

JPRS 72189

6 November 1978

ASIA

TRANSLATIONS ON NORTH KOREA

No. 628

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Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available through Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio, 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET		1. Report No. JPRS 72189	2.	3. Recipient's Accession No.	
4. Title and Subtitle TRANSLATIONS ON NORTH KOREA, No. 628				5. Report Date 6 November 1978	
7. Author(s)				6.	
9. Performing Organization Name and Address Joint Publications Research Service 1000 North Glebe Road Arlington, Virginia 22201				8. Performing Organization Rept. No.	
12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address As above				10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.	
				11. Contract/Grant No.	
15. Supplementary Notes				13. Type of Report & Period Covered	
				14.	
16. Abstracts The report contains articles on political, economic, sociological, military, and government events and developments in North Korea.					
17. Key Words and Document Analysis. 17a. Descriptors NORTH KOREA Propaganda Political Science Sociology Economics Military Culture (Social Sciences) Ethnology Geography					
17b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms					
17c. COSATI Field/Group 5D, 5C, 5K, 8F, 15					
18. Availability Statement Unlimited Availability Sold by NTIS Springfield, Virginia 22151				19. Security Class (This Report) UNCLASSIFIED	
				21. No. 87	
				20. Security Class (This Page) UNCLASSIFIED	
				22. Price A05	

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MILITARY AFFAIRS

'NODONG SINMUN' OBSERVES AIR FORCE DAY

Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 20 Aug 78 p 3

/Article by Han Chong-som, reporter: "The Sky of the Fatherland is an Impregnable Fortress"

/Text Our resourceful and brave people's air force, which keeps the blue skies of the socialist fatherland an impregnable fortress.

Tracing the air force's prodigious history, I recently visited a certain flight squadron which was celebrating Air Force Day.

Boundless pride and happiness were written on the coppery face of each of these air force officers and men born in the great leader's embrace and into sky sentinels, one of whom is a match for 100, into the ranks of steel which faithfully defend the fatherland's sky guardposts.

"It seems like only yesterday that the great leader set up the first air unit, and yet it has already been over 30 years. During that time our air force has developed so much that it cannot be recognized.

"I, too, who set off right after liberation following the ranks with the desire to learn air skills at Sinuiju, have grown in the embrace of the respected and beloved leader to become the commander of this flight squadron. Truly the proud history of the development of our air force would be unthinkable had it not been for the great leader's wise leadership and care..."

Thus spoke emotionally Comrade Yi Kuk-wan, with whom we met.

Right after liberation the country's situation was difficult and conditions were complicated.

Anti-party elements opposed the building of an air force by our own efforts, saying how can you build an air force with bare hands.

However, the great leader firmly beat back the obstructive machinations of the anti-party elements, personally initiated the building of the people's air force as the far-sighted vision which he had waited for since the time of the anti-Japanese revolutionary struggle, and he wisely led the work thereof.

The great leader Comrade Kim Il-song has taught:

"The establishment of an air force has very important significance for the building of a regular national military.

"Until now Korea has not had its own air force. We must establish an air force of the new Korea which can reliably defend the blue skies of our fatherland."

The great leader gathered the air technicians and the youth wishing to learn air technology scattered throughout each region into the Korean Air Association, personally becoming the chairman of the association to resolve the problems one by one and, grasping the hands of the association members, led them to lay the foundation enabling them to build the air force of new Korea.

Subsequently, at the time of the founding of the Pyongyang Academy he had an air class included there and sent the superior members of the Korean Air Association, thus rostering the framework of the yet to be organized air force unit.

Based on this kind of preparation, on 8 August 1947 the great leader finally created the first ranks of the first air force in our country's history.

The organization of the people's air force under the great leader's wise leadership was a shining victory of the immortal chuche ideology which he created and of the self-defense military line of its embodiment, our party, and constituted another proud result achieved in the building of regular revolutionary forces.

The respected and beloved leader, who created the first ranks of the people's air force, took the air force officers and men into his beneficial embrace to give them eternal political life and establish their chuche revolutionary view, and he gave his unstinging love and care to foster in our pilots the heroic qualities of courage and boldness and to give them the wings of skill and intelligence at the time of their first steps.

It was a day in December 1949.

Visiting a certain air squadron, the great leader closely observed at length the training of pilots with a broad smile on his face.

On the previous day his face had shone brightly as he watched the sons and daughters of laborers and farmers who had never seen an airplane up close, much less ride one, fly airplanes at will through the sky after such a short time.

On this day the great leader was very happy with the pilots' conduct of their training and taught them not to become complacent with success but to continue to do training well; on another day he sat knee to knee with the pilots, telling the stories of strong and wily commanders and teaching them one by one so that they would become familiar with the chuche airwar method as quickly as possible.

How warm and how great must have been the love and care received in those glorious days by the pilots who had been raised in the embrace of the great leader.

The story of the boundless love when, right after the armistice at a time when our people still had to tighten their belts and live in half-cave houses one day the great leader, visiting a certain air squadron, was touring a quarters construction site where he noticed that the walls were not thick and, worrying greatly that if the walls are thin the pilots might catch cold in the winter, awakened them to make the walls and ceiling thicker, still warms the hearts of pilots today.

That is not all.

Yesterday, worried about the rest and health of the pilots, the great leader built rest centers in scenic spots and had more snacks and milk provided them; even so, his mind was not at ease and today he visits the pilots' homes, checking their heating and even their floors, looking after them closely in all things just as though he were taking care of his own sons.

Thus the love and care of the respected and beloved leader became invincible strength and the will to annihilate enemies, vigorously calling our pilots forth to heroic exploits.

In the face of that fighting spirit and course, the enemy's "B-29," boasted as the "Flying Fortress," was pulverized in the first conflict, and the flying bandits who had bragged of their "technical superiority" were struck by the young pilots of the Republic, vomited blood and smashed into the ground.

In the face of that resourcefulness and courage, those enemy planes who crept like thieving cats onto our airspace after the war were also smashed.

We heard the following story at the double Red Flag squadron of Comrade Kang Ho-ung.

Once an enemy aircraft penetrated deeply into the republic's airspace, trying foolishly to discover the preparedness of our air force.

Leaving base immediately upon receiving sortie orders, pilot comrades Kim To-ryon and Kim Ha-yong speedily made contact with and closed in upon the enemy aircraft.

As soon as one of the enemy aircraft was tailed, the other began firing and railing.

However, pilot Kim Ha-yong closed in calmly, caught the enemy plane fully in his sights and finished him off.

Upon losing its leader, the other plane, with no thought of standing its ground turned tail and fled. It is known, however, that the plane which fled subsequently crashed and exploded while landing at its airfield.

Today our air force has grown incomparably strong.

An example is the squadron of Comrade Kang Ho-ung.

By further strengthening the study of the great leader's works and the teachings, particularly the on-the-spot teachings to squadrons, which he has given to their air force sector and actively carrying out revolutionary indoctrination and class indoctrination, all the pilots and technical maintenance crews in the squadron have been stoutly armed with the party's unitary ideology, and have been stoutly prepared to be chuche type revolutionaries who will devotedly fight in the fulfillment of the revolutionary tasks entrusted to them by the leader without wavering no matter the difficult circumstances.

All the pilots in the squadron have grown into one-against-100 skysky sentinels who can unfailingly make 100 percent contact and 100 percent annihilation no matter the complex atmospheric conditions or situation.

This is not limited to the pilots of Comrade Kang Ho-ung's squadron.

All our pilots and technical crews are so prepared.

Our people's air force, born in the embrace of the great leader and receiving his leadership, is invincible, and the skies of our fatherland protected by our brave "hawks" is always an impregnable fortress.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS

PARTY DAILY COMMEMORATES NAVY DAY

Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 28 Aug 78 p 4

/Article by Pak Chun-chaе, reporter: "The Sailors Defending the Fatherland's Seas as a Fortress"/

/Text/ Today is Navy Day, the meaningful holiday of our brave and resourceful sailors who defend the Fatherland's seas as a fortress.

On this day we look back emotionally on the proud, victory-and glory-filled course walked by our heroic people's military sailors under the wise leadership of the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song, and recently we visited the unit of the Korean people's sailor Pang Chang-hwan.

The ships floating majestically on the sea where blue waves were tossing, the one-can-defeat-100 omnipotent sailors whose seawind tanned faces overflowed with confidence and fighting spirit, these things filled the hearts of us watching with endless pride.

The great leader Comrade Kim Il-song has taught:

"We do not intend to invade any other country, but we must always be prepared timely to repel an enemy should he attack. In order to repel an enemy coming by sea, we must strengthen our navy."

Deeply aware of the importance to our country of the building of a naval force since our country is surrounded by water on three sides, immediately after liberation the great leader set forth guidelines for building a chuche naval force, and, using the anti-Japanese fighters whom he himself has trained as the backbone, he established our country's first regular naval force. One commander of the unit who met us told about this with deep emotion.

As busy as he was right after liberation with the construction of a new fatherland, the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song considered the building of a regular naval force to be an urgent problem which could not be delayed, and wisely led the struggle for its realization.

In order to select a site for the Maritime Security Cadre School, the prototype of the navy's cadre training base, the great leader traveled far from the capital to the shores of the Eastern Sea where he laid out the solid site for the training of naval cadre while walking at length in the morning dew of the soggy paths.

With the establishment of the Maritime Security Cadre School under the wise leadership of the great leader, superior naval cadre ranks of men of worker and farmer origin were solidly formed around the anti-Japanese fighter backbone.

August 28, 1949!

Our people and our navy officers and men will never forget this day, along with the immortal traces engraved on the navy's path to establishment and strengthening and development.

Visiting the sailors of the distant Eastern Sea that day, the respected and beloved leader paid no heed to the bracing ocean weather as he boarded the ship to breathe the sea breeze at length with the sailors and to give them resourcefulness and courage. That day the great leader looked after their life, saying that since sailors, unlike other branches of the military, are always away from land living on the sea, they should be well-fed and clothed.

Thus it was in the wise leadership and warm care of the respected and beloved leader that our country created its first fleet and could inform the world of the birth of a regular naval force.

The birth of the Korean people's navy is another shining result produced by the great leader's original ideology about the building of chuche type revolutionary forces.

Devoting deep concern to the work of strengthening the armament of the navy in developing it into a modern military force, the great leader, on the far course of on-the-spot guidance and with no chance to rest from his accumulated weariness, visited a certain port to see for himself the test run of a ship made by the working class; he was very happy that our working class could already make such a good ship and he gave them great faith and love, even naming the ship the "Labor."

Comrade Yom Mun-hae told us the following story.

When visiting this unit one day in the summer of 1968, the great leader paid no heed to the sun beating down on the decks as he boarded even the patrol ships to warmly look after the life of the sailors with his fatherly love.

Visiting the steaming galley, the beloved and respected great leader unreservedly grasped the wet hands of the soldiers and inquired about their

life; even though he had sent radios and musical instruments such as accordions so that they could lead a merry and cultural life and not miss the land while out at sea, his mind was not at ease and he personally toured even the washrooms to look closely after the life of the sailors.

Indeed the love and care the great leader has devoted to our sailors is boundless.

Saying that the hands and feet of the sailors should not freeze when out to sea in winter, the great leader bestowed his great love by sending fur overcoats, fur gloves, naval winter shoes and fur hats, even though the country was in a strained situation, as well as by making and sending various canned goods so that the sailors could eat meat and vegetables without much processing.

Shiningly recorded in the glory-filled course of victory walked by our people's navy under the wise leadership of the great leader are many exploits of the one-against-100 sailors; such as the sinking of the American imperialist middle cruiser, boasted of as the "moving ocean island", with four torpedoes by our youthful sailors at the severe time of the Fatherland Liberation War and the capturing of the American imperialist armed spy ship, the Pueblo, which had penetrated deep into our territorial waters after the war.

Today, the sailors of Comrade Pang Chang-hwan's unit are upholding with their hearts the great leader's on-the-spot teachings and are carrying out their days of guard duty with loyalty.

The sailors of this unit, including comrades Kim Chol-su, Kim Tae-sok, Yu Yong-il and Kim Chang-ik, carry the great leaders on-the-spot teachings to carry out much training so as to enhance their skills in their hearts, and are raising their professional skills as well as vigorously conducting training to solidly prepare themselves as one-against-100 omnipotent sailors.

Overflowing with the burning loyalty to protect and defend the great leader with political ideology and with their lives, our one-against-100 sailors are today solidly prepared to splendidly carry out their battle duties no matter the unfavorable maritime conditions.

The seas of the fatherland, defended by our heroic naval officers and men who are solidly armed with the chuche naval battle method, strategy and tactics taught by the great leader along with modern military scientific technology, are an impregnable fortress.

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CSO: 4208

ECONOMY

INFORMATION ON NORTH KOREAN INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES

[The following information on North Korean factories, mines and other industrial facilities has been extracted from Korean language sources published in Pyongyang. The following abbreviations are used in the sourcelines: NS = NODONG SINMUN; MC = MINJU CHOSON; NC = NODONG CH'ONGNYON.]

Sariwon Machinery Factory	processing steel to make steel-benders and various kinds of wire (NS 1 Aug 78 p 3)
Tanch'on Mining Machinery Factory	doubled production of freight cars, electric cars, and grinders compared with before the "100 days of combat" (NC 2 Aug 78 p 1)
Chonch'on Rock Drill Factory	SWYL and youth forming shock brigades and vanguards to participate in the "100 days of combat" (NC 2 Aug 78 p 1)
Hoeryong Shoe Factory	exceeded half-year plans in shoe production (NS 3 Aug 78 p 3)
Ch'ondong Mine	raising iron ore production during the "100 days of combat" (NS 4 Aug 78 p 3)
Ch'olwon Mine	at 60 of the "100 days of combat" has overfulfilled quotas by 60 percent. (NS 5 Aug 78 p 1)
Yangdok Wood Chemical Factory	more than tripling production over the same period last year (NS 5 Aug 78 p 1)
Tokhyon Mine	normalizing high standards of iron ore production with the aid of three revolutions team members (NS 5 Aug 78 p 3)

30 October Factory	increasing production of bearings with aid of three revolutions team members (NS 5 Aug 78 p 3)
Yongbuk Coal Mine	youth pit has increased daily production plan 1.5 times (MC 5 Aug 78 p 3)
8 February Union Youth Coal Mine	one company produced 10,520 tons of coal in a month and several platoons exceeded 10,000 tons (NS 6 Aug 78 p 1)
Unjon Metallurgical Building Materials Factory	overfulfilled year's plan by 3 percent as of 1 August (NS 6 Aug 78 p 1)
ChonCh'on Match Factory	finished half-year plan early, with help of three revolutions team members (NS 6 Aug 78 p 3)
Pyongyang Textile Machine Factory	exceeded "100 days of combat" quotas by 9 percent, as of 3 July (NS 6 Aug 78 p 3)
Hwadae Farm Machinery Factory	raised production of small farm machinery to 8 times previous production (NS 6 Aug 78 p 3)
Sinuiju Spinning Machinery Factory	overfulfilled its "100 days of combat" quota by 42 percent as of the end of July (NS 7 Aug 78 p 3)
Kwangch'on Foodstuffs Factory	processing grain, fruit, and seafood (NS 7 Aug 78 p 3)
Paech'on Disabled Veterans' Foodstuffs Factory	exceeded "100 days of combat" plan by 13 percent, and year plan by 5 percent in processing fruits and vegetables (NS 8 Aug 78 p 1)
Haeju Tractor Parts Factory	conducting political work in support of the "100 days of combat" (NS 8 Aug 78 p 2)
Hamhung Trailing Farm Machinery Factory	processing shop exceeded production plans for rice transplanting machinery parts by more than 20 percent. (MC 8 Aug 78 p 1)
Yongyang Mine	improving excavation during the "100 days of combat" (MC 8 Aug 78 p 3)

Iwon Mine	each platoon and company is exceeding combat quotas by 1.2-1.5 times daily (NS 9 Aug 78 p 1)
3 April Factory	doubled results in machine tool production (MC 9 Aug 78 p 1)
4 June Rolling Stock Factory	increasing production of heavy-duty freight cars (MC 9 Aug 78 p 3)
Hamhung Disabled Veterans' Medical Instruments Factory	converting to press production (NS 10 Aug 78 p 1)
Sinuiju Streptomycin Factory	conducting political work in support of the "100 days of combat" (NS 10 Aug 78 p 2)
Pyongyang Plastic Building Materials Factory	raising production of hoses for agricultural work (NS 10 Aug 78 p 2)
Songnim Foodstuffs Factory	exceeded year's plan by 13 percent in meat, fruit, and vegetable processing as of 4 August (NS 10 Aug 78 p 3)
Haeju Trailing Farm Machinery Factory	increased production of rice harvesters during "100 days of combat" (NS 10 Aug 78 p 3)
Songnim Foodstuffs Factory	overfulfilled year's plan on 4 August by 13 percent (MC 10 Aug 78 p 1)
Songjim Fireproof Goods Factory	modernizing refining process (MC 10 Aug 78 p 2)
Pyongyang Grain Factory	producing refined sugar, confectionaries, oils, (MC 10 Aug 78 p 3)
Ulliyul Mine	raised iron ore production 1.2 times during the "100 days of combat" (MC 11 Aug 78 p 3)
Musan Mine	setting up plans for running equipment fully (MC 11 Aug 78 p 3)
Tokhyon Mine	raising iron ore production and carrying out plans to prevent monsoon damage (MC 11 Aug 78 p 3)

