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TANK BATTALION FIRING TRAINING IMPROVEMENTS NOTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Mar 77 p 1

[Article by Guards Capt N. Gushchin, tank battalion commander, Northern Group of Forces: "How Experience 'Works'"]

[Text] If we make a time study of the work day of the headquarters officers of our battalion, it is easy to be convinced that the major portion of their service time is spent on work in the subunits. This is natural; it is here, in the companies and platoons, that a firm base is laid for all our successes and that the fate of the socialist obligations which have been assumed in the competition for a worthy greeting of the 60th anniversary of the Great October is decided. The headquarters officers check the course of the lessons and help the subunit commanders to organize competition for tasks and norms and to plan the most effective ways to eliminate shortcomings. Each of them bears personal responsibility for this before the party organization of the battalion and reports systematically on the state of affairs on the assigned sector.

The work of the headquarters officers is organized the same way in the other battalions of the regiment. The advantage of this style is that we have the opportunity constantly to be abreast of all matters and to effectively influence the competition's course. Leading experience began to be studied better.

Recently, I called attention to the following fact: the name of the tank platoon commander, Senior Lieutenant V. Shpilevskiy, is mentioned in the officers' reports more often than the others. In particular, it was noted that he has the ability to control the platoon in the course of live firings. Someone even expressed the assumption that Shpilevskiy, he says, has "his own" methods for teaching the tankers accurate firing.

Keeping an eye on the officer a little more attentively, we noticed that actually he does control the fire and the results in the accomplishment of the firing missions in the platoon which he commands appear to be better than in the others. One is especially struck by the fact that the subordinates of Senior Lieutenant Shpilevskiy executed the command to open fire more rapidly than the soldiers of the other subunits. It was decided to determine with

stopwatch in hand how much time the crews spend from the moment of the mission's receipt to the opening of fire. It turned out that for Senior Lieutenant Shpilevskiy's subordinates this time is one or two seconds less than for the others. And in contemporary battle, let us say, what does a second mean in a duel between two tanks? To preempt means to win.

With a more fixed examination of the procedure which the officer uses in training his subordinates, it was noted that he seems to divide the fire mission into component elements: target acquisition, determining the range to it, giving commands, and so forth. Each element is worked out until it is automatic. A competition for a reduction of the times to accomplish each operation has been organized in the platoon.

We acquainted the company and platoon commanders with his experience and they adopted it. This was not so long ago, and it is still too early to draw conclusions on its effectiveness on a battalion scale. But even now, one specific result can be mentioned. The battalion recently participated in a tactical exercise with live firing. The tankers had to conduct fire under difficult conditions. But they coped with the mission successfully.

This fact once again shows how important it is, in the course of a competition, to use all available reserves to raise the combat skill of the soldiers and the combat readiness of the units and subunits. This includes such an important reserve as the operational introduction of leading experience into the practice of the training and upbringing of the personnel.

Of course, each such step forward along the path of raising the effectiveness and quality of training pleases us. However, in evaluating our work on the generalization and introduction of leading experience, it must be admitted self-critically that the capabilities available in this matter are still not completely used. It often happens that we take as experience what lies, as they say, on the surface. At times, the truly new and advanced is not used.

The tank company commanded by Guards Senior Lieutenant A. Shkrobot has been showing excellent results for several years. Everyone knows that this is to the great credit of the company commander himself. We are making an example of Senior Lieutenant Shkrobot and are calling on all officers to be his equal. But, unfortunately, the matter does not proceed beyond appeals as yet.

The decree of the Central Committee CPSU, "On the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution," states that it is necessary to disclose and utilize reserves energetically and to disseminate leading experience more widely. This requirement directly concerns each of us. Raising the quality of combat and political training and the effectiveness of socialist competition is unthinkable without planned, systematic work on the introduction of leading experience.

6367

CSO: 1801

TRAINING OF NEW PERSONNEL IN AIR DEFENSE MISSILE UNIT DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Mar 77 p 1

[Article by Col I. Dokuchayev: "First Battle"]

[Text] The group of staff officers faced the task of checking the organization of combat training in the N-th antiaircraft missile unit and rendering assistance where necessary. The unit commander's report on the state of affairs indicated that he delves deeply into all the fine points of his subordinates' life and training and sees correctly the ways for the accomplishment of the missions facing the subunits. It was felt that great work has been conducted in the unit on the professional training and upbringing of the young replacements, the coordination of the sections, and renewing of the personnel.

But nevertheless, after his official report the unit commander expressed in a talk some fear that the presence of a large number of young officers and the replenishment of the combat sections with soldiers from the fall call-up may lower those indices which had been attained at the end of last year. And in the evening, I happened to be a chance witness to how instructions were given to the young officers by telephone. I was alerted by the recollection that in checking the coordination of the sections there were only experienced operators at the work sites. What was this? Overcautiousness? Or a sign that the assemblies of young operators and the lessons with them about which the commander reported were ineffective or else were not conducted at all? But the latter in no way squared with the work style of the unit's commander and staff which I knew for many years.

The battalion commanded by Major Kh. Niukanen was selected for a check. Last year, he was my brother-officer. He developed from guidance officer to subunit commander before my eyes. Major Niukanen always came out against formalism in training and against any attempt to embellish the state of affairs and hide or belittle shortcomings which are present. But he was on leave. Major P. Os'kin reported on the battalion's readiness for work.

A check of the manning status of the combat sections showed that they were manned by soldiers and sergeants of various draft periods. As followed from the report, the young soldiers are distinguished by good general training and

have successfully mastered their functional duties. However, at the check drill of the command post section not one soldier of the fall call-up was presented. And only after a reminder did the authorized section take its places in the cabin. Its composition also included Private A. Berdnikov. He received a good grade on special assemblies. He participated in several drills in the battalion. But he was not involved in the accomplishment of a training-combat mission in repelling a mass "enemy" air strike.

And then target blips appeared one after another on the remote indicator. The commands of the firer, Major Os'kin, are clearly heard. The guidance officer, Senior Lieutenant V. Borisov, works confidently. He discovered the lead target and turned it over to the operators for tracking. And here, it was as if they replaced the section. Officers Os'kin and Borisov no longer listened to the reports of Senior Lieutenant V. Barabanov about changes in the aerial situation and the expected nature of the aerial "enemy's" actions. Their attention is fixed on Private Berdnikov. Outstripping one another, they try to help the operator execute the commands. Experienced operators N. Tolov and S. Danelyan begin to fuss and become nervous. In the final result, the target was "fired upon" at the very last moment.

Meanwhile, a low-altitude and high-speed stratospheric targets entered the zone almost simultaneously. Major Os'kin saw these "enemy" actions but he had already lost the "picture" of the battle. Additional queries were directed to Senior Lieutenant Barabanov. The latter was forced to repeat the report which had already become obsolete to a great extent for making the correct decision....

The battle continued. The officers understood their error and left Private Berdnikov in peace. But now Privates Danelyan and Tolov, now together, now in turn, suggest the sequence for his work to their comrade. Carried away by tutorship, Danelyan committed an error which was inexcusable for him and the next target also almost got away unpunished. A minute or two later, Tolov also committed a similar error.

The drill was ended. A break was announced. But we did not hasten with the critique. Let everything cool down a little. Let the resentment for the unsuccessful work burn out. It is desired that the people themselves understand the true reasons for failure during these minutes of critical meditations from fresh tracks. Looking at them, I frankly regretted the absence of Major Niukanen. He endured the same type of unsuccessful battle several years ago. How could he not caution his subordinates against such failures in their work?

I listen to the conversation in the smoking area. There is no animation which is customary after successful field work. Silence. Only rarely do we hear hollow phrases with a shade of resentment and reproach directed toward Berdnikov. A guilty smile froze on the soldier's face. It looks as if tears are shining in his eyes.

Unfortunately, neither the officers nor the experienced operators never so much as mentioned that the reason for failure was not to be found in Berdnikov, but in each one of them. In the fact that they were unable to overcome the psychological barrier of a lack of confidence in the young operator. As a result, their good motive--to help the man-- developed into serious interference. And Private Berdnikov could not but listen to what his comrades said to him. And he, naturally, stopped being guided in his work by the skills which had been acquired and relied completely on prompting. And they followed out of place, lagging in time. So it turned out that the young operator, having lost confidence, could not acquire it prior to the end of the drill and the experienced specialists committed many mistakes.

At the critique, naturally, the talk was not so much about the grade for the training battle in the point system as about the correctness of each one's actions in regard to his comrade and about the accomplishment of their functional duties by all section members.

In talking with the operators, I asked Private Danelyan: did they help him like this in his first training battle?

"They helped, of course. True, a little less, and not everyone," the soldier answered. And after a pause, he refined his answer: "Yes, and there was no commission then."

The second psychological barrier can also be seen behind these words: how not to be found wanting in the eyes of the checkers. Succumbing to this good intention, some commanders strive to show only the best and not what actually exists.

After the critique, the sections again occupied their battle stations. The battalion continued its strained fight against the simulated enemy. Private Berdnikov is not yet functioning quickly and clearly, but in the overall coordinated work of the section this does not have such a great effect on the conduct of the battle. By their actions, operators Danelyan and Tolov compensate for a large portion of their comrades errors and, most important, they do not aggravate them. Only rarely does Captain Ye. Smirnov--he stands behind Private Berdnikov--prompt him in a low voice. And Berdnikov, nodding his head, implements the advice. In the overall flow of reports his, Berdnikov's, are also heard, reports from which it follows that he understands his tasks and knows how to perform them.

This time, the battalion worked considerably better. Not yet excellently, but with sufficient confidence. And there is a different tone in the voices of the people and a different expression on their faces.

I asked the officers a question in the battalion commander's office:

"What instructions did you receive from Major Niukanen concerning the young specialists when he went on leave?"

"Give them a full load with complete confidence," Major Os'kin answered.

There was an awkward silence in the office for several minutes after these words. And I thought of how it would have been much better if this correct thought had sounded in the the instructions which reached the battalion on the eve of the exercise.

6367

CSO: 1801

AIR FORCE OFFICERS COMPLAIN ABOUT LIVING QUARTERS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Mar 77 p 2

[Letter to the Editor: "Right Above the Headquarters"]

[Text] Dear Editors:

We are officers and warrant officers [praporshchik] of the N-th air unit who are writing you. We live in a dormitory, some of us for four or five years already, but no one remembers when repairs were made here. Our rooms contain tables, chairs, night tables, and beds. But if you could only see their condition!

New misfortunes were recently added to our troubles: the television sets, tape recorders, flatirons, and teapots which belong to the residents were removed from the rooms. They explain this by the interests of fire prevention. And the residents have been deprived of their last conveniences.

There is a "television room" in the dormitory. But it is not very suitable for resting and can accomodate only a small part of the dormitory's residents. Nor can the single teapot which is kept with the duty officer satisfy everyone. For the specific features of our service are such that after night flights we cannot use the services of the canteen or mess. Nor is there any place to wash, dry, and iron clothing and underwear.

We have mentioned all this many times to the officers who are responsible for the organization of public services and amenities in the dormitory-- Lieutenant Colonel R. Azikovich and Major P. Shalayev. However, no measures have been undertaken although we live on the third floor of the building, right above the headquarters where these officers work.

Senior Lieutenants I. Dudko, V. Kazhukhin,
Warrant Officer G. Nelovko, and others
(altogether 19 signatures).

6367

CSO: 1801

DEFICIENCIES NOTED IN USE OF INCENTIVE AWARDS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Mar 77 p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Seledkin and Maj V. Shalkeyev: "The Forgotten Pennant"]

[Text] The forest road on which there was a profound silence just a few minutes ago was now filled with the rumble of automobile engines. The column stopped just short of a small glade. The drivers immediately began to bustle about alongside the vehicles. One of them caught our attention. Somehow, he was checking his vehicle with special partiality--he tapped the wheels with the toe of his boot, carefully checked the fastening of the body, and removed snow from the windshield with nimble movements. We approached a little closer.

"Private Goryachev," the soldier reported.

There was a proud smile on his lean, windblown face. We talked. With animation and credulous sincerity Viktor told about his comrades who coped successfully with fatigue and the difficult route. One felt that he was satisfied in having withstood the difficult test.

Reaching for a tool, Goryachev turned awkwardly and a red cloth triangle fell onto the snow. We turned it around. An inscription ran in a golden ligature: "Best driver."

"Yours?" we asked the driver.

"Yes," he answered indifferently. "The club chief brought it...."

"And for what was it awarded?"

"Who knows, they didn't say...."

As we learned, a meeting of the party bureau took place on the eve of the exercise. The party activists spoke about the personal examples of the communists and about the duties of the editors of operational news sheets and vehicle commanders. They also discussed incentive awards for those who distinguished themselves and about the very procedure for awarding rewards. But a voice

was heard: why philosophize now, it said; wait until they distinguish themselves and then we can decide how to reward them. The pennants have been made, they say."

The vehicle personnel operated with great enthusiasm in the course of the exercise. The inspectors noted their ability to maintain the established speed on the march. And here the secretary of the party bureau, Captain V. Burkov, remembered the pennants. He took one of them and had already nearly made up his mind to go to the vehicle personnel but had second thoughts at the last moment. Catching sight of Lieutenant V. Yuglov, secretary of the Komsomol organization, Burkov ordered him to visit their location for a while and learn just who had distinguished himself, and he gave him the pennant.

But it turned out that Yuglov could not reach the place. In turn, he gave the pennant to the chief of the unit club, Senior Lieutenant Yu. Gortyayev. The latter had his own urgent assignment. Reaching the vehicle personnel, he caught sight of the familiar figure of a soldier. He knew Private Goryachev as an experienced driver, Komsomol activist, and reliable soldier. So he gave him the pennant virtually on the march.

The soldier was embarrassed, but he immediately thrust it in his tool bag.

No, neither good, joyous enthusiasm, nor a surge of strength, nor new activity caused the soldier's award.

What does this example tell us? I believe, not so much about an individual failure of the party activists as about the shortcomings of the system itself in employing incentive awards which developed in the subunit. When we spoke with Captain V. Burkov on this subject he declared with surprise:

"Really, can rewards be planned ahead of time?"

A typical admission! At times, some party activists seriously assume that the employment of incentives is a matter of chance: if there is success, there will also be an appropriate reward. If there is no success, about what reward can there be talk?

Of course, no one intends to fight to see that incentives are employed on any occasion in a competition. Their very value is in the fact that they should distinguish only the very best, should focus attention on the best examples, and stimulate in the soldiers the striving to follow the example of the leaders in the competition, be first, and receive recognition of their skill and military services.

If one agrees with the opinion of the secretary of the party bureau, Captain Burkov, then there remains nothing for the party activists to do but to sit and wait until life itself tosses them the opportunity to put such a powerful weapon as incentives into action in the struggle for high results in socialist competition.

However, Private Goryachev's example with the pennant graphically indicates that this position does not bring the required effect. And really, it cannot because in this case incentives come forth not as an active, mobilizing start in the struggle for high effectiveness of socialist competition but only serve to illustrate it timidly and march obediently at the tail of events which have already been accomplished, losing any possibility to influence them while they are still in the course of their development.

Here we are speaking not so much about the fact that soldiers were left unnoticed in the subunit who had achieved high grades in training, had become winners of the socialist competition, or had distinguished themselves on exercises and firings as about the formation of the conditions and circumstances which are able to assist the servicemen to show themselves in the very best light and create the preconditions for them to distinguish themselves in some way and earn praise, a good word, and an honored reward.

