

**Formal Mediation and Negotiation Training, Providing Greater Skills for
Commanders in Bosnia**

**A Monograph
By
Lieutenant Colonel G. Scott McConnell
United States Army**

**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

First Term AY 99-00

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

20000321 051

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Lieutenant Colonel G. Scott McConnell

**Title of Monograph: *Formal Mediation and Negotiation Training, Providing Greater Skills
for Commanders in Bosnia***

Approved by:

Robert Berlin, Ph.D. **Monograph Director**

COL Robin P. Swan, MMAS **Director, School of Advanced
Military Studies**

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. **Director, Graduate Degree
Program**

Accepted this Day of December 1999

ABSTRACT

Formal Mediation and Negotiation Training, Providing Greater Skills for Commanders in Bosnia

By Lieutenant Colonel G. Scott McConnell, U.S. Army, 63 pages.

U.S. Army units have been conducting peace operations in Bosnia since December 1995. There, the environment evolved from being one characterized by peace enforcement operations to one characterized by peacekeeping operations. As part of pre-deployment training and certification requirements, commanders and their units still train for peace operations. However, the training is not optimized for the environment that they will encounter.

The Bosnia environment requires battalion and brigade commanders to possess and utilize mediation and negotiation skills. These skills enable consensus and cooperation building among former warring faction (FWF) leaders, other militaries, non governmental organizations (NGOs), and other national and international agencies as they continue to implement the General Framework of Peace (GFAP) in Bosnia. If the U.S. Army followed U.S. policy, joint, and service doctrine, commanders would be better prepared for peace operations in Bosnia.

This monograph investigates and establishes a foundation of mediation and negotiation theory as it pertains to conflict resolution. It analyzes national policy, joint doctrine and service doctrine to determine that several doctrinal and policy requirements to train commanders in mediation and negotiation exist. After establishing doctrinal requirements for mediation and negotiation training, the monograph analyzes operational guidance and practice in Bosnia as well as the practices of other actors described above. This analysis serves to validate the doctrinal requirements.

Interviews of former Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) commanders and after action reports (AARs) then provide a basis of comparison that determines that the pre-deployment training for Bosnia is ineffective in developing adequate mediation and negotiation skills. It further determines that sufficient training programs are available or can be developed that will ensure a minimum competency in these skills for battalion and brigade commanders.

The monograph concludes that the U.S. Army should solve this serious training deficiency using a two-pronged approach. First, the U.S. Army must take immediate actions to correct the pre-deployment training and certification process in order to ensure that commanders are properly trained for the current environment. Second, it must address the officer professional development deficiency by incorporating mediation and negotiation training in its officer professional development programs. Both of these actions, correcting the pre-deployment training and certification processes and correcting the officer professional development programs must be done, in conjunction with well respected and competent government and non-government organizations that teach, practice, and research mediation and negotiation theory and practice on a daily basis.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
I. Introduction	1
II. Mediation and Negotiation Theory	5
III. Doctrine and Policy Review	13
IV. Operational Guidance.....	23
V. Pre-deployment Mediation and Negotiation Training	27
VI. Mediation and Negotiation Practice in Bosnia	30
VII. Warrior Ethos and Conflict Resolution	37
VIII. Mediation and Negotiation Training Program Feasibility and Acceptability.....	38
IX. Conclusion	41
Endnotes	44
Bibliography.....	56

Introduction

In 1997, General Dennis Reimer, then Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, stated that from 1989 to 1997, U.S. Army personnel and units deployed twenty-five times on peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance missions, and he saw that number increasing.ⁱ Much to the surprise of many combat veterans, he was correct. Since General Reimer made these remarks, U.S. Army units deployed in support of four more peace and humanitarian assistance operations. The last time the U.S. Army deployed to a region and conducted overt combat operations was 1989, during the Gulf War. Since 1995, the U.S. Army deployed over 100,000 soldiers and fifty battalion sized units to conduct peace operations in the Balkans (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Kosovo).

Non-traditional military operations such as stability and support operations (SASO), have become a fact of life for the U.S. military.ⁱⁱ Post Cold War National Military Strategies (NMS), Theater Military Strategies of the Combatant Commanders, and other guidance provided by the U.S. military's civilian leadership validate this view.ⁱⁱⁱ While many people agree that SASO should be a part of the Army's basic doctrine, few can agree on how much emphasis should be placed on SASO and how much (less) should remain on offense and defense. The on-going debate regarding *FM 100-5, Operations* exemplifies this.^{iv}

Regardless of the debate's outcome, the National Command Authority (NCA) will continue to order the U.S. Army to conduct SASO. Since 1991, U.S. military expenditures, real world contingency operations, and long term commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflict in Bosnia and Kosovo offer compelling evidence to suggest that the U.S. Army must develop, train, and maintain the ability to effectively conduct peace operations.

For the purposes of this monograph, discussions regarding peace operations are based on the, *FM 100-23, Peace Operations*, definition. "Peace operations encompass three types of activities: support to diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement."^v Mediation and negotiation skills are a key component of all three activities. **Support to diplomacy** includes peacemaking, peace building, and preventive diplomacy. In this context, military actions contribute to and are subordinate to the diplomatic peacemaking process. Examples of support to military diplomacy are military-to-military relations, peacetime deployments, nation assistance, and preventive deployments.^{vi} **Peacekeeping** operations are designed and implemented in order to monitor and facilitate peace agreements and support diplomatic efforts to achieve long-term settlements. Peacekeeping has significant training implications because the military is expected to conduct mediation and negotiation in order to facilitate the implementation of the peace agreement.^{vii} **Peace enforcement** is the threat or use of military force in order to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions.^{viii} While a commander can compel compliance through threat of military force, it is obvious that a commander's ability to compel compliance through mediation and negotiation is more desirable.

For commanders, mediation and negotiation skills are critical but neglected in U.S. Army officer professional development. A survey taken of the majors attending the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) Program at Fort Leavenworth, KS in 1999 indicates that of the fifty-three students in the course, only two students received formal training in the area of negotiation and/or mediation. One received training through a United Nations course in the Baltics; the other, a Canadian major, received training in mediation and negotiation several times in his career.

The significance of these findings is debatable, especially in light of a common (mis?) interpretation of the Army's Title 10 mission "to fight and win our nation's wars."^{ix} However, it is important to note that more than twenty of the SAMS personnel surveyed, deployed to peace operations during their career. If the nature of peace operations differs from the Army's traditional roles and missions and if the statistics of the population in SAMS accurately reflect the entire population in the Army, then perhaps the fact is significant. It indicates the U.S. Army needs to address the adequacy of its mediation and negotiation training.

Peace operations are complicated. Their success or failure has operational and strategic effects. They are often multinational, expensive, very restrictive, compete with other (combat) training requirements, and involve greater amounts of both civilian guidance and participation. Civilian participation includes third party actors such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs).^x All of these characteristics increase the military commander's mission scope and introduce unique challenges. For example, some common peace operations tasks include security, support to NGOs, and support to diplomacy. A U.S. Army infantry or armor battalion's combat tasks do not directly relate to these peace operations tasks, and because the unit's training focus is on wartime tasks, there is a resource-task mismatch. An armor battalion in Bosnia, for example, conducts dismounted and wheeled presence patrols in the battalion's area of operations. Consequently, commanders in the Balkans find themselves using other means to accomplish peace operations tasks. Two of these means are third party mediation and negotiation.^{xi} These tasks are not standardized in the U.S. Army's training programs.

This monograph focuses on the emergence of mediation and negotiation as non-traditional tools for U.S. Army commanders, and it determines whether or not the U.S. Army can better prepare its battalion and brigade commanders for peace operations in the Balkans by formally training them in mediation and negotiation skills. Chapter two of this monograph begins by establishing an understanding of conflict resolution and the theory and practice of third party mediation and negotiation. The third chapter reviews joint and other service doctrinal mediation and negotiation requirements during peace operations, and to a limited degree interagency and third country military policies and requirements for third party mediation and negotiation training. Chapter four focuses on the operational guidance given to U.S. Army battalion and brigade level commanders in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Chapter five identifies and characterizes past attempts to train commanders in mediation and negotiation while chapter six provides an evaluation of whether or not mediation and negotiation training improves the effectiveness of battalion and brigade commanders in Bosnia. In this chapter, the basis of analysis is provided through interviews, after action reviews (AARs), and other accounts of commander performance and experiences, as they conducted peace operations and interacted with former warring faction members, civilian authorities, NGOs, and other (multinational) military commanders. Then, the author assesses whether or not formal, standardized negotiation and third party mediation training would improve U.S. Army commander performance in that environment by evaluating the performance of commanders who have mediation and negotiation training against those who do not. As part of this analysis, the author investigates whether some success is a function of the personality of the commander (adaptive versus warrior leader). This discussion leads to the ultimate issue of whether or not such training is feasible suitable and acceptable.

Mediation and Negotiation Theory

In their best-selling book, *Getting to Yes*, Roger Fisher, the Director of the Harvard Negotiation Project, and William Ury, an expert on mediation and negotiation, state, "Everyone negotiates something everyday."^{xii} In order to understand how significant this simple observation is, it is important to understand the theory behind mediation and negotiation. Even more important is the understanding that mediation and negotiation occur when there is conflict.

Conflict is defined as "escalated competition at any system level between groups whose aim is to gain advantage in the area of power, resources, interests, values, or needs, and at least one of these groups believes that this dimension of the relationship is based on mutually incompatible goals."^{xiii} This leads to one of the key fundamentals and a preliminary step to mediation and negotiation. Before one can resolve conflict, he must be aware of it. Next he must be able to diagnose it. Lastly, he must begin to formalize a plan to manage it. Using this definition and the conflict management steps, it is apparent that in peace operations, there are multiple parties in conflict and that conflict can have multiple roots.^{xiv} Often, when people resolve conflicts, one-party feels that they end up a winner, and one feels that they lose out. The Balkans conflict illustrates these points well.

There are many parties in conflict in the Balkans. First there are the former belligerents. This category includes the military, government, and population. There are peace implementation parties. This category includes the military, government agencies, international organizations, and non-governmental organization (NGOs) that rightfully or wrongfully appear biased. Lastly, there are other non-state actors that seek to achieve their own goals. Currently in Bosnia this category includes organized crime syndicates.^{xv} Non-

state actors compete for power, influence, resources, and have needs which places them very much in conflict. All of these parties find themselves in or affected by processes called mediation and negotiation as they participate in the conflict resolution process. Their roles in mediation and negotiation in the region is described in greater detail in Chapter four.

Defining mediation and negotiation in terms that most people can agree upon is complicated. Like many social processes they evolve, and because mediation and negotiation are not sciences, they are subject to considerable interpretation. Technology, political systems, and changes in social mores directly impact the evolution process. In the international arena for example, rapid communication enables near real time coverage of mediation and negotiations. This provides more rapid feedback to and affects the mediation and negotiation participants' behavior. Response to feedback then directly affects all actors involved in conflict resolution. As technology makes communication faster and the world smaller, mediation and negotiation theory will change prompting more study by researchers and practioners in this area.

