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Korean Affairs Report

DPRK MILITARY STRUCTURE

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KOREAN AFFAIRS REPORT
DPRK MILITARY STRUCTURE
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N. KOREA/MILITARY AFFAIRS

ARMED FORCES STRUCTURE, MAKE-UP DISCUSSED

Political Structures

Tokyo GUNJI KENKYU in Japanese Mar 86 pp 196-205

[Article by Kin Motoyoshi, a research specialist in North Korean affairs]

[Text] The North is constantly watching the South and seeks unification of the Korean peninsula. Because of this the North Korean military, although divided into an Army, Navy, and Air Force, has no naval or Air Force staff, and the staff of the People's Army, which is mainly a land force, has overall operational command of the entire military!

The Special System of the North Korean People's Army

In discussing the North Korean military, it is expeditious to begin by considering the special nature of its military structure. This is not to say that the North Korean military has a unique structure not found in any other state, but it is more than a little different from the military in liberal states.

As in other countries, the North Korean military consists of an Army, Navy, and Air Force. It is known collectively as the People's Army of the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea.

Land forces form the main military strength of the People's Army. The Navy and Air Force have no independent military staffs, and all military operations are under the command of the general staff of the People's Army, which is made up mainly of land forces. The general staff is the sole conduit between the military and the supreme commander. The hierarchy, from top to bottom, is: State → the Workers Party of Korea, Central Military Committee → Military Affairs Department → the general staff → the respective headquarters of the land, sea, and air forces.

Separate and independent from this, as organizations directly under the chief of the general staff of the People's Army, are the Military Police Bureau, the Political Security Bureau, the Military Tribunal Bureau, the Military Prosecution Bureau, and the General Rear Services Bureau, and this includes the General Political Affairs Bureau. This system of a General Political

Affairs Bureau plays an important role in making the People's Army the personal Army of Kim Il-song; it also serves to prevent coups.

The General Staff, Which Ordered the Rangoon Terrorist Bombing

Under the general staff are 14 bureaus including the Operations Bureau, Kim Il-song Military University, Kanggon Officer Candidate School, and Non-Commissioned Officers School. Let us present the names and functions of the various bureaus.

Operations Bureau: In charge of all operational areas relating to military action, including general operational planning for the regular land, sea, and air forces as well as for paramilitary organizations like the Workers and Peasants Red Guard and the Pacification Unit, the drafting and issuing of operational orders, the preparation of operational statistics for the military forces, and responsibility for the composition of units and for military record-keeping.

Military Training Bureau: Carries out duties relating to education and training as well as military review of the People's Army, and has overall charge of military education and training, including education and training in military schools; also in charge of planning technical training for the military and planning training for the Workers and Peasants Red Guard and the Pacification Unit, and compiles military histories based on materials recorded by the Operations Bureau.

Military Mobilization Bureau: In charge of military recruiting, drafting, and discharge; generally having the functions of a military staff, it calls up reserve forces in accordance with the conscription requirements of the Military Reserves Bureau as issued to the Military Mobilization Bureau of each region or town; it is also in charge of call-ups of members of the Workers and Peasants Red Guard, which includes persons who have been discharged from the military.

Weapons Bureau: Carries out development and research of weapons of various types and is in charge of administering supply-and-demand planning for all types of weapons and munitions for the various military branches, in accordance with the supply-and-demand plans of the military commands.

Enlisted Personnel Bureau: In charge of all personnel matters with regard to military members, including issuing call-ups to the Military Mobilization Bureau based on the manpower requirements of the military, and classifying and assigning personnel to the different military units.

Classified Documents Bureau: Does general planning and inspection concerning security, including the classification, storage, encryption, and decryption of all militarily secret documents.

Reconnaissance Bureau: In charge of collecting intelligence reports and special duty involving armed actions against the South. Special naval strike

units like the Special 8th Corps and units 907, 198, and 448 are under the Reconnaissance Bureau. The focus of these important duties is the collection of military intelligence of all sorts, the assassination and kidnapping of key people, taking people North, and destroying important state facilities as well as strategic targets and basic industrial facilities. This bureau was behind the terrorist bombing in Rangoon.

Military Engineer Bureau: Carries out duties such as the construction of military facilities needed for military operations, logistics, and the construction of obstacles and laying of land mines; has under it an independent sappers unit and oversees a sappers petty officers school.

Cadre Personnel Bureau: Just as the Enlisted Personnel Bureau is in charge of all personnel affairs relating to enlisted personnel, this bureau has jurisdiction over all personnel affairs relating to officers, including promotions and keeping records and statistics.

Telecommunications Command Bureau: In charge of running and supervising radio and over-wire telecommunications of the military services, administration of military radio, and monitoring telecommunications traffic.

Geological Bureau: Its duties include research in topography and meteorology, the making of maps for military use, and weather forecasts.

Inspection Bureau: Carries out all military-related supervisory duties, including ascertaining the state of morale in the Army, Navy, and Air Force as well as in paramilitary organizations such as the Pacification Unit, the Workers and Peasants Red Guard, the People's Guard, and the Red Youth Guards.

Military Publications Bureau: Publishes and distributes all periodical and non-periodical materials and books needed by the military services; regarding Kim Il-song Military University, Kanggon Officer Candidate School, and Non-Commissioned Officers School, see below.

The role of the General Political Affairs Bureau is immense.

The General Political Affairs Bureau is also part of a separate chain of command: Workers Party Central Committee → Party Secretariat Military Department → People's Army Party Committee → General Political Affairs Bureau. But since the same person, O Chin-u, is chairman of the People's Army Party Committee, chairman of the General Political Affairs Bureau, vice-chairman of the Central People's Committee National Defense Committee, and minister of the People's Armed Forces Ministry, in substance the General Political Affairs Bureau is directly under the minister of the People's Armed Forces Ministry.

The military of a liberal state has no counterpart to this military organization known as the General Political Affairs Bureau. It may be said that the military is a political organization as well as a fighting force, and in running the military, political judgment always takes precedence over

military judgment. Let us now consider the departments within the General Political Affairs Bureau and their functions.

The General Political Affairs Bureau has 11 divisions and four departments.

Organizational and Planning Division: Has the duty of doing overall organizational planning of all activities to be carried out by the General Political Bureau and has planning functions for guiding the carrying out the bureau's activities.

Party Organization Division: In charge of all organizational affairs, including the expansion and inspection of party organization activities in the People's Army.

Socialist Working Youth League Guidance Division: Organizes, guides, and supervises Socialist Labor Youth League activities within the military.

Propaganda and Education Division: Organizes and guides political thought education and propaganda activities within the military.

Cultural Division: In charge of strategic psychological warfare; conducts psychological warfare activities within the military.

Special Political Division: In charge of planning and executing all activities for realizing the party's line and political policies within the military.

Inspection Division: Performs inspections regarding all party activities within the military.

Information Division: Organizes and carries out activities relating to news reporting and public information in the military.

Cadre Division: In charge of all personnel affairs relating to political officers in the military.

Special Operation Division: Commonly called Unit 563, this department's duties in peacetime include making contact with South Korean soldiers, kidnappings, planning border crossings into the South, making loudspeaker broadcasts in the demilitarized zone, and distributing publications, and in wartime its duties include carrying out measures regarding the populace in occupied territory, uncovering reactionary elements, and assessing the strength of the South Korean side.

People's Army Publishing Co.: Has duties concerning the issuance and publication of printed matter and books regarding the military.

People's Army Newspaper Co.: Its duties are the editing and issuance of the People's Army newspaper.

2-8 Film Studio: Its duties are to produce military-related films and distribute them to the various branches of the military and their subordinate units.

2-8 Athletic Corps: Trains and manages professional athletic teams within the military and arranges their appearance in meets of various sorts.

People's Army Concert Corps: As an entertainment troupe within the military, holds public performances for the benefit of various military units.

The Rear Area Services Bureau, the General Manager of Military Support Organizations

Next as a system for supplying needed military materials is the General Rear Area Services Bureau. Since this too is unique to the North Korean military, let us describe it. The General Rear Area Services Bureau has one headquarters and four bureaus.

General Real Area Services Bureau Headquarters: The headquarters consists of an organization and planning section, a military training section, an inspection section, a transport section, a telecommunications section, an administrative section, a secret affairs section, an officers section, an enlisted personnel section, an external affairs section, a political section, and a political security section. Each section has as its duty both general administration relating to the Rear Area Services Bureau and personnel and training regarding behind-the-lines military affairs.

Organization and Planning Bureau: Consists of an operations and procurement department, a procurement coordination department, a stockpiles coordination department, a supply coordination department, a relief coordination department, and a security planning department; its duties are planning and coordination relating to operations, procurement, supply, relief, and security.

Food Administration Bureau: Includes a procurement and supply department and a food stockpiling department and is responsible for supply-and-demand administration for the various branches of the military and for military food storage.

Clothing Bureau: Consists of a procurement department, repair department, supply department, and clothing storage department and is in charge of manufacturing, storing, repairing, and supplying clothing for the various branches of the military.

Fuel Bureau: Consists of a procurement office and a fuel agency; its duties are supply and demand and storage of fuels required by the various branches of the military.

Transportation Bureau: Consists of a procurement department, a storage department, a repair department, and a department for training soldiers to

operate trains; in charge of supplying, repairing, and maintaining various kinds of military transportation and training soldiers in train operation.

Construction Bureau: Consists of an organization and planning department, an administrative staff department, a technical department, an administration department, and 24 construction battalions; in charge of all duties in the field of construction, including military facilities and buildings.

Road Management Bureau: Consists of a construction department, a storage department, a traffic administration department, and three independent military road administration units; in charge of the construction, administration, and repair of roads for military operations.

Military Physicians Bureau: Consists of a staff, a central hospital, four behind-the-lines hospitals, and frontline field hospitals; in charge of general administration of military medical treatment and medical treatment; guides and has jurisdiction over military physicians schools and military hospitals of various grades.

Veterinary Bureau: Consists of a staff, a veterinary hospital, a veterinary officer school, and an equestrian training brigade; responsible for raising, breeding, and administering military animals and for training veterinary officers.

Finance Bureau: Consists of a budget planning department, a payroll department, and an inspection department; has general administrative responsibility for military-related financial affairs and accounting.

Military Equipment Production Bureau: Consists of an organization and planning department and an inspection department; responsible for overall production of and production planning for material and supplies needed by the branches of the military.

Transport Bureau: Consists of a road department, railroad department, and water transport department as well as a dozen or so transport battalions; bears general responsibility for military transport and administers and runs independent transport units.

Military Industry Bureau: Consists of an organization and planning department, an administration department, and an inspection department; responsible for the sale of various necessities deemed needed in or outside the military, and for running and administering the sale and supply of rations to military families.

Building Administration Bureau: Consists of a facilities department, a materials department, and a storage department; responsible for the repair and maintenance of all military buildings.

Four Paramilitary Organizations

Besides the above, North Korea also has a system of paramilitary organizations. These include the Pacification Unit, which serves as reserve manpower for the land-based forces, and the Workers and Peasants Red Guard and the Red Youth Guards, which both serve as a militia. In peacetime they are under the party Secretariat Military Department. In addition, the Public Security Department and, under it, the People's Security Force are each under the jurisdiction of the party Secretariat Military Department.

Let us discuss each of these.

The Pacification Unit, Which Forms 20 Divisions in 24 Hours

The Pacification Unit: This paramilitary organization is composed principally of 20- to 30-year-old veterans employed at factories and places of business of grade 3 or above. Analogous to how the regular Army is organized, they are organized into divisions, regiments, battalions, and companies according to the size of the factory or place of business where they work. The commanders of each grade or echelon as well as the staff are active-duty officers, and a division is part of the Rear Area Services corps. The chain of command involves dual control by the relevant party committee and the People's Armed Forces Ministry.