Recently, we had the occasion to visit the N-th antiaircraft missile unit. In the party committee, we learned about the high results of the subunit commanded by communist officer Yu. Gavryushov. The collective has retained the title of outstanding for several years already, here almost all specialists have a high rated qualification, and the soldiers are accomplishing the most difficult tasks.

Just how did communist Gavryushov achieve this? It is believed that one typical example from the work practice of the subunit commander and the party organization can serve as an answer to this.

In the small equipment room a young electrician, Private Yevgeniy Lizyura, was left alone with rolling-rumbling diesel assemblies and meters.

"A heavy responsibility rests on the specialists of our subunit," he recalled the words of the subunit commander. "Imagine what will happen if the equipment is left without voltage...."

Yevgeniy imagined. His greatest worry was what might happen through his fault. Try, understand the artfully designed circuits and meters at once. How much time is necessary to study all this? And the soldier lost his head.

This did not slip by the attention of communist Gavryushov. He noted that the new specialty came to the newcomer with difficulty. But Yuriy Vasil'yevich also saw something else--the diligence of Private Lizyura, his conscientiousness and sense of responsibility for the assigned matter. But how to arrange it so that the soldier has confidence in his own strength and in his ability to become the equal of the best specialists in the subunit?

During a routine drill in combat work the commander assumed a certain risk and unexpectedly announced a special situation: "The electrician, Private Chernokal'skiy, has been put out of action." Yevgeniy Lizyura was left alone. And there was an instant when he again felt lost. But the second hand inexorably ticked off the seconds and less and less time remained for brooding.

And Yevgeniy made up his mind. He began to work. Power reached the equipment at exactly the indicated time.

In summing up the results of the lesson, the officer noted the successful actions of Private Lizyura and announced his gratitude to him.

No, for the present this is not a pennant nor another reward which is awarded in a ceremonial, festive situation. This is only the first thanks. But their significance for the formation of the young soldier is difficult to overestimate namely because they "arrived" in time. The commander's praise dissipated the last remnants of a lack of confidence which the soldier had.

Now Private First Class Lizyura is a leader in the competition, a second-class specialist, and one of the best electricians in the unit. He has many rewards to his credit for successes in service. But the soldier especially remembers his first thanks which played such a great role in his formation as a soldier.

In the party organization of the subunit, such cases are considered not simply as a separate pedagogical experiment, but as an important condition for increasing the activity and effectiveness of socialist competition. Through the common efforts of the party activists, an atmosphere has been created in the collective which stimulates the soldiers to strive for successes and to see that their efforts in training bring the maximum effect.

We sensed this when we attended a small ceremony. After summing up the results of the competition for the month, communist Gavryushov awarded the pennant to the best specialist, Private Ramzak Akhmadov. He awarded it after all "pros" and "cons" were carefully weighed and all quantitative and qualitative indicators were considered. In accepting the reward, the soldier flushed with joy and pride. He carefully took the red cloth triangle in his worker hands and looked at everyone with moist, happy eyes.

6367

CSO: 1801

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION SCHOOL GRADUATES' INADEQUACIES NOTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Mar 77 p 2

[Article by Engr-Lt Col L. Kulikov: "Endurance Test"]

[Text] "I have decided to write your newspaper. Here is the problem. Graduates of the Kamyshin Higher Military Construction Command School such as Lieutenants A. Slichenko and V. Abanin proved to be unprepared for work with personnel. Apparently, something was omitted in the school...."

Lieutenant Colonel A. Pavlenko, commander of a military construction detachment.

He is seated before me, sullen and confused. I ask Lieutenant A. Slichenko to tell me why all his service proceeded in a distorted manner. How did it happen that a 22-year-old officer was excluded from the Komsomol and in only a year of service has several disciplinary actions and was condemned by an officer's court of honor? He remained silent for a long time. Then he answered nevertheless:

"I erred in my selection of a profession. I understood that service in a construction unit is not for me...."

I could not get any more out of him.

Of course, the matter is much more complex. Talks with commanders and political officers of the military-construction detachment and with Lieutenant Slichenko's comrades permitted a deeper understanding of what had happened. "Service is not for me"--this began when he was undergoing production practice. Being in the role of back-up commander of a construction subunit, Cadet Slichenko experienced great difficulties in organizing labor and the competition of the military builders and in the upbringing of subordinates. It began to appear to him that he is incapable of supervising people. And tomorrow's school graduate feared his future, surrendered to circumstances, and did not find within himself the courage to express his doubts frankly to his commanders and comrades in training.

The commander of the company in which Cadet Slichenko studied, Major Ya. Matishin, does not deny: yes, he saw that the cadet is somewhat weak. He had many shortcomings as a future officer. At the same time, although he did not shine with knowledge, Slichenko was successful in all subjects, committed no coarse violations of discipline, and was satisfactorily developed physically.

"There didn't seem to be any reason to drop him from the school," Major Matishin sums up what was said about his alumnus. The deputy commander of the cadet battalion for political affairs, Lieutenant Colonel A. Domaskin, also agrees with this opinion. He only added that, knowing about the weakness in Slichenko's character, he was confident that he would overcome it with time. Life and practice temper the will and strengthen the command character in an officer.

Yes, as the wise man said, a work of art is concealed in every block of marble. One need only know how to extract it from the block. The commanders also tried to bring up Cadet Slichenko as a willful person. Unfortunately, they did not succeed in doing this. Having become an officer, he encountered actual conditions for service and production in a remote garrison and Lieutenant Slichenko shirked before difficulties.

Nor did his commanders have sufficient educational sagacity. There is no denying their demandingness. But let us say directly that they did not give their subordinate sufficient tactfulness, spiritual warmth, or daily support. They could have helped him to understand his mistakes and failures in time. And not by regular punishment, but by convincing, advice, and concern; then, many of the unpleasantnesses with him certainly would not have happened.

Nor were Lieutenant Abanin and several other graduates of the school who performed their service in the same construction organization and were held to strict accountability for disciplinary offenses ready for the situation of a military construction site which had become complicated. Too much thoughtlessness shows through in their behavior and they are not trained to make a critical estimate of the situation and make correct decisions. What kind of example are they for their subordinates? They did not learn to be examples of self-discipline either in the school or in the military construction collective. And really, they themselves, as it appeared to me when meeting them, for the present were not imbued with the desire to become full-fledged members of the military collective.

"The signal is very alarming," noted the head of the Kamyshin school, Engineer-Major General S. Petukhov, in a talk with me. "It is necessary to look thoroughly into the reasons for the unworthy behavior of our graduates. I believe that both our omissions and gaps in the upbringing of the lieutenants at the construction sites had an effect here."

The head of the school was correct. Looking into the files of the young officers at the construction site together with the political officer, Major A. Galimov, prior to arriving in Kamyshin, we came to the single opinion that ideological-educational work with such an element as platoon commanders and deputy company commanders is not set at the proper level in many military-

construction detachments. Demanding high percentages of accomplishment of the plan from them, the senior commanders often left yesterday's graduates alone with poorly supported production and with adversity in everyday living. There were cases of the undermining of the young commanders' authority: they were rebuked in the presence of subordinates, and detachment commanders treated them tactlessly. Such a style for upbringing is inherent, for example, to Lieutenant Colonel M. Vel'ko and Major A. Besedin.

The following method of disciplinary practice of company and detachment commanders also causes doubt. Among many lieutenants, the only type of reward is...lifting punishment. Not all senior commanders consider the individual features of one officer or another. Lieutenant Sh. suffers from a speech defect and stutters. Of course, it would have been better to assign him to a technical post rather than command. But no one thought about this at the construction site. Some officers are not working in their specialty. Their days off are not regulated.

Lieutenant Colonel A. Pavlenko, the author of the letter to the editors, saw the incomplete work of the school's commanders and teachers in the lieutenants. Yes, they do exist. But, as we see, there are many omissions in the matter of the upbringing of the young officers in the units themselves. Training is only the first step toward the summits of soldierly mastery. The further school in the maturing of the officer-builder is the troop collective. "If skillfully ignited, even snow will burn," they say in Siberia. If we find the correct individual approach to each person, the most unyielding will change his behavior. But this must be preceded by painstaking and untiring educational work.

The Kamyshin school enjoys fully deserved authority in the district. This military higher educational institution contains well-trained command-instructional personnel and a solid training-material base and classrooms and laboratories equipped with contemporary means of automation and electronics. However, it is necessary to discuss something else.

All the lieutenants with whom I spoke declared that the school does not provide enough skills in disciplinary practice and the organization of production and socialist competition of the military builders. Lectures do not disclose completely the specific features of service and command activity in construction units.

As a matter of fact. One probationary training period during the four years--primarily as a back-up platoon commander. Only a two-hour lecture and one seminar on the subject, "The organization of socialist competition in the subunit." Really, can the cadet assimilate such a tremendous and important problem as competition, which now is the decisive factor in raising the effectiveness and quality of production, in such an insignificant time?

A special conversation about the ability to bring up people and instill the pedagogical skills which the cadets should receive during the time of their studies.

"We are afraid to talk about those complexities under the conditions of which our graduate must work." I heard this opinion with astonishment from many officers of the school. And I believe that it is pedagogically incorrect in its basis. No, the cadets do not scatter on learning about the specifics of their future work. On the contrary, they grow up from the knowledge of life and overcome the next step in command maturity more rapidly.

Readiness to endure all the burdens and privations of military service steadfastly--this is what Lieutenants A. Slichenko, V. Abanin, and several others were lacking.

It should be said that the school tries to follow how things go with the young officers. A service comment must be signed and sent to the higher educational institution on each officer a year after graduation. The significance of this form of influence on the training process is tremendous. The command, political department, and teachers of the school analyze the comments and consider them in their practice. But here is the picture which appears when you leaf through the file with these documents. The construction directorates of the Far Eastern and Transbaykal Military Districts were to submit their comments on a group of Kamyshin graduates back last year. But they did not reach the school. The construction organizations of the Siberian and Central Asian Military Districts did not consider it necessary to occupy themselves with an evaluation of the service activity of young commander replacements. Really, doesn't the lack of desire to become seriously engaged with the problems of educating young officers show through in this fact?

Yes, there are youth, a great charge of energy, and well-grounded ideological and theoretical training at the lieutenant's disposal. The entire further service and the fate of the trail-blazer builder are in his very own hands. But he needs help. Tangible help, result-producing help on the part of senior commanders, communists, and the entire collective. Especially when he is first becoming established. Under this condition, yesterday's cadet will withstand the "endurance test," the test for command maturity, more successfully.

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BAKU AIR DEFENSE DISTRICT COMMANDER ON OFFICER QUALITIES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Mar 77 p 2

[Article by Col Gen Avn A. Konstantinov, troop commander of the Red Banner Baku Air Defense District: "A Profound Knowledge of the Job"]

[Text] In the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th Party Congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stressed that a modern leader should organically combine party loyalty with profound competence, discipline with initiative and a creative approach to the job.

These demands apply fully to military personnel as well. They must have high ideological, theoretical and professional training, tactical skills, a knowledge of the documents regulating the life and activities of the troop, and an understanding of the pedagogical and psychological principles in instructing and indoctrinating the personnel. They should be on a level of today's requirements of military theory and practice, and continuously improve the style of their work.

In the troops of our district, a number of commanders, political workers and staff officers have grown up and developed, and they successfully carry out the complex and responsible tasks of training and indoctrinating the personnel, and organizing the socialist competition. They are marked by a profound knowledge of their job, party loyalty and irreconcilability for shortcomings, a desire to constantly improve the style of work, and to widely employ the new, more effective forms and methods of training and indoctrination.

Among the leading officers, I would like to name Col Yu. Orlov, the commander of an antiaircraft missile regiment, the personnel of which in the National Air Defense Troops was the initiator of the socialist competition to properly celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Great October Revolution. He has endeavored to so organize the training of subordinates that it is constantly full of the spirit of modern combat. And this, to put it frankly, is not an easy task. It can be solved only by constantly relying on the party and Kom-somol organizations and the staff officers. This makes it possible for the commander to know in detail the situation in the subunits, and to take effective measures to spread advanced experience and eliminate shortcomings. Col Orlov organizes his activities in precisely this manner.

The following example is characteristic. In one of the battalions, instances of an oversimplified approach to training the launch control officers were noted. How was this specifically expressed? By the fact that the officers being trained were put under conditions where they did not have to give particular thought to what target should be fired on first, what rate of fire should be selected, and so forth. All of this was known ahead of time, as were, incidentally, the actions of the "enemy," the flight profile of the targets, their routes and other data.

It is not difficult to guess to what such weaknesses could lead. For this reason, the commander, the political department and the staff took immediate measures to eliminate the shortcomings. Moreover, it was decided in the other battalions to thoroughly check the skills of the launch control officers and their ability to act effectively. The results of the inspection were discussed at a party meeting, as well as at a session of the procedural council. Particular attention was paid to the effective carrying out of comprehensive training sessions. It was decided to conduct regularly competitions for the title of best crew of a command post of a subunit, and the best launch control officer, and to study more specifically and disseminate the experience of the masters of precision missile strikes. Such a thoughtful and serious approach to the question was responsible for the success.

Officers improved their professional skills in the system of commander training, in exercises and training sessions. It is essential that these forms constantly acquire a new content, in order that the procedure for conducting them is improved in keeping with the development of the means of air attack and the methods of countering them.

Unfortunately, this is not always taken into account, and for this reason there are flaws in the training of the officers. I have met commanders and staff officers who confidently used tactical and operational terms, and at the same time found it difficult to reply when it was a question of a specific opposing "enemy," his possible tactical maneuvers on a given approach, the flight densities, combat formations, and so forth.

In a number of instances, an excessive concern with theoretical exercises can be noted in organizing officer training. Certainly, a knowledge of theory is essential. But certainly theoretical training in and of itself cannot develop in the officers such qualities as efficiency and flexibility of tactical thinking, foresight, initiative and independence in carrying out combat missions. The strength of a commander, as the organizer and leader of combat, is precisely in the ability to apply the obtained knowledge most efficiently in practice.

But let us become acquainted more closely with a different sort of officer. He has a sound military education and good experience in serving in the troops. But when it is a question of a major inspection, all sorts of mistakes and flaws appear. What is the reason? Obviously, it is due to the absence of sound practical skills and insufficient psychological conditioning.

frankly to the subunit commander. Then, along with the commander, he drew up a detailed plan for eliminating the shortcomings, and gave advice as to which questions should be given particular attention in the combat training of the radar operators.

Such a profound knowledge of the job and the ability, so to speak, to feel out the bottlenecks in the training of specialists and to contribute actively to eliminating the disclosed shortcomings are characteristic for officers L. Stovbenko, V. Marfin, Yu. Pokorskiy, O. Tret'yakov and many others. Each trip of theirs to the subunits contributes real and tangible results. And this, in my view, is the best affirmation of their competence on the questions of the service and combat training of the troops.

But, unfortunately, one at times observes that a certain officer ceases growing in professional terms, and is superficially concerned with the processes of development of military affairs. In practice, this leads to superficiality and to imaginary competence which sooner or later is doomed to failure in work.

The air fighter regiment X in the military district was known as one of the leading ones. But when a thorough inspection arrived, the previous achievements were noticeably tarnished. It was discovered that here there had been instances of oversimplification in working out the combat training missions, the grades were overstated for individual fliers and air specialists, and little use was made of the opportunities of the socialist competition.