Sariwon Shoe Factory	SWYL members and youth finished early both "100 days of combat" and year's quota (NC 11 Aug 78 p 1)
Songsan Mine	decreased electricity consumption 15 percent; should be able to save 10,000 kw/hours every month (NC 11 Aug 78 p 1)
8 August Factory	making large-size machinery, including equipment for shop enlargement (NC 11 Aug 78 p 3)
Pyongyang Women's Clothing Factory	as of 4 August, exceeded "100 days of combat" quota by .2 percent (NS 12 Aug 78 p 3)
Sungni Victory Truck Consolidated Factory	increasing mechanization of "Konsol-ho" production (NS 12 Aug 78 p 3)
Kusong Bicycle Factory	raised July production 10 percent over June (MC 12 Aug 78 p 3)
Factory where Comrade An Kuk-yol Works	studying the deeds of the anti-Japanese guerrillas (NC 12 Aug 78 p 2)
Pyongyang Elevator Factory	youth workers struggling to increase elevator production (NC 12 Aug 78 p 3)
Yomju Caustic Soda Plant	youth workers exceeded "100 days of combat" quotas by 9 percent as of 29 July (NC 12 Aug 78 p 3)
Hamhung Silk Mill	finished half year plan early (NS 1e Aug 78 p 1)
Nampo Glass Factory	one shop is doubling plate glass production (MC 13 Aug 78 p 1)
Munch'on Coal Mine	making and utilizing 20-ton mine cars (NC 14 Aug 78 p 1)
Hyesan Disabled Veterans' Daily Necessities Factory	recently made 22,600 trunks and some 90,000 briefcases (NS 14 Aug 78 p 3)
Nyongbyon Silk Goods Factory	fulfilling all indices of the "100 days of combat" quotas (NS 14 Aug 78 p 3)
Ch'ongsu Chemicals Factory	Phosphorous shop raised scope of phosphorous fertilizer production 5 percent (NS 15 Aug 78 p 1)

Unhung Mine	installing new compressors (NS 15 Aug 78 p 2)
3 April Factory	exceeding daily plans by 100 percent (NS 16 Aug 78 p 1)
Paekam Coal Mine	completed "100 days of combat" quotas (NS 16 Aug 78 p 1)
8 November Mine	youth workers doubled iron production during the "100 days of combat" (NC 16 Aug 78 p 1)
Manp'o Towel Factory	SWYL members and youth overfulfilled first year's tasks of the seven-year-plan by .7 percent (NC 16 Aug 78 p 1)
Kowon Coal Mine	tunnellers have doubled boring speed (NS 17 Aug 78 p 1)
Kaesong Garment Factory	as of 10 August, overfulfilled year's plan by 6.7 percent (MC 17 Aug 78 p 1)
Haeju Trailing Farm Machinery Factory	increasing production of rice harvesting machines (MC 17 Aug 78 p 2)
Hamhung Textile Machinery Parts Plant	conducting political work in support of "100 days of combat" quota fulfillment (NS 18 Aug 78 p 2)
Namp'o Fishing Implements Factory	as of 20 July, exceeded "100 days of combat" quotas by 2.6 percent and year's plan by 2.3 percent (NS 18 Jul 78 p 3)
Hasong Tire Factory	raising production with help of three revolutions team members (NS 18 Aug 78 p 4)
Pyongyang Silk Mill	overfulfilled "100 days of combat" quotas by .3 percent as of 13 August (NS 19 Aug 78 p 1)
Pyongyang Pharmaceuticals Factory	made 10 types of new pharmaceuticals and lowered prime cost 5 percent (NS 20 Aug 78 p 1)
Kumsong Tractory Factory	doubling production of materials for "P'ung-nyon-ho" tractors (MC 20 Aug 78 p 1)

28 August Factory	within the tripling of industrial production, raised production of loaders 1.5 times, crushers 1.7 times, and slurry pumps 3 times (MC 20 Aug 78 p 3)
Factory where Comrade O T'ae-chuk Works	fulfilled "100 days of combat" quotas on milling machine processing parts (NC 20 Aug 78 p 1)
Sinuiju Pulp Factory	all units exceeded "100 days of combat" quotas by 30-40 percent (NS 21 Aug 78 p 3)
Kangso Coal Mine	miners in the youth pit are exceeding fixed plans by 50 percent and raising extraction rate 80 percent (NS 22 Aug 78 p 3)
Pyongyang Consolidated Textile Mill	as of the 20th, exceeded industrial general production for "100 days of combat" by .2 percent and textile types by 2 percent (NS 23 Aug 78 p 1)
Kusong Bicycle Factory	last month exceeded bicycle production plan by 10 percent (NS 24 Aug 78 p 3)
Yangdok Wood Chemicals Factory	increasing resin production during "100 days of combat" (NS 24 Aug 78 p 4)
Ch'olsan Mine	miners of the Susan Submine overfulfilled daily ore production plans by 40 percent (NS 25 Aug 78 p 2)
Chungsan Mine	as of 20 August, overfulfilled "100 days of combat" quotas by 10 percent in strip-ping, exploratory tunnelling by 26 percent, strip preparator tunnelling 5 percent, and was even in phosphorous ore (NS 26 Aug 78 p 1)
Pyongyang Mining Machinery Factory	as of 19 August, exceeded "100 days of combat" quotas by 1.5 percent (NS 26 Aug 78 p 3)
Kumya Youth Coal Mine	as of 16 August, SWYL members and youth completed all goals of "100 days of combat" (NC 26 Aug 78 p 1)

8 August Factory	sends machine equipment to various factories, including Hoech'on Machine Tool Factory and Nakwon Machinery Factory (MC 27 Aug 78 p 1)
8 February Vinalon Plant	raising carbide production 30 percent, vinalon and vinyl chloride production 35 percent daily during the "100 days of combat" (MC 27 Aug 78 p 2)
Ullyul Mine	as of the 20th, completed "100 days of combat" quotas (NS 28 Aug 78 p 1)
P'ungnyon Mine	raising phosphorous ore production with aid of three revolutions team members (NS 28 Aug 78 p 4)
Kwisong Saltern	as of 22nd, raised salt production 24 percent, when compared with last year's results (NS 28 Aug 78 p 4)
Sinuiju Textile Machinery Factory	exceeded "100 days of combat" plans with aid of three revolutions team members (NS 29 Aug 78 p 2)
28 September Factory	producing pumps of various standards at 1.2 times the "100 days of combat" plan (NS 29 Aug 78 p 1)
Namp'o Glass Factory	doubling production of plate glass (NS 30 Aug 78 p 3)

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ECONOMY

BRIEFS

CHEMICAL FIBERS--The chemical fibers consolidated textile shop of the Pyongyang Consolidated Textile Mill is overfulfilling its "100 days of combat" plans, and is serving the national interest by conserving a great deal of labor and vinalon fiber. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 1 Aug 78 p 3] 9122

TEXTILE MILLS--Pyongyang city textile mills have produced a great deal of knitted clothing during the "100 days of combat." The Mangyongdae Textile Mill has been producing at well over its average prior to the "100 days." The Pyongyang Children's Textile Mill set high goals for the period and is endeavoring to achieve them, raising daily average results 1.5 times over before. The Nangnang [Lolang] Textile Mill is also registering good daily results. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 2 Aug 78 p 3] 9122

MACHINE REPAIR--Workers at the Sariwon Machine Repair Factory completed their year's plan on 10 July and finished their "100 days of combat" quotas on the 20th. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 2 Aug 78 p 3] 9122

CHEMICAL FACTORY CONSTRUCTION--Around the circumference of the main building area at the Aoji Chemical Factory construction site are a liquid ammonia storage building and gas tanks, as well as a rotational water pump. The first shop of the 34th Chemical Factory Construction Station, responsible for main building activation tower foundation construction, finished the job in one week. The third shop, working on large-size compressor foundation construction, finished three sites in 10 days, one-third the projected time. Youth shock brigades doubled and tripled foundation digging speed. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 2 Aug 78 p 3] 9122

RAILROAD CARGO--Thirty-five stations under the Pyongyang Railroad Bureau have overfulfilled their year's cargo haulage plan. These stations include those at Pyongyang, Sop'o, Sinsongch'on, Kump'yong, Milim, Sunan, Hwasong, Chasan, Hwangju, Haeju Youth, and Sariwon Youth stations. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 2 Aug 78 p 1] 9122

FOOTGEAR PRODUCTION--The Pyongyang Vinyl Chloride Footwear Factory is producing 1.3 times their plans daily, with 10,000 more pairs of shoes daily than before the "100 days of combat." The Sunch'on Shoe Factory raised its speed 1.2 times in high quality shoe production. The Pyongyang Shoe Factory and Sinuiju Footwear Factory are also producing footgear of high quality. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 2 Aug 78 p 1] 9122

PAPER MILL PRODUCTION--Workers at the Pot'onggang Paper Mill are participating in the "100 days of combat" to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the republic with increased production. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 3 Aug 78 p 3] 9122

TEXTILE INDUSTRY--Factories under the General Bureau of Textile Industry are modernizing to increase production speed. The Pyongyang Consolidated Textile Mill is overfulfilling its plans by an average of 18 percent, and increasing cloth production with vinalon fiber through aid from three revolutions team members. The Pyongyang Silk Mill is exceeding combat quotas by 38 percent daily. The Pakch'on Silk Goods Factory is exceeding combat quotas by 15 percent and is raising cloth production. The Hamhung Silk Mill and Pukch'ong Cloth Factory are exceeding plans by 40-70 percent every day. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 5 Aug 78 p 3] 9122

CHEMICAL FACTORY CONSTRUCTION--Workers at the Ponghwa Chemical Factory are concentrating efforts on high-tension electric wire construction and railroad spur construction in order to finish first stage construction during the "100 days of combat." [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 6 Aug 78 p 1] 9122

COMBAT QUOTAS ATTAINED--Sixteen factories in South Hwanghae Province finished their "100 days of combat" quotas as of the end of July. The Ongjim Textile Mill raised production 1.5 times over production before the "100 days." The Chaeryong Machine Repair Factory and T'aet'an Farm Machinery Factory established positive processes in materials production. Various food processing factories, including the Sinch'on Foodstuffs Factory, raised utilization standards for rural produce. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 7 Aug 78 p 1] 9122

SALT PRODUCTION INCREASES--Workers at Kwisong Saltern exceeded their year's salt production plan, raising production 54.1 percent, compared with the same time last year. The saltern lowered the prime cost more than eight percent over its plan. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 8 Aug 78 p 3] 9122

SCIENTISTS AID INDUSTRY--The 17 February Scientists' Shock Brigade visited the Kim Ch'aek Iron Works to aid in modernizing the ferrous metal industry. The scientists helped double tunnelling speed and stripping in just a few months at the Anju Coal Mining Complex. They gave help in raising the quality of magnesia at the Tanch'on Magnesia Plant. Scientists also achieved good results at the Youth Chemical Complex and the Sunch'on Cement Plant. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 11 Aug 78 p 4] 9122

MINING SURVEYS--The Geologic Survey Station Where Comrade Chong Yun-ho Works is undertaking scientific surveys concerning mine prospects. Each squad and company has already completed its year's plan. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 12 Aug 78 p 3] 9122

NATURAL RESOURCES MINISTRY--Geologic survey stations subordinate to the Ministry of Resource Development, such as those at Paech'on, P'yongch'on, and Hyongbong have all completed their "100 days of combat" quotas in seeking mines and coal mines. The Hyongbong Geologic Survey Station, which showed great results in seeking coal veins in the Tokch'on region, has also been useful in locating underground water. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 12 Aug 78 p 1] 9122

BEARING PRODUCTION--The 30 October Factory has increased bearing production, with the aid of three revolutions team members. The electricity shop is also producing 70 kinds of electric control tools, including tip switch frames. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 12 Aug 78 p 3] 9122

NAMP'O IMPROVEMENT--Socialist Working Youth League members and youth have formed 48 shock brigades for construction work. Youth at the Namp'o Glass Factory, Namp'o Electrode Factory, port enlargement construction site, and boat building combat site are setting new records. Also participating are youth from the city communications station, Namp'o Children's Medicine Plant, Namp'o Dyestuff Factory, and Samhwach'on Public Park construction site. [Pyongyang NODONG CH'ONGNYON in Korean 12 Aug 78 p 1] 9122

RAILROAD ELECTRIFICATION--Youth construction workers of the third battalion, working on railroad electrification between Taedonggang and Sinsongch'on have already finished 15 important projects. [Pyongyang NODONG CH'ONGNYON in Korean 12 Aug 78 p 3] 9122

SUNCH'ON COAL COMPLEX--The Sunch'on Region Coal Mining Complex, with the help of three revolutions team members, exceeded its July plan, despite monsoon weather. At the Yongdae Coal Mine, not only was production at a high level, workers laid 700 meters of mine car track and five conveyer belts. The Sinch'ang Coal Mine showed good results for July, while the 8 February Union Coal Mine and Ch'onsong Youth Coal Mine completed their "100 days of combat" quotas early. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 13 Aug 78 p 1] 9122

LAND TRANSPORTATION SUCCESSES--Units subordinate to the General Bureau of Land Transportation finished their "100 days of combat" transport quotas, raising freight haulage by a daily average of 33 percent. Mobile units of the Pyongyang Long-distance Vehicle Management Bureau, such as the Haeju Short-distance Vehicle Transport Station and Pyongyang First Special Vehicle Mobile Units, completed their quotas in mid-July. Transport combatants of the Unsan Short-distance Vehicle Transport Station are doubling plans daily, with increased trailer utilization rates. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 13 Aug 78 p 1] 9122

NAMP'O PORT IMPROVEMENT--Enterprises in Namp'o are showing unprecedented innovations in production and construction, while city administration economic organs are conducting political work at dock enlargement sites and production sites. In order to enlarge and modernize the port for generating foreign trade, construction workers of the Port Construction Work Station are progressing on embankment retaining wall construction. The third operations team is exceeding by 100-200 percent the large-size material fabrication amounts assigned them. The crane operations team is exceeding planned quotas by 300 percent daily in pile driving. The second steeplejack work team finished first stage materials assembly. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 13 Aug 78 p 1] 9122

CH'ONGCH'ONG REGION PLANTS--On the banks of the Ch'ongch'on River, the Youth Chemicals Consolidated Work Station is progressing on construction of a polyethylene factory and anilon factory, putting in circular storage tanks, pipes, towers, and subordinate buildings. The shop responsible for the no 3 tank is using cranes to install heat insulation materials. At the Anilon factory, the First Chemical Factory Equipment Assembly has finished assembly of important equipment for the synthesizing process and stock solution system, and is working on pipe construction and heat insulation operations. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 14 Aug 78 p 3] 9122

NAJIN RAILWAY OPERATIONS--Workers at the Najim Station are guaranteeing accident-free operations. To this end, inspection personnel are intensifying inspection of trains. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 15 Aug 78 p 3] 9122

YONGYANG MINE--At the Yongyang Mine of the Tanch'on Region Coal Mining Complex, miners at the Tonsan pit accomplished goals in July which were 13 percent over April's. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 16 Aug 78 p 2] 9122

ONGJIN SURVEY UNIT--The Ongjim Geologic Survey Unit is gaining successes in seeking apatite sources. They were awarded the "Kim Il-song badge" for the accomplishment of creating an average of one new mine every two years. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 16 Aug 78 p 4] 9122

CHANGANG FACTORY ACHIEVEMENTS--As of the 10th, 36 factories in Changang Province finished their "100 days of combat" early. The Manp'o Disabled Veterans' Socks Factory exceeded its quotas by 4 percent. The Kanggye Textile Mill greatly raised cloth production. Others included the Sichung Iron Products Factory, Wiwon Furniture Factory, Kanggye Domestic Family and Children's Cloth Factory, and the Chonch'on Oil Stove Factory. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 16 Aug 78 p 1] 9122

ECONOMIC SERVICES EXPANDED--The Kuyok [district] administrative committee for Hamhung city's Sap'o-kuyok, taking to heart the great leader's teachings on commercial sector work, are conducting political work to widen welfare activities at "100 days of combat" sites. District commercial, service,

and public food supply functionaries are increasing quick lunch outlets, mobile stores, and cool drink stands for factories and construction sites. Functionaries of the Undok Consolidated Store and Undok Fish Market have set up mobile stores by factory gates to be of service to the workers. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 16 Aug 78 p 2] 9122

TELEVISION FACTORY CONSTRUCTION--The Ch'ollikil [Thousand-li road] Youth Shock Brigade at the Taedonggang Television Receiver Factory construction site is finishing excavation and working on upwards of 200 meters of roads. Workers of the fourth company of the second batallion are working on cable inlet pipe construction. [Pyongyang NODONG CH'ONGNYON in Korean 16 Aug 78 p 1] 9122