Increased study and research by various academic disciplines (economic, psychology, politics, sociology, anthropology, and mathematics) will identify greater data about mediation and negotiation, and the science and practice of mediation and negotiation will continue to evolve. It follows then that the education and training levels of those who practice it will evolve as well. For example, in 1972, David Forsythe, a prominent expert on UN peace operations, described mediation in the context of peacekeeping as a ten-part process. The first five established the good offices or credibility and intentions of the United Nations. The next four parts described the types of mediation, and the last involved the legislation of the mediation.^{xvi} Forsythe's 1972 process appears simple, primitive, and very

narrow in scope compared to negotiation theory and practice espoused twenty-seven years later.

Jacob Bercovitch a noted authority on the theory and practice of mediation, states in his most recent work, that, mediation is “defined as efforts by third parties to prevent the eruption or escalation of destructive conflict behavior and to facilitate a settlement that makes renewed destructive behavior unlikely....The essence of mediation is persuasion, not coercion.”^{xvii} It is important that Bercovitch does not mention the level at which mediation occurs nor does he attempt to specify its forms.

Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman in *International Mediation Theory and Practice*, view mediation somewhat differently. They assert that there are four methods of mediation. In the first, the mediator, intervenes and changes the structure of the conflict from a dyad to a triad. They note that in some cases, by introducing a the third leg of the structure, it is sometimes necessary to assist one side of the conflict in order to assist the maintenance of a stalemate. This method has significant implications for peace operations commanders because impartiality, legitimacy, and objectivity are principles of peace operations.^{xviii} The next method they view is that the mediator takes on a role as communicator. In short, the mediator serves as a passive conduit and repository. Another method is for the mediator to take on a more active role. In this method, the mediator takes on an innovative thinking role. He helps the parties help themselves, by tactful, sympathetic, straightforward prodding and suggestion. The last method is that of the mediator as manipulator.

In this method, the mediator applies leverage--resources, power, influence, and persuasion where and when necessary to move the parties to agreement. Touval and Zartman do not view this method, also known as the carrot and stick approach, as a principle method.

It is the most demanding because the mediator must maintain a balance between the parties in conflict as he applies positive and negative leverage.^{xix} For many reasons, primarily expedience and training, the carrot and stick approach is the most predominant method in peace operations.^{xx}

Mediation has some unique characteristics. It can be formal, such as in a labor dispute where government mediators are active, or it can be informal such as settling a family squabble over television. Mediation is voluntary, the actors involved have the freedom to accept or reject the mediation outcome. Mediators, by their active involvement, enter the conflict, and with themselves they bring "...consciously or otherwise, ideas, knowledge, resource, and interests of their own or of the group or organization they represent. Mediators often have their own assumptions and agenda about the conflict in question."^{xxi}

Mediation plays a significant role in peace operations, and the commander's effectiveness depends on his abilities and skills to assist those in conflict to focus on the problem, to avoid blaming the other party(ies) or persons, to attempt to understand and respect the disputing parties' views, to communicate each other's positions, and to achieve cooperation in solving the problem at hand. Effective mediators must be trained and fully understand the dynamics of the conflict, specifically the motivations and interests of the actors involved, in order to determine which method is most appropriate.

The other means of conflict resolution that peace operations commanders likely experience or employ is that of negotiation. To a greater extent than mediation, the theory of negotiation is subject to very broad interpretation and application.^{xxii} Some simply describe it as puzzle solving. Others view it as a bargaining game involving an exchange of concessions, some consider it a way of reconciling differences within and between

organizations, and still others think of it as a means for implementing governmental policies.^{xxiii} Each perspective differs in terms of its application, perspective and implementation, and as with mediation, definitions of terms and stages in negotiations, continue to evolve.

Most people, when they hear the term negotiation, envision the classic labor versus management dispute or divorce settlement. Invariably the vision includes the notion that negotiation results in a winner and a loser. That kind of negotiation still exists, but now it shares its place with newer more normative approaches to conflict resolution. Two of the most common approaches are the distributive and value creating approaches. Both of these approaches share a common foundation.

In their book, *Getting to Yes*, Roger Fisher and William Ury advocate a four-step strategy in distributive negotiation. First they define negotiation as the basic means for getting what you want from others. It is back and forth communication designed to reach an agreement when you and the other side have some interests that are shared and others that are opposed.^{xxiv} Fisher and Ury go on to identify three ways to negotiate. They are soft, hard, and principled. Soft and hard techniques involve a trade-off between getting what you want and getting along with people. Principled negotiation, developed by the Harvard Negotiation Project, “decides issues on their merits rather than through a haggling process focused on what each side says it will and won’t do.”^{xxv}

Used by diplomats, lawyers, and couples, principled negotiation has four elements. They are separating people from the problem, focusing interests, not positions, inventing options for mutual gain, and insisting on use of objective criteria. Along these lines, Stephan Covey author of *The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People*, identifies six paradigms of

human interaction. They are: Win/Win, Win/Lose, Lose/Win, Lose/Lose, Win, and Win/Win or No Deal.^{xxvi} These six paradigms define the negotiation spectrum of conflict with Win/Win at the normative end and Win/ Lose (or Lose/Win) at the opposite end. In other words, in any personal interaction, actors view the outcome in one of these six ways. Covey asserts that the more understanding about these paradigms one has, the more effective he can be at resolving conflict at the normative end of the negotiation spectrum.

Distributive negotiation can best be described using an analogy of purchasing a car. In this process, the buyer has a range of money he is willing to pay for a given value (year, color, condition, etc.) of the car. For the purpose of the explanation, that range of money is between \$4,000 and \$4,500. The seller, on the other hand, also places a value on his car. He advertised it for \$5,000 knowing that he would take as little as \$4,300 for it. In distributive negotiation terms, the value each party assigns to the automobile represents the best alternative to a negotiated agreement or BATNA. The area where each party's BATNA overlap is called the zone of possible agreement or ZOPA. In this example, the ZOPA is between \$4,300 and \$4,500. If the buyer and seller agree to the sale of the car for a price in the ZOPA, both sides are satisfied (Covey's Win/Win relationship). If however, the seller assigns a value for the car at \$8,000 (Perhaps his wife is making him sell it and he does not want to.), and the buyer still has the same BOTNA, there is no ZOPA (Covey's no deal). If the seller's wife prevails and he must sell the car despite the fact that the highest offer is only \$4,500, Covey's win/lose relationship results. The buyer achieves his aims, and the seller likely feels victimized. In attempting to avoid any losers in negotiation, another technique, known as value creation recently emerged.

In negotiation, if the perception by one or both of the parties is that they will lose, and they perceive that there is no possible means to achieve an agreement because interests/alternatives under-lap, the party might defect or elect not to participate in the process. In order to prevent defection, the negotiator creates value. In other words, he introduces or creates value into the expected outcomes of an agreement. Value creation is a more complex negotiation technique because it requires greater cooperation and trust as well as an understanding of the interdependence and interrelationships between parties in the environment.

In the SASO environment, particularly peace operations, distributive negotiation is not the most effective means of negotiation. A peace treaty or implementation plan can be like the wife mentioned above. The leader of an organization is told he must cooperate with the terms of the treaty, even though it does not agree with it. Or, as was the case in Bosnia, the leader does not view the peace process or its participating signatories as legitimate. In response, a successful negotiator can create value in cooperation. Cooperation is a function of contact, understanding values, and interrelations. The negotiator must possess skills that enable greater cooperation. Cooperation allows a futuristic perspective to develop among the actors so that they can conceptualize value creation and value claiming. The negotiator possesses the communications skills and capabilities to create a "shadow of the future."^{xxvii}

For example, a mayor of a town refuses to find storage space for an NGO who provides temporary shelters to refugees from the minority population in his town. His fear is that the improved standard of living will draw more homeless minorities to his town threatening the balance of power. The NGO representative asks the military commander to help. The commander contacts the mayor and tells him that by helping this NGO, it might

signal to other NGOs and economic development agencies that the area is relatively stable. This could start the flow of economic aid that is vitally important to repairing the electrical system in his town so that its factory can resume production and provide jobs for the unemployed majority population in his town. The commander creates value by attaching jobs and long term future benefits to a seemingly unrelated event.

The example above helps to illustrate that peace operations are fraught with conflict. Properly applied, mediation and negotiation are effective means of resolving conflict. However, mediation and negotiation theory and practice are dynamic and require effective, continuous training. Because neither mediation nor negotiation is inferior or superior to the other, the practitioner must discern when one is more appropriate than the other is. In peace operations, the commander is the practitioner. He must also understand that he typically functions from positions of coercive or cooperative authority. His success often depends on whether he achieves cooperative consensus among all actors in the peace operations environment.^{xxviii} Training will enable him to know when and how to apply mediation and negotiation. Practice will make him more effective. Before the commander begins such training, though, he ought to understand applicable doctrine or policies regarding it.

Doctrine and Policy Review

In preparation for deployment to Bosnia and conducting peace operations, a battalion or brigade commander can find volumes of lessons learned. These valuable training aids do not, however, provide doctrinal guidance for peace operations. National policy, joint and service doctrine do. Doctrinal and policy guidance for peace operations flows from the highest levels of U.S. government through the Department of Defense (DOD) and its services to commanders. This chapter analyzes guidance at all levels to include the Executive

Branch, DOD, U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and the U.S. Air Force. It also reviews, both for points of reference and relevance, the U.S. Department of State's (DOS), other international organizations' guidance (the United Nations, NATO, and NGOs), and Canada's service doctrine. At a glance, the guidance appears discontinuous and inconsistent. Detailed analysis and review of applicable U.S. policy and doctrine leaves the battalion or brigade commander on deployment orders to the Bosnia searching for more succinct guidance.

In 1997, President Clinton, in Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD 56), issued significant guidance to all executive agencies regarding U.S. involvement in complex contingency operations. PDD 56 defines "complex contingency operations" as peace operations, humanitarian intervention, and foreign humanitarian assistance operations.²⁸ PDD 56 also directs that U.S. Government professional education institutions, such as the National Defense University and the National Foreign Affairs Training Center, incorporate the directives in PDD 56 in their coursework and exercises on interagency practices and procedures.^{xxix}

While PDD 56 is a logical point from which to look for guidance regarding peace operations, it does not provide direct guidance to battalion and brigade commanders. Rather, it tells senior U.S. Army leaders, such as commanders of force providing commands, to prepare for complex contingency operations to include interagency operations.^{xxx}

At the DOD level, one finds that joint doctrinal publications provide more specific guidance. For example, Joint Publication 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JP 1-02)* defines peace operations as "peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace."^{xxxi} Additionally *JP 1-02's* defines peace enforcement and peacemaking similarly to *FM 100-23*.

Peace enforcement. The application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to

international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.

Peacekeeping. Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.