Naturally, we dealt severely with the commander and the other officers of the unit. But we were also struck by another circumstance. Representatives of the superior staff had been repeatedly in the unit. After each trip, they reported that the situation in the regiment was good, and that the missions were being carried out successfully. What had these inspectors lacked? A profound knowledge of the job, competence or principledness and exactingness? Clearly, the efficiency of their work in the unit was low.

The military council and the political directorate of the district had to take effective and active measures to rectify the situation in the unit.

Undoubtedly such instances are few and far between. Nevertheless, we should be intolerant to any manifestations of conceit, self-complacency or a decline in responsibility. True competence should combine thorough military and political knowledge and professionalism, a sharp feeling of responsibility for the assigned area of work, independence, initiative, and a creative approach to the job. This is the basis for the successful activities of military personnel in carrying out the complex tasks of further raising the combat readiness of the troops.

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The unit staff officer, Maj P. Kuznetsov, for example, prior to the start of a tactical exercise felt confident. In actuality, his theoretical training had been given a high grade. No particular demands were made on him in the course of the training. However, in this instance the officer did not show his best side.

In following the game plan of the exercise which was known only to the superior staff, the "enemy" unexpectedly changed the direction of the attack. The unit commander immediately requested new data. And here the confidence of Maj Kuznetsov was replaced by nervousness and mistakes in his work. It could be felt in everything that the sudden maneuver of the air "enemy" caught the officer unaware. The senior chief sent a more experienced specialist to help Kuznetsov....

This case was analyzed in detail in the course of the analysis of the exercise. The necessary conclusions were drawn, including the one that tactical skills should be the core of an officer's competence. Since in tactics, as in any other area of military affairs, the times are constantly inscribing new lines, so in an exercise the accent must be put on mastering the most difficult variations of actions which conform to the requirements of modern combat.

Obviously such demands have not been fully considered in the staff of the unit where Maj Kuznetsov served. Of course, it cannot be said that maneuvers by the air "enemy" were not employed in the plans of the training sessions conducted here or that various inputs were not used. But they were too simplified and schematic. And there was little benefit from such exercises.

Each commander or chief should skillfully rely on the knowledge and experience of subordinates, and correctly orient them to carry out current and long-range missions considering the development of military affairs. And this requires a scale of thought and the ability to have an active influence on improving the quality and efficiency of combat training.

These qualities are particularly essential for the commanders, political workers and staff officers in inspecting in the units the military and political training of the personnel, and the correct fulfillment of the requirements of the regulations on the spot. And I would not err if I said that each such inspection is, at the same time, a testing of the competence of the inspectors themselves and their professional qualities.

The following case comes to mind. The radar operators of one of the subunits were late in detecting a control target. The subunit commander was hard put to answer where the reason for the delay was. And then the staff officer Engr-Lt Col G. Surkov arrived at the "point."

On one of the radar sets, the inspector detected a decline in the sensitivity of the receiving channel. The subunit commander who was standing nearby breathed easier as now it was obvious that the equipment had failed. However, the subsequent careful analysis in the actions of the specialists showed that it was not the equipment but rather the personnel and their insufficient knowledge of the equipment and the rules for operating it. Engr-Lt Col Surkov said this

CAPABILITIES OF NATO COMBAT HELICOPTERS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Mar 77 p 3

[Article by Engr V. Denisov: "Combat Helicopters. 1977"]

[Text] Foreign military specialists are paying more and more attention to helicopters. They consider them to be a very efficient means for carrying out diverse combat and auxiliary missions. For this reason, on the basis of the already existing experience and the most recent scientific and technical achievements, intensive work is being carried out abroad to improve all types of helicopters. The developers of the new generation of helicopters are endeavoring to raise their life span, reliability and combat readiness, to increase the cruising speed and strengthen the weapons. The basic efforts of the specialists in foreign helicopter building are aimed now at developing a new class of machines, the so-called combat helicopters.

Strictly speaking, combat helicopters are already in use in a number of NATO nations. However, in essence these are basically multipurpose helicopters adapted for fire support of ground troops from the air. But the combat helicopter being developed, for example, under the American AAH program is a specially designed complex of weapons, fire control and navigation equipment. As was noted in the journal AEROSPACE INTERNATIONAL, the primary mission of an AAH helicopter will be to combat tanks. Here, they assume the use of anti-tank guided missiles with a shaped head.

In the opinion of specialists, tactically it is most advantageous to use this helicopter from an ambush (in the radar shadow of terrain folds, behind buildings and trees), close to the possible lines of advance of tank columns. The helicopter, according to the AAH program, is also designed for combating armored personnel carriers and other objectives on the battlefield; as well as for security and accompanying transport and landing helicopters.

Until recently, two competing American firms were engaged in developing the new helicopter. These were: Bell which worked out the designs for the YAH-63 helicopter, and Hughes which presented the YAH-64. Both helicopters have a take-off weight of around eight tons and a cruising speed of about 280

kilometers per hour. They have been designed according to the single-rotor system with a tail rotor and a straight wing along the sides of the fuselage. This wing during high speed flight creates additional lift, reducing the load on the main rotor.

The crew consists of two men, the pilot and the gunner who sit in tandem, one above the other. In the YAH-63 helicopter, the pilot is in front and has a good view for piloting and firing. The latter circumstance, in the opinion of the specialists, is of important significance since in the future dogfights between combat helicopters are considered possible.

The power unit consists of two engines which have been located apart from one another. This raises the invulnerability of the helicopter, making it possible in the event of the failure of one engine, to continue level flight and even climb. The crew is protected by armor on the bottom and sides against bullets up to a caliber of 12.7 millimeters. Between the pilot and gunner cabins, a partition has been installed made from armored plastic, and capable of withstanding the hit of a 23-millimeter shell.

In designing both helicopters, the so-called principle of safe destruction was used, whereby the failure of individual elements did not entail the loss of the helicopter as a whole. For this reason, for example, the tail boom of the YAH-63 helicopter is capable, it is asserted, of sustaining the hit by a 23-millimeter shell, without failing, while the transmission shaft of the tail rotor can stand a hit by a bullet with a caliber of 12.7 millimeters. The blade of the main helicopter rotor, in having two spars, with the destruction of one of them, is able to continue operating, since the entire load is taken up by the second spar. Specialists from the Bell firm also feel that the double-bladed main rotor developed by them with a broad chord possesses greater survivability than the four-bladed rotor with narrower blades on the YAH-64 helicopter.

The cockpit canopy of a combat helicopter, as the American specialists assume, should withstand hits by shells of the 23-millimeter caliber. The cockpit itself should withstand a stress with the helicopter hitting the ground at a speed of 13 meters per second, and should not be destroyed if the helicopter falls in a overturned position.

The designers of the YAH-63 and YAH-64 combat helicopters have taken measures which will reduce the probability of visual detection of the machines. For this, the cockpit canopy has been made from flat windshield panels, and the helicopter itself has been painted with nonreflecting paint. On the YAH-64 helicopter, in addition, a reduction in the noise level of the tail rotor has been provided, and this also helps to reduce the probability of its detection.

The armament of a helicopter consists of eight antitank guided missiles and a 30-millimeter cannon. For carrying out fire support missions, containers can be installed with 19 unguided projectiles with a 70-millimeter caliber. The pilot aims the weapons through a stabilized sight which is equipped with an infrared night vision system in the forward cone, as well as optical and laser devices.

Particular attention has been given to servicing the helicopters under field conditions. Access to all units is achieved by hatches and built in entrance ladders. Repair operations have also been made easier in replacing the basic assemblies such as the reduction unit, transmission, rotor and engines.

Among the new helicopters of the European NATO countries, specialists have noted the multipurpose "Lynx," which has been developed under a joint Anglo-French program. It can transport up to 1.5 ton of different cargo or ten soldiers, and is armed with a 20-millimeter cannon, two 7.62-millimeter machine guns and antitank guided missiles. A naval version is being developed for antisubmarine operations and this will be based on a ship deck. It is equipped with more powerful engines and can land on water. It is also planned that the "Lynx" helicopters will be delivered to the Netherlands and Brazil.

Recently, in the press there have been announcements on the development of a modern "European" multipurpose tactical helicopter similar to the American UTTAS. Talks are under way between England, France and West Germany for creating such a helicopter which would be in service in the middle of the 1980s.

In West Germany, they plan to develop an army antitank helicopter using certain assemblies from the serially-produced BO-105 helicopter. In France, they are studying the plans of a two-seat combat helicopter with a take-off weight of 3.5 tons and armed with a ring-mounted cannon of 20-30 millimeters and six guided missiles.

The foreign press, in announcing these plans, has noted that they are based on the desire to win the Western European market which has been assessed at several thousand machines, and to oppose the pending invasion of American modern helicopters.

Thus, in the opinion of many foreign specialists, in the near future combat helicopters will take an independent place in the troops. The recent designs of such machines indicate that combat helicopters are becoming a more and more effective means for combating tanks and providing fire support for ground forces. This, undoubtedly, will tell on the character of conducting modern combat.

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NIGHT COMBAT OPERATIONS BY GROUND FORCES DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Mar 77 p 1

[Article by Col V. Yevdokimov, Hero of the Soviet Union, Candidate of Military Sciences and Docent: "Nighttime Combat"]

[Text] Dear editors! As is known, during the Great Patriotic War, our troops successfully conducted combat not only during the day but also at night. Modern weapons have broadened the opportunities of successfully carrying out combat missions under the conditions of limited visibility. However, nighttime combat, as is known, has a number of particular features which, in organizing it, should be considered by each commander. I think it would be useful if KRASNAYA ZVEZDA would describe the most characteristic of them.

Lt A. Kostyanovskiy, commander of motorized rifle company.
Red Banner Belorussian Military District

We have asked Hero of the Soviet Union, Col V. Yevdokimov, to reply to the young officer.

Lt A. Kostyanovskiy is right. During the Great Patriotic War, nighttime combat was used rather often. And it was conducted not only by individual subunits and units but also by large troop groupings. Under the conditions of limited visibility, our troops successfully pierced defenses, conducted meeting engagements, crossed water obstacles, and maneuvered for the purpose of encircling and destroying the enemy.

It would be difficult to overestimate the role of preparing the troops for conducting active nighttime operations under modern conditions, when they are equipped with the most modern means of reconnaissance as well as infrared and other equipment. Under these conditions, there must be skillful use of the night vision instruments, illuminants, and the organizing of protection for the personnel and optical instruments against the effect of light radiation with a nuclear explosion. Of particular significance are the bold and daring actions of the subunits as well as the manifestation of broad initiative by all commanders, and the use of deceit in the aim of using darkness for carrying out the set missions.

I will illustrate this by an example from tactical exercises. In the course of an offensive, one of the tank battalions, having encountered superior "enemy" forces, was forced to go over to the defensive. During the night it had to occupy a line which was disadvantageous in tactical terms. At the battalion staff they began to think how they could outsmart the "enemy." The solution was suggested by the chief of staff, Capt P. Krasnov. He proposed by using the tank tractors to simulate engineering work at the occupied positions, while the subunits during this time would withdraw to a new area and prepare for a counterattack. The proposal was approved, and soon the "enemy" which was hurrying to attack the battalion which, in its opinion, had not been able to dig in, was trapped.

I feel that the author of the letter will agree that Capt Krasnov did not think up anything new here. Deceptive actions were widely used by the front-line troops. But this episode again shows how important it is for the commander to thoroughly study the experience of organizing and conducting combat as acquired during the years of the Great Patriotic War, and to use it for training subordinates.

Here it is essential to consider the influence of both positive and negative factors on the actions of the subunits. Incidentally, nighttime actions under a fluid and rapidly changing situation aid in the concealed concentration of the troops, the preparing of surprise attacks, and the achieving of victory over the enemy with fewer forces. At the same time, the night also makes additional difficulties. During the night it is more difficult to observe the enemy, to orient oneself in the situation, to command the subunits and to maneuver the forces and firing. Under such conditions, the troops must show high field skills, and the ability to rapidly and accurately orient themselves on the terrain, to utilize the night vision instruments, the illuminating equipment, and also combat these means.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War teaches that in organizing and during the conduct of nighttime combat, it is essential first of all to carefully study the enemy, and to thoroughly assess its capabilities. It is also essential to clearly determine the procedure for illuminating the battlefield, coordinated actions, and the methods for indicating the direction of advance to the forward edge. Of great importance is the study of the terrain, and, if possible, the preparation of it for the forthcoming combat, including the marking by stakes and lights the routes for the advance of the tanks and the infantry combat vehicles to the line of attack, and the clarifying of the places for setting out light markers.

A special role is played by reconnaissance of the lines designated for deployment, and this should be carried out before the onset of darkness. Generally speaking, the bases of success in nighttime combat are established during daylight, when the commander carries out reconnaissance, and organizes measures to prepare for the forthcoming actions. The practice of nighttime marches, for example, indicates that with careful preparation and dependable organization of the commandant service and traffic control, well trained tank and motorized rifle subunits, in traveling on vehicles equipped with night vision instruments, are able to achieve a high speed during nighttime, and carry out missions as successfully as during the day.

The night has a substantial influence on the character of any combat, including a meeting engagement. The outcome of the latter depends primarily upon the able, decisive and bold actions of the commanders, and upon the correct use of the night vision instruments and illuminants. Training practices indicate that the illuminating of the terrain should be commenced with the starting up of a fire battle or in the event that the enemy detects the actions of our subunits.

A forward detachment under the command of Capt M. Semashko, in pursuing the retreating "enemy" at night, suddenly ran into an oncoming column. The point, having deployed in battle formation, met the "enemy" with organized fire. But the latter also deployed in battle formation and went over to an attack. The battalion commander ordered the artillery troops to open fire against the "enemy" and to illuminate it with rockets. In tying down the attackers from the front by the actions of the head, the battalion outflanked the enemy through the forest, was almost next to the "enemy," deployed in battle formation and rapidly attacked in the flank. The battle was won.

As we can see, although it is more difficult to conduct a meeting engagement at night than in the day, well trained subunits can carry out this mission successfully. Certainly the success of nighttime combat in all instances will depend upon its careful organization, the concealment of preparations and the achieving of surprise, the skillful use of forces and means, flexibility of command, the organizing of light support, and the combating of the enemy illuminating and night vision equipment. For this reason, in the decision of a subunit commander, for example, for a nighttime offensive, special measures are provided which facilitate actions in the dark. In particular, the precise direction of the offensive is indicated, the lead subunit is appointed and the personnel of it are equipped with the necessary instruments, illuminants, and lighted markers and indicators. The procedure for illuminating the battlefield and for using the night vision instruments and directional gyroscopes is established, and the methods of indicating the direction of advance to the leading edge and the attack are determined.

The complexity of nighttime combat also makes an impression on the organizing of interaction. Here, one of the important questions is a strict determining of the signals for the mutual recognition of the subunits. It is also essential that each commander have a clear and detailed notion of the conditions of nighttime battle and the sequence of actions of his own subunit and adjacent units.

During the war years, the motorized rifle and tank subunits often had to fight at night away from the main forces, and carry out missions independently. In utilizing the success of the daytime offensive, they penetrated the enemy flanks and rear, they captured road junctions, crossings, bridges and other important objectives, and held them until the arrival of the main forces. An example of such actions could be the combat of the submachine gun company of the 32nd Rifle Company in March 1942 at the city of Gzhatsk. In skillfully using the darkness, the company undetected filtered through the enemy leading edge, by a surprise attack captured two pillboxes deep in the enemy defenses, and held them for almost a day and a half, thereby providing for the successful attack of the entire company.

