed (60 percent) its new electoral core. Trust in socialists on the part of the mainly young population was kindled, finally, by yet another circumstance which was apparently secondary but in fact extremely important: this young population perceived the party, all of whose structures beginning from the stratum of activists and ending with the leadership element were filled with a galaxy of relatively young, on the average 40-year-old, people -- virtual peers, as "their own."29

And the socialist party could completely realize these sentiments which were favorable to it. Relying on the residents of economically developed areas and especially industrial zones which took up the main mass of the young, active population and having won the trust of part of the residents of rural regions who had swung from the Alliance of the Democratic Center, it almost doubled its support base in the society (to 9.8 million people) and received 46 percent of the votes. /However, from then on the PSOE proved to be face to face with a new opponent -- no longer centrism but a politically strengthened force which had gathered social forces, the Popular Alliance -- the direct descendant of Franco-ism laying claim to the role of the "civilized right."/30

So, the demarcation of social forces revealed by the results of the vote not only found its direct embodiment in the party structure which actually existed, but also required that the Spanish people reinterpret their comparatively recent historical experience. Again faced with a dilemma -- the /right/ or the /left/ -- they began to more frequently and attentively look back, searching for an explanation for what was happening around them in the lessons of the past. But in doing this, many of them could not as before ignore the events of the civil war of 1936-1939 -- the period in their country's life on which Franco-ism had imposed a kind of "taboo" which constrained, perhaps more than anything else, the normal development of social consciousness. After all, 15-20 years before then the parents of today's young men and women were frequently firmly convinced that their children did not need to know anything about that epoch which supposedly contained "nothing heroic."31

And too, even now these memories create grief and regret and pain: the war left memories of thousands of people killed and the sufferings of innocent victims and is associated with both the country's split into two camps and the harshness of the Franco-ist times. But today in the eyes of the people -- about equally for adults and young people -- it has acquired the different higher meaning of the turning point of all national development and of a conflict, harsh but in keeping with the times, of two particular and entirely familiar social forces. One of them started an uprising against the legal government and among contemporary Spaniards (in 91 percent of the cases) evokes associations with the bourgeoisie frightened by the successes of the democratic forces, with the actions of parties defending its interests, with the military straining for power (42 percent of the opinions), and with international reaction which was prepared to come to their aid. After all, "without the Germans and the Italians, as 66 percent of the population understands the events of those years, Franco would not have won the war." In turn recollections of the other, republican side generate memories for people of such important things, though even now not interpreted the same by everyone, as the first experience of regional autonomy -- 91 percent of the citizens associate it with the actions of the Popular Front -- and the establishment of democratic freedoms (75 percent, accordingly) and the nationwide enthusiasm which seized the workers, peasants, and intelligentsia, as well the Soviet Union's help.³²

/Giving their sympathies to one or the other of these forces, the Spanish people of our day seem to tailor themselves, measuring the lessons of the past, to the social and political situation surrounding them, determining their personal program of social actions for the future.

The lessons of the regime established after the fall of the Republic and the experience of the transitional period from Franco-ism to a bourgeois democratic system together with the general impact of the changes taking place around them -- all these things bring many young men and women (and, incidentally, part of the older generations as well) closer to traditional family political positions dating back to war times. There are quite a few whose grandfathers and great-grandfathers once took Franco's side who now defend the newly obtained freedoms along with the descendents of the republicans, tying their plans for a better future to the successes of the leftist forces. As early as the 1977 elections, these people who had dissociated themselves from the past made up to 17 percent of the PSOE supporters and 10 percent of all those voting for the communists, thereby making a small but very necessary contribution to strengthening and expanding the mass base of the leftists.³³

Among the youth, however, there are others for whom the events of recent years have fostered an increased sensitivity to the persistent admonitions from the right. Believing them means justifying everything done by Franco out of his "great love for Spain", whose very existence in the years of the Popular Front was supposedly threatened by social chaos and the "communist danger." And some young people who grew up in the last decade are starting to see an example for the present social system in the regime that collapsed -- or rather, in a form of it "romanticized" by propaganda efforts. Among them are not just some people fostered by reaction-minded parents, although they were

the very ones who formed the initial core (81 percent) of the mass base of the Popular Alliance. There are also those who do not have any firm political roots at all in their family background and until just recently followed the centrists. But it is precisely their support which allowed the Popular Alliance, which made an unparalleled (from 5.8 to 25.3 percent) electoral leap forward in 1982, to assert itself as the second-strongest national party and create a powerful center of sociopolitical gravity in the right flank. And it must be acknowledged that its impact on the social situation in the country is not decreasing at all, but rather has recently begun growing in spurts.³⁴

/Only by weighing the results of the test of power which was the lot of the PSOE in the last 3 years can the causes of this phenomenon be identified even in very general form, to say nothing of determining its probable prospects./

After all, the period of time allotted by the government the PSOE formed is running out. But the sum of unsolved problems has hardly declined at all and, moreover, more and more tasks which demand resolution are accumulating. And the main thing is that the socialists have not managed to fulfill their main promise: to create 800,000 new vacancies and wage a decisive struggle against the crisis in the employment sphere. On the contrary, the course they proclaimed to "reindustrialize" the country, which has stayed in the wake of scientific-technical progress, has already been paid for by the elimination of over 600,000 jobs. By the summer of 1985 unemployment had reached a record level for the industrial West, striking 22 percent of the economically active population and creating an army of almost 3 million "superfluous" people in Spain. But the only thing the government promises them is to "place" more than 500,000 in /temporary/ labor contracts, of which about 300,000 are intended for young people, whose futures are thus returned to the arbitrary power of the employers.³⁵

It is not surprising that the completely unrestrained process of declassification continues to seize more and more detachments of young men and women. And in the struggle against this declassification the PSOE cabinet is forced to resort to measures which substantially undermine its prestige. Trying to hold back the stream of crime which is literally overwhelming the country -- in 1983 alone crime rose by a factor of 1.5 there, the PSOE cabinet is determined to revise its own legislative indulgences which were adopted immediately after it came to power and until recently were considered a "bridge" to mutual understanding with part of the "rebellious generation." In addition to everything else, criminal responsibility for petty and as a rule "youth crimes" has heightened. But the socialists can only rescue their already tarnished image with great difficulty and by no means in everything. For example, slightly more than half of the population believed in their ability to guarantee "more security" for the citizens back in 1983. The crisis of Spanish society, whose focus is becoming the youth problem, has gone so far that, in the words of the head of the socialist party F. Gonzales himself, "The problem of social order may prove to be the Achilles heel of the leftist government."³⁶

/The capital of mass sympathy accumulated by the PSOE in the recent past is rapidly running out./ Thus, only 22 percent of the citizens support its international actions, and among youth it is even less. As for the choice

made by the party leadership favoring NATO membership, despite all the reservations concerning Spain not participating in the bloc's military organization and the promise to reduce the U.S. military presence in the country, barely more than one-third of the population approves of it. And the point is not only that antiwar sentiments have managed to become much more widespread there than in the rest of the zone of developed capitalism and that 61 percent of the residents there support the demand for an unqualified and unconditional ban on nuclear weapons while in Japan 58 percent do, in Italy -- 47 percent, and in the United States -- only 14 percent of the population. The persistent involvement of their country in the political orbit of the United States does not at all inspire enthusiasm among the Spanish people. The prospect of setting up their own homes in the transoceanic manner attracts only 27 percent of the young men and women. The American standard of the "strong" person, persistently offered to young Europeans from television and movie screens and on the pages of the press and in comics, as well as reinforced in every suitable case by demonstrations of U.S. military might, remains alien to most of them. At least half of them picture the "100-percent Yankee" as a person completely without humor and unable to make realistic assessments of his surroundings who recognizes only force and material advantage, suffers from a "superiority complex," and is afflicted by racial prejudices. So it is not difficult to understand why only a very few young Spaniards (17-19 percent) are inclined to give in to the public relations charm of R. Reagan, which seems to personify the America of today in their eyes. Surveys of recent years show: if the present master of the White House were to be a candidate for president here in Spain, he would not even get 10 percent of the vote. After all, in the opinion of 71 percent of these same young people, if Reagan were to become the head of the Spanish government, things in the country would be extremely bad.³⁷

Dissatisfaction with the foreign policy course of the PSOE is also rising. By the end of 1984 only 21 percent of the population continued to consider its measures in the economic sphere successful. Methods used by the government for the purposes of technological modernization of production -- curtailing entire sectors and mass firings -- are almost completely unpopular (only 19 percent positive evaluations). As for the measures directed to the struggle against unemployment, only one in nine Spaniards is satisfied with them. The efforts made by the socialist cabinet to curb terrorism are rated slightly higher. And all this has a particularly unhealthy reflection in the interrelations of the state with the population of the autonomous regions -- the country's main industrial centers -- where after some alleviation of the situation, the knot of socioeconomic, political, and national problems is tightening again. Thus, in 1984-1985 about half the residents of Catalonia and the Basque Region were already talking of the decline in trust of the central authorities. The particular political consequences were not slow to appear either: bourgeois nationalist parties have outdistanced the socialists there in recent local elections.³⁸

As a result all the state activities of the PSOE are evaluated lower the further they go. In the spring-summer 1984 alone the proportion of persons who approved of them declined to just 9 percent (among the youth this decline occurred almost twice as fast) after totaling slightly more than one-quarter of the population. About one-third of the citizens generally prefer to

describe the cabinet's work as "neither one thing or another." So after the spurt of political activism which accompanied the electoral triumph of the socialist party, apathy again is getting the upper hand. Three out of four Spaniards refuse to participate in any social campaigns. Reactionaries in turn tries to play on just this, either accusing the socialists of tolerating anarchy and "unmasking" their supposedly "authoritarian" ways, depending on the circumstances. Even the personal prestige of the head of the government has begun to waver: in the first half of 1985 the proportion of fellow-citizens who sympathized with him fell from 46 to 34 percent of the population. To be sure, F. Gonzalez is still beyond the reach of his main rivals. For example, the strata of voters who give their preference to the leader of the Popular Alliance M. Fraga Iribarne is half the size. But the gap between the PSOE and its main opponent (the Popular Alliance), which exceeded 22 percent of the national electorate in 1982, has now declined to 15.5 percent. And it is difficult to predict what the ratio of their forces will be in June 1986 -- by the time of the next parliamentary elections -- when the army of "superfluous" people is reinforced, as anticipated, with another half million unemployed, bringing it to 3.4 million people, and the borders of the zones of social disintegration will be expanded as never before.³⁹

/The years which have passed since the time of the fall of the Franco dictatorship have brought a new generation of people who grew up on democratized national soil and who are able to break with and in mass are breaking with the recent past./ The beginnings of gradual, although all-embracing -- encompassing the production field and the politics sphere and the administrative-state apparatus -- replacement of the representatives of the older groups of the population educated under the former regime by this generation have been laid. However, the limits of the social and spiritual development of today's youth established by the very essence of bourgeois society, which at that time was experiencing one of its most profound crises, also appeared. The short-lived structural break, which initially -- because of the specifics of local conditions -- affected the field of political relations and now has spread to the socioeconomic basis puts Spanish people starting life face to face with crucial problems which demand immediate and, the main thing, effective solutions.

In turn the various social forces, including those which occupied positions at the extreme political poles, persistently and each in its own way proposing prescriptions for treating the increasing social ulcers, are trying to secure, if not the active at least the moral, support of young people. But not one of them has yet managed to gain these sympathies for long. And although the disposition of social forces in Spain has already changed twice in the last decade in the most definite way, neither the centrists who drove the figures of Franco-ism from the sphere of politics nor the socialists who replaced them at the helm of state government could slow down, to say nothing of stop, the feverishly developing destructive processes.

The "persistent instability" which now defines the foreign policy situation in most capitalist countries keeps Spanish society in unalleviated tension, exhausting first of all the young people who are not materially secure and morally solid. A growing number of young people, crossing the bounds of

social disintegration, are adding to the stock of "explosive" human material which is rapidly accumulating in the country. Finding themselves at an impasse in life, rather large groups of these young people completely lose faith in the very possibility of struggling for better and are added to the masses of "quietly" degraded people. So in any case their energy and natural assertiveness, so necessary today in order to repulse the attack of reaction which is consolidating itself, is wasted to no purpose -- senselessly and without a positive political result -- and is spoiled, crushed by worldly skepticism, social cynicism, and apathy.

Consequently, the positive trends which made their way into mass conduct and consciousness, including youth conduct and consciousness, immediately after the failure of fascism, are beginning to lose support. Part of this social space just won by the leftists, after it becomes vacant, is seized by the right. But this cannot fail to have very dangerous consequences. After all, when Spain, like the entire capitalist world, confronts the lack of spirituality, moral devastation, and bitterness of the new generations, it is risking much more than many of the West European states. In a country which has by no means definitely broken with the recent Franco-ist past, which in addition has maintained its influential political representatives in that country's newly formed social culture, the struggle for youth does not simply predetermine the result of one election campaign or another but is also capable of changing the future of all national development.

FOOTNOTES

1. So, the initially sporadic and then regularly updated publication of the results of sociological public opinion surveys which by degrees brought the Spanish people to the idea of the greater split between the regime and the broad strata of the population became one of the unique levers used by the opposition for these purposes. And it was precisely young people who proved to be the social group with whom in 1960 -- long before the creation of the official Public Opinion Institute -- the systematic study of mass sentiments began. Of course, the possibility of verifying the results was, with the rare exception, small. Their data could only be used with reservations and more often -- as auxiliary material. Surveys become a full-value source from the scientific and political standpoint only after Franco's death. Fulfilling in essence the social mandate of virtually all the forces which had entered the political arena and were vitally interested in reliable and, the main thing, operational data on changes in people's views, they constituted a generalized picture of Spanish society going through the complex process of adjusting the mechanisms of action of the young bourgeois democracy. It is no accident that the frequency of these surveys and their publications, which were confined in 1965-1974 to some 15 cases, rose 7-fold in the next 5-year period after, reflecting -- on one occasion or another -- the viewpoint of approximately one-third of the population and gaining the trust of a large number of the citizens. (See: REVISTA ESPANOLA DE INVESTIGACIONES SOCIOLOGICAS, No 13, 1981, p 172; REVISTA DE DERECHO POLITICO, No 14, 1982, pp 115, 119).

