

JPRS 68732

7 March 1977

TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1267

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BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET		1. Report No. JPRS 68732	2.	3. Recipient's Accession No.	
4. Title and Subtitle TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS, No. 1267				5. Report Date 7 March 1977	
				6.	
7. Author(s)				8. Performing Organization Rept. No.	
9. Performing Organization Name and Address Joint Publications Research Service 1000 North Glebe Road Arlington, Virginia 22201				10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.	
				11. Contract/Grant No.	
12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address As above				13. Type of Report & Period Covered	
				14.	
15. Supplementary Notes					
16. Abstracts The report contains information on the Soviet military and civil defense establishments, leadership, doctrine, policy, planning, political affairs, organization, and equipment.					
17. Key Words and Document Analysis. 17a. Descriptors USSR Military Organizations Military Facilities Military Personnel					
17b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms					
17c. COSATI Field/Group 15C					
18. Availability Statement Unlimited availability. Sold by NTIS, Springfield, Va. 22151				19. Security Class (This Report) UNCLASSIFIED	
				20. Security Class (This Page) UNCLASSIFIED	
				21. No. of Pages 67	
				22. Price PC-A04	

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METHODOLOGICAL SKILLS OF UNIT COMMANDERS CRUCIAL IN TANK TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Dec 76 p 1

[Article by Lt Col A. Khanin, tank regiment commander, Red Banner Turkestan Military District: "Much Depends on Methodology -- Effectiveness and Quality Are Paramount"]

[Text] The first weeks of the new training year have passed. What have they been like? Above all they have been characterized by a high level of activism among personnel in the struggle for quality and effectiveness in the training process. The tankmen show at every training period and drill that they are striving hard to mark the 60th anniversary of Great October with high scores in military labor. I think this is also promoted by the fact that the training year began without a hitch, in combat rhythm, and the enthusiasm of our personnel was backed up by the organizational activity of the commanders, political workers, and all officers of the regiment.

Nonetheless, everything was not positive in the first days of training. For example, all the companies went through day and night tank firing drills. The men were performing the very same missions, but the effectiveness of the training periods differed. Why?

An analysis of the first periods of winter combat training enables us to conclude that concern for the quality of training periods means above all concern for the methodological skill of the officers and ways to improve it. Things look best in this work in the battalion commanded by Maj V. Shachinov.

For example, take the tank firing drill in the company commanded by Capt N. Ban'ko. The training period was very instructive and the men were enthusiastic. One could feel that they valued every minute of training time. The commander had carefully thought through the methodology of the training periods at all the training sites, envisioned the tactical background, and set up an appropriate target situation. The variety of targets by nature, distance, and careful camouflaging on the terrain inspired the men to show creativity and initiative. Moreover, a competitive spirit could be sensed at the training period. The time used to perform every

standard and the quality of the learning were carefully checked by the officer. Results were announced on the spot. The company commander singled out the ones who had handled the mission best and analyzed the mistakes that had been made.

Because mechanic-drivers were less well trained than other specialists in the past training year, an additional training site was set up. While the gunners were drilling they studied in the technical classroom, learning about the physical parts of the tank and practicing driving on a special trainer. In this way, the intensity, and therefore also the effectiveness, of training periods rises.

Here is a noteworthy detail. Maj V. Shachinov, the battalion commander attended this drill session. He did not take over for Captain Ban'ko, but rather used tact in teaching him the methodology for conducting a training period. The battalion commander allowed the company commander to notice all the weaknesses still occurring in his methodology and to eliminate them, so that they would not be repeated later. Furthermore, not just Captain Ban'ko but also other officers in the battalion are grateful to Major Shachinov for helping them eliminate gaps in their methodological training and create an instructive situation at every training period right from the start of winter training.

Things looked different during the same training periods in the battalion commanded by Capt V. Sarnatskiy. During the tank firing drills there several of the officers and sergeants came out badly. Most of the time was spent studying theoretical questions, not drilling. The training periods were made less effective by the absence of competition.

These examples give a good picture of the working style of battalion commanders. There are, in fact, significant differences in their attitudes toward the methodological training of subordinate officers. For Major Shachinov it is a paramount concern. He works on the principle that the superior teaches his subordinate and he believes that the professional and methodological training of the company commanders is a most important job of the battalion commander. He holds demonstration training periods and exchanges of know-how regularly. All of these things have a beneficial effect of the quality of training.

Captain Sarnatskiy, of course, also understands the importance of methodological training for officers. But he does not work much with the officers, feeling that it is the regimental staff's job to teach them methodological skills. Certainly much does depend on the staff. But we must not forget the proven principle of the superior teaching the subordinate; the battalion commander knows the strengths and weaknesses of the company commanders best and can thus be more effective in influencing their development, primarily by the individual approach.

Very definite conclusions follow from what we have said. All of us must work more right in the companies, where the foundations are laid

for high-quality performance of combat and political training missions and improving military discipline. We must work hard to teach company commanders methodological skill.

In short, the first training periods have given us much to think about. They confirmed that the quality of training period is directly dependent on the methodological training of the officers, above all the company commanders and platoon leaders. Every commander must be made more accountable for the training of subordinate officers. We must work tirelessly to improve practices in this area.

11,176

CSO: 1801

OUTSTANDING TANK REGIMENT STRESSES OFFICER TECHNICAL TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Dec 76 p 2

[Article by Guards Lt Col B. Maksimishin, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "Men and Machines -- Competition and the Know-How of the Leaders"]

[Text] The troops have entered the new training year enriched by know-how to which we must constantly return and draw out all its benefits. If I were asked what advances our regiment made during the past training year I would mention the high level of technical training of the officers. This is the basis of the skillful actions of subunits at tactical exercises, of accurate fire by the crews, and of masterful driving of the combat vehicles. In short, of everything that makes up unit combat readiness and fighting efficiency.

I will support my statements by reference to the tank battalion commanded by Guards Lt Col V. Vasil'yev. The personnel of this subunit set the tone in socialist competition throughout the training year. All the company commanders in the battalion are masters of combat qualifications and, with one exception, all the remaining officers are specialists first and second class.

Well-trained commanders can handle any mission. There are no mysteries in operating the machinery where they are concerned. The following incident is remembered in the subunit. The company commanded by Guards Sr Lt V. Kotel'nikov was marching. It was important to reach the assigned region by a set time, which was determined by the approach of the last vehicle. Suddenly one tank stopped. The mechanic-driver tried without success to "revive" the silent engine. Guards Lieutenant Colonel Vasil'yev turned up alongside and helped. A real expert on machinery, he quickly found the cause of the trouble. The tank soon caught up with the column again.

Officer technical training is a constant focus of attention for the commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol organizations of our regiment. It plays a large part in the officers' socialist obligations too. Almost all of our platoon leaders and company commanders

graduated from higher military schools and have mastered the fine points of combat work under the diverse conditions of modern warfare. But we understand very well that to go on without replenishing the knowledge we acquired at the academy or school means to fall behind the demands of the times. A person will only be able to exhaust the full capabilities of the machinery if he works hard every day to understand these capabilities and the way to realize them and is constantly making new discoveries for himself about the machinery. This can only come from diligent study. We organize things carefully to insure that officers aspire to technical knowledge and fulfill their lofty socialist obligations.

The regimental staff, headed by Guards Maj V. Zadorozhnyy, has made a notable contribution to this. Thoughtful planning of the training process has made it possible to use training sites more intensively and to conduct training periods without stops. Every week each company had two tank firing drills at the training ground, including night drills, and went to the tank range once to perform a fire exercise. Officer skills were always checked at training periods: how quickly and well they performed standards, how they operated the machinery and drove the vehicles. I think that everyone understands such high demands of officers. After all, they have a great obligation: to teach their subordinates military skills and control their actions.

After one of the fire drills, for example, it was determined that night fire was a weak point in the training of the company commanded by Guards Capt A. Kim. We analyzed the causes and found that certain officers were not adequately trained and had a poor knowledge of the weaponry. Some blame also fell on Guards Capt I. Belous, the battalion commander, who had not been demanding enough of his subordinates. Nor did the regimental command, contented with the battalion's past results, notice the dropoff immediately.

The problems had to be eliminated urgently. Additional tank firing drills were organized for the lagging units. The battalion commander reported at a service meeting. He had to account for himself before the communists at a session of the party committee. There was only one question: what was to be done to revitalize socialist competition among the officers for steady improvement of their technical skills? A series of activities was planned which were to mobilize the commanders and political workers to improve the personal professional and methodological skills even further.

Of course, the most helpful activity in improving the technical knowledge and skills of the officers is training periods in the commander training system. But this training alone is not enough. Technical conferences, demonstration lessons, exchange of know-how among the best specialists, and military-technical information sessions are very popular among us.

After a tactical exercise once in the company commanded by Guards Lt A. Zinov'yev, not all the vehicles were properly serviced. The deputy

regimental commander for technical affairs Guard Lt Col S. Tsimbalyuk did not limit himself to a strict admonition to the company commander. He conducted a demonstration training period on tank maintenance right there, and it taught the company and platoon commanders a great deal.

In our regiment socialist competition among officers for steady improvement in technical knowledge is backed up by purposeful party political work. All the communists of the regimental party organization and all officers are constantly studying new, progressive ideas that originate in the subunits. They disseminate them widely so that the achievements of one collective become the property of all.

The subunit commanders and tank crew members have adopted, for example, the know-how of our best gunners, Guards Sr Lt A. Shishev and Guards Maj A. Tolstov, and of our combat vehicle "ace drivers," Guards Sr Lt V. Lyubovtsev and Guards Capt Yu. Sokolov.

Looking back, one is convinced over and over again that propaganda for our combat traditions plays an important role in teaching tankmen love for their equipment. During the Great Patriotic War our regiment had a long and glorious trail. Sixteen Heroes of the Soviet Union grew up in it. During the harsh year of 1943 the working people of the Mongolian People's Republic bought a tank column with their own savings and gave it to the regiment. Two high awards from the Mongolian People's Republic hang on the Guards Battle Colors of our Berdichevsk Tank Regiment along with the orders of Lenin, the Red Banner, Suvorov, Kutuzov, Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy, and the Red Star. Moreover, the unit carries the name of the Mongolian national hero Suhe-Bator.

It would be correct of me to say that there is almost never a firing or driving drill or training period where our commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol activists do not relate stories of the regiment's history during the war and the valor of its heroes to their comrades-in-arms.

Armor and men... Only when it is warmed by the attention and concern of the men does armor give tank troops reliable protection in battle. This is an old truth, but we never tire of repeating it! The skill of fighting men who have mastered the tank equipment multiplies the combat efficiency of that equipment. In the past training year we advanced noticeably in technical training for officers and all personnel. But behind the generally good results we can also clearly see shortcomings.

During our thorough discussion of socialist obligations in honor of the 60th anniversary of Great October in the regiment, we carefully analyzed the causes of different levels of technical training in the subunits. The command and the party committee are worried by the fact that next to the outstanding companies are collectives who have achieved only satisfactory evaluations. For example, the company commanded by Guards Sr Lt V. Shaposhnikov, which obligated itself to become outstanding, reached the finish with no better than satisfactory marks.

In short, we have some lessons to draw for the future. Inspired by the historic decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the October 1976 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the principles and conclusions contained in the speech by General Secretary of the CPSU CC L. I. Brezhnev at the Plenum, the men of the regiment have resolved to raise their goals for socialist competition in the year of the 60th anniversary of Great October. We will continue to give concentrated attention to officer technical training. We see this as the key to a continued rise in the combat readiness of the regiment.

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CSO: 1801

INITIAL RESULTS OF NEW TRAINING YEAR SHOW IMPORTANCE OF ORGANIZATION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Dec 76 p 1

[Lead editorial: "A Precise Rhythm for Combat Training"]

[Text] Soviet fighting men are vigilantly guarding our country's security, accomplishing the missions of the new training year with great enthusiasm, and improving combat and political training. The socialist competition begun at the initiative of leading units in the branches of the Armed Forces and supported in all units and on all ships has assumed broad scope. Multiplying their achievements in military labor, the fighting men of the army and navy are preparing to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution in a fitting manner.

The initiators of socialist competition are setting a good rhythm in combat training. For example, the motorized rifle regiment commanded by Lt Col V. Zherybat'yev subordinates everything to outstanding fulfillment of training plans and programs. The commander, political workers, and the party and Komsomol organizations are directing the main efforts of personnel to improving ideological conditioning and tactical, technical, and fire training. The motorized riflemen are learning to operate confidently in all types of battle, day or night, and to hit the target on the first shot, round, or launch at all firing ranges for their regular weapons. Setting precise, concrete missions for each training day and an atmosphere of competition at training periods give purposefulness and consistency to training and increase the effectiveness of the training periods. Combat training is well-organized in many other units and ships as well.

All the same, the first weeks of the new training year did not pass without annoying failures. In the N unit, for example, they planned training periods with new specialists and decided to involve specialists from other subunits. A schedule was drawn up and Lt K. Smirnov and Ensign Yu. Laletin were assigned to be leaders. They spent a good deal of time preparing. But then the training periods were canceled. The leaders had to be reassigned to other groups. There were cases where training periods in the field, on the terrain, were replaced by periods in classrooms or on the square of the training post. Sometimes personnel were

put on administrative jobs during training time. There were instances of certain officers being poorly prepared for training periods. Such shortcomings cannot be tolerated.