SHIP REPAIR FACTORY--As of 31 July, the Songnam Ship Repair Factory exceeded its "100 days of combat" quotas. They have lowered by 7.2 days the repair period per ship, compared with the same period last year, and raised the number of ships repaired by 1.2 times. The engine assembly work team is producing spare parts and has exceeded plans by 1.5-2 times. The hull repair team has also greatly exceeded plans. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 17 Aug 78 p 1] 9122

COLLEGE HOSPITAL PHARMACY--The Pyongyang Medical College Hospital Pharmacy is struggling to produce medicine of several varieties. Workers pick medicinal herbs according to season, as well as cultivate herbs on ten chongbo of ground. For modern processing, they have made sugar-coating machines, dessicating machines, and crushers. The hospital produces 160 types of herbal medicines, 100 types of injective medicines, and 80 types of tablets. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 17 Aug 78 p 4] 9122

BRIDGE OPENING--A local meeting was held on the 17th to celebrate the opening of the Ch'ongch'on Bridge. The bridge accommodates both pedestrian and vehicle traffic, and ships may pass beneath it. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 18 Aug 78 p 1] 9122

REGIONAL INDUSTRY SUCCESSES--120 factories subordinate to the South Hamgyong General Bureau of Regional Industries have completed "100 days of combat" quotas. For example, the Iwon Chemical Goods Factory has produced more cream, toothpaste, perfume, and shoe polish. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 19 Aug 78 p 1] 9122

TOKCH'ON COAL COMPLEX--The coal mining machinery factory of the Tokch'on Coal Mining Complex fulfilled its "100 days of combat" quotas with the help of three revolutions team members. The automation shop has made 75-ton friction presses, 100-ton presses, and 500-ton presses. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 19 Aug 78 p 3] 9122

KRAFT PAPER FACTORY--Workers of the 35th Chemical Plant Construction Station, at the construction site of the Hoeryong Kraft Paper Factory, are finishing

equipment assembly work. The first shop is pouring concrete pillars and is engaged in large-scale structural assembly. Other shops have basically completed building wall frames and roof construction at the subsidiary facilities construction yard. Workers are exceeding their plans in pipe fitting by 1.4 times, having completed work on kilns, tanks, and large and small pumps. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 19 Aug 78 p 1] 9122

MACHINE REPAIR FACTORY--The Unp'a Machine Repair Factory has finished its year's plan by installing machine tools and increasing levels of conversion to press and dies. Workers have repaired construction and building equipment. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 20 Aug 78 p 2] 9122

HWANGHAE BUREAU SUCCESSES--As of the 18th, the South Hwanghae General Bureau of Regional Industry completed "100 days of combat" quotas early. The Chungso Chemical Plant has modernized facilities and produced more caustic soda and hydrochloric acid. The Chaeryong Chemical Plant is automating and raising production speed 1.5 times. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 21 Aug 78 p 3] 9122

TANCH'ON SHIP REPAIR--The Tanch'on Ship Repair Factory, with help from three revolutions team members, has exceeded its daily plans. Workers finished their first half year plan early, and exceeded their July plan by 25 percent. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 21 Aug 78 p 3] 9122

ELECTRIC LOCOMOTIVE FACTORY--The Kim Chong-dae Electric Locomotive Factory has set a goal of raising production 2.5 times during the 7 year plan. To this end, cadres and three revolutions team members are conducting political work on fully utilizing the 480-minute work period. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 22 Aug 78 p 3] 9122

COAL MINE ACHIEVEMENTS--Workers at the Kumya Youth Coal Mine completed their "100 days of combat" quotas as of the 16th. At the Paegam Coal Mine, with three revolutions team members' aid in repairs, workers exceeded combat quotas 1.4 times daily. The Yongdae Coal Mine has raised production through increased tunnelling speed. Workers and three revolutions team members at Sinyuson Coal Mine are normalizing high production standards by modernizing and enlarging extraction facilities. Workers and three revolutions team members at the Sillip, Chuwon, and Kangdong Coal Mines are increasing speed to fulfill "100 days of combat" quotas early. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 22 Aug 78 p 1] 9122

NON-FERROUS MINERALS MINING--Miners and three revolutions team members at various mines subordinate to the Changang Province Non-ferrous Metallurgical Industry Management Bureau are increasing ore production. Workers at the Wiwon Mine have completed all indices of their "100 days of combat" quotas. The Changgang Mine has achieved great results in ore production. Yongun Mine miners have doubled production through new blasting techniques. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 23 Aug 78 p 1] 9122

FREIGHTER LAUNCHED--The Namp'o Shipyard has built and launched the 20,000-ton freighter "Yonp'ung-ho" in honor of the 30th anniversary of the republic. The freighter, launched on the 22nd, is replete with loading and unloading facilities, as well as modern crew quarters and service facilities. This is the latest product of the shipyard which built such other 20,000-ton ships as the "Taedong-ho" and the "Ch'ongch'ong-ho." [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 24 Aug 78 p 1] 9122

CHEMICAL PLANT CONSTRUCTION--The 34th Chemical Plant Construction Station, at the Aoji Chemical Plant Construction site, is working on foundation construction for large-size compressors. Construction of the main building activation tower foundations, said to require more than a month, was done in one week. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 25 Aug 78 p 1] 9122

YANGGANG REGIONAL INDUSTRIES--Regional Industries of Yanggang Province finished their "100 days of combat" quotas 18 or more days early. The Hyesan Disabled Veterans' Daily Necessities Factory and the Hyesan Footwear Factory greatly increased production with the help of three revolutions team members. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 26 Aug 78 p 1] 9122

POWER STATION OPERATIONS--Workers are operating generators in accordance with technical standards at the Sodusu Power Plant, and the station is normalizing high standards of power production. The Kanggye Youth Power Plant is steadily increasing power production; the first youth generator shop saved great amounts of water by raising power output per ton of water. Power combatants at Sup'ung Power Plant are achieving great results in power production. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 26 Aug 78 p 1] 9122

FERTILIZER PRODUCTION--Chemical fertilizer combatants of the Youth Chemical Complex have been setting new records since the first of the year. The ammonia shop obtains more gas for production by eliminating loss and recycling waste gas to the maximum. The urea shop had adjusted the high pressure ammonia pump system and is operating machinery in accordance with materials and temperature conditions. Workers at the Ch'ongsu Chemical Plant have already finished their whole year's phosphate fertilizer plan. The Hungnam Fertilizer Complex is daily fulfilling "100 days of combat" plans. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 26 Aug 78 p 1] 9122

'COMBAT' QUOTAS MET--As of 20 August, 2,150 factories and enterprises nationally have fulfilled their "100 days of combat" quotas. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 27 Aug 78 p 1] 9122

PYONGYANG REGIONAL INDUSTRIES--Enterprises subordinate to the Pyongyang city General Bureau of Regional Industries have fulfilled established quotas for the "100 days of combat." Two such enterprises are the Pyongyang Consolidated Furniture Factory and the Pyongyang Cosmetics Factory. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 29 Aug 78 p 3] 9122

T'AET'AN MINE--The T'aet'an Mine exceeded its "100 days of combat" iron ore production plan, as of 26 August. In the transport sector, workers doubled large-size truck cargo and exceeded ore transport plans 1.2-1.5 times. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 29 Aug 78 p 1] 9122

INCREASED SALT PRODUCTION--Salterns subordinate to the Bureau of Salt Industries Management have exceeded production plans by 16 percent, on a daily average. The Kwison Saltern, as of the 22nd, produced 24 percent more salt compared with last year's results. The Namsi Saltern raised production by more than 20 tons, compared with average results last year. The Kwangnyangman and Kumsong Salterns have also finished their year's salt production plans. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 29 Aug 78 p 1] 9122

RESERVOIR CONSTRUCTION--The Kaesong City 13 October Youth Shock Brigade is engaged in construction at the Youth Reservoir construction site. Workers are setting records on embankment construction. [Pyongyang NODONG CH'ONGNYON in Korean 29 Aug 78 p 1] 9122

FACTORY MODERNIZATION--The Factory where [SWYL] Chairman Comrade Ch'oe Sunnam Works is making 10-ton ceiling cranes to be used in modernizing the casting operations. [Pyongyang NODONG CH'ONGNYON in Korean 29 Aug 78 p 2] 9122

NORTH PYONGAN RESULTS--Enterprises in the North P'yongan Province General Bureau of Regional Industries exceeded their "100 days of combat" quotas on the 26th. Enterprises raised consumer goods production 1.5 times and the number of items produced 1.2 times, compared with the same time last year. Per person production amounts rose more than 1.5 times. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 31 Aug 78 p 1] 9122

PYONGYANG TEXTILE COMBINE--Pyongyang 19 Oct--The Pyongyang Textile Combine carried out this year's plan at 100.2 percent as of 12 October in terms of industrial output value. During the period of the fulfilment of the yearly plan the combine incorporated more than 300 technical innovation proposals in production. It reconditioned the weaving machines to be high-speed ones. In particular, the combined chemical fiber spinning mill of the combine reconditioned the equipment in conformity with the specific features of chemical fibers and increased the rotation number of spindles by over 1,500 above last year's, thereby carrying out its plan for this year three months ahead of the set time. [Text] [Pyongyang KCNA in English 1857 GMT 19 Oct 78 SK]

SOUTH HAMGYONG HARVEST--Pyongyang 23 Oct--The richest-ever harvest has visited South Hamgyong Province this year. The per hectare yield of rice in South Hamgyong Province this year is over 870 kg greater than last year's and that of maize 1.2 tons. The province registered an impressive success in farming last year, too; the per hectare yield of rice and maize was respectively 500 kg above the previous year's plan. [Excerpt] [Pyongyang KCNA in English 1500 GMT 23 Oct 78 SK]

SOUTH PYONGAN INDUSTRY--The local industry of South Pyongan Province has rapidly developed with the support of the powerful central industry, greatly contributing to the improvement of the people's material and cultural living conditions. The number of local industrial factories in the province as of the end of 1977 grew 5 times compared with 1957. Today it has a powerful local industrial base equipped with all industrial branches--food processing textile, daily necessities, paper-making, chemical, machine-building, building-materials and coal hewing. In 1977, as against 1958, the gross industrial output value of the local industry of the province augmented 17.4 times. The variety of basic products last year swelled 4.8 times compared with 1957, or 36 times as against 1949. Today high-quality products turned out by the modern local industrial factories in the province are popular even at world markets. [Pyongyang KCNA in English 1516 GMT 24 Oct 78 SK]

COAL MINING EQUIPMENT PLANT--The Pyongyang Coal Mining Equipment Plant has increased hydraulic pit prop production by 2 to 2.5 times. The technicians and workers at the forging shop have remarkably increased their production quota using existing facilities, materials and labor by enhancing the ratio of stamp forging and using the press system. [Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 1300 GMT 20 Oct 78 SK]

CHON YONG-POM PLANT--Workers of the plant where Chon Yong-pom works have marked a new innovation in the production of motors. The party committee at the plant and the three revolutions team have encouraged workers to the struggle for the production of motors by repeatedly explaining to the workers the instruction given by the leader while giving on-the-spot guidance to the plant. [Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 0200 GMT 18 Oct 78 SK]

RAILWAY AUTOMATION--Workers engaged in the automation of railways are accelerating the automation of the Potong-gang river railway station, which is in the last stage of construction. They are struggling to complete the construction by the end of November. [Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 0400 GMT 18 Oct 78 SK]

ROLLING STOCK PLANT--Workers of the 4 June rolling stock plant struggle to mark new innovations in the production of freight cars and the repair of locomotives. Workers of the plant and three revolutions team members have risen to implement the instruction given by the leader while giving on-the-spot guidance to various sectors of the people's economy in Kangwon Province. Under the guidance of party organizations at the plant and with assistance from the three revolutions team, the plant has strengthened organizational and guidance work to solve problems concerning the construction of the steel cast shop and the development of their capability to repair locomotives. The workers are struggling to increase the steel casing capacity by three times by the end of this year. [Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 2231 GMT 18 Oct 78 SK] Workers of the 4 June rolling stock plant are marking innovations everyday in the production of freight cars. Workers of the forging shop have increased the speed of forging by 1.5 times by adopting the method of continuous heating in the production of 60-ton size freight cars. [Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 0200 GMT 18 Oct 78 BK]

PYONGYANG TRANSPORTATION--Fifty-four railway stations under Pyongyang Railway Bureau have completed their transportation quotas for this year as of the end of September. In particular, Haeju Youth Railway Station has transported 35,000 tons of cargo more than its originally scheduled quota for this year as of the end of September. [Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 0200 GMT 19 Oct 78 SK]

CHUNGSONG-HO TRACTOR PLANT--The Chungsong-ho tractor plant has recently increased tractor production through a technical innovation movement. [Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 0200 GMT 19 Oct 78 SK]

CSO: 4208

HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE

SCHOLAR EXAMINES CHANGES IN NORTH KOREAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Seoul PUKHAN HAKPO in Korean No 1, Dec 77 pp 199-229

Article by To Hung-yol, Associate Professor at the ROK Defense College: "Changes in the Structure of North Korean Society"

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1. Problem Consciousness

The definition of concepts concerning structure and social change has diverse meanings. This diversity of concepts is caused by the fact that concepts on how to handle society and structure do not always agree. Generally, social structure refers to the structure of a self-sufficient way of life in which the major demands of a society's components are met, that is, the structure of a comprehensive, total society. Such a total society includes various components, and these components are related to one another by a particular historical principle, and in a relative sense, they manifest a pattern of unity and continuity.

However, the concept of society changes according to where we focus on the various elements and dimensions comprising society and how we view their mutual relations. For instance, if we consider the actions and roles that men perform, it becomes a system of mutual actions and roles. If we look at groups, it becomes a system of mutual relations among groups. If we concentrate on system, it will manifest itself as a normative or value system.

Also, if we emphasize the mutual inter-dependence of the various elements, their adjustments and complements, it becomes a static integration (equilibrium) model. If we stress contradiction, tension, and conflict among them, it becomes a model of dynamic conflict. Although we assume that there exists a certain ideological assumption or theoretical and practical value judgment, and problem consciousness, there is a common point of reference in that they try to handle it as a question of structural relations.

However, there may be several different perspectives as to the nature such structural relations have. Representative examples are A. Comte's theory of the social organism, Malinowski's functionalism, Levi-Strauss' structuralism, T. Parson's structural-functionalism, K. Marx's historical materialism, and R. Dahrendorff's theory of conflict.

To quote R. Bendix: "In the history of sociology, the dispute between scholars who emphasize conflict and change, on the one hand, and scholars who stress integration and stability, on the other, draw our attention. The former is the theory of social conflict starting with Marx and Comte, and leading to Dahrendorff by way of Sorel. While they depend more on human beings and groups, the latter perspective is represented by the theory of equilibrium advanced by Durkheim and Parsons. The latter relies more on the framework of a 'functional-structural' and 'cultural' theory."² Thus, Bendix points out that the analysis of social structure is divided into two major camps. One of the particular characteristics emphasized by structural-functional sociology is its analysis of the function of latent structure. The concept of latent function refers to the action of bringing about results unintended by the components of a particular group. Against this, the action which brings the results that the components of the concerned group intend is termed manifest function.³ In terms of the method of approach to social structure, it remains too superficial a study to analyze only the function expected and recognized (manifest) structure by the components. Compared to this, if we analyze the results not expected by the components (latent function), we are able to look into even the internal consciousness and structure of motivation in human beings, so that such a study reveals an impression of being a more profound one.

If we are to investigate the relationship between manifest and latent functions using the example of a communist society, the manifest function in a communist society is basically derived from Marxism-Leninism. Social construction is carried out on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. However, despite this Marxism-Leninism, we discover the fact that "results contrary to ex-

pectation," that is, latent function, appear prominently.

The theoretical focus among sociologists concerning the concept of latent function is that social deviation is also an integral part of the fundamental social process. Therefore, a scientific scrutinization of deviation will add further depth to an understanding of the structure of social systems. Viewed from this perspective, an effective analysis of social structure must be carried out on a basis which includes the major axes of conformation and deviation.⁴ Accordingly, the universal trend of those scholars who study social deviation is that they regard the psychological view (or the physiological, anthropological perspective) of attempting to relate anti-social acts to personality structure (or individual biological characteristics) as being extremely weak in its empirical basis. According to a psychological and psychoanalytic perspective, an act of deviation must be understood in relation to internal causes, that is, frustration, mental anxiety, guilty conscience, and instinctive anti-social impulses. In contrast, the sociological perspective attempts to understand it from a social structural angle.

Thus, when we try to handle the problem of deviation from a viewpoint of latent structure, institutionalized expectations or the attributes, typologies, and changes of norm loom large as an important standard. Because, as the content of norms changes nonconformity is sometimes treated as conformity, or the contrary, conformity as nonconformity.

Thus, a perspective whereby we attempt to regard socially deviating acts as a quintessential phenomenon of social structure forms the centripetal point of sociological orientation. Accordingly, the utopian social system consciousness of the communists, which presupposes complete control over deviation, is extremely fragile in its empirical basis. And it is obvious that its point of orientation is already a fiction. Since social structures are tension management systems, all social systems create deviation unique to their systems. Accordingly, latent structures and functions are involved in it. Such a theoretical perspective is the general trend of deviational sociology.

