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NEW MILITARY SPORTS CLASSIFICATION STANDARDS FOR 1977-1980

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Feb 77 p 4

[Unattributed military sports classification for 1977-1980]

[Text] A new military sports classification has been put into effect since the start of the present year. The purpose of it is to further raise the level of the physical conditioning of the personnel, to involve the servicemen in regular sports exercises, to strengthen their health, and to extend their professional longevity.

In contrast to the previous classification, partial changes have been made in the new one. For example, the category standards and requirements for military gymnastics have been excluded, and throwing the F-1 grenade for accuracy has been introduced (in this exercise it is possible to fulfill the standard up to the first category, inclusively). Incidentally, there can now be holders of the first category for rowing in seaboats, the 1-km cross-country race, and so forth.

At the same time a procedure has come into force for the awarding of sports titles and categories in the Soviet Army and Navy. This provides, in particular, a rise in the scale of the competitions at which the fulfillment of the standards for master of sports is offered.

The new military-sports classification will help to further popularize the applied military types of sports and to raise the level of sports mastery among the personnel.

Today we are publishing, with certain abridgements, the standards and requirements of the new military sports classification.

Motor Vehicle Sports (Figure Driving)

Category Requirements

Category II--to win 30 classification points in contests of any group within two adjacent years.

Category III--to win 4 points in the contests of any group within two adjacent years.

Division of Contests into Groups

| Contest groups | Number of participants in each class of vehicles (at least) |
|----------------|---|
| II | 10 competitors not lower than category I |
| III | 10 competitors not lower than category II |
| IV | 8 competitors having categories |
| V | 8 competitors regardless of category |

Conditions for Fulfilling Category Requirements

1. Group I includes the contests to be held by the USSR Federation of Motor Vehicle Sports
2. Classification points are awarded to the participants of the contests for the places won according to the following table:

| Contest groups | Places won | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------|------------|----|----|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| II | 14 | 12 | 10 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 |
| III | 10 | 8 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 2 | -- | -- |
| IV | 8 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| V | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |

3. The awarding of points begins from the date of the official contest.
4. Sports categories are awarded in sequence.
5. The figures (exercises) are carried out in accord with the Rules of Military Sports Contests. For the awarding of classification points, the competitor should execute 10 figures in contests of groups II and III and at least 6 figures in contests of groups IV and V.
6. Classification points are awarded only to participants who have won not more than 300 points in cars and not more than 400 points in trucks. The points are determined by adding the penalty points received by the competitor for mistakes in executing the figures and for exceeding the test time in covering the route.

Military Sports Combined Tournament

Category Standards for All Types of USSR Armed Forces (in points)

| Types of combined tournament | Categories | | | | |
|--|------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| | a | b | I | II | III |
| Military triathalon No 1 (VT-1): firing AK-1 or AK-2, crossing obstacle course combined with running 400 meters, throwing F-1 grenade for distance and accuracy | 290 | 270 | 235 | 190 | 140 |
| Military triathalon No 2 (VT-2): lift with roll on cross-bar, 100- meter dash, 3-kilometer cross- country race | -- | -- | 235 | 190 | 140 |
| Officer combined tournament: firing PM [?Makarov pistol], gymnastics (exercises on hori- zontal bar, parallel bars, vaulting according to program for category III of the Unified All-Union Sports Classification), swimming 100 meters freestyle, cross-country race of 3 kilo- meters or skiing 10 kilometers (for age group I), 1-kilometer cross-country race or skiing 5 kilometers (for age groups II and III): | | | | | |
| Age group I | 340 | 300 | 270 | 230 | 180 |
| Age group II | 340 | 300 | 220 | 190 | 150 |
| Age group III | 340 | 300 | 190 | 170 | 140 |
| Military pentathalon (VP): firing AK-1 or PM, gymnastics (exercises on horizontal bar, parallel bars and vaulting ac- cording to the program for category III of the Unified All-Union Sports Classification), swimming 100 meters freestyle, 3-kilometer cross-country race, figure driving of vehicle | 400 | 370 | 330 | 275 | 200 |

Key: a--master of sports; b--candidate master of sports

Conditions for Fulfilling Category Standards

The exercises are performed in accordance with the Rules of Military Sports Contests.

Rowing and Sailing Sports

Rowing and Sailing Combined Tournament in Seaboats

Rowing and sailing combined tournament in seaboats includes the following exercises:

- 1) Two rowing races over 2000 meters;
- 2) Two sailing races with rudders over 50 cable-lengths;
- 3) Two sailing races without rudders over 30 cable-lengths;
- 4) Combined race over 50 cable-lengths with five stages;
- 5) Cruising race over 20 miles.

Category Requirements

Master of sports--to win first place or second place twice within 3 years in the USSR Armed Forces Championship, or first place with the Navy Championship or the championship of the higher naval schools, with participation in the contests of at least 8 crews, including 2 crews of masters of sports and 2 crews of candidate masters of sports.

Candidate master of sports--to win second or third place in the USSR Armed Forces Championship, or second place in the Navy Championship or the championship of the higher naval schools involving at least 3 crews of candidate masters of sports, or first place in the fleet championship with the participation in the contests of at least 10 crews, including at least 5 crews of the first category.

First category--to participate in the USSR Armed Forces Championship, or win third or fourth place in the Navy Championship or the championship of the higher naval schools with the participation in the contests of at least 10 crews; or first or second place or third place twice during one season in the fleet championship; or first place in the championship of the formation with the participation of at least 10 crews of category II in the contests; or win a victory in the contests of any scale over two crews of category I and 5 crews of category II, having come in among the 30 percent of the crews which have shown the best results.

Category II--to win the contests of any scale from two crews of category II and three crews of category III.

Category III--to win first place during one season in the contests of any scale, having won over two crews of category III or four crews of novices, with the participation of at least 5 crews in the contests.

Rowing in 6-Oar Seaboats

Category Standards (in minutes and seconds)

| Distance | Categories | | |
|-------------|------------|-------|-------|
| | I | II | III |
| 2000 meters | 12.30 | 13.00 | 13.45 |

Conditions for Fulfilling the Category Standards and Requirements

1. The setting out of the distance of the races, the equipping of the boats, the composition of the crew and the determining of the places won are to be carried out in accord with the Navy Minor Landing Craft and Boat's Signal Book.
2. The category of the crew is determined from the highest category of 50 percent of the rowers.
3. Categories are to be awarded to participants who know how to swim.

Light [Field] Athletics

Category Standards

| Types of events | Categories | | | | | |
|--|------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | I | | II | | III | |
| | a | b | a | b | a | b |
| 100-meter dash from a lying start (sec.) | 12.5 | 12.3 | 13.0 | 12.5 | 13.7 | 13.2 |
| 1000-meter cross country race (minutes) | 3.00 | 2.55 | 3.10 | 3.02 | 3.20 | 3.15 |
| 3000-meter cross country race (minutes) | 10.20 | 10.05 | 11.00 | 10.45 | 12.00 | 11.45 |
| Throwing F-1 grenade for distance (meters) | 65 | -- | 58 | -- | 50 | -- |
| Throwing F-1 grenade for accuracy (points) | 100 | -- | 90 | -- | 70 | -- |

Key: a--in light boots; b-- in high boots

Conditions for Fulfilling the Category Standards

1. The exercises are to be carried out in accord with the Rules of Military Sports Contests.
2. The throwing of the F-1 grenade for accuracy is carried out analogously to the conditions provided for carrying out this exercise in the VT-1

Skiing

Category Standards (in minutes, seconds)

| Race distance | Categories | | |
|---------------|------------|-------|-------|
| | I | II | III |
| 5 kilometers | -- | 23.15 | 25.45 |
| 10 kilometers | 42.00 | 46.30 | 52.00 |

Conditions for Fulfilling the Category Standards and Requirements

1. The exercises are to be carried out in accord with the Rules of Military Sports Contests.

Sports Parachuting

Category Standards

| Type of exercise | Categories | | |
|---|------------|-------|-------|
| | I | II | III |
| Parachute jumps Exercise 1--jump with plane speed of at least 300 kph (minutes, seconds) or Exercise 2--jump with fall stabilization (delayed opening of chute) for 15 sec. | 12.00 | 13.00 | 15.00 |

Conditions for Fulfilling Category Standards

1. The exercises are to be performed in the serially-produced, unguided parachute. Exercise 1 is executed from a height of 800 meters, and Exercise 2 from a height of 1200 meters.
2. The time of executing the exercise is determined from the moment the jumper leaves the airplane to his arrival at the finish. In Exercise 2, in addition, consideration is also given to the precision of holding the fall stabilization time or the delay in opening the chute. For the opening of the chute before or after the 15th second, 1 minute of penalty time is added to the overall time. With the opening of the parachute before the 10th second or after the 20th second, the standard is not considered met.
3. After landing and collecting the parachute in the carrying bags, the participants proceed to the nearest assembly point, they are recorded by the umpire and then proceed to the finish. The finish line is 1 kilometer away from the assembly point.
4. All participants arrive at the finish line with their parachutes, weapons and gear. The result is nullified with the loss of the gear, weapons or chutes.

Note. The number of assembly points is set considering one assembly point for not more than 10 participants, but not more than two points.

Applied Swimming

Category Standards (minutes, seconds)

| Type of event | Categories | |
|---|------------|------|
| | II | III |
| Swimming 100 meters freestyle in uniform with mock automatic (carbine) | 2.15 | 2.35 |
| Jumping from tower at least 3 meters high and swimming 100 meters freestyle | 1.15 | 1.31 |

Conditions for Fulfilling the Category Standards

1. The exercises are to be carried out in accord with the Rules of Military Sports Contests.
2. The jump from the tower may be executed in any manner.

Crossing Obstacle Course

Category Standards (minutes, seconds)

| | a | Type of Armed Forces, branch of arms | | | | | | | | | |
|--|-----|--------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | | c | b | d | e | f | g | h | i | j | |
| First control exercise on special obstacle course | II | | | | | 3.00 | | | | | |
| | III | | | | | 3.10 | | | | | |
| Second control exercise on special obstacle course | II | 1.35 | 2.20 | 2.35 | 1.55 | 6.25 | 1.50 | 1.20 | 1.25 | 2.35 | 2.20 |
| | III | 1.45 | 2.35 | 2.50 | 2.05 | 6.45 | 2.00 | 1.30 | 1.35 | 2.50 | 2.30 |

Key: a--categories; b--all subunits of ground forces, with exception of missile, antiaircraft missile, artillery, antiaircraft artillery, mortar, tank, motor, airborne and engineer troops; c--missile troops; d--missile, antiaircraft missile, antiaircraft artillery and mortar subunits of ground troops, Navy shore subunits; e--tank, motor subunits and subunits of engineer troops; f--airborne troops; g--antiaircraft missile troops of national air defense; h--radar troops of national air defense; i--Navy ships; j--marine subunits; k--civil defense units.

For the personnel of all types of the USSR Armed Forces:

The second control exercise on a standard obstacle course: 1.05 for category I, 1.10 for II, 1.20 for III.

The second control exercise on a standard obstacle course with 400-meter dash: 2.20 for category I, 2.25 for II, 2.40 for III.

Conditions for Fulfilling Category Standards on Obstacle Course

1. The control exercises on the special obstacle course are to be carried out in accord with the requirements of NFP-66 [Physical Training Manual] and the Rules of Military Sports Contests.
2. In the content of the control exercise for Navy ships, in comparison with the NFP-66, the following changes are to be introduced: the heaving line, in the event of the nonfulfillment of the conditions of the first throw, is collected by any method and thrown again.

Sports Shooting

Category Standards

| Type of event | Category | | |
|---|----------|----|-----|
| | I | II | III |
| PM event: firing PM at 25 meters at target with black circle--10 rounds (points) | -- | 80 | 75 |
| AK event: firing automatic at 100 meters at target No 4 (head & shoulders with circles)--3 trial, 10 counted rounds (points) | -- | 85 | 80 |
| AK-1 event: firing from automatic at 200 meters from 3 positions (lying, 1 knee, standing) 15 rounds (3x5) (number of hits) | 9 | 7 | 6 |
| AK-2 event: firing from automatic at 200 meters from 3 positions (lying, 1 knee, standing)--30 rounds (3x10) (number of hits) | 15 | 12 | 10 |

Conditions for Fulfilling Category Standards

1. The events are carried out in accord with the Rules of Military Sports Contests.
2. The AK event is to be carried out in a lying position without a prop, with single rounds in accord with the requirements of the firing course. The AK exercise may also be performed with a self-loading carbine.

Exercises on Special Equipment

Category Standards

| Type of exercise | Categories | |
|---|------------|------|
| | II | III |
| Exercises on looping swings-- 20 turns (seconds) | 31.0 | 33.0 |
| Exercise on gymnastic wheel (points) | 18.0 | 8.5 |

Conditions for Fulfilling Category Standards

1. The exercise on the turning swings (looping swings) is carried out in accord with the Statute Governing the Military Sports Complex of the USSR Armed Forces.

2. The following exercises are to be performed on the gymnastic wheel:

Category II. The first exercise--by swinging to the side to put the wheel into a left-handed spiral; to execute continuously 10 spirals on one rim (one spiral--0.8 point); to bring the wheel onto two rims, put it into the reverse spiral and execute several spirals (2 points); to bring the wheel back to two rims and leave the wheel. Second exercises--the same as the first but start with a right-handed spiral.

Category III. The first exercise--by swinging to the side, to put the wheel into a left-handed spiral; to execute continuously 10 spirals on one rim (1 spiral--1 point); to bring the wheel to two rims and leave the wheel. The second exercise--the same as the first but start from a right-handed spiral.

Each exercise of categories II and III is judged by a 10-point system. For receiving category II, two exercises are performed, and for receiving category III, one of the two exercises by choice.

Exercises with Weights (Two Events)

Category Standards

| Type of exercise and weight category | Category | Total points | Minimum number of tries in each exercise |
|--|----------|--------------|--|
| Double event in lifting 32 kg (one-armed jerk, two-armed press) Light weight (to 60 kg) | I | 50 | 5 |
| | II | 35 | 4 |
| | III | 20 | 3 |
| Medium weight (to 70 kg) | I | 80 | 8 |
| | II | 60 | 6 |
| | III | 40 | 4 |
| Semiheavy weight (to 82 kg) | I | 100 | 11 |
| | II | 80 | 9 |
| | III | 60 | 7 |
| Heavy weight (over 82 kg) | I | 120 | 14 |
| | II | 100 | 12 |
| | III | 80 | 10 |
| Double event in lifting weight of 24 kg (one-armed jerk, two-armed press) Light weight (to 60 kg) | I | 60 | 12 |
| | II | 45 | 9 |
| | III | 30 | 7 |
| Medium weight (to 70 kg) | I | 95 | 18 |
| | II | 70 | 13 |
| | III | 50 | 10 |
| Semiheavy weight (to 82 kg) | I | 110 | 20 |
| | II | 90 | 15 |
| | III | 70 | 12 |
| Heavy weight (over 82 kg) | I | 130 | 21 |
| | II | 110 | 17 |
| | III | 90 | 14 |

Conditions for Fulfilling Category Standards

1. The exercises are to be fulfilled in accord with the Rules of Military Sports Contests.

Accelerated Movement

Category Standards and Requirements

| Types of exercises | Categories | | |
|--|---|--|--|
| | I | II | III |
| Militarized cross-country running, 3 km with throwing grenades and firing automatic (minutes, seconds) | 12.30 | 13.30 | 14.30 |
| Short forced march of 6 km (minutes) | -- | 28.00 | 30.00 |
| Cross-country running with orientation on terrain | Win 1st-5th place in district championship, beating 5 athletes of category I or 10 of category II | Win 1st-5th place in formation championship, or 1st-10th place in district championship, beating in both instances 5 athletes of category II or 10 of category III | Win a place in the contests of any scale, being among the first 25% of the athletes showing the best results |

Conditions for Fulfilling Category Standards

1. The militarized cross-country running is carried out in accord with the Rules of Military Sports Contests, considering the following changes: for a miss in firing or throwing the grenade less than 40 meters, the participant is penalized, respectively, 20 and 10 seconds. There is no reward for the participants to hit the target or throw the grenade over 40 meters.

2. The short forced march of 6 km and the cross-country running with orientation on the terrain are carried out in accord with the Rules of Military Sports Contests.