Peacemaking. The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute, and resolves issues that led to conflict.^{xxxii}

Closer analysis indicates that the joint definition of peacemaking could easily pass as a definition for conflict resolution. All of these definitions, when read in the context of each other, indicate that mediation and negotiation skills are an integral part of peace operations. Yet, the terms mediation and negotiation only appear in a few joint doctrine manuals.^{xxxiii}

***Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations* does not mention mediation or negotiation anywhere in its text to include its military operations other than war (MTOOW) chapter. It does, however, mention that joint military forces must establish contact with government agencies to ensure efforts are coordinated.^{xxxiv} *JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)* does not mention mediation or negotiation either. Its discussion of the principles of military operations other than war mentions that interagency consensus building, multi-national cooperation, and legitimacy are essential to effective MOOTW.^{xxxv}**

From the previous discussion of mediation and negotiation, specifically Ury's model, it is obvious a trained mediator or negotiator is more likely than an untrained one to achieve an outcome that achieves and maintains legitimacy (Ury's Win/Win) in the MOOTW environment.

***JP 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations* provides perhaps the most significant guidance for the potential peace operations commander. First, and very importantly, it states that training of individual units is the responsibility of the military departments and services.^{xxxvi} In other words, there is a doctrinal requirement for the**

U.S. Army to train units and presumably their commanders in mediation and negotiation. *JP 3-07.3* also mentions that: Leaders selected for peacekeeping duty should be credible and decisive, display a high degree of professionalism, and be impartial. Because of the likelihood of independent actions, leaders at all levels must be able to make mature decisions based on sound judgment. They should have the capacity to accommodate frustrations. They must be able to quickly learn the local area politics, habits, characteristics, and customs.^{xxxvii}

Another joint document, the *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*, although not a doctrinal document, cements guidance in *JP 3-07.3*. The handbook, published in 1997, reflects significant changes from the earlier (1995) edition.^{xxxviii} It dedicates a complete chapter to command and control of multinational forces, mediation and negotiation skills, and Joint Military Commissions (JMCs).

Unlike its predecessor document, the 1997 version guidelines for conducting mediation and negotiation reflect the normative approach. Several illustrative vignettes from the IFOR and SFOR experiences in Bosnia describe this chapter's important concepts including the assertion that officers at all levels should be able to conduct mediation and negotiation.^{xxxix} The handbook also makes extensive reference to another pertinent doctrinal publication, *JP 3-08, Interagency Cooperation During Operations*.

Despite its obvious strategic level focus, *JP 3-08* provides direct guidance regarding mediation and negotiation, and it is relevant to peace operations.^{xi} *JP 3-08* specifically identifies that (senior) commanders will conduct mediation and negotiation. But more importantly, it recognizes that in the peace operations environment, interagency cooperation must occur at the tactical level in order to ensure a common frame of reference.^{xii} In describing the symbiotic relationship between the U.S. military and NGOs, it mentions that during humanitarian relief operations, NGOs are seldom willing to accept requirements from outside agencies.^{xiii} While it does not suggest or provide any specific means of training commanders for mediation or negotiation, it is not a significant shortcoming. *JP 3-07.3*, as discussed above, places that responsibility on the force provider (Service Chief).

Where joint doctrine is characteristically general or vague, U.S. Army peace operations doctrine is not. It is not entirely appropriate either. According to Dr. Steven Metz, an instructor at the U.S. Air Force's Air Staff College, and author of *Air Force Role in UN Peacekeeping*, DOD doctrine focuses on traditional (read Cold War), first generation (read scratch the surface) peacekeeping activities.^{xliii} Labeled as the Army's keystone doctrine, *FM 100-5, Operations*, reflects this traditional focus throughout.

For example, *FM 100-5* clearly devotes seven of its fourteen chapters to combat operations while discussing operations other than war (OOTW) in just one. Its descriptions of peacekeeping and peace enforcement further this bias towards combat operations or the use of force.^{xliv} Its discussion of considerations for combined operations accentuates this.^{xlv}

Conversely and probably more reflective of the post Cold War environment, *FM 100-23, Peace Operations*, published in 1994, states that peace operations consist of support to diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. Even more significant is its reminder to the reader that, "The definitions of these terms, although precise, must be viewed in a world beset with imprecise and ambiguous situations. So it is more useful to understand the principles of peace operations and the types of forces required to deal with them."^{xlvi} *FM 100-23* adequately defines mediation and negotiation and how they may be required during peacekeeping operations. However, the same manual makes three ambiguous statements in its training appendix, "Appendix C."

The guidance is ambiguous because it states peace operations tasks should not be added to a unit's mission essential task list (METL). This is a very combat task centric statement. The same passage then states that the amount of training required and when the training is given to units will depend on the particular peace operation mission. This statement is very appropriate and recognizes that peace operations environments evolve. The terms "just enough" and "just in time" are used to describe how much and when a unit should conduct peace operations training.^{xlvii} This last statement is also combat centric, and it fails to differentiate between leader and unit tasks.

Other U.S. Army doctrinal manuals provide similar guidance. They are not ambiguous, but they lack relevance and currency. For example, *FM 100-16, Army Operational Support*, and *FM 100-17, Decisive Force: Army in Theater Operations* clearly state the need to coordinate NGO, and coalition efforts in order to achieve a cohesive force and culture consensus among actors.^{xlviii} This guidance is faulty in two accounts. First, peace

operations are not decisive combat operations. Second, it does not recognize that consensus during peace operations encompasses a larger population of actors than during combat operations and hence is more difficult to achieve.^{xlix} *FM 41-10, Civil Affairs*, recognizes the role of good communications skills and liaison with other militaries, civilians, and governmental organizations; however, much of its tone focuses on civil military operations in support of combat operations not peace operations!

Despite apparent disconnects between PDD 56, joint doctrine, and Army doctrine, a basic framework of guidance exists for peace operations that:

- Recognizes that in peace operations, multidisciplinary coordination and consensus building is necessary.
- Requires services (in this case the Army) to train personnel and units for peace operations.
- Specifies the requirements for peacekeeping observers to be able to undertake mediation and negotiation in order to resolve conflict.

On review, sister service doctrine does not clarify or contribute to doctrinal guidance regarding mediation and negotiation in peace operations. The *U.S. Marine Corps Capstone Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1, Operations* does not mention peace operations much less a commander's requirement to mediate or negotiate.^{li} Nor does *MCDP 3, Expeditionary Operations* address mediation and negotiation requirements for its expeditionary missions that fall inside MOOTW.^{lii} Yet, this is the branch of service in our nation that typically performs non-combatant evacuations or NEOs all over the world.

The U.S. Air Force views things differently. Despite being a branch of service that readily accepts and in its doctrine states that in armed conflict and peace operations it assumes a supporting role, recognizes the importance of cross-cultural communications, and conducts formalized training in this area.^{liii} *U.S. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1-1* clearly recognizes that consent among all parties in a dispute is vital to success.^{liv}

None of the service or joint doctrine adequately recognizes the potential for continued participation in multi-national peace operations that involve interagency coordination. Nor does it recognize that PDD 56 mandates strategic level interaction between Federal agencies in complex

emergencies, which will likely result in the same interactions, in varying degrees, at tactical or battalion and brigade levels.^{lv} A review of the policies and training practices of both national and international organizations such as NATO, DOS, NGOs, the United Nations (UN), and other national programs illustrates this. This analysis also provides insight as to how other organizations and nations conduct peace operations and helps describe the peace operations environment from a non-U.S. Army perspective.

NATO recognizes that mediation and negotiation are vital components to conflict resolution.^{lvi} While there are no Standard NATO Agreements or STANAGs regarding this, a review of NATO training programs implies a certain understanding of its importance and complexity. There are several NATO military staff officer and commander courses that include training in mediation and negotiation. Training includes theory and practical exercises. While their content does not go into tremendous depth regarding mediation and negotiation theory, course availability underscores the importance NATO places on them.^{lvii} As the mediation and negotiation courses are based on the normative theory, it indicates their currency. The DOS's approach is more thorough and targets mediation and negotiation at the national level.

The DOS administers its own Foreign Service Institute as well as send its Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) to other private and public funded schools where they learn conflict theory, recognition, and resolution skills.^{lviii} Training on mediation and negotiation includes theory and practice and is based largely on the normative method developed by Roger Fisher and the Harvard Negotiation Project.^{lix} Also, the DOS maintains a pool of trained mediation and negotiation experts who can provide expertise as necessary to other DOS personnel or conduct mediation and negotiation.^{lx}

UN policy is similar to NATO's. The *UN Peacekeeping Handbook* states that mediation and negotiation used in joint commissions are the primary means of resolving conflict, achieving desired endstates, and exercising authority.^{lxi} The UN's accredits mediation and negotiation training programs in several countries. Superficial analysis indicates these courses appear to follow standardized UN guidelines. However, closer examination of course content indicates a lack standardization and quality

control. The U.S. Army's UN Peacekeeping training program provides an example.

The UN Peace Keeping Training Office (PKTO) states that the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command or TRADOC is the proponent for mediation and negotiation training.^{lxii} Further research lead to information suggesting that the combat training centers (CTCs) conduct this training on a regular basis as well as the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). But there is no formal focused BCTP training. Upon request, the BCTP coordinates negotiation seminars, lead by an Army expert from the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI). The training audience for this seminar is limited to brigade level commanders and staff and does not include a significant amount of time spent on theory.^{lxiii}

In contrast, post-Cold War Canada recognized the reduced likelihood of combat operations and increased likelihood of deployments to and participation in complex contingency operations. Canadian Defense Forces correspondingly implemented significant doctrinal changes.

Canadian Defense Forces training programs reflect these doctrinal changes. Today, Canada is probably the most respected and experienced peace operations contributing nation in the world.^{lxiv} Canada's military structure, organization, and equipment are very similar to the U.S. Army's making a comparison relevant.^{lxv}

Canadian Army doctrine requires mediation and negotiation training for all officer ranks. Unlike the U.S. Army, the Canadian Army integrates its mediation and negotiation sustainment training in all career courses and at unit level. Junior officers know and can successfully conduct mediation and negotiation.^{lxvi} NGOs train their field personnel in a similar fashion in order to achieve similar skills.

NGOs participate in complex emergencies throughout the world. According to the *Task Force Eagle JMC Handbook*, there are over seventy different U.S. NGOs providing relief in the U.S. sector in Bosnia.^{lxvii} NGOs and their personnel vary significantly. For example, some NGO leaders in the Balkans have graduate degrees in international relations, some are doctors, and others have no secondary education. One characteristic that the Balkans NGOs share is the recognition that their organization's presence in a country requires national or international consent and that their actions in a country likewise require consent of the lead humanitarian relief agency. Hence the predominance of NGO leadership in the Balkans is trained in consensus building.