Going a step further, A. Etzioni has attempted the formation of a macro-sociological theory by synthesizing the foregoing theory of equilibrium and conflict and the perspective of cybernetics. He is attempting to make an analysis of social change emphasizing society's ability to manipulate itself.

He has defined total social change always being a mixture of planned and unplanned change. He holds that in order for a

certain society to lead social change in an intended direction, it must be "self-manipulable." He explains this as the system's activity scale. He explains that the major variables which decide the activity scale of the society concerned are information ability, power, and consent, the former two being control factors, and the latter consent formation. In this case the control factors are variables that can be created mainly from the perspective of the governing people, while the dimension of consent formation is a variable in which the governed can take a leading posture.

Of the four types of society, that is, the active society, the passive society, the overmanaged society, and the drifting society and placing emphasis on the two factors of "control" and "consent," the most desirable type is the active society.

The communist society, which follows a totalitarian political pattern, belongs to the so-called overmanaged society. In this case, it manifests a high degree of control and a low degree of consent. Therefore, power which causes extreme deviation is regularly exercised. Attempts are made to mobilize normative power as much as possible. But since this depends on some method of coercion, its efficacy is weakened. Consequently, a society's ability of self-conversion is bound to be limited.

What attracts our interest in the development of Etzioni's theory of social change is, as we have observed earlier, the problem of potentiality of change and its direction. He emphasizes that this type of society can be also changed to an active society as it converts its means of control such as coercive violence and propaganda to education (indoctrination) and the interest-oriented exercise of power. Needless to say, it does not mean a theoretical formation which explains the process of social change; but it suggests a potentiality of developing a self-manipulable ability which is brought about by the change in the control form. It thus proposes an effective index for the study of social change in the communist system.

Recently, Z. Brzezinski, S.P. Huntington, H.G. Skilling, and others have been systematically formulating social theories pertaining to the system change of the communist society in relation to industrialization and urbanization.

Such various theories have mutually different perspectives. But a certain method must be selected according to the social aspect to be analyzed. Thus, only by simultaneously studying such various aspects can we correctly diagnose the social structural characteristics of North Korea and predict the process of its change.

But it also becomes problematic in this respect whether it is valid to explain the present condition of North Korea with concepts which have the social science background based on the values of a free society.

The reason is that since a concept reflects the structural situation, when we view North Korea with the concepts we employ, there is a great possibility of misjudgment, since North Korea has a clearly different system and uses vocabulary with a different nuance.

When several problematic points we have proposed above are presumed, in the comparative study of social structure we generally see the complementary use of Parson's theory of social equilibrium, Dahrendorf's theory of social conflict, Etzioni's macrosociological perspective, and Brzezinski's compound theory. Needless to say, there is no assurance that such theoretical models of general sociology will be valid in an analysis of North Korean society. Also, since in the study of North Korea we lack opportunities to objectively prove the results with post-facto confirmation, many limitations are encountered. Consequently, we must assume that the validity and accuracy of the North Korean analysis of their society are doubtful.

We have no alternative, then, but to approach the task of defining the structure and change of North Korean society by complementing the analysis with the general theory of sociology and the results of study in the characteristics of North Korea.

After taking into consideration various restrictive conditions, the author proposes in this study to limit himself to a clarification of structure and change in North Korean society from the following four aspects only. As proposed earlier, by using various theories related to social structure and change, he will first discuss the aspects of social structure which best reflect the social characteristics of North Korea in terms of manifest and latent functions. Secondly, he will provide an overview of the various aspects of social relaxation systems and change emphasizing the latent functions of subordinate systems. Furthermore, he will pay attention to selecting basic social forces operating in North Korea. (See Figure 1).

- (1) Manifest aspects (superficial society)
 - a. Value system: cultural goals
 - b. Organizational system: institutionalized means
- (2) Latent aspects (internal society)
 - a. Phenomena of strata: realistic contradictions
 - b. Phenomena of deviation: social structural change
- (3) Disparity between the superficial and the internal, and structural contradictions




Figure 1. Manifest and Latent Structures

Key:

- | | |
|---------------------------------|------------------|
| 1. Value | 4. Contradiction |
| 2. Unitary ideology and loyalty | 5. Means |
| 3. Strata | 6. Organization |
| | 7. Deviation |

2. Value System: Cultural Goals

Viewed at least from the aspect of latent structure, North Korea forms a society in which the unitary ideological system of Kim Il-song dominates all values. In terms of the cultural goals pursued in North Korea, only one ideal is publicly recognized. As a matter of principle in a socialist nation the policy principle of making the people believe and support one political ideal, that is, Marxist-Leninist ideology, is firmly established. In accordance with the unitary ideological system, state organs defend the socialist system against destructive machinations of domestic and foreign elements, and strengthen the ideological revolution to revolutionize and working classize the entire society. All others except the working class are defined as objects of hatred. Objects of admiration and the necessity of sacrifice are stressed. Loyalty is tested, and "dangerous thoughts" are enumerated to be rejected and attacked. In the socialist nation not only are opposing ideologies not tolerated, but ideology also bears an all-inclusiveness which regulates not only certain limited realms, such as politics, the economy, and religion, but all human activity as well. This means that it is at once the will of the state, and all are forced to obey this principle.

Unitary ideology signifies that Kim's ideology is adopted as the unitary, ideal standard (cultural goal) among social ideals, and the instructions of Kim Il-song are believed and practiced as the ultimate direction of action. In other words, the Marxism-Leninism interpreted and defined by Kim Il-song prevails as the only unitary social value. Accordingly, in North Korean society life alienated from Kim Il-song is not even conceivable, and ideals or policy directions not recognized by Kim Il-song cannot be allowed to exist. That is to say, under North Korea's slogan, "Think, speak, and act in accordance with Kim Il-song," devoting all living to the "ultimate implementation of the leader's instructions" is forced. An absoluteness and unconditionality which has priority over ordinances or "party decisions" is, in a certain sense, granted to his instructions.

In spite of this, the social ideal which North Korea formally supports is *chuche* ideology. Article 4 of the new constitution formally declares: "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea adopts *chuche* ideology, which has creatively applied Marxism-Leninism to the realities of our nation, as the guiding direction for its activity."

Accordingly, the orientation of latent social structure in North Korea may be characterized as the *chuche* line. It is clearly set forth: "The government of the People's Republic will consolidate the political independence of the nation by superbly embodying the party's *chuche* ideology in all fields; it will further strengthen the basis of a self-sufficient national economy capable of guaranteeing the unification and independence of the nation; it will thoroughly implement the self-determined, independent, and self-defensive line, which is designed to strengthen the defense potential of the nation, so as to reliably guarantee the security of the nation by its own power."

Thus, the reason that *chuche* ideology is purposely emphasized in North Korean society is solely because it attempts to adopt the particularistic standpoint of regarding the nation as the basic unit as a result of the unavoidable and realistic revision of orthodox Marxism-Leninism, which claims the universal validity of class. On the other hand, it implies that North Korean society is attempting to establish an adaptability for self-defense in the context of the confrontation between the major nations, the Soviet Union and communist China. In other words, an interpretation is attempted whereby in the process of introducing and internalizing communist ideology North Korean society faces the necessity to actively utilize traditionally particular elements, and that it is attempting to discover an apparatus of reationalization which will make possible the connection of universal principles to regionally particular

elements in chuche ideology.

On the other hand, a characteristic in the changes in latent social structure is that the psychological element termed "loyalty" becomes the most important political and social value sustaining North Korean society. This is extremely interesting. It implies that in order to analyze the structure of North Korean society, and to diagnose its structural change, we must above all analyze the individual Kim Il-song and popular loyalty to him. The reason for this is that the position which Kim Il-song occupies in North Korean society is absolute, and that the process of establishing a communist system after the Liberation in North Korea has become inseparable from personal loyalty; that is, the process of idolizing Kim Il-song.

When we review the examples of communist China and the Soviet Union, we find that a considerable length of time was needed for the idolization of a particular person, and that the process of its development also matured with class processes. That is, the early stages of communization always begin with the emphasizing of national loyalty or the loyalty to the state, and goes through a process of stressing class loyalty, party loyalty, and individual loyalty. These three social values, that is, national loyalty, class loyalty, and individual loyalty, have mutually complementing relations. But once individual loyalty has been established, national loyalty and class loyalty tend to be gradually absorbed by and integrated with individual loyalty.

Thus, the communist social system of North Korea is based precisely on the personal cult of Kim Il-song. Moreover, such a process of idolizing the individual causes the fierceness of loyalty to reach an extreme point due to character defects of Kim Il-song himself. Today going much farther than merely emphasizing loyalty in the individual dimension, that is, the stage of idolization, North Korean communists repeat the ridiculous propaganda that "because of Kim Il-song, heaven and earth have begun"; that "with the occult power of Kim Il-song the cold front was conquered," thus continuously deepening the unconditional loyalty which the absolute individual commands. Carrying it to an extreme, they scheme for the idolization of the entire family tree. And they utilize this as the basic means of maintaining the system.

From this perspective, we are trying to define the process of change in North Korean structures, and how it is related to the individual character of Kim Il-song through an analysis of the loyalty which forms the spiritual core in maintaining the North Korean system.

When we review past history we find without difficulty that

various means were always adopted to win over the masses and to stabilize power during the period of early reform in the communist revolution, and that during this process the psychological element termed loyalty was stressed.

The loyalty that we refer to here may be defined as none other than "a promise of self-sacrifice for a particular object." The particular object, viewed in the political and social realm, may be characterized as the state, the race, class, ideal, and leaders. National loyalty, then, would refer to the mental preparedness which requires sacrificing individual interests or happiness for the sake of the nation. Going a step farther, such a mental preparedness would carry out an integrative function and a function of group maintenance in sustaining the social system.

Then, what is the mental core which runs through inside the social system of North Korea? In this sense we may bring up three kinds of loyalty.¹¹

The first one is, as we have already noted, a loyalty to the state or the nation which originates from Marxism-Leninism. In the early stages of communization this social value destroys the old loyalty which was stressed in past times toward the traditional family, tribe, and regional community, and instead, proposes an effort to create a new value. It is maintained that generally speaking, changes in the social structure must be carried out simultaneously as a destructive influence to invalidate the function of the existing social system and as a creative influence to support the new social system. In other words, the two kinds of work, the destruction of old values and the creation of new values, do indeed reflect the two-faced nature of the revolution. In the case of North Korea as well the effort to foster such a national loyalty is eloquently expressed in Article 1 of the socialist constitution. That is, it is stipulated: "North Korea represents the interests of the Korean people."

The second one is the class loyalty involved in class struggle. It is the other side of loyalty to the party which is called the vanguard of class. That is, if we may say that the social value which awakens national consciousness lies in loyalty to the nation-state, then the social value which awakens class consciousness may be said to lie in loyalty to the party.

In other words, since class loyalty is a loyalty to a particular social class, because of that loyalty, it consists mainly of class consciousness, service to that class, or struggle against the classes hostile to that class.

Accordingly, class loyalty stresses the unity of the proletarian

class among several classes existing within the nation, and the struggle against hostile classes. Viewed from this perspective, the function of class loyalty forms an element indispensable in waging an internal revolution.

When viewed in these terms, we know that state loyalty or partisan loyalty are legitimate values fostered by the Communist Party. In the value structure on which the communist dictatorship system is based state loyalty and class partisanship form the unmistakable core of the manifest structure.

In spite of this, a problem arises when they are faced with the alternative of choosing one loyalty over another at a particular moment, and differences in opinion appear. When a conflict of views thus appears, it does not stop with the dimension of policy, but it penetrates further, even into the psychological and emotional dimensions, and finally develops into a power struggle.

If a policy confrontation develops to the stage of power struggle, supporting or opposing a certain policy line is interpreted as supporting or opposing a certain person. Accordingly, it may be logically stated that opposing the view of a certain person or criticizing his policy leads to a counterattack by that person, regardless of the argument's objective validity. It shows where the limits of discussion, based on the so-called internal democratic principle, lie within a communist society.

In other words, they may appeal to state or class loyalties in order to mobilize and agitate the masses. But when these two kinds of values go beyond the limits of mutual complementation, and confront one another in conflict, the natural result is that another value which could play a harmonious role in this context would become a problem.

Indeed at this point, individual loyalty as a separate value becomes a problem. Thus, national and class loyalties can actually come into mutual conflict and confrontation. The major reason of existence of individual loyalty lies in harmonizing the mutual conflict between these two kinds of value. Not only that, but those who have positions and those who want positions within the highest stratum of leadership come to the recognition that for their security or success they must create a cult around the most powerful person, and that service or sacrifice for such a person is a more concrete and effective policy of action. For instance, with the formulation of a policy whereby the enemies of Kim Il-song are the enemies of the party and the nation, the value of individual loyalty which is at the core of the control system has priority.

When we analyze political and social physiology in various communist nations, we find that it contains various latent functions. This is caused by a pattern of mutual relationships among the three kinds of value. For instance, when an objective situation is replaced by a political crisis (war or natural calamity) which surpasses the power of class, it is customary to appeal to national loyalties. In order to achieve social or political reform, class loyalty will be stressed. On the other hand, to insure the security of a dictatorial system, individual loyalty is practiced latently or openly. However, as we have already seen, in a real society these three kinds of political and social values are not only mutually complementary, but they also may come into conflict and confrontation when they face a realistic social problem. The question lies in such logic.

To summarize again, (1) even when consensual views on an ultimate goal exist, conflict and confrontation may exist within the stratum of leadership as to what policy should be pursued under certain objective conditions. And when such conditions prevail, the problems of the individual are involved. (2) While the three kinds of social value, that is, national loyalty, class loyalty, and individual loyalty, form mutually a complementary relationship during the early stages of revolution, once individual loyalty has been established, the other two kinds of loyalty tend to be adjusted and integrated by individual loyalty. (3) Since individual loyalty cannot intrinsically exclude conflicting concepts, the political base that it is able to enjoy is fragile. (4) In the early stages of accomplishing revolution, the psychological element called loyalty is deemed important even for the stabilization of power. But when the management period which may be called the latter stage of revolution is reached, the need for a functional elite rather than loyalty is rapidly increased, and conflict with the so-called political character (revolutionary character) becomes openly apparent.

When viewed from such a perspective of the theory of development, in the future North Korean society's social and structural contradictions are bound to expand with the process of social change. With this it is expected that Kim Il-song will sublimate himself into a superhuman and supernatural entity, and will be deified as an absolute, preceding the system. However, it has been historically proved that such an extreme policy of mass manipulation is always followed by its limitation and new restrictions. It will become more so in the context of the trend in the world for openness. It proves that, in the final analysis, the latent aspect of North Korean society contains a serious conflict situation and the contradiction of Kim Il-song

will become systematized.

3. Organizational System

The latent social structure of North Korea may be described as a highly controlled organized society based on "collectivist principles." That is, it is based on political collectivist principles which hold that in North Korea the individual is recognized only for the value of his existence as a component of the whole represented and controlled by the Workers Party, and that the "individual" must sacrifice all for the "sake of the whole." Article 49 of North Korea's socialist constitution clearly shows the characteristics of this society. Thus, it is stipulated: "The rights and duties of citizens in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are based on the collectivist principle of one for all and all for one." This collectivist principle serves as an effective standard for understanding the social structure of North Korea.

Lenin held that for the construction of a socialist society first, the existential conditions of society must be adjusted to become socialistic; second, later generations must be created as new human beings through intentional guidance and training by the Communist Party and, at the same time, the task of remolding the structure of the consciousness among older generations is urgently required; and that the two conditions maintain mutually complementary relations which are mutually related.

Based on these major premises, in North Korea the problem of adjusting the existential conditions of society was most urgent as a primary task following the Liberation in 1945. Precisely, the starting point in solving such a problem provided the necessary conditions for organizing North Korean society. At this point, the task of dissolving existing traditional social structures was proposed as a necessity. For this, North Korea carried out land reform and its policy for nationalizing industries. Immediately following this, North Korea forcefully carried through various socialistic reform policies, such as concentrated guidance and the registration of residents.¹² With these North Korea carried through an organization of the entire society in a short period of time unprecedented in history.

Thus, North Korea bases the legitimatization of all its acts on the "collectivist principle" as stipulated in Articles 49 and 68 of the "New Constitution." That is, North Korea adopts the premises of the collectivist principle which holds that "the individual exists for the whole," and adopts the principles of system composition as the moral norm whereby "a revolutionary ethos must be established so as to make the individual love collectivity and organization, and work for the interests of

society and people in the interest of the fatherland and revolution." North Korea regards these as necessary conditions for the "revolutionization of the entire society," the "working classization of all of the people," and communist construction. It may be said that in accordance with this North Korea has rendered the entire area of North Korea completely organized.

Now the collectivist spirit or collectivist indoctrination that North Korea refers to implies no more than that the individual must exist only as a tool for achieving communist political goals as a revolutionary fighter loyal to Kim Il-song. Thus, in a communist society organization is defined as a powerful weapon for achieving communist goals, and various mass organizations, including the Communist Party, are awarded importance as weapons for maintaining the system.