Under modern conditions, the cutting off of the subunits from the main forces can be even more significant. This requires from the commander the ability to take a decision independently for combat under any situation, and to carry it out. This is why it is so important, in the course of commander training and in daily exercises, to develop in the officers firm skills of commanding the subunits on the battlefield both during the day and at night.

Of particular significance for successful actions under nighttime conditions is the indoctrination of high combat morale qualities in the personnel, including: decisiveness, initiative, resourcefulness, tenacity, strong military discipline and combat teamwork. These qualities are developed more rapidly where there is a comprehensive approach to training and indoctrination, and where constant concern is shown for the effectiveness of party political work, the socialist competition and the quality of nighttime exercises.

As we can see, nighttime training has been and remains one of the most important elements in the system of training troops in the procedures and methods of actions under modern combined-arms combat. The ability to successfully conduct nighttime combat on a broad scale is visual proof of the high level of professional training of the commanders and the staffs as well as the morale of the personnel. The organizing of nighttime combat entails the solving of a number of specific problems. The ability to delve deeply into their essence and to consider them in training and indoctrination of subordinates is a duty of every commander.

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LACK OF FEEDBACK ON WORK OF SCHOOL GRADUATES VOICED

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Mar 77 p 2

[Article by Engr-Col A. Serzhantov, deputy chief of the Pushkino Higher Military Construction Command School, and Lt M. Petrovtsev, secretary of the Kom-somol Committee of the Officer Candidate Battalion: "But There Are Still No Replies"]

[Text] Each year, the demands are raised on the quality of training for officer personnel. This obliges the commanders, political workers and instructors of the military schools to be continuously concerned with improving the style of their work and seeking out and putting concealed reserves into use.

One of the important sources of information essential for a creative search is the responses about graduates. Each such response is carefully studied and analyzed, and often the weak and strong points of our former graduates are discussed at party meetings. The most characteristic responses and the letters from young officers who have completed the school are used in indoctrination with the officer candidates.

Unfortunately, we encounter serious difficulties as certain commanders "forget" to send in their responses, although this is envisaged by the corresponding documents. We know how only one-third of our 1974 graduates are serving in the subunits. As for subsequent years, here the picture is even more unpleasant. It is quite apparent that with such a situation the possibilities for generalizing and studying the responses are sharply limited. It must be noted also that among the responses there are those in which the description of the officer is given only in general phrases.

In endeavoring to rectify the situation somehow, the command of the school has worked out a special response blank which lists all the questions of interest to us. It would seem that not so much time and energy would be needed to fill out the corresponding lines. But, alas, this has not helped. The impression is gained that certain commanders do not understand that the indicating of shortcomings in the training of a young officer helps to promptly eliminate them. But if such a warning is not received, then the failures can be repeated again and again.

This is why we decided to appeal through the newspaper to the commanders of the units in which our graduates are serving. Dont't forget the responses! Certainly today's officer candidates will be serving under you tomorrow. And concern for the quality of their training is our common concern.

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SIGNAL UNIT TRAINING DEFICIENCIES NOTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Mar 77 p 2

[Article by Maj R. Kharitonov, deputy commander of the signal regiment: "Concretely and Purposefully"]

[Text] Because of service duties, I have often inspected the organization and state of military training in the subunits of a regiment. And here one could see particularly clearly the shortcomings in our work of disseminating and introducing advanced experience. Certainly everything new and progressive is tested out and undergoes a "roll-over" precisely in the company and platoon. And I would like to reflect on how one can make this process more efficient.

The company special tactical exercises come to mind. The best results were demonstrated by the company under the command of Capt Ye. Chebotarev. All the combat training missions and standards had been worked out here with a high quality. And the young specialists did not fail. They worked confidently as part of the crews, and correctly carried out various inputs. And there were many inputs. At the crucial moment of combat work, for example, several specialists who were providing contact were "knocked out." However, this did not prevent the subunit from carrying out the combat training mission well. Other men quickly took over for their comrades. And many of them worked according to the standards of first and second class. Thus, complete interchangeability in the crews, their teamwork, the high individual training of each man, and the skillfully organized competition for the tasks and standards provided success for the company, as it won first place in the regiment.

But nearby was the company under the command of Sr Lt G. Permyakov. It was noted that the specialists from this subunit clearly lagged behind their neighbors in skill. They acted in far from the best manner both in the initial stage when the company left the position, and during the march to the set area, and particularly in deploying the radios. Not one of the crews was able to carry out the mission precisely and effectively.

Certain comrades endeavored to explain this by the fact that in the company, the officer personnel had been significantly replaced. And in actuality, Sr Lt Permyakov had recently been assigned to the position of company commander.

And in the subunits the platoon commanders had little experience in service. But this was not the only problem. The officers had sufficient time to work through the questions of the combat teamwork of the crews and to improve the individual skills of the signalmen. The reason for the lag was that they did not pay proper attention to studying advanced procedures and methods in training subordinates.

At the same time, among their neighbors this work had been done concretely and purposefully. Capt Chebotarev decided to see to it that in each field exercise the crews were at full strength, and he achieved this. Usually specialists from one station are assigned here to the daily detail. Later on additional exercises are conducted with them, and they rapidly make up for lost time. But in the company commanded by Sr Lt Permyakov, men from various crews are assigned to detail as before. This not only prevents their teamwork, but also introduces definite difficulties in organizing additional exercises. As a result, certain men have fallen behind in certain subjects of instruction.

And here also we are to blame. Having analyzed the work of the staff officers, one could note that not everything is being done to make certain that there were no laggards along with the better subunits. All of us must show more tenacity, creativity and initiative. Here we should recall the lines of the decree of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers, the AUCCTU and the Komsomol Central Committee on the All-Union Socialist Competition. This document states the necessity of improving the practice of giving the results of the competition, and along with determining the winners, to assess the activities of those who have average indicators or are lagging behind, and to plan and implement measures to eliminate the factors impeding the work.

Certainly, we do evaluate the activities of the collectives. We analyze the shortcomings which impede the growth of skills among the specialists. And we also provide help to the laggards. In particular, Lt Col V. Ardemasov, Maj A. Belyy and others have done a good deal of work in this area. The experience of Capt Chebotarev and his subordinate officers has been studied and generalized. But still, as we can see, the proper effect from this work has not been achieved. In my mind, this is because, in endeavoring to more quickly bring the lagging collectives up to the level of the advanced ones, we do not always penetrate deeply into the essence of their experience, and we do little to involve the most advanced personnel in the work of introducing this experience into the practice of other collectives. And often those who are generalizing the experience overlook the fine points which are known only to those who directly prepare and conduct the exercises. For this reason the gap between the subunits has still not been reduced, and the experience of the advanced personnel is not truly assimilated.

The introduction of advanced experience into the practices of troop training and indoctrination is one of the most important tasks for the commanders, staffs and party organizations in the competition to properly celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Great October Revolution. And one of the reliable ways for raising the effectiveness of this work is concreteness and purposefulness in analyzing and disseminating the new and advanced features which arise in training.

COMBAT TRAINING FOR TANK UNIT COMMANDERS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Mar 77 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen Tank Trps Ye. Moiseyev, "The Commander and Instructional Methods"]

[Text] A company tactical exercise was taking place with live firing. Lt Col Yu. Lipskiy, a tank battalion commander, was directing it. The "tested" topic -- attacking a defending "enemy" from the move--had been practiced for a long time. Did it seem that it was possible to introduce something new into the organization of the class? Nevertheless, Lipskiy was made happy this time by more than one instructional methods windfall.

The basis for success was laid during the preparation for the exercise. The officer strove to create a tactical situation during which the major portion of the time would be spent on the dynamics of energetic actions. The appearance of defensive targets in the most unexpected places, sudden counterattacks, and many other complications were required, according to the director's thinking, to continually heat up the combat situation.

When the company's tanks were moving powerfully and irresistably on the "enemy", punching through gaps in his defenses, it was possible to demonstrate that combat superiority comes easy to the subunit without any special efforts. However, the skill of Lieutenant Colonel Lipskiy as an organizer of combat training and exercise director affected this also. He was able to prepare his subordinates ahead of time for the difficult test.

The regiment's chiefs of services actively helped him in this. They met on the eve of the exercise with the battalion commander and discussed in detail the questions to be practiced. Every opportunity, including multi-theme training in the assault position, which the company occupied before the attack, was used to raise the men's skill.

The crews practised hanging mine clearing attachments. They worked on the norms for defense against weapons of mass destruction. They checked the tank's systems and the re-fuelling of the vehicle. They prepared weapons, etc. All this was done under the immediate supervision of the chiefs of services with each crew in succession.

The last shots during the exercise rang out. The fighting men's firing training was rated good and their tactical training was recognized as excellent. They were happy, of course not because of the ratings themselves but because the exercise was a genuine school of combat skill for the tankers. It was filled to the utmost from the first to the last minute with dynamic actions.

Without a search and a striving to put the latest achievements in the field of instructional methods to work for the sake of combat readiness, it would be impossible today to talk about increasing the quality and effectiveness of the training process. The continual improvement of the material base, in particular the appearance of trainers and the considerable intensification of the training process which is caused by them, urgently requires a search for new instructional methods. However, it is important to develop in commanders a striving for the creative application of already known and well proven instructional methods and not to be afraid to speak one's piece when it is necessary to improve them.

Let us recall a well-known instructional methods principle: from the simple-- to the complex. How has this been carried out in practice? The young specialist underwent a "leisurely" preparation in stages. At first in the silence of the training classes, the ABC's of a combat specialist were presented to him; then, for more than a week he learned the material part using posters. Only then was the soldier given an opportunity to work directly on the equipment.

On the whole this principle has not lost its importance. However, life forces us to doubt the rightfulness of such a --one can say--simplified-- interpretation which is far from being the best way to influence combat readiness. The necessity to reappraise existing methods has been hinted at by the experience of the Great Patriotic War and by tactical training and firing practices. Let us mention that, in a front situation when new equipment arrived in the forces, the first requirement was to become proficient on it as quickly as possible. The enemy did not give time for "poster" training or for a gradual mastering of the weapon based on the strict sequence method. An understanding of the mechanism's and assembly's construction secrets occurred while it was being used.

All this brings on the thought of the advisability of a similar approach even today. And what is more, in connection with the decrease in the period of service and the increase in the men's general educational level, it now seems to be an especially long-term one. It is no accident that a broader combination of theoretical training and the acquiring of practical skills in operating the equipment has today become one of the leading trends in the development of instructional methods. All this is the result of research and a creative attitude toward the matter, including the organization of socialist competition.

The fire missions, which tankers must solve, are steadily becoming more complicated. This is dictated by the growing requirements of modern combat.

How do they keep pace with the demands of the times in the N-skiy unit? Let us say immediately that the level of training of the subunits is, in general, identical. The close subordination of all training subjects to tactical interests became the No. 1 task of the tankers. Nevertheless, the 2d Battalion under the command of Capt S. Klimchuk noticeably distinguished itself among the competitors. Based on the results of last year, this subunit was declared the best in the large unit and was awarded a special prize.

Based on the level of personal training, the other battalion commanders would, very likely, not yield to Klimchuk. Why is Klimchuk succeeding in this case? Because of his creative attitude, which was also full of initiative, to the organization of firing training and because of his ability to rely on the party organization in doing this.

During the present training year, firing training has a number of distinctive features. It is possible to describe them briefly as follows: The execution of exercises has become considerably more complicated. Some officers tried to travel the well-worn path of "coaching". However, nothing came from this as should have been expected. During firing, the crews are placed in such circumstances that it is simply impossible to "accommodate themselves" to the target situation as formerly happened at times. Before, it is no secret that several gun layers could use "with success" the data of one firer. In any event, each firmly knew that he would fire first at a "gun" target. Naturally, he kept the gun sight ready, looking primarily for a tank mock-up and not burdening himself with a search for other targets.

The firing director can now alter the target situation. Different targets appear in different places and are unexpected by the crew members. Having sized up the new requirements, Captain Klimchuk approached the former methods for training specialists with a critical eye. Before, for example, during tank firing training while one crew carried out an exercise, the other fighting men practiced dismantling the breech block, determining distances, loading weapons, etc. That is, each was, as they say, busy by himself.

Klimchuk introduced a simple but useful innovation. On a line and behind the crew firing, another one was placed. Seated at a trainer, it was as if its gun layer was also firing. He was required to react to the appearance of targets and essentially to perform the same combat work as his comrade located in the tank. He adjusted and shifted fire. Other members of this crew helped him in observing the battle field. They also actively participated in the critique of the firing. It was possible to designate several such "understudies" for the one firing. They were required to act without simplifications and to really evaluate their actions orienting on the results of the crew firing. In this way the capacity of the firing training range was sharply increased. The effectiveness of classes was increased and because of this the mobilizing force of competition began to be used more completely. In one unit of time, the men began to receive a considerably larger load

without involving any additional training instruments and allowances. This method completely justified itself even during live firing when the situation itself demands that the acquired skills be completely demonstrated.

The result of training using the new method was not slow in having its effect. Recently, the company which Sr Lt V. Ostrikov commands successfully performed a night firing with standard shells. While one crew was firing, the other tanks did not await their "turn" passively. They performed functional duties at trainers in conformity with the situation which had been shaped on the moving target gunnery range at night. Thus, it was as if each specialist tested himself repeatedly under complicated circumstances. Preliminary organizational work, which was insignificant in time and volume, was required for this.

It is understandable that the effectiveness of a commander's research into instructional methods depends on an officer's professional training. It is difficult to overestimate the role of company and battalion commanders in increasing it. Sr Lt A. Orlov, a tank company commander, in particular, clearly understands this. A specialist first class, Orlov is able to select the "key" to the study of the programmed material during different classes. In one case, he will lead the company to completely unfamiliar terrain; in another, he will create novel elements in the operations of the opposing side; in a third, having apparently "turned" the training field 180 degrees, he will organize the subunit's attack in an unexpected direction. He allots an active role in implementing his plans to platoon commander and sergeants. Subordinates receive creative impulses directly from them.

Sr Lt V. Shevelev, the commander of another company has a different work style. There are cases when the officer "could not find himself" during these same tank firing training sessions. He tried to train the soldiers who were lagging behind the most, himself. He lost sight of the subunit as a whole, i.e., he violated the principle that the chief teaches a subordinate. It happened this way because for a number of reasons Shevelev did not have sufficient experience in working with people. To the officer's credit -- it is necessary to say that he resolutely freed himself from these shortcomings. Capt V. Kashkarov, who knows his job as battalion commander well, deserves quite a bit of credit for this. The company commanded by Senior Lieutenant Shevelev is fighting for the title of an excellent subunit. There is every reason to suppose that it will join the ranks of right flank ones in competition.

The time for summing up the results of winter training is not far distant. This training took place under the badge of greeting the 60th anniversary of Great October in a fitting manner. Continual improvement in the instructional methods training of officers will help in the taking of new frontiers in socialist competition and, consequently, in combat readiness.

8802

CSO: 1801

ADVERSE EFFECTS OF OFFICER'S COMPLAINT TO NEWSPAPER DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Mar 77 p 2

[Article by Engr- Lt Col B. Lyapkalo, a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, "How Complaints Are Born"]

[Text] Capt V. Ul'chenko turned to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA for the first time at the end of November of last year. In his letter he told about shortcomings in the organization of the officers' and warrant officers' [praporshchiki] work day. It was reported from the higher headquarters, where the editors had sent the letter for consideration, that the appropriate instructions had been given to the unit command element.

