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TRANSLATIONS ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

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CONTENTS

PAGE

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Zambian Extradition Request for SWAPO Dissident Rejected by Tanzania (THE RHODESIA HERALD, 9 Feb 77)	1
Cape Verde/Angola Solidarity Strengthened (NO PINTCHA, 4 Jan 77)	2
Gabon, Congo Prepare To Apply Labor Agreement (Mba-Nguema; L'UNION, 24 Jan 77)	4
Briefs Zaire, Burundi, Rwanda Meeting	6

ANGOLA

Gabriel Garcia Marquez Writes on Cuba's Intervention in Angola (LA PRENSA, various dates)	7
Pan-African Labor Union Solidarity Conference Opens (JORNAL DE ANGOLA, 1 Feb 77)	25

CONGO

Minister Discusses 1976 Budget, Petroleum Receipts (Alphonse Poaty Interview; AFRIQUE INDUSTRIES INFRASTRUCTURES, 1 Jan 77)	28
---	----

ETHIOPIA

Soviet Ambitions Seem To Be at Root of Coups (Iqbal Ahmed; DIARIO DE NOTICIAS, 11 Feb 77)	32
--	----

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
GABON	
Plans Made for Further Mining Development (BULLETIN DE L'AFRIQUE NOIRE, 26 Jan 77)	35
MADAGASCAR	
Madagascar Asks Carter for Recognition of Sovereignty, Full Role (LA PRESSE MALAGASY, 20 Jan 77)	41
Conduct of 'Indian' Group Condemned (LA PRESSE MALAGASY, various dates)	42
Expulsion of Indian Wrongdoers Urged Indians Likened to French Colonialists	
MOZAMBIQUE	
Political, Economic, Ideological Difficulties Explored (Rene Lefott; LE MONDE, various dates)	45
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA	
Careers of Black Leaders Sobukwe, Mandela, Buthelezi Detailed (DIE TRANSVALER, various dates)	52
Mandela May Be People's Choice The Many Images of Gatsha Buthelezi	
Soviet Help to Black Nations May Result in Their Enslavement (Editorial; DIE TRANSVALER, 14 Jan 77)	59
South Africa Sees a Possibility of Civil War in Rhodesia (Editorial; DIE TRANSVALER, 11 Jan 77)	60
Commentator Suggests a Drastic Change in South Africa's Policy (Otto Krause; DIE TRANSVALER, 19 Jan 77)	62
South African Blacks Warned on Help From Abroad (Editorial; DIE TRANSVALER, 19 Jan 77)	65
Chance of Realistic U.S. Approach to South African Problem Seen (Editorial; DIE TRANSVALER, 13 Jan 77)	66
Bishop Defends Conscientious Objectors (THE STAR, 10 Feb 77)	67
Blacks To Forfeit Unemployment Benefits (John Patten; THE STAR, 10 Feb 77)	69

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
Education Department Inspects Private Schools (THE STAR, 10 Feb 77)	70
Opposition Scores Race Policy, Overspending (THE STAR, 10 Feb 77)	71
Police Restraint Essential in Soweto (Editorial; THE STAR, 10 Feb 77)	73
Efforts Made To Curb Huge Foreign Exchange Bill (Michael Chester; THE STAR, 10 Feb 77)	74
 RHODESIA	
New Anglican Bishop of Matabeleland Named (THE SUNDAY MAIL, 13 Feb 77)	76
Former White School Becomes Colored (THE SUNDAY MAIL, 13 Feb 77)	77
Women Call for Removal of All Racial Discrimination (THE SUNDAY MAIL, 13 Feb 77)	79
Botswana Said To Be Used as 'Safe' Base (THE RHODESIA HERALD, 11 Feb 77)	80
Bulawayo Asians Shot, Terrorist Killed (THE RHODESIA HERALD, 8 Feb 77)	81
 SOUTH-WEST AFRICA	
Segregation To Continue Under Multiethnic Government (THE STAR, 10 Feb 77)	83
 ZAIRE	
Increased Cooperation in All Fields Expected With Yugoslavia in 1977 (ELIMA, 19 Jan 77)	85

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

ZAMBIAN EXTRADITION REQUEST FOR SWAPO DISSIDENT REJECTED BY TANZANIA

Salisbury THE RHODESIA HERALD in English 9 Feb 77 p 4

/Text/ Lusaka. Tanzania has rejected a request from Zambia to send a SWAPO dissident detained there back to Zambia.