10272
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NAVAL TRAINING ACTIVITIES

Submarine Crew in Sea Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Feb 77 p 1

[Article by Capt 3d Rank V. Morozov, deputy commander for political affairs on an atomic missile-carrying submarine: "We Were Tested by the Ocean"]

[Text] For sailors, in peacetime, there is no higher or severer testing than a long cruise. Even if this is not the first or even the second one. This is because there always is in a forthcoming voyage something that is untested and new. In a recently completed ocean cruise, for the entire crew of our atomic submarine, there was one unusual or new thing: we had become the initiators in the Navy of a socialist competition in honor of the 60th anniversary of the Great October Revolution.

We were submerged for long days in the ocean depths. But still the feeling did not abandon the crew that our every step, success and failure were visible to all sailors. And for each day during the cruise, as today at the base, we will answer: It was spent as initiators should.

A long cruise is not only a testing but also an event for a ship crew. Undoubtedly, it is an event that is planned, prepared for ahead of time, but still an event. Even if because a stay at sea is a time of rapid development, maturing, the acquiring of valuable practical experience and the more profound realization of one's military labor. No matter what we were doing during the cruise, what missions we were carrying out, and no matter how far away we were, we constantly turned in our thoughts to the motherland. The ship crew felt shoulder to shoulder with all the Soviet people who are preparing by new achievements in labor to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the socialist fatherland.

In the party and Komsomol meetings, in the releases of the radio news and wall press, the submariners stated their confidence in their forces, and their readiness to do everything to successfully carry out the assumed socialist pledges and execute the missions of the voyage with a high quality. The inspiring words of Capt Med Serv V. Kucherenko and the junior officers V. Ryazanov and A. Skiby, and PO 2d Class A. Ponomarev come to mind. However, the ship command and the communists were aware that here desire alone

and a militant mood were not enough, and there had to be also a calculated and professional approach to all the questions of the voyage, the combat training work and the competition.

Cruise life went on with its measured pace. The combat shifts competed, the graphs were filled out with the first results, and the total results were summed up. The ship commander and I endeavored to evaluate from a new position every watch, every exercise and training session. That is, from the position of the initiators and right-flankers. And a great deal that previously did not strike the eye became noticeable. At that time, our commander, Capt 2d Rank A. Kazakov, wrote in his notebook: "We are insufficiently able to link the competition with the training process. The effectiveness of the training sessions must be raised by a thorough saturating of them with competitiveness. In summing up the results, there must be more concreteness and principledness."

Here the ship commander himself was present at the training of the torpedo crews. They are recognized specialists among us, and they know their job. The training was led by the crew senior officer, while the commander of the mine-torpedo department, Sr Lt M. Kabanov, was also present.

It must be said that the overall picture of the training was very satisfactory. However, Capt 2d Rank Kazakov drew attention to the frequent repetitions of the same inputs. And with more careful observation, one was also struck by their very regular succession. The torpedo men worked flawlessly. The presence of the ship commander also heightened their work. And in essence it was boring. The sailors, in performing the same operations in the customary sequence, easily kept within the standards, but they did not truly experience any combat excitement or rivalry. This was affirmed in summing up the results. The officer in charge conducted the analysis dryly and briefly, and one could feel that he did not have particularly anything to say. And even his praise for the outstanding men sounded somehow pale and unexpressive. Sr Lt Kabanov also did not consider it necessary to add anything.

Capt 2d Rank Kazakov was present in other departments, and later on, a day there after, conducted a meeting of the commanders of the department and chiefs of services. The ship commander sharply posed the question of raising the quality of the training, having noted that their monotony and lack of interest were fraught with double consequences. In the first place, the men ceased being active participants in the training process and they did not seek out new approaches to performing the operations and did not endeavor to introduce something of their own for improving the results of the work. Secondly, the sailors became accustomed to standard commissions, and a sudden change or complicating of the situation could lead to failures and mistakes.

In addition to the general analysis, Capt 2d Rank Kazakov had an individual talk with Sr Lt Kabanov. The commander advised him to attend training sessions in the electromechanical department, and to learn from the mechanical

engineer methodological skill and a creative approach to training subordinates. The exchange of experience was very instructive, and not only for the torpedo crews. Moreover, on the ship there was born and subsequently strengthened a desire on the part of all officers to enrich the training process with their own creative searches and the initiative of subordinates, and to organize this in an inseparable unity with the socialist competition.

Competitiveness began to permeate all spheres of the combat training of the ship crew. This was pleasing to us. Under the monotonous conditions of the cruise, under conditions of increased fatigue and constant physical and psychological stress, the tone of the crew's life not only did not drop, but on the contrary became higher and was enriched with new impulses of energy. And these impulses were born in the course of activating the socialist competition.

However, while at the outset of the cruise the ship commander and I were most concerned that the competition in the crew assume a true, to put it figuratively, oceanic scope with the participation of all the sailors, without exception, later on the question of the quality and effectiveness of the competition became the main one.

The greater skill of the specialists, the better standing of watches and the greater feeling of responsibility among the submariners could be felt and could only be a source of pleasure. But the competition is a process of many-sided relationships in a collective, and its results must be seen on a comprehensive level. Individual major accomplishments should not obscure the shortcomings, and an infatuation with a certain direction of the competition should not lead to one-sided results. For example, the commander of the missile department, Capt-Lt V. Yeres'ko, noted that the activation of competitiveness between the subunits and individual sailors, although leading to a growth of the excellent specialists, did not exclude a gap between the advanced and lagging ones. Thus the competitors PO 2d Class P. Zverev and Sr Sn G. Krinitsyn, in summing up the results, received evaluations with a major difference in points. A similar picture was observed in other subunits. And this happened because, in focusing the efforts on activating rivalry between the competitors, we did not always pay proper attention to the role of mutual aid and the moral aspects of the competition.

The elimination of this failing brought a tangible result.

Probably, from the sidelines it would be felt that for the initiators everything should go easily. The competition (particularly if you imagine being a right flanker) is not a harvest campaign where you merely pick the fruit. This is a constant and stubborn search, a struggle against shortcomings, and the all-round preparation for successes which have just been noted. And, probably, the main thing here is great exactingness.

By the end of the cruise, it could be said with confidence that the crew had matured, grown stronger, and grown in all regards. We returned much stronger than when we left. And precisely during these days, the ship commander endeavored to use any opportunity for testing the vigilance and skills of the

crew. Certainly, in time, particularly if the cruise is going successfully, the men begin to feel that everything will be fine, that nothing can happen on such a perfect ship, and they begin to overestimate their forces. Psychologically this is quite explainable. However, we could not permit such a phenomenon in the crew. Hence the training and exercises. And later on there was missile firing. It was, certainly, hypothetical, but with complete clarity demonstrated the actuality of the good training of the crew and its high moral and military mood.

Yes, having returned to the base, we could rightly say that we had been truly tested by the ocean. Because during the entire voyage we tested ourselves in the strictest manner. At present, at base, the crew is awaiting new missions. The main thing is to use the ocean experience with great benefit for achieving new successes in the socialist competition and in raising the combat readiness of the ship.

Atomic Sub Captain on Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Feb 77 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank V. Lyulin, commander of the missile-carrying submarine: "The Combat Standard"]

[Text] The alert caught the crew in the barracks. When the submariners had arrived at the ship, the representatives of the staff were already on-board. This is how a crucial inspection started for us.

The assembly upon the alert and all the subsequent actions of the sailors were strictly timed. The crew readied the ship for combat and the cruise ahead of the established time, it arrived promptly in the designated area, and conducted the launching of the missile with great accuracy. In the analysis it was stressed that the combat standards had been overfulfilled by many crews and subunits. This made it possible as a result to reduce the standard for the use of a missile weapon (the most important for our ship) by 17 percent.

The indicator is high and the sailors are rightfully proud of it. For me, as the commander, this achievement is also dear in the fact that it concretely expresses the effectiveness of our efforts to organize combat training and the socialist competition on the ship.

At present it is a rare conference, meeting or conversation among command personnel which does not touch upon the questions of the socialist competition, and the problem of aiming it at the mastery of modern weapons and new technology in a short period of time and a rise in combat readiness.

It is felt that with a comprehensive approach, the competition can encompass all spheres of training and life of a military collective. But still, it seems to me, its leading element is the struggle for the excellent execution of combat training missions and the exceeding of the standards in combat work.

Ultimately, an increase in the total saving of time for a ship in executing a combat standard is tantamount to improving the quality of executing the combat mission.

The conquering of a standard, in a certain sense, is similar to a conquering of a mountain peak. In the same manner that the leader of the climbing group should be confident of each person who is roped to him, and should know the route of the ascent and its most difficult areas, so the ship commander should see the way to condensing the normed time, and lead the cruise constantly and precisely along these paths, remembering that the incorrect "step" of a single specialist or the failure of any crew in combat can lead to irretrievable consequences.

At present the missile firing which was a strict testing for us is already a matter of the past. But the course which we followed in conquering the standard will be followed by the crew in the future.

The work done can be divided conditionally into several stages. In the first, initial one, the mission was to analyze the structure of the combat standard and to determine what elements in the actions of the individual specialists and crews, in improving them, could help the crew move forward.

As the analysis showed, in principle there are two possible basic directions of work. In the first, we could undertake efforts, with the aid of rationalization searches, to achieve certain technical advances which would raise the speed of the equipment, thereby reducing the "machine time" which is part of the combat standards. For a number of reasons, we used this reserve less than we would like. However, even in the pledges for the current training year, there are plans to work out and introduce at least 100 rationalization proposals. If it is considered that each of our officers has the diploma of a military engineer and many of the warrant officers [michman] are trained on the level of technicians, the feasibility of what has been planned is not in doubt.

But we view this direction as an auxiliary one, since the work of condensing the "human time," the second component of the combat standards, is more urgent and involved with the activity of the competition. In other words, the skills of the individual specialists and crews and the combat teamwork of the crew--here lies the basic course of the competition.

An example of this, in particular, could be the episode from the experience of the commander of the missile department, Capt 3d Rank Yu. Kavizin. The subunit was to carry out involved work on the equipment. How did the officer act? For all the subordinates, he drew up coordinated daily plans. Each day he gave the results and analyzed in detail the actions of each specialist. In the pairs of competitors, he determined the leader, and explained how the lead had been achieved, and what rational procedures must be adopted by the laggard. The creative competitive situation helped to develop the initiative of the sailors. Ultimately, the missilemen carried out the set mission almost twice as fast as is envisaged by the regulations.

On a submarine, when it is on a long voyage, there is a comparison of work not only for the subunits, but also for the combat shifts who stand the sea watch in turn. However, one must not forget the collective nature of modern weapons. In terms of a missile-carrying submarine, this is expressed in the well-known formula: "The firing is not done by the missilemen, the firing is by the crew." And we commence the indoctrination of any submarine, whether officer or sailor, by explaining the essence of this.

As a rule, initially a young person views this formula as a hyperbole with a pedagogical twist, and from this come semijoking and semiserious questions such as: "And do the asdic operators also fire?" "What do the electricians aim at?" However, it takes only a few trips to sea with training under conditions of real combat and real firing for such questions to disappear.

If the radio operators linger in reporting the reception of an order from the command post this is the loss of seconds.

And if the boatswain at the helm does not keep the designated depth, this tells in the maneuver and hence the quality of the combat work.

And if the asdic operators do not promptly detect the enemy in the area, the sub can get into a difficult situation.

In a word, excellent firing is in essence the excellent work of the entire crew.

This is possible if, in the first place, everyone, as he should, fulfills his particular standards; secondly, it is essential to achieve an interaction of the battle stations and crews which would provide for the totalling of these individual indicators in fulfilling the standards into a single one (it could be termed the total or comprehensive one), from which, per se, the level of the combat skill of the crew is judged.

In this area there is room for organizing the competition and for the widest creativity of the competitors. The skillful operation of the equipment on the basis of a profound knowledge of the instructions and manuals by the sailors; a competition between the men of the battle crews for reducing the standards; a rise in class skills; an improvement in the effectiveness of the exercises in the specialty, and the quality of standing the sea watch-- here are some of the specific spheres of the competition.

The foundations of the military skills of the submariners are established in these spheres. Here, the officer, the commander of the subunit, is the basic figure who to a decisive degree determines the effectiveness of the efforts of the sailors to fulfill the personal and collective pledges. His task is to provide a maximum level of skills in his subordinates, and to achieve effective teamwork in the work of the crews. The criterion for evaluating this activity by the officer is the fulfillment of the partial standards by the officer himself and his subordinates, both in the course of training and exercises as well as under cruise conditions.

In the crew, Capt-Lt N. Mar'yasin and Engr-Capt 2d Rank Mikhaylov have proved to be able organizers of the competition. Both officers are excellent educators. In relying upon modern recommendations of military pedagogics and psychology, they skillfully use an individual approach to the men not only in indoctrination but also in combat training.

However, the precise work of the specialists within their battle stations still does not guarantee the full success of the crew as a whole. It is essential that the necessary level of teamwork be achieved between the crews and subunits. And here commences a higher level of the competition. Here is the basic pursuit of the commander's participation in it. Both the analysis and the development of teamwork in the combat work of the crew depend largely precisely upon the ship commander.

It is worthwhile noting that the basic reserve from which the crew can gain the largest number of seconds is also to be found here, on the overlap of the actions of all elements of the complex ship organism, starting from the ship battle crew. Here the particular standards, as scientifically sound as they are, are designed for the maximum capabilities of the equipment and a high level of specialist skills. Here it is not so easy to achieve a substantial savings in time. But an improvement, for example, in the passage of reports from the battle stations to the central station or the achieving of mutual understanding between the ship commander and the department commanders, with the resulting enterprising and efficient actions of the officers in the course of the same missile attack, can lead to a savings of not just seconds but also minutes.

In modern combat, there is nothing more precious than a lead of several seconds over the enemy. The competition helps achieve these seconds in the process of training and in working out the combat standards.

Socialist Competition in Crew Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Feb 77 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank A. Karpov, submarine commander: "A Testing of Maturity"]

[Text] Our submarine this time could not avoid encountering the "enemy" ASW forces. The search group of surface vessels was so located as to control the "corridor" within which, according to the conditions of carrying out the mission, the submarine breaking through to the defended area had the right to maneuver.

But in and of itself the encounter with the "enemy" was far from tantamount to the loss of concealment. If, of course, the commander and the ship combat crew were able to use the capabilities of the equipment, and not lose precious minutes during which the correct tactical decision had to be found. Both the executive officer, the navigator and the watch officer made a contribution to the search for it. Each of them proposed his own variation.

Of course, in the midst of combat it is not always possible to follow this system. But if there is an opportunity, the commander should not overlook the occasion in a situation close to combat to test his assistants for maturity.

Judging from the reports of the asdic operators who were watching the targets, there still was such an opportunity. The executive officer and the navigator were experienced submariners. For this reason, of the greatest interest for me were the actions of Sr Lt V. Gudimov. Undoubtedly, the watch officer understood that the "enemy" at any moment could make contact with us. But he also understood that hurry was as dangerous as delay. In order to find the correct move, it was essential to weigh and evaluate everything, including: the position of the ships conducting the search, their courses, the areas of observation, the hydrology of the area, its depths and many other factors. From experience I knew how difficult this mission was when you were new in service.

Sr Lt Gudimov in turn requested target data from the asdic operators, made a final calculation and reported his decision. I made only one correction for speed. The submarine changed course several times as well as depth. And gradually the sharp voices of the sonars died out behind out the stern.

Victory! It was all the more precious because it had been won in the concluding stage of a long voyage which had been difficult for both the equipment and the men. And it was all the more significant as the crew had not prepared specially for this combat as the order to participate in the exercise had been received unexpectedly.

There was an element of chance in the fact that during the period of the breakthrough Sr Lt Gudimov was in the role of the watch officer. But it was far from accidental that his actions were characterized by both maturity and decisiveness, and, particularly importantly, promptness. In organizing the socialist competition on the long voyage, the command and the party organization of the ship had seen one of its main tasks in the fact that a drive to constantly improve military skills be inherent to each submariner. And above all for the officers who were the organizers of the training process and the competition in the subunits. In skipping ahead, I will say that the shift of Gudimov was most frequently the winner in the competition of the battle shifts headed by watch officers. Hence the success of the senior lieutenant in combat training was no surprise for anyone. Certainly in the "prehistory" were scores of training sessions and intense work by Gudimov himself and his subordinates to carry out the high socialist pledges assumed in honor of the 60th anniversary of Great October.