2. See: A. Lopez Pina, E.L. Aranguaren, "La cultura politica de la Espana de Franco" [The Political Culture of Franco's Spain], Madrid, 1976, pp 142-143.
3. See: Ibid., p. 76; R. Lopez Pintor, R. Buceta, "Los espanoles de los anos 70" [The Spanish of the 1970's], Madrid, 1975, pp 58-59; "La Espana de los anos 70" [Spain of the 1970's], Vol 1, Madrid, 1972, pp 880, 883, 890, 898; CAMBIO 16, No 648, 1984, p 126.
4. See: A. Lopez Pina, E.L. Aranguaren, op. cit., pp 79, 80, 160, 161; REVISTA ESPANOLA DE INVESTIGACIONES SOCIOLOGICAS, No 13, 1981, pp 33-35.
5. See: REVISTA ESPANOLA DE LA OPINION PUBLICA, No 48, 1977, p 366.
6. See: EL PAIS, 10 May 1977.
7. See: CAMBIO 16, No 329, 1978, p 15; ACTUALIDAD ESPANOLA, No 1321, 1977, p 21.
8. See: EL PAIS, 17 July 1977; 30 October 1982.
9. See: "Rabochiye-izbirateli v stranakh Zapadnoy Yevropy" [The Worker Voters in the Countries of Western Europe], Moscow, 1980, p 281.
10. See: SISTEMA, No 62, 1984, p 40.
11. See: CAMBIO 16, No 522, 1981, p 70; No 583, 1983, pp 64, 65; No 585, p 44; No 648, 1984, pp 122-123; No 707, 1985, p 109.
12. See: SISTEMA, No 33, 1979, pp 86, 88; No 41, 1981, p 139; CAMBIO 16, No 403, 1979, pp 15-18; "Sovremennaya Ispaniya" [Contemporary Spain], Moscow, 1983, p 81.
13. See: CAMBIO 16, No 707, 1985, p 106.
14. See: CAMBIO 16, No 648, 1984, p 123; No 675, pp 68, 69; SISTEMA, No 62, 1984, p 45; LE MONDE, 7 March 1985.
15. See: CAMBIO 16, No 508, 1981, p 59; No 522, p 70; No 707, 1985, p 106.
16. See: RAZON Y FE, No 1011, 1982, p 151; CAMBIO 16, No 497, 1981, pp 50, 53; No 522, p 77; No 648, 1984, pp 123, 125; REVISTA ESPANOLA DE INVESTIGACIONES SOCIOLOGICAS, No 13, 1981, p 30.
17. See: CAMBIO 16, No 648, 1984, pp 123, 125; RAZON Y FE, No 1025, 1984, pp 138, 139.
18. See: CAMBIO 16, No 638, 1984, p 24; No 648, pp 123, 125; RAZON Y FE, No 1025, 1984, pp 138, 139; LE MONDE, 8, 9 April 1984.

19. See: RAZON Y FE, No 1011, 1982, p 152; No 1025, 1984, pp 136-138; CAMBIO 16, No 508, p 58; No 630, 1984, p 21; No 648, p 122; No 686, 1985, pp 77, 78; SONDAGES, Nos 3-4, 1977, pp 76-77.
20. See: CAMBIO 16, No 414, 1979, p 29; No 497, 1981, pp 51, 53; No 522, pp 75, 77; No 638, 1984, p 24; No 648, p 124; No 695, 1985, pp 42, 43; RAZON Y FE, No 1025, 1984, p 134.
21. See: CAMBIO 16, No 662, 1984, p 27.
22. See: RAZON Y FE, No 1011, 1982, pp 153-154; CAMBIO 16, No 502, 1981, p 19; No 656, 1984, p 23; REVISTA ITALIANA DI SCIENZA POLITICA, No 1, 1985, pp 51-52.
23. See: CAMBIO 16, No 487, 1981, p 23; LE MONDE, 8, 9 January 1982.
24. See: CAMBIO 16, No 448, 1980, pp 71, 72; No 561, 1982, p 15.
25. See: REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS POLITICOS, No 34, 1983, pp 32, 33; REVISTA ESPANOLA DE INVESTIGACIONES SOCIOLOGICAS, No 13, 1981, p 35.
26. See: EL PAIS, 24 May 1977; CAMBIO 16, No 540, 1982, p 33.
27. See: "Rabochiy klass v mirovom revolyutsionnom protsesse. 1984" [The Working Class in the World Revolutionary Process. 1984], Moscow, 1984, p 139; CAMBIO 16, No 329, 1978, pp 12-14, 15; No 435, 1980, pp 17, 19.
28. See: R. Lopez Pintor, R. Buceta, op. cit., p 61; CAMBIO 16, No 648, 1984, p 122; SISTEMA, No 32, 1979, pp 61-61; No 35, 1980, p 41; "Rabochiy klass... op. cit., p 140.
29. See: CAMBIO 16, No 375, 1979, p 16; No 436, 1980, pp 29-30; No 448, p 30; No 648, 1984, p 122; No 671, p 43.
30. See: "Rabochiy klass... op. cit., pp 127-150.
31. See: A. Lopez Pina, E.L. Aranguaren, op. cit., p 138; CAMBIO 16, No 616, 1983, pp 60, 63.
32. See: CAMBIO 16, No 616, 1983, pp 62-65; No 167, pp 68-71.
33. See: Ibid., No 617, 1983, pp 70-71; J.M. Maravall, "La politica de la transicion. 1975-1980" [The Policy of Transition. 1975-1980], Madrid, 1981, p 42.
34. See: CAMBIO 16, No 617, 1983, p 70; J.M. Maravall, op. cit., p 42; "Rabochiy klass... op. cit., pp 139, 140.
35. See: CAMBIO 16, No 677, 1984, pp 83, 85; No 685, 1985, p 54; LE MONDE, 7 March 1985.

36. See: CAMBIO 16, No 588, 1983, p 49; No 638, 1984, pp 20-21; No 648, p 124; No 695, 1985, p 43; LE MONDE, 8, 9 April 1984.
37. CAMBIO 16, No 508, 1981, p 59; No 615, 1983, p 17; No 675, p 80; No 701, 1985, p 61; No 706, p 54; SISTEMA, No 66, 1985, pp 45, 46.
38. See: CAMBIO 16, No 615, 1983, p 17; No 654, 1984, p 32; No 681, p 60; No 710, 1985, p 28; SISTEMA, No 65, 1985, p 10.
39. See: CAMBIO 16, No 615, 1983, p 17; No 648, p 125; No 661, p 20; No 700, 1985, p 60; No 706, pp 51, 53.

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PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIALIST-ORIENTED COUNTRIES

Moscow RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNIY MIR in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 85 pp 125-137

[Article by Arkadiy Semenovitch Kaufman, doctor of historical sciences, professor, and senior scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute, under the rubric "For the Party Education System": "The Problems of the Development of the Countries of Socialist Orientation"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics in text]

[Text] Socialist theories are becoming more and more widespread in a number of states of Asia and Africa and the path of socialist orientation is being proclaimed as a form of social progress. The economic and political practices of the liberated countries confirm the historical patterns of origin of this transitional form of social development in the direction of socialism. It is a complex sociopolitical phenomenon which has not yet fully revealed all its potential and generates a number of new theoretical and practical problems.

The social experience accumulated in this sphere in many respects confirms and expands the theory of the issue and makes it possible to speak of the existence of a number of patterns of development of the states of socialist orientation, which, of course, does not exclude the numerous national features of this course in individual countries.

Naturally, it is impossible to analyze all aspects related to this problem within the framework of one article. The author therefore confines himself to examining certain questions of the theory of the transition of economically backward countries to socialism, by-passing capitalism or restricting its development, contemporary revolutionary democracy, the typology of the states of socialist orientation, and the role of the working class in this historic process.

The theory of the transition of economically backward countries to socialism, by-passing the capitalist stage of development, has a century-old history. K. Marx and F. Engels expressed their views on this question for the first time in correspondence with Russian populists in the 1870's-1880's. K. Marx related the possibility of by-passing all the "deadly mishaps of the capitalist system" to utilizing the triumphant European revolution. Believing that the capitalist path is not obligatory for all peoples, he at the same time emphasized that no one country through its own efforts and means

alone "can either skip natural phases of development or abolish them by decree."¹ However, as F. Engels noted in a letter to K. Kautskiy in 1882, the experience of social development has not yet provided the necessary material to determine "which social and political phases these countries must pass through before they also reach socialist organization; I think we could only put forward rather useless hypotheses on this."²

On the basis of the national-liberation struggle of peoples in the age of imperialism, V.I. Lenin formulated the idea of noncapitalist development and examined the question of building socialism in economically backward countries in depth.

V.I. Lenin's formulation of the opportunities and political and socioeconomic features of the transition of economically backward countries to socialism, by-passing capitalism, was reflected in a number of his works and speeches.³ In them, based on the theory of scientific socialism and taking into account international revolutionary experience, he defined the main forms and means of moving from prefeudal relations, feudalism, and underdeveloped capitalism directly to socialist forms of social relations.

Important political generalizations on this question are included in a number of Comintern documents. Thus, for example, one of the decisions of the Comintern adopted in 1930 notes that in conditions of noncapitalist development, capitalism cannot be immediately supplanted from social relations and draws an important conclusion: "One must proceed from the fact that socialism is not introduced immediately and directly. The transition to socialism presupposes a number of intermediate steps. The transition to socialism is a lengthy process which breaks up into a number of particular, successively conducted measures. Some steps which pave the way to socialism should stem from the needs of the masses and should be completely feasible in economic terms."⁴ The theses of the 6th Comintern Congress which speak of the objective possibility that by paths of noncapitalist development a bourgeois democratic revolution in backward countries can turn into a socialist revolution with the support of the socialist countries also devote a great deal of attention to the problem of noncapitalist development linked to aid from the Soviet Union and the international proletariat. And it is stressed that in such cases "the real course of development is determined by the /struggle/ and only by the struggle."⁵ In general in its documents the Comintern repeatedly turned to the problem of noncapitalist development and did a great deal to creatively formulate it.

The Leninist positions related to this question found reflection in one of the decisions of our party's 10th congress "On the Party's Immediate Tasks on the Nationality Issue"⁶

In generalized form the points of noncapitalist development or socialist orientation can be roughly reduced to the following.

1. The transition from precapitalist relations to socialism is not in the nature of a one-time action, but occurs gradually through a number of intermediate stages (in the economic, social, political, and ideological spheres) and in the course of the class struggle.

Capitalist relations are not immediately supplanted and the creation of state and cooperative forms of economy is one of the means to supplant them.

2. Taking into account the great strength of precapitalist and even patriarchal relations, questions of state power, and general democratic transformations, ideologies and policies are not decided directly through the establishment of the power of the working class but gradually during the development of transitional forms of social relations.

3. Taking into account the primarily peasant composition of the population, the specific political organization of the broad masses becomes very important. This political organization means the organs of power, still nonproletarian in class content, with participation of the broad masses.

4. The creation and consolidation of the proletarian party, which relies on the theory of scientific socialism capable of "translating true communist doctrine... into the language of each people,"⁷ heads the process of the transition to socialism.

5. The socialist countries' comprehensive assistance to the states of noncapitalist development, that is, complete realization of the role of the international socialist factor.

Questions of the theory and practice of socialist orientation on the basis of new social practices continue to be developed by the joint efforts of the CPSU, communist parties, and collective Marxist-Leninist thought.

Social experience is already familiar with various forms of transition to socialism by economically backward countries where anti-imperialist, antifeudal, and anticapitalist transformations make it possible to make ready the essential prerequisites for the subsequent transition to socialism. Such a historically transitional period is inevitable, for these countries lack the material and political conditions for a direct transition to socialist production relations.

The first form of the transition of economically backward countries to socialism found expression in the noncapitalist development of the Soviet republics of Central Asia, the Soviet North, and regions of the Transcaucasus. Of course, it must be taken into account that a number of important factors facilitated the noncapitalist development of the backward regions of the Soviet Union. They were an inseparable part of the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the development itself took place under the guidance of the communist party.

The second form of noncapitalist development took place in Mongolia, where the MPRP [Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party] headed the struggle for the socialist reorientation of society. Mongolia left the world capitalist system and in its development oriented itself to the Soviet state. There, imperialism's opportunities to impede the Mongolian People's Republic's [MPR]

noncapitalist development were minimized. Let us note that despite these favorable conditions, it was only in the early 1960's that the MPR entered the stage of completing the building of socialism.⁸

The third form of the transition of economically backward countries to socialism, by-passing capitalism, arose in conditions of the general weakening of imperialism, the emergence and development of the world system of socialist states, and the powerful surge of the national-liberation movement which caused the collapse of the colonial system in the third stage of the economic and ideological-political crisis of capitalism.

It is impossible to correctly understand and explain the theory and practice of socialist orientation in the contemporary period of the world revolutionary process without taking into account the diverse specific features of all the preceding forms of transition to socialism. And, naturally, the new forms should not be limited exclusively to previous experience. Nonetheless, despite all these features, the main task of the period of socialist orientation is to eliminate precapitalist and capitalist relations and create the conditions to shift to socialist social relations. In specific national forms which reflect the particular features of the domestic and foreign policy positions of the given country, the general patterns of Leninist theory of the proletarian revolution and socialist construction are manifested with full historical causality.

The countries of socialist orientation in Asia and Africa which are in different stages of this form of social progress are the "third world's" leading revolutionary detachment.

Revolutionary democracy, which in its documents has called for a reorientation of society on new, socialist principles, has become the leading political force in these states. When examining revolutionary democracy as an ideological-political trend the following should be taken into account: first, the decisive significance of socioeconomic relations and their mechanism of reciprocal impact on the ideological superstructure; second, the historical nature of revolutionary democracy and its attitude toward earlier social thought; third, the fact that of all other theories of socialism the revolutionary-democratic concept of socialism is closest to scientific socialism. Consideration of these factors enables one to correctly understand the real historical opportunities of revolutionary democracy and evaluate its theory and practical activity on a more precise and comprehensive basis.