The question, it seemed, had been settled. However, in February a letter again arrived at the editorial board from Captain Ul'chenko. In it, he reported that no changes for the letter had occurred in the subunit and that they were planning to transfer him to another garrison. Having learned of this, he had telephoned the chief of the political section and asked for a meeting. The discussion had been arranged for the first part of February.

Then complications began. The subunit commander forbade Ul'chenko to go, justifying it by the fact there was no need for such a meeting. "Everything that you intend to say during the discussion with the political section chief, put down on paper and send a letter by mail," he advised. Then Ul'chenko once and for all decided that they simply wanted to punish him for turning to the editorial board. He sat down to write a complaint to the newspaper.

At this point I became acquainted with Captain Ul'chenko.

He says: "Somehow I am not lucky in service. Sometimes, in trying to carry out an order, it was wrecked-- I permitted rudeness. However, it was in the name of strengthening regulation procedures."

Officer A. Gukov, who has known him for more than ten years, and other officers in the headquarters and political section told me in detail about Ul'chenko's complicated and contradictory nature. More than once, it turns

out, Captain Ul'chenko has been transferred, and raised and demoted in position. He had been demoted because of his lack of restraint and inability to work with people.

In a word, Captain Ul'chenko needed daily indoctrinational work, aimed at helping him to eliminate the serious shortcomings in his conduct and work. How is this work to be conducted? What is its level and effectiveness?

When the representative of the editorial board arrived on the spot, the command element released Captain Ul'chenko for the discussion with the chief of the political section. But how was it done? Sr Lt V. Skorikov, a unit propagandist quickly leaves for the subunit. He is given the task of helping in the preparations of the party meeting at which communist Ul'chenko's reference will be approved. Such a meeting was held.

However, the question asks itself: Why and who needed it so urgently? Why was it necessary to send the unit's propagandist to the subunit to conduct such a meeting?

Captain Ul'chenko considers that comrade Skorikov came to exert "pressure" on the communists in approving the reference. He considers that they even drew up the last certificate with a lack of objectivity.

He explains: "I eliminated all my blunders more than two years ago and the certificate was then a good one. But now, in order to transfer me to another garrison they have specially written an adverse certificate."

I familiarize myself with the material in Ul'chenko's personal records. Actually, the certificate at that time was a good one. But here was something that caught my attention. He had at the time two party punishments for tactless conduct toward subordinates and the subunit commander. There wasn't a word in the certificate about this. Why?

In return, the certificate, compiled in January of this year only contained an adverse tone. Let us admit that it correctly reflects the shortcomings in Ul'chenko's work style and conduct. Many officers, who knew Ul'chenko well, expressed such an opinion. It turns out, however, that this certificate was signed not by the subunit commander but by an officer on the unit's staff. He had signed for the subunit commander. Who had given him this right?

I was also shown the material from the personal records of communist Ul'chenko which was examined by the party organization on the second day after the approval of the above mentioned certificate.

I asked Ul'chenko: "What misdemeanor did you commit?"

He answered: "None. An order was swiftly given to examine my personal records...."

However, perhaps he had nevertheless committed a violation of military procedures, a breakdown in conduct? For this he undoubtedly would have been punished in the disciplinary system. I examined the notes on his service card. No, during the past months no disciplinary punishments had been imposed on the officer. True, there were two earlier published and not removed punishments: one-- a year old and the other-- two years old. However, during this period Ul'chenko was twice commended by the unit commander. How to explain this violation of disciplinary practices?

I decided to examine thoroughly the question of the grounds behind the examination of communist Ul'chenko's personal records. However, I did not find any concrete information in the extracts from the party meeting's record of proceedings or in the explanatory notes.

I telephoned the subunit's deputy commander for political affairs, Capt S. Vas'kov. He said that Ul'chenko had been acting in an unworthy manner for a long time in the collective and exerting a negative influence on his colleagues and subordinates. At the end of the conversation he confirmed Ul'chenko's words that the personal records had gone through the necessary formalities "on orders from above."

It was completely evident that Captain Ul'chenko had caused a lot of trouble for the subunit commander and deputy for political affairs, the party organization and the officer community by his conduct. However, was it really necessary to treat him in this fashion? No one has been given the right to violate the provisions of troop regulations and the norms of party life.

Something else is also clear: Captain Ul'chenko used these violations for his own purposes. As soon as storm clouds gathered over him and he sensed that the time had come to answer for his misdemeanors, all his energy was immediately spent not so much on eliminating his errors and shortcomings as on collecting facts for statements and complaints to different departments. There are sufficient facts. The calculation here is simple: Perhaps, my chiefs will catch it earlier and then, none of them will dare to disturb me with a finger.

These are the consequences to which serious flaws in the interrelationships of chiefs and subordinates and in the indoctrinational work with the men lead.

8802

CSO: 1801

DIFFICULTIES IN ORGANIZING RECREATIONAL ACTIVITIES DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Mar 77 p 2

[Article by Capt V. Gavrilenko, a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, "Not Spectators but Participants"]

[Text] Sr Lt D. Gidzula, secretary of a Komsomol committee, does not like to recall the sports holiday.

In the morning, while making the rounds of the subunits, he dropped in on one barracks room and over the buzz of electric razors heard a loud conversation:

"Well, again a race, again a tug of war"

Someone echoed: "Just like last time."

A third objected: "Would you take--even propose something else."

"But who asked us"

The secretary quietly closed the door and became lost in thought. It appears they are not interested? How much work has been invested in organizing the sports holiday! The party committee, at whose meeting Senior Lieutenant Gidzula was present, had briefly discussed the plan for youth measures. Each party activist had received an assignment. Contests in running and weight lifting and a tug of war had been planned. A militarized relay race for drivers had been provided for. In a word, according to the party committee's calculations the sports holiday should have evoked lively interest among the youth and be of use in combat training.

But now on the morning--here you are. A discussion like this. However, events were already developing; there was no time to evaluate what had been overheard. There only remained a burning sense of alarm somewhere in his soul.

The holiday began. Everything was going as intended. Measured, in order. However, one suddenly pricked up one's ears--the results were low everywhere. The excitement was not there. The secretary of the Komsomol committee caught himself thinking that it was even somewhat boring for him. Then the mood was quite spoiled. One of the subunits did not put up a team for the drivers' contest. They ended haphazardly and listlessly.

Yes, the holiday did not turn out well.

Evidently, the indifference of the Komsomol members to the forthcoming measure clearly made itself felt in the conversation to which Senior Lieutenant Gidzula was an unwilling listener. We often, and not without reason, say that it is necessary to work with youth in an interesting, absorbing and emotional manner, to take the age peculiarities of the youth and the needs peculiar to them fully into consideration, etc. Everyone agrees with this. However, for some reason not every party organization is able to carry out these reasonable requirements.

More than once I had had occasion to hear the lamentations of party activists: "We do not understand what else Komsomol members need? We have organized this for them and this And they are still bored." We have invited artists for them. We have showed them new movies. We have conducted trips All this is good. All this, of course, is necessary. However, is it possible to satisfy the wants of youth only in this way? What about the natural desire of Komsomol members to demonstrate their own organizational initiative, their own imagination, and their own creative energy?

The already mentioned sports holiday was greeted by the Komsomol members without enthusiasm because it was planned for them and not by them. Failure is cut out of this quicker than out of a generally poor plan.

It appeared that the unit's party committee wittingly or unwittingly placed emphasis on the entertainment aspect in guiding the Komsomol organization. For a long time, for example, the Komsomol members had wanted to have their own instrument ensemble. The command element met the youth halfway. The members of the party committee invested quite a bit of personal work in implementing this idea. They formed the ensemble. Now the fighting men often enjoy its performances. However, are the Komsomol members satisfied with such a solution? Hardly. Of course it is interesting to listen to. But many want to show their own capabilities. This has always been peculiar to youth. But amateur talent activities have not become a mass passion in the regiment. Is it not because the activists, both Komsomol and party, mechanically identify the popularity of the ensemble with the development of creativity in the regiment's youth?

Again, it turned out just as they considered the interest. Only a few individuals were in the ensemble. All the remaining people were in the same familiar role of listeners. It is very difficult to develop social

activity among the youth in this way. Create, invent, try--this is the slogan which is inseparably linked with the Komsomol.

It is necessary to meet youth half way -- this truth causes no doubts. But it means arousing youth to creativity, not tolerating petty guardianship, not taking to oneself organizational initiative where the Komsomol members, themselves, can handle it successfully. Otherwise, we create conditions which produce a consumer attitude in the youth. We unwittingly shove them into a position of detached on-lookers. Then, in trying to investigate the reasons for this, some of us are inclined to say that youth without initiative are now arriving. To complain of age in general is a useless pursuit. It is another matter to understand both the times and the people and, having understood, to organize work and skilfully select its forms and methods. To select, having as one's goal not only the presenting of something interesting but also the instilling of interest, the awakening of thought, and the giving of food for reflection. Finally, the most important thing is to use the initiative of the Komsomol members for the cause of combat readiness and for the progress of socialist competition.

It is no accident that the most experienced party activists consider working with youth a very difficult art which requires unusual coordination and constant creative effort. In some party organizations leadership of the Komsomol is inclined to be regarded as a slightly insignificant matter. Here in this troop unit the signs of such an attitude are unwittingly displayed.

The carrying out of coordination between the regiment's Komsomol and party committee has been entrusted to Lt B. Yakimov, a communist elected for the first time to the party committee. We talked with him for a long time. For all his conscientiousness, industriousness and readiness to take on any job, the lieutenant lacks experience in working with youth. This hampers his actions and impedes the organization of vital and direct contacts with the Komsomol aktiv. It is sufficient to say that two months after being elected to the party committee Lieutenant Yakimov did not know personally any of the Komsomol activists besides those serving in the same subunit as he.

Familiarity with the party committee's plans gives the impression that quite a bit of attention is being devoted to communists who are working in the Komsomol. The party committee's secretary conducts classes himself with them two or three times a month. It would seem that everything is well. However, as discussions with the young communists showed, these classes in effect boil down to short periods of instruction because the party committee's secretary is overloaded. A thorough and topical discussion of the problems troubling the Komsomol organization is simply impossible. Strange as this may seem, the party committee willy-nilly appears--if it is possible to express it so -- as the law-giver of the "platform" method in directing the regimental Komsomol. The young communists, when they return to the subunit, begin to operate in the same way. Of course, it is difficult in

such a state of affairs to talk about studying the Komsomol member's interests and -- that is the main thing --about attracting them to brilliant matters full of initiative.

Yes, quite a few youth measures are conducted here. An this only corroborates the thought that it is, it seems, much easier to do it for the Komsomol members than to absorb them in some useful undertaking, to direct their enthusiasm tactfully, and to maintain and develop genuine enthusiasm in them. This is troublesome--there is nothing else to say. However, in return the gain will mainly be the development of the youth's creativity and, in the final result, an increase in the unit's combat readiness.

This is the very time to recall the technical circles. They function poorly among the signalmen. They do not enjoy popularity with the youth. The party activists see the cause only in the irregularity of the lessons. But is it only this? When you begin to inquire how a circle's lesson takes place, you are persuaded that it practically does not differ from daily planned lessons on technical training. It is simply proposed that the circle members repeat that which has already been studied and practiced during training sessions in the classrooms or in the field. Let us say directly that this is far from youth creativity. There are quite a few people among the signalmen who are seriously absorbed in physics and radio technology. There are quite a few people who are simply striving to learn more. At the same time, the number of fighting men with a higher education, who are capable of transmitting their knowledge to their comrades, is expressed in a two-digit number. Of course, the interests of these and others far exceed the limits of the planned classes. The circles have been called upon to take these interests into consideration, to raise the technical erudition of the signalmen, to satisfy the inquisitiveness of the young people, to provide an outlet for their creative research, and to do this so that the knowledge, acquired during classes, will exert a direct influence on the growth of their combat skill. But enormous reserves for raising technical skill still remain unused.

Of course, such work with youth requires quite a bit of effort, imagination and selflessness. It is not easy. That is why it must not be approached with the attitude of a man who plants a tree today and thinks tomorrow he will saw boards from it. It is impossible. Working with youth is a painstaking job. There is elbow room in it for those who search for it and strive for it.

8802

CSO: 1801

PHYSICAL TRAINING SHORTCOMINGS OF ARTILLERY BATTALION NOTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Mar 77 p 2

[Article by Col N. Tikhonenkov, chief of physical training and sports in the Red Banner Turkestan Military District, "Why Have the Cups Lost Their Luster?"]

[Text] The situation during the tactical exercises became complicated unexpectedly. The "enemy" drove a wedge into the defenses in the area of a motorized rifle battalion and began to threaten a breakthrough to important lines. The artillery battalion, which Capt B. Sakhno commands, was ordered to move and cover the threatened sector.

Two years ago this same subunit had solved a similar task. Under difficult natural conditions and in 50 degree weather, the fighting men operated that time extremely successfully. They crossed more than one kilometer of shifting sands, dug ditches in time measured in minutes, camouflaged the weapons, and prepared a well organized fire plan. The "enemy" tanks were not able to break through the combat formations of the battalion.

At that time in evaluating the actions of the antitank reserve, the exercise director justifiably pointed out the high physical training of the artillerymen, their hardiness and persistence in achieving the assigned goal.

Actually, the artillery regiment at the time almost had the best indices for physical training and mass sports work among the district forces. I recall that on the eve of the exercise I had occasion to be present for a sports holiday in the unit. What an atmosphere of elation and striving to defend the honor of their battalion and achieve success in the contests there was among the fighting men! The unit commander presented cups, banners and certificates to the collectives which distinguished themselves and to individual athletes. He congratulated the victors in front of a formation. In the evening Col (Reserves) V. Aryayev, a Hero of the Soviet Union, appeared before the men. He was not able to hide his satisfaction with the holiday and with the good physical and volitional training of the fighting men. The frontline soldier turned to the experiences of the Great Patriotic War. He gave many examples where strength, endurance and persistency helped our artillerymen to defeat an enemy two and three times superior to them in strength.

It is completely understandable that now, two years later, the exercise director and we, the district's staff officers, expected high professional skill and endurance from the artillerymen. However, the hopes were not justified. The battalion did not arrive at the designated line on time. The combat norms for occupying firing positions were carried out without quality.

Was this an accident? An analysis of the physical training and mass sports work in the regiment showed that, unfortunately, the poor results shown during field training were natural. Despite ideal conditions for classes and an excellent training equipment and sports base, the artillerymen's training level lags behind the requirements of modern combat. Morning exercises and scheduled classes regularly take place in the unit. However, the quality of conducting them does not stand up to any critique. Socialist competition--this mighty and stimulating source of the men's activity, initiative and persistency--has been completely buried in oblivion here. Now, close to the end of the winter training period, the men in the batteries have in effect not assumed any specific responsibilities in sports.

However, the position of Maj N. Frolov, the chief of physical training and sports, is most surprising in this situation. To the question how is it possible to summarize socialist obligations in sports if the fighting men, each taken separately, do not have individual plans, the officer coolly answers:

"We will think of something. It will be no worse than the others."

It was the first time in many years that I had encountered such irresponsibility. It had led to irretrievable losses in time. Now, when the time had come to sum up the first results, they still only intended to do something in the unit.