It is an important task for commanders and staffs to insure that the technical and moral training process is flawlessly organized. Opportunities for maintaining a precise rhythm of combat training are excellent everywhere. The armies and naval forces have ideologically mature, professionally well-trained officers and up-to-date physical facilities for training. All this makes it possible, with well-organized organizational work by commanders, political agencies, staffs, and party and Komsomol organizations, to mobilize personnel for outstanding performance of missions related to mastering new equipment and weapons and improving field, air, and sea training.

As the first weeks of the new training year show, these missions can be handled successfully primarily in those places where commanders, political agencies, and staffs take a creative approach to their work, use positive know-how from the last training year, and do everything possible to see that each hour of training time is highly effective and fosters growth in the military skills of our personnel. In the motorized rifle battalion commanded by Lt Col G. Kalashnikov this is done by rational organization of training sites, which makes it possible to increase the training load on the fighting man; in the company commanded by Guards Sr Lt V. Maletskiy it is done by using technical training equipment built by efficiency workers of the subunit. Careful analysis of the course of the training process can reveal additional opportunities in every subunit, on every ship.

Shortcomings revealed in the course of training should receive fixed attention. These shortcomings and the factors which caused them must be the subject of principled discussion at service meetings, party meetings, and in Komsomol collectives. Effective steps to eliminate them must be taken.

It is very important to maintain a business-like atmosphere in military collectives at all times, to inspire the men to diligent military labor, and to avoid condescension in evaluating the men's knowledge and skills. Leaders must not become infatuated with numbers of outstanding personnel. The chief index of personnel training is readiness to perform any mission successfully, to operate boldly, determinedly, and with initiative in the most complex situations of modern warfare. The entire process of technical and moral training, firmly guided and constantly checked by commanders, should be subordinated to achieving this goal, molding good moral-political qualities and fighting efficiency in personnel.

In the training process as in all military service nothing is trivial. Organizers of the training process must apply their influence in all questions which are important for the intensity of combat training and the productivity of training time. The questions of the methodological training of training period leaders, organization of socialist competition, using training facilities, and combating simplification and indulgence should always be a focus of attention. Control, help, high

standards, and concern for the men are inalienable features of the work style which the party teaches us. The experienced commander, setting high standards for preparation for training periods, also sees to it that officers are given time for this preparation. When conducting training periods in the field, under bad weather conditions, he sees that the men are warmly dressed and provided with hot food at the proper times.

A precise rhythm in combat training is inconceivable without strong military discipline, strict regulation order, and exemplary organization of service. It is important to provide for everything, from precise fulfillment of the daily schedule and schedule of training periods to strict observance of safety precautions during work with the equipment and weapons, especially at exercises, during flights and cruises, and during field fire and missile launches.

Continuous party political work should aim at insuring a precise rhythm in combat training. Commanders, political workers, and party organizations must increase the accountability of all official personnel for the quality of training, teach officers to be demanding and high-principled, and hold all those at fault for disruptions of the training process strictly responsible. It is important to teach cadres to take an objective approach to evaluating the state of affairs in local areas and to fight resolutely against instances of grading too high, deception, and formalism in socialist competition.

The new training year has developed a good working rhythm. We must continue to use each day, each hour, of combat training effectively for outstanding fulfillment of training plans and programs and thus insure a further increase in the combat might of our Armed Forces.

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CSO: 1801

CORRECT MAPS, ABILITY TO USE THEM KEY FACTORS IN BATTLE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Dec 76 p 1

[Article by Capt Yu. Saltykov, Southern Group of Forces: "The Ability To Work With a Map"]

[Text] The attack began smoothly. The tanks moved across the plain, firing as they traveled. Fountains of dirt rose up in front of the attackers where the enemy's artillery was striking. To pass through the fire zone faster, company commander Capt V. Ostapenko ordered his subordinates to speed up.

Meanwhile the flatland was changing into a region of ravines and steep hills. The valley was tough going for the tanks because of the large number of boulders. The commander reformed the company into a column so that they could get past the obstacles without reducing speed by following a winding road which led through a ravine.

The commander had no doubt that his plan was correct. But no sooner had the company stretched out snake-like along the road than the mechanic-driver of the lead tank brought his vehicle to a sharp stop. A stone wall blocked his path. He could not drive around it because of the rugged terrain. The entire column had to back up to find a route around.

Enemy artillery began to speak again. The training leader ruled that two tanks were knocked out. And even though the company had managed to get out of the zone of fire by this time, the situation was still bad.

The neighboring company in the attack, commanded by Capt G. Myasnikov, broke through the enemy's intermediate line of defense but was forced to halt further advance because there was no support from the flank on which Captain Ostapenko's company was supposed to be. Ostapenko's company was several minutes late in reaching its attack sector.

The reconnaissance men who did not give the commander accurate information on the terrain can be blamed for what happened, of course. But still, the company commander himself is in large part the one at fault.

He did not have reliable skills in orienting himself on the map and made serious mistakes in writing in the tactical situation given to the company commanders the night before by the battalion commander. He marked the symbols for obstacles set up by the enemy approximately, without considering their actual location, and misplaced enemy fire points. Other company commanders made similar mistakes. If it had occurred to the battalion commander to compare their maps when he was giving the mission, he would have seen that each one had drawn up his own version of the tactical situation.

How were such mistakes possible? One of the reasons is that company commanders are not always taught the correct way to make a working map during commander training, at training periods and exercises. Sometimes they put only the most general entries on the map: the location of the enemy, their own route of movement, deployment lines. But every inaccuracy holds great potential for trouble, as is seen from the example of Captain Ostapenko. He ran himself into a stone wall because of poor map skills and carelessness.

Unfortunately, there are even cases where certain commanders neglect maps completely, even "forget" to take them into the field. The case of Sr Lt A. Kazakov, acting company commander, is a striking confirmation of this.

The motorized rifle battalion was making a long march that night. Because it was familiar terrain, some officers considered it superfluous to bring along maps. But along the route the battalion came to an intersection with three roads heading off in different directions. After checking his map the battalion commander led the column along the planned route.

The company commanded by A. Kazakov, bringing up the rear of the battalion column, had fallen slightly behind the other subunits. When the infantry vehicle carrying the lieutenant reached the intersection the end of the column was some 300 meters ahead. At night it was hard to see which road the vehicles were traveling on, particularly as they diverged from the junction along almost parallel lines.

It seemed to the officer that he had determined the route correctly. But the company did not catch up with the battalion column after three kilometers, nor after five. They had to use the radio to ask the battalion commander his location, although they had been strictly ordered to keep all company sets on receive only. Kazakov did not have a map with which to orient himself and report his location. The battalion commander had only one thing to do: go on the air, exposing himself, in order to give directions to the lost company. It took Senior Lieutenant Kazakov half an hour to get his company back to its correct place in the column.

One may reproach the senior officer for this because he did not check to see that all officers had topographical maps. But that is not the whole story. For a long time the company and platoon commanders had not done much work with maps. In general, the attention given to topographical training was inadequate. This was the source of the mistakes.

The commander's working map. The very phrase suggests that it is more than an accessory of the officer's mapcase. It is an important combat document which makes it much easier for commanders to control subunits. Therefore, the working map must meet certain requirements, foremost of which are graphic clarity, completeness, and accuracy in recording the situation. One cannot hope to perform combat training missions well at tactical exercises without a map at hand. The examples given above are fine proof of this. It is important to see that they are not repeated in the future, that the level of topographical training for officers is steadily improved during the winter training period.

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CSO: 1801

MILITARY-TECHNICAL TRAINING IS KEY IN AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Dec 76 p 2

[Article by Col Gen S. Bobylev, member of the military council and chief of the political directorate of the National Air Defense Forces: "Party Political Work and Mastering the Combat Equipment"]

[Excerpts] The party and the people are doing everything necessary to see that the technical equipment of the army and navy meets the highest standards of our days. Speaking of the National Air Defense Forces, the sentries of our country's air frontiers are equipped with weapons which embody the latest advances of scientific thought and technical progress. But all this remarkable combat equipment, all these mighty weapons, are just the foundation of high combat readiness and fighting efficiency. In the final analysis, troop combat readiness is determined by the men to whom the machinery is entrusted, their profound communist conviction and high level of professional skill. The more complex the equipment is, the greater the role of the people who operate it. USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, speaking at the scientific-practical conference of executive political workers of the army and navy, stressed that we must try to achieve that level of troop training where each fighting man has completely mastered current weapons and combat equipment.

Performing this mission demands reliable, effective support from party political work. But what are the chief demands facing political agencies and party and Komsomol organizations, who are expected to use their means and methods to step up the process of personnel mastering the new equipment and weapons, in the current phase? What are the grounds for these demands?

It is obvious that supplying the army and navy with new, complex combat equipment and weaponry has a significant effect on the character of military labor and makes it not only more intense but also creative, relying on extensive application of scientific knowledge. We are very aware of the fact that the methods and procedures for operating equipment develop along with the equipment itself. Practical experience demonstrates that

complicated combat complexes are operated reliably and with maximum effectiveness today in those places where they are operated by specialists with good theoretical training and broad technical outlook.

There is one more objective condition which makes it essential to give broader theoretical and practical training to our military specialists. This is the collective nature of the use of modern weapons and combat equipment. Officers who, for example, have served more than 10 years in the National Air Defense Forces can see especially clearly how this tendency is growing. But this makes the individual, the level of personal training, more important. This makes it necessary for the men to master related specializations.

As we can see, a series of inseparably interconnected factors are appearing which make it irrefutable that the military specialist today must know much more than his predecessors. And if we consider that the equipment is being developed and replaced at a growing pace, this too, of course, will have a certain effect on the training process and, therefore, also on the individual. The characteristics of this influence on the forms and methods of training and on the nature of physical and mental loads should always be reflected in party political work and inspire us to steadily improve it.

The foundation of success in ideological education work is laid above all in the course of political work, which is expected to mold a Marxist-Leninist worldview in personnel and help each fighting man become profoundly aware of his role in society and his obligations to it. While studying the decisions of the 25th party congress and the principles and conclusions contained in the speech by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the October 1976 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, officers, ensigns, sergeants, and soldiers learn the scientific foundations of our party's policy and how to confidently orient oneself in the dynamics of international events, to visualize the paths of communist building in our country, and to see more clearly the role of scientific-technical progress, its influence on the organization and character of military labor, without which the meaning of the high demands now made of personnel cannot be understood. Only a military man's solid conviction of the social significance of his labor yields a conscious aspiration to replenish military-technical knowledge independently and steadily improve skills in controlling combat equipment.

Political agencies and party organizations have an exceptionally important role in seeing that personnel master the combat equipment and weapons outstandingly during planned training periods. There are many forms and methods of work in this area, and they all help in seeing that every hour of planned training is used effectively.

I would like to dwell in particular on the importance of military-technical propaganda, which occupies a significant place in the activity of commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol organizations as a part of party political work. Each unit has numerous highly qualified specialist

officers and true lovers of their work. It is important to organize them for concrete, vigorous work with personnel. Their work should be mostly thorough explanation of the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress in the area of science and technology, party and government policy with respect to scientific-technical issues, and the rules and trends in development of weapons.

But a correct determination of the content of military-technical propaganda by itself does not guarantee that it will be highly effective. It must be organized so that it is carried on continuously, consistently, and always with a logical connection to the program of combat training, so that the content is clothed in forms which are interesting and as understandable as possible to the particular audience.

Military-technical clubs and lecture bureaus, quizzes, study circles, universities of technical knowledge, schools of progressive know-how, question and answer evenings, and scientific-technical conferences have become common in the National Air Defense Forces. The scientific-technical conferences occupy a special place in technical training for officers, and this is no accident. This form of military-technical study is most in line with the spirit of the times and the increased intellectual level of our officers.

Socialist competition has an exceptionally important role in securing a further increase in combat readiness, the quality of serviceman training, and rapid mastery of new equipment. Many commanders and party organizations make skillful use of its growing possibilities at all times. This enables them to successfully accomplish key missions of combat and political training and moral guidance of personnel together. This includes questions of studying, maintaining, and operating the combat equipment. There is a broad area of activity in these matters for all Komsomol organizations too. If competition is well-organized, it opens up room for further development of the contest method of combat training. This is a method which makes it possible to organically combine the classroom and out-of-class forms of special, military-technical personnel training.

However, competition has not yet become an inseparable part of the training process everywhere, so its enormous capabilities for instilling a love of the weapons and desire to study them better in fighting men are not being fully used. Some comrades continue to underrate the importance of the fact that well-organized competition at training periods develops the men's initiative and permits them to master progressive methods of working with the equipment more rapidly.

Searching and more searching. A desire to understand better the changes that are occurring and the ability to reject ineffective forms of work and resolutely oppose stagnation and inertia in thinking are characteristic of the party approach to work today. To work to expand the influence of party political work on the minds and hearts of the fighting men

means to be steadily improving the typical forms of work, coordinating them closely with the pressing challenge of mastering the new equipment and weaponry.

In this connection we cannot overlook the importance of the individual influence on personnel. This is becoming increasingly necessary because the personal responsibility of each man to whom modern equipment is entrusted is growing. Technical and moral training today cannot be done effectively enough without constantly considering the individual characteristics of the men.

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NAVAL TRAINING ACTIVITIES

Submarine Crew Combat Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Jan 77 p 1

[Article by Engr-Lt A. Leonov: "The First Watch"]

[Text] The submarine was moving on the surface. The ocean waves picked it up, passing the sub from one to another, seemingly, carrying the boat away from the shore intentionally. On the bridge, in the fresh air, the swell was not so fatiguing. But in the compartments, it was not so easy for the sailors. Of course, the submariners are people inured to all hardships, but still in bad weather they prefer the depths to the open sea. It is always quieter for the submarine, as they are further from the waves and further from the eyes of the "enemy."