In peacetime their duty is to defend the area behind the lines, but in wartime when a mobilization order is issued, they immediately are incorporated into the regular Army at the grade they had when on active duty and are assigned combat duty. They presently number 260,000 and will form 20 divisions within 24 hours of a mobilization order.

Even able-bodied old folks are in the Workers and Peasants Red Guard.

The Workers and Peasants Red Guard: This organization is made up of workers, peasants, and students between the ages of 15 and 45. Generally, at places of work most young people belong to the Pacification Unit where they work, while in more rural areas most belong to the Workers and Peasants Red Guard. Analogous to how the regular Army is organized, there is a Worker and Peasant Red Guard command under the Military Department of the party Secretariat, with the Worker and Peasant Red Guard organized into division strength for provinces and cities directly administered by the central government, regiment strength for cities, wards (within Pyongyang), and counties; battalion strength for villages, and echelon and platoon strength for settlements and individual workplaces. Each grade of Worker and Peasant Red Guard is under the command and supervision of the party military committee for the province, directly administered city, city ward, or county.

Women aged 18-30 are also members of the Workers and Peasants Red Guard. They receive training mainly in small arms, anti-aircraft machine guns, and first aid and relief work.

The basic mission prescribed for the Workers and Peasants Red Guard is to "protect with our lives the party Central Committee led by the Great Leader Kim Il-song, to defend at every guardpost of socialist-building, unconditionally and to the last, the line and policies put forth by the Great Leader, staunchly to defend the socialist fatherland and the spoils of the revolution from the encroachments of enemies, and to struggle for the unification of the fatherland and the nationwide victory of the Korean revolution." In peacetime this organization handles local defense, such as anti-aircraft defense. In wartime it is mobilized as a reserve force to provide defense behind the lines, provide escort support for shipments of material, and perform other duties, or even to be assigned to the regular Army. Its total membership is said to be 1.7-2 million.

The Workers and Peasants Red Guard officially has an age limit, but in practice even able-bodied persons of advanced age receive training in shooting a rifle and the like. Such scenes are seen all the time on North Korean television for domestic consumption. This is because, in accordance with the teachings of Kim Il-song that "Life begins anew at 80," and "The flow of the revolution must continue to blossom," idleness is not permitted. Thus it is possible that the true membership of the Workers and Peasants Red Guard exceeds 2.5 million.

The Red Youth Guards, Where Even Children Are Part of the Regular Military Forces

The Red Youth Guards: This organization consists of male and female students in the fifth and sixth grade of upper middle school of each village (14-16 years old) who are organized into company-grade echelons. Normally they are under the command of the party Secretariat Military Department, but at times of training mobilization they are placed under the Education Committee of the State Administration Council.

The duty of the Red Youth Guards is, literally, to defend to the death the higher ruling strata of North Korea. At the same time, a principal duty they are constantly given is to expose and extirpate "counterrevolutionary elements" hidden in North Korean society. Their training for improvement of fighting ability as a bodyguard for the rulers is strict and thorough. Every year they live in barracks for 2 months while undergoing training, and they are said to be good small-arms marksmen.

Upon reaching the age of 16 one is conscripted into the military, but by that time a member has already completed a considerable amount of basic training, and 6 months after entering the military he is promoted to "private 1st class," with a gold stripe in his bright red badge of rank. Thus the Red Youth Guards serve as a support corps or last-ditch corps which can replenish the lower officer crops in times of grave emergency. This is nothing but North Korea's unique system for totally exploiting the purity of children. There have been many tragedies in which a child, not even actually knowing just what a "counterrevolutionary element" is, has come to the conclusion that his parents must be "counterrevolutionary" and has turned them in. It is a

measure of the success of education beginning with nursery school that there exists no conversation or life with emotional ties between parents and children.

The People's Guard, the Military Force of the Public Security Department

The People's Guard is under the jurisdiction of the Fifth Guard Bureau of the Public Security Department (state police) of the State Administration Council. Low-ranking soldiers are selected from among the conscripts in the regular Army, given basic training for 3 or 4 months at the New Soldiers Training Center of the Public Security Department, then deployed. Officers are selected from among junior officers in the Guard and receive regular training at the People's Guard Officers School. There are the Railroad Guard, Coast Guard, Border Guard, Island Guard, Local Guard, Factory Guard, Pyongyang Special City Regiment, and Surrender District Regiment. The People's Guard stems from the 38 Guard, which was disbanded following the Korean conflict. It began in about 1959, formed for the purpose of strengthening the guarding of various coastal regions, borders, and islands using certain personnel drafted from younger veterans who serve on a 15-day rotation system.

Army Before Country; the People's Army, a Tool of Aggression

It is well known that the regular Army was founded (8 February 1948) even before the North Korean Government was (9 September 1948). Thus the purpose of the North Korean Armed Forces is not to protect the state but rather, being based on proletarian internationalism, to wage war to bring about a revolution.

Put more simply, this is an Army which was organized for a purpose unlike that of any other Army in the world: to start a war on the Korean peninsula and bring Communist revolution to the whole land. In other words, since it was founded the People's Army of North Korea has been organized solely as a tool for unifying the Korean peninsula under the Red Banner.

This orientation of the North Korean Armed Forces exclusively toward the purpose of aggression can be traced back to Stalin's view of war: "War is to be avoided, but war is unavoidable and a revolution is accompanied by war; war brings the revolution." These words of Stalin led Kim Il-song to the odd principle that an aggressive military corps is to be created prior to the birth of the state.

In order to bring the military under his complete personal control, and freely use it as a tool of aggression, Kim Il-song formed a political organization within the military. This is the ultimate system for monitoring and controlling the military.

The Fettering Political Organization Within the Military

The People's Army of North Korea is not the only military which incorporates within it a political organization. Political sections also exist within the

military in the Soviet Union and other Communist states. Having a political organization within a military first began in 1918 when the Soviet Red Army was founded as the armed force of the Communist Party; this first established the principle that the party organization shall exercise its influence on the military.

Since the organization of the North Korean military was patterned after that of the Soviet Union, it is not surprising that it should incorporate political structures; it would be odd if it did not. Article 46 of the rules of the Korean Workers Party extols the Korean People's Army as "the revolutionary armed force of the Korean Workers Party," and makes it clear that the military is subordinate to the party. Regarding the importance of political activities within the People's Army, Kim Il-song stresses that they are "important activities, part of the basic course which the party adheres to," and the authorities of the political organization within the People's Army is immensely strong and firm. Even the head of a corps or division cannot issue a single order or directive without the consent of a political-officer adjutant; this of course also applies to regiments, battalions, and companies.

There are three political pillars in the military. The first is the chain of command running party Central Committee → Military Committee → General Political Affairs Bureau → corps party committee → division party committee → regiment party committee → battalion first-class party committee → company party cell committee → platoon party group. Another chain of command runs: General Political Affairs Bureau → political deputy commander → political deputy division commander → political deputy regiment commander → political deputy battalion commander → political deputy company commander → platoon leader. The last chain of command is: General Political Affairs Bureau → Socialist Labor Youth League Central Committee → Socialist Labor Youth League People's Committee → Socialist Labor Youth League corps league committee → Socialist Labor Youth League regiment league committee → Socialist Labor Youth League battalion league committee → Socialist Labor Youth League company league first committee → Socialist Labor Youth League platoon league group.

As can be seen from this, all three chains of command lead up to the General Political Affairs Bureau, which keeps close watch over them all. In addition, there are the secretary organizations in the party Secretariat hierarchy. All these organizations form an intricate, hamstringing web.

The Military Party Committees, Which Control, Supervise, and Even Draft Operations

Political activities within the military are conducted under the leadership of the People's Army party committees, which are directly under the party Central Committee. This is in accordance with Chapter 7, Article 47 of the party rules adopted at the Fourth Party Congress in October 1961: "Korean People's Army party committees shall be organized, comprising party organizations of the various grades and units within the Korean People's Army and including the party organization of the Korean People's Army itself."

The military party is directly under the Central Party Secretariat, and the chairman of the People's Army Party Committee is also the head of the People's Army General Political Affairs Bureau. Under the People's Army Party Committee are party committees from the division to the platoon level, and they carry out activities in accordance with "the rules of the Workers Party and directives and regulations ratified by the party Central Committee."

The duties of the military party include: 1) deciding the military and policy directions of the party; 2) drafting of all military operations and training planning within the military as well as leadership, control, and monitoring; and 3) personnel administration in accordance with the goals of the party.

The Political Department, a Workers Party Organization Within the Military

Since the founding of the People's Army political activities were under the jurisdiction of the Culture Department, until the end of 1960, when it was reorganized into the Political Department. Later, at the Fourth Party Congress, the General Political Bureau was established within the People's Army and the activities of the existing Political Department were further strengthened.

Article 51 of the Korean Workers Party rules assigns to the Political Department the function of actually carrying out political activities within the military; it states, "the General Political Affairs Bureau and the political organizations under it shall organize and carry out party political activities as executive organs of the relevant party committee." The Political Department, which is a political executive organ, carries out, supervises, and monitors, through the military party committee and Socialist Labor Youth League committee in each military unit, the political activities decided upon by the military party committees, according to the rules of the central party and the directives and regulations ratified by the party Central Committee.

The duties of the Political Department include: 1) the carrying out and execution of matters decided upon by the party committees; 2) the study and dissemination of Communist theory; 3) political thought education; 4) ascertaining the thought trends of military personnel; 5) propaganda activities; and 6) psychological warfare.

The Powerful Political Officers and Party Secretary's Organizations

At the fourth plenary session of the fourth military party meeting in January 1969 North Korea introduced a system of political committees whereby, to build up a system of thought following only Kim Il-song, political secretaries selected by the Central Party Secretariat are assigned to military units of the various sizes and generally supervise military affairs, including both military and political matters. Secretaries sent from the party, i.e., political committee members, are assigned to units from the People's Armed Forces Department to brigade-size units, including independent brigades. For

smaller units, a political deputy commander is dispatched as a leader to carry out these duties.

A political officer must ratify and sign all orders and instructions having to do with military operations and has tremendous power and influence within the military.

The secretary organizations consist of the party Secretariat in the central party, the Secretariat in the People's Armed Forces Department, the responsible secretaries in the corps, political committee members in units on the division and regiment level, and political leaders in units on the battalion and company level; all these political officers are directly sent from and assigned by the central party.

Their duties include: 1) political activities for realizing the policies of the party; 2) the establishment solely of Kim Il-song thought; 3) monitoring of military activities in general; 4) coordination and supervision of political and party activities; 5) ratification of orders and plans; and 6) preventing the formation of cliques within the military.

Socialist Working Youth League: the Driving Organization for Ideological Armament Within the Military

On 16 January 1946 North Korea formed the Democratic Youth League as a means for strengthening party organization and as an organization for bringing non-party members under the sway of the party's leadership. Its greatest duty was devotedly to carry on the struggle for political, economic, and cultural development. Its activities within the military were done as part of the Cultural Department, but at the Fifth Congress on 16 May 1964 its name was changed to the "Socialist Working Youth League" and new by-laws were adopted. As a "Communist mass organization," it is a reserve unit in the party's struggle, a relief squad in the building of Communism. Its basic nature is to arm North Korean youth with the ideology system of the party and get them to defend unconditionally and carry out the line and policies of the party and, through the study of Marxism-Leninism and the thought of Kim Il-song, foster socialist patriotism and a spirit of proletarian internationalism and build socialism and communism better and faster.