The activation of revolutionary democracy in the present historical period and its transformation into a leading political force is related to the fact that neither the proletariat nor the national bourgeoisie has the ability to stand at the head of the revolutionary processes in the liberated countries because of their ideological, political, and organizational weaknesses. The activism of revolutionary democracy should be seen as a reflection of a certain level of development of the historical process in the liberated countries when large urban and rural petty bourgeois strata, whose views are distinguished by their middle-ground nature and inconsistency, appear in active political life. That is why revolutionary democracy and its role in the revolutionary-liberation process in the historical context should be examined in close

connection with the increasing role of these strata. On the one hand, this leads to a sharp expansion of the mass social base of revolution and, on the other, to its substantial political mobility.

In the social sense revolutionary democracy arises from a broad political trend which V.I. Lenin, in applying it to Russia, described as petty bourgeois, peasant democracy. While praising revolutionary democracy, he nonetheless stressed its petty bourgeois contradictory nature, the inconsistency of its ideology, and the error of its views of the peasantry as the main political force in the social movement.⁹ In this connection attention must be directed to the fact that the petty bourgeoisie in the liberated countries is, first, very large and, second, extremely heterogeneous in the social sense, since it includes many different substrata. Everything within the framework of the petty bourgeoisie is extremely mobile and unstable since each of the substrata responds to any changes in the situation in its own way, in particular when taking into account the consequences of the transformations being carried out in the countries of socialist orientation.

As general practice shows, there is a difference between national democracy and revolutionary democracy. National democracy, which to a substantial degree is based on traditionalism, national uniqueness, and religious ideology in its concepts, is an advocate of the national type of socialism, so-called national socialism. While it still plays a significant role as an anti-imperialist force, national democracy is differentiated and split during the aggravation of the class struggle and its left wing -- revolutionary democracy -- detaches and strengthens itself. Although revolutionary democracy preserves the social features characteristic of it, which find direct or indirect reflection in the sphere of its social conduct and stem from its social nature of fluctuation, it is far from homogeneous. However, one must not fail to note that a certain part of revolutionary democracy moves to the class positions of the proletariat, gradually approaches scientific socialism, and consistently carries out fundamental socioeconomic and political transformations which open up the possibilities of shifting to socialist relations in the foreseeable historical future. Naturally, this is a complex and difficult process, particularly in conditions of socioeconomic backwardness. Of course, in the present epoch the historical possibilities of revolutionary democracy have grown immeasurably, but upon examining its sociopolitical theories and practices we should obviously deal with "objective facts and masses and classes rather than individuals."¹⁰ This approach makes it possible to realistically see the revolutionary process in the countries of socialist orientation in the complex totality of its contradictions.

In this connection I would like to express the opinion that attempts to establish certain sociopolitical differences between petty bourgeois and revolutionary democracy as a whole are certainly incorrect.¹¹ The ideological evolution of contemporary revolutionary democracy toward scientific socialism is historically correct and inevitable. Nonetheless, at the present time only a small part of it is in the process of withdrawing from socially limited positions and moving to the positions of the working class. But a large part of contemporary revolutionary democracy is, if it may be expressed in this way, at the distant approaches to this historically important frontier. And this, naturally, is no accident. The essence of the matter is that the

policies and practices of revolutionary democracy are a direct or indirect reflection of the complex and contradictory socioeconomic and political conditions in which the liberated countries are developing. Therefore, the question should be examined with consideration for these sociopolitical realities; this allows its historical opportunities to be understood better and more accurately. In the totality of its component parts the revolutionary democratic position is intermediate and transitional; in other words, it does not have the character of a final class political choice and in general still expresses a peasant-petty bourgeois revolutionary spirit.¹²

Of course, when examining the revolutionary democracy of one country or another, the deep interaction of internal and external factors must be taken into account. But however these factors interact, the internal factor remains decisive. No external circumstances, even the most favorable ones, can do the job of the internal revolutionary forces. The internal factor means the ideological-political level of revolutionary democracy, the degree of organization and strength of the vanguard party and of the involvement of the popular masses in active political creativity, and the consistency of the domestic and foreign policy course.

In this connection, the organizational, ideological, and political role of the subjective factor in the countries of socialist orientation through the vanguard parties of working people becomes very important. We are speaking specifically of the creation and consolidation of those parties (as practice shows, they can have different names), their interpretation of Marxism-Leninism as the integral doctrine of the working class, their cohesion on the basis of this doctrine, and their gradual conversion into genuinely proletarian parties and parties of scientific socialism.

In practice this process occurs in one form or another in many countries of socialist orientation, but it has assumed the most profound and sufficiently stable forms chiefly in Socialist Ethiopia, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen [PDRY], the People's Republic of Angola, and the People's Republic of Mozambique, where the ruling vanguard parties of working people oriented to scientific socialism are being consolidated, and quite successfully (although not without difficulties of various origins), and are already in action. They include the Ethiopian Workers Party, the Yemeni Socialist Party in the PDRY, the Labor Party in Angola, and FRELIMO in Mozambique.¹³ The creation of the parties was an important milestone in the development and deepening of the course of socialist orientation. In this case revolutionary democracy makes social relations paramount while class rather than national factors are seen as the main stimuli of social development.

A substantial amount of this type of experience has been accumulated, for example, in Ethiopia, which took a creative approach in forming the party, a major achievement of the country's working people, and found forms and methods of party construction which were appropriate to national features. Initially, in December 1979, the Commission to Organize the Party of Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE) was formed. Preparing conditions for the creation of the Ethiopian Workers Party and disseminating Marxist-Leninist ideology among the working people were its main goals. In the slightly more than 4 years of its existence the COPWE held two congresses, eight regular plenums, and one

extraordinary plenum of the Central Committee where ideological, organizational, and political aspects of the creation of this party were discussed.¹⁴

In January 1984 a COPWE Central Committee plenum took place; it adopted the decision to set up the Ethiopian Workers Party (WPE) in the country. A constitutional congress was held in the first half of September 1984 in Addis-Ababa; the congress proclaimed the creation in the country of a party guided by the theory of scientific socialism and adopted the program and charter of the WPE.

In the accountability report to the COPWE Central Committee, Mengistu Haile-Mariam emphasized that the WPE is a Marxist-Leninist party which in the struggle to build the foundations of socialism will steadily increase the role of the working class.

The organizational and ideological strengthening of these parties and their conversion into Marxist-Leninist parties able to lead the country's transition to socialism and carry out consistently socialist transformations is not a simple matter; it entails difficulties which demand the serious efforts of revolutionary forces and a long period of time. But this process is historically conditioned and social practice is acquainted with such cases as, for example, in the Mongolian People's Republic, where in close cooperation with the international communist movement, the revolutionary democratic party of the peasantry and the intelligentsia involved with it have adopted the ideas of scientific socialism and become the Marxist-Leninist vanguard of the working masses in the struggle for socialism. It is precisely this process which is in the initial stage in this group of countries of socialist orientation.

In its practical activities, revolutionary democracy encounters great difficulties resulting not only from the extensive socioeconomic and cultural backwardness of the liberated countries and their continuing dependence on imperialism but also from the low level of political consciousness of the masses and the tenacity of patriarchal, religious, and nationalistic prejudices. It should nonetheless be acknowledged that revolutionary democratic regimes have not only published program documents of great socioeconomic and political significance but, overcoming difficulties, they have managed to achieve significant successes on the way to realizing these documents. They realistically carry out economic and political transformations which lead to changes in the society's social structure and threaten capitalist relations, particularly in countries where a consistent course of socialist orientation is being carried out. These changes are the basis of the intensifying class struggle in these countries.

The tasks involving the socioeconomic and political restructuring of society are being solved in different ways in the states of socialist orientation. This is the reason for the difficult problem of the typology of the countries of socialist orientation; when this problem is being defined it is necessary to consider, first, the level of sociopolitical obligations and socialist content of revolutionary democracy and, second, the level of real development achieved on the path of socialist orientation. In other words, with certain

• general historical patterns of the course of socialist orientation, one can speak of the different level of progress of different liberated countries along this path and the dissimilar role of revolutionary democracy in the social progress of these countries.

It seems to us that this typology can be determined with an adequate degree of substantiation on the basis of the social and political realities which have taken shape, in other words, on the basis of the end of a definite cycle of social development of the countries of socialist orientation when quite important reasons for establishing a scientific typology arise.

Based on these considerations, at the present time one can speak with some certainty of mainly two groups of states of socialist orientation. The first group includes such countries as Ethiopia, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, and Mozambique. In relation to them the following basic directions of the course of socialist orientation can be roughly formulated.

In the socioeconomic field: the consistent restriction, and in certain cases nationalization, of the property of monopoly capital in industry and the banking and insurance business; termination of inequitable treaties with foreign states; reduction of the sphere of action of national capital and state control of it; creation of the democratic state sector and its consistent conversion into the leading economic structure; elimination of estate ownership and distribution of land among landless and small-landed peasants; cooperation of peasants and urban small-commodity producers and the creation of cooperatives for different purposes; and implementation of broad social measures to benefit working people.

In conditions of a multistructured and backward economy, the dominance of small-commodity production, and the existence of survivals of primitive communal and patriarchal forms of economy, all types of cooperation (production, consumer, producers', credit, residential, and others) become vitally important. In these countries the organizationally established volunteer association for the joint activities of millions of small producers is becoming a major link in the economic system and political organization of the society and in the transition period from capitalism to socialism and the main means of socialist transformation of small-commodity production, including in agriculture.

In the political sphere it is the complete removal of the national bourgeoisie and landowners and their organizations from political activity and the creation and strengthening of revolutionary democratic power, which takes on the form of revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the people or the working class and peasantry¹⁵; development of various forms of political organization of the broad masses of workers and peasants; the creation of democratic institutions and a new state political system headed by the vanguard party of working people which unites representatives of the laboring strata of the people; involvement of the masses and their organizations in solving the questions of economics and politics; creation of armed forces to protect national sovereignty and the gains of the revolution from the endeavors of internal reaction and foreign imperialist forces; and a consistent course of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other socialist

countries; establishment by vanguard parties of working people of political ties with the CPSU and the world communist movement.

In the ideological sphere it is the proclamation by the vanguard parties of working people of scientific socialism as their ideology; dissemination of socialist ideas to the broad masses of working people; training of political and ideological cadres in the spirit of scientific-socialist ideas; creation of new ideological and cultural institutions to meet the needs of the course of socialist orientation; the struggle against various forms of bourgeois ideology and the legacy of colonialism in ideological and cultural life; and protection of common national features and democratic cultural values.

The social practices of the first group of countries attest to processes which have great revolutionary prospects. It must not be regarded as accidental that it is precisely these states which have progressed further along the path of socialist orientation than others and are the main target of imperialism, which operates in direct agreement with internal reaction and weaves political intrigues and plots against these states. After all, it is precisely there that capitalism in all its forms has found itself in economic and political isolation. The class enemy -- within the country and beyond its borders -- has a very sharp sense of this isolation.

Included in the second, most numerous group are the People's Republic of Benin, the People's Republic of the Congo, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, the Democratic Republic of Madagascar, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, the Republic of Cape Verde, and others at various stages of development. Each of them has significant distinctive features of development which demand rigorously concrete theoretical and political study. Within the bounds of the second group of countries are the left flank and the so-called center. And the possibility must not be excluded that the countries of the second group might shift to the first group of states, who are following a consistent course of socialist orientation, nor can one fail to see that some countries of the second group are accomplishing appreciable successes and changes in some fields while other states are accomplishing successes and changes in other fields.

For example, major socioeconomic reforms as well as measures focused on involving the masses in solving questions of policy, and in particular economics, are being carried out and the role of trade unions is increasing in such countries as the People's Republic of the Congo, the People's Republic of Benin, the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, and the Democratic Republic of Madagascar.

But in the context of the questions under study, there is a fundamental difference among these countries. Very important social and political changes are occurring in the first two of the countries mentioned. However, against this background one can note that in these countries foreign and national capital holds even stronger economic and political positions, there is substantial dependence on imperialist monopolies, the influence of social reformism in the working class and its movement is still strong, there is a certain disunity of its ranks, and so on.

Major transformations are being carried out in Algeria; they include those in the area of the political activization of working people and their involvement in sociopolitical life. Although it proclaims the elimination of man's exploitation by man and socialism as the country's main goal, the 1976 National Charter, the program document of the National Liberation Front ruling party, does not single out the working class as the main bearer of the socialist ideal and the political leader of the masses and considers that the building of socialism is possible within the framework of national values and Islam.¹⁶ Moreover, in Algeria all other parties, including the communist party, which has a great deal of experience in revolutionary struggle and enjoys popularity among the masses, are prohibited; this makes it difficult to disseminate the ideas of scientific socialism. Algeria has accumulated a certain amount of experience in involving workers in managing enterprises by creating elected assemblies of working people which simultaneously fulfill the duties of trade union committees. The workers participate in solving economic problems, in socioeconomic construction, in formulating production plans and financial expenditures of enterprises and managing them, and the like. The creation of these assemblies is regarded in the country as one of the important gains of the revolution. The activities of the assemblies of working people are becoming very important in this stage of the Algerian revolution, considering that there is still a strong private sector in the country which opposes the governmental course of socioeconomic and political transformations.

In Madagascar the national-patriotic forces of the country are still disunited; but the National Front to Defend the Revolution (NFDR) created in 1976 now represents quite an imposing force, especially considering the great influence in it of the Congress Party for Malagasy Independence (AKFM), which adopted scientific socialism as its ideology. There are differences of opinion between them on a number of issues, including on ways to develop the country. The trade union movement has also not been united yet. There are several trade union centers oriented to various political parties which are members of the NFDR. Foreign and national capital still hold strong positions in the country.