Today, the commander of the sub has particular reason to fear these "eyes." There was to be difficult combat with the surface vessels. And here the depths are both a defense and an assistant. But the hour of diving had not come yet. The situation prompted one to tolerate the rolling, and to struggle against the elements which devised a serious testing for the sailors.

WO [michman] Mikolay Lebedev today for the first time was to stand an independent watch. The sonar operator had been waiting for this day, but did not think that everything would be so bad for it: the tossing sea and the long crossing on the surface. Although Lebedev had recently joined the crew, he had tried in every possible way to shape up more quickly, to understand service and get rid of shortcomings. Still he was not simply a specialist but a commander with subordinates. The preceding training cruises had gone quite successfully. But now it was a very awkward position....

They had scarcely left the bay when the warrant officer began to feel the swells. He tried in every way to hold out and to encourage himself. He had always dreamed about the sea, he had studied hard, and had hoped to prove himself in the first training combat.... But the waves rhythmically

and constantly rocked the boat and all the efforts of will failed. And most importantly, his weakness was certainly noted by the sailors.

"Comrade warrant officer," heard Lebedev, never expecting to see the political worker, "could you help me with this tape recorder? Something isn't right."

The officer had seemingly not noticed the poor state of the sonar operator.

"Come with me."

...When Mikolay Lebedev had finished the repairs on the tape recorder, he suddenly noticed that the deck was still. It meant that they had submerged, and he, involved with an interesting job, had conquered his seasickness.

But soon a new concern seized the warrant officer as over the loud speaker came the voice of the watch officer:

"Next shift ready to stand watch...."

The comrades began to get ready to go on watch in the usual, quick manner. Mikolay Lebedev did not lag behind, but a strange, unexpected excitement grew in him with every passing minute. Now he would replace his comrade, and would be alone with the sea. The commander and the entire crew would believe his every report, and would hope that the sonar operator would spot everything, hear everything and detect everything. And he had to detect no more or no less than the "enemy."

In the companionway, Lebedev saw the sailors. They were looking at something, but having noticed the warrant officer they stood aside.

On the bulkhead hung a combat leaflet. A large toothy fish congratulated warrant officer Lebedev on his first voyage at sea. It wished him success, and obviously alluding to vigilance, inquired: "Sonar operator, do you hear me?"

It cannot be said that the amusing congratulations finally calmed Mikolay, but the awareness that his comrades were also thinking about his first watch was reason for encouragement.

The warrant officer had a good look around the sonar hut. The familiar situation immediately distracted him from alarming thoughts. He put on the earphones, and the sea sang its calming melody in them. They were beautiful sounds, and they could be listened to without end, like music, and one could rejoice that no one had violated the natural melody of the depths. But the problem is that somewhere the melody is violated by the propellers and sonars of the "enemy" ships. Somewhere these ships are plying the sea and feeling it out with powerful pulses. But the sub merely listens, endeavoring to also detect its rivals in combat training, and to remain unnoticed.

"Clear horizon," how many times WO Lebedev had reported this to the control room.

He saw how the minutes of his watch were flying by. He knew that the submarine was long in the area of "enemy" operations. The warrant officer realized that the commander of the sub and the entire crew were depending on him. But as before, with all his enormous desire, he as yet could say nothing except the two words: "Clear horizon."

In passing from day to day and from month to month, the watches of the sonar operators are measured by enormous numbers of hours. But the time of direct contact with the "enemy" is measured in just minutes. Lebedev had heard a great deal about this, but still was very hopeful that precisely his first independent 4 hours of watch would be lucky.

And in fact, the warrant officer was fortunate. He heard the target. And both clearly and certainly. And probably, any other sonar operator in his place would have done just as well, as the ship commander had precisely estimated the place of a possible encounter. But, nevertheless, WO Lebedev was fortunate. His first training combat had brought him the pleasure of sensing his usefulness for the ship about which he had fought so much both during training and in getting ready to set to sea.

The warrant officer did not remember everything that happened after very clearly. Probably just two moments: the first, when after his report of detecting the "enemy," the siren "sounded" the alert, and secondly, when the submarine, in executing a maneuver, suddenly shook and a new noise appeared, the noise of an ejected torpedo.

But the noise of the "enemy" he remembered, literally by heart. Having already come off watch, the warrant officer returned again and again to the sounds of the training combat, remembering all the anxious and joyful moments. And he himself was surprised that it is possible to recall this without fatigue, endlessly, like music. And it was music, the music of his baptism in combat.

Training on Board Outstanding Submarine

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Jan 77 p 2

[Article by Capt 2d Rank G. Yerkin, commander of the outstanding submarine "Yaroslavskiy Komsomolets": "The Shore and the Sea"]

[Text] The submarine "Yaroslavskiy Komsomolets" under the command of Capt 2d Rank G. Yerkin during the year of the 25th CPSU Congress fulfilled the combat training missions with the highest number of points during an extended sea voyage, and affirmed the title of outstanding ship.

In his article, the submarine commander shares his experience in a comprehensive approach to the shore and sea training of the crew, and reflects on the ways for raising the effectiveness of the socialist competition at sea.

The training year in our formation traditionally ends by competitions for the best subunit and best specialist. The masters of military skills, WOs [michman] S. Virych and S. Yakovlev from the crew of the "Yaroslavskiy Komsomolets" have repeatedly and successfully participated in them. Of course, this time as well they could have demonstrated great skills. But we decided to send a group of young specialists from the ship for the contests.

Who would come after the masters? What were the skills of their students? It was important to obtain answers to these questions in order to objectively judge what safety margin the crew possessed and whether the sea watch was strong only in its veterans. And the answer was that the commission of the contest judged PO 1st Class V. Lebedev (a subordinate of WO S. Virych) to be the best helm signalman of the formation, while PO 2d Class A. Malanin (a subordinate of WO S. Yakovlev) became the best electrician.

This note to a certain degree characterizes our achievements in the last training year. The growth of the skills of Lebedev, Malanin and other young sailors is natural not only because they had someone to learn from. The main thing is something else. The submariners have undergone the schooling of a long ocean voyage which was preceded by intense shore training. Precisely the effective use and harmonious combination of these forms of combat training have made it possible for the crew to take a new step ahead.

Frequently one hears from colleague commanders the good and true words that the ocean is the best teacher. Only they voice these words usually to justify oversights on such questions as the sailor's knowledge of the equipment assigned to them, the particular features of its operation, and so forth. At the base, supposedly, they have not learned it and will make up for it at sea. It turns out that shore training is deliberately viewed by such commanders as, what should one say, an incomplete period in the process of the combat shaping up of the crew. It is not hard to imagine what influence such views on the part of the commander have on the crew and on the attitude of the sailors toward exercises in the labs of precruise training, in simulators, and in the compartments of a submarine moored by the pier.

It is important that the young officers at times pick up from senior comrades not only positive but also negative "experience" that tells on their service activities and reduces their effectiveness. Like it or not persons are subjected to organizational routine which acquires at times a definite psychological basis. I happen to have encountered such a case not so long ago. And precisely during preparations for a long voyage. At a party

meeting, the communists were discussing their tasks for this period. As long as it was a question of providing high quality of work and reinforcing the repair skills of the submariners, there were no differences of opinion. But the proposal to carry out these tasks along with active training in the training labs and specialty exercises caused a difference of opinions. Individual communists considered such an arrangement as excessively troublesome. Supposedly the repair work could not be done seriously and it would be difficult to make the special training effective. Hence the work of the combat shaping up of the crew should be put off "until the ocean." To the honor of a majority of the communists of the "Yaroslavskiy Komsomolets," it must be said that they were decisively in favor of a more rational way. After the meeting, together with the subunit commanders, we fought out how to use the training facilities more effectively. Exercise plans were drawn up and approved. The sailors set specific socialist pledges for the pre-voyage period. The submarine control simulator provided an opportunity for the watch officers and the entire crew of the main control room to deepen their knowledge and acquire teamwork in actions. The engine room personnel and the electricians gained useful knowledge in the electrical engineering lab, while specialists from the torpedo combat department did the same in the torpedo firing classroom.

Did all of this cause even the slightest damage to the quality of preparing the equipment for the voyage? Not in the least. Judge for yourselves: the "Yaroslavskiy Komsomolets" traveled thousands of miles on a long voyage without having a single technical failure or the slightest breakdown in the equipment and mechanisms. Incidentally, we were able to reduce by almost one-half the time allocated under the plan for passing the course problems which preceded the voyage, due to the well organized training at the base. The grades for the combat exercises were also high.

But still the capabilities of the training base, as the range of practices showed, have not been fully utilized. And in particular, individual watch officers during a difficult situation of training combat, worked with excessive glances at the commander, and at times reduced their role to a relay of commands and orders. And the mistakes which individual young officers initially made at sea went back precisely to mistakes in shore training. In the exercises they did not always introduce the element of competitiveness, while the tactical background of individual training sessions had a low coefficient of complexity in comparison with real situations. Unfortunately, these mistakes had to be eliminated at sea.

Capt-Lt V. Sukhachev, my first mate, inevitably performed well in the role of a watch officer, showing reasonable initiative in working out decisions for a maneuver or attack. And this is not surprising as during the unannounced quizzes and training sessions he tried to test himself with the most complex inputs, and each day for him at the base was scheduled down to the minute. Incidentally it should be noted that precisely the tactical and sea skills of the officer polished up in the long cruise served for the senior chiefs as a basis for the recent promotion of Capt-Lt Sukhachev as executive officer.

How were the days at sea of the "Yaroslavskiy Komsomolets" filled? In the distant ocean meridians, the submariners improved their skills under conditions as close as possible to actual combat. Having a good shore and range "backlog," it was possible to boldly introduce an unique coefficient of complexity into each training session and exercise.

As an example, I might just give the training of the crew in damage control procedures with the submarine underway. When, after the end of the first weeks of the voyage, the sailors had mastered virtually the entire standard range of inputs for "fires" and "ruptures," the commander of the electro-mechanical combat department Engr-Capt-Lt V. Voyevodin proposed that the sailors from different compartments change places in the damage control exercises.

Certainly, a sea watch at battle stations was stood according to schedule. Hence, the men who knew the compartment perfectly were always present in it, monitoring the actions of the "guests."

And the rational core of the idea of the mechanical engineer was as follows. In principle, a situation is possible where a sailor may be in an unfamiliar compartment at a time when its personnel will be forced to carry out damage control measures. Hence, the sailor should know how to act in a different compartment and how to help him comrades. Moreover, we felt that the new form of training would increase the interest of the submariners in deepening their knowledge on the design of the entire ship, and this was also important for raising the combat teamwork of the crew.

We were not mistaken in our suppositions. And life brought us an unplanned surprise--and a pleasant one. As we had seen in conducting the training in adjacent compartments, the sailors acquired a good psychological lift caused by the change in situation and the newness of the conditions.

The new form of training also provided a new incentive for the competition and enriched its content. While previously it was carried out basically between the combat shifts, it now developed between the compartments as well, and what a competition it was! The men were really interested....

However, it must be admitted that not all the commanders of the subunits immediately understood what effect could be achieved by the creative approach to organizing a competition during the voyage. The question was also impeded by a lack of procedural skills on the part of certain officers. For example, the group commander, Engr-Lt V. Kozlov, in summing up the results, noted only the outstanding men, and felt it extraneous to compare the results of the competing sailors. Sr Lt V. Popov at times merely limited himself to merely repeating in his statements the individual comments made previously by the commander.

We have made it a rule that an officer, in preparing to sum up the results, compares the indicators of his subordinates recorded in the logs for the

individual types of training with the points of the sailors' pledges set for the period of the voyage or for the week. It has become a compulsory demand for the subunit commanders not only to determine those ahead, but also to analyze the reasons for the lag of individual men, and to take measures to give them specific help. In each subunit, combat leaflets are put out for the results of the day, and news photographs and satirical "expresses" came out regularly.

The ocean has made it an inviolable law for us that the socialist competition be a continuous process, and the level and intensity of it should be high regardless of what type of activity the crew is engaged in.

In following the example of the crew of the atomic missile submarine which was the initiator of the competition among the sailors to properly celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Great October Revolution, the sailors of our ship have accepted high socialist pledges. We see our task in the new training year to avoid the mistakes of the past and, relying on the best features in our experience, to use each minute of combat training with maximum effectiveness and high quality, no matter where the crew happens to be, at the base or at sea, for further raising the combat readiness of the boat.

Naval Aviation ASW Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Jan 77 p 2

[Article by Col (Res) A. Pyatkov, honored military pilot of the USSR: "Antisubmariners"]

[Text] The amphibious aircraft, with its engines roaring, took off into the overcast sky. With its unusually shaped wings, it looked like a giant sea gull. Maj V. Tsokolov watched the airplane until it disappeared in the leaden clouds, and then having made a note in the plan table, moved his hand along the arm of his chair and looks questioningly at the meteorologist on duty. He nodded promisingly, everything was in order, the weather would not fail.

I understood this silent dialogue. In the morning I had been present during the analysis of the weather situation, and knew that it was not easy for Tsokolov to take the decision for the flights. The weather map was sprinkled with signs showing a possible change in the weather. The squadron commander with the meteorologist on board had taken off for reconnaissance, and while in the air had radioed back that they would fly.