The pledges which were worked out directly for the period of the long voyage became an organic component in the pledges for the entire training year. For the officers, their basic content was determined by such points as profound mastery of the equipment in one's own and adjacent department, improving the class skills, and the struggle to obtain permission to perform duties a level higher than the position held.

In my view, it is worth taking up in more detail the last aspect of the competition. And because the given form of improving the combat skills of submarine officers was instituted comparatively recently, and because this aspect of the competition is closely tied to the moral aspects in the service of an officer and his position in life.

Let me give the following example. Engr-Capt-Lt I. Pisarev, having been permitted at one time to command a group, subsequently began to work, as they say, haphazardly. And for the crews, Pisarev initially drew up pledges from streamlined phrases which in essence provided no incentive for new goals.

This did not remain unnoticed. But it is one thing to notice and another to influence the convictions of an officer and his mood, and upon this, ultimately, depends whether or not a person will find the desire and force to work at full force. It scarcely made sense to apply pressure through an order. And the question should be raised more widely than just the pledges of one group commander. Unfortunately, elements of self-complacency were also observed among certain other officers.

For this reason the agenda of the party meeting held on the eve of the voyage was devoted to the socialist competition during the cruise and to the tasks of raising the combat skills of the communists. The principled party discussion provided a tangible result. Communist Pisarev, like certain other comrades, set specific high goals, and during the cruise worked intensely, and this made it possible for him, in particular, to be permitted to command a subunit. It is worth mentioning also that virtually all the commanders of departments returned from the voyage with dependable back-ups.

And group commander, Lt V. Svirin, was not only permitted to perform the duties of the chief of the radio engineering service (RTS), but also commanded the subunit for a rather extended time when the RTS chief was ill. And the RTS under the command of the lieutenant not only did not slip back but even took a new step forward.

Also proving its effectiveness was the time-tested form of the competition of a competition between combat shifts. As is known, during a cruise the submarine crew is divided into combat shifts headed by watch officers. The struggle for first place and the acute competitiveness in carrying out the exercises and training sessions impelled the officers heading the combat shifts to constantly improve both their personal skills as well as the skills of subordinates. A particularly acute rivalry developed between them when it was a question of mastering the tactical procedures of conducting combat in a duel situation and countering the "enemy" ASW forces and means.

Largely due to the competition, there was accelerated development of such watch officers as Sr Lts V. Gudimov and V. Tumanov. And I am confident, once Sr Lt Tumanov is on watch, in the course of the breakthrough of the sub into the designated region, his actions would be as mature as the actions of Gudimov.

The cruise is over. But the competition to properly celebrate the 60th anniversary of Great October is assuming even greater urgency in the crew. For us the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution" has become a new incentive to achieve high levels of combat mastery. In being guided by the ideas of this document, the submarine crew is moving steadfastly to the set aims. And as always, the officers are on the right flank of the competitors.

Adm Yegorov on Command Effectiveness

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Feb 77 p 2

[Article by Adm Flt G. Yegorov, commander of the Red Banner Northern Fleet: "The Effectiveness of Command"]

[Text] In the analysis of an exercise, no matter what its scale or complexity, one can always note episodes which merit particular attention. As a rule, these are decisions that are of interest in their goal and precise in execution, and rationally organized training combat in which not only are the successful tactical procedures apparent, but also the individuality of the commander, his character and style.

The detachment of ships which during the exercise were under the command of Rear Adm V. Zub had to repel an "enemy" attack. The situation was involved and dynamic, with numerous sudden inputs. It was difficult to guess the intentions of the "enemy," and at the same time it was impossible to wait for a clarification of the situation or the adjustment of numerous and not completely reliable data. Clearly it was not easy for the staff officer to control the actions of the forces and command the ships in such combat. At the same time, it would be impossible to term the circumstances into which he had fallen as extraordinary. Precisely such a situation is characteristic for modern combat at sea.

How did the staff officer behave in the situation? He confidently commanded the detachment, and promptly took the decisions which were immediately given to his subordinates. The terse and concrete instructions were quickly and accurately carried out by the ship commanders. This made it possible for the staff officer to execute the given decision in a short period of time, the ships of the detachment were in a more advantageous position and were able to make a strong strike against the "enemy." The battle was won.

In analyzing this episode, we first of all noted the synchronized nature of the tactical thinking of the staff officer, the cruise staff and the ship commanders, their complete mutual understanding in combat, and the overall creative aim of achieving the greatest success. There was no doubt that the detachment of ships would carry out any other mission in precisely the same manner. For behind the picture of the actions of the ships, one could detect the controlling will of the detachment commander and smooth command. The staff officer and the cruise staff were immediately able to break the

complex of questions down into cardinal and secondary, and they organized a solution to them which was differentiated in terms of the forces but also interrelated. As a result, the staff officer himself was able to be concerned with the main mission, and all the remaining was assumed by the staff. It clearly provided the staff officer with generalized information and the necessary data for command.

Of very great significance was the fact that the ship commanders did not feel the cruise staff was interfering. Each of them clearly saw his active role in the combat, in thoroughly understanding the tactical goal, and aided in every possible way to its best execution.

Naturally, behind this apparent ease and coordination of actions at sea, one must also see the great preparatory work. And this is work based upon the last achievements of command science and practice. This is a command of the times. The problem of improving the structure and methods of command as well as raising its effectiveness is an acute one in all spheres of life, including in the Army and Navy.

As is known, the qualitative replacement of the fleet has led to the broad diversification of its forces and means, weapons and equipment. Radical changes have occurred in all areas of naval arts. Armed combat at sea will be characterized by great dynamism and by sharp changes from one type of actions to another, by great spatial scope, by frequent changes in the situation, by a rapid growth of crisis situations, and by the necessity of solving suddenly arising problems. The significance of the time factor will grow immeasurably and the leadership of the forces in combat and in operation will be more complex.

While in the past weapons and their speed were commensurable with the capabilities of man, and control was carried out using long established methods, at present the situation has changed. Now we cannot limit ourselves to the traditional methods of command in combat. It is essential to take up the new, the advanced, what has been suggested by life, reasoned out by theory and tested out in practice. And it is a question not only of the broad and effective use of not only modern technical means and control systems (automatic control systems and computers). It is a question of reorganizing the very psychology of a commander and his very approach to the job.

Here is an example. Recently a ship commander did not conceive of his work as anything more than personally taking decisions on all questions of any scale arising on the ship. But now a commander aims primarily for greater independence and responsibility in the work of the department commanders and the service chiefs. As a result, his labor assumes a more purposeful character while the work of the subordinate officers becomes more intense and interesting. As a whole, ship command rises to a new, more efficient level.

At one time, a group of generals and officers from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov was present on the large ASW ship "Dostoynyy," and went to sea on it. The officers

were most impressed by the style of work of the commander, the communist Capt 3d Rank A. Il'in. Externally it seemed that the crew acted without any intervention by him. In actuality, each man clearly carried out his functions in obeying the will of the commander. And this showed the achievements of the commander in organizing service and in ship command.

It is wise here to emphasize the important role of the socialist competition in the struggle for the teamwork and effectiveness of the work by all elements in the complex fleet organism. In preparing to properly celebrate the 60th anniversary of Great October, the staff officers and ship commanders have assumed specific pledges to raise their knowledge and skills in the command sphere. Many of our officers are conducting research, they are preparing dissertation resumes, and are generalizing the experience of commanding the forces and means on a cruise and in combat.

A comprehensive approach to the problem of command presupposes the presence of a scientific method to evaluate the training level of an individual person, whether he is a rank-and-file operator or a ship commander, as well as the crew as a whole. Then it is possible objectively to also define the capabilities of each combat unit, and this is of enormous significance in the system of command.

The 25th Party Congress pointed to the necessity of improving the methods of command, and in particular "release the upper echelons of leadership from petty matters, and provide efficiency and flexibility in decision making." Yes, at present a senior chief must be able first of all to have an overall view of his job, and focus forces precisely on those questions which are primarily his responsibility.

But it would be wrong to think that this can be done fully in one element, that is, the ship commander and the staff officer, although command in combat is manifested primarily in this element.

"The essence of organizational questions, to put it simply, consists," noted the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, at the 25th Party Congress, "in having each person, with the required rights and bearing full responsibility within these rights, to carry out his job. This elementary rule of life is, at the same time, the basic principle in the science and practice of control." To be concerned with raising the competence and responsibility of each person in a control system is a most important task for the senior chiefs, the political bodies and party organizations.

Let us turn to the duties of a ship commander. His functions are complex. He does not merely carry out the instructions of the staff officer in combat, but is an active participant in the command process. The commander is the organizer of combat. He must have a quickness of tactical thinking, the ability to thoroughly analyze the situation, to predict its changes and to elaborate the necessary measures for this eventuality ahead of time. It is very important to correctly determine the aim of the actions and the methods of achieving it, to rationally allocate forces and means, and coordinate the efforts of the crew.

Ultimately, the labor of people lies at the basis of the process of command in utilizing automation equipment. This labor comes down to an analysis and synthesis of the information, or, to put it another way, to assessing the situation and taking a decision. The decision of a commander is the basis of command in combat. It brings together and focuses the knowledge, skill and will of many people. And experience indicates that constant success comes primarily to those commanders who themselves not only act skillfully in combat, but are also able to make full use of the forces and capabilities of subordinates, primarily from the ship combat crew. And this is achieved by correct command of the crew which has been honed in training sessions.

Here, of particular significance is the tactical training of the ship commanders and staff officers. Precisely in the course of it is sharpened the timing in the tactical thinking of the staff officer, the staff and the ship commanders. This underlies mutual understanding in combat.

Generally speaking, the skills of smooth work are impossible to achieve without an ordered system and sequence. Here of importance is a rational combining of sea and base training for both the ships and the officers. Base training largely predetermines the success of operations at sea. It includes not only the work of the crews on simulators but also the playing through of various tactical variations with the ship commanders and staff officers, as well as the polishing of the organization of interaction.

The fleet has acquired diverse experience in base training. In the formations there is a constant search for the most effective forms of commander and staff training which meet the requirements of the times in organizing command of the forces at sea. The procedure of actions in carrying out various missions has been thoroughly worked out, including the combating of submarines, surface vessels and aviation. The modeling of certain situations significantly facilitates command of the forces and raises its efficiency.

Certainly the exercises and long cruises are a higher school in developing command of the forces. Here they polish up the precision of actions, and capabilities are determined as well as the direction for further improving the methods and procedures of command. However, there are instances when individual chiefs do not fully appreciate the value of each hour of exercises, and do not fully utilize the possibilities of the long voyages. And it happens that in this high stage of working out the command system, they begin to make up for what should have been done at the base.

The success of an operation, combat or strike is founded primarily in working out the plans for conducting them. Here special responsibility rests on the staff, as the command body. Precisely clear planning based upon a profound understanding of the ultimate aims by the commander and his staff as well as the ways of achieving them, and carried out using scientific methods and automation, is the inner directing core of combat work for the complex organism of a formation. All activities of the staff are a complex of major and minor missions, among which there are no "insignificant" ones. It must not be forgotten that at times a measure which is minor in terms of the scale or the number of persons participating in it is of decisive significance in carrying out the major mission.

In keeping with the development of the navies, the time factor is assuming greater and greater significance in command of the forces, and this factor has become the determining one. And not because sailors previously did not know how to value time. They did. Proof of this is the numerous examples of effective and rapid actions in combat of the North Sea sailors during the war. At times seconds determined the fate of victory. But these were victories of a tactical scale. But now the time factor is assuming special significance both in carrying out tactical missions as well as strategic ones. Hence, the unusually important value of every second now. And it must always be remembered that command is sharpened, improved and put on a scientific basis for the sake of each second won in combat. For the sake of victory.

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PARTY-POLITICAL WORK IN A TANK DIVISION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Feb 77 p 2

[Article by Guards Lt Col V. Krayushin, chief of the political branch of the Guards Tank Ural-L'vov Volunteer Division imeni Mar SU R. Ya. Malinovskiy, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, delegate to the 25th CPSU Congress: "Before Us -- New Heights"]

[Text] There have been many joyous, unforgettable events in my life, but never before had I experienced such deep feelings as I did at the 25th CPSU Congress. For the entire 10 days a business-like and, at the same time, amazingly warm and comradely atmosphere reigned in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses.

A year has already passed since the congress. For our division it was a year of hard work and new successes in combat improvement. As I write these lines my memory comes alive with incidents from a tactical exercise with field fire in one of our units. Even though the officers in the unit had been replaced and newcomers were filling the spots of the experienced specialists discharged into the reserve, the tank troops generally handled their combat training missions well. At the range in a complex tactical situation the regiment operated confidently and intelligently and earned an overall rating of "good."

The fourth tank company, now commanded by Sr Lt P. Bashashin, showed up best. That is not surprising. In firing skills, for example, the company has no equal in the regiment. They are especially good at night fire.

Communists in the unit can well remember the time when the fourth company did not stand out in training and its results in combat training never rose above average. Then in the last year the collective of the subunit moved abruptly forward. It would not be an exaggeration to say that great credit for this belongs to the party organization and to the regimental party committee. The communists took steps against those who accepted the fact that the company was not making use of all its possibilities for qualitative growth, those who were content with average scores. And they demonstrated true party principle, persistence, and ability to carry a job through to the finish.

The direct impetus was provided by the results of a certain check training period in fire training. Some of the tankmen in the company lacked confidence, looked to the commander (for suggestions) too much, became confused as soon as the situation became more complicated. This was discussed at a party meeting held soon afterward.

"Sometimes, instead of teaching the men thoughtful actions in battle, we deal superficially with the important things," communist Sr Lt Ye. Zdunov and other comrades said with concern at the meeting. They gave Capt A. Kuznetsov, at that time commander of the fourth company, as a graphic example.

The members of the party committee completely understood the concern of the speakers at the incorrect approach of certain officers to the methodology of training tankmen. They did everything necessary, first to break down the incorrect view (specifically among the communists of the fourth company) regarding methodology for training specialists, and second, they took care to see that leading know-how received broad dissemination.

Communist Kuznetsov was invited to the party committee to tell how the company was fulfilling the requirement on raising the quality and effectiveness of the training process. The invitation itself already forced Kuznetsov and the other communists of the subunit to take a self-critical look at the results of their work, see their mistakes in fire training more clearly, and start thinking about how to improve the training of their subordinates. These very questions were discussed at a company party meeting later.

But the party committee's role was not limited to just this. They commissioned party activists Capt G. Petrovich and Maj D. Mos'kin to summarize the know-how of the best methodologists in the regiment, including that of communist Lt V. Shavga, and see that the fourth company adopted these practices.

We have worked hard and continue to do so on the task, given by the 25th CPSU Congress, of raising the level of party leadership and improving organizational and political work among the masses of people. At the congress it was emphasized that the level of party leadership depends directly on the militance and initiative of party organizations, on how well they have mastered the Leninist type of work. The past year gives us rich material to analyze, for reflection on how party militance and initiative show up in practice and how they should show up.

With respect to the party organization where Major Mos'kin is a member of the party committee I would say that the effectiveness of its influence on the subunit is primarily a result of the fact that it is not a passive recorder of events and phenomena but rather an active organizer of work and an ardent propagandist for party ideas in the main areas of the struggle for regimental combat readiness. The party organization teaches communists to be active political fighters, advocates of

everything new and progressive. It develops in them such invaluable qualities as a creative attitude toward work, a state-minded approach to accomplishing large and small tasks, precision and discipline, and high standards in assessing results achieved.

I will give one more example from its practical work. Not long ago the party committee heard a report by Sr Lt A. Lopatkov, battalion commander, at one of its meetings.

This subunit has been outstanding for several years. The tankmen have obligated themselves to retain this honorary title. If we speak of the current state of affairs in the battalion as a whole, there is no cause for alarm, at first glance. But behind the generally positive picture the party committee discerned certain danger signs in the work of battalion communists. Some seemed to be slightly overimpressed with their own successes. The battalion commander himself was no exception. As a result, the mutual high standards of communists with respect to the quality of their work had dropped in the subunit party organization.

The complacency of certain communist leaders soon showed in training scores and socialist competition. The battalion received marks below its capabilities for regular exercises in firing and driving the combat vehicles. Instead of taking a principled, party-minded approach to this, however, they clutched at a straw, saying: "Well, what if they are worse than we could do? They're no worse than our neighbor units!" To this self-consoling they added another line: "The training year has just started, we'll catch up."

