Is the Army Heading for a Joint-Integration Train Wreck
Abstract
This monograph argues that the Army's Battle Focused Training system as represented in FM 25-100 and FM 25-101 no longer reasonably assures tactical unit readiness for participation as the ground force elements in the joint force of the future. Because of the dynamic manner in which joint force commanders configure their force packages, unit trainers can no longer account for all of the permutations of operational contexts within the scope of their resource- constrained unit training plans. Additionally, demand for immediate responses to unplanned joint force requirements denies these same commanders any room for error in their preparations for war or conflict. As a result, these units will fail to consider and prepare for the conduct of critical joint integration tasks, which might prove vital to their performance in the designated operational environment. This monograph examines the experience of Army units in Operations UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (1994), INTRINSIC ACTION (1998), and JOINT FORCE (1999) to demonstrate tactical unit performance of joint integration tasks in their commitment to joint contexts not clearly provided for under Battle Focused Training constructs. Using joint and service doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures (DTTP), this monograph evaluates each unit's performance to answer three questions. First, this research establishes if the required capabilities were doctrinal. Secondly, it determines if the units had or could have accounted for the disparity between their actual state of readiness and that required for the given mission. Finally, this research analyzes whether the units maximized the use of available time and DTTP in preparation for their mission.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2000
- Accession Number
- ADA374693
Entities
People
- James F. Dickens
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College