Syria has achieved certain successes on the path of economic and social progress. The Arab Socialist Resurrectionist Party (Ba'th) and the Syrian Communist Party (SCP) are collaborating in the National Progressive Front created in 1972. Syria is following a consistent anti-imperialist course in the international arena, firmly opposing the aggressive policies of Israel supported by the United States, trying to achieve a fair comprehensive settlement in the Near East, and actively participating in the nonalignment movement. The Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and Syria signed in October 1980 raised Soviet-Syrian relations to a new, higher level and not only helps strengthen Soviet-Syrian cooperation in various areas but also helps objectively strengthen the positions of the national-patriotic forces, among them the working class, and their role in the struggle to step up progressive socioeconomic and political transformations in the country. However, processes which have a negative impact on the correlation of class forces continue in the country's socioeconomic position. The accountability report by H. Bagdash, the general secretary of the Syrian

Communist Party Central Committee, to the 5th Syrian CP Congress (29-31 May 1980) says that "in recent years capitalist-type production relations have been developed and are dominant in Syria." On this basis, the report emphasizes, the party Central Committee has decided to exclude the point which says that Syria is on the path of noncapitalist development from the party program.¹⁷ In the revised program that point now reads as follows: "Our party favors the country's development along the path of social progress in the direction of socialism and progressive anti-imperialist Arab unity."¹⁸

In some countries of the second group, overcoming difficulties, the socialist orientation is gradually established as the direction of social development and in others -- departure from certain political principles mainly stemming from the growth of nationalist aspirations, fear of the energetic political activity of the masses, and frequently serious mistakes lead to distortion of the course of socialist orientation proclaimed (in Burma, for example), which damages the implementation of the course itself.

Other countries also have their distinctive features in development along the path of socialist orientation; this only emphasizes the complexity and contradictory nature of development along this path.

The experience of socialist orientation accumulated is becoming more and more diverse and thus rich in content. Each of the countries implementing this course introduces its own features, rooted in its history and specific historical reality, into the general theory of the question. The successes and victories of this form of development, like its negative lessons, open up new prospects for accelerated progress of the liberated countries.

The totality of general directions of activity of the revolutionary democratic regimes proper are what comprises the content of the national-democratic stage of revolution in the states of socialist orientation. The prospects of these countries moving to socialism are closely related to the consistent performance of the tasks of national-democratic revolution -- the historically transitional period of socialist orientation. In this case we encounter some of the examples of revolution developing into a higher form from a lower one when the question of "who removes whom" is decided in one form or another. It is precisely this social process which is taking place under the guidance of revolutionary democracy, although in different ways, in the different states of socialist orientation.

Thus, the elements of contradictoriness and inconsistency of revolutionary democracy by no means exclude its deeply progressive role, in historical terms, in the national-liberation revolution. It attempts to carry out socioeconomic and political transformations in the interests of the people to whom it is closely tied. Evaluating this form of development, B.N. Ponomarev notes: "It has now already been proven: the countries of socialist orientation have chosen a correct, promising path." Pointing out further that these countries have "a mass of problems which often have no analogues in the past or in the present," he emphasizes that "they persistently continue making their way toward the lofty goals of social progress..."¹⁹

Revolutionary democratic theory and practice is to a substantial degree related to socialism's fate in the zone of national liberation revolutions. That is why socialist orientation has a direct relationship, in terms of sociopolitical content and prospects, to the fundamental interests of the working class, the consistent bearer of the ideas of socialism and the most purposeful champion of the social restoration of society. The working class cannot ignore revolutionary democratic concepts when they serve as the foundation for important socioeconomic transformations. While evaluating revolutionary democracy socioeconomically and politically as a progressive trend, the communist party "must operate on /scientific foundations."20 In other words, we are speaking of the need for the working class and its organizations to have a deeply creative attitude toward revolutionary democracy and the need to use its socialist potential in every possible way in the interests of stimulating social and political progress and to politically unite all supporters of the socialist goal.

A country's development along the path of socialist orientation promotes the emergence of objective conditions for the political awakening of broad strata of urban and rural working people, their involvement in active sociopolitical life, and the creation of various mass organizations.

In the states of socialist orientation, the demands of semiproletarian and nonproletarian masses of working people gradually move beyond the confines of general democratic transformations; this converges them with the demands of the working class. However, the struggle to consistently follow a course of socialist orientation objectively becomes part of the movement of the proletariat for its own class interests. Thus, social practices themselves unite these two currents in their joint political struggle for common goals.

The theory and practice of socialist orientation should be regarded as not only closely related to the present role of the working class but also to its participation in this process in the future, when its political potential and role will increase even more. Because it is precisely the working class which is the consistent bearer of the ideas of socialism and the most purposeful champion of social restoration. The economic and political growth of the working class and its intensified impact on all spheres of social life in the countries of socialist orientation is indisputably becoming one of the major problems of these countries' development.

The real place of the working class in the countries of socialist orientation is determined, in the first place, by the level of its political consciousness and organization; secondly, by the degree of consistency and depth of the course of socialist orientation being implemented, that is, by the objective socioeconomic and ideological-political conditions in the given country; and thirdly, by the depth of influence of world socialism on the given state.

Speaking of the revolutionary potential of the working class and its role in the development of the revolutionary process in the countries of socialist orientation, the various subjective and objective factors which, on the one hand, restrict and, on the other, in every possible way help the working class of the states of socialist orientation fulfill their historical role should be realistically considered.

As for the difficulties which the working class encounters, they are above all the result of its small size, political and organizational weakness, social heterogeneity, the existence in it of many transient groups, national-ethnic separateness, the still substantial influence of long-lived patriarchal traditions, and various forms of bourgeois and petty bourgeois ideology. It will take a long time to overcome these difficulties.

However, there are a number of important factors (and their significance is increasing) which facilitate the strengthening and further growth of the sociopolitical role of the working class in the states of socialist orientation. Let us name the main ones: the quantitative and qualitative growth of the working class; its higher degree of concentration in connection with the accelerated development of industry and the creation of new sectors of industry; its greater role in public production; the formation in conditions of social progress of favorable opportunities to increase the sophistication and political consciousness of the working class; the increased understanding by ever-broader circles of revolutionary democracy of the working class's important role in transforming society; and the intensified political influence of world socialism and the international communist movement on the working class of the liberated countries. These factors stimulate the organization and political consciousness of the working class in the states of socialist orientation, help strengthen its positions and facilitate its better understanding of its class and international tasks, facilitate assimilation of socialist theory and practice, and help the working class turn into an important and then leading political force.

In the states of socialist orientation the working class and its organizations carry out their activities in specific political conditions which to a certain degree have not been seen in social practices before. The working class in these countries carries out its activities in conditions of revolutionary democratic, not bourgeois power; and its policies and practices to a great extent are based on the interests of the majority of the people. This means that the sphere of support of this power on the part of the working people may be quite large; this naturally does not exclude constructive criticism of it.

It is within the framework of this activity and frequently in unusual or unaccustomed conditions that the working class works out the particular goals and tasks of its struggle and forms of participation in realizing revolutionary democratic programs and cooperation with revolutionary democracy and so forth through its own party, and when there is no party, through trade unions. In these unique conditions the correct combination of national and class interests in the struggle for democracy and a socialist future becomes the major problem facing the working class. In this case the working class has run into many new theoretical and political challenges, whose particular solutions are in many respects suggested by revolutionary practice. All these challenges together have a direct relationship to the challenge which is quite complicated for the working class and its party -- political activity in the sphere of operation of political systems in the countries of socialist orientation.

In these conditions the creation of a political alliance of the working class and the urban and rural semiproletarian and nonproletarian masses becomes important; this alliance can become a powerful national democratic coalition in the struggle to consistently conduct a course of socialist orientation and the struggle against the possible relapses and political vacillations of revolutionary democratic regimes. In light of this it should be kept in mind that trade union organizations of the working class, on the one hand, support the policies of revolutionary democratic regimes but, on the other, defend their own class interests and their independence, which these regimes do not universally or always recognize, frequently trying to integrate trade unions into the state and party system. But attempts to depoliticize trade unions inevitably lead to narrowing the social base of these regimes and to their losing a reliable support base among the masses.

The political development of the states of socialist orientation and the appearance of new, progressive social forces striving toward socialism make it urgently necessary for the working class to have a profoundly creative attitude toward the course of socialist orientation. We are speaking of the need for them to use all opportunities in the interests of all-out intensification of the national democratic revolution. In these conditions on the national and international levels the urgent task of communists is to work out a tactically correct attitude toward contemporary revolutionary democracy which stimulates the joint struggle of all adherents of socialism. It is precisely on this basis that communist parties, loyal to the general principles of Marxism-Leninism and guided by the need for a creative approach to solving urgent questions of the liberation struggle, try to combine high revolutionary principles and tactical flexibility, promote new slogans in connection with the new demands of social life, and take a realistic approach to their practical implementation within the framework of the course of socialist orientation.

The choice of the path of socialist orientation by a large group of liberated countries signifies a serious undermining of the positions of imperialism and is a major achievement of the revolutionary forces of contemporary times. Despite difficulties of various origins and local defeats, the course of socialist orientation in recent years has demonstrated its great potential and become a historical reality which has been converted into a major factor of socioeconomic and political development of the countries of Asia and Africa.

The international communist movement and the countries of socialism saw and properly evaluated the historical significance of the course of socialist orientation in time and took a substantiated and principled position in regard to this form of social progress, announcing their support of the profound socioeconomic and political transformations being carried out by revolutionary democracy. For the world communist movement and the countries of socialism, the question of cooperation with the countries of socialist orientation is part of the historical question of alliances on the world level in the struggle against imperialism and for peace, democracy, and socialism. The international support of the countries of socialist orientation by real socialism has in the contemporary period become a historical factor helping to strengthen their economic, political, and diplomatic positions.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union supports close economic and political ties with the countries of socialist orientation. These ties, a fundamentally new form of the political solidarity of world socialism and the communist movement with the countries of socialist orientation, increase the impact of socialist ideology on these countries, help strengthen socialist trends in the national liberation movement, and help strengthen the course of socialist orientation in Asia and Africa.

FOOTNOTES

1. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], Vol 23, p 10.
2. Ibid., Vol 35, p 298.
3. See, for example, the works of V.I. Lenin: reports at the 2nd and 3rd congresses of the Communist International, the brochure "On the Production Tax," the report at the 2nd All-Russian Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East, the letter "To the Communist Comrades of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Dagestan, and the Gorsk Republic, and others.
4. "Strategiya i taktika Komintern v natsionalno-kolonialnoy revolyutsii na primere Kitaya" [The Strategy and Tactics of the Comintern in the National-Colonial Revolution Using China as an Example], Moscow, 1934, p 280.
5. See: ibid., p 59.
6. See: "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh syezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK" [The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences, and Central Committee Plenums], Part 1, Moscow, 1954.
7. V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 39, p 330.
8. See: "XVIII syezd MNRP (26-30 maya 1981)" [The 18th MPRP Congress (26-30 May 1981)], Ulan-Bator, 1982, p 49.
9. See, for example: V.I. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 21, pp 441-446, Vol 23, pp 138-140.
10. V.I. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 31, p 157.
11. See, for example: V.O. Li, "On the Social Typology of Noncapitalist Development," AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA, No 10, 1979, p 34; same author: "Sotsialnaya revolyutsiya i vlast v stranakh Vostoka" [Social Revolution and Power in the Countries of the East], Moscow, 1984, p 19 and other pages.
12. See: K.N. Brutents, "Sovremennyye natsionalno-osvoboditelnyye revolyutsii (nekotoryye voprosy teorii)" [Contemporary National Liberation Revolutions (Some Questions of Theory)], Moscow, 1974, p 337.

13. For more details on this see: N.D. Kosukhin, "Formirovaniye ideyno-politicheskoy strategii v afrikanskikh stranakh sotsialisticheskoy orientatsii" [The Formation of Ideological-Political Strategy in the African Countries of Socialist Orientation], Moscow, 1980; O.V. Martyshin, "Afrikanskaya revolyutsionnaya demokratiya" [African Revolutionary Democracy], Moscow, 1981; "Afrika. Strany sotsialisticheskoy orientatsii v revolyutsionnom protsesse" [Africa. The Countries of Socialist Orientation in the Revolutionary Process], (responsible editor A.A. Gromyko), Moscow, 1984.
14. See: Haile-Mariam Mengistu, "An Important Stage of Ethiopian Revolution," KOMMUNIST, No 13, 1984, pp 89-98.
15. Let us note in this connection that by the political formula "revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" V.I. Lenin meant a relationship of classes, not a particular political institution to carry out the cooperation of these two classes (see, for example: V.I. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 34, pp 133-134.
16. See: "Natsionalnaya khartiya Alzhirskoy Narodnoy Demokraticheskoy Respubliki" [The National Charter of the Algerian Democratic and Popular Republic], Moscow, 1979, p 11.
17. "V syezd Siriyskoy kommunisticheskoy partii. Damask, 29-31 maya 1980 g." [The 5th Syrian CP Congress. Damascus, 29-31 May 1980], Moscow, 1982, p 81.
18. Ibid., p 107.
19. PMS, No 2, 1985, p 8.
20. V.I. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 41, p 65.

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SYMPOSIUM HELD ON ANNIVERSARY OF HELSINKI CONFERENCE

Moscow RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNIY MIR in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 85 pp 159-163

[Article by Igor Vladimirovich Kazey under the rubric "Communications": "A Useful Dialogue of Social Forces"]

[Text] This article is the last work by learned secretary of the USSR Academy of Sciences International Workers Movement Institute and candidate of historical sciences Igor Vladimirovich Kazey, who died tragically on 6 October 1985.

Among the major international events of postwar history, the adoption by the leaders of the countries of Europe as well as those of the United States and Canada of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has acquired enormous significance. The world gives due credit to the state wisdom of those who put their signatures on the historical document of the Helsinki Conference. However, it is difficult to overestimate the enormous contribution which the popular masses and mass social movements have made to the institutionalization of the "spirit of Helsinki."