It was precisely such attitudes that the party committee opposed after its thorough preliminary study of affairs in the battalion party organization. A tough party discussion was held with Lopatkov. Although it was bitter in a way, there is no question it was also useful, timely medicine against self-flattery with past successes, against complacency and elements of conceit.

The position taken by the party committee is, in my opinion, a convincing example of the mature approach to affairs, the contemporary style of work, the style to which so much attention was devoted at the congress. The party organization did not trail along behind events, it stepped in without hesitation and directed them into the necessary channel.

The activism of the party organization of the regiment is a result of the fact that they continued steady work to improve intraparty work during the past year. Criticism and self-criticism, a well-organized system for checking on performance of decisions adopted, and an ability to resolve the most complex issues in a positive way -- these are the foundation of militance in party collectives. In a demanding atmosphere where every CPSU member and candidate for membership is held responsible the political consciousness of regimental communists grows,

they are more responsible personally for their assigned work sectors, and Leninist practicality and principle become more widespread. In its turn this instills confidence that the obligation adopted by the collective of the regiment will be fulfilled: it will earn the title of outstanding in honor of the 60th anniversary of October.

But we cannot close our eyes to the fact that we have military collectives that have not progressed notably in the struggle for better combat training, even though they live and work in the same conditions. The causes of such "marking time" differ in each individual case. But I think there is one very important factor: flaws in the work style of the party organizations of these subunits.

I recall a talk I had with Maj A. Marinchenko, secretary of a primary party organization in one of the battalions of the division. The battalion is not now outstanding for success in competition. The secretary said that things were worst in the company commanded by Sr Lt N. Popov.

"How do you explain that?"

He shrugged his shoulders and said straight out, "I don't know how to explain it."

Unfortunately, neither the secretary nor the party bureau he heads had tried to take a thorough look at the organization of training and competition in the company mentioned. The subunit has communists and its own party organization. In short, there are people to rely on, to hold strictly responsible in party terms for the state of affairs in the subunit. One would expect the company communists to be invited to a meeting of the party bureau or to be asked to report to a party meeting; they should be asked their opinion on the reasons for low scores in, for example, fire training. But in reality, so far all they have done is record the problems, not fight against them.

We must admit here that the political branch is also at fault in these problems. In the daily rush we sometimes fail to try to get to every primary party organization and look at its style of work. The obvious omissions in the activity of the party organization of which communist Marinchenko is secretary were a lesson for us too, the workers of the political branch. Needless to say, we took the necessary steps to correct the situation in the party organization.

But this example leads one to think that we have not yet used all our possibilities and reserves to raise the militance of our party organizations, as discussed at the party congress. In the current training year we face new heights of combat improvement. By working to fulfill the tasks that flow from the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, the communists of our division will see that these heights are taken, that the combat readiness of the subunits rises even higher.

REPORT ON WESTERN DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL MINE WEAPONRY

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Feb 77 p 3

[Article by Capt 1st Rank-Engr (Ret) A. Geyro, laureate of the State Prize, and Capt 1st Rank-Engr A. Sazonov, candidate of technical sciences, docent: "Naval Mines -- Military-Technical Thinking Abroad"]

[Text] The prospect for development of mine weapons is again arousing the interest of foreign specialists. Typical in this respect are the numerous statements by R. Duncan, the American specialist who concludes that "naval mines are becoming one of the basic types of weapons, with a substantial influence on the course and outcome of war." In the view of other authors, the use of mines in nuclear missile warfare will be most important in the fight against missile-carrying atomic submarines. At the same time, the role of mine weapons in combatting naval landings is emphasized. It is not impossible, foreign specialists argue, that in case of war mines will be used to blockade enemy bases and ports and to disrupt shipping lanes.

Based on these ideas, according to the foreign press, the naval forces of the United States, England, West Germany, France, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Japan, and other capitalist countries are working extensively on building new models of mines and searching for appropriate tactical methods of using them in battle. A special scientific research center coordinates research on mine and antimine weapons within the framework of the aggressive NATO bloc.

The chief directions of research may be grouped as follows: creating special antisub mines; standardizing aviation mine and bomb ammunition; development of mines to destroy surface ships and floating installations; improving mines for underwater saboteurs.

Some idea of the scale of this work can be gotten from the fact that work on planning antisub mines and resolving questions of their use in battle is managed in the United States by the naval weapons laboratory in the state of Maryland; it is a major scientific research center and employs hundreds of physicists and engineers.

The "laboratory" occupies an area of roughly 324 hectares. It has several proving grounds for studying the physical fields of a ship, testing mines, and carrying out experimental mine-laying runs.

The fact is, foreign specialists note, that increasing the range of action of missile weapons makes it necessary to move antisub minefields significant distances from friendly shores and to lay them over large areas. Taking this into account, in 1975 the U. S. Navy adopted a qualitatively new antisub self-guiding torpedo-mine called the "Captor." It is sometimes referred to as an encapsulated torpedo or a torpedo in a shell.

Unlike earlier antisub mines with contact and proximity detonators that are triggered when a submarine passes in the immediate vicinity, the Captor torpedo-mine, after detecting the target at a considerable distance, releases a torpedo which converges with the target and destroys it.

According to reports in the foreign press, the Captor detects a submarine traveling submerged at depths down to 450 meters at distances of more than one kilometer. This greatly increases the area controlled by the encapsulated mine.

Fourteen million dollars was spent testing the Captor in 1974 alone. During 1974-1976 expenditures by the U. S. Navy on its research, development, and testing were roughly 60 million dollars. And the total costs of the program are estimated at 334.5 million dollars. The U. S. Navy proposes to buy 4,000-4,500 mines.

Attempting to justify such large expenditures, the NEW YORK TIMES made this comment: "The military value of the new mine will be blockading Soviet submarines in the Norwegian Sea or wiping them out when they try to return to base for repairs. The U. S. Navy proposes to set up barriers on the two chief paths of Soviet submarines of the Northern Fleet into the Atlantic. One minefield will be laid in the Denmark Strait between Greenland and Iceland and the other will be between Iceland and the British Isles. It is planned to use this mine to bar the paths of submarines heading from Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk into the Pacific Ocean."

There are other plans too. For example, it is envisioned that the Captor mine can be used to lay minefields over enormous water areas adjacent to the east and west coasts of the United States. In the opinion of naval specialists, such fields would eliminate the necessity of organizing convoys in these regions and thus liberate significant antisubmarine forces for actions on the high seas.

In addition to the Captor torpedo-mine the U. S. Navy is working on making the Quickstrike ground mine with a combination detonator, either hydrodynamic (pressure) or acoustic-mechanical. The designers picture a detonator whose sensitivity is adequate to fire with large as well as

small ships and vessels. To counter enemy minesweeping activities, a remote control system is being developed that will make it possible to set the mines in armed position at any time for six months, after which they can be exploded or neutralized at the decision of the command. In 1976 18 million dollars was appropriated for development of this mine.

According to press reports, in addition to these projects the United States is searching for ways to improve the so-called "brain" of the mine, that is, electronic devices that will protect it against sweepers, put it in an armed position a certain time after laying, and so on.

To enhance the operational-tactical capabilities of various classes of submarines, American military specialists have proposed adapting atomic submarines armed with ballistic missiles for laying active minefields. It is felt that the displacement and navigation equipment of these ships would permit them to be used as mine layers. For example, submarines of the George Washington type can take up to 256 mines and lay down a minefield several dozen miles long secretly.

Similar investigations are going forward in the other NATO countries.

For mining narrows, coastal channels, and the approaches to bases from distances that are safe for submarines, the United States has adopted the MK27 self-transporting proximity ground mine. After it is fired from a torpedo launcher it behaves like a slow-going torpedo. After covering a certain distance it settles on the bottom and becomes a conventional ground mine.

Large-scale mine-laying by aircraft is attracting new attention from foreign specialists. The Distractor project, for example, envisioned adapting mines as bombs and bombs as mines. The series-produced MK 36 aviation mine and the small series-produced Snakesky fragmentation bomb were taken as the objects of standardization. A bomb percussion detonator was developed for the mines and a mine proximity detonator for the bomb.

These are a few of the lines of development of mine weaponry now being followed abroad. It is easy to see that the Pentagon, and the military departments of many other capitalist countries along with them, are carrying on intensive research to turn naval mines into strategic weapons.

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NEW BOOK ON SOCIOLOGY OF MAN-MACHINE SYSTEMS PRAISED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Feb 77 p 2

[Review by Col-Engr V. Bokarev, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, of the book "Sistema: Chelovek i Voyennaya Tekhnika (Filosofsko-Sotsiologicheskiy Ocherk)" (The Man-Military Machinery System [Philosophical and Sociological Essay]), by A. B. Pupko, Voenizdat, 1976, 252 pages: "Man and Military Machinery -- New Books"]

[Text] "Continue in the future to keep the country's Armed Forces at a high level so that Soviet fighting men will always have the most up-to-date weapons, ones which the imperialists cannot ignore -- that is our duty to the people and we hold it sacred!" These words of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of our party, at the October 1976 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee are the perfect expression of the Soviet State's concern to equip the army and navy with powerful and effective weapons.

One of the most important indices of the level of sophistication of combat equipment and weaponry is "compatibility" with human beings or "adaptation" to them. Therefore, Soviet military science devotes unflinching attention to the problem of the interrelationship of man and machinery.

This is a multifaceted problem that is studied by a whole set of military-social and military-technical sciences. As practice demonstrates, however, these investigations are truly effective only when they are illuminated by Marxist-Leninist methodology. In this connection, the new book "The Man-Military Machine System," published by the Military Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Defense, attracts attention.

The book is distinguished by extensive use of the systems approach to analyzing the interrelations of human beings and military machinery. Such an approach enables the author to uncover the dialectical character of this interrelationship, identify the essence and structure of the man-military machinery system, and show that army and navy weapons are the "materialized strength of knowledge." The essay gives an original definition of military machinery and offers a classification of it.

The systems approach allowed the author to make a detailed analysis of the patterns of development of the man-military machinery system resulting from the action of both external social factors and the internal logic of development itself. The external social factors -- politics, economics, and culture -- affect the development of the man-military machinery system by compelling and making possible steady improvement in the system's capability to accomplish the ever-more complex and decisive objectives of armed battle. The internal logic of development of this system is interpreted by the author as a process of progressively turning over the basic battle functions of the human being to machines and mechanisms.

The book gives a particularly careful review of the substance and patterns of change in the role and functions of the fighting man in the man-military machinery system. To give his statements a concrete character, the author provisionally divides personnel according to functional relation to the system itself. There are three groups: outside the system, within the system, and the command group. This classification permitted the author to avoid hazy statements about the interrelations of "man in general" and "military machinery in general." The development of military machinery affects these groups of personnel differently. The group within the system is reduced, the group outside the system grows larger, and the command group remains relatively stable in numbers but its role increases rapidly. After investigating the degree of possible and necessary human and automatic machinery participation in the elementary control cycle (receipt of data, processing it, and issuing an executive signal), the author gives solid grounds for the Marxist thesis that it is impossible in principle to eliminate the human being from an automated troop control system.

The work concludes with an analysis of the methodological problems of optimizing the man-military machinery system. Here the author puts in original form the question of a single apparatus for comprehensive investigation of this problem, one which would unite the methods of the different military science disciplines that study various aspects of the interaction of human beings and military machinery. The author correctly criticizes the antiscientific methodological propositions of bourgeois researchers that prevent them from uncovering the true relations between various military-social and military-technical sciences. Basing himself on the Marxist-Leninist thesis that the human being has the dominating role in relation to military machinery, he refutes such theories of bourgeois military sociologists as the "pushbutton war" theory or the theory of "supersmall armies." Marxist-Leninist theory with its harmoniously merged components and the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of war and the army are a truly scientific basis for investigating the interrelations of human beings and military machinery. They are the system-forming nucleus of the knowledge employed to optimize the man-military machinery system.

There are two ways to optimize such systems in a real process. The first is to work from the machinery to the human being, to refine the machinery

in such a way as to reveal all human capabilities more fully. The second is to work from the human being to the machinery, to organize the vocational selection, training, and education of fighting men so as to make full use of the capabilities of the machinery. A special role here is played by the superiority of Soviet fighting men as pointed out by USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov: "their superiority in ideology and consciousness, in their lofty socialist patriotism."

Liek any creative work, Lt Col-Engr A. Pupko's book contains better and worse pages. Some of his statements need refinement and additional support. However, there is no doubt that this study is a contribution to working out the methodological problems of military theory and practice. I believe it will serve as a good handbook for familiarizing a broad range of military readers with timely issues under conditions where man-military machinery systems are developing rapidly.

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COMBAT TRAINING ACTIVITIES IN MOTORIZED INFANTRY DIVISION

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Feb 77 p 2

[Article by Guards Col G. Lobachev, commander of the Guards Motorized Rifle Taman' Division imeni M. I. Kalinin: "Concreteness, Practicality -- To Be the Leading Unit"]

[Text] The third month of winter training is coming to an end. Analyzing the course of competition we see again and again that the goal set forth by the men of the Taman' Division in this anniversary year -- to make the division the best unit in the district and in the Armed Forces -- has great mobilizing force. We all remember well how USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, visited our division just before New Year's and said that we have a chance to become the best unit in the Armed Forces. All this was a powerful stimulus for personnel in the struggle for new heights of combat improvement. This has been shown graphically at the tactical exercises held in most units and subunits.

Foremost among the factors which promote effective competition and creative activism by personnel I would mention work to propagandize the glorious traditions of the division. What is noteworthy about this work in the current anniversary year? It has become more purposeful and concrete. It is more closely tied to the tasks facing personnel. We must admit that the campaign approach used to be seen fairly often in this work. Sometimes the only occasions when work would pick up would be just before holidays and other noteworthy dates. We now try to see that traditions are a permanently active mobilizing factor. The most recent exercises, for example, had the slogan "Operate in the field as they did at the front." Before the exercises talks were given in all subunits using concrete examples from the front. And at the exercises themselves every subunit heard propagandists and agitators calling on the men to measure up to their earlier comrades.

Propaganda work has begun giving more attention to the division's traditions in socialist competition. The men are proud of the fact that such initiatives as "Meet Daytime Standards at Night" and "Hit the Target with the First Shot or Round" originated in our division.

Other forms of work such as meetings between the young Guardsmen and veterans of the division and friendships between military collectives and collectives at enterprises in the cities that were liberated with the help of the division during the war are being used more actively.

In discussing the style of work of the division headquarters and political branch I would note first of all the increased attention to questions of organizing competition right in the subunits and the effort to use the mobilizing force of competition to accomplish primary missions -- maintaining high combat readiness, mastering up-to-date machinery and weapons, and keeping them in outstanding condition.

It is common knowledge that the success of our work is decided in the company and battery. Does each one of them have a concrete objective in competition and a consistent plan to achieve it? Are results summed up regularly? Do all the men have realistic individual obligations? This is where the emphasis is put; this is what defines the style of work of the officers of headquarters and the division political branch.

The staff and political branch recently summarized the know-how of Guards Capt P. Filippov. The motorized rifle battalion that he commands operated successfully at tactical exercises and earned the gratitude of the district commander of troops.

What is instructive about this battalion commander's style of work? Above all, he persistently, purposefully teaches young officers how to organize competition right in the course of training activities. So in this battalion competition has indeed become an inseparable part of the training process.

Unfortunately, we have not yet reached the point where all training periods are handled this way. Take just one problem, summarizing progress in fulfilling obligations every day. After all, it sometimes happens that the training period ends, the trainees have conscientiously done what they were supposed to, the stopwatch has been clicked, but there are no evaluations. The training leader enters them in the log out of his head, in retrospect. There is no need to say that such evaluations do not "work," their relation to obligations and competition is very conditional and approximate.

Such a state of affairs is intolerable, of course. How do we provide officers with knowledge of questions of organizing competition? The main method, of course, is individual work. We are guided by the principle that the superior teaches his subordinates. Problems of organizing socialist competition are discussed at assemblies in the commander training system as well. In addition to all this there are demonstrations of the know-how of the best methodologists. Demonstration training periods were conducted recently in the artillery battery commanded by Guards Capt V. Kovalenko, a skillful organizer of competition, to give an example.