Specific examples of consensus building training are mediation and negotiation training, conflict resolution, and others.^{lxviii} Interaction, a

consortium of U.S. based NGOs, coordinates for its member NGOs to participate in Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotations at Fort Polk, Louisiana. According to its operations officer, the purpose of the training is to better understand how the military functions in the peace operations environment as well as gain an appreciation or empathy for how military commanders view NGOs. Conversely, military commanders and soldiers gain an appreciation for what NGOs contribute to humanitarian assistance operations.^{lxix}

After reviewing all available national, joint, and service guidance, the battalion or brigade commander preparing for peace operations in the Balkans, must reach the conclusion that U.S. Army guidance to conduct mediation and negotiation theory is inconsistent with joint doctrine and is ambiguous. Worse yet, based on *FM 100-23*, he may unwittingly conclude that his primary training focus should remain combat skills thereby relegating mediation and negotiation training to "just enough" and "just in time." This notion dismisses the fact that other actors in the peace operations environment learn and practice mediation and negotiation theory. If actors in the conflict practice it, they likely expect military commanders to do so as well. The next chapter, an analysis of operational mission guidance for peace operations in Bosnia reflects this.

Operational Guidance

Mission guidance for the commanders in the Balkans originates from the national level. As a signatory to the Dayton Peace Accords (also known at the General Framework Agreement for Peace or GFAP) President Clinton agreed to contribute U.S. military personnel, under command of NATO, to the peace implementation process in Bosnia-Herzegovina. NATO's commitment and responsibilities under the GFAP, *Annex 1-A: Military Aspects*, clearly fit doctrinal definitions of peace enforcement and peacekeeping. *Annex 1-A* directs the military to conduct Joint Military Commissions (JMCs).^{lxx}

JMCs are multi-party meetings chaired and hosted by the military in order to achieve consensus and resolve conflict between former warring faction (FWF) military representatives.^{lxxi} JMCs are not a U.S. or NATO concept. Rather, they are a carry-over from the UN Protective Forces (UNPROFOR) in the Balkans.^{lxxii} In accordance with the Commander Implementation Force's (COMIFOR's) guidance, formal JMCs were conducted down to battalion level. Their stated purpose was to provide the commander a mechanism through which instructions were given, and through which procedures for supervising, monitoring, and verifying FWF

were developed and published. JMCs also provided a venue through which military issues, civilian concerns and issues, and other aspects of the GFAP could be addressed.

Despite guidance that JMCs were to be conducted down to battalion level, COMIFOR guidance did not include JMC structures or resourcing (staffing) below brigade level.^{lxxiii} This is important because, through omission, the guidance may have communicated to commanders that JMCs at battalion and lower levels were not important. Before designated commanders in Germany could even fully comprehend the ramifications of JMCs, and only a few days after the signing of the GFAP, the nature of peace operations in and military tasks involved with peace implementation increased, especially for units that succeeded IFOR.

In December 1995, at the *Peace Implementation Conference* in London, NATO increased its commitments to the peace implementation process. The conference, chaired by the Office of the High Representative (OHR) of the UN, developed the strategy for recovery for Bosnia-Herzegovina. There, GEN George Joulwan, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), accepted additional military tasks for NATO. They included providing assistance to UNHCR and other international organizations in their humanitarian missions.^{lxxiv} This commitment ensured NGO, national agency, and international organization participation in JMCs and other operations in the region. The GFAP, NATO's commitment to the peace implementation process, and U.S. Army doctrine combined to influence the plans and orders under which commanders operate in the Balkans.

The senior European based U.S. military command in NATO, the U.S. European Command (U.S. EUCOM), published its guidance in *USCINCEUR OPLAN (operations plan) 4243*.^{lxxv} OPLAN 4243 mandates training and certification of all participating military forces. It also requires U.S. forces capable of conducting operations throughout the spectrum of conflict. It specifically states that they will "...be particularly proficient in conducting non-traditional Operations Other Than War (OOTW)," and "...interact with civil authorities as every level to ensure continuous coordination and cooperation with civil authorities."^{lxxvi} OPLAN 4243 did not change since 1995. Only trained and certified units deploy to Bosnia-Herzegovina to serve in the Stabilization Force (SFOR) a successor to IFOR.

Subsequently, Major General William Nash, the commanding general of Task Force Eagle, published his guidance. His four main points were that TF Eagle would implement the military tasks required by the

GFAP, it would make the multinational division work, it would assist in humanitarian aid and civil affairs as much as possible, and it would protect the force.^{lxxvii} Subsequent to NATO's deployment, COMIFOR, Admiral

Leighton Smith, wrote very specific guidance regarding joint military commissions to all commanders in Bosnia. Recent unit standing operating procedures (SOPs) standardize the conduct of JMCs, bilateral meetings, NGO humanitarian support tasks, and other consensus building tasks as well as tactical peace operations tasks.^{lxxviii} Admiral Smith's guidance appropriately and almost directly reflects JP 3.07, the *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*, and closely reflects guidance in the *UN Peacekeeping Manual*.^{lxxix}

In accordance with guidance from their higher headquarters, U.S. Army brigades and battalions in Bosnia patrol, provide security for numerous civilian agencies and organizations, civilians, the International Police Task Force (IPTF), and other designated sites and persons, they conduct show of force operations, and they conduct support to humanitarian operations. By their nature, all of these tasks compete for the commander's resources and therefore create conflict. The following hypothetical scenario illustrates the interrelations of the actors.

The mayor of a town finds the presence of heavily armed soldiers intimidating to himself and the ethnic majority while the minority population welcomes it. The local United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) representative finds the SFOR (U.S. military) roadside checkpoints designed to prevent illegal movements of weapons an obstacle to movement of refugee supplies (provided by Scottish Relief Services) to a minority refugee camp. All parties voice their grievances to the U.S. commander and demand to know what he will do about it. They remind him of his GFAP and related obligations. If he chooses, the commander faces several dilemmas.

First and foremost he can elect not to face any dilemma. Might is right and he has a mission under *Annex 1-A*. This approach, however, does not satisfy higher headquarters intent or guidance, and it will likely lead to greater conflict not only with the local population and its leadership, but also with the NGOs who have their own missions. In response, the commander decides to conduct a JMC or multilateral meeting.

Based on AAR comments he received at Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) during his train-up and mission rehearsal exercise, the commander conducts the JMC. By most accounts it did not go as planned. The local leadership representatives were belligerent and inflexible in their demands. The UNHCR representative seemed to have a more long-term

focus than the “decisive victory” the commander wanted, and none of parties seemed willing to meet on common ground. He is frustrated.

Unfortunately, his experiences are not unique.

After action reports (AARs) from Bosnia indicate many situations occurred similar to the hypothetical one above. The same AARs also indicate that not all mediation and negotiation training is the same. The next chapter, focuses on the training that battalion and brigade commanders received as part of their pre-deployment training for IFOR and SFOR missions.

Pre-deployment Mediation and Negotiation Training

U.S. Army units have participated in peace operations in Bosnia since December of 1995. Initially, the peace operations U.S. Army combat units conducted there were characterized as peace enforcement operations. During the last three years, they evolved into and remain predominately peacekeeping operations. Lessons learned and interviews indicate pre-deployment training for deploying units was not consistent nor was it always relevant for each of these units, especially their commanders. This chapter provides insight into the causes and unanticipated consequences of this training.

Pre-deployment training inconsistencies can be attributed to several factors. Time available to train is the most common. After IFOR accomplished its mission and was preparing to transfer authority to the follow-on force SFOR, a covering force mission was given to several Germany based units. Because of its late identification, pre-deployment training was compressed, especially for senior leaders. Hence, pre-deployment training for Bosnia is called by many as “just-in-time” mission-focused training.^{lxxx}

Another factor that impacted pre-deployment training was training resources. As part of the Seventh Army Training Command’s (7th ATC) Title 10 mission to provide trained and equipped units to EUCOM, the CMTC in Germany, was the lead agency for training and

certifying units for Bosnia missions. The responsibilities grew out of 7th ATC's responsibilities during Task Force Eagle's certification exercises Mountain Eagles I and II.

During Mountain Eagle's I and II, there were no holds barred in identifying and incorporating subject matter experts on most non-traditional peace operations tasks. For example, the U. S. Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI) sent two colonels to conduct a senior leader political-military seminar.^{lxxx} They conducted the seminar over a two-day period. Negotiation training lasted three hours. Not all post-IFOR deploying units received training from the U.S. Army PKI. Instead, they received training from a 7th ATC designated trainer using the U.S. Army PKI materials. Two other training components suffered similar fates after the initial Task Force Eagle train-up and deployment. They were the role players and scenario writing.

Mountain Eagles I and II created very accurate replicas of the U.S Division's area of operations in Bosnia. Emphasis was placed on the FWFs and all available information regarding them. U.S. Army PKI personnel and the V Corps G5 trained role players to participate in JMCs and other bilateral meetings. Subsequent pre-deployment training and certification exercises did not have the same level of preparation and resourcing.^{lxxxii}

Scenarios assumed and portrayed a stagnant Bosnian operational environment. Despite the fact that the Bosnian economy, dispositions and actions of FWF actors, and the political environments were improving, scenarios continued to portray the early 1995 peace enforcement environment. This point is made clear by Major General Larry Ellis' recent comments in a U. S. Institute for Peace article in which he remarked that the training scenarios enacted at CMTC during his mission readiness exercise (MRE) trained him for an environment that did not exist in Bosnia.^{lxxxiii}

These general failings of the 7th ATC specific training were likely repeated at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). From 1997-1998, the JRTC was the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) executive agent for training and certifying U.S. based units deploying to Bosnia. The JRTC replicated the 7th ATC training program and borrowed CMTC Observer Controllers (OCs) to train its OCs.^{lxxxiv}

Other observations regarding pre-deployment training are that the training was more observation and evaluation than training. The OCs, with few exceptions, lack the depth of knowledge to formally train and evaluate mediation or negotiation theory and subsequently measure learning.^{lxxxv} Consequently, the training was broad-brush. Borrowing from Dr. Metz' expression, the training was first generation. Theory training was minimal consisting of the distributive approach described previously and focused on a narrow application. This application was focused on getting the FWFs to comply with the military aspects of the GFAP. Additionally, interviews and AARs indicate that the training failed to recognize whether the mediator or negotiator employed an acceptable theoretical approach to mediation or negotiation.^{lxxxvi}

The fault, if any in this inadequate training lies in the pre-deployment training priority. IFOR and SFOR pre-deployment training and certification was also very peace enforcement vice peacekeeping centric. Commanders focused on collective security tasks and less on leader tasks.^{lxxxvii} Given the debate regarding greater inclusion of SASO in *FM 100-5*, reluctance to embrace soft peace operations tasks such as negotiation are understandable.

The consequences of all of these factors is that peace operations tasks such as mediation and negotiation become "check the block" training events rather than quality

training that benefits the unit. For example, one recent division's senior leaders spent only three hours learning the theory of mediation and negotiation. As a minimum, a basic understanding of mediation and negotiation theory requires at least eighteen hours while an understanding of practical applications requires another six.^{lxxxviii}

Training is vital to any task accomplishment. Mediation and negotiation tasks require no less. Indications are that U.S. Army pre-deployment mediation and negotiation training attempts are ineffective and irrelevant. They are ineffective and irrelevant because they do not achieve a sound mediation and negotiation theory base that can be applied to any given set of conflict circumstances. The next chapter identifies the experiences and training levels of battalion and brigade commanders from IFOR and SFOR and illustrates this.