The basic organization of the Socialist Working Youth League is the first-grade group, which is the fighting unit which directly carries out the party policies and higher-grade league decisions. A first-grade group is prescribed for all units having three members or more. Thus the Socialist Labor Youth League is organized even within the People's Army and carries out activities in accordance with written guidelines ratified by the league's central committee and the directives of the Korean People's Army General Political Bureau.

As an organization for bringing non-party members within the military under the sway of the party's leadership, its role within the military is as an auxiliary organ of the party for unifying the daily life of all military

personnel with the activities of ardent party members, and it is an organization for controlling the thought of military personnel and encouraging the carrying out of military duties, through publicizing the party line and policies and through thought education.

The organization of the Socialist Working Youth League is similar to that of the party. Its most basic fighting units, the first-grade groups, are set up in companies, with smaller groups set up in platoons and squads, and Socialist Labor Youth League committees set up in units of battalion size and greater. Pursuant to the regulation that the league organization within the military shall carry out its activities under the guidance of the party committee and political organization, it is subject to the direction and supervision of the relevant party committee and political organization.

The principal duties of the Socialist Labor Youth League within the military are: 1) promoting the building of socialism and communism; 2) unconditionally defending and accomplishing the line and policies of the party; 3) arming the military with the sole thought system of Kim Il-song; 4) studying Marxism-Leninism and the thought of Kim Il-song; and 5) providing leadership for devotedly leading a military life as a revolutionary warrior.

Distrust of the People's Army Movements: Kim Chong-il's System of 3-Channel 3-Day Reports

Beginning in about spring 1983, North Korea promulgated through the entire military a system of "3-channel 3-day reports" to enable Kim Chong-il to receive accurate reports about everything happening in the military, correctly ascertain military movements, and control the independent action of the military. The "three channels" refers to three lines of communication: 1) via the political department; 2) via the military staff; and 3) via the command structure. The "3-day reports" refers to planning, deciding, and reporting anticipated actions 3 days in advance, with regard to: 1) troop bodies of platoon strength or more outside the division's district; 2) movement of heavy weapons such as tanks or armored vehicles outside their district; and 3) the out-of-district movement of heavy firepower from mortars on up to missiles.

But since then more detailed reports have come to be required; now even movements within the assigned district must be reported. If the reports received from a political officer, a staff officer, and a command officer concerning an undertaking do not completely agree, Kim Chong-il will not give his permission. When the three-channel reports do not agree, the reason for the discrepancy is rectified. Since this causes trouble, the officers in the three channels of reporting confer with each other beforehand to confirm the general outline of what they will report, but occasionally an officer breaks his promise and writes something else in his report. That is, sometimes a "channel" will betray the other channels to score points, and there are many "political lines."

For example, in order to make it easier to obtain Kim Chong-il's permission, it might be agreed that the movement of two companies of troops will be

reported as the movement of one company. The reports filed along the three channels must all be the same, but the "channel" which breaks its promise can steal a march on the others.

Kim Chong-il's Army

Tokyo GUNJI KENKYU in Japanese Apr 86 pp 200-209

[Article by Kin Motoyoshi, a research specialist in North Korean affairs]

[Text] Led by the father-and-son supreme commanders Kim Il-song and Kim Chong-il, the uniquely structured North Korean military is forging ahead, gaining strength day by day.

The Corps is Organized for Attack

As we read in previous article, the organizational structure of the North Korean People's Army consists of the headquarters of eight corps and one special corp, as well as the Navy, Air Force, artillery, mechanized, guided missile, and capital defense commands, all directly under the general staff. The special organizational structure is such that these various command headquarters have no direct liaison with each other but must communicate, when necessary, via the general staff.

We also explained that there are naval, air, artillery, and other command headquarters and that the land forces have none. The Army has no command headquarters, and the various corps are separately under the direct command of the general staff.

This, of course, is a military organization which puts the entire military directly in the grasp of Kim Il-song. There is a system of corps without a single army, but the military was not always thus structured. Until 1970 there was an Army headquarters under the general staff, and there were five "mass armies": the 1st, 2d, 3d, 5th, and 7th, plus 19 divisions, 5 brigades, and 1 regiment.

It is generally thought that an Army system is better for the offense while a corps system is better for the defense. But in the case of the People's Army, there is another meaning behind the fact that the various corps are directly connected to Kim Il-song. In a nondespotic country a corps is necessarily defensive, but a corps under the direct command of a dictator is extremely advantageous for offensive purposes. Even without needing to talk about the size of an Army and of a corps, Kim Il-song's intent may be gleaned from observing that in responding to a direct order, a corps moves into action much more quickly than mass armies, for which orders must pass through the Army commands. As we explained last time, it should be remembered that the North Korean People's Army was founded for the purpose of aggression.

We have already stated that in the present military structure there are, under the command of the chief of the general staff, eight forward and rear corps,

the Special 8th Corps, the artillery command, the mechanized command, the naval command, the Air Force command, the capital defense command, and the guided missile command; the eight corps and the Special 8th Corps, the artillery command, the mechanized command, the capital defense command, and the guided missile command are all, needless to say, land forces.

A corps is the largest unit in which combat and support units cooperate as a basic tactical command. Under a corps are infantry divisions, brigades, mechanized divisions, light infantry brigades, and rifle brigades.

The mission of the Special 8th Corps includes joint operations with the regular Army, nonconventional guerrilla warfare, and commando operations. Under the Special 8th Corps are special brigades.

Under the artillery command are anti-aircraft artillery divisions, women's anti-aircraft machinegun brigades, anti-aircraft artillery brigades, artillery battalions, and SSM battalions. The guided missile command used to have SAM brigades, which beginning in 1976 have been transferred to the Air Force, being replaced by additional deployment of SSM; in addition, the guided missile command has technical support unit repair facilities.

The Navy has under the Naval Command the Eastern Sea Fleet Command and the Western Sea Fleet Command, both of which have fleets under them.

The Air Force has under the Air Force Command fighter divisions, bomber divisions, and air transport divisions, as well as radar, telecommunications, and construction regiments and air bases.

The Ever Stronger Land Forces

Today's North Korean land forces include, besides the above corps and commands, education and guidance units, direct command units, and military schools of various grades.

Under the 8 corps are 35 infantry divisions, 3 mechanized divisions, and 2 armored divisions, plus, as combat units, 5 armored brigades, 4 infantry brigades, 2 independent armored regiments, and 5 independent infantry regiments.

Under the Special 8th Corps are 4 reconnaissance brigades, 8 light infantry brigades, 23 special brigades, 3 amphibious brigades, and 5 air battalions.

According to recent estimates of the U.S. military, the total strength of the land forces of the North Korean People's Army has been increased to 740,000-880,000.

These figures differ somewhat from the MILITARY BALANCE figures, but information from U.S. military sources show independent figures. Which figures are the more accurate is open to debate, but in this article we will use the latter figures. In MILITARY BALANCE the number of infantry divisions

was reduced from 35 to 34, but at present it is hardly thought that North Korean military manpower has been cut. Other differences with the MILITARY BALANCE figures can be found, but we would like to accept them for the above reason.

The land forces of the North Korean People's Army have several peculiarities which may be said to be organizational characteristics. For one, its tactical units are independent. The basic tactical units of an infantry division are the infantry regiment, mortar regiment, artillery regiment, anti-aircraft artillery regiment, armored battalion, and anti-tank artillery battalion. Such a mix of units makes possible independent fast-maneuvering support operations with the kind of firepower which each unit has.

These firepower support units continue to be strengthened. Measures are being taken to improve performance and maneuverability by replacing tank engines with higher-horsepower engines, interchanging self-propelled guns with tanks, and replacing towed field guns and howitzers with new models of self-propelled cannon.

Another notable feature of the land forces is their anti-tank reserve units. As the name indicates, these are anti-tank combat units. In infantry divisions and regiments anti-tank mobile reserve units including sapper units needed for obstacle laying and other military engineering support are organized for each field gun, anti-tank gun, or self-propelled gun and placed under its command. These anti-tank reserve units are highly mobile and are considered swift in performing their anti-tank defense duties.

These anti-tank reserve units are normally kept in reserve in the second echelon region. Their mission is determined by whatever means of defense are permitted by the state of the battle and the topography when enemy tanks appear. Infantry unit joint support operations are possible for support when necessary. The anti-tank reserve units can conduct operations making full use of their mobility and are sometimes deployed as division combat units for special operations such as counterattack against, surrounding of, and widening breaches in enemy tank dispositions.

Infantry divisions incorporate under their command artillery units in order to unify the means of firepower support under one command and carry out effective firepower support operations, but such units are composed without regard to the type or caliber of their equipment. This too is a support unit of unique nature.

A Corps With the Manpower of Eight Divisions

A corps of course has a command headquarters which bears general responsibility for the corps' performance. Under the direct command of a corps command headquarters are 3 or 4 infantry divisions, mechanized divisions, armored divisions, independent infantry brigades, rifle brigades, artillery regiments, 160 mm mortar regiments, 200/240 mm rocket launcher regiments, 37/85 mm anti-aircraft artillery regiments, 100 mm anti-tank battalions,

telecommunications regiments, chemical battalions, sapper regiments, dirigible reconnaissance battalions, military hospitals, and, for infantry divisions, units assigned from the Special 8th Corps and the People's Guard. The total regimental strength actually under command of a corps is equivalent to about eight divisions per corps.

An artillery regiment has command companies, 130 mm artillery battalions, and 152 mm artillery battalions. A sapper regiment has river-crossing sapper battalions, construction battalions, and technical sapper battalions.

The command structure of a corps is roughly similar from corps commander to regiment commander. Under the corps commander are military, political, home-front, and artillery deputy corps commanders, but down to the level of regiment commander there is exactly the same system of deputies under the commanding officer in each grade. The command structure in a corp consists of a staff and political staff plus safety leaders and supply platoons, and in all grades the staff has a chief of staff.

The basic strategic unit of a corp is an infantry division, which needless to say is a composite unit of combat and support components. In order to perform its assigned duties effectively, an infantry division is supported by artillery, armored, sapper, telecommunications, and chemical units from the corp and effectively utilizes these units in carrying out its duties. An infantry division consists of a command headquarters, three infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, a 120 mm mortar regiment, an anti-aircraft regiment, an armored battalion, a self-propelled artillery battalion, an anti-tank artillery battalion, a sapper battalion, a telecommunications battalion, a chemical battalion, and, as attached units, a light infantry battalion and four to six People's Guard companies.

As we have explained earlier, even brigades have anti-tank mobile reserve units, organized in the same way as with a division, for defending against attack from massed enemy tanks, but their size can be expanded depending on the battle situation and other circumstances. An infantry brigade consists of three infantry regiments and, supporting it, a 120 mm mortar regiment, a 122 mm artillery battalion, and a chemical company. Below this level, infantry regiments and infantry battalions have a similar makeup.

Composition of the Tank-Oriented Mechanized Headquarters

What explains the special nature of the North Korean military system are the mechanized headquarters and the artillery headquarters behind them. Except for the armored units which the infantry divisions of each corp have under them, the mechanized headquarters are military units in the tank classification. Under the commander of a headquarters are a political department and a staff as well as, directly under the commander, a command, an armored division, an armored brigade, a tank repair station, a tank pacification station, and a tank school.

An armored division has a command, a mechanized infantry battalion, an armored regiment, a reconnaissance battalion, an artillery regiment, an anti-aircraft artillery battalion, a sapper battalion, a telecommunications battalion, a technical battalion, and a chemical company. Also, an artillery regiment contains a command company, an artillery battalion, and a mortar battalion, and a technical battalion contains a repair company, a rolling stock repair company, and a technical company.

A staff has five sections--operations, weapons, the ranks, training, and officers (commissioned officer personnel affairs)--and is directly attached to each unit under the command of an armored division.

North Korea is thought to have a total of about 3,000 tanks, of which about 300 are estimated to be in operation.