Improving the methodological training of the officers is a concern that never becomes secondary. We understand that regiments and divisions cannot become outstanding if they do not struggle for leading methods of training and education. On this level, the experience working with company-level officers in the regiment commanded by Guards Lt Col N. Andreyev is edifying. They summarize the know-how of the best methodologists differentially: for each particular type of combat training. Methodological conferences are held regularly in the regiment.

The differentiated approach is a reliable way to raise the quality and effectiveness of command training. In one of the regiments, for example, the best methodologist in organizing battle drill exercises is considered to be battalion chief of staff Guards Capt V. Marchenkov. Guards Sr Lt V. Kiselev, a company commander, is recognized as the authority on questions of drill training. These names are well known in the regiment, and in the division too. Their skills have become a kind of guideline for other officers.

"The honor of the division is your honor!" This was the agenda for a recent meeting in one of the party organizations in the division. Formulation of the question in this way unquestionably deserves approval. Certainly, it is precisely the accountability of each communist for achieving the lofty goal that guarantees our common success. This idea was clearly expressed at the meeting of the division party aktiv, which discussed the tasks of communists to develop competition for leading unit. Party organizations are looking deeply at the course of this competition and trying to develop the creative activism of personnel in every way. As a result, the competition is encompassing more and more spheres of our lives. Competition for the best military post, the best barrack, and for model physical facilities for training is spreading.

The lofty goal also requires great intensity, putting all our reserves into play. The CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "The 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution" evoked a new surge of creative activism among the soldiers. We see it as our challenge to guide this enthusiasm into further raising combat readiness.

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STEPS TO IMPROVE TRAINING METHODOLOGY IN FIGHTER SQUADRON

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Feb 77 p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Korobov, Red Banner Baku Air Defense District:
"A Creative Style of Work"]

[Text] At the scheduled time the fighters followed one another into the sky of light clouds. The planes had not gone more than 30-50 kilometers when they were ordered to intercept the check targets. Wild aerial duels flashed by. Then came a landing at an unfamiliar airfield for refueling. And a new order: deliver a missile strike against radio-controlled targets at the maximum extent of flight range. Lt Col G. Grigor'yants, Maj Yu. Artamonov, and capt I. Yerokhin and E. Namitullin distinguished themselves. Their deadly accurate launches were noted with gratitude by the senior officer.

This success was doubly gratifying if you consider that the pilots of the squadron only began incorporating the new missile plane a short time ago. And retraining, as we all know, always involves not just improving piloting skills acquired earlier but also reassessment of training methodology, changes in customary views and ideas of the tactics of waging aerial battle, and a check of personality traits.

Capt I. Yerokhin, for example, is a generally skillful interceptor pilot. But he had some difficulty mastering the new fighter plane. Although the officer suffered with every failure, his development as a thoroughly trained fighter pilot was plainly going too slow.

Of course, this inevitably alarmed the squadron commander. It was decided to make a careful analysis of the methodology for training pilots and then discuss the question at a party meeting.

It was a business-like, principled talk, and made it possible to reveal a number of flaws in the training methodology for airmen. Specifically, it was observed that training leaders sometimes supervised and guided trainee pilots, especially new ones, too closely. By contrast, another commander left almost everything up to his subordinates with respect to

calculation in the preliminary stage of flight preparation. But as soon as the young pilot took off, he would be there guiding his every move. This led to the indecisiveness and timidity sometimes seen in the actions of a few pilots during training intercepts.

At the meeting they also said that during this difficult period of transition to new equipment they would have to make more intensive use of the capabilities of socialist competition. Specifically, the communists favored increasing the role of individual rivalries between pilots and, at the same time, carefully organizing exchange of flying know-how.

Specifically, coming back to Capt I. Yerokhin, Maj Yu. Artamonov, a member of the party bureau of the squadron, became his sponsor. Artamonov is known as a pedant in the best sense of the word. This is, we should note, a very valuable trait for an aviator. Yuriy Dmitriyevich demanded that Yerokhin have thorough knowledge of theory and checked his actions in the trainer or the airplane cockpit down to the fine details.

This real party characteristic is typical of many other communists in the squadron besides Major Artamonov. And it is not seen only in the form of readiness to share know-how. For example, Capt Z. Namitullin, speaking at a party meeting, made a number of suggestions to increase the effectiveness of competition for a worthy celebration of the 60th anniversary of Great October.

What did they discuss? The thing was that in summarizing the results of individual competition the winners were often determined mechanically, without taking account of the men's tactical skills. Say that Maj V. Tsvetkov always, in every training battle, tried to act creatively and swiftly and destroy the target unexpectedly. His rival in competition, by contrast, always seemed to carry out his actions slowly, following the standard routines. There was no feeling of creativity about his style. Nonetheless, the two pilots often received the same scores because, in the end, both performed their missions.

It is not hard to guess what such superficial leveling led to. The pilots lost interest in competition. Therefore, it was decided to evaluate results not only according to the final results of field fire or practice intercepts but also with due regard for information from the command post and aircraft monitoring equipment. This immediately put a spark into competition among the pilots.

The party bureau gave very serious attention to raising the effectiveness of competition among aviation specialists. How were things before? They would determine the best plane and announce the name of the technician, as if no other specialists had worked on it. Of course, this discouraged them. And even the "winner" was uncomfortable in front of his fellow servicemen.

There were also cases where specialists known to be unequal in knowledge and experience were paired in the competition for best technical condi-

condition of the aircraft. One of them, for example, is a master of combat qualification, a specialist respected by everyone. The other has just been a technician a short time. Clearly the winner is known in advance here. So he will not feel any particular satisfaction in winning.

The situation has changed now. By removing the elements of formalism in competition the squadron commander and party activists achieved a notable rise in the training level of the specialists, which is shown by the results of flight tactical training. But this is just the beginning, of course. The party organization still has much to do to see that the airmen achieve the set goal, moving the squadron into the ranks of the outstanding by the 60th anniversary of Great October.

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METHODS TO IMPROVE AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Mar 77 p 1

[Article by Lt Col V. Shevchenko, a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Flag Over the Hangar"]

[Text] The technical maintenance unit (TECH) holds on to first place in the regiment in the competition to greet the 60th anniversary of Great October in a fitting manner. For high indices in work and for the qualitative and effective performance of periodic technical maintenance, the commander ordered a flag to be raised over the hangar where the TECH is located in honor of these first rate men in competition. This has become a tradition here.

A supersonic missile carrier with its swept back wings spread out is in the spacious hangar. This hangar is similar on the inside to a factory shop. Aviation specialists bustle about it. Some are mounting engine assemblies, others are installing an ejection seat, still others are checking the radio navigation equipment. A business-like atmosphere also reigns in the TECH laboratories where instruments and complicated radar systems are inspected. Periodic technical maintenance is taking place. Its extent is great. Dozens of operations must be performed.

Long before the end of the shift the missile carrier will be prepared by the work and care of the TECH specialists for new impetuous dashes into the stratosphere. The periodic technical maintenance was completed two hours earlier than the prescribed time. In doing this, the squadron's specialists receiving the aircraft didn't find a single defect in it.

Engr. Capt M. Mitov, the TECH chief says: "The high quality of the work is achieved by the professional skill of all the specialists, by their thorough knowledge of the sequence of each operation, and by the recognition of the men's responsibility for the safety of the flights."

The TECH personnel have achieved a rhythmical pace of working on new aviation equipment in the shortest period of time. Even last year justified criticism was addressed to this subunit. The men worked

strenuously. However, they did not always manage to perform periodic technical maintenance on time and with high quality.

It was necessary to start mastering thoroughly the technology of carrying out each operation. They determined a strict sequence of operations for the specialists. They wrote up an itinerary of inspections and worked out a procedure for placing an instrument at the work positions. This provided a considerable savings in time and contributed to the growth of quality in the time limits. However, the specialists continued to search for even more effective ways to reorganize the entire work cycle. It was necessary to raise sharply the productivity of the fighting men's work. This is possible only by increasing in every way possible their qualifications, technical skills, and background in servicing missile carriers.

Competition to master new equipment in the shortest time has been spread in the TECH. Communists and Komsomol activists head the campaign for technical knowledge and the introduction of scientific organized work elements into the maintenance of modern combat aircraft. At the same time, commanders and group chiefs have improved the organization of the entire periodic technical maintenance process. They have tested different ways to maneuver by forces and systems.

The optimum way was found. There were no bottlenecks. Work productivity grew one and a half times. The growth in the aviators' rated qualifications and their technical background contributed to this to a considerable degree. Socialist competition helped to solve these problems. Having improved their direction, the TECH had an opportunity to increase the men's responsibility for high qualitative indices in work.

A "Board of Quality" was established in order to guarantee wide publicity and the use of visual methods with respect to the specialists' achievements in the competition within the TECH. It has been set up in the hangar. Its columns are filled in by the squadron's engineers who receive the aircraft after the periodic technical maintenance. The slightest flaws detected by them are immediately reflected in the appropriate column. Based on this objective data, the winner in the competition between the different periodic technical maintenance groups is determined. The red pennant, which designates the best collective, is often conferred on the specialists in the aviation weapons group which Capt N. Gorbunov heads.

Moreover, the best technician and mechanic is determined daily on the basis of this objective data. The author of these lines had occasion to observe how the temporary banner was passed to Sr Lt Tech Serv F. Valiakhmetov and WO [Praporshchik] V. Bakharovskiy, a mechanic, in front of a formation. They had been victorious in the competition. This is customary here. The contest for the best organization of the work area was popular.

The struggle for effectiveness and quality in servicing the equipment takes place under the slogan, "For each aircraft--an excellent servicing." In

this struggle an information bulletin, which the subunit party organization puts out, is a great help for the TECH specialists. Progressive ways to service equipment are analyzed in it. Instances of deviations from prescribed procedures for performing this or that operation are discussed. Such cases are now being observed ever less frequently because a short exercise is conducted on each one of them at the end of the day. For example, WO N. Oleynik connected a line incorrectly. He noticed his mistake himself and immediately corrected it. However, they not only discussed this item in the TECH but also conducted a training session with all the specialists on preventing possible mistakes in the future.

The capacity of the TECH and the quality of periodic technical maintenance has grown considerably during the current training year. The men, inspired by the resolution of the CC CPSU, "Concerning the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution," are displaying selflessness in their military work, creativity and initiative. The rationalizers' movement is growing. For example, Sr Lt Tech Serv V. Yastochkin and WO officer K. Gerasimenko have made a number of devices and instruments which speed up the work process and increase the quality of the operations being performed.

A red flag billows over the hangar. The TECH specialists are filled with a determination to hold on to first place in the competition and to greet the anniversary of Great October in a fitting manner.

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REMOTE RADAR SITE OPERATIONS DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Mar 77 p 2

[Article by Col A. Sgibnev and Lt Col V. Kostko, Order of Lenin Moscow Air Defense District: "The Commander From an Outlying 'Position'"]

[Text] The guests were unexpected although they were always welcome. The commander of the aviation regiment was the first to get out of the Gazik [Soviet equivalent of a jeep] which had braked to a stop near the gates of the KPP [check point]. After him, came a few more aviators.

The lieutenant colonel said to Capt Vladimir Morozov, the company commander, who had come to meet him: "We have come to you on the instructions of our entire unit. Quite a few words of praise were addressed to the radar operators during today's critique of the flights. You supported our combat training in an excellent manner. Therefore, we have been authorized to transmit our heartfelt thanks to you"

The aviators accompanied by the hosts walked about the area of the "position". Ship's pines, as if carrying out the orders of the senior command, covered it with thick snow covered crowns. Even the vanes of the radar antennas seemed to belong to the forest. The neighbors liked the barracks--it was old but maintained in the highest quality condition by the care of the soldiers. The classrooms for special training were equipped no worse than those in schools-- this also it appeared had been done by the hands of the soldiers and officers themselves. The troops' enthusiasm introduced a lot directly into the appearance of the positions; an innovation here, an innovation there which improved the equipment's capabilities.

The regimental commander said with special animation when he was leaving: "Young lads, everything you have, despite the remoteness, is sound, solid, and military!"

The company was really sheltered behind the forests and behind the dales. It was a long way to travel to it from the unit and all the more from the district's headquarters. However, it was significant that when

we turned before the official trip for advice and help to Maj Gen Avn Aleksandr Nikolayevich Sosnikov, first deputy chief of the political directorate, and Maj Gen Aleksey Ivanovich Voronin, chief of the radar troops, we heard from them not only a general evaluation of the state of affairs at the "position" but also the names of the most interesting people--so to say, the specific addresses of successful and instructive work. This means that the "position" is far on the map but at the same time close to one's heart. It could not be otherwise! The radar company is age-old in the time interval of the sentinels of our native Soviet sky. It is, as life shows, the main battle foxhole of the radar troops. It is from here, from this "position", that information containing the most complete characteristics of any target, which has appeared in the air space, mounts "upwards." It is received in an instant with electronic swiftness. Here, at the "position", the reliability of the continuous watch is built as well as our great faith that not a single foe will be able to disturb the peace of our country and people without being detected and with impunity.

We spent more than one day in the company and tried to see how life there actually is--rigorous, strained, happy and concerned. We were convinced that this life was simple and elevated, full of constructive enthusiasm and state recognized responsibilities. Veterans, who have spent more than one year at the "position", also remember the freezing weather, the maddened mercury, the rabid wind, and the scorching and intense heat. They do not only remember cases where for some reason engines fell silent, antennas died away, and the cabins of the sets became deserted.

A poet wrote: "A soldier's work is heavy work. It is harder than mining ore." These are true--very true--words! Please look at how strained normal workdays are. The flights have just ended. They are several hours of selfless efforts. They do not have time to air the cockpit and to consider even fleetingly some difficult moments in the radar operator's tracking of the targets. A special signal hurls the crews to meet the "enemy" assault. Brief minutes of combat charge the men with front-line excitement. They burn with the reality of the danger. They recall in all severity that watchfulness is not simply a slogan--it is a weapon.

Then it grew crowded around the work positions. Near those who already felt comfortable on watch, stood young soldiers from the fall and winter replacements. The time, it seemed, was not impassioned. There were no planned measures. However, the screens skimmed in a business-like and concentrated manner. There were, all told, two or three blips on the luminescent field. Then like peas pouring from a bag, there were ten more targets. Pvt Valeriy Makismov--the new men watched with envy-- acted dexterously and in a well trained manner. He increased his watchfulness and teamwork. The data for the first fix were given. Valeriy heard "Good lad" from the control point. Another fix ... another Suddenly the situation changed sharply. The glass circle was laced with jamming ripples. Bright white spots began to dance on it. The operator began to waver for a fraction of a second. His commander, Sr Lt Yevgeniy Skorokhod, himself an operator first class, noticed it. However he did not begin to work in Maksimov's place.

His voice rang out: "Concentrate, act more calmly, remember what they taught you."

Private Maksimov switched on the anti-jamming equipment and soon information about the "enemy" targets was again going to the control point in a constant stream. The young men smiled, seeing their future in the work of the operator-- a future of fortunate strain and professional confidence.

"Well, it seems everything is within the norms!" Captain Morozov looked at the clock and, smiling warmly and in a comradely manner, said to the operators: "Now it's time for hockey"

It was as if by this calm and satisfied "Everything is within the norms," by this smile which was natural and not formal, and by the invitation to the TV screen--to the hockey battle, the commander removed tiredness from the men and restored an atmosphere of normal life. We are deliberately abandoning any simple coupling to shade the teaching and every day ability of the commander in maintaining truly regulation interrelationships with the men. It is immeasurably more difficult for him, at the "position", than under a single unit roof hard by the headquarters. He is still young and already a chief who is independent in a great deal. The organization of troop order, the men's attitude and the men's fate depend on him. How to equip oneself? How to conduct oneself? It is possible to curse from morning to evening, to frown, to spare no metal in one's voice, and not achieve order. Exactingness, Morozov read in one memoir, must not be optional. It must be required. It is possible outwardly to button up all life's hooks and buttons-- and still it is not the basis for desired successes. Where, it is asked, is the standard for all this? How and with what can one measure the optimum proportion of exactingness and kindness, of the strictness, which is inevitable in service, and respectfulness?