In recent decades the desire of broad sociopolitical forces to have a positive impact on solving urgent international problems has been revealed more and more clearly. They recognize the need to turn Europe into a region of lasting peace and mutually advantageous cooperation as the high humanistic duty of the continent's inhabitants, survivors of the most destructive wars in the history of mankind, as well as an important prerequisite for more successful resolution of the major economic and social problems which disturb the popular masses. This forces the peace-loving European community to more actively influence the policies of governments.

From the standpoint of the historical prospects of the struggle against the threat of military confrontation and for the establishment in Europe of an atmosphere of peace and disarmament, the joint actions and statements of political parties and social organizations of different orientations become important. This trend appears prominently, in particular, in expanded contacts and interaction and the development of a dialogue on major problems of world policy between representatives of different trends in the workers movement. "The international situation urgently requires the active and effective efforts of the workers and democratic movements in the struggle

against the threat of war," emphasized General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev during the meeting in the the Consultative Council of the Sotsintern [Socialist International] on disarmament.¹

As shown by the recent evolution of the foreign policy concepts of social democracy and to a certain degree a number of Christian and centrist parties and many occupational and social organizations, opportunities are expanding for unity of actions among broad sociopolitical forces in the struggle for disarmament and peaceful coexistence in Europe and to strengthen security on the continent.

The steadily increasing interest of the community in various aspects of settlement of issues in Europe greatly increases the mass potential and political weight of the movement for European security and cooperation. Committees on European security and cooperation created in many states of Europe unite prominent public figures, representatives of the workers movement and women's and youth organizations, figures of culture, scientists, religious figures, and such in their ranks. The representativeness and authority of this public movement enabled it to make a significant contribution to the search for general approaches to crucial international problems in various stages of progress toward creating an effective system of security on the continent.

It can be stated on solid grounds today that not one of the fruitful results of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe can be considered outside the context of the actions of the peace-loving forces.

How does the public of Europe and North America evaluate the condition and prospects of the all-European process 10 years after Helsinki? The international symposium dedicated to the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe held in Helsinki to a significant degree made it possible to assess this. The following topic was discussed there: "The All-European Process: Trends and Prospects." The Finnish Committee for European Security and Cooperation (STETE) acted as the organizer of the symposium which ended on 1 September 1985. Many public figures and representatives of various political parties, trade unions, and mass movements, and scientists from different countries of Western Europe, the United States, and the socialist states participated in its meetings held in Finland's parliament building. Represented at the meeting in Helsinki, for example, were figures of the social democratic parties and workers occupational organizations from Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the FRG, and Belgium, Catholics and communists, and a number of experts on problems of European security and cooperation.

The symposium's work attracted a great deal of attention from Finland's mass media: the content of the main reports and speeches and the course of debate at its meetings were widely covered for a number of days by various organs of the press and in radio and television broadcasts. A press conference was organized; representatives of social, scientific, and trade union organizations of a number of countries took part in it.

Opening the symposium, STETE president P. Tyuyelyayarvi appealed to its participants "not only to evaluate the problems of the past but to a greater degree outline our goals for the future by asking where we go from here."

P. Vyayuryunen, the minister of foreign affairs, welcomed the participants in the symposium on behalf of the government of Finland. He noted that for his country the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe "was and remains a unique forum facilitating the development of the policy of neutrality. The peaceful solution of European problems and closer contacts and cooperation among peoples and states, regardless of their political, economic, and social systems, conforms to Finland's national interests." In the opinion of the country's official representative -- the host of the all-European conference, an open and honest dialogue should serve the development of the Helsinki process as well as the success of the conference of the countries participating in the conference in Vienna.

Representatives of the U.S. and USSR communities gave reports at the first plenary meeting: Ambassador G. Leonard (from the leadership of the Washington "Committee for National Security") and USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member and director of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMRD [International Workers Movement Institute] T.T. Timofeyev (member of the Buro of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation).

The exchange of opinions which took place touched upon many aspects of the all-European process: political, military, economic, cultural, and scientific. The ideas expressed by the representatives of the USSR and the other socialist states a month earlier at the meeting of ministers of foreign affairs from 33 states of Europe, the United States, and Canada received a significant response at the symposium. Despite the difference in approaches, the delegates of the meeting firmly favored the continued process of detente and mutually advantageous cooperation.

The new Soviet peace initiatives, including the announcement by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev on the unilateral moratorium on any nuclear explosions until 1 January 1986 and his interview with the American magazine TIME, were praised at the forum of social forces in Helsinki. The position of the Soviet leadership was justifiably regarded as an expression of good will by the USSR and of its desire to persistently try to achieve real progress on the way to reducing nuclear armaments and consolidating peace and international security.

The speeches of many participants stressed the historic link between the two anniversary dates which were celebrated this year: the 40th anniversary of the Victory over Hitler's fascism and Japanese militarism and the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Final Act of the All-European conference. The origins of the Helsinki process date back to the results of World War II. The Final Act of Helsinki fixed the political realities which took shape in the world after the victory of the anti-Hitler coalition. This document reflects the expectations and hopes of the peoples of Europe for a peaceful future, a stable mechanism of political relations, and mutually advantageous cooperation. It is precisely because of this, as the Swedish representative and prominent figure in the social democratic movement B. Carlsson noted, that

"the all-European conference on security and cooperation is the main event in Europe's postwar history."

The adherence of two different socioeconomic systems to the policies of detente and coexistence has a stronger impact in Europe. There can be no other links between them but peaceful cooperation in the nuclear age. Recognition of this fact is the basis of the Helsinki Accords. The need for this cooperation in various spheres has become even more urgent in the mid-1980's, participants in the symposium emphasized. This is the result of those processes which received development in the last decade. The refinement and accumulation of new and more destructive types of weapons which outstrips and complicates the political process of negotiations on arms limitation continues at an accelerated rate. The internationalization of economic, political, social, and cultural life is increasing and interrelationship and interdependence among peoples is intensifying. The pace of the scientific-technical revolution has accelerated and at the same time the scope of its socioeconomic and political consequences has increased. The problem of protecting the environment has become more crucial for the states of Europe. These types of pressing universal all-European problems, in the words of B. Carlsson, can only be solved through the joint efforts of the countries of Eastern and Western Europe.

The participants in the symposium not only devoted main attention to evaluating the present situation in Europe but also to the prospects for its development. They stated that by the early 1980's progress in the detente process had slowed down. The military-political situation in Europe became seriously complicated after the United States began to deploy medium-range nuclear missiles on the territories of a number of NATO states in late 1983. The steps taken by the United States to militarize space are leading the arms race to a qualitatively new stage and have posed a threat to the negotiations going on in Geneva to limit nuclear and space weapons. There has been no progress in negotiations to reduce armed forces and arms in Central Europe for a long time. Revanchiste trends in the West which question the political settlement in Europe can only be defined as a violation of the Helsinki Accords.

But what are the further prospects?

This question was touched upon in one way or another in many speeches by the symposium's participants. The difference of expressed opinions, viewpoints, and assessments regarding the particular aspects of the all-European process by no means lessens the significance of the general ideas brought out on ways to improve and stabilize the political, economic, cultural, and other ties among states with different social orders.

The fundamental problem of contemporary international relations is to establish a new form of political thinking which corresponds to the realities of the nuclear age. This demands that stereotypes of thinking which took shape earlier and which were based on the supposedly most reliable guarantee of security -- force of arms -- be overcome. Critically evaluating such ideas, G. Leonard (USA) rejected the concept of security based on the quest for nuclear supremacy. "It is politically ludicrous and morally brutal to

plan the 'defense' of Western Europe using weapons which will probably destroy it," he noted. "Our enemy is nuclear arms, nuclear war, and the entire system of war business in all its aspects." American medium-range nuclear weapons, which are central to NATO strategy, must be removed from the continent's territory, G. Leonard believes. And not simply transferred to military ships or airports in the United States where they can easily be returned to Europe, but completely destroyed. The principle of equality and equal security presupposes that such steps be taken, he noted.

Like other participants in the symposium, the American expert protested against moving the arms race into space. He believes that the "Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) which the U.S. administration is trying to impose on its allies cannot be regarded as defense and cannot save the world from the threat of nuclear conflict. On the contrary, in this case all the dangers stemming from intensifying the arms race would increase unpredictably. The "Star Wars" program can fundamentally destabilize the system of international relations since, noted G. Leonard, the SDI "cannot improve the chances for achieving an important agreement on strategic weapons but would be completely incompatible with the prospects of substantially reducing offensive weapons."

The conviction of some strategists that ordinary weapons can insure security on the continent contradicts the interests of the peoples of Europe to no small extent. The continuous refinement of nonnuclear weapons for conducting war has substantially increased their harmful impact. In a settled region such as the European region, the consequences of armed conflict even using ordinary weapons are most tragic. And the plans for a massive crippling nonnuclear strike being developed by the European NATO command, such as the "Eierbettel," confirm this. This position was reflected in B. Carlsson's speech which, among other things, noted: "The new conflict in Europe can be an indescribable catastrophe even when nuclear weapons are not used. Taking into account the number of atomic power plants, chemical enterprises, and burial places for toxic wastes, the impact of conventional war to a certain degree could be compared to a conflict using a limited number of nuclear weapons. In conditions of the high population density, victims among the civilian population would be enormous. Vast regions would become lifeless and possibly uninhabitable in the future. The conclusions which must be drawn for the policy of European security are obvious. Detente and monitoring of weapons is the only way to survive." In fact, an orientation toward negotiations and other political mechanisms for insuring security may be the only reasonable possibility of reducing the danger of war on the European continent. This fully corresponds to the spirit of Helsinki.

The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries firmly support these concepts of security. The Soviet position on questions of political and military detente was given in T.T. Timofeyev's report. In the spirit of Helsinki the Soviet Union proposed a complex of important initiatives focused on fulfilling all sections of the Final Act, including the problem of reducing nuclear and other weapons. The USSR reinforces its constructive proposals with concrete steps focused on creating a favorable atmosphere of trust in all negotiations being conducted in the interests of achieving mutually acceptable agreements. Thus, in April 1985 the Soviet Union unilaterally stopped deployment of its medium-range missiles and carrying out other reciprocal

measures in Europe. Back in 1983 the unilateral Soviet moratorium on launching antisatellite systems into space was announced. The moratorium on nuclear explosions introduced on 6 August 1985 was the latest major Soviet initiative.

Following the path of fulfilling the decisions of the Helsinki Conference, the person giving the report noted, the USSR fixed the 10 principles of the Final Act in its Basic Law (Constitution) as mandatory norms in interrelations with foreign states. The norms worked out in Helsinki thereby became the basis of the Soviet Union's interrelations not only with the European states but also with all other countries of the globe. The USSR's efforts have found expression in a large number of treaties and agreements and in setting up the system of political consultations and creating intergovernmental joint commissions on scientific-technical and economic cooperation, and in the entire complex of ties and contacts with the states of different social affiliations. The principles agreed upon in Helsinki have been elevated to the rank of national legal norms in many other states of the socialist community. Among other things, the representative of the Polish Institute of International Relations A.D. Rotfeld noted that soon after the Helsinki Conference, the Polish People's Republic Council of Ministers adopted a decree which obligated all central ministries and departments to follow the principles of the Final Act of the all-European conference in their activities.

Those participating in the symposium praised the contribution of the host country of the Helsinki Conference to improving the political climate in Europe. Support was expressed for the proposals made at one time by President U.K. Kekkonen to create and register in international law a zone free from nuclear weapons in northern Europe. These types of proposals receive broad support from the world community and are considered by it as an alternative to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and an effective means of maintaining the security of countries and of entire regions of the planet. The idea of a nonnuclear zone is not only finding ever greater numbers of supporters in northern Europe but also in the Balkans and outside Europe -- in the Far East and in the Asia-Pacific Ocean Region. The speeches by representatives of various political parties and social organizations of Finland and other countries demonstrated how great the impact of these proposals is among members of parliaments and different social forces in the countries of Northern Europe.

The constructive nature of the debates at the symposium by no means indicated an absence of ideological differences of opinion. In criticizing the aggressive foreign policy course of the U.S. administration, some of the participants nonetheless gave tribute to a certain degree to those concepts whose supporters have tried to lay "equal responsibility" for the aggravated situation in the world on the Soviet Union. These types of assessments are based on the stereotypes prevalent in the West which do not take into account the practical peace initiatives of the USSR. For example, as was clear from the speech by the Norwegian scientists M. Seter, in his opinion the logic of relations between two "superpowers" has a certain fatal aspect for the destiny of Europe. The creation of an effective system of European security can be insured, in his opinion, on the one hand -- by the European NATO allies extricating themselves from the "control" of the United States and, on the

other -- by the OVD [Warsaw Pact Organization] extricating themselves from the "control" of the USSR. This point of view, however, was not supported by most of those participating in the symposium.

The expansion of mutually advantageous business ties and cooperation between the countries of the East and the West are among the important directions of materialization of the Helsinki Accords. The trends and prospects of development of this cooperation became a subject of special discussion at one of the symposium's sections. And it was noted that the "spirit of Helsinki" envisions setting up mutually advantageous economic and scientific-technical ties between the countries of Western Europe and the socialist states. Quite a lot has already been accomplished in this direction. In the last decade the system of trade-economic and scientific-technical agreements has been strengthened. Many of them are calculated for the distant future. Production cooperation received some development and progressive types of production ties on the basis of mutual interest in jointly incorporating the latest achievements of scientific-technical progress and designing and building enterprises on a compensation basis are being refined. Trade turnover between the Western European countries and the European CEMA countries almost doubled in the period from 1975 through 1983 -- from 41 billion dollars to 74 billion dollars. Even during the major crisis of the capitalist economy in the early 1980's when the deep recession of business activity was accompanied by an appreciable reduction in the total volume of foreign trade transactions, their trade-economic ties continued to be developed, although not at such a rapid rate as before.

To be sure, the difficulties which were revealed in the field of political detente, as was noted at the section's meetings, were also reflected to a certain degree in the level of economic cooperation among a number of states with different social orders. The economic sanctions resorted to by the U.S. administration had a negative effect on the development of trade relations among them. The sanctions also affected many firms of the Western European countries which maintain ties with foreign trade organizations of the socialist states. "This pressure on other countries should be regarded as contrary to the Final Act of Helsinki," declared M.-L. Riskilya, a representative of Finnish trade unions and the STETE deputy chairman, in her report at the symposium.