For North Korea, for which oil is as precious as blood and for which oil conservation is a national policy, it would be a lavish waste of fuel to run 1 to 2,000 tanks for training in peacetime. But in order to mobilize all 3,000 tanks in wartime, arithmetic shows that a minimum of 12,000 trained tank soldiers must be available. But sufficient skills can hardly be acquired when only 300 tanks are available for training 3,000 crews, even on a rotation basis.

In addition, North Korea is presently upgrading the power of its tank engines, but it is clear that higher-horsepower engines consume more oil. On top of this, in September 1985 North Korea's only ocean-going tanker, the Sonbong, was bombed and sunk by an Iraqi plane while berthed at Kharg Island to take on oil. The oil shortage is serious, and because of it both the Air Force and Navy are thought to be faced with a considerable dilemma concerning insufficient training.

Composition of the Artillery Headquarters, Whose Main Duty Is Air Defense

The main duty of the artillery headquarters is air defense. Under it are a command, an anti-aircraft artillery division, an anti-aircraft artillery brigade, a women's anti-aircraft machinegun brigade, an independent anti-aircraft artillery regiment, 120 mm, 150 mm, and 130 mm artillery battalions, a 130 mm coastal artillery battalion, a Frog surface-to-surface missile battalion, a weapons depot, an ammunition depot, and, as educational organizations, a general artillery school and an artillery petty officers school. Under the general artillery school are 76.2 mm and 122 mm artillery battalions, an anti-aircraft artillery battalion, a mortar battalion, and an AT [anti-tank] company.

An anti-aircraft division has a command company as its command, and has 57 mm, 85 mm, and 130 mm anti-aircraft artillery regiments. A 100 mm anti-aircraft artillery regiment has a command company and an anti-aircraft artillery company, and under it are a reconnaissance platoon, radar platoon, wired platoon, and wireless platoon.

Strong air defense is the bitter lesson of the Korean conflict, when nothing could be done about the air superiority held by the allied Air Force. The artillery headquarters is independent of the corps in order to have a highly mobile air defense.

The total number of anti-aircraft guns deployed throughout the country is said to be about 8,000, but these are towed artillery. The main weapon of women's anti-aircraft machinegun brigades is the four-shot mounted machinegun, but anti-aircraft cannon and machineguns are also mounted on trailers and trucks. Keeping ZSU-23-4 and ZSU-57-2 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns and SAM-7 surface-to-air missiles separate, the number of these anti-aircraft machineguns presently cannot be ascertained with accuracy. Since the majority of the women members of the Workers and Peasants Red Guard are organized into anti-aircraft machinegun battalions, it may be estimated that this anti-aircraft firepower must number more than 10,000 guns.

Special Units

When we speak of North Korean special units, what immediately comes to mind is the Special 8th Corps. But there are other units besides this which are also called special units. One of them is the Reconnaissance Bureau under the general staff, as well as seagoing special units, light infantry brigades, and the 595th unit, which is under the supervision of the party liaison department.

These are under the People's Armed Forces Ministry, but in substance they are under the command of the party Secretariat's secretary for the South. It gets a bit complicated, but the Special 8th Corps, the seagoing special units, and the light infantry brigades are all under the command of the Reconnaissance Bureau, and the seagoing special units are under the command of the Special 8th Corps. Moreover, the light infantry brigades are part of the Special 8th Corps.

The party liaison department trains agents who specialize in underground party activities. Besides the 695th unit under the liaison department, seven or eight escort units have the job of spy activities and training for operations against the South, and the Reconnaissance Bureau specializes in guerrilla warfare and trains agents. The dirty work of nonconventional warfare and sabotage is the job of the special units under the Reconnaissance Bureau.

The Special 8th Corps was formed in January 1969 by amalgamating the 124th unit, which had been founded in 1967 and had been strengthened, and the 17 air transport parachute reconnaissance brigades under a new military strategy of "applying the legitimacy of modern warfare and revolutionary warfare."

Since 1973 North Korea has increased the strengthen of the Special 8th Corps to five brigades, and the light infantry regiments which were created then have been beefed up to two brigades per corps.

The Special 8th Corps has a command under the corp commander, and a telecommunications company, security company, dirigible reconnaissance company, sapper company, medical company, and transport company. Making up the Special 8th Corps are a light infantry brigade, air infiltration brigade, forward, coast amphibious brigade, reconnaissance brigade, light infantry battalion, duty support company, telecommunications company, sapper platoon, and security platoon. The light infantry battalion has a command and a light infantry company, reconnaissance company, and mortar company. In addition, it seems to have attached to it an air battalion and a special battalion, but this cannot be ascertained with certainty. In every brigade there is an education battalion for each regiment, and the training seems to be very arduous, but the soldiers are content and loyal because the pay and other benefits are good and belonging to the Special 8th Corps makes them part of an elite. Thus when members of the Special 8th Corps slip into South Korea, they become living lethal weapons rather than human beings. They are the world's most dogmatic soldiers, or even the world's most dogmatic creatures. The same is true for the members of the Reconnaissance Bureau.

Militia Organizations

Last time we briefly spoke of the Workers and Peasants Red Guard and the People's Guard. Let us now discuss their organization in somewhat more detail. Although an explanation is hardly necessary any more, North Korea imposes a policy of full mobilization of its entire populace based on the premise of all-out war in order to achieve its basic goal of unification under Communism by force of arms, and because of this, the people are thought of as nothing more than a source of armed might. This is demonstrated by the existence of, besides the regular Army, the militia organizations of the Workers and Peasants Red Guard and the Red Youth Guards, as well as the reserve forces of the Pacification Unit and the People's Guard.

The organization, operation, and mobilization of the militias is done by the party Central Committee Military Department, while the Central People's Committee National Defense Committee has charge of the regular Army and Pacification Unit under the People's Armed Forces Department as well as the People's Guard under the Public Security Department.

The Workers and Peasants Red Guard is organized, through the party organization, on a regional administrative and workplace level, taking into account the peculiarities of the local region and population. In the case of a general place of business, most younger people belong to the Pacification Unit where they work, while in more outlying areas most of them are members of the Workers and Peasants Red Guard. In addition, 18- to 35-year-old women also belong to the Workers and Peasants Red Guard.

The organization of the Workers and Peasants Red Guard is similar to that of the regular Army. In almost all cases a party chairman is appointed as the commander on each level, and either a military department or a military mobilization and Socialist Labor Youth Command is appointed for medium-size

units. The Workers and Peasants Red Guard in a farming village is normally organized as the job demands.

Appointed as the head of a regiment is usually the district party chairman or district party organizing committee vice chairman. A battalion usually consists of three companies, but a large one may consist of four. A company is made up of three to four platoons, and a platoon is made up of three to six squads.

On the regimental level, the commander of the regiment has under him a political deputy regimental commander, a military deputy regimental commander, a deputy rear area regimental commander, and a safety department head. The political deputy regimental commander is the vice chairman of the district party committee in charge of propaganda and is responsible for regimental party activities, Socialist Labor Youth activities, and propaganda. Ranking under him are the regimental party chairman, regimental Socialist Labor Youth chairman, and regimental agitators. The post of the safety department head is occupied by the head of the district party safety department or the Public Security Department safety department head; he monitors the thought trends of the members of the regiment.

The district military mobilization department head serves as the military deputy regimental commander. Under his command is a telecommunications company headed by the district communications department, with about 25 communications personnel and radio operators, coding personnel, and wired-communications personnel.

The military department company commander is appointed from among village party officials, and platoon leaders are appointed from among local cell committee chairmen and farm co-op foremen with ample military experience.

The deputy rear service regimental commander is the district people's committee chairman, and the district people's committee is responsible for rear service support. During training his place is filled by the district vice chairman for industry, who commands sanitation and disinfection companies. Serving as head of the sanitation company is either the district people's hospital director or sanitation station head, and the company is made up of physicians, nurses, sanitation station directors who are not company commanders, and district public health workers. Especially in rear area service companies, all parts of the district people's committee are mobilized.

The regimental chief of staff is the head of the district party military department or the head of the district military mobilization department; operations and training staff are appointed from among capable former officers. In addition there are a staff secretary and telecommunications company, with a battalion under them.

Under the battalion commander are a political deputy battalion commander, a military deputy battalion commander, a chief of staff, three to four companies, a telecommunications company, a sanitation company, and a supply

company. Under the company commander are a political deputy company commander, a sanitation platoon (each platoon consists of 3-6 squads of 9-12 persons each), and 3-4 platoons (30-40 persons).

At every university student Workers and Peasant Guard regiments are organized. The head of the school is the supreme commander within the university, and political deputy deans, faculty heads, professors, Socialist Labor Youth officials, and Public Security Department heads within the university are appointed as commanders on various levels, as with Workers and Peasants Red Guard units made up of workers. A peculiarity of student units of the Workers and Peasants Red Guard is that they are classified militarily according to academic subject matter. For example, infantry units are at Kim Il-song University, Pyongyang Light Industry University, Pyongyang Music University, and Pyongyang Acting and Film University, military engineering at Pyongyang Construction University, telecommunications at Kumch'aek Industrial University's electrical engineering department, military medicine at medical universities, chemistry at Hungnam Chemical Industry University, naval military at Wonsan Fishery University.

The Reserve Troops

The Pacification Corps is under the four Rear Services corps and consists mostly of infantry. It is said to be able to form 20 divisions within 24 hours of issuance of orders in an emergency. Its leaders and key personnel are active-duty military members assigned to duty with it. The membership of the Pacification Corps consists of able-bodied, party-minded people selected from among 20- to 40-year-old persons who have previously served in the military.

They are organized in units by place of business: a company for a third-class place of business with 500 or more employees, a battalion for a second-class place of business with 2,000 or more employees, a regiment for a first-class place of business with 3,000 or more employees, and either a brigade or a division for a special-class place of business, depending on its special nature and how many employees it has.

For the Pacification Unit at universities, a school is organized into a regiment, an academic department into a battalion, a faculty into a company, and a class into a platoon. Officers for specialized branches of the service can be trained through courses which take into account one's major course of study. The equilibrium with the student Workers and Peasants Red Guard is not certain.

In the Pacification Unit, four regiments make up a division. A regiment has, under the regimental commander, political, military, artillery, and deputy rear area services commanders as well as a chief of staff. A regiment is called a pacification regiment, but in substance it is an infantry regiment and consists of five infantry battalions, a guard company, a telecommunications company, a 7.6 mm machinegun company, and a 120 mm mortar company. A battalion is made up of three infantry companies, a guard platoon, a

telecommunications platoon, and a 7.6 mm machinegun platoon. A company has under it three platoons, and a platoon has under it three squads.

We mentioned something of the makeup of the People's Guard in the last article. It is under the Public Security Department, and under the command of the Guard Bureau are the Pyongyang Special City Guard Brigade, the Kaesong District Guard Regiment, the Border Guard (about 500 regions), the Coast Guard (about 67 regions), the Island Guard (462 regions), the Factory Guard (100 regions), the Local Guard (100 regions), the Pyongyang Railroad Guard, the Anju Railroad Guard, the Hamhung Railroad Guard, the Ch'ongjin Railroad Guard, and the Kanggye Railroad Guard. As its name indicates, the People's Guard is a paramilitary security organization. It is even assigned as military-related guard units, and in an emergency it becomes a military force under the department to which it is assigned.

Deployment of Land Forces

The main units of the North Korean land forces are classified into "commitment units" deployed in the "forward" regions along the demilitarized zone, and the "reserve unit" dispersed behind them in the strategic reserve area.

From the defense organization standpoint, the land forces are deployed in three zones in a three-echelon formation for commitment to battle and replenishment of forces: the front-line zone along the demilitarized zone, the second-line zone between Pyongyang and Wonsan and, further in the interior, the home-front zone.