This is an art. It did not immediately come to Vladimir Mikhaylovich Morozov. In that subunit beyond the polar circle from where Vladimir Mikhaylovich was assigned here, the commander, with whom Morozov served, tolerated, he recalls, failure. He, when he had just started, did not consider the peculiarities of the "position". He was not able to understand that the methods for a commander approaching the men and for solving various questions, which arise during work, cannot be identical and unalterable. He, this commander, had quite a bit which was inviting and distinctive--but two things, two circumstances let him down. First, Senior Lieutenant Samoylov was content with only external perceptions of the collective. He saw, so to speak, the official structure of the collective but did not know its real life and the real interrelationships within it. When a breakdown in work occurred, he scrutinized only the causes which lay on the surface and not those deep down which exist secretly and undermine an organism in an underhand way.

For example, many were surprised when the commander using his authority elevated an individual who was clearly unworthy. Sergeant Ikonnikov

arrived in the company for re-education-- he had slipped up in his old place. Shy and experienced, he quickly discerned the collective. He picked out the weak-willed and spoiled them. Then, he began to bully them. Only after a letter to the political section and after a careful examination on the spot was the "leader" dethroned and the "magnetic field" which he had created around himself, broken up.

Had Samoylov known his subordinates better and had he relied on the aktiv, nothing like this would have happened....

The second thing which impeded the commander was the fact that he only noticed shortcomings and violations. During the entire day he did not say an encouraging word. He loved to repeat. "There is no sanatorium for you here!" Had Samoylov served directly in a unit, they would have perceived his "illness" more quickly and would have corrected him, but here--the "position", the isolation--we shall wait long before it is noticed or heard.... Fortunately, one of the chiefs who travelled to the "point" quickly caught on to the fact that something was wrong in the company. The men were sullen and worried. There was no joy in their work. He tarried at the "position" beyond the time planned. He talked things over with every one and found out everything. Then he spent a few hours with the commander. Evidently, he opened his eyes quite a bit. Samoylov noticeably changed from that time. He did not decrease exactingness. It was the basis of order; however, if you demonstrated diligence or distinguished yourself, he invariably said thank you and singled you out in front of everyone.

Thus Samoylov, having enhanced himself as a big wig, learned--and along with him the young Lt Vladimir Morozov also learned. He learned to grow with the years into a strong specialist--to grow into a commander on whose shoulders would be placed an independent post.

What was he--commander and communist Morozov--good in, most of all? A knowledge of the men. Not that knowledge which comes from reading basic biographical particulars but that which is born in working with subordinates, in the white heat of social and political life, and in spiritual closeness. When studying a man, the commander first studied his attitude toward work, his integrity and his reliability. Integrity and reliability are especially important at the "position"-- just as in the trenches- complete self-sufficiency and complete trust in each other are needed before battle.

The captain says with conviction; "Everything begins with the squads and with the crews. Distinctive micro-collectives are created in them. These then form one large and complete collective. A distinctive chain is built. Its links are the crews. If a weakness springs up in one link, the strength of the entire chain is threatened"

The captain continues; "I can for a week or two not drop in on the crew which WO Aleksandr Ivanov commands and be certain that he will not cause me concern with anything. Why? Because when assigning replacements to him we consider very carefully that the warrant officer is a recognized

organizer and teacher in the company. He is also an expert in radio technology and knows where to look. For him a radio set was his first love on earth. This possession reaches out for him. We do not prevent him from joining hands with this interest. On the contrary, we hunt it out and we pick it out. As a result, the years pass, the names of the soldiers, who form the crew, change--but the main thing--devotion to profession and a burning and driving thirst to show oneself to be an expert--remains unchanged and set in cement. Please do not think that Ivanov has an assembly of dried up old men which recognize only the equipment. They dance when they have a free minute, unite and show their erudition in public literary debates. However, I repeat, the primary motive, which pulls the men together, is the enthusiasm in the work of the radarman."

We listened to Captain Morozov and involuntarily caught ourselves thinking: This is a military teacher. A commander teacher. Concerned about the knitting together of the company, he omitted nothing from view. He did not thoughtlessly leave anything out of his reckoning--not the soldier's age, not his nationality, not the circumstances purely associated with his fellow countrymen.

Capt Vladimir Morozov is also strong in something else-- a concern for the men. Let us say right out, it is the fatherly concern which is traditional for Soviet commanders and the code of their activity. Here, he roused the entire collective. Here, all inventions and all initiatives are in a common pot. Who said that if a "position" is far away, that means it is possible to permit some detriment in its life? No and no again! The barracks at the "position" are comfortable. The messhall holds first place in the unit. Because of the good beginning of communist Sergey Nikolayevich Andreyev, the former company master sergeant who is now in the reserves, an apple orchard was growing near the messhall. Fairly often, the hothouse gives a treat of vegetables in the wintertime. On holidays and on night watches the menu is supplemented from the subsidiary farm. Based on 1976 results, the company took a prize position. An impassioned discussion took place at an open party meeting on how to keep the title of "excellent" and how to work even better during the 60th anniversary of October. This happened at the beginning of December. Several days later on the advice of the commander the communists specially discussed the agenda, "Concern for daily life is a concern about increasing combat readiness."

At the "position" they tie together both daily life and combat training in a skilful, state and party manner!

The commander would have liked to accompany us but he couldn't. They reported to him that there were targets in the sky. Many targets. Both high altitude and low altitude. In general, everything began to boil at the position and began to swirl around. Capt Eduard Mankevich, a radar troop expert, added to the report: "We have still not let a single target pass."

The company commander was convinced--up to now and for always! No matter what would happen, not for a minute will the radio electronic vigilance of the "position" be weakened.

We, when we were leaving, were happy that we had met on our journalistic travels still another commander communist who has a modern education, is mature in a political and combat respect, and is progressive in his methods and work style, i.e., a typical representative of today's generation of officers--defenders of October.

8802

CSO: 1801

IMPORTANCE OF PROPER ATTENTION TO SERVICEMEN'S LETTERS STRESSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Mar 77 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank A. Ivanov, a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent:
"The Answers Are Reassuring"]

[Text] In the letters and statements of servicemen, the members of their families and the workers and employees of the Soviet army and navy, the active position of our Soviet people is displayed and their concern about raising the combat readiness of the troops, the effectiveness and quality of training, and the effectiveness of competition, and improving their way of life, is visible. In many letters there are specific suggestions, advice and desires which are directed toward the speediest elimination of existing shortcomings.

The attitude toward these letters in the units and establishments, where they are frequently sent for measures to be taken, is very attentive and serious. Commanders and political workers carefully study the problems which are touched upon. They try to implement useful suggestions more quickly. The letters are normally examined thoroughly and in a business-like manner. A graphic proof of this is the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers' thanks, which arrive in the editorial board, for the specific and rapid measures taken on their statements.

At the same time, letters sometimes arrive in the editorial board from authors who are puzzled. The suggestion was admitted to be a rational one. They had received a positive statement that measures would be taken but the matter has not moved from dead center. What is the reason? When analyzing such facts, you come to the conclusion that some commanders and chiefs do not always delve into the substance of the suggestions and desires. They do not hurry to implement sensible advice. They do not check on how their instructions are carried out.

M. Kropinov, chairman of a local committee in a troop unit, wrote to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA that the unit's workers and employees were seriously in need of an apartment house. The cornerstone laying was being delayed

because of the slow construction rate of the sewerage system. The editors sent the reader's letter to the Volga Military District's deputy commander of troops for construction and troop billeting. It was admitted that Comrade Kropinov's suggestion to speed up construction was advisable. Col A. Katakov, the main engineer in the district's construction directorate, informed the author that the main projects in the sewerage system would be operational in 1976 and that strict instructions had been given to Engr Maj V. Mirzoyev to continue the work.

However, Colonel Katkov evidently did not find time to check on how these "strict instructions" were being carried out. Now, in March 1977, the work is far from being completed. It is impossible to erect the building. Comrade Kropinov writes that the work of the military builders is poorly organized, equipment stands idle, and there is no pipe for the collector. Thus, the promise, which was given by Colonel Katkov not only to the author of the letter but also to the entire collective, remained unfulfilled.

The promises of Capt 1st Rank V. Perepelkin also remained only on paper. The elevator has worked badly since October 1975 in a multi-storey building in one of the Northern Fleet's military garrisons. The attempts of the inhabitants to obtain repairs met with no success. Then, they turned to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. The writers of the letter soon read comrade Perepelkin's answer: "The chief of the Murmansk section of the Severliftremont SU [Construction Directorate] has given a commitment that the elevator in your building will be repaired during the period 10 - 17 May 1976." Here is a new letter to the editorial board. On instructions of the tenants, comrade V. Baturina writes: "The elevator is not working and none of us believes that anyone will take our letters and the repair of the elevator seriously."

It is not difficult to understand the bitterness and resentment of the many people who for around two years have been forced to walk up and down the steep stairwells in the multi-storey building only because comrade Perepelkin and others were too busy to solve this question.

It is not enough to sign a reassuring answer, to recognize a suggestion or statement as justifiable. It is not even enough to give instructions. It is no less important to check on how these instructions are being carried out, and to convince oneself that everything is being done to solve the problem objectively, completely and thoroughly. Neither comrade Katkov nor comrade Perepelkin had done this.

Of course, in some cases circumstances arise so that the accepted solution cannot be carried out in the designated time. That means that it is necessary to apologize to the people, to explain to them the reasons for the delay, and without fail carry out the promise. Most often, people submit requests whose solution does not require great efforts and material resources. It is sufficient to show a minimum of attention and basic sensitivity to easily satisfy a legitimate requirement. Unfortunately, some people in positions of responsibility lack these qualities.

Lt Col V. Ruban turned to the editors in the spring of 1976. In June of 1975 the officer had been awarded a valuable gift by order of the Soviet army chief of tank troops but he still had not received it. The officer soon received an answer over the signature of Col V. Aksenov. It was stated in it that instructions had been given to the chief of the Kiyev Higher Tank Engineer School to investigate why the watch had still not been delivered and to "guarantee the delivery of such an item."

The author of the letter supposed that now the annoying misunderstanding would be at an end. He was mistaken. Recently, still another letter from Ruban arrived at KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. It seems he had still not managed to receive the award although he had travelled the 100 kilometers to the school four times and even earlier, while he was a cadre, had asked that the watch be forwarded to the unit. The letter ended with bitter words of resentment.

It is really a pity. On the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA it is often reported that as a result of persistent searches awards for military time find their owners after 30 or more years. They are presented in a solemn ceremony. Here, a search is not necessary. Nevertheless, for almost two years the officer was not able to obtain the valuable gift which he was awarded for his irreproachable service. Obvious irresponsibility is present here-- you cannot call it otherwise.

Three items. Three letters with specific proposals dictated by a concern for the common cause. Three reassuring answers. Three unfilled promises. The question spontaneously arises: Do the responsible officials who signed these documents remember the well-known resolutions of the party and government about procedures for examining proposals, requests and complaints? Do they know the corresponding instructions of the USSR's Minister of Defense? It is said right out in them that working on letters is one of the most important sectors of commanders' and chiefs' party and service activity and that it is necessary to make the guilty parties responsible for the red tape and callous attitude toward the requests, of those submitting them.

8802
CSO: 1801

REVIEW OF BOOK ON THE TURKESTAN MILITARY DISTRICT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Mar 77 p 2

[Review by General of the Army A. Luchinskiy, Hero of the Soviet Union, of the book "Krasnoznamennyy Turkestanskiy" [The Red Banner Turkistan], Voenizdat, 1976, 438 pages with illustrations and diagrams, 1 ruble 59 kopeeks]

[Text] The military historical essay "Krasnoznamennyy Turkestanskiy", which has been published by the Voennom Izdatel'stvo of the USSR's Ministry of Defense tells about one of the oldest military districts.

I, who had occasion to serve in this district in various positions from platoon commander to commander of troops, would like to point out that the essay's group of authors, using extensive material, the military historical research of scientists, and the memoirs of veterans have managed to show fully and positively the district's role during the various stages of its existence.

The essay tells in a popular way how in the spring of 1918 under difficult military and political circumstances, young Red Guard and Red Army detachments, poorly armed and insufficiently supplied with ammunition and rations, selflessly defended their native Soviet authorities from the combined forces of internal and international counterrevolution.

An important landmark in the district's history is the formation of the Turkestan Front established in accordance with M. V. Frunze's directive of 13 August 1919. The description of the Aktyubinskaya operation, which was conducted by the front's command and during which the Southern Army of White Guards General Belov was crushed, makes interesting reading. Much of the book is devoted to telling about the exploits of units and the heroism of fighting men and commanders and to questions concerning the development of strategy and tactics when organizing the combat operations of the front's troops on mountainous desert terrain. The Aydynskaya operation of the troops in the Zakaspiyskaya Army Group is clearly shown. V. V. Kuybyshev, member of the front's Revolutionary War council took an active part in this operation.

The section, "A New Stage in the Combat Training of the District's Troops," clearly shows how, with the growth of our country's economy, the power of the army has grown and the re-equipping of the district's units with new combat equipment has taken place. It also shows with what zeal and persistency the district's fighting men have mastered the heights of military skill.

During the grim years of the Great Patriotic War, the Central Asian Military District (as it was called from June 1926 to July 1945) was turned into a distinctive arsenal for the formation of combat reserves for the front and for the training of cadre for the active army.

Even during the first months of the war, several units and large units of the district took part in very important combat operations by the Soviet Army. Among them, the 316th Infantry, the 83d Turkestan Mountain Infantry, the 20th and 21st Cavalry divisions and other large units particularly distinguished themselves. The 4th Cavalry Corps participated in the battle at Stalingrad. The district's great role in solving the strategic task of guaranteeing the security of the Soviet Union's southern borders is shown in the book.

The book illuminates in detail the postwar period in the life of the district's troops. With each year, the ability of the Turkestan fighting men to wage modern combat in mountain and desert terrain has been improved. Their ideological training has grown. The role of political organs and party and Komsomol organizations in the life of the troops has increased. The work of commanders, political organs and party and Komsomol organizations in the men's ideological and political training and in strengthening the troop's friendship with the workers in the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan is thoroughly reflected in the book.

One reads the pages, on which it is told how the Turkestan fighting men were the first to come to the aid of the population when natural disasters (the Ashkhabadskoye earthquake in 1948, the threat of a sudden breakthrough of water through an obstruction in the Zeravshan River in the vicinity of the settlement of Ayni in 1964, the earthquake in Tashkent in 1966) occurred.

The award of the Order of the Red Banner to the district in February 1968 was a recognition of the high services of the district's forces in strengthening the defensive might of the Soviet state and its armed protection and in combat and political training.

The book's final chapter, "A Combat Outpost on Our Motherland's Southern Frontiers", is devoted to the present period in the activity of the district's forces. The chapter reveals the importance of the Red Banner Turkestan Military District in the over-all defense system of the country of the soviets. Having familiarized himself with it, the reader will learn the enormous positive changes which have taken place in the organization and way of life of the troops.

An important place in the book is allotted to the treatment of ideological work, the formation of a communist world outlook in the servicemen, and to instilling in them the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and the glorious revolutionary work and combat traditions of the CPSU, the working class and all Soviet people.

The Soviet Army is an army of friendship with peoples. This has been reflected in the book. It clearly shows the further strengthening of the troop's friendship with the workers, the toilers in the fields, and the intelligentsia of Uzbekistan and Turkmeniya.

The entire life and military work of the fighting men in the Turkestan Military District have been subordinated to the strict execution of the historical decisions of the 25th CPSU Party. Approving with one voice and fervently supporting the political policy and practical work of the Leninist Central Committee of the CPSU and the Politburo of the CC CPSU headed by comrade L. I. Brezhnev, the men in the district's forces perfect their combat skill, watchfully stand guard over the peaceful work of the Soviet people, and vigilantly protect the southern frontiers of our motherland.

Despite a few chronological shortcomings, the military historical essay, "Krasnoznamennyy Turkestanskiy" will be a good help in the military and patriotic indoctrination of the district's fighting men and the youth in the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan on the glorious combat traditions of the USSR's armed forces.

8802
CSO: 1801

SERVICEMAN A VICTIM OF PERSONNEL OFFICER'S NEGLIGENCE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Mar 77 p 4

[Article by Col A. Drovosekov: "For Another's Sins"]

[Text] During the spring of last year a sergeant on extended active duty, Vladimir Ivanovich Danilov, decided to replace the rich south for the rigorous romance of Kamchatka. He declined the offer to stay on active duty and was discharged into the reserves on 30 April.