Soviet-Finnish trade-economic relations, which have been successfully developed for many years and are not subject to the fluctuations of international market conditions, are an example of equitable and mutually advantageous cooperation between countries with different social orders. As the Finnish participants in the symposium noted, they help their country overcome certain severe consequences of crisis development which are characteristic of the world capitalist economy with fewer economic and social costs.

The deepening of economic cooperation serves the cause of consolidating peace, trust, and security in Europe, the symposium participants acknowledged. But this sphere of cooperation has yet another aspect which attracted special attention at the forum. Europe today, in the words of P. Tyuyelyayarvi, is not only a continent with greater danger of armed conflict but is also a

continent where "unemployment, social despair, and apathy" have not been eliminated in many countries. Does this have some relationship to economic cooperation? Finnish experience, among other experience, confirms that the development of mutually advantageous economic relations with the socialist countries can become one of the important ways to solve the socioeconomic problems facing working people. Trade-economic cooperation with the USSR guarantees employment for more than 150,000 Finnish workers and employees. The favorable prospects for Soviet-Finnish trade offer great hopes for another 150,000 Finnish working people who do not now have work. It is precisely for this reason that the mass organizations of Finnish working people are trying to exert what power they have toward expanding economic cooperation with the USSR. The Soviet-Finnish trade union commission on economic cooperation has been operating for a number of years; M.-L. Riskilya discussed its work in her speech at the symposium.

The development of economic ties between the East and the West occupies an important place in the concept of an "alternative economy of peace" -- an idea which is gaining popularity in the Western European community, including among trade union organizations of different orientations; I. Lindemans, the director of the research center of the Confederation of Christian Trade Unions of Belgium, talked about this at the symposium. Peaceful economic cooperation among states with different social orders, the productive use of existing economic resources in the interests of increasing the quality of life and economic and social development, and the conversion of military industry are the essential requirements of the concept of the "economy of peace," which is enjoying growing support in the workers movement of the capitalist countries. According to I. Lindemans's calculations, if the volume of foreign trade ties with the socialist countries rose in most Western European countries even to its present level in the FRG (where about 2 percent of the work force is engaged in fulfilling orders for the socialist states), this would create at least 1 million additional jobs in the countries of the European Economic Community.

The militaristic precepts of those transoceanic circles who fight for intensifying the arms race and moving it into space contradict the interests of peaceful economic cooperation. Many state and public figures of Western Europe who participated in the debate regarding the prospects and possible consequences of the European states' participating in realizing projects within the framework of the U.S. administration's so-called SDI have come to this conclusion. The speech by the prominent economist and general secretary of the "Finnish Champions of Peace" organization Y. Pakaslakhtu was dedicated to certain aspects of the impact of these programs on the European economy. "If the Western European countries were to take part in realizing the SDI, it would have a negative effect on their economy, which would be doubly advantageous for the United States," the speaker concluded. Participating in Washington's plans to ready "Star Wars" would lead to using a significant part of national income and research and financial resources of the countries of Western Europe in the political and military interests of the United States. This would seriously limit the possibilities of developing national economies, reduce the competitiveness of many sectors of Western European industry, and at the same time strengthen the positions of the military-industrial complex even more, with all the resulting negative economic consequences for the

working people and the broad popular masses of the countries of Western Europe.

The "Strategic Defense Initiative" was criticized from similar positions at meetings of the section which discussed the problems of cooperation in the field of science and technology. In his speech E. Helander, the representative of the Academy of Sciences of Finland, pointed out the danger of enlisting an ever-greater number of talented scientists and technicians in military industry. Thus, the financing of the SDI comprises a rather large part of all expenditures for scientific research and other developments of the United States, and the Pentagon plans to increase it even further in the future. In 1984 more than 5,000 skilled scientists and technicians were engaged in developing technology for the SDI alone, while by 1987 they are to be increased to 18,000. The participants in the symposium who spoke in the section expressed a unanimous desire to step up efforts to put the achievements of contemporary science and technology at the service of the cause of consolidating peace and economic and social progress.

The successful realization of the Helsinki Accords creates the prerequisites for substantially expanding contacts among people: achieving agreements between states with different social systems on exchanging verbal, press, radio, and television information and developing cooperation in the culture and education spheres. In summarizing the results of the all-European process, the symposium participants praised the level of cooperation achieved among the European countries in the humanitarian spheres. A number of speeches criticized the attempts by certain reactionary circles of the West to attribute to the socialist states "nonobservance" of the Final Act in connection with "human rights." This was regarded as an attempt to distract the public's attention both from flagrant violations of peoples' rights and human rights in the world of capital and from those sections of the Helsinki Accords which deal above all with the problems of insuring European security and peaceful cooperation of states, thereby justifying their own real departure from the positions of the Final Act.

Contacts among states in the humanitarian fields must serve the ideals of peaceful cooperation and mutual understanding among peoples, the symposium participants emphasized. An appeal signed by prominent figures in art from Europe and North America was distributed recently in Helsinki; it said: "We people working in art from all countries participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, on the day of the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Final Act, appeal to all countries who participated in the Conference to continue the process it began and to build bridges of culture across all borders. We are certain that this is the best contribution to the cause of peace."

Despite all the diversity of approaches and assessments of the political situation which has taken shape in Europe and the level of cooperation achieved in the fields of economics, science, and culture, the symposium participants took a step forward in formulating mutually acceptable tasks to serve as guidelines for the actions of the peace-loving community.

"Public opinion not only serves to remind governments of the need for progress in the all-European process; it must also stimulate and enrich it. Acting in this way, we have the right to demand that we are listened to," these words from the speech by STETE president P. Tyuyelyayarvi to a significant extent also reflected the significance of the meeting in Helsinki which demonstrated the desire of various political and social forces to defend the principles of the all-European conference and, moreover, facilitate a return to detente and real normalization and improvement of the international situation.

FOOTNOTE

1. PRAVDA, 23 March 1985.

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ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN CADRE TRAINING VIEWED

Moscow RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNIY MIR in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 85 pp 172-175

[Article by E.K. Avdonin; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics in text]

[Text] Great challenges in the field of the economic construction and consolidation of their economic independence face the peoples of the liberated countries who have won political independence. One of the most complex of them is the problem of molding skilled national cadres. The latter, acting as one of the factors which determines the country's socioeconomic development is in close interaction with all links of the economic mechanism and often has a decisive impact on its operation. The number of skilled cadres in various spheres of social activity and their habits and ability serve as major indicators in evaluating the level of development and independence of the liberated states. Success in solving the complex socioeconomic problems of these states to a substantial degree depends on how the question of the nature, form, and degree of their training and utilization is solved.

Winning political independence gave the liberated countries an opportunity to begin to demolish old structures and create their own system of education and training of skilled cadres. State expenditures for these purposes increased from 2.3 percent to 4.1 percent of total gross national product, or from 31 dollars to 146 dollars per capita in the period from 1960 through 1980. Their upward trend is also characteristic of all liberated countries. According to UNESCO data, the number of countries whose expenditures for education and training of cadres exceed 4.5 percent of gross national product increased from 43 in 1970 to 59 in 1978.¹ Nonetheless, the gap between the corresponding indicators in these countries and in the developed states, where this indicator totaled about 6 percent of total gross national product, is still quite high, and two-thirds of the Earth's population which lives in the developing states account for only one-eighth of the world expenditures for education. Regrettably we must state that not one of the liberated countries can at this point fully provide itself with cadres with the necessary skills. A number of them still do not even have the basic elements needed to create a national system of occupational training. There are no elementary conditions for conducting procedural, research, and informational activities, for example. But they lack experience and -- most importantly -- the cadres needed for developing curricula and organizing training for teachers and

instructors. All this leads to the fact that in most liberated countries national systems for training skilled cadres are unable to deal with the tasks which the course of economic development poses.

This is explained not only by the extremely heavy legacy of the past and the low level of socioeconomic development of many liberated countries, but also to a substantial degree by the neocolonialist policies of the imperialist states.

However, it is important to note that young states who have chosen the path of socialist orientation (Algeria, Angola, Afghanistan, Mozambique, Syria, and others) have achieved certain successes in developing public education and occupational training. As the CPSU Central Committee Accountability Report to the 26th CPSU Congress pointed out: "The development of these countries on the progressive path is, of course, different and it is taking place under complicated conditions. But the main directions are /similar/. They include gradually eliminating the positions of imperialist monopolies and the local large bourgeoisie and feudal lords, and limiting the activities of foreign capital. They include guaranteeing that the people's state controls the commanding heights of the economy, shifting to planned development of production forces, and encouraging the cooperative movement in the countryside. They include increasing the role of the working masses in social life and gradually reinforcing the state apparatus with national cadres who are devoted to the people."2

By now the states of socialist orientation have accumulated some experience in solving the problems of training skilled cadres. They have created a significant educational-materials base, set up the training of teachers and instructors, and laid the foundations for scientific-method work and the gathering and dissemination of information. As a rule, the training of national cadres in these countries is carried out in state educational institutions which are at the same time scientific research centers. Having such a foundation, they have made and are successfully carrying out plans focused on improving the existing systems of education and training of cadres and refining planning and coordination in the utilization of young specialists. Therefore, it is absolutely correct to conclude that "the more quickly and radically social transformations are carried out in a particular country, the more decisive the break with historically outdated social structures is, and the more decisive the turn toward socialism; the more favorable the conditions for developing national systems of education and training of native cadres of specialists are."3

Nonetheless, gaining political independence and choosing the path of socioeconomic development, though necessary, are far from sufficient conditions for effectively shaping national skilled cadres. Very serious problems still remain which hinder the development of the process; among them we should note the "low level of labor productivity, the weak division and socialization of labor, and the broad distribution of small-scale, manual production and primitive patriarchal, in-kind economic relations, which are ultimately subordinate to national and through it to world capitalism."4

In this connection, it is fully relevant to stress that the problem of shaping national skilled cadres has a clearly expressed class nature and the struggle to solve it is in part a struggle to choose a path of development. Should we strive for economic independence or remain in the backyard of the world capitalist system? Which sectors should we develop first, and, consequently, which cadres should we train? What goals should their training serve? How is the national system of cadre training correlated with general national plans of development? What are the real conditions of effective utilization of national cadres for the purposes of socioeconomic development? That is by no means a complete list of the questions which are the object of discussion in the UN and in its specialized organizations such as UNESCO, the ILO [International Labor Organization], WHO [World Health Organization], and others. It is completely natural that the ways and methods to solve them proposed by the imperialist states, on the one hand, and the socialist states, on the other, are determined above all by the class nature of the states. Representatives of the imperialist camp in the UN use every method available to try to conceal the class nature of these problems, soften their political edge, reduce everything to the field of economic relations, and shade their sociopolitical aspect. Offering financial and technical assistance to the liberated countries, the imperialist circles work through international organizations to influence the general approach to solving the problems of training cadres and adapt both the structure of the specialists being trained and the very utilization of them to their own interests. They often use the forum of international organizations to propagandize their own experience in cadre training, which, of course, is expected to insure the best conditions for obtaining maximum profit for private business and representatives of large capital.

Nonetheless, despite the neocolonialist positions of the imperialist circles which predominated for many years in the UN and its specialized institutions, international organizations have played and continue to play a definite positive role in solving the socioeconomic problems of the young liberated states. With their admission into the UN, the necessity of giving them effective assistance in the matter of shaping a contingent of national skilled cadres becomes increasingly obvious. It becomes increasingly difficult for Western countries to sabotage the demands advanced by progressive forces in the UN and its specialized institutions. In the late 1960's, the activities of international organizations in the field of training skilled cadres for the developing countries expanded in a fundamental way. Almost one-third of all expenditures for technical assistance programs began to be allotted for stipends to special-status students from developing countries and for carrying out various measures focused on creating systems for training national skilled cadres. Nonetheless, taking into account that the realization of the plans for training national cadres depends to a strong degree on external sources of financing, the imperialist powers, and above all the United States, try to utilize this circumstance for their own expansionist purposes.

The representatives of the USSR and the countries of the socialist community in the UN in turn try to help the liberated countries solve their main problems, among them those in the field of training skilled cadres. Using the development of the Soviet republics as an example, they propagandize the experience they have accumulated in social development and economic planning.

Soviet experts who work in many developing countries transmit Soviet experience to them and formulate curricula and programs for various specializations. Occupying responsible posts in headquarters and regional departments of international organizations, representatives of the USSR and other socialist countries directly affect the determination of the forms and methods for giving assistance to the young states and to a significant degree force the imperialist countries to take the real needs of the developing countries into account.

In recent years the nature of the activities of most international organizations in the field of training skilled cadres for the liberated countries has changed. This also relates to the International Labor Organization. More than 70 young states which had broken with colonial dependence and entered the path of independent development joined the ILO. With the support of the USSR and the other socialist states, delegates of the new ILO member states began to raise urgent problems of international relations and to insist on the expansion of international cooperation to protect the interests of working people. Reflecting the need which is increasing in the world for a skilled work force, the ILO has been compelled to devote more and more attention to questions of training and increasing the qualifications of cadres of different specializations and levels. In 1979-1982 the ILO almost doubled expenditures for technical assistance in the field of cadre training, while the range of its activities and expenditures on other programs was either maintained at the previous level or even reduced. In the period from 1972 through 1981, the ILO spent about 37 percent of its budget on the vocational training program. The ILO devotes special attention to creating new and developing already existing educational institutions and to training and raising the qualifications of teachers and instructors as well as of the administrative apparatus of educational institutions, and publishing textbooks, various types of methods, and the like.