In the forward zone are 20 divisions under 4 corps in which combat and support units of all types are deployed, as well as an independent aviation brigade; the total strength deployed here is more than 300,000 men. As is well known, the disposition of the corps from east to west is: 1st Corps, 5th Corps, 2d Corps, and 4th Corps, each defending its own bases.

All along the front these units build underground-structure positions and form a powerful network of firepower with firearms and guns of all types. The underground positions are able to accommodate company-size units and supplies, making it possible to continue limited independent combat even under conditions of local nuclear warfare.

The building up of this zone of emplacements began shortly after the truce. By about 1962 the first stage of construction was finished, and that same year saw completion of the second line of defense from Anbyon in Kangwon Province to Suanni, Hwanghae Pukdo following the December decision of the Fourth Workers Party Congress fifth plenary session that there shall be a policy of nationwide fortification.

The forward positions are not just company-size cave emplacements; almost all field guns and tanks are in cave emplacements too. All along the truce line there are being built various kinds of obstacles; this activity is known as "emplacing the six heavy obstacles," which refers to hidden tank-trap pits,

boulders, anti-personnel and anti-tank minefields, noise-making obstacles (such as laying out empty cans and dried-out branches which will make a sound when troops pass over them), barren sand fields which will reveal the footprints of any troops which pass through them, and high-voltage barbed-wire entanglements. These obstacles are every 1-2 km north of the military demarcation line.

Recently such obstacle fields have been strengthened, more defensive fence lines and anti-tank obstacles have been added, and much cave emplacement construction work has been done, including Y-shaped field gun emplacements within the demilitarized zone.

As to the attack capability of these military forces, it is estimated that 10 or more infantry divisions led by tank are ready at a moment's notice to stream into the region within a stone's throw of Seoul, and that more reinforcement and support units can follow in a short time. Thus a surprise attack by the North Korean Army can be judged to be a large-unit blitzkrieg.

In other words, an armored division can mass tanks and armored vehicles as near to Seoul as possible, with most of the artillery's firepower positioned in the front-line area. Hidden artillery emplacements in well-built trenches can, at the start of hostilities before the attack by artillery troops, provide effective support without harming attacking friendly forces.

Seoul can also be directly attacked by Frog surface-to-surface missiles and new self-propelled models of cannon positioned along the truce line.

In addition, sapper regiments specializing in river-crossing operations have the capacity to support, by mobilizing all their river-crossing equipment, division-size river-crossings, and if multiple river-crossing regiments go into action, the main attacking units can strike quickly, and river-crossing operations by several regiments in other regions can easily be supported.

And when needed the light infantry of the Special 8th Corps, which has two brigades per division, can infiltrate in the rear of the South Korean Army and open a second front, causing confusion in the South Korean ranks and making possible a mass attack like a great, raging wave. The light infantry battalions attached to the attacking divisions can carry out independent guerrilla operations separate from the divisions' main body, thereby supporting and further facilitating the attack.

Meanwhile, by feigning large-scale mobilization drills the four divisions of rear area services units, which during peacetime are deployed along the second line between Pyongyang and Wonsan and along the seacoast in the east and west, can easily make a disguised move to the front. Even without resorting to such subterfuge, reinforcement troops can get to the front in no more than 7 days on foot, or in 3 days by vehicle.

The emphasis of training in the land forces of North Korea has been no cooperation between the combat arms, outdoor mobilization, and joint

exercises, and efforts are being made to mechanize equipment and make it self-propelled. More emphasis is being placed on upgrading the blitzkrieg capability of mechanized units and on tactical training especially for breaking tough fortified zones. In particular, much time is being given to training for conquering flooded rice-field regions during summer.

So that the momentum of an attack will not be lost because of rivers, and in order to make elaborate river-crossing operations unnecessary, stress is being laid on river crossing by force and on training for speedy execution of operations. To this end, soldiers are undergoing more swimming training, and ways are being sought to make armored vehicles amphibious.

Kim Chong-il is the de-factor commander of the army. And since he is in fact called the "supreme commander" of the People's Army, that is how the soldiers of the People's Army think of him. This is confirmed by the testimony of Major Sin Chung-ch'ol (captain in the People's Army at the time of his defection), and (a 23-year-old People's Guard corporal attached to the 5th Corps), who defected with much flurry on 3 January 1986, said the same thing in a press conference. As one would expect from the "3-channel 3-day" reporting system we spoke of in the last article, the movements of the Army are controlled by organizations directly under Kim Chong-il.

Our common sense might tell us that having two supreme commanders can only lead to confusion, but this seems not to be a matter of much concern in North Korea. "The troops of Kim Chong-il" is beginning to be said instead of "the troops of Kim Il-song."

It is extremely dangerous that a young personality with no war experience should hold the actual power over an army. We can only hope that ideology will not take precedence over the danger of the destruction of a people.

Military Strength

Tokyo GUNJI KENKYU in Japanese May 86 pp 186-193

[Article by Kin Motoyoshi, a research specialist in North Korean affairs]

[Excerpts] The mystery-shrouded North Korean Navy and Air Force. "Phantom submarines" secreted away in grottos are a hidden threat, and despite a fuel shortage, care is being taken to introduce new-model warplanes!

Three New Mechanized Corps

In our last articles we gave a brief explanation of the land forces, but we must give some supplementary explanation concerning the makeup of crops. In the last article we discussed in specifics the buildup of land forces, especially the buildup in heavy equipment, but since this data was based on information available up to 1983, there was no information for explaining concretely what changes have taken place in the makeup of the land forces, which continue to be strengthened.

But according to MILITARY BALANCE published by the British Institute for Strategic Studies, which was released at the end of 1985, it has come to light that a large-scale North Korean reorganization of corps has been reported; three new mechanized corps have appeared, and these, combined with the previous eight corps in all branches of the military, bring total strength up to 11 corps. It cannot be ascertained from the report in MILITARY BALANCE whether the additional three mechanized corps are under the mechanized command or, like the other eight corps, are independent corps directly under the general staff. Their names would seem to indicate the latter.

For the past several years MILITARY BALANCE has been reporting the number of tanks and armored personnel carriers at 2,965 give or take 1,000, with approximately 4,000 combat armored vehicles. But the figures released last year put the number of tanks at 3,565 and armored vehicles (including combat vehicles and personnel carriers) at 1,100, for a total of 4,665. That is, between the figures in MILITARY BALANCE in 1984-85 and those in 1985-86 there is a total difference of 700 vehicles.

This is considered due to the policy of armored buildup which began in about 1982, though the amount of increase seems somewhat small for the formation of three additional corps of mechanized units. In any case, some time will be needed to ascertain the nature and scale of the reorganized corps and the additional mechanized corps.

Regarding the Special 8th Corps it is of some interest that MILITARY BALANCE 1985-86 reports specifically as special units what in previous years it treated as a general corps, calling them "Reconnaissance Bureau special units" and placing their strength at 22 special operations brigades totaling 80,000 men. But what is of some note here is that this is not a corps but 22 brigades, with a strength assessed not at 100,000 men but 80,000 men. They include three commando regiments, four reconnaissance regiments, one river-crossing regiment, three amphibious battalions, and five airborne battalions. Here again, it will take time to confirm this information.

Last summer newspapers also reported the additional formation of mechanized corps, but it is not at all surprising that North Korea is escalating its buildup of military power as long as the true purpose of North Korea's basic principle of unification is, contrary to their slogan of "peaceful unification," armed unification or revolutionary unification supported by armed might. But now that South Korea, with the Olympics coming up, is in the international spotlight, North Korea needs some sort of a pretext for exercising its military power and invading the South. The eyes of the world would not permit a heedless blitzkrieg invasion as in the time of disturbances in South Korea. But North Korea is a ruled collective which operates on moral principles far removed from what is elsewhere taken for granted, and if it calculates that the odds for victory are good enough, it is capable of invading the South regardless of world opinion. If it takes the South Korean peninsula in a sweeping conquest, then "might makes right," and the world will acknowledge the victor. That is why they have their sights set on the withdrawal of the American troops now stationed in South Korea, which are far

superior in the total military force than the South Korean defense forces. The idea is to watchfully wait till the time is ripe. We should recognize that here lies the purpose behind North Korea's policy of military buildup upon military buildup.

Naval Forces: Phantom Submarines Enshrined in Grottos

The North Korean Navy is under the direct command of the chief of the general staff. The naval command has under it the East Sea Fleet Command and the West Sea Fleet Command. The East Sea Fleet Command is in Wonsan and has command bases in Wonsan and in Ch'aho the West Sea Fleet Command is in Namp'o and has command bases in Namp'o and in Sagap.

Under the command of the chief of the naval command are a chief of staff, political department deputy commander, navigation department deputy commander, technology department deputy commander, and home-front deputy commander.

The staff departments under the command of the chief of staff are an operations department, training department, telecommunications department, radar department, seacoast artillery department, reconnaissance department, officers department, enlisted men department, finance department, artillery department, chemical department, records and documents department, and cryptography department.

The deputy political department commander has under his command political department, safety department, organizational department, propaganda and incitement department, and Socialist Labor Youth League department.

The deputy navigation department commander has under him a waterway department, meteorology department, and sea chart compilation department, and the deputy technology department commander has under him an organization and planning department, vessel construction guidance department, material supply department, and a technology department.

The deputy Rear Service commander has under him departments for organization and planning, food, clothing, buildings, fuel oil, transport, harbor and port facilities, subsidiary work, and ship fittings, as well as a military physician department.

Each base command and each naval squadron is organized nearly identically to the way this command is organized.

Taking a look at the organization of each fleet command, the Wonsan base under the East Sea Fleet Command has three guard squadrons, a missile guard squadron, a minesweeping formation, one or two torpedo squadrons, and a storage squadron.

At its other base at Ch'aho are three guard squadrons, a submarine squadron, an antisub squadron, and a storage squadron, as well as a coastal defense missile unit separately under the fleet command.

Under the West Sea Fleet Command are, at the Namhang Iagru base, two guard squadrons, a missile guard squadron, a submarine squadron, two torpedo squadrons, a coastal defense missile unit, and a storage squadron, as well as a coastal defense missile unit and two radar bases. At its other base in Sagap it has two guard squadrons and a storage squadron.

Directly attached to the naval command are Navy University, Navy Central Hospital, Naval Officers School, the Naval Technical Training School, and Naval Petty Officers School. Navy Central Hospital has a training squadron and scientific laboratory.

The foregoing is a general explanation of the organization of the Navy, but matters concerning detached bases cannot be accurately ascertained. Also, we give no figures here; for the various types of vessels and equipment the reader is referred to the figures in MILITARY BALANCE. Moreover, missile boats introduced from China last year and submarines and destroyers (said to be 19 vessels) built by North Korea itself are unconfirmed.

North Korea is said to have 21 submarines at present, but they have never been shown, so that they are called "phantom submarines." It is an unconfirmed submarine fleet. It is said that 8 of these 21 submarines are old Soviet or Chinese ships while the rest were all made in North Korea. It is widely known that powerful Japanese-made diesel engines are being imported into North Korea by triangular trade via Hong Kong, but it is not known whether these engines are intended for submarines or for tanks.

Different Strategy and Tactics for East and West Sea

The main force of North Korean Navy, including submarines, missiles, high-speed boats, and escort ships, is deployed in the East Sea, which is given far higher priority than the West Sea. This is because: 1) the depth of the East Sea makes submarine operations easier, and joint exercises with the Soviet Pacific fleet are possible; 2) ocean currents in the East Sea make mine warfare a possibility; 3) there is the favorable condition that the difference between high and low tide is small; 4) the coast in the east is favorable for landings along the coast of South Korea; 5) rapid measures can be taken against South Korean and Japanese fishing boats.