And now the flights were under way. The commander of the ASW squadron, Maj Tsokolov, directed his subordinates on the ground and in the air calmly and with confidence. With unexpected complications in the situation on the route or at the range, he did not become excited or hurry, but also was not long in taking the decision. I watched the precise actions

of the major, and I recalled the comment about him made by the aviation commander of the Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet, Lt Gen Avn A. Pavlovskiy: "An exacting officer, he has been able to organize the training process well. And he controls the flights skillfully."

This squadron for 3 years running has held the title of outstanding. The aviators are endeavoring to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Great October Revolution with new successes in military service. The detachment under the command of Maj V. Mirnyy holds first place in the squadron for the basic indicators in military and political training.

The training missions grow more complex from flight to flight. Considering this, the commander is constantly concerned for raising the quality of the exercises and training sessions, and sees to it that they are carried out in a spirit of healthy rivalry in the struggle for effectively working out each element of piloting techniques and combat usage.

"For example, the taking off of the amphibious aircraft from the water or a landing," said Maj Tsokolov in a conversation. "Seemingly it is an ordinary thing. The pilots are trained. However, each time when flights are to be made from the sea base, it is wise to recall the particular features of piloting. The landing is no easy thing, if a fresh wind blows up the waves...."

I listened to the squadron commander and recalled the distant August day in 1941. On that day, my airplane was shot down over the Gulf of Finland. Somewhere between Helsinki and Tallin, when both motors of my shot-through DB-3 bomber ceased functioning and the airplane became unusually heavy and uncontrollable. In order to maintain speed, I moved the controls away from me. The altitude rapidly declined. When there were just 50 meters to the water, I warned the crew that I would be setting it down. The navigator, Sr Lt Volkov, the gunner-radio operator Sgt Nevredov, and the air gunner Sn Belousov greeted this decision in silence.

The whitecaps helped me determine the leveling off altitude. In pulling the controls toward myself, I began to bring it down on the water. And immediately you were aware the water was hard. In truth, everyone escaped unscathed. The aircraft began to sink quickly, and we were scarcely to pull the rubber liferaft out of it. Sometime later, we were picked up by a patrol boat which was on duty in the area assigned to it.

Certainly there is, as they say, a substantial difference between actual combat and flights to carry out combat training missions. But there is also something in common, a maximum intensity and the exhausting complexity of tacking at low altitudes, when hour after hour there are only whitecaps under the wing. The crews of the squadron headed by Maj Tsokolov search for and detect not surface vessels which are clearly visible from far off, but rather submarines which skillfully maneuver in the depths of the sea.

I was told about the difficulties of locating an underwater target by the navigator of the subunit, Maj S. Lipatov. "The noises of the return signals," he explained, "must be analyzed instantly. Otherwise the mission is not carried out and the crew is in disgrace. For an experienced navigator, the opportunities of the search equipment, it can be said, increase significantly, and no interference can confuse him. Without delay he is able to classify the signals according to all the features, and hence the success of the strike is guaranteed." The pilot, Sr Lt V. Strogantsev, and the squadron signals chief, Capt M. Yakut, shared their impressions on the flights over the sea. "The success of an aerial search," noted Strogantsev, "requires well coordinated actions by the crew members. Combat teamwork determines everything. The reciprocal understanding must be complete. To put it simply, everything depends upon the teamwork and feeling of mutual help."

A feeling of the mutual help of a comrade, the spirit of friendship and collectivism. How essential these qualities are for each flyer during a flight over the sea! Whether it is the first or the twentieth or any other flight, if there is no ground under the wing, moral strain and psychological stresses inevitably make themselves felt. And, of course, it is easier to fly and there is greater confidence in the success of the very complex mission, if the crew members understand each other completely.

At one of the meetings with one of the young navy flyers, the aviation commander of the Navy, Col Gen Avn A. Mironenko told about the specific features of flights over the ocean and the skill and courage needed in order to successfully carry out the missions far from the home shores. The combat veteran gave instructive examples from actual experience. He shared his ideas on the development of the volitional qualities of character and the necessity of firm special knowledge and skills. He also spoke of the need to become used to the sea.

Getting used to the sea.... Maj Tsokolov expressed his opinion on this question simply: "When you first see the expanse of water stretching from horizon to horizon, you feel a chill run through you. But now, if I do not see the glint of water under the wing, I become bored."

Confidence, professionalism and purposefulness--these qualities of character among the squadron aviators are clearly manifested in their military deeds. They carry out their duties cheerfully, without whining, although in training and service they must overcome many difficulties. Their garrison is a piece of land surrounded by water, as they say a "dime" located far from population points. And here the club, of course, is no municipal theater, and the school is also no ten-year one. Starting with the fourth grade, each day the children are delivered by launch to a secondary school located on the opposite shore.

We spoke with Maj Valeriy Tsokolov and his deputy for political affairs Maj Gennadiy Bobin about the life and service of the personnel in the squadron. In describing how the experience of the finest personnel is

propagandized, Maj Bobin, a military pilot first class, mentioned the names of the leaders of the competition, including Capt D. Sevost'yanov, Sr Lts A. Akhmed'yanov and V. Nikitin, WOs [praporshchik] A. Yartsev and Yu. Kurzov, and other aviators and masters of military affairs. And I recalled the portraits that I saw in the squadron's room of military glory showing the frontliners who served in the squadron during the years of the Great Patriotic War. Young, energetic, full of intelligence and feeling, there were the faces of Lt Col Il'ya Ponomarenko, Jam Ivan Orlenko, Capt Ivan Tikhomirov, Sr Lt Mikhail Borisov and others, living and fallen in combat, decorated and undecorated with the gold stars of the heroes. They did not serve in our regiment, but those mentioned above by name, I knew more than 3 decades ago. I met them at the forward airfields. And sometimes in the air, when jointly we bombed the Nazi naval bases, torpedoed Nazi ships and laid mines on enemy channels.

And involuntarily I thought about the strong spiritual closeness of the generations of military pilots. The traditions of the frontliners are alive and constantly being added to in the actions of the young aviators. There is the same energy and will. And there is the same eternal youth of the defenders of the motherland ready to carry out a valorous feat in combat.

Simulators Used for Training Naval Crewmen

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Jan 77 p 1

[Article by Engr-Capt 2d Rank A. Kontiyevskiy: "A 'Fire' in the Artillery Magazine"]

[Text] A red light flashed on the control panel.

"A fire in the artillery magazine!" thought WO [michman] A. Shpak immediately. "The automatic fire extinguishing system should be turned on now."

However, a second passed and then another, but there was no signal that the automatic system was operating. What had happened? The warrant officer tried to use the remote control for the system from the action station. But this also did not help. Hence the fire had already damaged the electrical wiring. The crew petty officer had never gotten in such a situation before, but without becoming confused, he immediately turned on the fire extinguishing system by hand. The fire was put out. On the lightboard there flashed "Check."

The warrant officer was fighting the fire, as they say, hypothetically. No "fire" had broken out on the ship. This was a practical exercise in a classroom using a special simulator designed by Engr Capt 3d Rank A. Ignatov. And he was leading the exercises.

Then WO A. Shpak received several inputs, and again his actions were flawless. It seemed as if the crew petty officer had gone through a trial of fire and water before learning the damage control procedures so confidently. In fact, A. Shpak had only trained on the simulator. But on the ships, the attitude for this course is one of great confidence, almost like actual experience. This is because the value of the skills acquired by the sailors on the simulator have been affirmed in the course of carrying out combat training missions.

At present, in preparing for a long voyage, virtually all the ship specialists have an opportunity to "freshen up" their skills, and to raise their practical abilities, in training directly at their action stations. But many, for example the sonar and radar operators, in addition have simulators. But how can the practical skills be improved for those sailors who operate damage control systems? Certainly while anchored at the base, these systems must be constantly ready for use. Even the inspections and adjustments here necessitate the observance of increased caution. This question, it must be said, has long concerned the ship commanders, the flagship specialists and the mechanical engineers. Various training devices and simulators have been created. However, the most successful solution has been found by Engr-Capt 3d Rank A. Ignatov. He has designed and made an automatic trainer-tester which operates according to eight programs. The dimensions of the automatic training device are small and it will easily fit in any classroom. And the effectiveness of the simulator is significant. And most importantly, with great simplicity in operation, it makes it possible to create conditions very close to real emergencies during the training sessions.

A group of sailors from a destroyer have arrived for training. Sr Sn V. Makarov is at the controls of the simulator. He came on board relatively recently. However, his service duties presuppose a flawless knowledge of the automatic explosion and firefighting system, and the ability to service and use it. The senior seaman answered theoretical questions rather confidently, but he executed the practical actions cautiously, as if fearing to make a mistake. Here you could feel a lack of experience. For this reason, V. Makarov had an assignment which was simpler than WO A. Shpak. Moreover, under these conditions, the simulator would immediately "suggest" whether the specialist was acting correctly or not.

Somewhere after the sixth switching, the trainer "did not permit" any further actions to be carried out. It turned out that Sr Sn V. Makarov had not followed the work sequence. Now he would have to do everything over, or, having corrected the mistake, go on to the next operation. Having mastered this comparatively simple program, the specialist is then able to begin working through it under a more rigid time limit, and then go on to the following program.

In the fleet, the design of Engr-Capt 3d Rank Ignatov has been well received, and such simulators have appeared in many units. An analysis of the data

indicates that the automatic training device makes it possible to reduce the training time of the specialists by 3 fold.

...The command is given to bring the automatic device to the starting position. The next specialist is called to the controls. He will put out fires and combat a suddenly rising temperature in the artillery magazines.... Certainly this is all conditional, as is the case in training, but this is to develop real, firm skills of operating one's department and which are so essential for a sailor during a cruise and in combat.

Combat Training Results of Ship Commanders

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Jan 77 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank F. Tevyanskiy, fleet staff officer: "The Style of Work: Creativity and Routine"]

[Text] The analysis of the exercise was long over. However the ship commanders and the staff officers were in no hurry to leave. They were exchanging opinions, they were propounding their views, and endeavoring to put themselves in the place of the commanders whose actions today had been thoroughly examined and assessed by the senior chief.

The admiral, in starting the analysis, drew the attention of the officers to the fact that all the ships had been under equal conditions. But the results of their actions in training action had varied.

In actuality, the submarine commanded by Capt 2d Rank A. Karlov had carried out its mission very effectively. It quickly detected the "enemy," it established the main target and attacked it immediately. But the surface ship personnel under the command of Capt 2d Rank A. Shakun showed restraint in their actions. They were late in taking up an advantageous position for combat, they closed with the "enemy" rather indecisively, and here did not achieve true interaction.

In a word, the successes of some and the mistakes of others were obvious. But the reasons for them were less apparent. Moreover as in experience and tactical skills, the ship commanders were equally qualified.

As it turned out, the outcome of this combat had been determined by the moment that the commanders reported to the flagship that their crews were ready for the exercise. This was because officers A. Karlov and A. Shakun had rather different notions of the content of training, and viewed its role differently in the forthcoming combat.

How did the commanders prepare for action?

Capt 2d Rank A. Karlov first of all drew attention to the punctuality and preciseness in carrying out the requirements of the regulations, as well as a procedural succession and carefulness of the training. He analyzed in detail the capabilities of the "enemy," its strong and weak points. In particular, the submariners studied the character of the sonar signals, the noises generated by the propellers of surface vessels at different speeds, and they calculated the probable ranges for detecting the "enemy" under the conditions of the assumed sonar intensity. The calculations were made for all phases of combat in all its possible variations.

The submarine commander involved in this work all the specialists from the ship action crew, seeing to it that they were fully aware of the actions which the crew would be carrying out in the training action. Moreover, Karlov proposed that all officers submit their own proposals for the more efficient use of the equipment and weapons. After this, he prepared several versions for the action plan. Of course, the commander was aware that it was impossible to anticipate everything ahead of time or to precisely model the action. But the standard variations which could easily be corrected were not only thought out but also worked out by the submariners.

Capt 2d Rank A. Shakun prepared differently for the exercise. He did not feel it necessary to examine several versions of the forthcoming training actions. In relying on his experience and intuition, the officer selected, in his opinion, the most probable case and the plan was worked out for this. This was entrusted to a narrow group of persons. Many of the officers were left on the sidelines. Their activities and exercises with subordinates prior to setting to sea, although having an intensive character, did not show a clear and specific purpose.

Shakun himself, obviously, relied primarily on his skills, tactical initiative and creativity in the course of combat. At least he gave little attention to a preliminary preparation of the plan. And, farmed out completely to subordinates, the plan, in the level of its elaboration and quality, of course, did not exceed the level of the tactical knowledge of the executors. The contents of the plan were influenced by the unjustified caution, a certain superficiality, and the hope that the situation would favor the surface ships....

But in reality, the situation was much more complicated. And Capt 2d Rank A. Shakun was unable to readapt quickly.

Thus, the differing approach to the preparations led to different results in combat. Here one could feel the strong aspects in the style of work of one commander and the shortcomings and flaws in the style of the other. And the question arises automatically: wouldn't it be simpler for all the ship commanders, in preparing for the exercises, to use a single stereotype, where the volume, sequence and quality of the necessary work would be strictly batched out?

Yes, precisely this is needed by a young, beginning ship commander. However, too rigid regulation of a commander's activity would scarcely be beneficial for an officer who has already developed his own style, his tactical character and who is searching for new ways to raise the combat readiness of the ship. This is particularly so in the period of preparing for training actions. For this reason, it is essential to speak of a specific style of a specific commander both in conducting training actions and in preparing for them. Moreover, the senior chiefs must help an officer determine and find his own tactical style, help to develop strong individual qualities in the commander and at the same time learn to overcome shortcomings and critically assess his activities.