Mediation and Negotiation Practice in Bosnia-Herzegovina

In his article, *Grunt diplomacy, In the Beginning There Were Only soldiers*, Tony Cucolo relates some of the frustrations he encountered as a battalion commander in IFOR with Task Force Eagle. As the senior U.S. Army commander in the town of Brcko, still today a very contentious area, he struggled to get Serbs and Bosniacs to reach a consensus regarding local peace initiatives. Nothing he tried worked. Both sides refused to communicate face-to-face, and both sides expressed great distrust with one another. Finally out of frustration and "exhausted of whatever diplomatic finesse an infantry lieutenant colonel could muster... he switched to light conversation."^{lxxxix,xc} The light conversation worked and broke the ice on an otherwise dead locked situation. The leaders of each faction represented met on common ground introduced by the battalion commander.

After some time in Brcko, Cucolo discovered other actors he had to reach consensus and develop cooperation with, NGOs. As security in the area improved, NGOs began arriving. Their role was to provide humanitarian relief and initiate economic recovery. Cucolo faced numerous problems such as advising NGOs through the UNHCR on humanitarian assistance project priorities, priorities for relief, and providing support when possible.^{xc} Cucolo described his role at this point

during his deployment as one of “quasi-mediator. That is he had his own interests and point of view, he facilitated, negotiated, arbitrated, and managed relationships between his unit and the other actors in Brcko.”^{xcii} Cucolo’s self-description reflects contemporary mediation and negotiation theory as expressed by Thomas Hume and Thomas Colosi.^{xciii} His actions also reflect the limited training he received during pre-deployment training. Several times during his tour in Bosnia, he referred to his notes from a “Senior Leader Pol-Mil Seminar” he attended in 1995.^{xciv}

Touval and Zartman would say that Cucolo used three of the four mediation methods they identified before he stumbled upon the fourth and most effective one. Nonetheless, Cucolo’s conclusions regarding U.S. Army doctrine and his incomplete background to conduct peace operations as required in Bosnia are relevant. It is also relevant to note the context of his experiences. During IFOR, compliance of FWFs was the focus of JMCs and military operations—classic peace enforcement. Subsequent peace operations conducted by SFOR take on, for the most part, more of a peacekeeping nature.

Cucolo concludes that the military is a valuable third party actor and mediator in the conflict resolution process. As such, the military can seize the initiative through mediation and negotiation and shape outcomes. Most significantly, Cucolo identifies that doctrinal guidance is lacking. Consequently, commanders justify inaction and incomplete preparation for peace operations by citing doctrinal constraints. Others use it as a point of departure for innovative solutions. This results in a difference in opinion, at varying levels of command as to what third party activities (mediation and negotiation) are suitable and appropriate.^{xcv}

LTC Curtis Scaparotti, also a battalion commander in TF Eagle, had a different experience and drew dissimilar conclusions to COL Cucolo. LTC Scaparotti’s battalion trained and deployed with the express mission of securing Tuzla airfield the TF Eagle headquarters location. His training was specifically focused on combat tasks. He did not attend mediation or negotiation training. Yet, mid-way through his two and one half-month deployment, he conducted a relief in place of the UN forces in what would become the Russian brigade’s sector. Then he conducted a relief in place with the Russian brigade. Scaparotti conducted bilateral discussions and JMCs with FWF military leaders, and he

conducted coordination with the Russian brigade commander and executive officer. His accounts relate several of the dynamics encountered by Cucolo, but his account mentions no actions that reflect mediation or negotiation techniques. Moreover, his conclusions tend to focus on the ability, in peace operations, to be innovative and decisive when required.^{xcvi} LTC Scaparotti is not an anomaly. In fact his experience and conclusions bear further investigation into the implications that some leaders are adaptive and others warriors. This is investigated in the next chapter.

COL Cucolo's and LTC Scaparotti's experiences in Bosnia seem to define two extreme limits of the experiences commanders had in resolving conflict in Bosnia. Scaparotti's experiences appear to reflect that, without the training, he resorted to compelling compliance through the threat of the use of force. COL Cucolo, on the other hand, sought and gained consensus through contact, but his tool kit was limited. It reflected the narrow scope of pre-deployment training he received. It is not surprising then that Cucolo does not mention the negotiation technique of creating value when relating his experiences. The experiences of other commanders fall on points in between.

Colonel Robin Swan commanded Task Force 1-26 Infantry as part of SFOR in 1997. He attended the three-hour pre-deployment training seminar and regards it as inadequate and underdeveloped. His experiences differ from Cucolo's in that the focus of SFOR was less on *Annex 1-A* tasks and more on creating greater security and stability.^{xcvii} As a frame of reference, note that the number of NGOs active in Bosnia in 1995 grew by 200 percent during 1996-1997.^{xcviii}

In COL Swan's words, the focus of bi- and multi-lateral meetings and to a lesser extent, JMCs was to create cooperation and a "shadow of the future."^{xcix} In order to

accomplish this, COL Swan focused his efforts on interaction, understanding the positions of the actors (Fisher and Ury-esque), and creating value.

For example, he dealt with a leader who threatened to frustrate minority resettlement in a town. COL Swan recognized that at issue was the leader's prestige as well as power. In response, COL Swan offered to put a good word in with the U.S. AID representative and see about getting some money for the town in order to get factories operating again. The approach worked, and COL Swan did not have to compel compliance through the use of force.^c

COL Swan did not learn his approach from pre-deployment training. He, like many of his contemporaries, learned by doing. Then, after completing his command, COL Swan attended the John F. Kennedy School of Security Studies at Harvard. There he studied negotiation. When asked if the training he obtained at Harvard would have helped him to be more effective in Bosnia, he answered, "Yes." He then identified several areas where the U.S. Army could provide more effective and timely conflict resolution training to peace operations commanders.^{ci}

In addition to former battalion and brigade commanders, feedback from senior commanders is available that indicates that mediation and negotiation training improved the effectiveness of commanders in several aspects, and it contributed greatly to the overall international efforts to implement peace and stability in the region. Brigadier General Stanley Cherrie, the Assistant Division Commander of Task Force Eagle, wrote an article entitled "Bosnia Lessons Learned" for *Military Review* in July of 1997. In the article, he makes two significant observations regarding his experiences prior to and during his deployment to Bosnia with IFOR.

General Cherrie describes Task Force Eagle's training program as the toughest, most concentrated training our Army has ever done. By his account, pre-deployment training was not just-in-time training. In fact it was very thorough and broad in scope—in combat tasks. Or, in other words, it included tasks that would "...encourage, approaching any interface with the respective factions from a position of professionalism and strength."^{cii}

One could also state that General Cherrie's other observation regarding JMCs was myopic. JMCs worked well for the peace enforcement operations (where combat tasks are necessary), but the "carrot and stick approach" he uses to describe JMCs is no longer suitable in Bosnia.^{ciii} General Nash employed Colonel Stratman from the U.S. Army PKI to build and run Task Force Eagle (division) level JMCs. They were tremendously successful, and resulted in creation of a formal JMC staff section in the Task Force Eagle headquarters. Stratman's success could be attributed to his in depth knowledge of mediation and negotiation. Instead, General Cherrie's "first generation" understanding of peace operations attributes Task Force Eagle JMC success to Stratman's very "effective carrot and stick approach."^{civ,cv} A failure to recognize the benefits of a well-trained mediator and negotiator was myopic. Nonetheless, for Task Force Eagle, JMCs were the most effective means available of gaining consensus, cooperation, and issuing guidance. Again, this was in the context of peace enforcement vice peacekeeping.

Another commander, General Montgomery Meigs III, served both as the Task Force Eagle commander in 1997 and as the Commander of SFOR in 1999. His observations regarding his preparation for his jobs are relevant despite his high level. General Meigs states that in peace operations, one "...must understand the art of consensus-building in a

multinational staff and among the international community, how you present yourself, and how to avoid the little nasty argument.”^{cvi}

His predecessor as Commander SFOR, General Eric Shinseki, and Major Generals Ellis and Nash, both Task Force Eagle Commanders, echo General Meigs’ comments.^{cvi} They all indicate that, despite training, “...they were not prepared for the experiences that they had in Bosnia.”^{cvi} General Nash amplifies this feeling when he states that his negotiation training was not difficult enough and was too focused on “getting to yes.”^{cix} General Nash’s comment reflects the prevailing consensus among professionals cited in this document that negotiations theory training can not be effectively accomplished and practiced after only a few hours of training.

Two conclusions are drawn from the observations of former commanders in Bosnia. When commanders, at all levels, had training in negotiation, it improved their effectiveness. The other conclusion is that training for commanders was not consistent in content or duration. Both conclusions complicate and obscure any definitive judgment of how much mediation and negotiation training may increase a commander’s effectiveness in Bosnia. These conclusions also indicate that perhaps some leaders are more adaptive to changing circumstances than others. The next chapter discusses adaptive and warrior leadership as it applies to mediation and negotiation training for peace operations.

The Warrior Ethos and Conflict Resolution

The warrior ethos introduces another consideration with regard to mediation and negotiation skills of battalion and brigade commanders. In describing the warrior ethos, *FM 22-100*, the U.S. Army’s Leadership manual, states that it is a drive to be the best, to triumph

over all adversity, and to remain focused on mission accomplishment and that refusal to accept failure is at its core.^{cx} General Shinseki stated that he was totally unprepared for his role in Bosnia. He characterized his performance in Bosnia as the “make it up as you go manner.”^{cx} LTC Scaparotti’s account reflects a similar approach. He was not prepared to conduct a JMC, but he did. In this sense, General Shinseki and LTC Scaparotti displayed the *FM 22-100* warrior ethos when they adapted to their surroundings and new requirements in Bosnia. Their circumstances and achievements indicate that mediation and negotiation training is necessary but not essential to the warrior leader. This sidesteps the core issue. The core issue is whether battalion and brigade commander performance and effectiveness can improve with the training not whether they can succeed in peace operations without it.

A representative sample of senior officers state and their observations support conclusions that they could have been better prepared for peace operations in Bosnia. They cite numerous examples and instances of where the training helped but could have been better. Their comments are not contradictory of the warrior ethos. Instead, they support it. *FM 22-100* states also that the U.S. Army is a learning organization that harnesses the experience of its people and organizations to improve the way it does business.^{cx} It follows that the U.S. Army, as an organization, has an obligation to learn about and from peace operations and adopt new techniques and procedures that result in greater efficiency and effectiveness.

U.S. Army leadership doctrine requires leaders to be warriors and seek self-improvement. Providing such training to battalion and brigade commanders prior to conducting peace operations in Bosnia is therefore requisite. The next chapter evaluates whether the training is feasible and acceptable.

Mediation and Negotiation Training Program Feasibility and Acceptability

There is a wide variance in mediation and negotiation training techniques, methods, and application styles. This requires the application of two criteria in order to determine if mediation and negotiation training is feasible and acceptable. These criteria are time required and availability.