P. Selznick who analyzed Soviet society defined organization in a communist society as a powerful weapon for achieving communist goals.¹³

It is concluded that the Communist Party and other mass organizations as weapons for maintaining the system (1) are media for social control; (2) are charged with the role of indoctrination; (3) utilize the technique of mobilization; (4) employ strategies for implementing system goals and manipulation; (5) and strategically subordinate all means of propaganda to the demands of organization.

From such an argument North Korea also secured the guiding role of the party, proposed it as a problem of confrontation to strengthen ties with the masses, and put forth its priority effort on the revolutionary reform of social organizations.

Thus, the party causes all residents to belong to organizations in an overlapping fashion by residence, occupation, and strata. Then, the party directly controls the leadership organs of such organizations to enable those cadres to perform the functions of a medium between the party and the masses. In this manner, the party carries through comprehensive and many-faceted control.

F. Schurman explained once the reason for stressing the organization of residents in a communist society as follows. When a system of rule oriented toward the dictatorship by one party is formed, it is possible for the party to control the nucleus of ruling power, but the party itself cannot control individuals who are non-party members and who represent the governed. Thus, the party organizes the general masses by residence, occupation, and strata so that the party directly controls the leadership organs of such organizations, and to enable them to perform the intermediary functions between the party and the masses.

Going a step further, North Korea has attached to organization the concept of " a blast furnace for ideological tempering and a school for revolutionary indoctrination." The party took complete control of such workers organizations as the Socialist Working Youth League (including the Young Pioneers), trade unions, the Democratic Women's Union, and other organizations in the scientific and cultural fields, and it has caused all residents to belong to several such collective organizations at the same time.

We cannot but help noting the importance of this, but also that North Korea has thoroughly applied the principle of party organization, so-called democratic centralism, as stressed by Lenin, to the process of organization. Chapter 2 of the rules of the Workers Party clearly states, "The party is organized on the principle of democratic centralism." It may be said that this principle is totally applied in the case of many different organizations.

The principle of democratic centralism stressed by North Korea contains the following three principles for action.

The first is that various party leadership organs from top to bottom regularly summarize and report their task to party organizations. Second, party members must unconditionally obey party organizations, the minority must obey the majority, subordinate organizations must obey superior organizations, and the entire party organizations must absolutely obey the central committee of the party. Third, subordinate party organizations mandatorily execute the decisions of superior organizations, and superior organizations systematically command and inspect the work of subordinate organizations. This ultimately implies the fact that the principle of centralism and of supervision over subordinate organizations is thoroughly vested in the leading position of the party. Accordingly, mass organizations at various levels are allowed no informal activity other than formal activity under the direct control of the party. Thus they form a social structure closed internally and externally. In the guidance method of organizational life as well such organizations propose a new "system of summing up organizational life," "the anti-Japanese guerrilla style work method," and "the anti-Japanese guerrilla style organizational life spirit" as directed by the party, and strictly demand that they are observed unconditionally and absolutely.

However, a closer examination of the so-called system of summing-up organizational life in North Korea is a method of life activity which has been fabricated as the inheriting and develop-

ing of Kim Il-song's anti-Japanese style system of summing up organizational life. It may be interpreted as a means whereby all analyze and evaluate their tasks and lives with a strong method of criticism by connecting them to the practice of revolutionary tasks. Now, failure to mount criticism in such cases is criticized and punished as being "familial action" or "self-preservationism." Thus, in order to wage the ideological struggle North Korea uses a method of criticism in the name of the new system of summing up organizational life. It mobilizes all mass organizations for the task of indoctrinating and remolding through the ideological struggle so as to shape all societal components into chuche-type communist revolutionaries who are loyal to Kim Il-song.

In other words, it implies that North Korea wages an ideological struggle using criticism as a weapon and the method of criticism anywhere anytime, continuously remolds individuals through the ideological struggle. Thus, North Korea continues the life process of forging individuals into "human robots" and "human machines" which are more loyal to Kim Il-song. When considered from this perspective, collectivist organizations which form the manifest structure of North Korean society act as the unitary channel of connecting "all to the individual of Kim Il-song." It has also been expanded as a "political means" to strengthen the Kim Il-song system.

As manifested, the goals aimed at by the organization of the entire society can be discussed naturally from various angles. To mention several important ones among them, (1) it is oriented toward a struggle to take over the masses or win them over for the purpose of strengthening Kim Il-song's dictatorial system. (2) It is actively utilized as a means of controlling residents by containing and breaking up various negative elements in society, and by concealing contradictions in the Kim Il-song system. (3) It has become a medium for encouraging a socialist labor emulation system by mobilizing insufficient labor forces. (4) On a long-range basis, it is designed to tenaciously attempt a communistic human remolding by awarding function as indoctrination and study network through collectivist pressure. (5) Other than that, it is used as a filter to eliminate so-called subversive elements and also acts as a channel for replacing members of the elite.

However, in the case of North Korea many problematic points remain in carrying out the afore-mentioned intentions by using mass organizations as a medium. Moreover, an important fact to note is that North Korea is not free from the disfunctional limits of organization.

First of all, as we have already seen, problems are raised in that the favorable social functions of the primary group are difficult to anticipate because North Korea destroys the traditional social structure such as the family system, and it thoroughly excludes the possibility of the existence of spontaneous, informal organization. Second, problems arise because of the communist view of the individual who unilaterally not only stresses the collectivist principle but also totally overlooks human nature. The communists underscore the aspect of collectivity as being perfect, rational, good, and efficient. In contrast, they define the individual as being imperfect (the individual is not a perfect entity which can hold itself responsible), irrational, evil, selfish, and a non-willed existence which is controlled by environment (the individual races for the goal only through competition). Thus, in the relationship between organizations and the individual the uniqueness of the individual is unilaterally sacrificed, and it is even compounded by the "primordial situation of conflict between organizations and the individual." ¹⁵ Problems are thus caused.

In spite of various deliberate policies of socialization in North Korea, the realities of North Korean society show that, contrary to the establishment of a certain ideal, "societal image" selected by the communist ruling group, various conflicts and contradictions exist internally among residents, mass organizations, and component elements of society. That is to say, there appears in reality a serious lagging phenomenon between the demand of the ideal for the construction of a new society anticipated of Kim Il-song-ism, and the social character which it practically embodies through social organization. Thus, North Korean society cannot escape the fact of a drastic discrepancy between its manifest and latent functions.

In this respect, North Korea has every year and every quarter raised tasks confronting North Korea to overcome various problematic points of the system and such realistic contradictions which really exist by confronting the problems of various mass organizations. In spite of this, because of various basic problems that collectivist organization contains, the repetition of a vicious cycle of escalating problems is the result.

4. Phenomena of Strata

The question of class may be said to be central to the realm of Marxism-Leninism, since Marxism not only advocates an ideology oriented toward a classless society, but it also analyzes the social structure from the perspective of class confrontation.

Now, as a realm in which great discrepancies exist between

ideology and reality¹⁶ in the communist society we must mention the class question.

To put it differently, the realistic contradiction diametrically conflicts with the ideology of "equality" (value system or cultural goal) and the structure and change in North Korean society can be found in the latent structure called the phenomena of strata.

The phenomena of strata in North Korea has not been formed through the natural distribution process of social remuneration, but is a political means which was suddenly fabricated through the process of the policy of socialization. It has been utilized as one of the means of social control designed by and reorganized in the direction planned by the political ruling stratum. In this sense, socialistic remolding is nothing less than the reform work of the structure of strata,¹⁷ and at once it implies the linearization of resident control.

Nevertheless, North Korea stipulates in Article 6 of the new constitution that: "In North Korea class conflict and the exploitation and oppression of men by men have been eternally abolished." Thus, it agitates as though the phenomena of strata had been eliminated and an "ideal society" without conflict among classes had been established. However, although there is no capitalistic strata as they are referred to in capitalist society, it is a fact that a new structure of order of strata designed to fix the relationship between the ruling and the ruled has been intentionally organized.

To evaluate the political aspect in North Korea's communist society which advocates an egalitarian society, a greater strata difference such as the difference between regions, and the stratification between occupations are gradually becoming rigid as a fact of reality.

a. Criteria for Social Evaluation and Strata Mobility

In the classification of strata in North Korea the most important criteria may be said to be strata classification according to class nature and party spirit.

That is, in North Korea class policy has been developed by literally applying the so-called class concept and the principles of class struggle in accordance with Marxism-Leninism. Accordingly, the replacement of bureaucrats is carried out on the basis of social background, an extremely vested criterion, and the degree of loyalty to the party. That is to say, the most important variable in the classification of strata is partisan spirit or proletarian nature. The vested and semi-caste hier-

archical system thus formed bi-polarizes or tri-polarizes North Korean society.




Figure 2. Political Classes and General Residents in North Korea

Key:

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|---|--------------------------|
| 1. Ruling strata | 6. Intellectuals |
| 2. Party bureaucrats | 7. General party members |
| 3. Administrative bureaucrats | 8. The ruled |
| 4. Military bureaucrats | 9. General residents |
| 5. Enterprise and cooperative farm managers | 10. Alienated strata |




Figure 3. Social Stratification in North Korea

Key:

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. Core masses | 5. Intermediate strata (deputy directors and section chiefs of the party and central government) |
| 2. Basic masses | 6. Mass strata (workers, peasants, office workers) |
| 3. Complicated masses | 7. Alienated strata (resistance forces, families whose members have fled to South Korea, religionists, repatriated prisoners) |
| 4. Privileged strata (central party cadres, the upper echelon of the cabinet, the military, and the courts) | 8. Central party cadres, cabinet ministers, and the upper-echelon leaders of the courts |

The basic masses comprise those who are workers and peasants (poor and employed peasants) and those who have not committed offenses in the past or currently.

Of these, the stratum belonging to the core masses refers to the activists of the party among the basic masses, and is composed of following:

1. Those who participated in the anti-Japanese national struggle, and their families.
2. Those who participated in the anti-Japanese armed struggle, and their families.
3. Those who participated in the underground and guerrilla struggle in South Korea, and their families.
4. Those Korean residents in Japan who were active as cadres of the General Association of Koreans Residing in Japan, and their families.
5. Families of those who were killed during the Korean War.
6. Families of soldiers who died during the Korean War.
7. Servicemen's families.
7. Veterans.
9. Party and administrative cadres, and their families.

Composed of the basic masses core masses exercise priority privileges in the distribution of various social values.

This is particularly so in the replacement of bureaucrats. It is so because they can most easily grasp opportunities for political and administrative replacements in a closed social system in which a system of competitive replacements based on merit is almost non-existent.

The complicated masses in terms of class refer to those who were landlords and capitalists during the Japanese imperialist period, and to those who have committed errors in social life. They are further divided into three strata according to their class nature and partisan spirit, and they are under respective surveillance and oppression.

1. Those groups that can be considered the "objects of acceptance" who are judged to be acceptable again by strengthening political and ideological education and brain washing.¹⁸
2. Groups other than the above who are the "objects of surveillance" in collective surveillance as openly disclosed to the general masses.
3. Those groups who are "objects of sanction" and who are segregated from the general masses and restricted to special areas.

Since 1958 North Korea has carried out investigations into the socio-economic class background of residents on three occasions. In May 1958 North Korea conducted concentrated central guidance work. In 1960 it conducted residents registration work. And from April 1966 to March 1967 it carried out a re-registration of residents. Those were massive adjustment works preceding the arming of the so-called worker-peasant militia. Based on the work of re-registration of residents, beginning in about

April 1970 North Korea subdivided all residents into 51 strata and carried out specific investigations into their socio-economic class background. The characteristics of resident composition and the contents of class policy revealed through the work to classify residents into 51 strata are summarized as follows.

First, the core stratum (bereaved families of revolutionaries, the party, military, and administrative elites) numbers 3.93 million or 28 percent of the total number of residents. They form the privileged class which enjoys all priority social opportunities. To their second generation are given the opportunity for higher education and for replacements in the party, military, and administrative cadres. Among the components of this stratum there exists latent conflict between those party cadres who have superior positions on one hand, and military and administrative elites with less influential positions on the other. As a matter of fact it is conjectured that an internal division of the stratum is taking place.

Second, the so-called basic class is composed of workers and peasants who do not belong to the core class but whose social background is trusted. This class is known to number 6.6 million or 45 percent of the entire residents. Children of this stratum may attend school as far as technical colleges, but are basically excluded as replacements for party and military cadres.

Third, the complicated masses include families of the police force which was formed during the Korean War against North Korea, families of landlords during the Japanese imperialist occupation of Korea, and families of those who were purged. These are estimated to number 3.82 million or 27 percent of all residents. Their children are allowed only to complete junior high school, the compulsory educational process, and their class mobility is thoroughly controlled.

North Korean communists set 1972 as the starting point of the so-called movement for the remolding of socio-economic background, and they have endeavored to reorganize the core class and the basic class so as to together comprise 90 percent of all residents; to reorganize the complicated masses which are the objects of semi-surveillance so as to comprise 5 percent; to reorganize the hostile class which are the objects of surveillance so as to comprise 3 percent; and to reorganize others (repatriated residents from Japan) so as to comprise 2 percent. This is understood to be designed to prevent the spread of a system of counter-consciousness among residents in accordance with an extreme class policy, but the situation is such that its success is difficult to be anticipated.

Thus, the basic purpose of the strata classification in North Korea, needless to say, is to play the role of an apparatus of political control aimed at seeking out beforehand the political forces opposing the North Korean system so as to suppress their anti-party and counterrevolutionary acts and to establish a system of surveillance over "reactionary classes."

When viewed in this light, the social structure of North Korea is characterized by its extreme political and organizational nature. North Korea regularizes the structure of strata in accordance with class policy and coercive controls. The projection of such excessive power leads to the division of residents into two parts, the privileged stratum and the alienated stratum, and to the formation of the latent structure which internally kindles the conflict within the strata.

In North Korean society, as Djilas has maintained, a "new class" has already been formed. Social mobility to cause the change of strata is gradually disappearing. This proves that the Communist Party's class policy itself had set as its aim to overthrow the old ruling class and emerge as a new ruling class.²¹

Originally, in a liberal democratic society the strata form a channel for absorbing the able energy of society, and they find the significance of their existence in displaying the role of increasing efficiency. However, the hierarchical order of strata which is reminiscent of the medieval caste system, in the final analysis, is extremely restrictive of social mobility. Moreover, since from the beginning control by a power originating from a particular focus blocks the potentiality of maturing a rational mechanism which could remedy conflicts between strata, it may lead to latent malfunction.²²

Not only the multi-dimensional and competitive structure of strata are open and strongly flexible, but also the criteria for evaluating strata such as education, income, and occupation are diverse and complicated. However, in the case of North Korea the decisive factor for deciding strata is represented by the single variable of "degree of access to the power structure," and the vested attribute (proletarian nature) is strongly added to it. Thus, the wavering of the single-dimensional variable of strata bears even the latent potential of extensively confusing the social order. In this sense, the class policy of North Korea is bound to result in making important the control of the power structure which thoroughly excludes politically destructive heterogeneous elements.

The upward social mobility of an alienated group among the current generation in North Korea, particularly the complicated masses, is impossible in any real sense. That is, the extreme,

vested rigidity which the caste-like structure of strata in North Korea indicates does not tolerate the social mobility of the current generation. As a good example, this can be adequately conjectured from the pattern of social mobility in American and Soviet societies, and particularly in the example of Soviet society. 23




Figure 4. Social Strata of Soviet Society and Their Mobility, 1940-1957

Key:

1. Ruling elite (high-ranking government, party, economic, and military bureaucrats)
2. Celebrities (scientists, artists, writers, and other heroes)
3. High-class intellectuals (managers, technicians, politicians, high-ranking bureaucrats, and soldiers)
4. Labor mobility (highly-skilled workers, production workers)
5. Successful peasants
6. Peasants
7. Common workers
8. Coerced labor
9. Common intellectuals (professionals, doctors, jurists,

middle-ranking bureaucrats, middle-ranking soldiers, technicians

- 10. White-collar workers (low-ranking bureaucrats, clerks)
- 11. Low-class workers
- 12. Lines indicating possible social mobility
- 13. Lines indicating restricted social mobility (boundery-crossing is not allowed)

As Figure 4 shows, the strata possessing the possibility of having any realistic access to the ruling elite are bound to be limited to certain strata (reformist elements) which monopolize privileged favors and the opportunity for social mobility in all phases of social life.

As has been referred to above, the general characteristics indicated by the structure of social strata in North Korea may be summarized as follows due to the extreme vested attributes that the structure bears. (1) North Korea schemes to perpetuate the ruling (controlling) and the ruled (controlled) relationship by extremely limiting social mobility and by allowing little or no social mobility itself. (2) However, as it recognizes only a partial and extremely small social mobility within each generation (see Figure 5), it stimulates conformity action in new generations so as to accelerate the creation of opportunistic-type men and forms the basis for a social control order.