The preparations and bustle connected with the passage took quite a bit of Danilov's time. It wasn't until August that he set foot on the land of volcanoes and geysers. Without delay, he went to the Yelizovskiy City Military Commission. However, a misfire occurred here. Danilov's personal records were not found at the military commission. Vladimir Ivanovich was sad. After several days, on 6 September, he called the unit commander. The commander immediately instructed the chief of staff to investigate everything.

The chief of staff began his working day with a question addressed to Captain Shukayev, a staff officer:

"Boris Zhakhfarovich, where are Danilov's personal records?"

"They were sent to the Maykopskiy Rayon Military Commission on 12 May 1976. The outgoing reference number is 0150."

The chief of staff was surprised; "To Maykopskiy? But instructions had been given to Danilov to go to the Yelizovskiy City Military Commission."

"Correct. However, personal records are sent to the military commission in the place from where one is inducted and from there to the place of one's residence selected when one goes into the reserves."

The chief of staff was frankly doubtful. However, he did not begin to check on Shukayev's statement -- it was necessary to act and not lose time.

"Get in touch with the Maykopskiy Rayon Military Commission. Find out where Danilov's documents are."

Captain Shukayev found out and reported that Danilov's personal records had not been sent from the rayon military commission for a number of reasons. They would be sent tomorrow. The chief of staff reported this to the commander and sent a telegram to remote Kamchatka.

Several days passed. There was a ring from higher headquarters. It seems Danilov had turned to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA because of the delay in his personal records. Investigate, comrade chief of staff, and report.

The investigation showed that Danilov's documents had never been sent to the Maykopskiy Rayon Military Commission. For almost five months they had lain in the unit's headquarters and were sent to the Yelizovskiy City Military Commission only on 21 September!

The item, as they say, was impressive. An exchange of opinions took place between the chief of staff and Captain Shukayev. As a result Boris Zhakhfarovich was severely punished.

It would seem that the story of Danilov's personal records would end with this. But not so-- in November they again returned to the unit as incorrectly and extremely carelessly drawn up and with amendments and erasures. In general, they were not accepted at Danilov's new place of work. There was nothing else for Danilov to do except to wait until his documents were returned to Kamchatka in proper form.

However, time passed and the documents were not returned. Vladimir Ivanovich talked things over with his wife... and himself left to get his personal records. He arrived in the unit on 8 December and reported the purpose of his visit.

The commander expressed doubts; "It cannot be that you do not have your personal records. However let's check." He called the chief of staff.

The chief of staff said; "Comrade Danilov's personal records were sent out long ago but in any event we must ask Captain Shukayev.

Comrade Shukayev answered; "We do not have Danilov's personal records."

The commander called in WO [praporshchik] B. Borisov the manager of the post office.

He reported; "The personal records were received. I immediately passed them to Captain Shukayev for re-doing."

Silence reigned in the office

This, still unfinished, story directly cost Danilov a pretty penny. Almost nothing remained from the money earned from the sale of a house. He, himself, was inconvenienced; his family was inconvenienced. And Captain Shukayev was guilty of this.

Did Boris Zhakhfarovich admit this himself? I do not know. I did not have an occasion to ask him about it -- he was on leave. Therefore, in order not to distort the truth accidentally, the author of these lines, when checking V. Danilov's complaint, tried not to overlook a single small detail. He established that beginning with Danilov's transfer to the reserves and until his repeated cables inclusive, Boris Zhakhfarovich deceived the commander and chief of staff more than once.

Based on available information Boris Zhakhfarovich is being transferred to a new position. It would be good if last year's report by the chief of staff were sent with him to his new place of work. In it it is said that comrade Shukayev "in order to hide gross deficiencies in his work, his lack of industriousness, and careless attitude toward service resorted to lies and falsification of documents... which is incompatible with the trust shown to him." Having read this, the new chiefs would immediately know whom they have to deal with.

8802

CSO: 1801

INCENDIARY BOMB EMPLOYMENT AND DEVELOPMENT BY NATO DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Mar 77 p 3

[Article by Col I. Grabovoy, candidate of military sciences, and Col V. Kadyuk: "Bombs Filled with Fire"]

[Text] It is well known that fire as a combat weapon has a history of many centuries. However, it became a weapon in the contemporary meaning only in the 1940's. It was then that abroad, more precisely in the United States, it was decided to use a jelly-like viscous substance which possesses strong adhesion and high combustion temperature, which received the name "napalm," for military purposes.

The first American air raid on Japan with the employment of the new incendiary bombs in March 1945 led, as the specialists have noted, to astounding results. The report of this bombardment announced: "A conflagration broke out in which 15 square miles of the city burned and the flame rose so high into the air that it could be seen at a distance of more than 200 miles."

Of course, no small role was also played here by the circumstances that crowded blocks of the Japanese capital which had been built with light, mainly wooden houses were intentionally subjected to napalm bombing. Thus, from the moment of their appearance American napalms became one of the cruelest means of destruction and this is graphically confirmed by the history of their further use.

The intensity of the combat employment of napalm increased from year to year. If approximately one out of five American aerial bombs were filled with incendiaries during World War II, then during the war in Vietnam they were already 40 percent of the total amount of aerial ammunition. Sometimes they comprised up to 70 percent of the total bomb load.

The quantitative and qualitative growth in incendiary weapons with the years substantially expanded the range and significance of the missions which could be accomplished with their use. This was caused primarily, as foreign military specialists believe, by the fact that along with high effectiveness incendiary ammunition has a low cost. According to data in the foreign press, the cost of a high-explosive medium-caliber bomb is twice that of a napalm

bomb of the same caliber. Here, the consumption of incendiary ammunition for the destruction of a target is considerably lower than that of high-explosive ammunition.

Burning mixtures and compounds with which various types of ammunition and other means of employment are charged comprise the basis of contemporary incendiary weapons. For example, the manual of the US Army divides its incendiaries into three basic groups: mixtures on a base of petroleum products, metallized mixtures, and thermite and thermite compounds. Especially distinguished here is conventional and plasticized phosphorous (it is also used as a smoke-forming substance) and the TRA mixture. Their difference is that they ignite spontaneously in the air.

Napalm-B is considered the most effective burning mixture of the first group. Received in the inventory of the American army in 1966, it possesses combat properties which are improved in comparison with old mixtures: it is distinguished by high inflammability and increased adhesion even to moist surfaces. During combat employment, napalm-B is able to create a center of fire with a duration of 5-10 minutes at a temperature of about 1,000 degrees. Napalm-B is lighter than water; therefore, it floats on its surface, thereby retaining the ability to burn. The mixture burns with a smoking flame, saturating the air with caustic incandescent gases and combining it with oxygen. In addition, during combustion it liquefies and acquires the ability to penetrate through various leakages inside cover or a combat vehicle.

Metallized incendiaries (pyrogels) have a burning temperature of 1,200-1,600 degrees and the NPT mixture which is a combination of napalm, phosphorous, and thermite--3,000 degrees. When they burn, a black slag is formed which is able to burn through thin metal, char wood, and flow into combat vehicles. Of the thermite incendiaries in the inventory of the USA Army, we now find thermite compounds marks TN-2 and TN-3 which were developed even before World War II and a new thermite compound, TN-4.

Thermite possess an extremely strong incendiary action. When they burn, a temperature of about 2,800°C is developed. They can burn through metal parts of combat equipment, putting it out of action. The indicated thermite compounds are used in aerial incendiary bombs.

Great attention to the development of new incendiary mixtures and compounds which are suitable for combat use under any climatic conditions and with various weapons systems is also being received in other NATO countries.

In just what directions are the foreign specialists conducting their searches? First of all, they are trying to improve the combat characteristics through an increase in temperature and burning time. They are working on increasing adherence to various surfaces including moist and vertical ones. They are also engaged abroad with the development of mixtures which ignite spontaneously in air or water and with the search for mixtures which have a simple technology for preparation under field conditions.

It has been reported in the press, for example, that a new thickener, E-10 which permits reducing the time for the preparation of incendiary mixtures directly in the ammunition from 18-24 hours to 5-30 minutes has been created. An incendiary mixture which, in accordance with the estimate of foreign specialists, is considerably superior to known authorized formulas for napalms and which can be prepared on the basis of jet aviation fuel has been developed. Models of incendiary mixtures have appeared abroad which are thickened using fibrous materials. The combustion products of such incendiaries are poisonous and this makes considerably more difficult the elimination of the after-effects from their employment since it requires special protective means.

A special place in the creation of incendiaries is occupied by the obtaining of compounds which are capable of spontaneous combustion. The United States, for example, has developed several versions of such mixtures for filling the 66-mm incendiary rocket grenade, the XM-74, and the 213-mm free rocket. Using in the composition of the mixtures powdered zinc, cerium, barium nitrate, benzene, polystyrene, and other components, the American specialists have obtained the opportunity to make small-caliber aerial bombs completely of an incendiary compound to fill clusters.

Along with the improvement of incendiary mixtures, new designs of ammunition are being developed abroad, especially of aerial bombs. Here, it is appropriate to recall that incendiary aerial bombs are subdivided into incendiary bombs proper and fire bombs (napalm bombs). The first group includes bombs which are comparatively small--from 1 to 100 pounds and which are employed in clusters and small containers. Thermite compounds as well as new ones which are obtained on a base of cerium and barium nitride are used to fill them. In view of the insignificant content of incendiary substance (0.28-19 kg), bombs of this group create individual centers of combustion. It has been reported in the press that new small-caliber incendiary bombs, BLU-68/B and BLU-70/B, which are dropped from airplanes in clusters containing 670 bombs each, have undergone tests and have been accepted in the inventory of the American army.

Fire (napalm) bombs have a weight of 250-1,000 pounds. They are thin-walled cigar-shaped containers of steel, aluminum, or aluminum alloys which have been filled with thickened mixtures, most often napalm. Napalm bombs which do not have stabilizers are called tanks. In contrast to ammunition of the first group, napalm bombs create a volumetric stricken area. On being dropped, a charge of explosive material destroys the ammunition housing and the incendiary mixture is scattered in all directions up to 100 meters or more in the form of burning particles, creating a continuous zone of fire. The area of destruction, let us say, of a 750-pound bomb may reach 4,000 square meters here.

As can be seen, the program for work in the field of incendiary armament in the United States and other NATO countries is embracing a broad range of

problems in the design and development of new types of incendiary mixtures and ammunition and in raising the effectiveness of their employment. This is one of the directions of the arms race which the militaristic circles are trying to whip up with all their with all their strength.

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PERFORMING TECHNICAL SERVICES IN MISSILE UNIT DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Mar 77 p 1

[Article by Lt Col V. Kuzyakin, Order of Lenin Moscow PVO District: "According to the Law of Acceleration"]

[Text] The platoon commander, Senior Lieutenant S. Bossert, studied the schedule for periodic technical servicing which was plotted accurately on a sheet of heavy paper. The senior lieutenant placed a question mark next to the small circle which conventionally designates the section headed by Private D. Kapianizde. Only several minutes ago Private Kapianidze had reported that the section had begun to accomplish the next operation in periodic technical maintenance on the launcher somewhat later than the time called for by the schedule. So the platoon commander began to ponder: how to find a way out for the section to make up the lost time? It can, and it would not bother the senior lieutenant if it were not for one circumstance....

The officer had already made an estimate long ago: is it not possible to reduce the time for the conduct of periodic technical maintenance on the combat equipment? The thought was attractive, but it was not so simple to implement. In such a matter, haste is fraught with the most serious consequences. Time and again, Senior Lieutenant Bossert returned to his mental considerations before expressing them to the battery commander, Captain S. Levin. The latter initially was even doubtful: didn't the norms threaten the launcher-men too much?

"Everything has been thought through and calculated," the senior lieutenant defended his position. "In the platoon, more than half the specialists have an increased qualification; they have much experience in the conduct of such work and passed the test on the range successfully."

The battery commander listened attentively but he did not hurry with his answer. And not because he had not decided to assume responsibility. Captain Levin himself had also made an estimate where and on what the time for the accomplishment of the operations could be reduced. What the senior lieutenant proposed was unquestionably of interest. But will it bring the greatest value if it is limited within the framework of only one platoon? A struggle

for a reduction in the times for conducting periodic technical maintenance had also been conducted in the subunit earlier. The section members had assumed obligations to save time in the accomplishment of technological operations. But as a result, it turned out that each one individually attains an outstanding result while the overall grade for the section, platoon, and battery remains virtually unchanged. What is the matter?

Captain Levin shared his observations with an experienced specialist, officer B. Bondarenko, who admitted that he also had devoted attention to this situation. On the next periodic maintenance work, it is necessary to analyze thoroughly the entire course of its accomplishment and to see how each specialist and each section member functions. And then, on the basis of the results which have been attained, they would outline a specific plan to struggle for the attainment of the planned goal. The officers came this conclusion.

The plunger of the jack is shot with a moist, metallic luster. Private A. Fedin applies the lubricant with quick, nimble movements. Finishing the work, the soldier moves on to the next assembly of the mechanism. He works precisely and quickly. It is not in vain that he bears the title of first-class specialist. In several minutes, Private Fedin reports that he has completely finished the inspection and servicing of a launcher mechanism. Captain Levin looks at his watch: the soldier has reduced the time for the accomplishment of this operation by a third.

Alongside Fedin, Private Ye. Kochergin is engaged in checking the electric motor. He completes his work within the time allotted by the norm. As a result, the effect of the time saved by Private Fedin is lost.

This is how things stood in the section. But contrasts were also observed in the platoon. If the men headed by Private First Class B. Nadiradze operated and exceeded the schedule, the specialists of the section headed by Private A. Grachev accomplished its operations, barely meeting the schedule. An even spottier picture had developed on a battery scale. What are the reasons? The main one is the different level of training of the specialists.

This means that it is necessary to concentrate attention on the problem as a whole rather than on some one element and to achieve the acceleration of work in all elements.

Considering the experience and training of the specialists and the degree of complexity of the operations, it was proposed that the amount of acceleration of the work be the same for all elements of the missile complex.

The young missilemen were assigned the task to master their duties in such a way that when accomplishing periodic technical maintenance they work on a par with the experienced soldiers. A demonstration lesson was conducted especially for the newcomers in the battery at which the best section, headed by Private First Class Timofeyev, demonstrated the most effective procedures for

accomplishing all operations. On this lesson, the beginning specialists saw with their own eyes that even the most laborious operations can be accomplished ahead of the normative time.

Thanks to all these measures we succeeded in raising substantially the level of training of the young specialists. This permitted the battery to conduct recent prescribed periodic maintenance with high quality and the shortest possible times.

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COMMANDERS' RESPONSIBILITIES AS ORGANIZERS OF COMBAT DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Mar 77 p 1

[Editorial: "The Commander--Master Organizer of the Battle"]

[Text] The combat training of the men of the Soviet Armed Forces is proceeding in a business-like, strained rhythm. Just as all Soviet people, they are preparing to mark the glorious jubilee of the Great October with high achievements. The combat maturity of the personnel is maturing on field lessons, in flights, on sea cruises, and in the course of tactical exercises, and the ability of the commanders to control their subunits, units, and ships under conditions as close as possible to combat conditions is being polished.

In accomplishing the tasks of strengthening the Armed Forces of the Soviet state, our party has always attached and is attaching great significance to the training of qualified military personnel and the molding of lofty moral-political and combat qualities in them. Remarkable organizational abilities, political maturity and boundless devotion to the socialist Motherland, and many-sided professional training of the Soviet officer corps were one of the decisive factors of our victory in the Great Patriotic War. The present generation of the Fatherland's defenders are worthy heirs to combat glory. Mastering the science of victory which was forged in the battles for the homeland, the Soviet officers are striving to utilize the war experience creatively in training servicemen for the conduct of contemporary combat operations.

Contemporary battle with its dynamism, saturation with a variety of combat equipment, and tremendous physical and moral load on the personnel is complex. And this imposes ever-increasing requirements on command personnel. As the organizer of battle, the commander is required to understand the situation without error, be able to determine the goal of combat operations and the methods for its attainment clearly, assign personnel and equipment efficiently, and coordinate and support the actions of the troops in every way.

In the course of winter combat training many of our commanders demonstrate high combat maturity on exercises of subunits, units, and ships. On a recent exercise, for example, which was conducted in the Group of Soviet Forces in

Germany the tank battalion under the command of Captain V. Zorin distinguished itself. Directed by the commander's firm hand, all subunits of this battalion functioned as a single organized and coordinated combat organism. This was manifested especially graphically at the stage of battle where the attackers encountered a strong point on a previously prepared position. Using reconnaissance data, the commander managed to determine the weak links in the "enemy's" defense and accomplished the clear maneuver of the subunits. Combat success was achieved as a result of the actions which demonstrated initiative and resolve.