It is necessary to mention how important it is to aim and dispose people, to evoke in them a fierce striving to achieve concrete results in a definite type of sports. Here, one cannot do without painstaking and persistent work. They evidently forgot this truth in the unit. For example, many classes on physical training leave a strange impression. Their directors conducted these classes without any consideration for the individual capabilities of the fighting men and without taking into consideration the strong and weak points of the students. Everything is identical; everyone is under one command. Naturally such classes can hardly contribute to increasing the quality of physical training and bring an appreciable benefit.

The lesson plans of some officers, warrant officers [praporshchiki] and sergeants also turned out to be generalized. It was felt that the instruction and instructional methods classes were conducted in an unsystematic manner with them. Incidentally, not all sergeants are able to do the manual by the numbers well on the gymnastic equipment. Finally, the specifics of the artillerymen's service are not considered and, therefore, their required professional qualities are poorly developed. Perhaps this is the main shortcoming.

Undoubtedly Maj N. Frolov deserves to be seriously reproached for such a state of affairs in the area entrusted to him. However, both the commanders and the unit's sports committee are no less responsible. Reflection on the cited facts leads to the thought that some people in the regiment do not understand well enough the importance of physical training--the most important means for developing moral and combat qualities in the fighting men. Even the secretary of the party committee, to whom the appropriate signals came, did not take any effective measures. The weak organization of physical training could have become the subject of a serious discussion at the party committee-- incidently this topic was mentioned in the plan--but the discussion was not held. The secretary made a helpless gesture: "Small daily matters ate it up."

Things are no better with mass sports work. No matter how we tried, we were not able to find out how many in the regiment would be trained as sportsmen with official ratings and VSK [military sports series] badge holders. It cost quite a bit of effort to rehabilitate the classes in the sections. There are people in the unit whose heart bleeds for the development of olympic and military applicable types of sports--for example, masters of sports and candidates for master of sports, Privates M. Dadayev, S. Madzhidov, P. Abdurakhmanov, and others. But, unfortunately, they have never been able to display their initiative since one of the battalion's officers--Capt S. Bobrovnikov categorically forbade them to engage in sports even during the time prescribed for it.

The unit Komsomol committee also took a strange position. Because of the sluggishness and with the connivance of the Komsomol activists sports holidays ceased to be held in the regiment. Military relay races and contests between artillerymen in various areas were forgotten. This is a youth matter and who if not the leaders of the youth should be the pioneers in everything new and set the example in organizing physical culture and sports. If you open the committee's plans of two years ago it can be seen that relay races and other contests were systematically conducted then with a consideration for the specifics of the artillerymen's service. The fighting men were trained in crossing contaminated sectors, laying communications lines, and preparing weapons for combat. Squads, crews and platoons competed with each other. The best subunits were awarded cups and certificates.

Now these cups are losing their luster and gathering dust on shelves as a silent reproach to the comrades who are now responsible for the condition of physical training.

One cannot resign himself to such a situation. And any reference to supposedly objective circumstances must not be disregarded. The motorized rifle regiment, where Capt A. Kudryavtsev is the chief of physical training and which is located not far away, has managed to achieve excellent indices in physical training and sports. Are conditions better there? No. The training equipment and sports base, for example, is still poorer than that

of the artillerymen. However, the men's responsibility is greater. The commander, party committee and sports committee of the unit, jointly worked up a long range plan for training VSK badge holders and rated sportsmen during the winter training period. Broad use is made in the unit of multitheme classes. Even morning exercises are conducted in the form of a multitheme lesson with an exchange of training sites and end with a three-kilometer run. Part of the training on the VSK norms are now organized during the hours for independent study and mass sports work. A six-kilometer forced march as a subunit is completed each week.

Here, example is worthy of imitation. I would like to believe that the artillerymen will extract lessons from the mistakes they have made, that they will be able to restore the former traditions and that they will again occupy a leading place in the district with respect to physical training and sports.

They have all the conditions for this. Only desire and initiative are needed.

8802

CSO: 1801

FREE-LANCE INTERCEPTOR TRAINING METHODS, RESULTS VIEWED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Mar 77 p 2

[Article by Maj G. Shul'ga, squadron commander and military pilot first class: "Free-Lance Operations"]

[Text] The situation in the tactical flight exercises developed in such a manner that more and more often "enemy" air scouts began to appear. Nor was the possibility excluded of a surprise attack against the defended objective by fighter bombers which could utilize the particular features of the terrain. The sharpshooter-pilot, Lt Col Ye. Ivanov, proposed to the commander that the free-lance method be employed for fighters on the directions of the probable appearance of "enemy" airplanes. The first sortie for such a mission was planned for officer Ivanov.

Having carefully studied the tactical situation, the sharpshooter-pilot endeavored to determine the most effective maneuver in conducting the search. In the flight, the experienced air fighter acted skillfully, and made full use of the aircraft visual observation equipment and procedures. Soon thereafter a characteristic blip appeared on the screen of the radar sight. There could be no doubt that it was a target. Its range of detection was maximal. Using the afterburner, the fighter sped to the rendezvous.

Suddenly the "enemy" employed interference and undertook an active counter-maneuver. The unexpected complicating of the situation did not disconcert Lt Col Ye. Ivanov. In switching to visual search, he began to carefully examine the airspace. And soon he detected a pair of "enemy" airplanes coming in for the attack. From a complicated maneuver, the pilot made a precise and irresistible attack. The free-lance operation was a success!

This tactical combat procedure was widely used by Soviet aviators in the years of the Great Patriotic War. Free-lance combat missions were ordinarily given to the best prepared and experienced pilots. Beyond the front line and in the enemy rear, they successfully carried out an independent search for airborne and ground enemy targets, and they destroyed them by surprise strikes. Here is one of the frontline episodes which was described by Maj (Ret) V. Zhuravlev. In May 1943, in the dogfights over the Kuban', Capt P. Tarasov

together with Lt S. Kalugin in just one free-lance sortie shot down three Nazi airplanes. And one invader, having forced it to consume the entire unit of fire, was caught in a "pincers," and forced down at a Soviet airfield.

The present generation of military aviators are creatively using the frontline experience, and are boldly taking up the tactical discoveries tested out in the fire of dogfights. Undoubtedly here the commanders most carefully consider the fundamental qualitative changes which have occurred in equipping modern aviation. At present the range of flight altitudes and speeds has risen immeasurably, the range of combat airplanes, the distance, precision and might of the air strikes have increased. In the course of combat training, there has been effective use of diverse tactical procedures for the concealed and surprise attacking of a target, and the destruction of it from an involved maneuver.

Of course, the ground radars and guidance from command posts have greatly helped the pilot in searching for and detecting the enemy. However, in the dynamics of modern combat, situations are possible when control of the crews from the ground will be difficult due to certain unforeseen circumstances. And then the fighter pilot must search for the target independently. Moreover, in a certain tactical situation, the free-lance method can be the only preferred one which provides the successful execution of the combat mission. And this requires from the pilot both initiative and combat activeness as well as flawless tactical skills. And, of course, such an assignment can be shouldered only by highly trained air fighters, dogfight masters and sharpshooter pilots.

Since in a difficult combat situation the commander often knows only the overall situation and the direction of the most probable appearance of the enemy, he relies totally on the initiative of the pilots and their tactical knowledge. For this reason, a free-lance fighter should possess flawless flying skills and show high combat activeness. He himself seeks out the enemy and, disregarding its numerical superiority, is the first to make a surprise attack or boldly engages it, imposes his will on the enemy, and stuns the enemy by the newness of the maneuvers.

Thus, the principles of the method of combat, in essence, have remained unchanged. But the means of detecting the enemy used in this have undergone substantial changes. For example, take such a crucial stage of the flight as the search. Under the conditions of a partial or complete absence of information on the air enemy, independent (autonomous) search for the targets presently represents an entire complex of actions including the use of the aircraft detection systems combined with visual spotting. The radar equipment of a modern missile-carrying airplane provides for the fulfillment of the missions by the free-lance method under the worst weather conditions. Undoubtedly this is very important in a combat situation. Certainly, the enemy will also endeavor to utilize any circumstances which would impede its detection in order to break through covertly to the defended objective and make the attack.

In a free-lance flight, a particular role is played by the factor of surprise. For this reason, in carrying out a mission, the pilot should exercise combat maneuvering in such a manner as to be the first to detect the target and attack it. The frontline rule of "the first to see the enemy is half-way to victory" not only has not lost its significance but has assumed an even broader sense. The slightest miscalculation in selecting the optimum flight profile, like any violation of radio discipline, can lead to the loss of concealment, this important tactical advantage.

At one time, in a tactical flight exercise, one of the pilots from our squadron, having carried an independent search, began to close in with the target. But at this moment, the airplane piloted by him was suddenly attacked by the "enemy." The pilot could not understand how this could happen. But it was all very simple. Being confident that the search had finally ended successfully, the aviator had reported to the command post: "I see the target and am attacking." And this was sufficient to give himself away. The attacker himself was now under attack. And can such a thing happen in a combat situation? The opposing side certainly possesses advanced means of detection, and will not be slow in using them in order to anticipate the maneuver and determine the outcome of the battle in its favor.

Combat teamwork and precise tactical and fire coordination are required from the lead pilots in the group search for targets. Certainly the correctly perceived plan of the commander must still be quickly and precisely embodied in the maneuver selected for the attack. And here excellent teamwork determines a great deal. But, to put it frankly, in the first flight to work out this exercise, some of our attacks did not excel in boldness. Not all of the wingmen acted in coordination and the maneuver was drawn out. At times the tactical surprise of the strike was lost.

The most serious attention had to be paid to raising the quality of group team work. The commander and the procedural council of the regiment, having analyzed the actions of each aviator in the air, took measures to further improve the pilot training procedures. In particular, it was decided to increase the demands on the accuracy of executing the group teamwork standards, as well as fundamentally improve the quality of the exercises and ground training. The training compound was reequipped for working through flight missions using the "walk-through" method. In the compound, the entire flight area was reproduced, and against a diversified tactical background we began to play through all of the possible variations of the air situation and the models of combat. As a result, the effectiveness of the combat training missions was sharply increased.

This was largely aided by the socialist competition among the regiment aviators to worthily greet the 60th anniversary of the Great October Revolution. The early fulfillment of the personal pledges to raise class skills, improve knowledge of the equipment, aerodynamics and tactics, to raise ideological conditioning, to strengthen military discipline and proper order, as well as the struggle for efficiency and quality in working through the combat training missions--all of this told tangibly on further improving the air skills of the flyers.

The skill level of the aviators in our squadron has risen noticeably. They have all become first-class pilots, and at present each of them can handle the most complex exercise, including free-lance flying. Of course, the young pilots here have something to learn from the experts. In truth, the targets can no longer escape unnoticed by the beginning "freelancers," and they all detect them at shorter ranges than, for example, such experienced air fighters as Maj's G. Kulik, V. Maslennikov and V. Abrosimov. To their score are a number of accurate missile launches against targets detected at maximum ranges. And our commanders and party activists broadly propagandize the experience of the best.

In combat training flights, we are constantly improving the tactical procedures and searching out the most effective ones. In avoiding routine and oversimplification, the aviators are learning the art of the independent search for and destruction of targets on the first attack and with the first missile. For this we are profoundly studying the frontline experience and the experience of exercises, and we are conducting tactical quizzes, conferences and colloquiums.

As a result, the air skills of each pilot and the combat readiness of the squadron are growing day by day. There is confidence that our subunit will greet the jubilee of the Great October Revolution among the leaders.

10272

CSO: 1801

INVESTIGATION OF BAD MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PRACTICES

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Mar 77 p 2

[Article by Lt Col (Res) I. Moshkovskiy: "Bad Methods"]

[Text] Lt Col Tech Serv A. Grabina, having learned of the content of the letter to the editors, immediately decided to give "battle" to the authors. They, supposedly, did not want to work like they should, and had violated discipline. Aleksandr Borisovich [Grabina] reinforced his arguments by the fact that three military construction workers had committed a flagrant violation of military discipline.

"You see how they behave, but still they are dissatisfied and write complaints."

I listened to the enterprise leader and was amazed. From his logic it followed that those he was criticizing were themselves to blame for everything.

But let us turn to the letter and analyze the factors which caused it. The authors, military construction workers from a company the personnel of which is employed at an enterprise, complained that they were deprived of an opportunity to have normal rest, to improve their interests and participate in mass cultural work and sports.

"The plant chief," they wrote, "forces the military construction workers to work above the established time. Our work day on the first shift ends at 1620 hours, and at 1630 hours we must form up and the plant chief or, upon his instruction, one of the officers or warrant officers ["praporshchik"] of the company sends us for additional work."

I spoke with many military construction workers. All of them including the brigade leaders and Komsomol activists stated that yes, rather frequently the working day had been extended. And I myself was the witness of this. But the enterprise chief refused to budge claiming that they were taking black for white and turning isolated instances into a system. Ultimately, he also was forced to admit that they had to resort to such methods.

But why? Did production necessity require this? No. These facts were explained by poor organization of labor. For example, let us take the construction brigade the personnel of which rather often was kept on after the shift for various sorts of work. Here there were enough men to carry out the amount of construction work which was being carried out at the plant. The construction workers were also not short on materials, but they made little headway. Nor were they helped by the "director's additions" as the wits said. Even in 10-12 hours, the construction workers did not produce what should have been produced in a normal work shift. In the three quarters of 1976, their average fulfillment of the output standards was scarcely 95 percent. At the end of the year, in December, output was just 62 percent. The result for the last period during my visit at the plant had not yet been given, but the tentative data were available. They were no reason for joy.

There are many reasons for low labor productivity, but the first of them is the bad method of recruiting personnel for the construction collective. If one of the soldiers working in the plant shops has been guilty of some misdeed, he is transferred to construction. This is justified by arguing that supposedly violators of discipline cannot be left on assembly-line production. If it is considered, in addition, that the earnings of the members of this collective, due to various sorts of irregularities, are 2-3 fold lower than their fellow servicemen working in the shops, then it is obvious that the men are reticent to work here.

Here there are so many irregularities that it would be even hard to describe all of them.

There is a strict rule that before the men can be sent to work, they must be given a strict assignment and an order written out. But no one writes out the orders for the construction workers. They are told: Do you work and we will draw up the orders later. I was interested in just how the orders were drawn up "later," and I spoke with the foreman, Pfc D. Mashanlo, who, in the words of the plant chief, keeps an accurate count of what the construction workers are doing, and on the basis of his data at the end of the month, the orders are written out and closed.

But the foreman keeps no accurate but just approximate count. In the entries of Pfc Mashanlo for January, for example, is merely a listing of what types of work the construction workers are engaged in. How much work they did where, what amount of work they fulfilled, and in what time--there is no information on this. Moreover, the foreman kept his entries only until 18 January, and then stopped them.

No one is concerned about the low professional skill of the construction workers. No exercises are conducted with them and there is no trace of guidance, and it is strictly fend for yourself. And it is not surprising that there is a great deal of bad work. At the end of last year, the team of Pfc A. Zhuk was sealing the floor of the second story of housing building. The work was accepted. But it has recently appeared that the sealing is bad and it leaks like a sieve. It had to be redone.

Neither at the construction site nor in the barracks will you see any "express" leaflet or other visual agitation showing the results of the work done by the construction workers. At the end of the shift, no evaluation is given for the work of each man. The results of the competition are not summed up. To put it more accurately, it has long died out. And not only in the construction brigade, but also in the entire company. In February neither the individual nor the collective socialist pledges for 1977 were set.

"We are still working them out," said the company commander, Sr Lt M. Dyatlov, in justification.