Battalion and brigade commanders have incredibly busy schedules that must be a consideration in determining the feasibility of implementing any mediation and negotiation training programs. Devoting too little time to the training, as was conducted for IFOR, achieves the ineffective "just-in-time" training effect while imposing minimal demands on the commander's available time. Sending a commander to the two week Lestor B. Robert Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre held in Nova Scotia, Canada or taking a course of instruction at a university would be more effective training, but are both time prohibitive.^{cxiii,cxiv} Feasible options for training must lie somewhere in between. This includes adopting an approach that trains commanders throughout their careers. Such an approach is feasible, and there are obvious advantages to it including the training of an entire officer corps not just selected commanders, the internalization of conflict resolution skills by all officers, and the ability to standardize the training. However, this approach does not provide a short-term solution to current U.S. Army mediation and negotiation training deficiencies.

Mediation and negotiation training must also be current and relevant in order to be acceptable. There are numerous civilian and military mediation and negotiation training resources available for military commanders. Most of them espouse the normative approach

to negotiation. For example, the U.S. Army War College (AWC) in Carlisle, Pennsylvania offers an elective course entitled "Resolving Conflict in a New Era."^{cxv} This course consists of twelve lessons taught over a five-week period of time. Attendance at the AWC is limited, however, to promotable lieutenant colonels and colonels who may or may not command U.S. Army brigades. In this regard, relying on the AWC to train battalion and brigade commanders in mediation and negotiation is unacceptable.

Another training program is in place at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center (JFKSWC). There, a faculty member from the AWC teaches a course entitled "How to Negotiate: Strategy and Process." The course is taught to Civil Affairs(CA) officers. It consists of six-three hour classes that cover negotiations theory and exercises followed by a six-hour simulation exercise drawn from experiences of CA officers in Bosnia.^{cxvi} This course was also recently taught to senior leaders from the Tenth Mountain and Twenty-fifth Infantry Divisions.^{cxvii} This course also represents a feasible method of addressing the U.S. Army's short-term pre-deployment mediation and negotiation training deficiencies identified above.

U.S. Army pre-command courses (PCCs) for battalion and brigade commanders present another acceptable training opportunity. PCCs last a minimum of two weeks and typically last for five weeks. PCCs focus on combat and combat decision making and planning skills.^{cxviii} Currently, neither the U.S. Army Infantry School nor Center, the Armor Center and School, or the School of Command Preparation at Fort Leavenworth train mediation or negotiation skills or theory to their command designees.

Training quality also bears on whether mediation and negotiation training is acceptable. Previous chapters indicate that training quality has a direct impact on its

effectiveness. Well-trained and understood theory that is reinforced by practice is most effective and acceptable. Conversely, training that lacks standardization and quality control, as is indicated with UN PKO accredited training programs, is not. First generation or narrowly focused training, such as that conducted by the CMTC, is also not acceptable because it lacks relevance and effectiveness.^{cxix}

Short training periods, such as the CMTC's also lack a comprehensive approach to mediation and negotiation theory and practice. Short training periods are a result of the U.S. Army's inability or reluctance to pull its commanders "out of the line" to go to school for long periods of time as was the case with COL Swan. Canada's training program seems to have adapted to overcome this same dilemma.

Canadians begin their mediation and negotiation training at the junior officer level, and they continue the training throughout the officer's career.^{cxx} This approach has merit in that it achieves training early and continuously in an officer's career. As a result, platoon leaders can successfully mediate and negotiate.^{cxxi} This approach also addresses s one of the conclusions of the U.S. Institute of Peace special report that U.S. Army platoon leaders ought to be capable of negotiating.^{cxxii} Additionally, such a training approach communicates early on to officers that SASO is as much a part of the Army's roles and missions as combat. This is another conclusion by general officers surveyed in "Training U.S. Army Officers for Peace Operations, Lessons From Bosnia."^{cxxiii}

Conclusion

Since Task Force Eagle stood up and began training for peace operations in Bosnia, U.S. Army battalion and brigade pre-deployment training has almost exclusively been focused on peace enforcement and warfighting tasks. This approach provides the

commander a very credible force that the commander can threaten to use in order to compel FWF members and leaders to cooperate, and in a peace enforcement environment, this is acceptable and necessary. Unfortunately, this training is no longer relevant nor is it very effective, and U.S. Army battalion and brigade commanders conducting peace operations in Bosnia are improperly trained for their assigned missions.

This monograph identifies the U.S. Army doctrine and training deficiencies that cause this.

The U.S. Army's fails to follow U.S. joint and its own doctrine as well as conduct appropriate pre-deployment training of battalion and brigade commanders conducting peace operations in Bosnia. The U.S. Army's most significant doctrinal deficiency is its failure to acknowledge that joint U.S. military doctrine and U.S. national policies tell commanders that they will be trained at and conduct negotiations during peace operations. The *Joint Force Commanders Handbook for Peace Operations*, despite not being a doctrinal manual, clearly expects *joint* commanders to have those skills. By ignoring joint doctrine, U.S. Army peace operations doctrine lacks definition and authority. The U.S. Army must review its current doctrine and identify whether it clearly reflects joint doctrine and the likely missions the U.S. Army will perform. Doctrine such as *FM 100-23* that is clearly combat centric must be reevaluated and changed to reflect the potential for long term commitments to peace operations and other SASO. They must also provide commanders the necessary framework that causes them to develop and train requisite skills such as mediation and negotiation.

Current doctrine does not provide an adequate framework, and there is a large training void. Several flawed U.S. Army training methodologies reflect this training void. They are "just enough" and "just in time" as indicated by lessons learned and AARs, the fact that the vast majority of U.S. Army officers do not have any mediation or negotiation

training, and the fact that U.S. Army premiere professional development institutions and its Combat Training Centers (CMTC, JRTC, and NTC) do not adequately train mediation and negotiation skills.

As the U.S. Army corrects its doctrinal deficiencies, it can develop and implement short- and long-term mediation and negotiation training programs that ensure battalion and brigade commanders are adequately prepared for peace operations in Bosnia. Other militaries, agencies, and international organizations train mediation and negotiation successfully. Their training programs originate from their recognition of its value in peace operations environments, and they subsequently incorporate it in their doctrine and policies. The U.S. Army must take similar actions. It must accept SASO doctrine and tasks as equals to combat doctrine and tasks especially in light of the historical examples that indicate the U.S. Army's role is one of non-combat more so than combat.

Correcting these deficiencies is both feasible and acceptable. The current practice, as shown by lessons learned from peace operations in Bosnia, clearly indicates there is a pre-deployment training opportunity during which time effective and adequate training can take place that can address the U.S. Army's short-term problem of effectively training battalion and brigade commanders. The current "just-in-time" pre-deployment training" can be made more relevant and effective, using experts from the U.S. Army PKI, civilian experts from academia, and civilians from the NGO community to develop and implement it. Mediation and negotiation training relevance can be assured by incorporating lessons learned and changes in the operational environment.

Simultaneously, long-term officer professional development programs, similar to Canada's, can be developed and implemented as well. The advantages to this approach are

that the U.S. Army, in a period of a few years develops and trains its entire officer corps in valuable SASO skills. Formal, structured mediation and negotiation theory training throughout officers' careers also helps the U.S. Army to distance itself from Cold War doctrine and address the cognitive tension between training and maintaining skills for combat and training and maintaining skills for peace operations (SASO).

Another training opportunity that is unique to battalion and brigade commanders and can address both the doctrine and training problem is implementation of mediation and negotiation training at PCCs. Incorporation of such training, developed and taught by qualified personnel (U.S. army PKI), at armor and infantry battalion and brigade PCCs can achieve the desired training levels.

The U.S. Army accepts risk when it assigns a mission to a unit knowing that it might not be adequately resourced to successfully accomplish it. This is currently the case in Bosnia. U.S. military doctrine specifies that commanders possess certain minimum mediation and negotiation capabilities as they conduct peace operations. Operational guidance and directives reinforce that doctrine. Yet, commanders continue to serve in Bosnia without adequate training. The U.S. Army, by definition, then accepts unnecessary tactical, operational, and strategic risk

ⁱ Dennis Reimer, GEN in his Army Birthday address in March 1997. See <http://www.dtic.mil.armylink.news/Mar1997/s19970325bday97.html>

ⁱⁱ See, for example, Lawrence Yates' article "Military Stability and Support Operations: Analogies, Patterns, and Recurring Themes," in *Military Review* (Oct. 1997): 51, 52. Therein Yates describes that since 1775, the U.S. Army fought ten traditional wars and participated in thirty-five non-traditional military operations.

ⁱⁱⁱ Analysis of the EUCOM, CENTCOM, SOUTHCOM, and PACOM CINCs Theater Engagement strategies, clearly indicate that the priority of military effort is prevention of

complex emergencies associated with failed states. Additionally, Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD 56), which will be discussed in depth in Chapter 2, specifically mentions U.S. military involvement in these operations. Many experts believe that when the Cold War ended so too did the forces that held lesser-developed and unstable nations states together. See also, *The 1995 National Military Strategy in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement*, (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1995), 4.

^{iv} On the FM 100-5 Web site there are numerous articles whose subjects are the U.S. Army's role in SASO. See <http://cgsc.army.mil/cdd/f465.htm>. Generally, contributors to the debate agree that SASO is part of it; the debate centers on whether SASO should be the focal point.

^v U.S. Department of the Army *FM 100-23, Peace Operations* (FT Monroe, VA: Dec 1994), 4.

^{vi} *Ibid.*, 2,3.

^{vii} *Ibid.*, 5.

^{viii} *Ibid.*, 6.

^{ix} U.S. Code Title 10, Section 3062 (1988).

^x According to the UNHCR, there are currently over 200 NGOs conducting relief operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Since 1995, they distributed over \$850 million in relief and aid. Military support to NGOs is a symbiotic relationship. NGOs rely on military assistance for security. In return, the military does not have to resource relief and it can retain its impartial stance more effectively. For a more complete humanitarian operations perspective see the UNHCR web site at <http://www.unhcr.ch/fdrs/my99/bih.htm>. Internet. Accessed 1 February 1999. Other statistical data is available from the High Commissioner's annual speeches at <http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/unhcr/hcspeech/>.

^{xi} See for example, "Unique Aspects of Peace Operations" in *Coalition Command and Control: Peace Operations*. Number 10, October 1994, 1-4. Available from <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/z1001.html>. Internet. Accessed 24 October 1999.

^{xii} Roger Fisher and William Ury. *Getting to Yes*, (Harrisonburg, VA: Penguin Books, 1986), i.

^{xiii} J. Lewis Rasmussen. *Peacemaking in the Twenty-first Century in Peacemaking in International Conflict Methods and Techniques* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 32.

^{xiv} Randall Dolinger. "How do You Manage Conflict" in *Negotiation Skills (in the*

MOOTW Environment). Available from <http://www-cgsc.army.mil/djco/Pubs/papers/negotiate/negotiation/manage.htm>. Internet. Accessed 17 August 1999.