In addition to giving assistance in training skilled cadres for developing industrial production, increasing its volume, and creating new sectors, projects involving training and increasing the qualifications of national cadres for agriculture occupy a conspicuous place in ILO activities. Work on researching and using progressive methods and means of instruction continues. And preference is given to the so-called modular method of training, known in the USSR as the block method of formulating curricula and programs. The program worked out for training cadres of the middle and low levels of production management (the work of enterprise foremen was used as an example) based on using the modular training method was discussed at a seminar in the USSR and aroused the particular interest of specialists working in this field. Special attention is devoted to developing regional ILO institutions to promote the exchange of experience in the field of training skilled cadres and preparing educational materials as well as the exchange of information which is of particular interest to the developing countries.

And nevertheless, as many delegates to the 229th session of the ILO Administrative Council held in February 1985 noted, the approach of this organization's leadership to solving many problems facing the liberated countries, among them those in the field of molding national cadres, still does not conform to the interests and needs of the independent development of

the liberated states. The activation of proimperialist attempts to involve the ILO in preparing the ground for the profit-making activity of private capital in the developing countries has a negative effect. The activities of the Turin ILO center, which even recently devoted too much of its attention to training higher management cadres for enterprises in the private sector, serves as clear proof of this. On the other hand, such important questions as cooperation, the creation of agroindustrial complexes, the problem of the "brain drain," and a whole number of others are outside the field of view. In the matter of training management cadres, the Turin center's program directly corresponds to the American "Program of Democracy and Public Diplomacy" proclaimed in 1983. The essence of this program is that the United States is trying to confer upon itself the right to carry out mass intervention in the affairs of other, and above all liberated, states under the pretext of "defending democracy." It proposes to "do so using timely training of leadership cadres of the the liberated countries, who after coming to power could defend American interests."5

As the USSR representative at the 229th session of the Administrative Council pointed out, the ILO is now undergoing a major crisis. The cause of the crisis is that the ILO ignores the questions which touch the fundamental interests of working people and the plans and viewpoint of the socialist countries. The interests of the developing countries are also not taken into account to the proper degree. The possibility of continuing the normal cooperation of states with different sociopolitical system has been put in doubt.

In this regard, UNIDO [UN International Development Organization], which supports the activities of governments in this area, has achieved certain successes in the cause of helping create systems for training skilled cadres. The generally positive nature of UNIDO assistance should be noted; this distinguishes UNIDO, for example, from the activities of the ILO in the field being examined.

As the systems of education and training of cadres develop, the center of the struggle is shifted and a reevaluation of values seems to occur. While in the early stages the main attention was devoted to training cadres for industry and instructors for educational institutions, at the present time emphasis is laid on carrying out projects correlated to some extent with existing national systems of cadre training and with the needs of the local labor market, and so on. The fact that many liberated countries have now accumulated some experience in solving problems of national cadre training accounts for this position. The technical projects of the leading international organizations in this field acquire a new direction and quality. Above all the trend toward the creation of national systems rather than individual service offices is noted; this becomes possible because of work done earlier.

Everything mentioned above enables the conclusion to be drawn that the activities of different international organizations in the field of training national skilled cadres are not unambiguous and are often very contradictory in nature. Without negating the particular successes in the matter of creating systems for training cadres for the developing countries, at the same time it must be noted that the existing shortcomings in the activities of

international organizations have a negative impact on the process of forming national cadres, which in turn plays a certain role in impeding the rate of economic development of these countries.

The consistent and persistent struggle of the liberated countries in international organizations in close alliance with the socialist countries focused on maximally converging technical assistance programs with needs arising during the construction of the independent national economy should become an effective means of overcoming the contradictions and one-sided nature of international assistance in the sphere of education and training of skilled cadres. Refining planning and management and taking careful account of the needs of the developing countries in national plans for training cadres would be an important step forward on the way to increasing the efficiency of the use of the cadre potential of the liberated countries.

The overwhelming number of liberated countries have a real opportunity to insure quantitative and qualitative growth of skilled national cadres. It is guaranteed by their political sovereignty, the program of socioeconomic transformations, the powerful support of the countries of the socialist community headed by the USSR, and the increased activism and prestige of these countries in the international arena.

FOOTNOTES

1. "A Statistical Survey of Education in the World," UNESCO, 1981, p 65.
2. "Materialy XXVI syezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1982, p 12.
3. A.G. Smirnov, O.P. Pobokova, and G.F. Tkach, "Natsionalnyye kadry osvobodivshikhsya stran" [The National Cadres of the Liberated Countries], Moscow, 1980, p 18.
4. "Sotsialisticheskaya orientatsiya osvobodivshikhsya stran" [The Socialist Orientation of the Liberated Countries], Moscow, 1982, p 37.
5. PRAVDA, 18 February 1983.

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CSO: 1807/205

BOOK ON STUDIES OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES REVIEWED

Moscow RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNYI MIR in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 85 pp 179-182

[Review by A.V. Gordon of book "Osvobodivshiesya strany: Obshchestvo i lichnost. Kriticheskiy analiz nemarksisitskikh kontseptsii" [The Liberated Countries: Society and the Individual. A Critical Analysis of Non-Marxist Concepts] by B.S. Starostin, "Mysl", Moscow, 1984, number of copies not given, 286 pages; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics in text]

[Text] The author of the book under review has been specializing in the area of criticism of non-Marxist theories of development of the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America since back in the 1960's. It is precisely in that period in Soviet Eastern studies, African studies, and Latin American studies that the formative period of the very genre of scientific-critical research occurs.

When it forms this genre evolves and gradually changes from a variety of critical literature of a counterpropaganda nature to a sector and inseparable part of strictly theoretical research on the complex sociogeographic complex which is being transformed and differentiated and which as a result of this objective complexity still does not have a strict scientific definition and for the lack of it is arbitrarily called the "liberated countries," the "developing countries," the "third world," and so on. The formative period of this special sector of research fits the urgent needs of Soviet Eastern studies, African studies, and Latin American studies for which -- especially in the early stages of the formation of scientific knowledge on the developing countries -- foreign, as a rule non-Marxist, literature played the role of the main source study base and the base of factual material in the form of not easily accessible statistical information and the results of empirical, "field" research, and the like. The task of cutting out, as B.S. Starostin writes, everything "scientifically groundless in the research of bourgeois authors" and identifying "objective, trustworthy factual data which is of interest to really scientific Eastern studies" has become paramount (p 258). In these conditions Soviet scientific-critical literature performs an information function in the direct sense of the word, but, needless to say, it is supposed to orient toward the newest concepts, theories, and methods of bourgeois Eastern studies rather than cite individual facts; this also makes it possible to properly select the information since it does not exist in itself as such but only within the framework of certain concepts and theories.

Helping Soviet researchers, in the words of V.I. Lenin, "assimilate and process" knowledge about the object under study accumulated in bourgeois science, scientific-critical literature as a variety of scientific research itself assimilates and processes knowledge on the given object and approaches to it. This allows Soviet scientists working in the field of criticism of non-Marxist theories to identify the problems of development of the knowledge itself on the object and to formulate the questions prepared by the progress of world science which have not been satisfactorily answered within the framework of bourgeois Eastern studies. The formulation of such questions is a creative process with its own peculiar dialectics. In evaluating what has been achieved by world science, the Soviet scientist naturally relies on the level of study of the given problem area which has been achieved in domestic science. In posing in his opinion unsolved questions, he also seems to be addressing two audiences. And to the degree the analysis of the condition and development of bourgeois Eastern studies is not a goal in itself, questions which need to be refined and made deeper -- in short, questions which need further study -- are made paramount in the criticism of non-Marxist theories in Marxist science.

In analyzing the condition and development of the study of the problems of the developing countries in Western science in his book, B.S. Starostin outlines a particular circle of questions. What is the true significance and real correlation of economic and noneconomic factors in social development? Are the existing traditions only a conservative force and therefore should they be gotten rid of or can they "coexist" with innovations in the process of revolutionary transformations? What are the social and political structures of "postcolonial society"? What role does religion play in this society? How does a person in Asia and Africa perceive the "leap into the 20th century" and what is the structure of his personality? (pp 7-8).

These are the questions around which criticism of the authors of theories and methods of Western social studies revolves. But in addition, writes B.S. Starostin, they are problems which are vitally important to the liberated countries; at the same time they are the theoretical problems facing Marxist science. Some of them (the question of the structure of the personality, for example) are still just becoming objects of study in Soviet research on the liberated countries, while others (the role of religion, for example) need to be refined in connection with new phenomena in the political and social life of these countries; finally, the field of research being studied by Western science also breeds Marxist criticism of those theoretical problems which have been and are the focus of attention of Soviet Eastern and African studies but to a certain degree remain controversial -- on this level the author specially singles out the problem of the historical type of development in the precolonial period as well as the problem of the formational definition of "postcolonial society" (see pp 35-36, 90, and others).

The book under review as a whole is attractive precisely because the author attempts to depart from the trend common in the literature of pitting only general positions whose validity for Marxists has not demanded proof for a long time against the concepts of bourgeois Eastern studies being criticized. B.S. Starostin convincingly shows that the task of formulating a Marxist

alternative to contemporary bourgeois theories must presuppose the continued development of Marxist science, which must be continuous and progressive. "Marxist methodology is not a magic wand or a golden key which automatically and easily opens the gates of truth and gives ready answers to the most complex problems posed by life. The mastering of this methodology and the ability to use it in a particular study requires major efforts, a broad scientific worldview, and great creative skill from scientists," and in this case, writes B.S. Starostin, Marxist-Leninist theory becomes "truly the Ariadne's thread in the study of contemporary structures and processes, among them those in the developing countries" (p 88).

The fact that while specializing in criticism of non-Marxist theories, at the same time the authors do their own research on one particular theme or another is a virtue of the Soviet scientific-critical literature of recent years. It is no accident that one of the comments on the book under review³ mentions the section devoted to criticism of the sociology of the personality as very informative. In fact, it is perhaps the section most saturated with new material for our literature; undoubtedly the author's own research on the problems of the personality and socialization of the individual in the developing countries facilitated this. Within the section the chapter on socialization is, in our opinion, distinguished by the most successful correlation of the three functional elements of scientific-critical work: the informational element (in the narrow sense of the word), the strictly critical element (in the sense of identifying the defects of the theories being analyzed), and the positive element (the formulation of a Marxist alternative). However, in our opinion an organic unity of these three elements is not achieved in the section as a whole.

The author here repeatedly cites the well-known proposition that one should proceed from an evaluation of the totality or "ensemble" of social relations in studying the personality (pp 192, 234). Undoubtedly, the Marxian thesis that "in its reality" the essence of a person "is the totality of all social relations"⁴ was in the history of social thought a discovery which, as B.S. Starostin justifiably writes, made possible "the scientific-sociological approach to analyzing the personality" (p 192). But in itself the approach "from social relations," it must be noted, has also been adopted since then by non-Marxist sociology, and while it can be productively contrasted (as the author successfully does) to the ethnopsychological concepts of the "man of another world" being criticized, in criticism of the theories of the "traditional personality," the "transitional man," and the like it produces little. This is because, in our opinion, such theories of bourgeois social science show the opposite extreme -- not psychological, but sociological reductionism, a particular type of "vulgar socialism" from whose standpoint the features of the "traditional personality" are defined by the "traditional nature" of the society, the features of the "transitional personality" by its "transitional nature," and so on. Of course, one must and should question the grounds for the bourgeois concepts of "traditional" and "transitional" societies as such, which, by the way, the author convincingly does in other sections of the book as well as in other works of his; but in a special critical analysis of Western "sociology of the personality" it would be better to focus first of all on the defects of the very "method" of straight-line projection of a model of social relations on the structure of the personality.

At first glance the supporters of the theory of the "marginal personality" avoid sociological reductionism. But the impression is still created (B.S. Starostin also mentions this) that at least in part of their work we see a projection of the way of life and behavior of the so-called marginal, that is, declassé, strata of "postcolonial society." But then the question arises -- to what degree does this theory relate to other strata of this society. Generally, it remains unclear whether the concept of the "marginal personality" describes the particular social /type/ of personality or its particular condition: the point is that in the corresponding works (presented in the book) the authors are speaking more of destructurization than of the structure of the personality. The question of the type of personality suggests itself in any case: is "marginality," according to this concept, a manifestation of the crisis of growth and a stage on the path of the formation /in the future/ of the "modern," bourgeois personality, or, is it the negative (declassé) features resulting from the fact that this is, so to speak, a peripheral (compare the "peripheral economy" and "peripheral capitalism") but nonetheless in this sense a /variant/ that has taken shape of bourgeois personality and the individual on the "edge" of historical development?

In connection with criticism of non-Marxist sociology of the personality, B.S. Starostin touches upon the question of a noncapitalist alternative to bourgeois development of the personality (see p 254, for example) and this is very appropriate. But a more precise formulation of the question of the noncapitalist /type/ of personality would be just as appropriate, in our opinion.

In many respects the flaws in this section of the book which result in certain complaints against the author like those stated above arise from the objective complexity of the questions which arise and the fact that Soviet science has not worked out the particular problems of the personality in the liberated countries. But to quite a large extent they are also related to the delay in formulating a general philosophical theory of the personality from those tasks which social practice and the diverse and changing social reality pose for individual sciences and which these sciences must try to resolve.

From the very beginning the book under review makes the problem of interdisciplinary interaction and the problem of interdisciplinary research paramount. Naturally, they are mainly examined on the critical level -- as a problem of the shortcomings and defects of the study of the "postcolonial society" in Western science, but the lessons of this examination often prove to be instructive even for Soviet social science. In describing a typical shortcoming of one of the non-Marxist concepts, B.S. Starostin writes, for example, that the synthesis of approaches which is so essential today to the progress of interdisciplinary research on the personality is being replaced in it by a "mechanical combination of multidisciplinary concepts within the framework of one description which lays claim to conceptual status" (pp 226-227). Fears have also been repeatedly expressed even among Soviet scientists that the integration of approaches of representatives of different scientific disciplines which study one complex object or another, these very problems of the personality for example, can result in a mixing of concepts on

different planes and levels or the hegemony of one discipline which "imposes" its approach and methods on the others. Of course, the problem cannot be solved by decreeing a new discipline corresponding to the object (in our case, "the study of the personality.") But nonetheless, even the preservation in such cases of the traditional multidisciplinary approach, and hence traditional interdisciplinary barriers, is not the solution to the problem. It appears that the path of gradual and organic convergence of the conceptual apparatus and mutual enrichment of the methods of the various disciplines involved in study of the corresponding object may be the optimal one. In any case, the dilemma of the multidisciplinary-interdisciplinary approach is not simple; it exists both within the framework of the study of a number of particular problems (for example, when researching such objects as the peasantry, the city, the army, and others) and within the framework of the development of knowledge about the developing countries as a whole.