The soldiers and sergeants cannot even remember when they were assembled and told who was ahead in the competition and who behind. Judging from the indicator board hanging up in the Lenin Room, the last time the results of the competition were given was at the start of October of last year. But the graphs of the indicators have been filled out in such a manner that you need a guide to them. I asked many soldiers and sergeants what the five-digit figures opposite their names meant, but they merely shrugged their shoulders.

Logically the question arises: How do the communists react to all of this? Certainly there are a number of them in the company, some five persons. But here is the answer. From November through February not a single party meeting was held. And in daily life, the activity of the communists is low. No one gives them instructions, and no one is interested in their social activity. For this reason, certain comrades take no part in indoctrination. Nor are the voices of the Komsomol members heard. Certain youth leaders have followed the path of violating military discipline.

Seemingly such disorder in the company should concern the primary party organization of the plant and its bureau headed by the secretary N. Vetrov. But here no particular concern is felt.

On the second day after my arrival at the plant, a meeting of the primary party organization was held. They discussed the work results for 1976 and the tasks of the communists in light of the requirements of the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers, the AUCCTU and the Komsomol Central Committee "On the All-Union Socialist Competition to Raise Production Efficiency and Work Quality, for the Successful Fulfillment of the Quotas of the Tenth Five-Year Plan." The very agenda suggested a serious analysis of shortcomings, a correct party evaluation of them and a determining of ways to eliminate them. But no such thing was done. The plant chief, Comrade Grabina, who gave the report at the meeting, avoided all these unpleasant matters and the communists did not correct him.

Facts are a stubborn thing. They affirm that the organizational and indoctrinational work among the military construction workers has been neglected. Instead of taking specific measures, the plant chief has exacerbated the situation. The methods which he has selected for making up for the plans are bad ones. Success cannot be achieved by extending the work day or by roughness.

SPORTS PROGRAM IN LENINGRAD NAVAL SCHOOLS CRITICIZED

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Mar 77 p 4

[Article by M. Shlayen, KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Dismissed From the Spartaciad"]

[Text] It is generally recognized that it is very important for military personnel to master the procedures of man-to-man combat with the enemy, and to be strong, bold and decisive. This applies, naturally, to sailors as well, particularly, as it seems to me, to the officer candidates of naval schools. Certainly, having become officers, they themselves must instill these qualities in their subordinates. But, as strange as it seems, recently boxing, wrestling and heavy athletics have totally disappeared from the programs of matches between the naval schools, in any event, for us in Leningrad. And at the Spartaciad being held at present, the officer candidates are deprived of an opportunity to measure their strength, and to find champions for a whole series of important applied military types of sports, including boxing, wrestling and weightlifting. Why have the sports disciplines fallen into disgrace and which in a most active manner influence the improving of the physical conditioning of future naval officers?

Lt Col (Res) V. Nikitin, master of sports

Why, in fact? The program for the present Spartaciad of naval schools includes swimming, water polo, a naval all-round combined tournament, underwater sports, rowing, volley ball, shooting, skiing, an officer all-round tournament, and chess. As can be seen, there is no boxing, wrestling or heavy athletics. Possibly, the specialists in physical culture who work at the Leningrad schools consider that these types of sports are not needed and they do not need to be worked on. Having visited the city on the Neva, I was able to talk with those who are directly concerned with the physical training of the officer candidates. I would like to give their opinion on the given question.

The chief of the chair of physical training and sports at the Higher Naval Submarine School imeni Leninskiy Komsomol, Col G. Yakovlev, said: "Naval service has its specific features, and of course there should be a certain leaning toward the aquatic types of sports. At the same time, I feel that it is completely wrong to exclude from the matches between the schools those disciplines which help the future officers master the procedures of self-defense and attack, and to strengthen character and will. If this was done for the sake of saving money, it should be noted that the expenditures for organizing tournaments in these types of sports are minimal. Money does not have to be spent on traveling, as there is everything within one city. It is not necessary to rent halls. For example, any competitions can be held at the excellent facilities of our school. We also provide judging using our own forces, as among the instructors there are sufficiently qualified judges."

The same viewpoint was adhered to by the deputy chief of the physical training chair at the Higher Naval Engineering School imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy, Capt 3d Rank A. Zababurin. "For 16 years I served on various ships," he told me, "and from my own experience I know that the most popular and accessible types of sports for sailors are weight-lifting, wrestling and boxing. Even during cruises, the organization of training and matches did not represent any problem as we could lay down the gym mats, and the floor was ready. Generally speaking, it is illogical that the officer candidates in the Spartaciad do not have the opportunity to enter the ring, to test their grip or make their lift."

"Since ten types of sports have been selected for the Spartaciad," opined the chief of the physical training chair at the Higher Naval School imeni V. M. Frunze, Capt 2d Rank O. Stupakov, "in one way or another it was necessary to focus on them to the detriment of the others. The most dangerous thing in such a step is the loss of any incentive to develop the 'abandoned' disciplines, the setting up of sectional work and the conducting of competitions involving at times the entire personnel. On the other hand, it is no secret that in terms of the number of participants and attendance, the weight-lifting, boxing and wrestling tournaments significantly surpass the competitions for a number of types of sports included in the Spartaciad."

Seemingly the question would be clear. The specialists and everyone with whom I was able to speak was in favor of boxing, wrestling, weight-lifting and a number of other disciplines. Everyone with the exception of one, the chief of physical training and sports for the Leningrad Naval Base, Col G. Vysotin. "Boxing, wrestling, heavy athletics and gymnastics have been excluded from the program as atypical types of sports for the navy," was his opinion. Briefly and clearly they are atypical.... "And then we were instructed," continued Comrade Vysotin, "in the present year to hold contests for not more than ten types of sports in the Leningrad Naval Base."

Let us note that among them are water polo, kayaking and canoeing, sailing and swimming. However neither the sailing races nor the kayaking and canoeing contests are in the program of the Spartaciad of the naval schools. These types have been replaced by other, less "costly" ones. But in taking

such a step, they did not even remember the interests of the wrestlers, boxers or heavy athletes. And competitions for the named disciplines, if they were incorporated in the Spartaciad, undoubtedly would cause greater attention.

Is there a way out making it possible to eliminate the obstacles on the path of the officer candidates who wish to test their strength on the mats, in the ring or under the bar? We feel a constructive solution has been proposed by Capt 2d Rank O. Stupakov. "The Spartaciad should include contests in 15 types of sports," he feels, "and the schools must make up teams for each of them. The match would be for the results of the performances in eight or a maximum of ten types of sports, including in 5-6 previously stipulated compulsory ones."

When this article was being readied for press, the editors received one other letter from Leningrad from the honored master of sports, Col (Ret) K. Viktorov. The veteran warned of a clearly bad situation in the development of wrestling at the Leningrad Naval Base. "For several years," his letter stated, "wrestling matches in Leningrad have been held without the navy athletes, although the times have not been forgotten when the Baltic trained many strong masters of the mat and national champions. How can we get off of dead center the development of a type of sports which until recently was a great favorite among the sailors?"

"We do not have coaches or money," was the first response of Col G. Vysotin when he was informed of the veteran's letter.

We would like to reply to this with the words of the deputy chief of the Leningrad Army Sports Club, Lt Col M. Levit:

"The reference to a lack of money or the absence of coaches, in my view, is invalid. Our club possesses excellent specialists, the halls at times are half-empty, and let the sailors come and participate with us. We will only be glad if we can help train high-class wrestlers among them. We would be happy to enter the Leningrad championships or other competitions with a combined team with the navy athletes...."

Thus it turns out that the hitch is not in the lack of coaches and money. Initiative and interest here is what, probably, is lacking to solve this problem.

10272
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IMPORTANCE OF EFFECTIVE COMBAT TRAINING EXERCISES STRESSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Mar 77 p 1

[Editorial: "High Effectiveness for Training Exercises"]

[Text] The past months of winter training have been marked by a particular intensity in the struggle to improve the quality and effectiveness of military labor and the socialist competition to properly celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Great October Revolution. In keeping in step with all the Soviet people who are realizing the historic decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, the men of the Army and Navy by practical deeds and by improving their military skills, are responding to the appeal of the party to work better and to raise the effectiveness and quality of their labor.

The rise in military skills is largely determined by the instructiveness and the results of the exercises, as a higher form of training and indoctrination and a most important means for raising the field, air and naval skills of the personnel. During the exercises, sea voyages and in flights, the skill of the commanders and staffs is improved in commanding the troops and naval forces, the teamwork of the subunits, units and ship crews is strengthened, and the skills and ability of all the men to act decisively and actively in combat are sharpened.

Many exercises conducted during the present year have become a true school for courage and skill, discipline and organization. In particular, the exercise in the motorized rifle company commanded by Capt T. Vlasov was conducted in an instructive manner. From the very first to the last minutes, it was marked by dynamism, intensity, and by the desire of the leader to create conditions which would force all the soldiers, sergeants and officers to make full use of the capabilities of the weapons and equipment. In working out one of the most difficult questions of an offensive with field firing, the company demonstrated strong teamwork and the ability to carry out diverse fire problems under difficult tactical situations.

A rise in the effectiveness of exercises is a comprehensive task. Its successful solution is achieved by the entire course of combat and political training. The better the exercises are conducted for all the training disciplines, the more fully the mobilizing force of the socialist competition

is used, the higher the individual training of each man and the more rapidly the teamwork of the subunit grows. Here an important role is played by the battle drill, special tactical and demonstration exercises.

The effectiveness of the exercises is largely determined by the situation created at them. If the situation meets the requirements of real combat, if the men are given difficult missions, if they must fight on diverse terrain, and if they are opposed by a strong and technically well equipped "enemy," then such an exercise will leave a good mark. In creating a difficult tactical situation, it is important not to constantly interfere with the commanders in the exercises, but rather in every possible way encourage their independence, and teach them under any conditions to seize initiative and hold on to it firmly. This is a dependable way for developing in them tactical thinking and a desire to solve the set missions creatively.

But, unfortunately, elements of oversimplification and routine in the exercises have not been excluded everywhere. The plans worked out for them are frequently standard ones. In some places exercises are conducted year in and year out according to a single scheme, and this impedes the development of the initiative and creativity of the commanders and staffs. In a number of units and subunits, the tactics of conducting fluid types of combat are being improved slowly, and slowness is permitted in deploying into battle formation and attacking the enemy from a march formation. The carrying out of firing and special problems is not always subordinate to the tactical demands.

Serious shortcomings were detected, for example, by the superior-staff officers at a tactical exercise for the company commanded by Sr Lt F. Nausin. Here little attention was paid to controlling the fire of the subunits, and clarity was lacking in the organization or coordinated actions. With the concluding of the attack, the motorized rifle troops for a long time pursued the "enemy" on foot, while the situation suggested the necessity of mounting on the infantry combat vehicles. However, at the required moment the commander was unable to give them instructions for moving out because of a disruption in communications. Clearly, these flaws which created a distorted notion of the nature of modern combat could not help but influence the effectiveness of the exercise.

It is essential to learn how to properly value each hour of exercises, flights and cruises. The conducting of them involves a number of material expenditures such as the consumption of ammunition, fuel, motor life, and so forth. It is all the more important to obtain a maximum return. Here a great deal depends upon how carefully the strategy and plan of the exercise have been worked out, and how thoroughly they have thought out such questions as designating the enemy, using simulation, and how instructively the analysis was made at the end of the exercise. There must be support for the experience of those commanders and staffs who conduct a large portion of the exercises, particularly in their crucial stages, as two-sided ones, when both opposing sides are represented by real subunits and ships. Practice convincingly shows that in changing the direction of actions as necessary and in resorting to the giving

of surprise missions and other methods of intensifying the training, on comparatively small sized training fields and ranges it is possible to achieve great effectiveness in the exercises. Under any conditions, the instructiveness depends upon the level of organization and discipline in the personnel and its ability to carry out any missions precisely and on time.

In the exercises to act as if on the front! Our finest subunits, units and ships under this motto enter the field, participate in flights and stand ocean watch. This mobilizing slogan obliges a great deal. As on the front means under constant combat stress, when each man precisely knows his mission, his role and place in the general formation and is enriched with new experience. In creating such an atmosphere in the exercises, it is difficult to overestimate the role of the socialist competition. There has been the effective practice of accepting specific pledges for the period of the exercise with the summing up of them according to stages, as well as the broad development of the competition for specific missions and standards.

Effective party political work is a strong means in the struggle to improve the effectiveness of exercises. The more actively this work is carried out and the better the character of the missions being executed is considered, the greater its influence on the personnel and hence the higher its effectiveness.

Raising the effectiveness of exercises is a most important task for all the commanders, political bodies and staffs. To solve it successfully means to make a new contribution to raising combat readiness and to the struggle for properly celebrating the 60th anniversary of the Great October Revolution.

10272

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SENIOR AIR DEFENSE OFFICER ON JUNIOR OFFICER TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Mar 77 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen Art N. Mil'chenko, chief of staff of the Order of Lenin Moscow Air Defense District: "A School of Discipline and Professionalism"]

[Excerpts] On a fine July day of 1941, Lt Nikolay Mil'chenko arrived in one of the antiaircraft artillery units of the Leningrad Military District. He soon called up his men at the alert, without knowing that a war had started for him. He went through the entire war, from the first to the last day. Several Nazi airplanes were shot down by the precise firing from the battery commanded by Lt N. Mil'chenko. During the war years his military service was marked by two Orders of the Red Star and medals.

In the postwar years, N. P. Mil'chenko completed the Military Artillery Academy imeni M. I. Kalinin and the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov. At present Lt Gen Art Nikolay Petrovich Mil'chenko is the chief of staff of the Order of Lenin Moscow Air Defense District.

The small flickering line on the oscillograph screen at one moment curved like a fantastic snake, and then literally sank into its cold greenish depths. The systems technician, a young lieutenant out of annoyance tapped the housing of the oscillograph lightly. But even this "decisive" measure did not produce any effect as instead of strict rectangular pulses, some funny curvey figures flashed on the screen.

Finally it was possible to discover that the cause of all of this was a malfunctioning resistor in one of the units. It was a question of a few minutes and it was replaced.

"Wouldn't you know!" said the young officer dejectedly. "Yesterday I intended to test this unit. But then I got busy and overlooked it...."

And the lieutenant began heatedly to list everything that he had done on the day before. It turned out that he did not have a single free minute. Seemingly the result of all his efforts should have been high. But, unfortunately, that was not the case.

Sometimes, in talking with young officers, I have heard the opinion that the ability to organize ones's service activities in a precise and purposeful manner comes only with time. But at the start of a commander's career, it is difficult to demand unfailing professionalism in work from a lieutenant. Supposedly during this period miscalculations and oversights are unavoidable.

I do not intend to assert that a young officer from his first steps in service acquires both the experience and wisdom of a grey-haired veteran. I know for myself how difficult it is at first to find the correct rhythm in work. Either there is not enough time or one is overwhelmed with a flood of secondary questions, or unforeseen inputs arise which require an immediate solution.

But all these difficulties are surmountable, if the lieutenant does not wait passively until long years of service have developed in him the custom of correctly allocating service time and strength. The hopes placed on chance are poor hopes.

I agree that it is not easy for a young officer to learn professionalism, preciseness and organization in a short period of time. First of all, it is essential that he develops the ability to evaluate his own actions objectively and by principle. The officer cannot grow and improve if he does not know what specifically he still lacks in the style and methods of work.

In analyzing the results of his work, a young officer should clearly see what goal he has achieved. And he must self-critically assess what still had not been done and what prevented him from achieving the planned goals.