Naturally, it was not without the influence of the flag officer that both initiative, carefulness and thoroughness were developed in the action style of Capt 2d Rank A. Karlov (incidentally, these qualities were conditioned by a profound awareness of the content and purpose of the tactical regulations). And they made it possible for the submarine commander at sea to act confidently, boldly, and truly creatively.

The submariners did not make a single mistake, in responding flexibly and intelligently to the changing situation. The subsequent analysis of their actions showed that one of the previously elaborated variations was very close to the actual one. This freed the commander and the entire ship action crew from the labor-consuming "rough" work, and the wasting of effort on an initial analysis of the situation; it made it possible to devote all attention to a more careful and precise execution of the combat maneuvering and the attack itself. During all of this, a calm and professional situation was maintained on the submarine, and this actively aided the achieving of success.

But Capt 2d Rank A. Shakun clearly overestimated his abilities. It happens that one or another success in combat which comes without any particular effort creates in the commander an illusion of the ease of combat at sea and the notion that careful preparatory efforts are unneeded. The extremely incorrect notion arises of the very character of the commander's creativity.

Capt 2d Rank A. Shakun obviously had decided that the forthcoming mission differed little from those which he had carried out previously, and at the same time was hoping on the knowledge and experience which would help him correctly find his way in the actual situation.

But as is often the case, the situation was not the ordinary one. And the only version of the plan which had been prepared could not encompass the situation. The commander was forced to immediately seek a way out of the situation, to give new intermediate missions to his subordinates, but they, without understanding the idea of the commander, were unable to effectively help in carrying out this plan. Precious time was lost on all sorts of clarifications and coordination, the analysis of the situation was

superficial, and an atmosphere of nervousness developed at the main command post.

Unfortunately, not only certain ship commanders but also individual senior chiefs feel that the style of a commander's combat actions can be developed only at sea. Of course, no theoretical exercises, group exercises, work on simulators, or even training on regulation equipment at the base can replace training at sea or on a cruise for either the crew or the commander. Precisely here, under conditions as close as possible to actual combat, and in comprehensively carrying out the combat training missions, the commander reinforces his knowledge, he sharpens his practical skills, he improves his tactical mastery, and acquires psychological conditioning. But all of this is possible only with a most serious attitude toward shore training.

Practice shows that even the simplest training combat does not forego a commander's complacency, presumption or disregard of preparatory work. For the arts of tactics never stand still. What yesterday the commander, for example, considered new and original in opposing a rival, may not bring the desired victory in repeating it today.

The overestimation of one's capabilities is sometimes manifested in the fact that the commander, in himself preparing carefully for action, feels it necessary to give his plans (without any special reason for this) to just a narrow group of officers. But certainly collective thought and a collective search largely determine the success in tactical creativity and the success in using the weapons.

The 25th CPSU Congress noted the dependency of successful leadership upon the style of work. And this dependency can clearly be traced in the activities of a commander. The times require that a ship commander be a searching and enterprising leader who is favorably inclined to innovation both in training and in indoctrination.

A creative style of work presupposes one other important demand on an officer who heads a fighting collective, and this is tenacity and an unswerving will to carry out one's decision. This is one of the basic distinctions of the intellectual labor of a commander. He should be able not only to correct his intentions and plans quickly, along the way, but also achieve their implementation decisively. The creativity of a commander is always apparent in the end results, that is, in the victories won. This is the first criterion for the style of a commander's work. And if you have failed, if you have not been able to use all opportunities for achieving success in combat, this means you must pay close attention to your style of work to see where the flaws are.

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CSO: 1801

REACTIONS TO NEWSPAPER CRITICISM OF UNIT COMMANDER DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Jan 77 p 2

[Article by Lt Col Justice I. Vashkevich, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent:
"A Lack of Principle"]

[Text] During those 2 weeks when Sgt. N. Andryunin was being treated in the hospital, none of his fellow servicemen risked visiting him. They feared falling in disgrace with Lt Col A. Bezbakh. But when the sergeant was discharged from the hospital and returned back to the subunit, the lieutenant colonel, upon first meeting him, was not interested in his state of health but rather how many days of arrest he had missed in the guard house because of illness. Tears of resentment returned to his eyes from such a "lot" and by evening the sergeant was back in the hospital bed.

The instance, need it be said, is an exceptional one. It goes beyond any limits of ordinary dealings between servicemen, and contradicts the tradition of an attentive, considerate and benevolent approach by the commanders and superiors to their subordinates. But the question of how this could happen was still not raised, and the deputy regimental commander for political affairs, Maj S. Voloshin, had already informed me:

"We had a talk about sensitivity," and showed me the minutes of a session of the party committee.

And in fact, precisely on those days when the described events were unfolding, the regimental party committee had discussed the article "A Lack of Sensitivity" published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 8 October 1976, and had recommended that the communist officers delve more deeply into the daily needs of the personnel, and be more responsive to the requests of the men. And when the sergeant was back in the hospital, Maj Voloshin himself submitted to the political department a report on the measures taken in pursuit of the newspaper's actions. Thus there had actually been a "talk about sensitivity" in the regiment. It was only unclear why such well documented words did not as yet result in deeds, and what had prevented, for example, Lt Col Bezbakh from establishing normal, that is, according to the regulations, relationships with his subordinates?

Alas, the very work "regulation" was not once mentioned by the lieutenant colonel in explaining his actions. It seems, at one time, he had been concerned for granting Sgt Andryunin a short leave because of family circumstances. And he was concerned, incidentally, without having sufficient basis. And since that time he assumed that by the trip home the sergeant was totally bound to him personally. And what his indignation was when he learned that precisely Andryunin had written to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "The personnel of the squad which I command has no permanent place in the barracks." And the fact that this was the truth and the sergeant had showed praiseworthy tenacity in concern for his subordinates was of no importance for Comrade Bezbakh. The main thing was that Andryunin turned out to be an "ungrateful" person and the chief considered it possible to employ his power to wound the "stubborn man."

Yes, the word "regulation" was not uttered by the lieutenant colonel in our talk. And the conflict itself arose precisely because the chief actually disregarded the standards of the regulations which set out his relations with subordinates. And where the exactingness of the regulations and the concern of the regulations for subordinates are replaced by personal "generosities" or by personal dislike of the superior it is possible to have what occurred to Sgt Andryunin after his writing to the newspaper.

Certainly it would have been possible to avoid the unpleasant incident if the party committee had shown proper principles in discussing the letter "A Lack of Sensitivity." The letter, itself, began with a story of how Maj A. Tarasyuk constantly rebuked Sgt Andryunin for the letter to the editors. However, the name of communist Tarasyuk was not even mentioned at the party committee meeting. And is this surprising? Certainly in order to provide a just evaluation of the suppression of criticism, certain committee members should have also discussed their own unpleasant actions in this story, and evidently the comrades did not have enough courage for this.

The deputy regimental commander for political affairs also did not take a just position. Instead of supporting a proper attitude toward the case and the public action of Sgt Andryunin, Maj Voloshin saw in the appeal of the squad commander to the editors a certain infraction of the procedures for submitting complaints. He even endeavored to refer to articles of the Disciplinary Regulations, although here there is and cannot be any prohibition for the servicemen to state their judgements in the press. And while the political worker was searching for nonexistent "arguments," the suppressors of criticism, as we already know, acted truly against the regulations.

We should note something else. In the report submitted by Maj Voloshin to the political department, it was announced that certain officers of the regimental medical service had been regrouped. However, during the recent months, judging from the service files of these officers, only commendations had been given to them.

At the same time, with a truly thorough discussion of the question raised by the newspaper, they could not have limited themselves to just the facts given in the letters. The regimental commander and his deputies, as well as the members of the party committee, in speaking about consideration for people, would have been obliged, for example, to say whether in the regimental barracks there were drying rooms, whether the first personal service room in the district had regained its former fame, and whether the soldier's tearoom had become a place for interesting relaxation.... But I did not see a word of this either in the decision of the party committee or in the report to the political department.

The letter "A Lack of Sensitivity" was published in October of last year. Only a month later did the already known report on the purportedly taken measures come in to the political department, where it was filed in the other "incoming matters".... As yet the editors have not received a reply to the newspaper's action. And this again shows the practice which has become established in the political body of not responding correctly to criticism in the press.

Recently at our request the editors received a letter signed by the deputy chief of the Political Directorate of the Transcaucasian Military District, Col L Sharashenidze. Obviously, in referring completely to the same report of Maj Voloshin he announced that the fact of the incorrect attitude of Lt Col A. Bezbakh to Sgt N. Andryunin "had not been established." By fortuitous coincidence, the letter had been sent from the political directorate on the very day that the correspondent met with Lt Col Bezbakh and precisely established that, alas!, this was the case.

Now, it must be assumed, the district political directorate will go more deeply into what has happened, and take truly effective measures to eliminate the shortcomings disclosed by the newspaper. It is impossible not to do this as it is a question of principledness, an attitude toward criticism, and respect for the demands of our military regulations.

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CSO: 1801

BOOK ON CARPATHIAN MILITARY DISTRICT REVIEWED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Jan 77 p 2

[Review by Gen Arm I Shavrov, chief of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov, of the book "Krasnoznamenny Prikarpat'skiy" [The Red Banner Carpathian Military District] Izdatel'stvo Kamenyar, L'vov, 1976, 248 pp, price 1 ruble 41 kopecks]

[Text] For more than 3 decades, the Red Banner Carpathian Military District has been defending the western and southwestern frontiers of our motherland. The history of the district is the subject of the work which has just been published in L'vov "Krasnoznamenny Prikarpat'skiy." Created during the victorious year of 1945, the district incorporated many famous formations and units. Thousands upon thousands of valorous defenders of the motherland fought under their colors and performed unprecedented feats. Some 700 of them received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The rich military traditions of the district serve as a powerful means for the political and military indoctrination of the soldiers, sergeants and officers.

The troops of the district are stationed on the territory of several oblasts. The book provides a brief description of their historical features, the participation of the workers in socialist construction and in the fight against the Nazi invaders, and it tells about the growing friendship of the peoples of our fatherland. It is noted that during the years of the Civil War and foreign military intervention, here units of the young Red Army defeated large detachments of White Guards and bourgeois nationalists, along with the foreign interventionists. Here also fierce battles raged against the Nazi invaders. The book devotes a particular place to the operations of the troops of the Soviet Army during the years of the Great Patriotic War on the territory where the troops of the district are presently stationed, as well as to the military feats of our soldiers who participated in the battles. In the summer of 1941, here fierce, bloody battles were waged by the formations of the 5th, 6th, 12th and 26th armies of the Southwestern Front, as well as units and subunits of the border troops. Their actions helped to thwart the Nazi plan of a blitzkrieg. The heroic feat of the men of these armies who received the colossal strike by the Nazi military machine

and the activities of the military councils, staffs and commanders such as M. Kirponos, I. Muzychenko, P. Ponedelin, F. Kostenko and others are properly described in the work.

The work also treats the heroic struggle of the Soviet people against the Nazi occupiers on the temporarily occupied territory of the district. It is pointed out that the partisans in the western oblasts of the Ukraine made a significant contribution to the nation-wide cause of defeating the Nazi invaders. The work gives a large place to describing the expulsion of the Nazi occupiers from the right-bank Ukraine by the Soviet Army and the liberation mission of the Soviet forces in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania. The authors of the materials published in the work clearly indicate the increased strength of the crushing strikes by the Soviet forces against the enemy and the grandiose scope of their offensive operations. For example, they give the following data: By the start of the L'vov-Sandomir Operation, the First Ukrainian Front which was fighting on the territory of the district had 1.2 million men, around 14,000 guns and mortars, 2,200 tanks and SAU [assault guns] and over 2,800 airplanes. This was a colossal force which crushed the opposing enemy grouping almost a million strong. The scope of the operation was also grandiose, deploying in a zone 400 km wide and 350 km deep.

The operations conducted showed the military talents of the Mars SU G. Zhukov and I. Konev, Gens N. Vatutin, I. Petrov, A. Grechko, K. Moskalenko, N. Pukhov, D. Lelyushenko, P. Rybalko and others. The successes of our troops were provided by the high organized, purposeful and continuous party political work. Its organizers were the military councils and political bodies of the fronts and armies, and these were headed by experienced party workers.

The work clearly shows the diverse and purposeful activities of the chief of the political department of the 18th Army, Gen L. I. Brezhnev. Using specific examples, the role of the political workers is shown in mobilizing the men of the army to successfully carry out the combat missions. Boldness, creative initiative, loyalty to party principles, decisiveness in taking and implementing decisions, personal valor, and a desire to always be in the thick of events, in the regiments, battalions, companies, directly at the forward positions, and on the main axis, and a combining of great exactingness with constant concern for the needs of the men--these were distinguishing traits of L. I. Brezhnev.

The authors of the work thoroughly bring out the mass heroism of the Soviet troops, their courage and valor shown in the battles on the Ukrainian land and in liberating the European nations. The reader will learn of the feat of the fighter pilot, Sr Lt I. Ivanov, who at dawn of 22 June 1941, at 0425 hours rammed a Nazi airplane. Exceptional tenacity and courage were shown during the first days of the war by the artillery troops of the 1st Antitank Brigade under the command of Gen K. Moskalenko. Their defense on the Lutsk axis was unbreakable for the units of the Nazi 14th Tank Division.