Figure 5. Profile of Social Mobility Between Generations

Key:

- 1. "Elite" occupations
- 2. Intermediary occupations
- 3. Manual work occupations
- 4. United States

- | | |
|------------------|---------------------------------|
| 5. Soviet Union | 9. Large-scale social mobility |
| 6. Great Britain | 10. Small-scale social mobility |
| 7. Italy | |
| 8. North Korea | |

(3) The merciless class policy toward the socially-alienated groups which includes a large part of the total population has room for intensifying the "anti-system feeling" of these groups. But their feeling has no possibility of expressing itself in organized outward action. It is determined that such feelings will burn inside as a latent factor of conflict.²⁵

Viewed in this way, it appears that the social structure of North Korea not only extremely limits the mobility between strata because of "innate" and "vested" factors, but also depends on control by power rather than an effective mechanism for the dissolution of conflict between strata.

This not only reduces the magnitude of social activeness,²⁶ but also accompanies considerable latent disfunction such as the wear and tear on the potential ability of society brought about by limiting the "possibility of upward mobility of capable persons" and the internal burning of conflict. Viewed in this manner, the structure of strata in North Korea does not indicate the favorable function of the phenomena of strata, but rather supports the argument held by the conflict school (phenomena of strata= projection of ruling relationship).

B. Social Composition by Occupation

The public classification standards for occupational statistics in North Korea are extremely simple. For, North Korean society denies class subdivision of society and stresses only comprehensive functional classification. That is, its classification consists of workers, clerical workers, peasants (members of cooperative farms), and soldiers. Such a simplified classification may be described as the result of the cooperativization of agriculture and the obliteration of individual commerce and industry, or as the goal of such policy.

According to the composition of North Korean residents by occupation and by the method of public classification in North Korea, the number of workers which was only 12.5 percent in 1946 rapidly increased to 41.2 percent by the end of 1965. The number of clerical workers which was only 6.5 percent also increased to 15.6 percent. On the other hand, individual peasants who amounted to 74.1 percent in 1946 as well as all merchants, handicraft industrialists, and entrepreneurs all

disappeared with the completion of the cooperativization of agriculture and the policy for obliterating individual commerce in 1965. At the end of 1965 members of agricultural cooperatives comprised 40.8 percent of the total population. As shown in Table 1, by December 1959 when the socialist economic system was firmly established, the composition of the North Korean population by occupation demonstrated that workers formed 37.3 percent; members of cooperative farms, 45.7 percent; office workers, 13.4 percent; and others (including those handicraft workers who joined cooperatives), 3.3 percent. However, in 1972 it was estimated that workers comprised 42 percent, members of cooperative farms, 44 percent, and office workers (such as writers, actors, and other free service workers), 14 percent.

Generally, with the increase of urban population the number of workers and office workers increase, and with the exodus of rural populations to cities the number of members remaining on cooperative farms tends to decrease. That is, as when (in Table 1) during the decade 1963-1972 the number of peasants decreased by 7.5 percent, while during the same period the number of workers increased by 5.8 percent, and that of office workers also increased by 3.7 percent.

Table 1. Demographic Composition of North Korea by Occupation

(12) 年別	北韓의 職業別 就業人口構成 (單位: %)										
	(1) 區分	(2) 總人口	(3) 勞動者	(4) 事務員	(5) 農協員	(6) 個人農	(7) 協同農園社員	(8) 企業家	(9) 個人手工業者	(10) 商人	(11) 其他
1946.12	100.0	12.5	6.5			74.1		0.2	1.5	3.3	2.2
1949.12	100.0	19.0	7.0			69.3	0.3	0.1	0.8	1.7	1.8
1953.12	100.0	21.2	8.5			66.4	0.5	0.1	0.6	1.2	1.5
1954.12	100.0	25.7	10.4	17.1		44.2	0.5	0.1	0.6	0.9	0.5
1956. 9	100.0	27.3	13.6	40.0		16.6	1.1	0.03	0.3	0.6	0.5
1957.12	100.0	28.7	14.9	49.9		3.2	2.2	0.01	0.3	0.4	0.4
1958.12	100.0	31.7	14.4	49.8			3.2				0.9
1959.12	100.0	37.3	13.4	45.7			3.3				0.4
1960.12	100.0	38.3	13.7	44.4			3.3				0.3
1963.10	100.0	40.1	15.1	42.8			1.9				
1965.10	100.0	41.2	15.6	43.2							
1972*	100.0	45.9	18.8	35.3							

(13) *1972年은 推定임(軍人除外)

(14) **《北韓全書》(中), p.41에서 인용

(15) 資料: 《조선중앙년감》, 1961, 1964, 1968년

Key:

- | | |
|----------------------------------|--|
| 1. Classification | 10. Merchants |
| 2. Total population | 11. Others |
| 3. Workers | 12. Month and year |
| 4. Office workers | 13. 1972 estimate |
| 5. Members of cooperative farms | 14. Quoted from PUKHAN CHONGGO, Vol 2, p 41 |
| 6. Individual peasants | 15. Sources: CHOSON CHUNGANG YONGAM, 1961, 1964, and 1968. |
| 7. Members of cooperatives | |
| 8. Entrepreneurs | |
| 9. Individual handicraft workers | |

Such general trends may also be found by comparing the weight of industry versus agriculture in the total social production. That is, agriculture which represents rural areas comprising 66 percent of the total social production until 1956 rapidly increased to 74 percent. Such a trend implies that the social prestige of those who engage in industries enhanced compared to those who engage in agriculture, and that the differences between strata and regions in North Korean society are becoming more and more serious.

Also in terms of such variables as income, the level of salaries among clerical workers are clearly the highest, followed respectively by those of workers and peasants. The difference in remuneration between occupations is difficult to ignore. (See Table 2.) The decisive factor for bringing about such class differences seems more than anything else to be the quality of labor. Differences in labor are classified as those which exist between mental versus manual labor, and between skilled versus unskilled labor. These four categories of labor lead to differences in income, educational standards, residence, and mental life. Moreover, differences in remuneration have an impact on the social prestige and position of individual occupations. Accordingly, occupational differences to some extent contain the implications of strata differentiation.

Table 2. Wages by Occupations and Positions in North Korea (As of June 1974)(2.35 North Korean won=1 U.S. dollar)

(1) 區 分	(2) 職 級	(3) 賃金額(원)
(4) 中央黨 및 政務院	(5) 部 長(長官級)	300~350
	(6) 副部長(次官級)	250~300
	(7) 局長級	160~190
(9) 地方黨 및 人民委員會	(9) 道(特別市)委員長級	200~240
	(10) 市·郡 "	110~150
(11) 經 濟 機 關	(12) 特級企業所支配人	260~310
	(13) 1 級 "	200~230
	(14) 2 級 "	155~180
(15) 教 職 員	(16) 大學教員	90~190
	(17) 中高教員	60~ 80
(18) 勞 動 者	(19) 3級	59
	(20) 8級(技師級)	92
(21)	資料：南北韓生活實態比較(平和統一研究所, 1975) ; 都興烈, 남북한사회역량비교(1977), p. 78	

Key:

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. Classification | 13. Class 1 enterprise manager |
| 2. Occupational rank | 14. Class 2 enterprise manager |
| 3. Wage (won) | 15. Teaching personnel |
| 4. Central Party and Administration Council | 16. College instructor |
| 5. Department director (minister level) | 17. Middle and high school instructor |
| 6. Deputy department director (vice minister level) | 18. Workers |
| 7. Bureau director | 19. Class 3 |
| 8. Local party and people's committee | 20. Class 8 (engineer level) |
| 9. Provincial (special city) chairman level | 21. Sources: "Nambukhan Saenghwal Silt'ae Pigyo," Research Institute for Peaceful Unification, 1975; To Hung-yol, "Nambukhan Sahoe Yongyang Pigyo, p 78 |
| 10. City and county chairman level | |
| 11. Economic agency | |
| 12. Special class enterprise manager | |

Next, a problem exists in the selection and allocation of occupations. In North Korea occupation has become service to the state. That is, rather than defining occupation as a display of personality or an opportunity for self-realization

it is defined as an obligation to accept sacrifice. Therefore, an opportunity or possibility for a change of occupation does not rest with the individual, but is entrusted to the planning organization of the state. It would be difficult for one to find any joy of living in one's occupation. Instead, elevating one's position for the purpose of winning political trust becomes his sole wish. Therefore, one must do his job purely for others, even if he does not like his job. That the individual is unable to do a job he likes leaves room for the accumulation of frustration.

Such characteristics in North Korea's latent aspect lead to a rigid and strict strata classification and management for political purposes and to the emergence of disaffected forces. When these have become organized, there is room for the emergence of an "anti-system element." Precisely for this reason, in the North Korean communist collective control over general residents is bound to be further frustrated. Therefore, it should be noted that although acts of formal, outward conformity may be elicited, when the dissatisfaction of the alienated strata, conflict between strata, and going a step further the differences within strata are internalized, stability and integration in the pure sense of the word will be difficult.

Several of the afore-mentioned facts may be interpreted as the resultant phenomena of the industrialization policy as well as the class policy which the North Korean mobilizing regime has pursued. Therefore, it is appropriate to consider that North Korea has formed a latent structure which contains within it may problems such as the differences which exist between industry and agriculture, an unbalanced change between urban and rural areas, differences between strata, differences in remuneration between and within occupations, and conflict between strata.

5. Phenomena of Deviation

The latent aspect in the process of structure and change in North Korean society which becomes problematic is characterized as social deviation. It is a fact that crimes, human alienation, including juvenile delinquency, massification, bureaucratism, formalism, bourgeois ideology, factionalism, parochialism, familialism which ought not exist in the ideal communist society are emerging as realistic social problems. These phenomena are such that they cannot be solved in spite of the efforts of the North Korean communists. If we view this as a latent function of a particular society, they may be described as a resultant phenomenon unexpected by the communist social system.²⁷

Social change in modern history has impressed us with the point that there are marked differences between idealistically conceived communism and its empirical reality. Such premises are even more notable in the phenomenon of social strata and the problem of social deviation.²⁸

In spite of this, it is an extremely difficult thing to expose various anti-socialistic problems in a communist society compared to an open, free society, and the pains which would follow such an exposure are serious. For, neither the utopian ideal regarding the social order nor its infallibility in a communist society has been given up, but rather the spokesmen for communist societies always display the vision of a perfect society, and they stress only the ideal image in their public speeches.

Viewed in this way, there is no reason why facts or statistics on various social crimes perpetrated within North Korea should be published, nor has it ever published them. It is impossible to discover data dealing with anti-social phenomena taking place in the social realm even by thoroughly going through all the newspapers, magazines, and academic journals in North Korea. They make it appear as though the fact of crime and deviation do not exist.

However, in spite of such propaganda under a closed system, at the bottom of the historical situation in North Korea social crimes continue or reappear. According to what has been thus far revealed, the kinds and scope of social crimes such as crimes, deviation, unemployment, social absurdity, the abuse of vacation, resistance movements, human alienation, and flight from North Korea are diverse and deep-rooted.

Besides these, when we review the contents of various crimes defined in the "North Korean Criminal Law," such crimes as disorderly conduct against the state sovereignty, encroachments on state management, encroachment on state ownership, encroachment on the human body, encroachment on citizens' property, violation of the labor law, crimes in public duty, economic criminals, encroachment on social security and the people's public health, and military crimes are provided for.

In connection with this latent structure and function, which are thus realistically raised in a socialist state, the communists employ the following explanation as to why crimes are perpetrated and what constitute the particular causes of anti-social phenomena.

First, they point out that we must keep in mind the fact that the propaganda on the "attraction of the free world" and the dissemination of individualistic views sometimes can exert an influence on people of certain sectors.

Second, social deviation is attributed to the responsibility of parents.²⁹ According to the data gathered from sample surveys, 80 percent of all juvenile delinquency is related to non-interference. Moreover, all cases of non-interference are caused by the failure of parents to perform their duties.

The percentage of crimes committed by juveniles from imperfect families is higher by 20 to 50 percent compared to the control group, according to data gathered from various surveys. This may be interpreted as an indication that in most cases the parent is unable to adequately supervise his or her children.

Even in the cases of formally perfect families, when a condition of familial failure is created by the illness of one of the parents, the long-term absence of a parent, and the special working conditions of parents, juvenile delinquency may be the result. Not only that, but it must not be forgotten that the basic type of family in a socialist society is a family with working parents.

Drawing women into labor leads to a reduction of the possibility of supervising children's behavior and of bringing them up. This also results in reducing the influence of parents over children. The atmosphere of the family determines chiefly the direction of the moral development in children's personality. And this is formed by an image in the minds of young people and adults, as well as the attitude of the family concerned about society. Accordingly, it is considered basically important in preventing social crimes to strengthen the joint control over children's education and to develop the parents' system of education at the same time. Without resolving these basic problems, it is impossible to establish perfect conditions for preventing delinquency.

Third, some Soviet scholars in their treatises on the personality of criminals pass the causes of crime to the perpetrators themselves. That is to say, Soviet scholars maintain that criminals have not reached the level of public education and culture, that they have failed to progressively utilize all opportunities offered by society, and that they are originally of bad character.

Fourth, in connection with the latent function borne by the socialist system we find that Marxists consistently refer to a kind of cultural lag in order to explain social crimes as "vestiges of capitalism" or "remnants of bourgeois ideas."

The social scientists in communist nations presume that "social crimes in the communist state may be anticipated from the characteristics of the socialist system." They maintain

that the phenomena and processes which form the basis of juvenile delinquency are the results of the influence exercised by the vestiges of past economy, ideology, culture, and daily life, and that it is³⁰ tied to the process of the development of material resources. Lenin, too, held that the "basic cause of illegal acts which encroach on the rules of social relations is the exploitation of the masses, and their want and poverty, ("State and Revolution")." Thus, he avoided approaching a solution to the essential question.

There remain thus many problematic points in the theory of survival which assumes that the cause of deviationary acts is the vestige of past attitudes which still survive even after the old social system was destroyed.

This logic may be convincing in the case of the older generation. But when one attempts to apply this logic to younger people, it implies that the established generation hands down such vestiges to the later generations.

Kim Il-song's thoughts on the problem of latent function in North Korea do not escape from this category. Kim Il-song once interpreted the spread of an anti-social spirit as follows:³¹ that is, he sought the sources of social deviation in such secondary aspects as the survival of feudal and bourgeois ideas, the lack of revolutionary experience on the part of cadres, the immaturity of cadres in mass guidance methods, defects in the party's policy over cadres, and the party's erroneous work style.

We feel a need for re-examining the main theories of the communists on latent structure in this regard. The most characteristic aspect in the development by the communists of the theory on social deviation is that, as we have already observed, they are forced to avoid finding the cause of social deviation in the primary systems of their society. Accordingly, they explain it from the standpoint of seeking it "outside" communist society.

For that reason, their analysis (which remains unconvincing) of deviation depends on the concept of "contamination" or "survival."

Thus, in terms of space and time these two concepts are designed to attempt to firmly negate the possibility that the responsibility for anti-social actions does not lie with the communist system, since they seek the causes of anti-social actions "from without." That is, the concept of "contamination" refers to a "degenerative West European bourgeois influence." This is clearly expressed in the following passage: "How can non-

essentially reactionary views and customs erode the spirit of the individual as a whole against a socialist society? We must note first of all the kind of impact it has on people in certain sectors of society, in which the propaganda waged by imperialists for the attraction of the free world and bourgeois views on individualism are spread."

Then, the concept of "survival" is expressed in the following statements: "Under socialism it is not the fact that crime is generated from the social system itself. It has encroached from an exploiting socio-economic form into socialist construction. In that sense, crime is viewed as the survival of the past in the minds and actions of men. We hold that egotism, squandering, drunkenness, and discourtesy to women are unique to the preceding socio-economic form, and they are not born of the quintessence of socialism. Accordingly, our society is absolutely free from such responsibility...Even after the socio-economic causes for giving rise to such phenomena disappear, the survival of the past lingers long in the consciousness of men."

Now, in terms of the results of a concrete investigation of such delinquency, parallel with these ideologically-inspired premises, it becomes meaningful that delinquency is forcefully connected with the concepts of "survival" and "contamination."

At a practical empirical level as manifested in the aforementioned aspects there exists a surprising similarity between the two systems. Nevertheless, communist sociologists contend that delinquency is a separate quality which has essentially nothing to do with socialist society.

Such a view sometimes serves as a cause for inviting exposure to the contradictions in communist society itself. For, when they insist on the theory of survival or cultural lag, which assumes that the causes of all deviationary actions are the "survival of the past still lingering on even after the old social order has been destroyed;" their contention contains in itself major difficulties.

That is, such a theory may be applicable to the older generation. But when they attempt to apply it to the younger generation, it reinforces the contention that the established older generation hands down such vestiges to the younger generation. Thus, their contention contains a self-contradiction.

Viewed in this way, we may even conclude that a factor for a certain "social deviation" which we can confirm in communist society as well as in all other societies is a product origi-

nating from the social environment of the communist system, and that in this aspect latent structure-function is a supra-system phenomenon.

Moreover, needless to say the fact that particularism is required is an ubiquitous phenomenon found not only in communist nations but also in any other society. However, when we consider latent structure or its importance in connection with the fact that it is defined with considerable variation depending on the character of the system and especially in the case of North Korean society, it is important to note that the problem of latent function is unique to North Korean society and is directly related to the problem of maintaining the system.