Here it is of no importance what segment of time is encompassed by the compiled plan, be it one day or several days, a week or a month. The demand on the plan is just one thing, that is, to order the work of the officer, and instill in him the habits of professionalism and organization. And I would stress particularly that organization is developed by the strict observance of the requirements of the oath and the regulations, the instructions and orders of the commanders.

There is a very true view that the plan of an officer's work is his order to himself. Yes, an order! And his attitude toward it should be the same as for any order received by an officer. Here there can be no concessions due to the fact that the plan has been compiled independently, and consequently, the officer only bears responsibility to himself for violating it.

Certainly this is an enticing thought when something has not been done and one can justify this and be content that the oversight will be made up later. Only this does not end up correctly. If a concession is made for oneself and no one notices this, the habit appears of putting off the fulfillment

of the planned measures for an indefinite time. No, here there must be firm conviction and tenacity in achieving the set goal. The personal discipline and organization of an officer are an example for subordinates and an important means of their indoctrination.

Lt Oleg Dobrovol'skiy, in the first period of his service, encountered a number of difficulties in mastering the complex military equipment. The young officer had enough conviction to recognize that he was largely to blame for this. He did not have enough tenacity, stubbornness and purposefulness. How could the situation be corrected.

The subunit commander, Maj B. Bukirev, an experienced officer and an intelligent indoctrinator, helped the lieutenant compile a specific plan of independent work. It clearly defined what result the lieutenant must achieve in a week, month, and at the end of the training period.

The constant supervision and help of the subunit commander aided Lt Dobrovol'skiy in avoiding a lack of organization, and to learn to assess his work self-critically. Now he is one of the best officers in the unit, and is successfully fulfilling the pledges in the competition to properly celebrate the 60th anniversary of October.

Some young officers seriously believe that organization and professionalism are needed only in service. Discipline and particularly self-discipline are based upon a complete totality of will. If the young officer learns to value not only his service time but also his free time, he will achieve much greater results in his activities.

Lieutenant years! They fly by quickly. But if not a single day and not a single hour of this irrecoverable time is wasted, their mark will remain for all one's life.

10272

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NEW DEVICE FOR MILITARY SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Mar 77 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank A. Ivanov: "Sociometer-2"]

[Text] This is the name ["Sociometer-2"] which has been given to a new questioning device developed at the Department for Military Sociological Research Under the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. The many years of work by Candidate of Psychological Sciences, Col V. Kovalev and Engr-Maj V. Chepurov have been crowned with success. Considering the originality in elaborating the principles and particular features of designing the device, in comparison with examples of Soviet and foreign equipment, the State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers for Inventions and Discoveries has registered "Sociometer-2" as an invention, and have issued the appropriate certificate to its developers.

The need to develop such a unit has long been felt. The problem is that in recent years the range of methods and techniques of concrete sociological research have been significantly enriched. But the methods of collecting sociological information and its primary processing have remained virtually unchanged. As a result the timeliness of the conducted research has suffered.

"Sociometer-2" which is an electronic totalling device, to a significant degree eliminates this shortcoming. If, for example, with conventional methods of collecting and primary processing of sociometric information in studying intercollective relationships on the platoon scale, at least two days were needed for analyzing the obtained material, the use of the new unit for solving a similar problem reduces the overall time expenditures to 1-2 hours.

The procedure for carrying out questioning using the "Sociometer-2" is simple. Each of the persons being questioned selects one answer from the five proposed ones, and independently of the others trips the switch with the corresponding answer code on the individual board, and this answer is then recorded by the counter of the central board. The answers of all the persons being questioned are automatically totaled. The researcher immediately receives information for subsequent analysis.

Military sociologists have conducted a practical testing of the new questioning device. The possibility has been affirmed of operating it both under stationary as well as field conditions. The "Sociometer-2" is a portable device consisting of two units weighing 8-10 kilograms. The experimental operation of "Sociometer-2" has shown that it will be widely used in sociological research of an applied character, in raising its effectiveness. The new device has been positively praised by specialists from the Sociological Research Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

At present, the Department of Military Sociological Research has worked out the technical specifications for manufacturing the "Sociometer-2." One of the plants in the near future will begin producing the first batch of the new unit.

For inventing the device "Sociometer-2," the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, Gen Arm A. A. Yepishev, has expressed gratitude to Col V. Kovalev and Engr-Maj V. Chepurov, and has presented them with valuable gifts.

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IMPORTANCE OF MOTION PICTURES FOR TROOP INDOCTRINATION STRESSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Mar 77 p 4

[Article by Maj Gen V. Zemzerov, first deputy chief of the political directorate of the Central Troop Group: "The Use of the Military Screen"]

[Text] Art has become an inseparable part of the life of a modern army. In spiritually enriching the soldier, it reaches him from the TV screen, from the boards of the club stage, from his favorite radio program or from the bookshelves of the library. And probably the favorite muse is the muse of the movies which has invaded the ancient Greek family of the patronesses of the arts in our century. The weekly attending of movies at his club has become for the soldier a matter that is as essential as it is natural. It is not essential to agitate the soldier to attend the movies, as at the scheduled hour he himself willingly takes his place in the auditorium and expectantly awaits for the instant when the sorcery of movie equipment brings to life the silver screen in front of him.

But now the film is over. The men leave the auditorium, and even from their faces at times it is possible to judge that the impressions of the film are varied. Along with a feeling of gratitude, a feeling of dissatisfaction is often encountered. It would seem that this is natural as the perception of art is an individual matter. Some people are even inclined to assert that in offering a film to the viewers, it is impossible to plan ahead of time the impact that it makes on them. We cannot agree with such an opinion. The film is not merely a spectacle or an amusement. It is an indoctrinator. V. I. Lenin called the movies the most important of all arts. And our clubs have a number of opportunities for a planned and purposeful influence of the minds and hearts of the military viewers using the means of the movies. But far from all of the cultural and educational workers use these opportunities fully.

Recently I happened to be present in an artillery unit which for 4 years had had the title of outstanding. Here military discipline was constantly high. Here they are able not only to struggle for the achieving of high results in military improvement, but also they know how to provide interesting relaxation. And here the military movie screen has become one of the active means of ideological, military and moral indoctrination of the servicemen.

The club of this unit is headed by Capt N. Dorofeychik. Talks before the films, conferences of movie viewers, movie lecture series and special subject movie evenings have become firmly established as the most popular forms of work for the club. And this work has a purposeful, concrete indoctrinational character. The men of the unit are fond of regularly holding film festivals here. In the course of them, they usually show the best works of Soviet film arts with the simultaneous use of various means of visual and verbal agitation for explaining their artistic merits and for most fully disclosing the purpose and subject of the author. The chief content of the film festivals in the current year has been the most important event in the life of our nation, the 60th anniversary of the Great October Revolution. For example, the regular film festival on the subject "The Communist Party--The Organizer and Leader of the Soviet Armed Forces" was carried out in an interesting manner. The program of this festival included the films "Chapayev," "Immortal Garrison," "Heroes Do Not Die," "Great Patriotic..." and others. The festival was opened by the unit commander who gave an introductory speech to the viewers. Before each subsequent film, knowledgeable lecturers spoke in the auditorium. The festival ended by the summing up of results and by a joint exchange of opinions. Later on there was a concert by the amateur artistic group and the repertoire included works on the party, the Soviet Army and on heroism. Of course, a most vivid impression was left among the servicemen.

It should be pointed out that although each young man has often attended the movies before induction into the army, one must not overestimate his film knowledge. He has certainly not seen all the films from the treasure house of Soviet film arts. And his taste can scarcely be considered completely formed. In order to teach the military viewer to fully perceive a work of film arts, and to sense its impact, he needs a good mentor and an able guide. And the club can and should become such a guide.

It is possible to indoctrinate a person, to shape his character, ideology and morality only in relying on the peaks of human conduct and situations in which all the spiritual qualities of a personality are most fully apparent. Most often such situations are encountered in battle and in war. Soviet film arts in a penetrating and delicate manner have examined the motives and spiritual sources of a great feat, having embodied them in vivid artistic images on the screen. For this reason, even now among the viewers such pictures as "Two Fighters," "She Defends the Motherland," "Young Guard," "Hot Snow," and others are constantly popular. Unfortunately, these and similar pictures are not often seen on the military screens, although these films, as a rule, are available at the film repositories. Why do certain cultural and educational workers endeavor no matter what to obtain newer films, forgetting that the newness of a film in no way is a criterion of its artistic and ideological level. And here it is essential to stress that an important role in forming the military movie repertoire is to be played by the deputy commanders for political affairs and the political bodies, and that a great deal depends upon the correct relationship between the unit club, the movie repository and the film renting point. It is very important to organize things in such a manner that each club has a list of films available at the repository or rental point, so that the soldiers know about them and are able ahead of time

to state their preferences. For this purpose, the political directorate of the group, for example, each year sends out to the troops a special catalog of films available in the film holdings. For example, the catalog drawn up for the current training year includes around 80 artistic and as many documentary and popular scientific films. This makes it possible for the political workers to plan the film schedule for the month ahead of time, and to organize the viewing of those films which best conform to the current tasks of the day.

Incidentally, there are many interesting popular scientific, documentary and military training films in the film holdings, but this wealth is far from always used as it should be. This happens primarily because the political workers at times underestimate the role of the movie in carrying out measures. As an example, let us take the practices of the club where Sr Lt I. Dushkin is the chief. Recently a talk was held here on the exemplary standing of guard duty and administration within the unit. An important subject? Certainly so. But the measure was carried dully and dryly, with a certain taste of formalism. And it evidently never occurred to the organizers that the effectiveness of the talk would have been greatly increased by visual means and by using as examples such documentary films as "Always on Guard" or "Face to Face." A much greater emotional impact on the men could have been achieved if the meeting conducted in this club between the men and workers from the judge advocate office and the court martial and devoted to the questions of legal indoctrination would have been accompanied by the showing of the impressive documentary films "Bitter Lesson," "The Case is Heard," or, for instance, "The Road Leading Only Downward."

Soviet film art is an active and effective means of communist indoctrination. Permeated by Leninist party loyalty and concern for the people, it helps to indoctrinate upright and convinced soldiers, loyal defenders of the motherland, and people of high culture and morality. And its very rich indoctrinational arsenal must be used thoughtfully, purposefully and skillfully. In recreating stage by stage the pages of the heroic history of our country over the 60 years of struggle and creation, film arts help the commanders and political workers to develop in the personnel a communist ideology, and a sharp feeling of personal responsibility for those social and spiritual values which have been won by their fathers and grandfathers and passed on like a baton, to the young hands of their heirs.

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FAILURES IN SCHOOL MILITARY PROGRAMS DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Mar 77 p 4

[Article by Lt Col F. Semyanovskiy, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "The Courtesy Visit"]

[Text] "According to the work plan of the council of the "Luch" [Ray] Children's Club set up under the Housing Office No 7 in the city of Gor'kiy, it was decided to invite military personnel from the local garrison to the club for one of the evening meetings. I turned to the political worker, Sr Lt N. Kisel'nikov, with a request to send military personnel to the children. He promised that it would be done, he took down the address of the club, and asked directions to get there. Around 50 children assembled for the meeting. They waited an hour and then two, but, disappointed, they were forced to leave as the guests did not show up...."

(From a letter to the editors by the indoctrinator of the "Luch" Children's Club, Ye. Pakhomov).

Having arrived in the garrison, I immediately met with Sr Lt Kisel'nikov. He, as strange as it may seem, endeavored to explain the event by the fact that similar requests were addressed to him very often, and he could not satisfy all of them. And in the given instance, as it turned out, he had simply forgot his promise. Reading between the lines one could understand that this was not particularly the most important thing for them.

Later I spoke with the author of the letter to the editor, Ye. Pakhomov, and with the chairman of the housing committee, Ye. Naumova. They were all convinced that the club members needed to meet with the soldiers and that they could do a good deal of good.

Judge for yourselves. The "Luch" Club has set for itself the task of organizing the recreation of juveniles at the place of residence during the evening when they are at times left alone. Working under the club on volunteer principles is the "Young Dzerzhinets" School and sports sections, while

excursions and various evening meetings are held with the children. The indoctrinator Ye. Pakhomov gives particular attention to working with the so-called "problem juveniles" a portion of whom is registered with the children's department of the police. In this regard he places great hopes upon the help from the Komsomol organizations in the subunits of the local garrison, as the word of a military man is very authoritative for a juvenile.

From the experience of the Komsomol organizations from many units and subunits of the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District, I know just how beneficial are their sponsorship ties with the schools. The soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers ["praporshchik"] and officers help in conducting the "Zarnitsa" [Summer Lightning] and "Orlenok" [Eaglet] military sports games, and in these schools they conduct lessons of courage, drill inspections and songs, contests for paramilitary types of sports, and so forth. The children, under the influence of the servicemen, become more organized and disciplined.

It must be said that in the unit where Sr Lt N. Kisel'nikov serves, something is also being done on this level. Thus, the soldiers, sergeants and officers visit the school where Lt Col (Res) N. Rodin works as the military leader. However, here there is one fine point. Nikolay Aleksandrovich Rodin himself for a long time served in this unit, and thus it is not difficult to guess that precisely the periodic visits by the soldiers with the children of this school are to be explained by his initiative.

But in Gor'kiy, there is not just one school or just one vocational-technical school.

In order to systematize the sponsorship work, the garrison command a year ago defined for each subunit the "objectives" for sponsorship work, that is, several schools. In particular, four schools and the city vocational-technical school were assigned to the subordinates of Sr Lt N. Kisel'nikov. However, it has turned out that the soldiers did not even set foot in three schools and sponsorship here was just on paper.

"On the other hand we have visited other schools, although they were not assigned to us!" said Sr Lt Kisel'nikov.

Just what does this "visited" mean? In one of the schools, the reenlisted Sr Sgt V. Antipov helped make a stand, and several soldiers conducted talks. Similar talks were held in another school. In a third one, a group of soldiers was present at a recreational evening.... The senior lieutenant went through his notebook, and tried to recall other similar "measures" which in their character were more reminiscent of courtesy visits than serious and purposeful sponsorship work.

In essence, the Komsomol committee of the unit also has stood aside from sponsorship work in the schools. In a talk with its members, it was learned that this work is not in any way planned, and soldier-leaders are not assigned to the schools. Although, in principle, the Komsomol activists are in favor of planning and in favor of the activeness of military patriotic indoctrination for the Pioneers and school children who are sponsored by them.

In fact, sponsorship work is carried out as follows. Someone of the school representatives turns to the unit political worker, the same Kisel'nikov, and he, if there are soldiers or sergeants free of training, sends them for the "measure." And thus it goes, from instance to instance, from request to request.

It must be said that Sr Lt Kisel'nikov is a young political worker. He still lacks experience in the subunit, and it is all the harder to demand from the officer that he skillfully coordinate the efforts of the soldiers and the local bodies in the military patriotic indoctrination of the younger generation. We would like to believe that the workers from the political body would help Sr Lt Kisel'nikov and the Komsomol committee establish truly strong and professional sponsorship ties. Only then will the servicemen be not accidental visitors in the schools, but rather with their own personnel, along with the instructors and Komsomol activists, they will be able to successfully solve the common important task of indoctrinating the younger generation.

...As for the "Luch" Club, Sr Lt N. Kisel'nikov has visited them and apologized to the indoctrinator Ye. Pakhomov. A meeting between the men of the subunit and the juveniles will occur in the near future.

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