In February 1944, in the battles on the Styr' River, an immortal feat was performed by two Soviet soldiers, the Russian Viktor Yershov and the Uzbek Neymat Khakimov. In rescuing wounded comrades, with antitank grenades in their hands they threw themselves under the tracks of two enemy tanks and blew them up. At the site of their death, near the village of Balakhovich on the boundary of Rovenskaya and Volynskaya oblasts, there now stands an obelisk recalling this feat. Scores of hero soldiers were entered in perpetuity on the rolls of the units of the First and Fourth Ukrainian fronts.

The book also describes in detail the postwar period of the district's life. It tells of those formations and units which have formed it, their military traditions and rich combat experience. These traditions and experience worthily serve the cause of indoctrinating the new generations of soldiers, of improving their military skills, raising combat readiness and mastering the new models of weapons and military equipment. The book tells of the unflagging practical activities to strengthen the combat readiness of the troops carried out by Mar SU I. Konev, Gens A. Yeremenko, K. Moskalenko, M. Popov, K. Galitskiy and others.

The process of military and political training of the district troops as well as all party-political work have been constantly under the unflagging attention of the military council and the political directorate of the district, and the party organizations of the army collectives. The leadership of the activities of the political bodies at that time was provided by the prominent political workers, Gens K. Kraynyukov, A. Yepishev, S. Mel'nikov, K. Sorokin and others. From July 1945 through June 1946, Gen L. I. Brezhnev was the chief of the district political directorate. By his unflagging and diverse activities in this position, Leonid Il'ich [Brezhnev] made a substantial contribution to raising the combat capability of the district troops. He was often among the troops, he knew their needs well, and took prompt and effective measures to satisfy these needs. His talent for party political leadership of the Leninist type at that time gained new facets.

An important place in the work has been given to the period of the fundamental changes in military affairs. On the basis of the rapid development of Soviet industry and scientific and technical progress, models of modern, more powerful weapons and modern military equipment have appeared. A complete rearming of the district troops was carried out. In a dialectical unity with this process, the methods of troop combat were also improved. The arming of the Soviet Army and Navy with nuclear missile weapons had a particular influence on their change. In a special chapter, the authors examine the basic processes of the revolution in military affairs which have involved the organizational structure of the district troops and all their military activities. It gives many instructive examples from the practices of military and political training and troop exercises and maneuvers. The experience is generalized of improving the style of troops leadership and party political work, and for improving the organization of the socialist competition in the district units and formations. Here also the

basic aspects are examined in the birth and development of military cooperation with the armies of the fraternal Warsaw Pact countries, as based upon the principles of proletarian, socialist internationalism. Many new names are given of the outstanding men during these years, the inheritors of the glory and military traditions of the district.

A special chapter is devoted to the last 10-year period in the life of the district. From specific examples, the authors show the activities of the military council, the commanders and political workers, the party and Komso-mol organizations in mobilizing all the army collectives to fulfill high socialist pledges. In the course of the socialist competition, the activity of the servicemen has increased, many have mastered related specialties, while the staffs have received thousands of different rationalization proposals.

The men of the Carpathian District have marked the major dates of our history--the 50th anniversary of the Great October Revolution, the 50th anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces and the centennial of V. I. Lenin--with high indicators. On 15 January 1974, by an Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Carpathian Military District was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for a great contribution to strengthening the defense might of the Soviet state and its armed defense, and for successes in military and political training. Inspired by the high governmental award, the men of the district with even greater enthusiasm are continuing to improve their military skills, to master the complex military equipment, to improve field and air skills, and to strengthen military discipline, organization and order.

Recently, I spoke with the troop commander of the Red Banner Carpathian Military District, Col Gen V. Varennikov, who completed our academy in 1967 with a gold medal. He said that the year 1976 has remained in the memory of the Carpathian troops as a year of great undertakings, a year of the historic 25th CPSU Congress and the start of the 10th Five-Year Plan. The Carpathian troops have set new, increased socialist pledges. In the future they will honorably carry out their sacred duty of defending the peaceful labor of the Soviet people.

In conclusion, I would like to note that the book "Krasnoznamenny Prikarpat'skiy" has been written on a documentary basis, in a lively intelligent style, it is well illustrated and is interesting to read. Interesting appendices are found at the end as reference material. The handsome format of the book is largely due to the L'vov Izdatel'stvo Kamenyar. The book will undoubtedly be positively received among the military community and a broad group of Soviet readers.

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CSO: 1801

POOR PHYSICAL CONDITION OF WARRANT OFFICERS CRITICIZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Jan 77 p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Guk: "The Warrant Officers Forgotten"]

[Text] The pontoon battalion under the command of Lt Col S. Stepin had to support the crossing of a water obstacle for advancing subunits. "To whom should the most difficult thing, the reconnaissance of the river, be entrusted?" thought the officer. "Certainly the men are tired out from the march."

Behind the subunit were scores of kilometers over the training roads, and each new segment of the route had come with difficulty. The heavy special vehicles often were stuck in the sand. It seemed that a little more and the equipment would not hold out. However, regardless of the great intensity, the men continued to carry out the combat training missions confidently.

The commander's attention was caught by the thick-set figure of WO (praporshchik) V. Samsonenko. Who else but him, a candidate master of sports, a decathalon athlete, and to other equally fit and able men should the responsible and difficult mission be entrusted to?

Soon the reconnaissance of the water obstacle had been completed. Based upon the data submitted by WO Samsonenko, the battalion commander took the optimum decision. And again work got under way. Everyone worked as if there had not been any long difficult march or sleepless nights. In looking at their commanders, WOs A. Kurochka, V. Zheltyshev and others, the subordinates endeavored to keep pace with them. Having significantly exceeded the standards, the specialists put up the crossing ahead of the established time. And immediately equipment began to move across it. A fierce battle broke out with renewed strength on the opposite shore.

The men of the battalion have always excelled in good field skills and a high level of physical conditioning. As not only this exercise has shown, but also other ones, the personnel here are capable of enduring great physical and psychological stresses. In the battalion equal attention is

given to the physical conditioning of both the officers and their immediate assistants, the warrant officers. For this category of servicemen, exercises at the sports compound are organized regularly. Short forced marches are a customary phenomenon in the subunit. Rather frequently Lt Col Stepin and other officers train the warrant officers at the obstacle course. And naturally here many of the warrant officers are high-class athletes. Their skill and fondness of sports, like a baton, are passed on, in turn, to the soldiers. For this reason the pontoon troops work so ably and without fatigue under conditions as close as possible to actual combat.

The missions which the men carry out in the course of training are continuously made more complicated. The stress on the human organism is increased, and the demands on the man's physical and psychological endurance are raised. This is understood well by the commanders of the leading subunits. In being concerned with the conditioning of the personnel, the officers, in organizing physical training and mass sports work, endeavor to rely on the warrant officers, as, for example, in the battalion commanded by Lt Col Stepin. But such a practice is not the case everywhere.

The following instance comes to mind. In physical training exercises in a tank company, the soldiers under the leadership of the sergeants were exercising on the sports equipment. The warrant officer stood by watching their actions. From time to time, without moving, he shouted out "recommendations" and gave "advice" to those who did not carry out the assignment.

"Take off your coat and show us how the move should be done," they suggested to P. Sapchuk.

The warrant officer was indignant: "I can't even remember when the last time was that I approached a horizontal bar. You must realize the sergeant major of the company has many other concerns...."

Let us assume that this is actually the case. But how can a warrant officer, the first assistant of an officer, appear worse than his subordinates in physical terms? What has his presence at the lesson provided the young commanders? Precisely nothing. Unfortunately, WO Sapchuk is not alone. For unknown reasons, here physical training is considered to be a secondary matter not only for the subunit sergeant majors. In benefiting from this laxness, the warrant officers holding the positions of company technicians as well as battalion medics, storeroom chiefs and other specialists carefully avoid sports exercises. And such a situation does not evoke alarm in anybody.

Or another fact. The battalion commander, Lt Col I. Dimchenko, described to me in rather fulsome terms the achievements of the subunit. From time to time he emphasized:

"Our warrant officers are dependable men, and the leaders in all areas. Take the chief of the instrument room, WO A. Shevtsov. He is not only a

knowledgeable specialist, but also a good athlete. Warrant officer school gave him the basic procedural skills, and this helps him in successfully conducting physical training exercises with the soldiers and sergeants of his shift.

It was pleasant to hear this, however I wondered if in the regiment there were warrant officers who had not completed such schooling. How did they improve their physical condition? The question was left hanging. Neither Dimchenko nor the chief of physical training and sports in the regiment, Sr Lt V. Gapon'ko answered it, but merely shrugged their shoulders in failing to understand how it happened that certain warrant officers were frequently absent from the physical training exercises.

Yes, they had simply been overlooked. They had not found the time to involve them in a sports section or invite them to participate in meets for various types of sports. And should one be surprised that, for example, the commander of the housekeeping platoon, WO V. Chechelev, the cook WO Yu. Lazarev, and the senior technician WO N. Kos'yachenko had forgotten when they put on sports clothing last.

Some persons are inclined to feel that it would be enough that the warrant officers of a unit basically carry out their duties. But is it worth it to rebuke them for a low level in athletic training? Undeniably! It must not be permitted that this category of serviceman, due to insufficient conditioning, shirks, as sometimes happens, the duties of field exercises and tactical training.

The winter training period opens up broad opportunities for raising the training level of the warrant officers. The exercises with them should be organized on a high procedural level, and be carried out in the spirit of competitiveness inherent to our sports.

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CSO: 1801

EDITORIAL ON NEED FOR AND METHODS TO IMPROVE MILITARY RESEARCH

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Jan 77 p 1

[Editorial: "Military Scientific Work in the Troops"]

[Text] The 25th CPSU Congress clearly defined the most important directions in scientific development at the present stage, and pointed to the necessity of raising the effectiveness and quality of scientific research, providing a further improvement in the forms of the tie between science and production, and accelerate the introduction of scientific achievements into the national economy.

These basic demands of the party are a dependable guide in solving the problems of the theory and practice of military affairs. The fundamental qualitative changes in the material base of the troops and naval forces and the development of new types of military equipment raise the fire power, striking force and maneuvering capabilities of the units and ships, and they lead to the rise of new methods of combat. All of this necessitates a constant improvement in the views concerning the organization of the troops, their combat use, support and control, and raises the role and significance of military scientific work.

On the basis of the theory and method of Marxism-Leninism, our military personnel, in the course of scientific research, delve into the essence and patterns of the phenomena of war, and they profoundly analyze the effect of new weapons on the methods of combat and the organizational structure of the formations and units, the forms and methods of the morale, political and psychological training of the personnel. The main efforts in military scientific work are concentrated on seeking out the ways for a further rise in the combat readiness of the troops and naval forces.

It would be possible to name many staffs, units and ships where military scientific work is carried out on a planned and purposeful basis. Included in them are many staffs and units of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, the Kiev and Carpathian military districts, and the Pacific Fleet. Many of the higher military schools are working fruitfully in this area. The

urgent questions of military theory and practice have begun to be more widely discussed on the pages of military journals and newspapers and at annual military scientific conferences and meetings.

However, in the area of military scientific work, there still are definite shortcomings, the elimination of which will make it possible to further raise the level of scientific activity among command personnel, the staffs, political bodies, military academies and scientific research facilities. Among these shortcomings, one must mention first of all the weak tie of certain theoretical works with the practices of the military and political training of the troops, the lag in elaborating a number of important problems, and the insufficiently high scientific level of individual generalizations of experience from exercises and reports on them.

The interests of the further development of the Armed Forces necessitate that the chief efforts of military scientific work on the staffs, in the military schools, units and ships be directed at the prompt solving of the crucial problems of practice. This can be achieved only in the instance if the daily life of the Army and Navy, and particularly experimental, operation-level and tactical exercises and long voyages become the laboratory of scientific exploration, as these are the best experimental base for working out new solutions and theoretical concepts in the entire vast range of military scientific problems. Naturally, the most important scientific problems and the fundamental research must be carried out by the combined efforts of the troops, the military schools and scientific research institutions.

The increased amount of military scientific work and the complexity of solving theoretical and practical questions have posed the necessity of involving the largest possible number of generals, admirals and officers in scientific research. Under today's conditions, each officer should be an active proponent of scientific progress in the life and combat training of the troops. Here, particular attention must be given to the scientific research work of field officers, aimed at generalizing the advanced experience of military and political training, the indoctrinational and training methods of the personnel, the experience of operating weapons and military equipment, and at elaborating and introducing new tactical procedures for the combat use of this equipment. The creative efforts of the commanders, staffs and political bodies should be aimed at solving these important problems.

One of the ways for improving military scientific work in the troops and fleets is to raise the level of its planning. Here the plans should encompass the most important directions, and provide a systematic approach to the problems being solved, as well as the use of the most effective forms of military scientific work. It is essential to eliminate more decisively cases of formalism in scientific activities, and to end the practice of judging the results from the number and volume of the written works, reports and executed measures. The main criterion for the effectiveness of scientific research should be the timeliness of the research, its concreteness, soundness, and practical value for further strengthening the combat readiness of the troops.

An important form of military scientific work is the military scientific conferences and meetings. It is essential to see to it as much as possible that the reports and speeches at these conferences give not generally known truths as sometimes is the case, but rather pose acute and crucial questions, and that problems be discussed which stem directly from troop practices.