^{xv} Daniel P. Bolger. *Americans at War in the 1990's*, (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995), 274, 358.

^{xvi} David Forsythe. *United Nations Peacemaking: The Conciliation Commission for Palestine*, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1972), 13-18.

^{xvii} Jacob Bercovitch. *Resolving International Conflicts the Theory and Practice of Mediation*, (Boulder, CO: Letra Libre, 1996), 76.

^{xviii} U.S. Department of the Army. *Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations*, (Fort Monroe, VA: 1995), 15.

^{xix} Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman. *International Mediation and Practice*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 10-14.

^{xx} BG Stanley F. Cherrie (retired) "Task Force Eagle" in *Military Review*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, July-August 1997), 71. BG Cherrie's remarks reflect a common trait observed and practiced by IFOR in Bosnia.

^{xxi} Jacob Bercovitch. "Mediation in International Conflict, an Overview of Theory, a Review of Practice" in *Theory and Practice Peacemaking in International Conflict, Methods and Techniques*, (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 127-128.

^{xxii} In general, see the *Negotiation Journal*. Available at <http://www.wkap.nl/journalhome.htm/0748-4526>. Internet. Accessed 12 October 1999. There are several editorials and articles in *Negotiation Journal* discussing the need for the negotiations field to regulate itself and standardize negotiation practices.

^{xxiii} Daniel Druckman. "Negotiating in the International Context" in *Peacemaking in International Conflict, Methods and Techniques*, (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 81.

^{xxiv} Roger Fisher and William Ury. *Getting to Yes*, (Harrisonburg, VA: Penguin Books, 1986), xi-xii.

^{xxv} Ibid., xii.

^{xxvi} See, for example, Stephen R. Covey's book, *The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People*, (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 206-216. Here he describes that conflict results in one of six outcomes. They are: win/win—both sides get something out of the solution; win/lose or—some one loses or perceives to lose, the other wins causing greater

conflict; lose/win—the same as win/lose; lose/lose/win—both sides can not agree because of the perception by both parties that they lose; and no deal—in this case, parties do not even come to the table and attempt to reach an agreement because of extreme differences.

^{xxvii} Robert Axelrod. *The Evolution of Cooperation*, (Boulder Books, 1984), 174. See also, for example, COL Robin Swan, former battalion task force commander during SFOR in Bosnia in 1997. In a conversation with the author on 29 November 1999, he described the concept of a “shadow of the future.”

^{xxviii} Thomas G. Weis and Leon Godenler. *NGOs, the UN and Global Governance*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner Publications, 1996), 37.

^{xxix} Ibid. Interestingly, the coursework directed by the President consists of elective courses, and none of these courses contain learning objectives regarding negotiation and mediation.

^{xxx} Ibid. PDD 56 subsumes the “other” responsibilities of the U.S. Army. Per PDD 56 and Title 10 the Chief of Staff of the Army must ensure that senior U.S. Army leaders understand and can function effectively in interagency operations. There is no discussion in the PDD regarding combined interagency operations.

^{xxxi} U.S. DOD. *JP 1-02, Approved Joint Terminology, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, (Washington D.C.: GPO, 4 March 1994) available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/ip1_02.pdf. Internet. Accessed 14 October 1999.

^{xxxii} Ibid.

^{xxxiii} Ibid. The term “mediation” does not appear in JP 1-02. The term “negotiation” appears but is defined only in terms of hostage negotiations as one would find in terrorist or criminal situations.

^{xxxiv} U.S. DOD. *JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1 February 1995), V-1-8.

^{xxxv} See, for example, the discussion of the principles of operations other than war in U.S. DOD. *JP 3-07, Joint Military Operations Other Than War*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 5 October 1995), II-6, 7.

^{xxxvi} See, for example, U.S. DOD. *JP 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 12 February 1999), VII.

^{xxxvii} Ibid., VII.

^{xxxviii} See for example, *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 28 February 1995), Chapter III and *Joint Task Force*

Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 16 June 1997), Chapter IV. The descriptions of and guidelines for mediation and negotiation in the 1995 version do not reflect the normative approach to negotiation. Whereas, the 1997 version does.

^{xxxix} Ibid., *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*, 16 June 1997, p IV-15-19.

^{xl} U.S. DOD. *JP 3-08, Interagency Cooperation During Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, October 1996), I-11.

^{xli} Ibid., I-5.

^{xlii} Ibid., I-9.

^{xliii} See, for example, page seven of Dr. Metz' article, *Air Force Role in UN Peacekeeping*, available at <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj.metzz/html>. Internet. Accessed 12 October 1999. Despite its title, the article presents a very comprehensive analysis of U.S. and UN peacekeeping doctrine.

^{xliv} See, for example, U.S. Department of the Army, *FM 100-5, Operations*, (Fort Monroe, VA: June 1993), Chapter 13. Despite the discussion regarding the principles of OOTW, there is an obvious bias toward the use of or threat of the use of force. The statement "They must be prepared to apply elements of combat power to restore order, to separate warring factions, and to return the environment to conditions more conducive to civil order and discipline." Clearly it fails to recognize that mediation and negotiation are also means to solve conflict.

^{xliv} See, for example, pages 5-1 through 5-3 of Chapter 5 of FM 100-5. The discussion regarding the combined operations characteristics identifies that "...participating nations in the coalitions must agree to clearly defined and mutually attainable objectives." Yet there is no mention in the chapter regarding mediation or negotiation skills furthering the implication that there are other workarounds to consensus building.

^{xlvi} FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, 2.

^{xlvi} Ibid., 86. "Appendix C, Training" provides any commander the doctrinal excuse to always train combat tasks first.

^{xlvi} See for example, U.S. Department of the Army. *FM 100-16, Army Operational Support*, (Fort Monroe, VA: May 1995), 2-11, and *FM 100-17, Decisive Force: Army in Theater Operations*, (Fort Monroe, VA: May 1995), 4-7.

^{xliv} See, for example, U.S. Department of the Army. *FM 27-1, The Law of War*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, June 1967), Chapter 1. During conflict not considered war,

combatants do not have as much authority (and responsibility) as during war. Consensus during peace operations then, is dependent upon voluntary compliance.

ⁱ U.S. Department of the Army. *FM 41-10, Civil Affairs*, (Fort Monroe, VA: 11 February 1993) 3-1-12.

^{li} U.S. Marine Corps. *MCPD 1, Warfighting*, available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/mcdp1.pdf. Internet. Accessed 29 October 1999.

^{lii} U.S. Marine Corps. *MCPD 3, Expeditionary Operations*, available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/mcdp3.pdf. Internet. Accessed 29 October 1999.

^{liii} See, for example, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Training. Available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpkotrainning/list/htm>. Internet. Accessed 29 June 1999. This site provides links to peacekeeping training program course information for several countries. Of note are the ones from Belgium, Austria, Australia, and the U.S. The U.S. link includes only U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army training courses. The See, for example, the U.S. A.F. Special Operations Command list of training it offers in cross cultural communications.

^{liv} See for example, U.S. Department of the Air Force. *Air Force Doctrine Document 1-1*, (Montgomery, AL: September 1997), 7.

^{lv} This is in fact the case in Kosovo. There, military commanders' areas of responsibility coincide with geographic areas of responsibility of U.S.AID field representatives. Daily coordination occurs between the military commander and AID representative. Available at http://www.usaid.gov/hum_response/ofda/kosofs116.html. Internet. Accessed 28 October 1999.

^{lvi} See, for example, Headquarters, Allied Force Central Europe (ACE). *Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (HQ, ARRC) ARRC CIMIC Constants*, (22 September 1995), 5. A discussion of civil military cooperation (CIMIC) clearly identifies that CIMIC personnel will assist the commander's negotiation and mediation efforts.

^{lvii} See, for example, NATO. *NATO Schools Catalog*, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/1998.htm>. Internet. Accessed 19 July 1999.

^{lviii} See for example, DOS. Foreign Studies Institute Report. Available at <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/reports/chap2.htm>. Internet. Accessed 14 October 1999.

^{lix} See, for example, the DOS web site <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/htm>. Internet. Accessed 14 October 1999.

^{lx} Ibid. This site provides several links to training programs in DOS.

^{lxi} Ibid., UN Peacekeeping Training Office.

^{lxii} Ibid.

^{lxiii} See, for example, Lieutenant Colonel William Gade, Staff Judge Advocate Trainer, BCTP. Information obtained via email at FT Leavenworth, KS on 10 December 1999.

^{lxiv} Ibid., Dr. Metz' in *Air Force Role in UN Peacekeeping*, 7.

^{lxv} Following the Cold War, the Canadian Defence Ministry, much like the U.S. DOD, planned for and drew-down its armed forces. The reduction was proportionate to the U.S. DOD's draw-down. Its forces remain structured in a similar fashion to the DOD. Training, command and control, and combat systems are similar if not U.S. manufactured.

^{lxvi} Ian Hope, major, Canadian Forces. Comments were expressed during a conversation on 15 November 1999 at FT Leavenworth, KS and are reflected in a *Low Level Negotiation Package* document published by the Headquarters, 1 Canadian Brigade Group, Canadian Forces Base Calgary, 12 January 1994.

^{lxvii} Multinational Division (North). *MND (N) Joint Military Commission Handbook* available at <http://www.call.army.mil/newsletters/96-8/sec1.htm>. Internet. Accessed 28 June 1999.

^{lxviii} Interaction. Interaction Publications website. Available at <http://pair.com/pub/index.html>. Internet. Accessed 14 October 1999.

^{lxix} In March, 1999 at Fort Leavenworth, KS, the Operations Officer of Interaction spent several minutes discussing the importance and benefits of NGOs participating in JRTC rotations. Their participation helps both the military and the NGOs to understand each other.

^{lxx} See, for example, NATO. *The General Framework Agreement*, available at <http://www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-home.htm>. Internet. Accessed 28 October 1999. While *Annex 1-A: Military Aspects* pertains directly to the military, the other Annexes provide insight to potential conflicts that might be addressed in JMCs. Available at <http://www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-an1a.htm>. Internet. Accessed 28 October 1999. Another valuable source of background information is General Wesley Clark. "Building a Lasting Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina" in *NATO Review*, No. 1, (Spring 1998), 19-22. Available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1998/9801-06.htm>. Internet. Accessed 28 October 1999.

^{lxxi} U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). "Peace Agreement Language and Intent" in *CALL Newsletter 96-8*. Available at <http://call.army.mil/call/newsletters/96-8/sec2.htm>. Internet. Accessed 28 June 1999.

^{lxxii} See, for example, a UN document entitled *Joint Commissions*. This document, obtained via fax from Bosnia in 1995, describes in detail the intent, composition and conduct of regional and local joint commissions conducted in the Balkans prior to the Dayton accords. Another document from the U.S. Army CALL, "Joint Military Commissions" available at <http://call.army.mil/call/newsltrs/96-8/sec2a.htm>. Internet. Accessed 28 June 1998. This article describes Section II of the *COMIFOR's SOP* which deals exclusively with JMCs.