Winter combat training provides many examples of skillful actions by commanders of all echelons. However, instances are sometimes encountered where, in the course of exercises some officers, especially young ones, display indecision and the inability to reinforce their theoretical knowledge with the practical organization of battle. Here, some officers display poor knowledge of the increased combat capabilities of their own subunits and attached and supporting forces and means without which their effective use is unthinkable. Nor can the one who today has a reputation as an expert in tactics be satisfied with what has been attained. Military affairs do not stand still. Each new combat situation places the commander under new conditions and requires new decisions. And this obliges commanders and all officers constantly to supplement their store of theoretical knowledge, improve organizational skills, and conduct a tireless search for the most effective procedures in the employment of new combat equipment and weapons. The commander must be an expert in the theory of offensive and defensive battle and confidently control the subunits day and night, both under conditions where weapons of mass destruction are employed and without them.

An invariable fellow-traveller of success in combat always was and remains combat activity and command initiative. The commander must strive to be the first to discover the enemy, preempt him in deployment, and inflict his will and his concept of operation on him. Of course, this does not mean that one should rush headlong forward. The error of some young officers also consists of the fact that in the course of exercises they ignore the "enemy" and do not turn their attention to his maneuver and fire which, in actual battle, may lead to great losses. The skill of the organizer of battle consists of the fact that, making his decision quickly, he proceeds from a sober estimate and specific situation, relies on the principles of military art, and considers the enemy's strong and weak aspects and the actual capabilities of friendly forces and means.

The primary duty of commanders of all echelons is to master this art tirelessly. For this, it is necessary to make more complete use of command training and tactical and marching drill and demonstration lessons and tactical and special tactical exercises on which a difficult, rapidly changing and instructive situation should always be created which includes elements of surprise and reasonable risk while observing necessary security measures.

A high level of instructiveness of the measures for combat training is even more necessary since today young officers are at the head of many units, ships,

and subunits. Ideologically tempered and well trained theoretically, they need the accumulation and improvement of the skills in the direction of battle. As practice shows, their development into commanders proceeds more successfully where the degree of organization and solidarity of the subunits is higher and where socialist competition contributes actively to the growth in combat skill. Senior commanders, higher headquarters, and political organs are called upon to render great assistance in the development of young officers.

Commanders, political organs, and party organizations are called upon to inculcate in the military personnel a sense of the new and to direct them to the search for more effective methods and procedures in combat operations as well as to propagandize the experience of the Great Patriotic War and the achievements of tactically mature commanders. At the same time, it is important to create in the officer environment a situation of intolerance toward manifestations of simplification and indulgences and passivity and sluggishness on the exercise fields.

The range of problems solved by the commander in the course of the organization of battle, beginning with the clarification of the mission and the making of the decision and ending with combat and material-technical support of the troops, is broad. And the commander's work will be most effective when he will constantly rely on the active support of the staff, his deputies, commanders of subordinate subunits and units, and on the assistance of party and Komsomol organizations.

The Soviet commander bears personal responsibility for the constant combat readiness of the subunit, unit, or ship entrusted to him. And one of the most important components of this combat readiness is his tactical maturity, ability to unite people, and his ability to mobilize them for the successful accomplishment of any combat mission.

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COMBAT TRAINING OF NAVAL INFANTRYMEN DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Mar 77 p 1

[Article by Capt-Lt V. Shirokov: "From the Wave to Granite"]

[Text] The armored personnel carriers are rushing toward the sea. The military cantonment which is lost in the snowdrifts and the easy comfort of the barracks were left far behind. Aroused by the alert signal, the naval infantrymen are sitting in concentrated silence and thinking of what awaits them up ahead. And what awaits them is the boarding of amphibious assault ships, a crossing of the sea, and the storming of a shore which is occupied by the "enemy."

The armored personnel carriers are rushing to the noise of the surf. It is already muffling the howling of the engines. A few more minutes of the uneven road and the naval infantrymen will feel the instability of the deck. This is because the sea is rough.

This is exactly what alarms the platoon commander, Lieutenant V. Yeremenko, now. Once in a while he looks at the young seamen, R. Kondoy and F. Velinin. They are experiencing a large wave for the first time. On land, the newcomers are already able to do much and they have even acquired considerable experience. But the soldierly labor of the naval infantryman is such that both land and water must become native for him in battle. Even if on a passage the assault troops need not conduct combat operations, they must experience the effect of rocking which many people cannot easily endure. And, if today the young seamen succumb to seasickness, it will be very difficult on the shore for those who have lost strength and, this means, also for the entire platoon.

Lieutenant Yeremenko has applied considerable effort to prepare his subordinates for the stormy voyage. On physical-training lessons, he tried to vary the loads, developing in the seamen endurance and the ability to function clearly and in a collected manner in a situation which approximates a combat situation even after prolonged physical exercises. In the entire battalion, the officers also allotted a large role to the moral-psychological hardening of the naval infantrymen, trying to conduct all lessons on gunnery and tactical training under conditions similar to a landing with "enemy" counteraction.

The naval infantrymen had a tradition during the war--to conduct meetings between experienced servicemen and those who were going to sea for the first time prior to an assault landing. The naval infantrymen are doing the same thing today. A Komsomol meeting took place on the eve of the exercise. A lively exchange of experiences took place on it. The main thing which the veteran naval infantrymen tried to transmit to their comrades was the personal experience in the preservation of strength, orientation, and self-control under difficult situations as well as the maintenance of an atmosphere of mutual assistance and help for one's comrades.

There was something to tell the men because many times already they have shown their skill in difficult training battles. It is not without reason that for the second year in a row the naval infantrymen are winning the Challenge Red Banner of the fleet's military council for successes in socialist competition. And then today, they must again show that they are able to work on improving their combat qualities and that the obligations which they assumed in honor of the 60th anniversary of the Great October are being accomplished successfully.

Despite the storm, the sea crossing was successfully accomplished. The ships approached the shore in secrecy. The seamen brought them to the place for the assault landing with high precision. The naval infantrymen made ready for the landing. They did not succumb to the rocking, they maintained a boldness of spirit, and they stepped boldly from the wave to the granite.

Discovering the assault landing force, the opposing side attempted to throw it back into the sea. Machineguns chattered, automatic bursts crackled, and gun salvos thundered. The attack began to lose its orderliness and it almost seemed to be bogging down.

At just such moments seconds decide everything. The battalion commander understood this clearly. He moved the hand-held grenade-launchermen up forward and ordered them to neutralize the "enemy" weapon emplacements. The outcome of the battle depended on the successful actions of several men. And they did not fail, showing once again that they are professionally and psychologically ready for the most difficult situations. The fire of Seaman A. Potapov was especially effective. Demonstrating enviable self-control and cold-bloodedness, the grenade launcher forced the gun emplacements which had been discovered to fall silent and did not have a single miss.

The attack received a new development. And a new test awaited the naval infantrymen: to force a zone of conflagrations.

The flame howled threateningly and smoke and soot flew toward them. And the "enemy" again intensified fire: the figures of the attackers could be clearly seen in the gleams of the conflagration.

"How about the newcomers?" Lieutenant Yeremenko again fell to thinking uneasily. His platoon had begun to cross the zone of fire. Then Junior Sergeant V. Bogdanov rushed forward, His comrades hurried behind him.

A battle, even a training battle, is very difficult work. This is especially true for naval infantrymen. They must do much and do it quickly: land, attack, drive the "enemy" out of occupied positions, expand the beachhead which has been captured as much as possible, dig in.

Then the naval infantrymen "picked up" the armored personnel carriers. But they soon stopped, bogged down in the deep snow. This means--to the skiis and forward, forward, as long as possible.

The "enemy" laid down a smoke screen. This means, he is preparing a counter-blow. If we continue to move in a straight line, we may encounter prepared machinegun fire. Bypass the smoke screen? Yes, and on the left flank where, according to the reports of the scouts, the "enemy" does not expect an attack.

The maneuver was successful. One more jerk. And again. The battalion commander notes that his subordinates are tired. However, some do not have sufficient physical endurance. But the combat spirit is high, even among the newcomers. But nevertheless, it will be necessary to organize individual work with them. This is the first conclusion for the present. But the battle is continuing and it will provide more food for thought.

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MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENTAL COMMANDER ON TRAINING METHODS AND RESULTS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Mar 77 p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Boriskin, commander of a motorized rifle regiment, Red Banner Belorussian Military District: "Introduction of Experience"]

[Text] The majority of the regiment's subunits worked in the field all week. Replacing one another, they drove the combat vehicles on the same routes and accomplished other combat-training missions under similar conditions. Nevertheless, the results proved to be different. The men of some subunits increased their combat skill noticeably while others continued to mark time.

The reasons for this situation interested the staff personnel and the regiment's party committee. A group of officer specialists analyzed several lessons in the companies on leading disciplines. A curious regular law was discovered.

In summing up the results of the socialist competition of the men for high results in firing, driving, and using combat equipment, the commanders of the lagging subunits spoke only of their subordinates' shortcomings without disclosing their reasons. Approximately the same orientation was adhered to by the Komsomol and party activists of these collectives. Their presentations at meetings, in the wall press, and over the local radio were filled with criticism of fellow servicemen who did not cope with the difficult norms. Nothing was said about those specialists who are achieving good results.

The picture was different in the companies where things went better. Here, too, the shortcomings of the men were not concealed. But along with criticism the commanders devoted considerable attention to a detailed analysis of those procedures and operating methods of the specialists with the aid of which the greatest results from the lessons and the high effectiveness of socialist competition were attained. Using the forms for popularizing the men who distinguished themselves which are inherent to them, the party and Komsomol organizations tried to acquaint others with their experience.

What shortcomings are characteristic of the lagging subunits? Take the company commanded by Captain V. Mikhal'chik. It returned from the firing line several times in a row and just failed to cross the line for a three. In

which regard, all firers rather than two or three soldiers let the company down. Some used the sight unskillfully, others found it difficult to make an estimate of and utilize the terrain, and still others did not consider weather conditions correctly. In other words, almost every gunner and tank commander did not have sufficient mastery of some element of firing but, at the same time, they utilized others well. If the commander had paid attention to this, a way out could have been found.

By the way, this is what happened later. On the advice of the regiment's staff officers a critique of the next unsuccessful firing by the company was conducted somewhat unusually. Noting the shortcomings of those who fired, Captain V. Mikhal'chik dwelled in detail on the favorable actions of each of them. Then the commander gave the men the opportunity to evaluate each other's pluses and minuses themselves. A profound and instructive conversation by the specialists resulted.

With consideration of this the commander, relying on the initiative of the company's communists, organized an individual competition between soldiers and sergeants. The pairs of specialists who competed with each other accomplished the volume of work planned for them on the trainer and the portable sight. Prior to the next live firings, they began to compete in the accomplishment of fire missions with the use of a programmed plotting board which was made in the subunit.

And, as they say, the ice was broken. The mutual enrichment of the men with the experience of conducting fire under different conditions led to an overall growth in their skill.

The facts which were presented became the subject of a serious talk at the regimental party meeting and the methodological conference of the officers. Many other examples were disclosed where commanders were not able to handle efficiently the leading experience available in each troop collective. Attention was directed to the decree of the Central Committee CPSU, the Council of Ministers USSR, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, and the Komsomol Central Committee concerning the all-union socialist competition which stressed the necessity to ensure the broad, systematic dissemination of leading experience everywhere. The party document called this work the most important task in the organization of socialist competition.

In order to implement the leading experience in combat and political training effectively, it was necessary to study it more profoundly. For this purpose, a special group was created from among the staff personnel, party activists, and the best trained officers in the regiment's subunits. The results of its activity were not long in being felt on the equalizing of the subunits' ability in gunnery, tactical, and technical training. I will dwell on the following example.

Observing the organization of the lessons on the ground by the battalion commander, Captain M. Semashko, Major G. Mukhamedzhanov came to the conclusion

that the creation of a situation in the field which is more complicated than usual contributes to their effectiveness. The battalion commander skillfully combined the working out of problems in tactics and the conduct of fire. Operating in the attackers' skirmish line, any of the soldiers could suddenly receive a target indication and the command to accomplish a fire mission. Thus, they succeeded in instilling in the men such qualities as the ability to observe the battlefield and exploit the terrain when conducting fire much more rapidly than formerly.

Naturally, in summing up the results of the socialist competition for the month Captain M. Semashko's subordinates came out ahead. Speaking to the personnel, Major G. Mukhamedzhanov disclosed the reasons for the battalion's successes and recommended that its leading experience be used in other collectives, too.

Captain M. Semashko and other leading officers spoke at the next officers' call. They told in detail about the method for organizing combined lessons in the field, their party-political support, and the forms and content of the socialist competition of the soldiers, sergeants, and officers at different stages.

The experience in driving infantry combat vehicles accumulated in the battalion where the chief of staff is Captain Ye. Gelyukh was widely introduced in a similar manner. Here, a procedure for the individual training of the driver-mechanics for operations under difficult conditions was worked out from the first days of the training year. After taking a compressed theoretical course, each of them works out a certain range of problems on the trainer equipment and accomplishes a number of preparatory exercises with the instructor. As a result, mistakes which often restrain further growth in the skill of the young specialists are avoided on the first independent runs.

Fixed attention to leading experience and the striving to see that not one good undertaking remains a matter for some individual man or a limited circle of specialists helped us to accomplish many difficult tasks. For example, to overcome the picture which existed in the past where subunits showed sharply contrasting results on the rifle range or combat vehicle driving grounds. For example, one company or battalion attained success because they employed a leading method for preparing their weapons. But the other men who replaced their neighbors on the rifle range did not even suspect this. Things are different now. On the recommendation of the regimental staff, the subunit which has completed firing or has driven its infantry combat vehicles as a rule does not leave the training site until its representatives share the "secrets" of their successes or the reasons for their failures with the comrades who are arriving there. The critique of the actions of the men of one subunit in the presence of another is also widely practiced in the regiment as a procedure for disseminating accumulated experience. Commanders and party and Komsomol activists from competing collectives are often invited to the summing up of the results of socialist competition in the platoons and companies.

In our view, special significance is had by experience in using the training-material base. The level of contemporary trainer and other auxiliary equipment is very high. For example, the trainers, mock-up vehicles, and other means which we employ in the regiment permit us to attain complete simulation of the movement of the equipment, the conduct of fire from on board it, the launching of antitank guided missiles at various ranges, and so forth. That is, we have available the actual capability to instruct and evaluate the level of training of the specialists in full volume without waiting to go out into the field or for exercises or live firings.

In order to utilize these great opportunities, we practice the exchange of the experience of the best specialists with the demonstration of work on trainers and behind sights and benches. Almost all of them included in their individual obligations a point about the skillful use of the training-material base. The personnel learn this on lessons of the technical and gunnery study groups which are led by Engineer-Lieutenant Colonel A. Golub and Major V. Poddubko.

I should like to dwell again on one important factor in the introduction, into combat training practice, of leading procedures and methods of operation by the men and the use of weapons and equipment in battle. I have in mind the results of the technical creativity of the rationalizers and inventors. We have achieved a situation where any valuable suggestion by the skilled personnel is widely introduced into being. I will mention some of them. An attachment for the machinegun which was designed with the participation of Major V. Poddubko provides for training firing with single cartridges or with the complete load of the belt. Its use reduced considerably the time for the accomplishment of the norms and increases the quality of training of the specialists. A simple device developed under the supervision of Senior Lieutenant A. Dushko does much to increase the results when firing at night. The introduction of these and other innovations on the scale of the entire regiment is not a simple matter.

Competition for the effectiveness of technical creativity has been organized in the unit. The chiefs of services are responsible for ensuring the correct orientation of the rationalizers' technical thinking and for the rapid use of their suggestions in practice. By the way, rationalizer work is one of the directions of socialist competition between the officers of the services.

The men of the regiment have given their word to greet the 60th anniversary of the Great October in a worthy manner and bring their unit up among those which are outstanding. The months of combat training which have passed are instilling confidence that this lofty goal will be attained. The guarantee of this is the persistent and skillful introduction of the leading experience generated by the enthusiasm of officers, warrant officers [praporshchik], sergeants, and soldiers.

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