But recently more naval vessels of all kinds are being deployed in the West Sea as well, gradually building up the capacity for independent operations and conducting blockade and large-scale landing operations against South Korea's five islands in the West Sea and, in an emergency, against Kyonggi Bay and Asan Bay.

A special feature of the North Korean Navy is that its guard squadrons are geographically dispersed. In particular, more than one-fifth of the entire warship strength is at Changjon on the East Sea, a base near the truce line, and at Sagap on the West Sea. These seem to be deployed near the truce line in order to respond rapidly to the South Korean Navy, since these are ships of about 100 tons with a small operational radius.

The Wonsan base, the Ch'aho base, and the coastal defense missile units are under the East Sea Fleet Command, and the Wonsan base is a mother base with support facilities. Under it are the Wonsan guard unit, a minesweeping squadron, and two torpedo squadrons. Apart from this, Changjon which lies directly north of the truce line, and Taeho, which lies at the northern end of Hamhung Bay, each have one squadron. And as detached bases there are Kugjibung base and Hodu base.

Under the command of the Ch'aho base is the Ch'aho antisub base, and on Mayangdo is a submarine base that serves as a mother base. In addition there are guard squadrons at Sinjio, Kimch'aek, Ch'ongjin, and elsewhere. Detached bases are Sinch'ang base and Najin Base.

Under the West Sea Fleet Command are Namp'o base and Sagap base as well as coastal defense missile units; the mother base with support facilities is Namp'o base. At this base are a submarine squadron, the Namp'o guard squadron, and a missile guard squadron. Also, Ch'odo base, Bip'agap base, and Kwangyangni base, which are all detached bases, each have one torpedo squadron, and Tasari base has one guard squadron. Moreover, Namp'o base and Kado base near Sinoeju are each a special radar base.

North Korean submarines carry torpedos and mines and have the capacity for torpedo attacks on large South Korean naval vessels and for mining important ports and bays.

The high-speed missile boats are equipped with Soviet-made Styx missiles having a range of 46 km, and in addition there are torpedo boats, patrol boats, landing craft, and gunboats. They have the capability for landing infiltration and firepower support on both the east and west coasts.

North Korean-made moored mines, influence mines, surface naval vessels, submarines, and aircraft can conduct both offensive and defensive mine warfare simultaneously.

With radar installations in 40 locations, North Korea can monitor its entire territorial waters. In particular, covering the West Sea is a string of radar installations from Haeju to Changsangap Cape. This is thought to be because of the South Korean Army stationed on the nearby West Sea five islands and because this area was a base for South Korean guerrillas at the time of Korean War.

North Korean coastal defense units are building over 1,000 coastal gun platforms along both the eastern and western coasts, presumably in readiness for an invasion by the South Korean Army. Almost all of them are in cave emplacements facing outward to sea and are disguised with camouflage netting so as to be hardly distinguishable from the sea; Japanese trading ships which sail north along the coast do not notice them at all.

North Korea has more than 10 subterranean naval ship refuge bunkers as well as underwater refuge bunkers for submarines. These shelters are caves dug out at

the foot of mountains in deep coastal waters. It is said that at a detached base in Namaeri in Kasonggun a hole has been made into a rock wall to form a large tunnel for hiding warships. On Mayangdo in particular there are many underwater tunnels for submarines. There has been talk that several years ago, when members from the Chosoren in Japan visited North Korea they toured a submarine base where ground underneath the coast was made into water channels. Underground there was, besides a shipbuilding dock, a large factory in operation. The location is not certain, but it is thought to be either the Mayangdo base or the Namp'o submarine base on the western coast. It is just the same as the underwater base that appears in animated cartoons on television.

The emphasis of North Korean naval training, besides more and larger submarines, missile boats, and landing craft, is on training for attacking naval ships, training for cutting off supply lines, joint naval-air exercises, and training for quick and forceful landings.

Air Force: Fuel-Shortage Cuts Flight Training Hours

The air force command has five fighter plane divisions, one bomber division, one transport plane division, a bombing and reconnaissance brigade, transport brigade, helicopter regiment, radar regiment, searchlight regiment, telecommunications regiment, construction regiment, and navigation control regiment as well as an aviation college and civil aviation bureau. Directly under the commander of the air force are a chief of staff, deputy political commander, deputy flight commander, deputy engineering commander, deputy Rear Services commander, deputy air defense commander, and a command guidance office and investigation and trial office.

Under the chief of staff are a flight training department, operations department, reconnaissance department, meteorology department, enlisted men department, officers department, secret affairs department, weapons department, telecommunications department, finance department, guard company, military physician department, and firefighting units.

Under the deputy political commander are a political department and a safety department; the political department has an organization section, propaganda section, and lecture section, while the safety department has an investigation section, safety section, information section, and cryptology office.

The deputy flight commander has a tactical-firing department, piloting guidance department, and navigation and bombing guidance department, and the deputy engineering commander has a technology department, aircraft repair station, automobile repair factory, and sanitation gas (referring to oxygen?) department.

The structure of the command of each flight division is nearly identical to that of the air force command; they have a chief of staff and various deputy commanders who are very similar in function. What all the flight divisions have in common organizationally are a flight regiment, divisional repair

facilities, radar company, searchlight company, telecommunications company, and military bases.

A flight regiment has four flight battalions and a maintenance operations company, anti-aircraft company, and color guard squad. A maintenance operations company can complete the repair of an aircraft for which it is responsible within 25-50 hours. The anti-aircraft company is responsible for air defense on the base. The color guard squad is in charge of keeping and guarding the military flag.

A flight battalion has three flight companies and, under a deputy engineering battalion commander who also serves as an engineering company commander, an engine group, static electricity group, radio group, and weapons group.

Each base has a chief of staff, political deputy base commander, Rear Area Services deputy base commander, and safety department commander organized under the base commander almost the same as above. A base has a guard company, transport company, telecommunications platoon, sapper platoon, fuel oil supply station, material supply station, weather station, military physician's clinic, nursery, and shop for military personnel.

The North Korean Air Force exercises centralized control over all air operations. In early 1960 the civilian aviation bureau was put under the air force command in order to improve mobilization and air transport capacity, as by military use of civilian transport aircraft.

The civilian aviation bureau has, under its bureau chief, deputy bureau chiefs of various sorts: political, operations, engineering, and Rear Area Services. The bureau commands an international group, mobile leadership group, repair stations, and Rear Area Services companies. In normal times they run civilian aviation, but since organizationally they are part of the Air Force Command, in an emergency they swing into action for air transport operations for military forces and supplies.

As explained above, the North Korean Air Force has jurisdiction over all aviation. Thus all airports may be thought of as military airports. North Korea has about 70 airports, counting both large and small ones. It is noteworthy that many airports, even some large ones, use roads as runways. Let us discuss Air Force bases and airports in more detail.

Normally an international flight for Pyongyang will land at Pyongyang Airport, which is located at the eastern edge of the city, in a place called Mirimdong, Sadonggu; the runway runs east and west. Passengers hardly ever catch sight of a military aircraft because military craft avoid this airport when it is being used for international flights.

Within a 60 km radius of the capital city Pyongyang are 11 aircraft bases of various sizes. Among them are three which have long runways: Pukch'ang in Pukch'anggun, P'yongan Namdo 60 km north-northeast of Pyongyang, 13 km south-southwest of Sunch'on and the hot springs village of Appu (means "before")

25 km northwest of Namp'o. Among the other large bases in the capital region, the one with the longest runway (4 km) is Sunan base. The airport where long ago the Yodogo was forced to land was this base, which is even equipped with jet engine starters. This base too seems to be used as an international airport for Pyongyang. There is a large base which uses as a runway, the Sunan-Appu north highway, which adjoins this Sunan base to its north, and a large base which, 20 km to the northeast, uses as a runway the Pyong-Ui highway at a point 10 km south of the Sunch'on base. The MiG 23's which have just been furnished by the Soviet Union are thought to be stationed somewhere among these six bases.

Besides these, there is another large base near Hwanghaeup, Hwanghae Pukdo 40 km south of Pyongyang. The small airports in the capital region (seen as probably used for connections) include an airport (presently unusable) 10 km west of the Sunan base which uses the Pyong-Ui west highway as a runway, an airport in Kangdongup which is adjacent to and east-northeast of Pyongyang, and an airport in an area of Pyongyang known as Sangwonup which likewise uses a highway for a runway.

Other airports in P'yongan Namdo are the large base at Kaech'on, a small airport (presently unusable) which uses the Kaech'on northwest highway as a runway, and a small airport at Maengsanup. The bases and small airports in each provinces are as follows:

P'yongan Pukdo: Bases in Sinuiju, Kusongsi Pangyon, and Taesanup, T'aesangun, and small airports at Pangyon Highway, T'aesan Northwest (unusable), Sonch'ongun Southwest, and Unsangun Sanguonri.

Hwanghae Pukdo: Three large bases, at Hwangju, Kogsan, and Kogsan South Highway, and three small airports, at Tanhung and elsewhere.

Hwanghae Namdo: Two large bases, at Guwairu and T'aet'an, and four small airports, at Haeju and elsewhere.

Kangwondo: Two large bases, at Wonsan and Saep'ogun, Hyonri, and, besides a small airport in T'ongch'ongun, Kuupri which was completed in 1983, nine small airports, including two which are unusable.

Hamgyong Namdo: Two large bases, at Hamhungsi Toksan and Chongp'yonggun, Sondok, and three small highway airports, at Sinhung and elsewhere.

Hamkyong Pukdo: One large base, at Oranggun, Haemunri, and six small airports, the northernmost of which is at Ch'ongjin.

Yanggando: One large airport, at Samjiyonsinmusong, and three small airports, at Hyesan and elsewhere.

But there are of course no airports in the important military equipment industrial area of Kanggyesi, nor in Chagangdo which is strange. Or are there

perhaps airports which are completely hidden? The base at the most northerly latitude is Sinmusong base, at the foot of Mt Paekdu.

The "Chuche" Spirit: More MiG's

In accordance with the four great military policies, most of the facilities at North Korean Air Force bases are underground or in caves deep in the mountains, making them indistinguishable from the air. Is what seems to be a small airport really a large Air Force base? The same applies to naval bases, but North Korean camouflage efforts are on a grand scale.

Last year the Soviet Union, in a 180-degree reversal of its heretofore stubborn refusal to accede to Kim Il-song's demands, supplied MiG 23's to North Korea. It was thought that during last year 40-50 planes would probably be delivered; until then there were no more than 26 planes, but almost all estimates expect that ultimately it will surely be 50 planes.

By letting Soviet fighter-bombers overfly North Korean airspace and allowing them to land at North Korean Air Force bases, North Korea is receiving large supplies of MiG 23's, is receiving SAM 3 missiles, and is being promised material and technical assistance in construction planning for nuclear power generation stations. Thanks to selling the Soviet Union on the "chuche spirit," North Korea is rapidly increasing its military power and has obtained advanced technology such as nuclear technology. The fact that North Korea underwent a military transformation as soon as Gorbachev came to power is considered highly significant and must not be taken lightly. Taking it lightly would be a fatal mistake. This is a warning not just to South Korea but to Japan and the United States as well.

The deployment of MiG 23's to North Korea has subtly altered the balance in air power between North and South Korea. The only fighter South Korea has that can oppose the MiG 23 is the F-16, but its orders for F-16A's and F-16B's total 35 planes and at the moment only a fraction of them are deployed.

But for North Korea the MiG 23 may, if not handled right, turn out to be of no practical use, because of the fuel shortage problem which we explained when discussing land forces. The scarcity of fuel seems to have made training hours insufficient for aircraft as well as for tank exercises. Judging from the total number of aircraft which North Korea is thought to have, more aircraft need to be kept in the air over North Korea constantly. Despite this, North Korea is thought to do only one-fifth of the training done in other countries.