Military scientific information holds an important place in achieving high effectiveness in scientific research. It must be considered that the rapid growth of the volume of this information and the necessity of its prompt assimilation necessitate the preparation of abstracts, reports and scientific papers which would briefly, precisely and tersely give just the essence of the research as well as the basic, predominantly new conclusions and recommendations.

In the Armed Forces there are many good examples of this. Thus, on the staff of the Moscow and certain other military districts and fleets, innovations in one or another area of military knowledge are routinely studied. The informational materials each month are generalized and issued to officer personnel, and measures are taken to rapidly introduce the acceptable recommendations into military training practices.

In working out the long-range problems of military affairs, it is essential not to lessen attention paid to studying the experience of the Great Patriotic War. It is one of the important sources for the creative development of military theory, for improving troop training, and for indoctrinating high morale, political and combat qualities in the personnel of the Army and Navy.

The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, L. I. Brezhnev, in the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th Party Congress stressed the necessity "of a true respect for science, the ability and desire to seek advice and consider it." This notion has direct bearing upon our military personnel. The military councils, commanders, political bodies, staffs and party organizations must have a more active influence on the content and methods of military scientific work in the Army and Navy, and bring about an improvement in the quality level of the research and its effectiveness in the struggle to further strengthen the combat readiness of the troops.

10272

CSO: 1801

RADAR UNIT COMBAT TRAINING DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Jan 77 p 1

[Article by Maj V. Tyapkin, commander of a radio-technical battery, master of military skills: "Training Sessions Lead To Success"]

[Text] Initially, the air "enemy" endeavored to break through to the objective defended by us at a medium altitude, but it was unsuccessful. But possibly this was just a diversionary maneuver?

"He'll come in at a low altitude," proposed Engr-Lt S. Gladkikh. "He'll use the terrain for concealment...."

The young officer who was performing the duties of the guidance officer guessed the tactical strategem of the "enemy." In fact, several seconds later a high-speed, low-flying target appeared on the screens. After an instant, it began to disappear, but we knew what to do. When the aircraft reappeared within the coverage of the station, the launch was made. Accurate and destructive.

Let me stress that in the company, the guidance officer was Engr-Lt Gladkikh for whom this specialty was a related one. Of course, under our conditions it is not easy to train persons who can take over, particularly in the short periods dictated by the interests of maintaining combat readiness. Take just one factor, the condensing of the exercises and the greatest possible improvement in their effectiveness and quality. The person who masters the specialty of a guidance officer may feel confident before the screen only after many, many training sessions. And, of course, he must have an excellent knowledge of his equipment, as well as the tactical procedures and combat capabilities of the air enemy. And without this there is no success as otherwise the training sessions are turned into routing coaching.

Combat requires not the mechanical learning of possible variations, but rather the creative reasoning out of the air situation. Simulators help in successfully mastering the basic models of duels against an air enemy. They contain numerous possibilities which are sometime far from best utilized. Certain specialists endeavor to train only with a simulator.

Undoubtedly, a simulator possesses great merits, but, as experience shows, it is also possible to start the training using available simulation devices. For example, we have widely used them not only in training guidance officers, but also for training operators and the entire combat crew of a battalion command post. As a rule, prior to the start of the exercises, one of the most experienced sergeants adjusts the equipment for the previously compiled program. This depends upon the skills of the basic team of specialists, the quality of assimilating the preceding subjects and other factors, but the training procedure remains fixed "from the simple to the complex."

We do not artificially force the acquiring of skills. They, like the foundation of an enormous building, are built gradually, in a strict sequence. We begin with the releasing of a single high-speed target or we simulate a group attack, where the airplanes maneuver little. Then the air situation is made more complicated. The speed increases and jamming appears.

With an improvement in the skill of the specialists, the training program is changed. At present, our young officers Lt A. Botvinko and Engr-Lt S. Gladkikh can handle group and high-speed targets, and detect them among the interference. And they started simply, by training to quickly locate a target, when the blip was artificially "compressed," and the image on the screen had to be identified. The exercise, I might note, is not a clever one, but we use it widely for developing a special feeling of vision which a guidance officer should possess.

We approach the most complicated type of combat work in the second half of the exercises. Here the targets appear for a very limited time. And they travel, using active and passive interference. The simulation equipment provides an opportunity to repeat the most difficult versions.

The importance of such training is difficult to overestimate. I recall the first trip to the firing range. We were preparing at that time for combat training launches on a major alert, and we trained long at the screens. It seemed as though we had worked out all the models of combat, but life always makes corrections. After the high-speed high-altitude target which we shot down, another one entered the coverage. It was completely covered by jamming. Honestly speaking, I did not expect this and for an instant was confused. Because of this, the launching moment was almost missed.

Later on, when the young guidance officer, Lt N. Pleshakov, appeared in my subunit, using the simulation equipment we repeated that memorable battle. Pleshakov also was late in acting. And the reason? The same as for me: insufficiently acute response. And, of course, this response must be developed. To the honor of the young officer, he trained a great deal and in a comparatively short period of time excellently mastered the duties of a guidance officer. On the firing range, Pleshakov hit the target with the first missile. And I should immediately stress that the simulator helped him acquire skills.

Training sessions, as our experience suggests, should be carried out daily for 2 or 3 hours. Analysis of the mistakes should be given the closest attention. This is real schooling for the specialists.

Of course, it is simply impossible to master the combat work without the aid of senior specialists who have great experience. Hence, the young officers have the right to count on their support. For this reason, in our battalion, the commander and the party organization focus the troop collective on friendly, well coordinated work. And the result of this is the accurate combat training launches and first place in the socialist competition. At present, in competing to properly celebrate the 60th anniversary of Great October, the battalion is struggling to reaffirm the title of outstanding.

10272

CSO: 1801

AVIATION REGIMENT SETS HIGHER STANDARDS FOR RATING PILOTS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jan 77 p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Shestakov, deputy commander of an aviation regiment and an expert pilot: "Exactingness"]

[Text] The flights under complicated meteorological conditions had ended. I approach the pilots who had gathered around the KP [command post] and listen to the remarks of one of them:

"A three for the flight, it cannot be! In the summer just for such an exercise-- I performed it then no better and no worse--they gave a "good" rating. The inspector was out of sorts, if"

It was necessary to introduce clarity into the pilot's discourse. The inspector was kindly disposed--that was precisely clear to me since I had checked the flier's training myself. And here, since he had flown "no better and no worse" than before, it was necessary to lower the rating.

What had happened? Perhaps the norms had changed? No, they remained as before. Perhaps, the pilot had had a break in flying? No, he flew regularly. It is simply that this time the approach to evaluating his actions was different--more strict-- such as the criteria in aviator training should be. Some weakening had been observed during the last training year here.

The fact of the matter is no matter how strict the norms are, they all contain certain tolerances; "from and to." For instance, deviations from the assigned flight altitude of plus or minus 50 meters are allowed in one exercise. However, it turns out that one flier constantly maintains the given flight parameter without the slightest deviation and another's altitude, strolls, so to speak, within the 100-meter limits. The quality of the flying is, essentially, different. However, if the norm is formally maintained, then it is necessary, it turns out, to assign the same rating to both pilots.

Such levelling, undoubtedly, cannot depict with sufficient completeness the true training level of this or that pilot and the way he performs his socialist responsibilities.

Fairness and strictness in rating are an important stimulus in the combat improvement of aerial fighting men. Objective and accurate, it reflects an aviator's true training level. It impels him to work with complete efficiency and achieve a more qualitative performance of each combat training task. Conversely, if a commander permits weakening and does not notice "small" mistakes by a subordinate, he creates in him an illusion of well-being and willy-nilly inculcates in him carelessness in his actions. For this reason, an experienced pilot also makes an error in piloting at times.

In our unit, everyone remembers when the flight which Maj L. Vlasov, a military pilot first class, commands, finished bombing on the range with large errors. Why? This flight was considered an excellent one. The critique of the flight showed that the flight commander himself had made a mistake in maintaining altitude. His partner, Capt V. Dovganetskiy, missed because his speed at the moment of dropping the bombs was excessive. His other partner also did not act in the best way. These are specialists with the highest qualifications. Fives decorate their flying logs. From where did mistakes so unpardonable for experienced pilots come? As it turned out, not all the ratings, which they had received earlier, were sufficiently objective. The fliers became complacent. They lessened the exactingness shown to themselves and to their training.

In order to raise the effectiveness of competition, we began during the new training year to evaluate results more self-critically, to fix the slightest deviation from the norm, and to analyze thoroughly the fliers' actions in the air. Such strictness was at first not to everyone's taste. However, it was necessary both to use the growing capabilities of new aviation equipment more effectively and in the interests of flight safety.

We began with requiring all squadron and flight commanders to analyze all norms carefully and study the requirements in guidance documents thoroughly. Then they took an examination. Special classes and command flights were conducted. During these, instructors were able to increase instructional methods skills during the summer training and their personal training in flying techniques. As a result, command exactingness for the level of subordinates' training grew noticeably. The number of excellent ratings decreased. In return, there was no longer any doubt about them. The quality of flying assignments improved. The comparison of competition results became more exact.

A strict check of the objectivity of the ratings permitted the differences in carrying out socialist responsibilities and in training to be seen more clearly both for individual fliers and for subunits. For example, the flights which Majors V. Konyukh and L. Vlasov command, were considered to be excellent ones. It was not simple to determine which of them would be in front. When the aviators' training and service indicators were treated with great exactingness, it seemed that the flight headed by Vlasov would yield to its rival in socialist competition by one grade. The firing and bombing flights which took place also corroborated this. Major Konyukh's subordinates performed all tasks with an excellent rating. Some fliers in Major Vlasov's flight received only threes.

The flying critiques became more topical and instructive for the competitors. Some mistake is being analyzed. A magnetic tape with the comments of the flight leader is repeated. The VH recorder of the pilot's flight is shown on a large screen. The obviousness of the results is evident.

Party concern for the effectiveness of the aviators' socialist competition greatly contributes to the increase in the effectiveness and quality of the summer training. Commanders and political workers and party and Komsomol activists are effectively publicizing the experience of the best men. They are making the achievements of first rate men the property of the entire collective. On flying days, it is possible to see a special stand at our airfield. On it next to the flier's photograph are located materials on the objective checking of the aerial exercise performed by him and the ratings for each complicated element.

We have also improved practices in summing up results. Now, not only numerical indices are compared. We touch upon the combat and moral qualities of a flier. Of course, one should not judge these straightforwardly. It is important for a commander to know the motives for a subordinate's conduct and to understand what thoughts and feelings impel him to act this or that way in performing his duties. Even in equivalent combat training ratings it is necessary to keep a lot in mind in order to determine correctly the all-round readiness of a flier for combat.

In the competition to greet the 60th anniversary of Great October in a fitting manner, our regiment undertook the responsibility of becoming an excellent one and is confidently proceeding to this line. We are trying during the new training year to plan aviator classes and training more thoughtfully. We are improving the methods and leadership of socialist competition. The rated qualifications of the flying complement are being improved at a high tempo. Already, about 70 percent of all unit fliers now have a first class rating. During the first weeks of the new training year, more than half of the flights have had the highest indices in combat employment. It appears that higher command demandingness for the accurate carrying out of each norm and stricter exactingness in evaluating flight results has played a mobilizing role in this growth.

8802

CSO: 1801

TANK COMPANY COMBAT TRAINING DEFICIENCIES NOTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Jan 77 p 1

[Article by Colonel Ye. Babynin, a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Why Is There No Checking?"]

[Text] The tanks had departed for the field and were returning. The crews were dismounting and were lining up in a small area. They listened to the comments of Lt V. Vinogradov, the company commander, and again hurried to their vehicles. Nearby, another group of tankers were training at putting on the combined arms protective outfit. In a word, at first glance the classes were taking place at full speed.

However, it soon appeared that the company was not engaged according to the schedule but was practicing questions which had already been worked on long ago. An officer explained that the weather had ruined the game: They had planned to set up tank weapons firing when fog, suddenly falling on the range, interfered with it. They decided to organize training on crew teamwork. In essence, this was not training but an idle drive about the range.

The question automatically arose: When does the company commander intend to make up that which was omitted, considering that the range will be occupied by other podrazdeleniye? Evidently, it will be necessary to borrow from the time designated for practicing other topics. This has an inevitable effect on the quality of the troops' training. Why did it happen?

The cause was the formalized approach to the class schedule and its inaccurate carrying out. A situation can become complicated so that sometimes it is advisable to make a deviation from the schedule. However, it is also necessary to be convinced how ready class leaders and their subordinates are for this and take, when necessary, appropriate measures. Some people forget about this.

So it was this time. Lieutenant Vinogradov turned to the deputy regimental commander with a request to permit him to organize firing instead of the planned class. The deputy regimental commander gave permission but did not find out whether the subunit was ready for firing. As a result only 60

percent of the company's men went to the range. Some fighting men were performing duties and others were carrying out various assignments. Some platoon commanders and sergeants were also not ready for the class.

Disregard of the schedule also has an effect when other officers are preparing their lesson plans. These are not approved by the battalion commander. The data for drawing them up is absent. This is all for "flexibility." The men were already accustomed to such a situation: The class can take place or the class cannot take place. Of course, such "flexibility" will bring nothing but harm.

And so it turned out. When it became clear that the weather would not allow firing, the company commander displayed his ignorance when he again put the plan, which had been drawn up, aside. It was impossible to organize the lesson according to it because it did not correspond to the actual conditions. Therefore, the lieutenant began to train on crew teamwork which dragged on almost till supper.