^{lxxiii} U.S. Army CALL. "IFOR/JMC Structures" in *CALL Newsletter 96-8*. Available at <http://call.army.mil/call/newsltrs/96-8/sec3.htm>. Internet. Accessed 28 June 1999. This section provides helpful diagrams of JMC structures from the ARRC, Division, and brigade JMC structures in IFOR.

^{lxxiv} Carl Bildt. "Remarks to the Peace Implementation Conference" in *Speeches by the High Commissioner*, available at <http://www.ohr.int/docu/d951208a.htm>. Internet. Accessed 13 March 1999.

^{lxxv} George A. Joulwan, General. *U.S. EUCOM OPLAN 4243*. Available at <http://www.eucom.smil.mil/eccs-as/libr...s/plans/oplans/oplan4243/4243bp3a.html>. Internet. Accessed 8 July 1999.

^{lxxvi} *Ibid.*, 1.

^{lxxvii} Curtis M. Scaparrotti. "Blue Falcons in Bosnia" in *Peace Operations*, published by the Strategic Studies Institute, (U. S; Army War College, 25 January 1999), 39.

^{lxxviii} U.S. Army CALL. *JMC Planning and Guidance Handbook 19981106* in JMC Military Commissions. Available at <http://call.army.mil/call/newsltrs/96-8/sec3.htm>. Internet. Accessed 24 October 1999. The lessons learned in this portion refer to excerpts of Task Force Eagle's SOP regarding JMCs. See pages 80-82.

^{lxxix} *Ibid.*, *Joint Peacekeeping Handbook*, Section I. It summarizes The Statement of Procedures established by Admiral Smith. "It specifies that, "... at lower levels, JMC activities included disseminating policy, issuing instructions to factions on policies and procedures, and coordinating GFAP-required actions, resolving military complaints, questions or problems, coordinating civil/military actions where appropriate, and developing confidence-building measures between the parties."

^{lxxx} This expression is used several times in an article found in the U.S. Peace Institute Special Report entitled "Training U. S. Army Officers for Peace Operations," available at <http://www.usip.org>. Internet. Accessed 2 November 1999. The gist of the article is that peace operations require significant changes in senior (general officer) education and professional development. The article cites several key Bosnia veterans and makes a strong argument that mediation and negotiation training is imperative. The "just in time" comment

has obvious ties to guidance in Appendix C of *FM 100-23*.

^{lxxx}i In December 1995, as an observer controller for Mountain Eagle I and II, the author obtained a copy of the Pol-mil Seminar notes. Also, former ambassadors were incorporated into training scenarios.

^{lxxx}ii The author's units provided role players, and he observed subsequent mission rehearsal exercises at CMTC from 1996-1997.

^{lxxx}iii Ibid., Training U. S. Army Officers for Peace Operations." See, for example, MG Ellis' comments, p. 3.

^{lxxx}iv See U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned. "Peace Support Operations Rehearsals" in *Newsletter No 98-1*, (FT Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, April 1998), 2. Also *ibid.*, U.S. Peace Institute Special Report, "Training U. S. Army Officers for Peace Operations," 2-4.

^{lxxx}v This assertion based on a comment by MAJ Kathy Gavle in a discussion on 23 November 1999 regarding the UN Peacekeeping course she attended in Sweden.

^{lxxx}vi Ibid., CALL and interviews with LTC Tony Cucolo and COL Robin Swan.

^{lxxx}vii Lawrence Yates. "Military Stability and Support Operations: Analogies, Patterns, and Recurring Themes." *Military Review* (July-August, 1997): 51. See also U.S. Army CALL. "Training for Stability Operations by the CMTC, 4 QTR FY96 and 1QTRFY97"

^{lxxx}viii From an interview with COL (Ret) James McCallum, U.S. Army PKI, on 14 November 1999. Since 1995, COL McCallum trained more than 400 officers at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (JFKSWC) and senior leaders deploying to Bosnia. His program consists of twenty-four hours of training. Eighteen hours are dedicated to theory, and six hours are devoted to a simulation exercise consisting of scenarios and twenty-five role players. Recently, one division's Bosnia-bound senior leadership only received three hours of training.

^{xc}Tony Cucolo (Lieutenant Colonel). "Grunt Diplomacy: In the Beginning There Were Only Soldier's" in *Parameters*, (Spring 1999), 1. Available at <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/99spring/cucolo.htm>. Internet. Accessed 13 July 1999.

^{xc}i Ibid., Cucolo, 8, 10. See, also, Wesley Clark, (General). "Building a Lasting Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina" in *NATO Review*, No. 1, (Spring 1998), 19-22. Available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1998/9801-06.htm>. Internet. Accessed 28 October 1999. In this article, General Clark describes the NATO commitment to provide humanitarian support when available. This change in policy from the UNPROFOR to NATO was a bitter pill for NGOs to swallow.

^{xcii} Ibid., Cucolo, p. 7.

^{xciii} Cameron Hume, a mediation expert and career diplomat, wrote *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices*. Thomas Colosi wrote *On and Off the Record: Colosi on Negotiation*. His expertise in negotiations focuses on business. COL McCallum used both authors' texts to teach negotiation at the U.S. Army War College, and they were used at the Pol-Mil seminar.

^{xciv} The author discussed the contents of the "Pol-Mil Seminar" during an interview on 14 November 1999. During the conversation, he related that he referred to his notes from the seminar frequently and that they were a great benefit.

^{xcv} Ibid., Cucolo, p. 11, 12.

^{xcvi} See LTC Scaparotti's briefing slides published in "Blue Falcons in Bosnia" in *Peace Operations*, (Strategic Studies Institute, U. S. Army War College: 25 January 1999), 71-82.

^{xcvii} Robin Swan (Colonel). Former battalion commander, Task Force 1-26 Infantry, First Infantry Division, USAREUR, SFOR, 1997. Interview conducted by the author on 29 November 1999 at FT Leavenworth, KS.

^{xcviii} International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA). *ICVA NGO Support Project in BiH*, available at <http://www.ddh.nl/org/poo/uk/introduc/icva.htm> Internet. Accessed March 1999. There are currently 330 different NGOs operating in Bosnia. In 1995, upon the signing of the GFAP, there were less than 100.

^{xcix} Ibid., Swan.

^c Ibid., Swan.

^{ci} Ibid., Swan.

^{cii} Stanley Cherrie (Brigadier General). "Task Force Eagle" in *Military Review*, U.S. Command and General Staff College: July-August 1997), 65. As told by BG Cherrie, the first Armored Division conducted eleven command post or validation exercises from October until 15 November 1995. It conducted the Pol-mil Seminar on one day. This seminar included the session on negotiation and mediation taught by the Army PKI.

^{ciii} Ibid., Cherrie, 71. Also, during the course of researching this monograph, the author discover not references accept in IFOR documents and AARs to "carrot and stick approach."

^{civ} Ibid., Metz. Reference is made here to Metz' observation about peace operations.

^{cv} Ibid., Cherrie, 71.

^{cvi} Montgomery Meigs, (General). As quoted in "Training U.S. Army Officers for Peace Operations, Lessons From Bosnia," United States Institute of Peace Special Report 29 October 1999, 6. Also available at <http://www.usip.org>. Internet. Accessed 2 November 1999.

^{cvii} See, for example, "Training U.S. Army Officers for Peace Operations, Lessons From Bosnia." The authors of the article, cite numerous times, the consensus among general officers (There were twenty-five.) who served in Bosnia that doctrine must change to encompass large peace operations, that consensus building among all actors was paramount to successful operations, and that their ability to function effectively in peace operations at senior levels was a function of "just-in-time-training" and previous military assignments. The authors conclude that, rather than rely on the assignment process to develop effective peace operations senior leaders, the Army develop junior officers who will grow into effective senior officers.

^{cviii} Ibid., Meigs, 2.

^{cix} William Nash, (Major General). As quoted in "Training U.S. Army Officers for Peace Operations, Lessons From Bosnia," 29 October 1999, 3.

^{cx} U.S. Department of the Army. *FM 22-100, Leadership* (Washington, D.C.: June 1999), 2-21.

^{cx} Eric Shinseki (General). As Quoted in "Training U.S. Army Officers for Peace Operations: Lessons from Bosnia" in the United States Institute of Peace Special Report, 29 October 1999, 4.

^{cxii} Ibid., *FM 22-100*, 5-25.

^{cxiv} See, for example, <http://www.cdnpeacekeeping.ns.ca/C-02.htm> for a description of a two week course taught in Canada at an institution founded by Lester Pearson, a former Canadian ambassador. The cost of the course is approximately \$1500. Also, the John F. Kennedy School of Security Studies offers courses in conflict resolution.

^{cxv} See, for example, the U.S. Army War College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and U. S. National War College course description available at the UN Peacekeeping Training Office, "U.S. – Complete Academic Year Courses" available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/training/usa21.htm>. Internet. Accessed 29 June 1999. There is also an erroneous description of a core course taught at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College that implies negotiation is taught during this course.

^{cxvi} See, for example, the syllabus for mini-course 236j, taught at JFKSWC by the U.S. Army PKI. This information was obtained by email, from the course author, Colonel (Ret) James McCallum on 14 November 1999.

^{cxvii} Ibid., Colonel McCallum. In a telephone interview, Colonel McCallum remarked that the training effect on one of the divisions was a "drive-by" (shooting) because the unit waited until it was almost too late to conduct the training.

^{cxviii} The author obtained this information from the proponents of the PCCs at each of the installations indicated.

^{cxix} The overall train-up for Task Force Eagle units was very comprehensive and intensive.^{cxix} But there are at least two examples (MG Nash and LTC Cucolo) that indicate that not all of the negotiations training results in the similar competencies. To review, experts from the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute provided training on JMCs and mediation and negotiation. On 14 October 1995, V Corps hosted a Political-Military Strategy seminar. Its focus was on negotiation strategy and processes. The stated purpose of the seminar was to "Present key considerations regarding preparation and execution of negotiations, (interoffice, interagency, and international)." ^{cxix} The slides reflect a broad theoretical basis for negotiation. Some mention principled negotiation. Others mention only two of Ury's paradigms, Win-Win and Win-Lose. One officer, LTC Cucolo, states he sued the training effectively. The other, obviously missed something. Three years later, MG Ellis observes that (essentially) the same training is no longer relevant. He suggested training scenarios against which he had been trained were obsolete because the mission had changed from one of compelling compliance to one of a more steady state nature. See MG Ellis' comments in "Training U.S. Army Officers for Peace Operations: Lessons from Bosnia," (United States Institute of Peace Special Report, 29 October 1999), 3,4.

^{cxx} Ian Hope (Major). Canadian Forces, former UN Peacekeeper in Bosnia 1994-1995 and IFOR battalion S3 1995-1996. Interview by author, 15 November 1999, at FT Leavenworth, KS.

^{xxxi} Ibid., Hope.

^{xxxii} Ibid., "Training U.S. Army Officers for Peace Operations, Lessons From Bosnia," 9.

^{xxxiii} Ibid., 8-10.