6. Conclusions

In the foregoing we have examined the structure and change of North Korean society from the two phases of manifest and latent functions in terms of the four aspects, (1) cultural goals (value system), (2) organization as a means of system, (3) phenomena of strata, and (4) deviation.

Based on the above discussion we would like to suggest a forecast of change in North Korean society as follows by drawing analogies from several important facts in the structure of North Korean society.

First, there is the problem of internal contradiction borne by the policy of the individual idolization of Kim Il-song. The idolization of the leader is psychologically necessary to enable the mechanism of identification to work. In order to do this, the leader must monopolize the power governing all rewards, prizes, and punishments. Kim Il-song has already carried out a policy for establishing an individual cult (individual idolization and deification) and the idolization of the family. Finally, he is frenziedly trying to build the basis for a communist dynasty in order to carry on his power generation after generation under the slogan, "let us be loyal generation after generation."

Now, since this idolization system is primarily based on individual loyalty, it cannot avoid the concept of exclusiveness. Especially in the case of North Korea, the basis of individual idolization is more fragile and fictitious due to the concoction of national history, the emptiness of Kim Il-song's ideology, and the extremity of mass manipulation. The latent disfunctional structure which will follow will become an important factor for deciding social change in the future.

Second, what is conceivable is the form of reaction due to

frustration. The results of studies about the causes of juvenile delinquency in the United States and the Soviet Union reveal that the major similarity between the two systems in the majority of cases of juvenile delinquency is caused by a reaction to frustration.

In this respect, North Korea is an even more unfavorable situation. Let alone the absolute material poverty, a sense of relative deprivation resulting from the closed class structure is at work. That is to say, strata division based on socio-economic backgrounds, partisan spirit, and political standards, and the resultant differences in living standards, differences in educational opportunity, differences in occupational choice, differences in the system of thought, the prevention of leaving work places, and differences in residence prevent the majority of residents from voluntary social participation. Moreover, the frustration of residents who are dropped from such a linearized upward process and their consciousness of alienation finally develop into dissatisfaction against the system, and the potentiality of their anti-social action becomes strong.

Third, in this connection problems arising from the rigidity of the strata structure and social mobility are emphasized.

North Korea has formalized "class conflict and the exploitation and oppression of men by men have been forever eliminated." But the realities of North Korea are that not only a new class has already been formed, but also even the social mobility which might lead to class change has already disappeared.

When we see the fact that the Communist Party's control has its purpose in overthrowing the old ruling class and emerging as the new ruling class, the social structure of North Korean society has only a political meaning in thoroughly systematizing the order of social prestige according to socio-economic background and partisan spirit.

Accordingly, it works as a mechanism of power control which thoroughly eliminates politically any factors of counter-resistance to the system. Viewed in this way, the class indoctrination and class policy which North Korea has pursued for over 30 years under the name of the realization of the dictatorship of the proletariat have formed only a privileged class for a minority to monopolize the privilege of power rather than having built an egalitarian society and fostered a revolutionary spirit and revolutionaries. Moreover, it is judged that the policy process to perpetuate such privileged positions has fostered frustration, unrest, and the psychology of alienation among residents.

The realistic double-faced condition in which North Korea is purported to have an egalitarian ideology as its guiding ideal is practically unequal as a society forming the basis for social structure in North Korea. As long as this dualistic Kim Il-song-ism forms the basis of North Korea's system, social unrest and psychological dissatisfaction will directly lead to social deviation and to the deepening of latent disfunction.

When the foregoing is considered, we reach the conclusion that any factor related to change in the social structure of North Korea is the product of the result of contradiction in the social system unique to the social conditions in North Korea.

FOOTNOTES

1. To Hung-yol, "Social Structure of North Korea," ANBO YONGU, Tongguk University, 1974-75, p 103.
2. R. Bendix, "Culture, Social Structure and Change in Embattled Reason," p 139. On this point C.W. Mills and R. Dahrendorf hold a similar position.
3. R.K. Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie," "Social Structure and Social Theory," 1957, pp 131-160.
4. T. Parsons, "The Social System", Glencoe Free Press, 1951, p 251; M.B. Clinard, "Sociology of Deviant Behavior," Rev ed, New York, Holt, Reinhart, and Winston, 1963, Chap 2.
5. R. K. Merton, op. cit; Albert K. Cohen, "The Study of Social Disorganization and Deviant Behavior," R.K. Merton and others ed, "Sociology Today," New York, Basic Books, 1959, pp 462-463.
6. R. K. Merton and R.A. Nisbet ed, "Contemporary Social Problems, New York, Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1961, pp 728-729; R.J. Morris, "A Typology of Social Norms, A.S.R. Vol 21, Oct 1956, pp 610-613.
7. W.E. Moore, "Social Change," Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1953, pp 10-12.
8. A. Etzioni, "The Active Society, a Theory of Societal and Political Process," New York, 1968. He schematizes social types as follows:

Division	Active society	Passive society	Overmanaged society	Drifting society
Control	+	-	+	-
Consensus	+	-	-	+

9. To Hung-yol, "Comparison of Social and Cultural Forces Between South Korea and North Korea," National Unification Board, 1977, pp 32-33.
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CSO: 4208

HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE

USSR, DPRK SIGN PUBLIC HEALTH COOPERATION ACCORD

Moscow Radio in Korean to Korea 0930 GMT 21 Oct 78 SK

[Report on the signing ceremony of the USSR-DPRK public health cooperation agreement and talks by USSR Minister of Health Petrovskiy and leader of the DPRK public health delegation Comrade Pak Myong-pin, DPRK minister of public health. Kim Chae-pong, DPRK ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, also attended the signing ceremony]

[Excerpts] This cooperation plan anticipates expansion of the cooperation between the public health workers of our two nations, exchanges of experiences in the clinical and general medical fields, scientific research data and related publications.

Petrovskiy delivered a brief speech at the signing ceremony: Dear Korean comrades: I am pleased to meet you today on the occasion of the signing of the cooperation plan for the public health sector. This plan shows that overall relationships between our two nations, including those in the medical sector, are solidifying and developing.

Next, Minister Pak Myong-pin said: During our visit, we signed the 1978-79 public health cooperation plan which will benefit and enhance the cooperation between our two nations. I firmly believe that this cooperation plan will mutually benefit, solidify and develop the friendship and cooperative relations between the medical workers of our two nations.

A friendly talk then followed between Petrovskiy and the DPRK guests led by Public Health Minister Pak Myong-pin.

The comrades of the DPRK summarized their 10-day stay in our country during the talk. Comrade Pak Myong-pin, DPRK minister of public health, said: We have toured many places, including public health organizations, scientific research institutes, and exchanged our views with fraternal Soviet medical workers.

Petrovskiy then spoke to the Korean guests: I am happy to note that your visit to our country has been successful. We made every effort to enable the members of the fraternal DPRK delegation to discuss the working level of

Soviet medical organizations, research projects carried out by our scholars, hospital facilities and the educational system for cadre training. We believe that you had the opportunity to sufficiently observe how medical service is being carried out in our country during your tour of Moscow and ten other republics and the medical facilities in the Ukraine, Belorussia and Azerbaijan.

There are many similar tasks before the scholars of our two nations. I had this feeling when I visited the DPRK last year. Great attention is given to the public health sector in your country as in the Soviet Union. Therefore, it is worthwhile to mutually exchange our experiences.

CSO: 4208

POPULATION, CULTURE AND SOCIETY

'PUKHAN' EDITORS REVIEW RECENT SOCIAL TRENDS IN NORTH KOREA

Seoul PUKHAN in Korean Sep 78 pp 178-185

[Article by Editorial Department: "Views on Present-Day North Korean Society"]

[Text] Since 1975, North Korea has required that the whole populace recite an oath of allegiance before a portrait of Kim Il-song 5 to 10 minutes prior to beginning their daily chores. This is to be performed under the supervision of party cells in each work site so as to encourage loyalty to Kim Il-song and increase productivity. In particular, this was practiced daily in 1975, once a week, on Sunday, in 1976, and since last year, only on 16 April, the day after Kim Il-song's birthday.

Depth of Knowledge About Kim Il-song

The North Koreans have been given such thorough indoctrination in the idolization of Kim Il-song in their daily lives that it has become customary to use honorifics such as "great leader, Kim Il-song, the leader" etc., when referring to Kim Il-song in public.

It is worth noting that even daily necessities are believed directly distributed very cheaply by Kim Il-song himself. Nevertheless, as a consequence of the problem that, behind the scenes, these revert solely to the classes with proper family background and who receive special consideration from Kim Il-song, less than 30 percent of the entire North Korean population are satisfied with the state of affairs, and a majority of the others are considered to be vacillating and opportunistic. An extreme example of idolization is when a plaque or monument indicating the "spot where the leader gave instructions" is erected in a place or district where Kim Il-song visited even on a single occasion.

The North Korean historical fabrication that Kim Il-song's paternal great-grandfather set fire to the "Sherman," a U.S. merchant ship, in 1871, is not believed, because a majority of the people have read history books prior to the communization of North Korea in 1948. Moreover, rejection of the story that Kim Il-song liberated the Korean peninsula has become widespread among North Koreans of middle age or older who wonder "how a person could crush the 1 million Kanto military force in such a way?" Outwardly, North Koreans consider the picture showing Kim Il-song shooting a Japanese policeman with an air rifle as creditable because "since he became a leader he must have been brave from his youth," but among friends, they consider it as no more than a child's prank.

Family Life

In early 1976, North Korea required all women to delete the proper name "cha" from their names. This is because the proper name "cha" was formerly an imitation of a Japanese female name, and is a holdover from Japanese imperialism in basic conflict with Kim Il-song's chuche ideology.

The housing situation in North Korea is in particularly dire straits. The municipal housing situation is a good example. It is a common occurrence that couples are not allocated separate housing immediately after marriage, but must continue to use the common lodging facilities in factories and enterprises just as they did before marriage. They have to wait until the husband's or wife's director or supervisor has enough power, and then they are able to set up a new household 5 to 6 months and sometimes even 1 year later.

For example, in the combined housing compound (50 households in one building) located in Namp'o City, South P'yongan Province, there is one room and a kitchen, with shared toilet facilities. In apartments which are a little better, there are one to two rooms, and cadre occupy three-room apartments. Recently, toilet facilities of the wash-room type have appeared, but are unusable because of the severely worsened water situation, and they say that people dig wells for water, and frequently have difficulty obtaining laundry water. They receive an allotment of 30 kg of smokeless anthracite per month for fuel, and the women are forced to do the hard work of compressing it into coal briquettes by hand.

Household furnishings mainly consist of one bedding chest and one pantry chest. Cultural appliances are limited to wired speakers and an occasional radio which is hard-wired to receive only North Korean broadcasts (public announcements and propaganda), which is hardly worth paying good money for.

A very small number of television sets is assembled, but only officials of party or government organs and local party cadre have them, and there are only two sets in the combined housing compound No 1 (50 households) in Namp'o City. Broadcast times are limited to 2 hours from 8:30 pm to 10:30 pm to avoid detracting from work efficiency and study time. These broadcasts consist merely of all kinds of artistic presentations furthering the idolization of Kim Il-song and pushing the "100-Day Battle."

As for newspapers and magazines, non-party members cannot read the NODONG SINMUN, but can read only local newspapers.

The food situation is illustrated by North Korea's positive emphasis on the five-point program to remake nature for the purpose of producing 8 million tons of grain. The food allocation system was adopted in November 1957 by the so-called cabinet decisions nos 96 and 102. The grain allotment system was reset after 1959 and revised in April 1963. The food allotment for heavy laborers was 700 grams per person per day, 400 grams for those working at home, 600 grams for students in middle school or higher and 100 grams for children in kindergarten or child care centers. The mixture of rice with other grains was 40/60 for heavy laborers, but frequently corn meal is substituted for rice.

Four days a month, conservation is mandatory and they are forced to work their heads off to prevent starvation.

Kimch'i, side dishes, red pepper paste, bean curd, soy sauce etc., are distributed by factory unit in an attempt by Kim Il-song to utilize female labor to the maximum under the slogan "to improve nutrition and liberate women from the kitchen" as a facet of his Three Great Revolutions.

Meat is allotted first to high level cadre, soldiers and party members, and ordinary citizens receive an allotment of 1 kilogram of port per household on the four major festival days of the year (1 January, New Year's Day; 15 April, Kim Il-song's birthday; 9 September, Founding of the Republic; 10 October, Founding of the Party) and there are many people who have never tasted beef.

Three kilograms of fish can be bought every 2 months with coupons, but one's turn sometimes doesn't occur because the cadre of party, government organs and social organizations have taken the lion's share.

Condiments are chiefly pepper and onions, and many other kinds of seasoning are non-existent, and ordinary people taste sugar hardly once in 4 years. It is surprising that sesame oil is non-existent.

One bottle of rice liquor is allotted per household on each of the four major festivals. Children receive 500 grams of cookies on the festival days, but the cookies are so tasteless and hard that they are called "brick cookies."

Very low quality cigarettes such as Paektusan, Samjiyon brands, etc., are allocated to the populace, but there is only a 15-day supply of these cigarettes and the remainder is pouch tobacco which must be rolled to be smoked.

Cultural appliances are too expensive to buy, but in the unlikely event that one has enough money, they still cannot be bought because of short supply. Daily necessities are sold on the black market for three times the established price. The North Korean authorities punish black marketeers, but instead of being stamped out, they continue to flourish. In the midst of such conditions, those persons on the level of Administration Council deputy department chiefs and higher utilize the private "No 10 Store" and other high level party members receive priority allotments of goods, therefore they suffer no hardship from scarcity of supply.

At the Pyongyang Textile Factory party committee enlarged conference in January 1962, Kim Il-song spoke about promoting and developing the textile industry and disclosed that "the weakest point is that there are not many kinds of goods and their quality is low," and in December 1969, he admitted that "the quality of the cloth now being made in the local industrial plants is inferior and requires a great deal of raw material, so the price is so expensive that not everyone can afford them." In the face of such lack of variety and the shabby quality of goods, the price of 150-180 won, which is more than double the monthly salary of 70-90 won for the ordinary office worker or laborer, becomes exceedingly expensive for them.

All the laborers, peasants and fishermen in North Korea receive one suit of work clothes per year and have to buy their own outside clothing at a cost of 150-180 won each, and since they have to leave their houses at dawn and return after dark from Monday to Sunday, because there is always some meeting or something to attend, they have no opportunity to dress up and go out. For underwear, they receive only two T-shirts, two underpants, three pairs of socks and one pair of winter underwear per year. Women workers wear fitted shirts.

Social Life

They say that on the occasion of his personal visit to the Hamgyong provincial area around October 1969, Kim Il-song said that the Hamgyong provincial people had more factionalist elements than other localities, such as provincialism, domesticism, etc., that they do not carry out orders from the center and are full of opportunism; that they don't display any eagerness for political study, and he emphasized that they must arm themselves ideologically and pointed out that not a single person from Hamgyong Province occupied a high-level position in a central office.

Also, former Korean residents in Japan who have been repatriated to the North were assured a job, but they are living in such extreme poverty that to augment their livelihood they secretly sell precious articles which they either possessed when repatriated or received from Korean residents in Japan, and they are forbidden to return to Japan.

Furthermore, after the 25 June incident, North Korea evicted families with members who fled to the south and forced them to move to cooperative farms and coal mines in Hamgyong, Yanggang, and Chagang provinces, etc., restricted college entrance and party membership of their children, and subjected them to severe discrimination by frequent motivational scrutiny, etc., in their local residential areas.

The majority of North Koreans are not satisfied with their jobs. This is because there is no freedom of job selection or job change, no chance of working where one would like to, no atmosphere of working according to one's convictions because of the autocratic social structure, and one cannot perform the work one wants due to the inordinate control of working conditions. They are too exhausted from the tense daily life consisting of study wrap-up sessions, quota fulfillment meetings, report sessions, etc., and the lack of a trustworthy companion to confide in due to the work atmosphere of "backbiting" and "informing." They are unable to give vent to their feelings, and cannot aspire to a position with authority because prior consideration is given to proper family background, and then it must be negotiated well behind the scenes.

Prior to 1975, North Korea made Russian the second foreign language to be studied, but after 1975, English was studied as the second language in middle school instead of Russian, and they say that the instructor teaches it 1 to 2 hours a week and that the students show a tremendous interest in it.

It is said that North Korean youth consider religion and praying to God or Buddha as superstition which deludes the people and is unproductive. Recently, however, some soothsayers have occasionally appeared in the alleys of Namp'o.

Military Affairs

Twice a year, once for the counties, once for the provincial people's hospitals, the North Korean Worker's Party Military Mobilization Department holds a physical examination for those over 16 years of age and inducts them. Persons disqualified are those under 45 kg weight and 150 cm height, blood pressure over 150, eyesight under 0.6. Some of those who pass are dispatched as reserves to each plant and put to work according to the plan of the Military Mobilization Department. When they reach 20 years of age they are released from military service and transferred to factory training units.

Women volunteer for military service because if they volunteer and are accepted, they become party members and look forward to better social treatment after completion of military service. Regarding mobilization for military training, the work site training unit holds 16 hours of mountain reconnaissance, night training, etc., every Monday. The Youth Red Guards enter the county training base for 2 months a year and conduct training. The Worker Peasant Red Guards hold military training 5 to 6 hours a week. Mobilization of labor forces is carried out twice a year, 40 days for high school students, 80 days for college students, 60 days for ordinary laborers, by having them perform farming, road and dam construction, etc.