Things were going no better at the second training site. Here WO [Praporshchik] Yu. Suyazov, who was performing the duties of platoon commander, was supposed to train gun layers in adjusting fire using a terrain model. However, nothing had been prepared for it. Even the blanks for noting down the results of observation were missing. In turn, the combined arms protective outfits had come to hand and it was decided to practice the norms for putting on protective equipment. The warrant officer, as it later turned out, in general did not know what classes had to be conducted according to the plan.

So the company in point of fact spent a half day for nothing. Having violated the schedule, the commander violated instructional methods procedures for training subordinates on planned topics. How did the senior chiefs react to this? It is possible to say, in no way. The deputy regimental commander and Guards Maj Yu. Dubinin who was filling the position of battalion commander only stated that such free thinking had been noticed in Vinogradov before. It is reasonable to ask: Why do such items have a place and why is the necessary checking on the way classes are organized according to the schedule absent?

8802

CSO: 1801

COMMANDERS CRITICIZED FOR DELAYING OFFICER'S PROMOTION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Jan 77 p 2

[Article by Engr-Lt Col B. Lyapkalo, a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "How They Taught a Good Lesson' to a Lieutenant"]

[Text] During the meeting the officers listened to an order awarding the next military ranks. Lt Vasiliy Mel'nik, having listened to the names of those the same age as he, held his breath and waited. They were just about to name him. His first promotion! What a happy and unforgettable event for an officer! How great was Mel'nik's chagrin when he was not among those who were awarded the rank of senior lieutenant. The lieutenant was at a loss: "What happened? They recommended everyone together for a promotion."

He didn't feel any guilt on his part. He served diligently and conscientiously. Perhaps an inaccuracy had slipped in? He asked his immediate chief, Engr-Maj A. Borika, this question and then the subunit commander, A. Bochurov, and the political worker, officer A. Sursyakov. None of them knew the reason. They promised to find out.

The meeting about which we are talking was held at the end of September 1976. A commission from higher headquarters arrived in the unit during the first days of October. During the inspector's inquiry Lieutenant Mel'nik stated that he had been held back from being promoted for unknown reasons. Two days later on the list of suggestions, complaints and statements made by unit personnel during the inspector's inquiry the note appeared opposite the lieutenant's name: "For violating disciplinary regulations and poor technical training, the presentation has been delayed three months. The matter will be decided by the completion of the final inspection." This explanation apropos of the lieutenant's statement was made to the higher headquarters' commission.

The same day Lieutenant Mel'nik was summoned to the unit commander.

The commander explained to the lieutenant: "The promotion was delayed for a violation of regulations which you committed when you signed among others... a complaint to the editors of the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA newspaper.

The lieutenant said: "But a half year has passed since then. No one announced any punishment to me."

During this conversation with the unit commander and his deputy, Lt Col I. Yakovlevich, the lieutenant quoted one of the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA publications which emphasized that an appeal to a newspaper in any form cannot be regarded as a violation of regulations. However, no one even began to listen to this. The young officer left the office completely convinced they had acted unfairly towards him. He told his colleagues about this. One of them also related Lieutenant Mel'nik's resentment in a letter to the editors of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

We thoroughly investigated all the circumstances stated in the letter. How does Lieutenant Mel'nik serve? Excellently. A disciplined officer full of initiative. One of the best specialists in the subunit. This is how Mel'nik's immediate and direct chiefs characterized him.

"Why then in July when they proposed him for a promotion was he only rated 2d class?" asked Lieutenant Colonel Yakovlevich, who was temporarily performing the duties of the unit commander, in order perhaps to justify with this the note made earlier about the lieutenant's poor technical training.

However, Engr-Lt Col A. Bochurov immediately specified that at the time Lieutenant Mel'nik had still not completed the period required for raising a rated qualification and that he now was a specialist first class.

Lieutenant Colonel Yakovlevich continued to stand his ground: "Then the specialists on the unit's staff assigned him a low rating."

However, as it turned out, the lieutenant had responded in an excellent manner to the commission which checked the training level of officers before awarding them a promotion to the next rank. And not long before this, thanks had been expressed to him for success in training. During his three years of service in the unit he had 34 commendations. Among them were quite a few that characterized him as an excellent specialist. Thus the wording about the lieutenant's poor technical training in the official document was, as they say, far fetched.

What remained? The letter to the editor. Indeed, Lieutenant Mel'nik among other officers had written to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. Many, including Engineer-Major Borika knew about his intention to write such a letter. "Write and we'll see what they answer you from KRASNAYA ZVEZDA," -- such was the reaction of his senior comrades. But when the letter received wide publicity and caused quite a bit of unpleasantness for some chiefs, then for some reason the appeal to the editors began to be considered a "violation of

regulations." It is hardly possible to call the actions of the unit's leaders competent and fair. They had decided, as is evident, simply to teach the lieutenant a "good lesson": They said that in the future it will keep him from sending a letter to a newspaper and will stop others.

Vasiliy Mel'nik has now been awarded his promotion. However, it appears that the higher level political organ and headquarters will give an appropriate evaluation to the facts of the unfounded delay in awarding the promotion and to the legal violations in the chiefs' interrelationships with subordinates.

8802

CSO: 1801

CARPATHIAN M.D. PARTY-POLITICAL WORK FOCUSES ON COMPETITION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Jan 77 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen N. Shevkun, member of the military council and chief of the Red Banner Carpathian Military District political directorate:
"Competition Is at the Center of Attention"]

[Excerpts] The winter training period is a critical stage in the socialist competition to greet the 60th anniversary of Great October in a fitting manner and strengthen the combat readiness of the forces further. Daily leadership of competition and the maintenance of a high spirit of comradely rivalry--These are the most important things and, perhaps, the most difficult in the activity of commander, political workers and party organizations.

In this connection, the necessity stands out to be more persistent in putting into practice basic Leninist principles on organizing socialist competition to publicize and compare results creatively and considering the distinctive features of the present moment, and to expand capabilities for the practical repetition of progressive experience.

Organizing competition is a complex process requiring constant searches and effective control. Party organizations have been called upon to struggle for the confirmation of such an attitude toward socialist competition.

A comprehensive evaluation of competitors' results provides an opportunity to make fuller use of criticizing deficiencies in work and discover the reasons for lagging behind and the careless work of some servicemen. Unfortunately some of our party organizations forget about this. The party committee of which Maj V. Sokolov is a member, in particular deserves such a reprimand.

One cannot say that here they do not pay attention to the organization of competition. Questions, connected with strengthening party influence on competition activity, are discussed both during party committee sessions and party meetings. The decisions made are not bad. However, here is the damage: As soon as the matter reaches practical implementation of the decisions, activists for some reason forget about high principles in work.

They do not display the necessary exactingness toward communists--the organizers of socialist competition. At times, they close their eyes to the fact that the assumed responsibilities are not carried out during combat training and especially when conducting tactical exercises, live firing, and driving combat vehicles. As a result, some communists do not carry out the responsibilities they have undertaken. In such a situation this has an effect on the subunits which they lead.

The commander sums up the results of the competition. However, purposeful and varied work around achieved results is also the direct affair of party organizations. Party organizations act very correctly when they are concerned about servicemen's operational information on the progress of competition and when they orient people on a creative search in the struggle to raise combat skill further.

Important measures have been outlined in the resolution of the CC CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the VTsSPS [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions] and the Komsomol Central Committee concerning union-wide socialist competition. They are directed toward improving the material and moral stimuli of competitors and their correct combination. Moral stimulation means the rewarding of a first-rate individual with respect, honor and fame. A warm and friendly word of approval, handing a pendant or certificate to the victor, a celebration in honor of the best specialist in the unit, an interesting story by a propagandist or agitator about the valuable experience of first-rate individuals--these and many other work forms inspire and animate people. They impel them to creativity and summon them to struggle for the best results. We must constantly remember this and not be stingy with kind words about those who deserve them because of their diligence and successful training and work.

I would like to mention one more important principle of competition--comparison of results. Every one knows that without a comparison of results it is impossible to develop competition fruitfully and to increase its effectiveness. However, not everyone considers that this principle presupposes a comparison of competition results not only with respect to quantity but also to quality. In pointing out this aspect of the matter, V. I. Lenin mentioned that the organization of competition "means the capability to find the most correct and the most economical way...." In other words, when determining results, it is important to bring to light not only the fact of the responsibilities fulfillment but also with what means and at what cost such a fulfillment was achieved.

I remember how at the end of last year the N-skaya unit party committee was busy analyzing the results of the way officers and warrant officers (praporshchiki) in the tank battalion, where Maj M. Kravchuk is the commander, carried out their responsibilities. This is a good subunit and all its fighting men completely carried out the responsibilities they had undertaken. However, the members of the party committee came to this conclusion. The men, it appears, did not work at full speed. If they had been able to

use all available reserves in the battalion, many officers and warrant officers would have been able to become experts in a combat qualification.

Competition achieves high effectiveness when a spirit of genuine rivalry permeates it, when the broad influence of the strength of example is put into effect, and when the initiative of one man is converted into a mass movement. Considering this, each party committee must be concerned about widely disseminating the experience of the best specialists and introducing it into training and indoctrination practices. It is very important that this not be limited only to general appeals. It is necessary, as incidentally they act in the party organizations of progressive units, to see to it that each activist performs a specific assignment--whether this be organizing technical propaganda, preparing evening get-togethers for specialists to exchange experience, or helping young officers in their study of combat equipment and weapons.

The military council and the political directorate of the district are doing a lot to enkindle the flame of the competition, which was started at the initiative of the fighting men in a motorized rifle regiment of the Zheleznaya Division, even more in units and subunits. The motorized riflemen have come forward as the leaders of the competition in the Ground Forces to greet the 60th anniversary of Great October in a fitting manner. We recently found out about the patriotic initiative of the Taman' guardsmen who have joined in the struggle for a progressive large unit. All this is a testimonial of the high patriotism and creative spirit of our fighting men. The immediate duty of political organs, party committees, and all party organizations is to maintain in every way possible and to improve the atmosphere of the men's creative searching, to delve deeper into the progress of socialist competition, and to be concerned with raising its effectiveness.

The first results of the new training year convincingly testify that the effectiveness of competition is highest in those collectives where it is organized and conducted on the basis of Leninist principles and is in accordance with the high requirements of the party for effectiveness and quality in all our work.

8802

CSO: 1801

INTERCEPTOR PILOT SUCCESSFULLY HANDLES EMERGENCY SITUATION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Jan 77 p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Mukhin: "Moments of Courage"]

[Text] The plane, piloted by Capt Viktor Storozhenko, started at 2111 hours. After some time one of the operators reported in alarm:

"I see a bright flash.

The flight leader requested: "Firm up the coordinates."

"In the area of the first zone."

Storozhenko should have been in the first zone. An inquiry was received quickly on board the fighter piloted by him. However, the ether was silent. Radio communications, which had been operating until that moment without interruption, were suddenly and unexpectedly broken.

What misfortune had occurred in the sky? How and with what could one help the flier? This concerned everyone but primarily, of course, the commander who was located in the start KP [command post]. The flight controllers and the landing director clung to the screens.

The following rule exists: When a flier does not answer, radio communications are conducted with him as usual--if the radio transmitter has become inoperative, it is possible for the on board radio receiver to be in working order. And so it was now. Hardly had the landing director reported that he was observing a blip from an aircraft in the area of the first zone, when information again began to go into the ether from the ground....

Meanwhile, the flier, suddenly finding himself in a critical situation, did not lose his presence of mind. He fought for the life of the machine. What had happened?

An atmospheric electrical discharge had hit the aircraft when Viktor Storozhenko pressed the transmitter button, intending to report on the exercise in the zone. A powerful explosion deafened him, fiery sparks flashed in front of him. The first idea that flashed across his mind was: "a fire?" The pilot almost automatically took the control rod himself. The fighter was rushing upwards. Storozhenko looked around: "If there's a fire, why isn't the red light burning? ..." He was reassured a little. The fighter selected the altitude as before. Clouds. Night. Not a single navigation instrument was working. How to get to the "mark"? ...

But what's this? The revolutions of the right engine began to fall. Then it stopped completely. The flier thought: "I will have to break out of the clouds quickly -- perhaps I will be able to orient myself." He acted calmly, collectedly and confidently.

After several unsuccessful attempts to start the engine, Captain Storozhenko decided to "pull" with one. Fortunately, he finally saw the ground lights through a break in the clouds. Having "hooked" on them, he brought the machine down and approached the airfield. It was then that the commander at the start KP breathed easier-- radar tracking testified that the plane was "on the mark." They prompted the flier from the ground on how best to circle, what altitude to maintain, and where to pay attention. Only the pilot did not hear those commands on board. The aircraft radio set was silent.

The fighter was circling for a landing, finding himself somewhat high in the glidepath. He was clearly visible--his landing light was on. The commander had hardly any doubts now that the flier was not hearing a single one of his words. Nevertheless, he transmitted:

"Approach is accurate in direction."

"Don't speed up. Good. Parachute!..."

At 2123 the aircraft landed. The flight had lasted 12 minutes.

Soon we met with Capt Viktor Storozhenko. He was obviously embarrassed by the increased attention. He complained a little that the aircraft was still "laid up" and that non-flying weather is holding up. It is felt that he would like to be again in the sky on a flight. Without this, he cannot conceive of service.

It remains to add that the commander of troops of the Baku PVO [air defense] district, Col Gen of Aviation A. Konstantinov, expressed thanks to Capt Viktor Storozhenko and presented him a valuable gift for his courage and high skill.

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CSO: 1801

END