The complex of sciences on the contemporary developing countries also took shape historically and spontaneously and in various stages of development both its appearance and structure were changed. The major historical foundation of this contemporary scientific complex -- Eastern studies -- was traditionally "complex and multifaceted," essentially a science of cultural studies.⁵ And at first hegemony belonged to the philological methods of study, which also determined the appearance of the science, although economic and ethnographic ("anthropological") research on non-European societies and cultures also existed at that time. At the start of the contemporary period, in the 1940's-1950's, economics became paramount in Western science on the developing countries. Then, when experience with postcolonial development revealed the error in linear schemes of economic growth, the positions of sociology began to become stronger (and institutionalism, from the standpoint of a method close to the structure-functionalism prevalent in sociology, grew stronger in economics itself). In recent years, writes B.S. Starostin, "as criticism of dehumanized, formalized, and depersonalized sociology increased... attempts appeared to synthesize the sociological... approach to the personality with updated ideas of cultural anthropology and ethnopsychology, and on the basis of this synthesis to create a dynamic picture of a person living and acting within the particular sociocultural framework of any country or region of the developing world" (p 209). The positions of cultural studies are being revived but primarily on a cultural or social-anthropological basis with all its synthetic features which stem both from the "anthropolization" of sociology and from the sociologization of "anthropology" (that is, ethnography), rather than on a philological basis.

Two fundamental features attract attention in this experience of the evolution of scientific knowledge. First, the multidisciplinary nature of the study of the social-geographic complex of "Eastern," "non-European," and "developing" countries (the designation of each of the stages was arbitrary, which in itself was not accidental) was not only preserved but also increased, since the circle of disciplines expanded. At the same time -- and this is second -- there was a constant trend toward integration, which as a rule was embodied in the hegemony of one of the disciplines to which the representatives of the others seemed to be compared; this objectively (spontaneously) led to the convergence or even borrowing of the conceptual apparatus and methods of research.

The author of the book under review justifiably notes that integration of scientific knowledge is made more difficult in Western social science by the lack of a general scientific methodology (p 10). However, the interdisciplinary problem also exists in Marxist knowledge of the developing countries, since the processes of differentiation of scientific knowledge, like the processes of its integration, are general scientific processes. Obviously, even Soviet science on the developing countries remains multidisciplinary, but the trend toward integration of knowledge on this subject should continue to be developed, and on a deeper, more conscious basis.

The book under review can be recommended precisely as an example of a basically successful solution to the problem of interdisciplinary study. Such a discipline -- the sociology of "postcolonial society" -- does not formally exist in Western science. In the "table" of disciplines, the sociological study of the developing countries is represented by the sociology of the city and the countryside, the family, education, religion, and the like. The summary works on a theoretical level and the practical empirical research which yields to adequate synthesis with difficulty and therefore is very rarely the object of critical analysis by Soviet scientists also are included here. It may be said that the sociology of the "postcolonial society" presented in the book under review is the fruit of the reconstruction of a Soviet scientist who on the basis of Marxist methodology tried to solve the dual task of critical analysis and creative synthesis.

Moreover, he did not confine himself to sociology alone. In characterizing the study of "social stratification" and "social changes," he encroaches on the field of economic theories; in characterizing the "sociology of religion," he traces its interweaving with the study of religion; of the joint disciplines the book devotes the most attention to socioanthropology. Not all disciplines, it is true, receive a sufficiently full reflection. It seems that the encroachment into the field of economic theories noted could be better substantiated. It is correct that on the critical level Soviet scientists do a better job of studying this field than other scientists; but in that case a generalization of scientific-critical works by Soviet economists suggests itself -- on the level of the general social aspects of the corresponding non-Marxist theories, needless to say.

The monograph under review is one of the first attempts to reconstruct the whole complex of knowledge on the developing countries in Western science in its general philosophical-historical, theoretical-methodological, and sociopolitical foundations. Considering the complexity of this task, B.S. Starostin's contribution must be given proper credit, and at the same time it must be noted that all the grounds and prerequisites are present for further fruitful activity by Soviet scientists in this direction.

FOOTNOTES

1. It was formulated by the efforts of many Soviet scientists -- economists and sociologists, historians and cultural scientists, and specialists on

general problems, and experts on particular countries. The result of this is the large amount of literature which exists at this time, whose breadth of subjects can be pictured by just the list of monographs published in recent years: L.I. Reysner, "Razvivayushchiyesya strany: ocherk teorii ekonomicheskogo rosta" [The Developing Countries: An Essay on Theories of Economic Growth], Moscow, 1976; N.A. Lidley, "Burzhuaznyye teorii ekonomicheskogo razvitiya" [Bourgeois Theories of Economic Development], Moscow, 1978; "Afrikanskiy gorod (kriticheskiy ocherk zarubezhnykh kontseptsii)" [The African City (A Critical Essay on Foreign Concepts)], Moscow, 1979; M.A. Cheshkov, "Kritika predstavleniy o pravyashchikh gruppakh razvivayushchikhsya stran" [Criticism of Notions of the Ruling Groups of the Developing Countries], Moscow, 1979; Ye.B. Rashkovskiy, "Naukovedeniye i Vostok" [The Study of Science and the East], Moscow, 1980; V.Ye. Chirkin, "Burzhuaznaya politologiya i deystvitelnost razvivayushchikhsya stran" [Bourgeois Political Science and the Reality of the Developing Countries], Moscow, 1980; B.S. Starostin, "Sotsialnoye obnovleniye: skhemy i realnost" [Social Revival: Schemes and Reality], Moscow, 1981; A.V. Shestopal, "Levoradikalnaya sotsiologiya v Latinskoy Amerike. Kritika osnovnykh kontseptsii" [Left Radical Sociology in Latin America. Criticism of the Basic Concepts], Moscow, 1981; V.M. Kollontay, "Krizis burzhuaznykh teorii razvitiya osvobodivshikhsya stran" [The Crisis of Bourgeois Theories of the Development of the Liberated Countries], Moscow, 1982; B.I. Slavnyy, "Nemarksisitskaya politekonomiya o problemakh otstalosti i zavisimosti v razvivayushchemsya mire" [Non-Marxist Political Economy on the Problems of Backwardness and Dependence in the Developing World], Moscow, 1982; Ye.A. Cherepneva, "Burzhuaznyye kontseptsii sotsialno-politicheskogo razvitiya Indonezii" [Bourgeois Concepts of Indonesia's Sociopolitical Development], Moscow, 1984, and others.

2. V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 18, p 364.
3. See: V. Sumskiy, "Criticism of Bourgeois Sociology of the 'Postcolonial Society'," AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA, No 2, 1985, p 62.
4. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], Vol 3, p 3.
5. See: V.M. Alekseyev, "Kitayskaya literatura. Izbr. trudy" [Chinese Literature. A Collection of Works], Moscow, 1978, p 130.

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CSO: 19807/205

REVIEW OF BOOK ON ASIAN WORKING CLASS

Moscow RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNYI MIR in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 85 pp 186-187

[Review by S.N. Alitovskiy of book "Rabochiy klass Azii" [The Working Class of Asia], responsible editor A.S. Kaufman, "Nauka," Moscow, 1985, number of copies not given, 287 pages]

[Text] Two decades have passed since the last reference publication on the working class of Asia and Africa came out. And now we have a new work: "Rabochiy klass Azii."2 Represented in it are 34 Asian states, i.e., practically all except the socialist ones (separate reference publications are being prepared on them).

The broad and meaningful introduction describes the general conditions and factors of the formation and development of the proletariat of the countries of Asia: the growth in the total number of people included and the growth in the cadre core, the appearance of new detachments of it resulting from the development of the scientific-technical revolution, and its increased role in the sociopolitical life of its countries; the progressive influence of world socialism, and in particular the policies of the countries of the socialist community in the international arena and on the political consciousness and awareness of the working class -- influence which stimulates its participation in the struggle for the progressive path of socioeconomic development, including the struggle to carry out a consistent course of socialist orientation in places where it has been proclaimed. Finally, the major influence of the entire international worker and communist movements as a whole on the growth of the international consciousness of the national detachments of the working class of the Asian countries and on the policies of its Marxist-Leninist parties is not omitted.

In evaluating the enormous work done by the authors, one must not fail to mention the rather large difficulties which they faced, many of which were related to the shortcomings of official national statistics as well as to the incompleteness of the very processes of formation of the proletariat, which often does not lend itself either to strict consideration, to say nothing of direct analysis. In many cases -- this especially concerns defining the limits and size of the working class -- the authors are compelled to use the not-always-objective data of bourgeois statistics or, when there is none, restricted to merely signs of the trend in the development of the phenomenon

being examined. Nonetheless, the book cites broad information on the specific features of the formation of hired labor, its social sources, the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the working class, the condition of labor legislation, and the activities of trade union centers of different political orientations, and others. National and international sources as well as materials and data contained in foreign literature are extensively used.

The initial methodological premise which guides the authors in defining the very concept of the "proletariat" in conditions of the development of the new national Asian states appears correct to us: start "not from the sector where the given worker is engaged, large or small industry, but first of all from the position he occupies in the system of social production, and precisely from whether or not he, being in this system, creates surplus value." The authors consider it necessary, on the one hand, to refrain from a broad interpretation of the proletariat (and do not include the preproletariat or the semiproletariat in it) and, on the other, to avoid a narrow treatment of the concept of the proletariat which reduces it merely to the proletariat which works in modern enterprises, which are still not very common in Asia.

Analysis of the data given in the book on change in the size of the army of hired labor shows that while the rural proletariat still fundamentally predominated, the industrial proletariat grew more rapidly than the rural proletariat in the 1960's-1970's (to be sure, only one-quarter of all the people working for hire and connected with the modern sector of the economy belong to the proletariat in the strict sense of the word). An increase in the proportion of the industrial proletariat is characteristic of all Asian countries in the present period, although in the late 1970's it still averaged only 6-7 percent of the able-bodied population. Be that as it may, qualitative changes in the structure of the working class are at hand. The introduction says that these changes are the result of such changes in the structure of employment in various spheres of the economy which began in the 1950's-1960's as accelerated industrial development accompanied by growth in manufacturing, especially heavy, industry, the improved occupational and skill composition of the working class, the decreased role of the peasantry in adding to the working class, the rejuvenation of the ranks of the proletariat, and the like (p 12).

The book's objective and well-systematized data show the concentration of the working class, and especially its cadre core, which most fully embodied the features of the proletariat as the leading class of society. This is especially noticeable in the countries of socialist orientation, and above all in their state sectors. It is notable that in many countries of capitalistically oriented development, the state sector also occupies the leading role in this process.

Information on the economic and social position of the worker occupies a large place in the book; to a substantial degree this position depends on the compliance of governments and private entrepreneurs with social legislation, above all in the area of labor relations. In many Asian countries quite progressive labor legislation has gone into effect; however, this legislation has not been reinforced by material and other guarantees, which reduces its real significance. In most of the countries which figure in the book, the

application of labor laws in practice still extends mainly to workers engaged in the state sector, above all in state factory-plant industry, and most often does not extend to such categories of working people as seasonal workers, temporary workers, and workers engaged in artisan and small-shop production -- in other words, to the overwhelming part of the working class (p 14).

Information on the organization of workers and on the growing role of the working class in the social life of its countries is diverse. The problems of the trade union movement and questions of the trade unions' struggle for deepened economic and social reforms, the democratic rights of working people, protection of the independence of their countries, and peace and disarmament are the focus of attention of the authors of the articles.

The trade union movement still encompasses only a small part of hired labor, mainly workers in large and medium-sized industrial enterprises and institutions in cities. The degree of coverage of workers by trade unions still remains at the same very low level as 2 decades ago (10 percent of the army of hired labor), but on the other hand, the absolute size of trade unions has risen (now about 12 million people), and the main thing -- their importance in sociopolitical life has increased in almost all Asian countries.

The book substantiates the conclusion that the working class is now more precisely than ever segregated from the whole army of hired labor and that the core of the national (contemporary) proletariat has appeared, which is a result of the growth in national capitalism and the creation of industrial enterprises in general on a new technical basis. In overcoming the numerous difficulties related to the still far-from-eliminated legacy of colonialism, the workers movement is entering a new period of development where the need arises for new forms of struggle and closer consideration of all the features of the formation, composition, and socioeconomic position of various detachments of the proletariat in the strategy and tactics of the workers movement. The formation of a core of cadre factory-plant proletariat and the greater role of the ideological-political vanguard of the working class and its communist parties are the prerequisites and conditions to insure that the workers movement moves to a higher level where it will acquire the qualities of an independent class movement separate from the general democratic movement.

The incompleteness of statistical data mentioned above and its relative approximation of complex Asian realities were the main reasons that the scientific level and practical merits of the different reference sections are different. The data on Burma, India, Iraq, Iran, Cyprus, Pakistan, Thailand, Turkey, the Phillipines, and Japan meets contemporary requirements to a greater degree; this is less true of the data on Syria, Lebanon, and Malaysia, where even existing statistical materials were not fully used in writing. Unfortunately, Egypt was dropped from the group of Arab countries represented in the book.

On the whole, this reference book undoubtedly deserves a positive evaluation as a contribution to the study of the problems of the formation and development of the working class of Asian countries, as a useful aid in

researching the complex processes of class formation in these countries in the postcolonial period, and as an essential manual for many practical workers.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Rabochiy klass Azii i Afriki" [The Working Class of Asia and Africa], Moscow, 1964.
2. A similar publication on Africa came out somewhat earlier. See: "Rabochiy klass stran Afriki" [The Working Class of the Countries of Africa], Moscow, 1983.

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