The training unit at the military supplies factories in North Korea is formed into a system similar to the regular army from male and female workers between the ages of 18-45. They perform in-house patrol and defense duties in peacetime and are transferred into the regular army in wartime. One AK rifle is issued per person and one four-man 14.5 mm anti-aircraft gun is issued per platoon. They hold combat training, target practice and live-fire exercises on the company level for 2 hours a week after work. Training units in ordinary factories are composed of men between the ages of 18-35, and training activities are the same as the military supplies factory training units.

Militarization of the Fishing Fleet

The boat that illegally encroached on our territorial waters in the middle of last May was North Korean fishing vessel No 632, built in March 1978. Heavy guns were fixed in the bow and stern (anti-aircraft gun and MAXIN heavy machine gun). Recently, all North Korean fishing boats are constructed to make it possible to arm them. This is one facet of the scheme to have all fishing boats armed or made into naval vessels for combat in emergencies. According to Kim Il-song's special instructions in 1959, North Korean fishermen were required to spend 300 days a year at sea excluding severe winter. Among the movements forced upon North Korean fisherman, having to stay at sea for 300 days a year whether they catch anything or not is one of the most difficult to endure.

An editorial in the NODONG SINMUN on 5 September 1977 urged the "fishermen not to leave the ocean empty during the four seasons, but to carry out their fishing chores and bring about a new transformation in fishing." In reality, however, it is impossible to catch fish for 300 days a year, so this can be seen as an attempt to extract a maximum effort from the fishermen to increase fisheries production.

Accordingly, it is only after 2-5 years that laborers and fishermen can earn as much as 1 won 50 chon in North Korean money, and those with over 5 years experience receive 1 won 85 chon to 1 won 90 chon.

To be a vessel captain, one must have over 10 years experience and pass an examination. The monthly salary is 100 won on the average, while a suit of clothes costs 150-180 won, and it takes several years to be able to buy a watch, since watches are not manufactured in North Korea. In order to earn 100 won, the catch must exceed 100 tons and 10,000 tons of fish are levied on the fisheries work office, and when the catch falls short of this level, instead of funds being borrowed from the center to pay their wages, the fishermen are at their wits end to repay their debts.

Not anyone can become such a fisherman if he wants to. They must be of an approved party and ideological nature in what is called the character investigation, or be a child of a cadre. In particular, a first mate and above must be a party member, but since there are fishing vessels with a shortage of crew, even non-party members are said to go to sea if they have the experience. Of particular note are women and married couple fishing boats. According to Kim Il-song's instructions, which he gave in person at the conference of activists in the west coast district fishery sector held in March of last year, women's boats were built in the Namp'o work site and women were sailing out to sea, but there was still a scarcity, so married couples' boats were built and couples sent out together to fish, thereby destroying family balance and order, and enforcing heavy labor without distinction.

While living at sea, one is permitted to return home to take care of personal matters once or twice a month, but permission must be requested and granted beforehand. If this procedure is not followed, one's name is continually brought up for criticism in meetings throughout the year. Because persons who are exhausted from fishing are continually pestered with "wrap-up work" around 8:00 am every day while ashore during the cold season for some sort of management meeting, general meeting, study session and whatnot, they arise early in the morning, go to some hidden spot out of sight of others and cook their meals. Accordingly, there is not time to think about such things as women's activities.

Weddings and Funerals

Freedom in marriage is unthinkable in North Korea. A person with an unacceptable family background or party spirit cannot marry. The marriageable age is 30 for men and 27 for women. Three bottles of liquor are allotted for the wedding celebration, and only five persons besides relatives are permitted to attend.

For funerals, one goes to the beautification work office (one in each city and locality) and buys a coffin for 30 won, and transportation to the public cemetery is provided by trucks from the affiliated place of work, or, in the case of cooperative farms, by cart. In Namp'o City, for instance, there is no crematorium, so burial takes place in the designated public cemetery. No more than eight persons besides relatives are permitted to attend the funeral. Two won each is collected at the place of work for funeral expenses, and five bottles of liquor are allotted for the funeral.

Sacrifices to ancestors were strictly prohibited as a remnant of feudalism by Kim Il-song toward the end of the 1960's, and only a picture of Kim Il song is hung in homes.

Crime and Disease

Even in North Korea where there is such strict control and there is nothing worth stealing there are countless instances of theft and rape.

Theft occurs in places of work, of course, but it is a common occurrence for young people facing hunger to steal food. Also because there is a great deal of pressure on students at all levels to participate in the movement to collect discards and scrap iron, there has been a marked increase in the theft of all kinds of discards and spare parts to fulfill the quota. As a consequence, North Korea is actually raising its youth as criminals.

Murder and armed robbery are prima facie capital offenses. Crimes of violence have increased with the advent of repatriates from Japan, and these instances have mostly been combined with dissension and frequently inflicted upon North Korean cadre. In particular, a lot of rapes are committed by Communist Party Cadre which is a revealing reflection of the state of affairs in North Korea under the totalitarian dictatorship of Kim Il-song. For example, it is widely known among North Koreans that the Hwanghae Provincial party committee secretary, Kim Yol, victimized over 100 married women in 1 year. Another good example of this is the former North P'yongan provincial people's committee chairman, Kim Sung-sop, who hopped the fence in an attempt to rape a woman teacher in the middle of the night but, perceived as a burglar, was knocked unconscious with a club wielded by the woman teacher's father. In similar instances of rape, two instances occurred recently in Namp'o City, South P'yongan Province, where the criminals were caught and executed by firing squad at a mass trial.

Brought to the brink of starvation, the North Korean people are dying from all sorts of illnesses as a result of heavy labor.

The most rampant diseases are yellow jaundice, infectious hepatitis, tuberculosis, malnutrition (Pellagra), heart valve malfunction, strokes, neuralgia, etc. Unfortunately this is a hopeless situation due to backward North Korean medical technology and facilities. To cover-up this shabby state of affairs, a mass movement is underway to produce medicinal herbs on a large scale.

Social Trends

Since disclosing another's shortcomings under the guise of criticism is frequent in all sorts of gatherings, such as party study sessions, and there is no freedom of choice or movement, the tendency has increased for employees to slander (backbite) each other in order to gain favor with the guidance persons.

When speaking at various kinds of meetings, one is expected to quote the instructions of Kim Il-song and must use a reverential vocabulary in so doing. Consequently, the majority of North Koreans are kept in step with idolization almost by force of habit. Behind the scenes negotiations run the whole gamut of social life, such as job assignment, choice of schools, military induction, procurement of goods, etc. Since a completely closed and autocratic structure has been formed on premodern socio-cultural base, the irrational atmosphere arising from this can be viewed as the principal offending cause.

Inasmuch as all efforts must be concentrated on fulfilling excessive quotas under discriminatory conditions where private ownership of the means of production is rejected, incentives stemming from this are absent, and a proper family background is the controlling factor for advancement, a lackadaisical, almost listless atmosphere devoid of initiative is a natural consequence.

The majority of North Koreans, living in a closed society, are completely ignorant of South Korea and are being trained by anti-South Korean slanderous reports and broadcasts in report meetings and work wrap-up sessions. Because they believe the North Korean propaganda as it is, they have absolutely no admiration for South Korea, but instead tend toward hostility.

Because the true state of affairs is far removed from the propaganda of its being "possible to eat pure rice and meat soup, wear silk and live in homes with tiled roofs," passivity has become habitual, and the propaganda slogans which North Korea hangs up everywhere are met with inner disinterest or derision. For example, at the height of the Chollima movement (1000 league horse movement), the joke passed among trustworthy friends was that "next year a Mallima movement (10,000 league horse) will be pushed."

North Korea's situation is worsening day by day; backbreaking heavy labor, thoroughgoing surveillance and strict control of life are accelerating and, indeed, an abject drama is unfolding in which it is impossible even to die as one pleases.

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GEOGRAPHY


JAPANESE JOURNAL PRINTS MAP OF PYONGYANG

Tokyo KITA CHOSEN KENKYU in Japanese No 51, Sep 78 pp 54-55

[Research materials: "Street Map of Pyongyang"]

[Text]

SOURCE: Map, "KOREA," Peking, Hsin-hua Shu-tien, June 1976
 "Pyongyang Tourist Map," Pyongyang [no date]



Key:

1. Pyongyang Zoo
2. Kim Il-song University
3. Friendship Tower
4. Pyongyang Stadium
5. Pubyok-ru
6. Moranbong
7. Ulmidae
8. Chollima statue
9. Liberation Tower
10. Korean Revolutionary Museum
11. Ongnyugwan
12. Mansudae Assembly Hall
13. Pot'ongmun
14. Students and Childrens Palace
15. Nagwangjong
16. Kim Il-song Square
17. Party Foundation Memorial Hall
18. KPA Martyrs' Tower
19. Pyongyang Grand Theater
20. Pyongyang Thermoelectric Power Station
21. Kim Chung-t'ae Locomotive Factory
22. Ongnyu Bridge
23. Taedong Bridge
24. Sinso Bridge
25. P'altong Bridge
26. Songsin Station
27. Changjong-ri Station
28. Taedonggang Station
29. Pyongyang Station
30. West Pyongyang Station
31. Pot'onggang Station
32. Sop'o Station
33. Korean Museum of Art
34. Taedonggang Hotel
35. Pyongyang Hotel
36. Taedonggang Hall
37. Central Industrial and Agricultural Exhibition Hall
38. Korea Documentary Film Studio
39. Po'tonggang Hotel
40. Changgwang-san [phonetic] Hotel
41. Pyongyang Gymnasium
42. People's Palace of Culture
43. Kim Il-song University Street
44. Pipa Street
45. Nagwon Street
46. Kumch'ol-san Street
47. Sosong Street
48. Red Street
49. Stalin Street
50. Chollima Street
51. Pot'ongmun Street
52. Korean People's Army (KPA) Street
53. Ch'ongnyon (Youth) Street

"Kyonghung Street, which stretches from Taet'aryong Intersection in Pot'onggang-kuyok (Kyonghung-dong in Pot'onggang-kuyok) and Hasin Street, which stretches from Hasin-tong in Sosong-kuyok to West Pyongyang Station, both of which had been under construction," according to KCNA on 6 September and PEOPLE'S DAILY on 8 September, "were completed with an all-out assault prior to the 30th anniversary of the founding of the republic."

CSO: 4105

GEOGRAPHY

TWO COUNTIES INCORPORATED INTO CHONGJIN: NOW 'BIGGEST' CITY

Tokyo KITA CHOSEN KENKYU in Japanese No 51, Sep 78 pp 8-10

[Article: "Unusual Changes Continue to Occur in North Hamgyong Province-- North Hamgyong Province Divided Into Northern and Southern [Portions]"]

[Text] The Soviet advance into the area north of Chongjin, North Hamgyong Province has been increasing recently. Factories, railroads and ports are being rapidly constructed with Soviet help, and it has reached the point where the Najin Port in particular is used almost exclusively by the Soviet Union as its private port to ship its goods. (See KITA CHOSEN KENKYU No 49, p 19; No 51, p 33 and YUKAN FUJI 3 Aug 78)

The 27 August NODONG SINMUN and 29 January NODONG CH'ONGNYON revealed that the Kyongsong and Musan counties of the North Hamgyong Province have been incorporated into Chongjin.


Before this, the area of Chongjin was about the same as Pyongyang City (see Map-A), but according to these reports, Chongjin has become the "city" with the largest area in North Korea. Moreover, with the incorporation of Kyongsong and Musan counties into Chongjin, North Hamgyong Province has been divided into north and south (see Map-B).

Generally the administrative boundary is established by taking economic and geographical factors into consideration, and adopting measures to sever the geographical link by dividing an administrative area into north and south is generally just not done.


This unusual incident occurred, however, when the two "counties" were incorporated into Chongjin, making Chongjin the city with the largest area in North Korea (about three times the size of Pyongyang). Our research institute's study to date [shows that] there is no administrative gain from incorporating Kyongsong and Musan counties into Chongjin (e.g. to have smooth commercial activity).¹ Rather, to take such a step as to separate North Hamgyong Province into north and south is even disadvantageous and will in no way bring any administrative gain. Such being the case, one can only think that the aim of this measure was not to incorporate two "counties" into Chongjin,² but

there was some kind of circumstance that necessitated the division of the North Hamgyong Province into north and south. Naturally North Korea has not revealed what the circumstance is, but as has been mentioned earlier, because the Soviet Union is increasing its influence in the area north of Chongjin, it is thought that perhaps Chongjin has turned into a special region, something like the leasing of the Najin Port (see KITA CHOSEN KENKYU's estimation, No 49, p 19).

Furthermore, until now North Korea has officially announced administrative re-zoning in the form of a government decree, and it is therefore unusual for North Korea to have rezoned without officially issuing a government decree, as it has done this time.



1. Map-A
2. Former Chongjin and Pyongyang
3. PRC
4. USSR
5. North Hamgyong Province
6. Chongjin
7. South Pyongan Province
8. Pyongyang



1. Map-B
2. New Chongjin (as of August 1978)
3. Coalfields
4. (1) Najin Port
(2) Oil refineries
5. (3) Unggi Consolidated Farm

FOOTNOTES

1. Since the iron ore used by the Kim Chaek Iron and Steel Complex in Chongjin comes from the Musan Mine located in Musan County and is transported by slurry transport pipes to the Kim Chaek Iron and Steel Company, the economic relationship can be said to be close. One may think that it is for this reason that Musan County was incorporated into Chongjin. But because the Musan Mine and the Kim Chaek Iron and Steel Complex are state operated

and centrally controlled, they would not receive administrative control from "provincial" or "county" organs (local administrative organs control local factories.) After 1974, major state operated enterprises became complexes through unification of related industries. The Kim Chaek Iron and Steel Complex and Hwanghae Iron Mill have also become complexes even though their raw material base and facilities are located in other "counties" and "provinces," and the complexes themselves play the role of administrative organs. (From Kim Il-song speech) Accordingly, there is no sufficient administrative reason to incorporate Musan County into Chongjin. Even their relationship with regional factories is not close. In Kyongsong County there is Chuul Hot Spring, which serves as a recreational area for the people of Chongjin. Chuul Hot Spring is a national recreational spot, and is not operated by the Chongjin Municipal Administrative Committee, but is administered by a ministry of the State Administrative Council. Therefore, there was no need to incorporate Kyongsong County into Chongjin.

2. This research institute has been able to confirm only two counties as having been incorporated into Chongjin. In reality, however, it is possible that even more "counties" have been incorporated.

CSO: 4105

FOREIGN TRADE

CEMENT TO INDIA ON LONG-TERM BASIS OFFERED

Madras THE HINDU in English 18 Oct 78 p 9

[Text] New Delhi, 17 Oct--North Korea has offered to supply cement to India under a long-term contract.

In the wake of acute cement shortage, India had imported 70,000 tonnes from North Korea in April-June this year. Subsequently, a contract for importing 1 million tonnes was concluded.

The proposal for a long-term contract was made by the North Korean Foreign Trade Minister, [Ch'oe Chong-kun] at his meeting with the Commerce Minister, Mr Mohan Dharia, here today.

Mr Kaun [sic] is here leading a trade delegation for talks to finalise a trade agreement for 1979.

Today's discussions resulted in both countries agreeing to fix a target of Rs. 100 crores for the two-way trade in 1979. It was also decided to make attempts towards a balanced growth of trade.

The North Korean delegation had gone round industrial centres in Bombay, Bangalore and Delhi and identified several items of interest to its country. These included traditional items like jute bag, pig iron, iron ore, chrome ore, manganese ore and cotton textiles and non-traditional items like conveyor belts, shellac, sugar, six-wheeler trucks, polyethylene sheets, dumpers, wire ropes, dyestuffs, and railway wheels.

The North Korean minister indicated to Mr Dharia that his visit would be followed by the visit of a team of experts, who would finalise the import contracts. He also indicated that another delegation comprising shipping and transport experts would visit India to remove the bottlenecks in the flow of goods and to improve the shipping services between the two countries.

Dharia's Suggestion

Mr Dharia suggested that India's exports to North Korea should be stepped up on a long-term basis so that a balanced growth of trade could be achieved. He said there was tremendous possibility of growth of trade between the two countries. In addition to various engineering goods, India would be in a position to export spices and certain wheat products and leather goods.

Mr Kaun said there was not much awareness about India's technological capabilities among the businessmen and industrialists of North Korea and suggested that India could organise an exhibition in his country for this purpose. Mr Dharia welcomed the suggestion.

The volume of two-way trade between India and North Korea had risen from Rs. 82.6 lakhs in 1970 to Rs. 1,060.9 lakhs in 1977. Trade between the two countries had been governed by bilateral agreements concluded from time to time. As the volume of trade expanded, it was felt that a major constraint in achieving more rapid growth was the need for achieving a balance of trade within the trade protocol. Therefore, the two countries decided to switch over to trade in freely convertible currency from March this year.

CSO; 4220

END