It is widely known that two MiG 23's seem to have collided over North Korea last fall, but a lack of training makes such mishaps unavoidable. It is thought that North Korean pilots have gone to Africa and the Middle East ostensible to render assistance and have returned having practiced piloting MiG 23's. Nevertheless, training still seems to be extremely inadequate.

Personnel Management

Tokyo GUNJI KENKYU in Japanese Jun 86 pp 188-195

[All articles are written by Kin Motoyoshi, a research specialist in North Korean affairs]

[Text] Military service in the North Korean People's Army is officially for 3 and 1/2 years in the Army, 4 years in the Navy, and 4 years in the Air Force, but actually it lasts for more than 10 years: watching for a chance to invade the South.

The People's Army "Bird in a Cage" Personnel Management

In the North Korean military, personnel management can be cited as a system for ensuring constant subservience to Kim Il-song and the party. Personnel affairs in the North Korean military adhere strictly to the basic policies of the party, and this is based on the dictum of Kim Il-song: "The decisive element in the makeup of armed forces is people, and the thought and consciousness of military personnel play a decisive role in the fighting might of a military unit. The party must therefore have full authority and control in military personnel affairs."

The practical effect of this is that the right of personnel management over military personnel is exercised through an organization of political officers within the military. As we mentioned briefly in an earlier article, a distinction is made between the leadership class of officer and the rank-and-file class of enlisted men, and this distinction is maintained in classification, assignments, promotions, personnel records, and statistics.

Individual personnel changes in the military are controlled as much as possible. Officers are reassigned only when a reshuffling of personnel is unavoidable, such as when someone becomes incapable of performing his duty because of an accident or the like, when a vacancy occurs due to someone being discharged from the military, when someone's party-mindedness is weak, when personnel adjustments must be made because a unit is being created or disbanded, or when someone is sent away for long-term education.

Personnel reshuffling among enlisted men is done only in circumstances such as when the relieving of frontline units by rear area services units is unavoidable, when due to an accident a soldier is unable to perform his duties, when one is transferred to a special unit as essential personnel, when a unit is created or disbanded, when personnel reshuffling is necessary due to the reorganization of a unit, or when personnel are sent away for various types of education.

Thus both officers and enlisted men usually serve in the same unit from beginning to end; it is extremely rare to be transferred to another unit from the unit one originally was assigned to. This is why People's Army officers

and listed men who have defected from North Korea to South Korea speak of serving in the same unit for about 10 years.

This system is of great significance. When some circumstance arises within a People's Army unit, the unit must respond to it on its own. This usually makes units very clannish and resistant to the introduction of methods of other units. This nature developed a-posteriori because of the extreme limits on personnel reassignments, but the party has its own reasons for keeping personnel reassignments to a minimum.

From the party's standpoint, transferring an officer or enlisted man to another unit would give him an opportunity to compare his new unit with his old one. It is not desirable for those in the People's Army to know too much about things which do not concern them. Someone who is repeatedly transferred from unit to unit will not only come to know the internal affairs of each unit but will also become widely known, developing personal friendships and a large number of personal contacts. Such a man is a great danger to the party, which cannot allow that anyone should know too much about various matters and have friends and comrades that the party does not know about.

Strictly limiting personal contacts will prevent this, and in North Korea, where everything is under the control of the Workers Party, keeping people's personal contacts to a minimum can be done successfully as a powerful party policy. Indeed this might be called "bird in a cage" personnel management.

This policy of the party does not apply just to the People's Army; it extends to all workplaces in North Korea as well. Like in the People's Army, one cannot keep changing jobs. A fellow worker is not a friend with whom to share one's joys and sorrows, but a rival who will pull you down whenever he gets the chance. It's "today you, tomorrow me," and unless one forces a colleague to self-criticism every time something happens, one will not be safe oneself. That is the policy of the Workers Party.

Automatic Promotions Till One Reaches One's Limit


The system of ranks in the People's Army of North Korea is different from that of Japan or South Korea in both officer class and petty officer and enlisted man class. Up to the general class there are four ranks each of officers and petty officers, two ranks of enlisted men, and even two ranks of marshals. Under a Supreme People's Assembly order promulgated 31 December 1952 in the midst of the Korean conflict, military ranks are called "military designations" and the general grade is called "general ranking officer class."

From the top, the rank designations are marshal, vice marshal, general, colonel general, lieutenant general, and major general; as in the ranks of generals, there are field grade officer ranks for colonels and captains: a field grade officer ranks go up to senior colonel, and a junior grade officer ranks start from junior lieutenant and to captain. Senior enlisted personnel ranks are master sergeant, senior sergeant, sergeant, and corporal. The enlisted ranks are private 1st class and private. A senior sergeant is








also called a "chief petty officer." Kim Il-song is the sole marshal, and at present the vice marshal is O Chin-u.

Generals serve in such posts as head of the People's Armed Forces Department, chief of the general staff, and head of the General Political Affairs Bureau; at present there are 14 generals on active duty. Colonel generals serve in such posts as head of a frontline corps or assistant chief of the People's Armed Forces Department. Lieutenant generals serve in such posts as head of a Rear Area Services corps, head of a People's Armed Forces bureau, or head of a general staff bureau. Major generals serve in such posts as division commander, general staff officer, or deputy corps commander. Colonels serve in such posts as deputy division commander, division chief of staff, or corps staff officer. Senior colonels serve in such posts as regiment commander or division operations section chief. Lieutenant colonels serve in such posts as deputy regiment commander, head of an independent battalion, head of a regiment staff section, or division staff officer. Majors serve in such posts as battalion commander, People's Guard company commander, or regiment staff officer. Captains serve in such posts as deputy battalion commander, commander of an independent company, battalion chief of staff, or regiment staff section chief. Captains serve in such posts as company commander or battalion staff officer. Senior lieutenants serve in such posts as deputy company commander. Lieutenants serve in such posts as platoon commander or deputy company commander. Master sergeants serve as chief petty officers, but they are different from warrant officers. A senior sergeant serves as a deputy platoon commander, a sergeant as a squad commander, and a corporal as a deputy squad commander.

North Korean Army Rank Insignias:



[Continued on following page]

	Senior Colonel
	Colonel
	Lieutenant Colonel
	Major
	Captain
	Senior Lieutenant
	Lieutenant
	Junior Lieutenant
	Master Sergeant
	Senior Sergeant
	Sergeant
	Corporal
	Private 1st Class
	Private

High-ranking officers, of the rank senior lieutenant on up, are strictly investigated, and then given either command or staff duty. In order to be assigned to command duty one must: 1) have both political and military knowledge; 2) have a record of having successfully commanded a unit; 3) be capable of educating and commanding his own staff; 4) be capable of understanding and commanding Rear Area Services work and political activities; and 5) take an interest in the welfare of his subordinates.

In order to be assigned to staff duty one must: 1) be an expert with a high level of general and military knowledge; 2) have experience in staff

operations; 3) have a keen intellect and organizational ingenuity; and 4) be loyal and of good conduct. One deemed to fail to meet any of these qualifications is passed over for promotion and is eventually discharged from the military upon reaching retirement age.

The officer promotion system adopts a method which also uses the rank system of military designations and duties and is strongly influenced by the party's personnel management policies. Authority to decide on promotions is given to the Officer Council, and because of this party members tend to be given priority in personnel matters. Matters considered when deciding upon a promotion include length of service, service record, one's family background, one's military and party life, and how well one has obeyed regulations. In the promotion of officers, personnel are reassigned due to discharge from the service, transfer to other duties, or death, and when a vacancy occurs higher up in the military organization, capable people are assigned to higher-ranking vacant posts, and promotion recommendations are made through the chain of command. After an examination of documents by the People's Armed Forces Department General Staff Officers Bureau, the consent of the General Political Bureau is obtained and a People's Armed Forces Department order is issued. Promotion recommendations are obtained from such people as the person who is leaving the post to be filled and persons of combat valor. For regiment commander and above, the People's Armed Forces Bureau makes a direct recommendation, but what is required is not only examination and consent by the general staff and the General Political Bureau, but also the approval of the Kim Il-song organization (the party Secretariat).

The appointment management system for promotions in the People's Army is characterized by the following: 1) An appointment is decided upon by the personnel judgment of the officer staff depending on the unit's needs, and the party must consent to the appointment. 2) There is a preference system which favors the promotion of persons deemed to be superior in their family background and strong party-mindedness. 3) Normally staff officers are promoted only to staff positions, and command officers only to command positions, and after promotion one is expected to specialize and keep serving in the same chain of command. 4) The intent is to keep personnel reshuffling to a minimum, keep people serving for long periods in the same unit, and retain core combat personnel.

The factors considered when selecting someone for a post are as follows: 1) One's military record, how well one has carried out one's duties, and the term of the appointment are taken into consideration, and command or staff officers are selected from those who have served as a lower-ranking command or staff officer. 2) Combat experience is considered important; many of the first-line command officers have combat experience, and persons who have distinguished themselves in combat are given the title of "combat hero." 3) The candidate's origins must be good; he cannot become a key person in the organization if there are "suspicious elements" in his family background. 4) Preference for command and important staff posts is given to graduates of military colleges. 5) Persons who have been demoted or downgraded or have otherwise received punishments are excluded from consideration. 6) One must

receive good performance evaluations. In a company, the company commander and political deputy company commander evaluate the military and political performance of all officers in the company, and they themselves are evaluated by the battalion commander and political deputy company commander. A battalion commander and political deputy battalion commander evaluate the military and political performance of all officers in the battalion, and they themselves are evaluated by the regiment commander and political deputy regiment commander. 7) Among the factors considered when a selection is made for promotion are one's military record, combat experience, party connections, origin, ideology, performance of one's current duty, level of education, physical condition, military college graduation record, age, occupation before entering the military, commendations and punishments received, and appointments to office. 8) Evaluations and reports are made once every quarter, and at the end of the year an overall evaluation is made and kept together with one's service card by the political and officer chains of command.

As we mentioned earlier, personnel reassignments in the People's Army are kept to a minimum as a matter of principle, and since it is not easy to get permission to leave military service, vacancies in higher-ranking posts do not occur often, and the promotion escalator does not run smoothly. Thus even for persons who obviously should be promoted, their appointment to a higher-ranking post is delayed. And even when one is appointed to a higher post, he cannot obtain promotion recommendations for several months because of performance evaluations. In addition, Article 10, Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Central Committee rules provide that when one is promoted, his rank designation is made simultaneously with his being conferred a decoration for his performance. With this kind of slow promotion system, promotions in the People's Army, except for highly favored people, are very slow.

After a candidate student is commissioned as a junior lieutenant, one is promoted to captain by serving a minimum of 2 years in each rank, but as a practical matter one must serve 3 to 4 years. Next, promotion to senior colonel is about 4 to 5 years, but the promotion just from lieutenant colonel to colonel in itself takes a rather long 5 to 6 years. A minimum of 6 years of service is needed for promotion from senior colonel to major general, but actually one cannot guess how many years it will take. General-rank promotions can take extraordinarily long; there are very few persons who were promoted to beyond lieutenant generals, lieutenant generals who were promoted 20 years ago still remain as lieutenant generals.

The foregoing is the case of the land forces, but in the Air Force it seems that special promotion regulations apply. Yi Ung-p'yong, who defected to South Korea in a MiG 19 in 1983, rose to the rank of colonel by being promoted precisely every 2 years. The promotion regulations state that one must serve for 3 years as a captain before being promoted to major, and must serve in the next-lower rank for 4 years for promotion to lieutenant colonel, 6 years for colonel, and 4 years for senior colonel. In the Navy, although these regulations are not followed, it is not as bad as in the land forces. Navy

and Air Force personnel probably receive such treatment because they are technically of a different order than land force personnel.

Enlisted men are not promoted according to any regulations; when their unit falls below the prescribed strength, a minimum number of persons are promoted according to a promotion standards. In the regulations, promotions are every 6 months, Soviet-style, but since the term of service of enlisted men is very long, this regulation is a dead letter having no correspondence with actual practice. If the regulations were followed, one would rise to special-duty master sergeant in 3 years, but it actually takes 7 to 8 years. Recently 10-year stints in the military are being demanded in order to increase combat strength, and promotions in the enlisted ranks will have to become even less frequent. Those who can be recommended for promotion are those who have served in their present rank for at least 6 months, have served admirably, and are strongly party-minded. The promoted person is first appointed to the higher post, and his promotion is reported to the next higher ranking unit. Of course, party members and loyal elements are preferred. For promotion from private to private 1st class, the company commander recommends duty-devoted persons who have spent at least 6 months in the military; the regiment enlisted men's section considers the personnel makeup of the company, and promotions are made by order of the regiment commander. Petty officers are considered by the platoon Officers Council, and officers of the rank of sergeant and above are considered by the company Officers Council; written recommendations are prepared for suitable persons, and when the promotions are reported to the division enlisted men's section via the regiment enlisted men's section, promotion orders are issued in the name of the division commander. These promotion orders are usually announced by the People's Armed Forces Department on commemorative days (People's Army Foundation Day on 25 April, Labor Day on 1 May, Liberation Day on 15 August, and Administration Foundation Day on 9 September).

For a private 1st class to be promoted to corporal, he must have served as a private 1st class for at least 6 months, have served admirably, have good political activity, be appointed to a corporal post, and be recommended by the company Officers Council. In practice, a private 1st class is not recommended for promotion until he has served as a private first class for at least 3 to 4 years. The same conditions must be met for promotion from corporal to sergeant, sergeant to master sergeant, and master sergeant to senior master sergeant, but in practice the term of service must be from 1 to 2 years.

Enlisting New Troops as Occasion Demands, in Order To Build Up Military Strength

Up until January 1956 the People's Army was formally a volunteer Army, but beginning in February of that year a compulsory conscription system was instituted requiring military service from age 18 to 22 in peacetime and from age 18 to 45 in times of war.

In peacetime, callups are under the jurisdiction of the People's Armed Forces Ministry, but in times of war, pursuant to a decision of the party military committee, the Korean People's Army Supreme Command is in charge, and the Military Mobilization Bureau and the Enlisted Personnel Recruitment Bureau have jurisdiction. The People's Armed Forces Ministry Military Mobilization Bureau compiles information about the state of draft-age personnel as reported by the provincial (direct-rule city) military mobilization departments and reports the results to the Enlisted Personnel Recruitment Bureau. Based on this information, the Enlisted Personnel Recruitment Bureau drafts plans for discharge from the military and drafts personnel recruitment plans based on the personnel needs of various units, classified by military type, branch of service, unit, and time. When the Military Mobilization Bureau is asked for troops, it relays its needs to the military mobilization departments of the provinces and direct-rule cities, and each provincial military mobilization department communicates callup orders to the military mobilization departments in cities, counties, and districts. The city, county, and district military mobilization committees issue mobilization directives to the people's committees in villages, hamlets, and worker wards. The people's committees of villages, hamlets, and worker wards to which recruitment quotas have been assigned confer with the relevant party and Socialist Labor Youth League organizations and select recruits from among registered draft-age persons, and report to the city or county people's committee with a final decision.

The people's committee keeps track of an individual from the time he is 14 years old, and when he turns 15 the committee makes up a military mobilization card and keeps it on file. Those who were reported to the city or county military mobilization department as finally selected assemble at a city or county people's hospital and undergo a first physical examination. Those who pass this physical are given a draft notice and through the village, hamlet, or worker ward people's committee appear at the city or county people's committee military mobilization department, where they undergo a second physical.

Those who pass the second physical are issued uniforms and undergo the prescribed recruit training at the inductee training center for the division or regiment to which they are assigned. Upon completion of recruit training they are given assignments according to the classification of military branches and are assigned to their units. In order to maintain a uniform degree of combat readiness, no more than three or four recruits are assigned to a platoon. Draft calls are issued from time to time depending on the number of persons discharged from the military.

Among those subject to conscription are many persons who are exempt from callup or have their callup deferred. Besides those who flunk the physical, many receive a deferment for political reasons. One fails the physical if one is less than 150 cm tall, weighs less than 43 kg, or has any of various diseases (hepatitis, tuberculosis, pleurisy, color blindness, mental disorder, a venereal disease, etc.). Persons who receive a draft deferral for political reasons are: 1) persons who work in socially important professions (educators, party workers, important administrative personnel); 2) key

industrial personnel (essential locomotive and transport personnel); 3) members of the Public Security Department; 4) university students and high school students approved for promotion to university; 5) university students who have passed a military-science examination; and 6) only sons having elderly parents (father over 60, mother over 55).

In addition, persons having a bad personal background which only in North Korea is grounds for disqualification include: 1) family members who have gone over to the South or have rebelled (to the eighth degree of kinship on the father's side, to the sixth degree of kinship on the mother's side); 2) persons who have crossed over to the North from the South, and family members who were sent to the North from Japan (in the beginning, "repatriated" persons were allowed); 3) persons repatriated from other foreign countries (recently some of these have been taken into the military); and 4) persons who have served a criminal sentence.

Persons over 30 or underage who are excluded or deferred from conscription are made to undergo training with the Pacification Unit, Workers and Peasants Red Guard, or similar organizations, and persons having a bad background are made to serve in Rear Area service groups, construction gangs, or the like. University students must take a compulsory course in military training, and only those who pass the graduation examination are appointed as reserve or petty officers and accepted in militia organizations.

Insignias of the Branches of the North Korean Army



Infantry



Armored



Artillery




Engineers



Transport

[Continued on following page]



Telecommunications



Judicial Affairs



Medical Affairs



Military Music



Finance

Term of Service of 10 Years or More: Preparing for Invasion of the South

In January 1965, by order of Kim Il-song, the age bracket subject to the draft was shortened by 2 years, and from then through 1970 military service lasted from age 20 to age 25. But in 1971 the old age limits were restored, requiring that military service begins at age 18. Kim Il-song was beginning to think seriously about an invasion of the South, and he wanted to build up the army. Upon reaching the age of 17, both males and females took a preliminary physical examination, and after taking a second physical at age 18, those who passed were assigned to the military. As evidence that Kim Il-song was then seriously contemplating an invasion of the South, it suffices to point out that despite the mood of detente beginning with the North-South joint communique of 1972, the North Korean Army was secretly digging tunnels under the military demarcation line for an invasion of the South. Three tunnels were discovered, but according to the testimony of defectors there were about a dozen. In 1974 the age bracket subject to military service was again expanded by a year, to begin at age 17. But Kim Il-song, the man behind the ax murder at Panmunjom, again in that year lowered the initial draft age by a year, to age 16, while keeping the age for discharge from the military unchanged, thereby automatically increasing the length of military service. And since discharges from the military were casually postponed for those who entered at age 18, the actual length of service rose to 10 years. Not only that, but light infantry and rifle units belonging to the Reconnaissance Bureau serve for 10-13 years. And even after discharge from the military, the former soldiers belong to the Pacification Unit or the Workers and Peasants Red Guard, so that in effect the term of military service remains till age 45 (for males).

Also, a long-term service noncommissioned officer system is in effect in order to retain technically skilled noncommissioned officers for long service terms. The qualifications are that one must have superior technical skills, have a good background, and be loyal to the party. Such officers are appointed from among noncommissioned officers of the rank of sergeant and above, and serve for an additional term of 1 to 5 years following completion of their obligatory term of service. But since most noncommissioned officers have no desire to serve an extra term, volunteers are solicited by the unit commanding officer through advice and persuasion. And to secure a large number of long-termers, they are allowed to marry and live outside the barracks, receive the pay of a second lieutenant, and are given field promotions to officer.

According to Cabinet Decision No 148 of February 1956, the term of service in the People's Army is 3 years and 6 months in the land forces, 4 years in the Navy, 4 years in the Air Force, and 4 years in the technical branches of the three services. But this is now completely a dead letter, and to leave the military after the term of service set forth in this decision is absolutely impossible barring an ideological problem or physical disability.

The time for separation from the military does eventually come for those who have served for long periods. Those who have received discharge orders from the People's Armed Forces Ministry, after attending a discharge ceremony at their division or corps, go, led by an escort sent from the Military Mobilization Department, to the provincial, city, or county Military Mobilization Department and Public Safety Department, where they exchange their military identity papers for civilian identity papers, then visit their place of work unofficially decided upon beforehand and complete procedures for their job assignment, then finally return home. After a few days of rest, they report to their workplace. But those who have been discharged from the military because of bad background, ideology, or a purge, are sent to a forced labor camp immediately upon discharge from the military.

Since August 1965 officers, in principle, have not been permitted to leave the military; discharge is permitted only for persons of bad background, the infirm, persons punished by military judicial proceedings, and those who have reached the retirement age for their rank. Those discharged by reason of reaching retirement age are given preference in job assignments upon discharge.

The retirement age for military discharge is 35 for ranks junior lieutenant through senior lieutenant, 40 for captain, 45 for major, 50 for lieutenant colonel, and 55 for colonel and senior colonel. There is no retirement age for officers of ranks in the general grade.

Branches of Arms and Classifications in the Three Services

As we have already said, the People's Army is made up of the land forces, the Navy, and the Air Force.

These are under the command of the head of the People's Armed Forces Ministry, who also serves as head of the general staff. The Navy and Air Force conduct operations in the form of supporting the land forces.

The branches of each of the three services are as follows, although only the land forces seem to note these differences with collar and shoulder insignias. The branches in the land forces are infantry, armored, artillery, engineers, telecommunications, transport, finance, medical affairs, legal affairs, chemical, military music, rear area service, and veterinary physicians. What is interesting is that the insignia of the finance branch is a hammer and sickle, the well known national symbol of the Soviet Union. In the Navy, the branches of the service are different as between officers and enlisted men. And among officers there is a further division into basic branches and staff branches. The officer basic branches are navigation, artillery, engines, telecommunications, and torpedos and mines; the officer staff branches are finance, legal affairs, and medical affairs. The enlisted-rank branches are deck hands, helmsmen, electric, navigation, artillery, range finding, torpedos and mines, radio, radar, engine construction, operation, sonar, boilers, chemistry, paymaster, and waterways. In the Air Force there are special branches and general branches; the special branches are piloting, navigation, aircraft firing, control on-board telecommunications, radar, course control, telecommunications, maintenance, and aviation radio, while the general branches are transport, engineers, general telecommunications, finance, medical affairs, legal affairs, safety officers, and political officers.

In the People's Army, a branch of the service is considered one job function, and within the same branch a distinction is made between command and staff function with a further distinction made in staff functions between staff operations and technical functions. This is because of the policy of personnel management which we discussed above.

In the case of the land forces, after undergoing recruit training at individual units under each division, new recruits are evaluated by the division's enlisted men section as to their academic performance, civilian experience, physical condition, and individual skills, then classified as to branch, given their duties, and assigned to units. The assignment of recruits to the various branches is done approximately as follows:

Artillery, chemical, telecommunications, and engineering soldiers are technical school graduates. Political, security, and guard soldiers are persons of good background. Transport and finance duties are assigned to persons of social experience. Infantry is for persons having no special skills. Medical affairs, legal affairs, and military music are assigned to those having the qualifications.

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