The Tanzanian Foreign Ministry reportedly told Zambian authorities that there was "no legal basis on which the request could be granted."

The Zambian Supreme Court had granted a writ of habeas corpus to Mr Andreas Shipanga, a former SWAPO publicity secretary, last September.

But Mr Shipanga, who was detained by Zambian authorities last year after an outbreak of dissent in SWAPO ranks, had by then been moved to Tanzania at the request of SWAPO officials.

The court ordered Zambian attorney-general, Mr Mainza Chona, to ask the Tanzanian Government to return Mr Shipanga to Zambia by 14 October.

At that time Mr Chona told the court its decision was not politically sound, and could cause a rift between Zambia and Tanzania.

The court rejected this and gave a final order to have Mr Shipanga returned to Zambia by Monday.

Tanzania has rejected the plea, and the court has adjourned to consider further the issue.

CSO: 4420

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

CAPE VERDE/ANGOLA SOLIDARITY STRENGTHENED

Bissau NO PINTCHA in Portuguese 4 Jan 77 p 3

[Text] Pedro Pires in the People's Republic of Angola.
A joint communique reaffirms the strengthening of
solidarity.

At the invitation of Comrade Lopo de Nascimento, prime minister of the People's Republic of Angola, Pedro Pires, prime minister of the Republic of Cape Verde, made an official visit of friendship to the People's Republic of Angola from 9 to 15 December.

The prime minister of the Republic of Cape Verde headed an important delegation consisting of representatives of several ministries while the Angolans were headed by the prime minister of the People's Republic of Angola.

During his stay in the People's Republic of Angola, Commander Pedro Pires participated in the 20th anniversary celebration of the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] in the province of Cabinda. Everywhere, the Republic of Cape Verde's delegation was welcomed warmly, fraternally and enthusiastically. This is proof of the deep feelings of friendship and militant solidarity uniting the two peoples in their struggle.

During this occasion, the prime minister of Cape Verde met with members of the Cape Verde community in Angola, especially those of Cabinda, Luanda and Benguela. He encouraged sincere collaboration with the MPLA and our sister nation of Angola.

The prime ministers of the People's Republic of Angola and of the Republic of Cape Verde held talks in a climate of perfect harmony. They had a broad exchange of impressions on the current experiences in their respective nations, on matters related to cooperation between the two countries, the overall African and international problems, especially as to the developments in southern Africa. Both parties expressed their strong wishes to consolidate the bonds of solidarity between the two nations and the two peoples.

To this end, the governments of the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cape Verde signed a general agreement of friendship and cooperation. On the basis of this accord, specific agreements were also signed on cooperation

in cultural matters, trade, maritime transportation, postal services and telecommunications as well as a memorandum on air transportation. The statute on people and assets and cooperation in the fields of law and fishing were also discussed.

The two parties reaffirmed, especially, their militant solidarity with our brothers of Mozambique in their struggle against the aggression by the two minority and racist regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa. The two delegations likewise expressed their support for the struggle by the peoples of Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa, guided by the revolutionary vanguard.

The Republic of Cape Verde's delegation was received by Comrade President Dr Agostinho Neto, President of the MPLA and the People's Republic of Angola. Comrade Pedro Pires, in behalf of PAIGC [African Independence Party of (Portuguese) Guinea and Cape Verde] and the government of the Republic of Cape Verde congratulated the Angolan people for their victories during their 20 years of struggle against colonialism and imperialism. He also expressed the joy of all the Cape Verde people at the great victory marked by the admission of the People's Republic of Angola to the United Nations.

The prime minister of Cape Verde for himself and for the Cape Verde delegation gave thanks for the warm welcome and the brotherly treatment given them. He invited comrade Lopo de Nascimento, prime minister of the People's Republic of Angola, to visit the sister Republic of Cape Verde. The invitation was accepted. The date will be arranged through diplomatic channels.

Both parties congratulated each other for the success of their talks which reinforced and consolidated the bonds of friendship and militant solidarity which has always existed between the peoples and governments of the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cape Verde and their respective revolutionary vanguards, the MPLA and PAIGC.

8923

CSO: 4401

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

GABON, CONGO PREPARE TO APPLY LABOR AGREEMENT

Libreville L'UNION in French 24 Jan 77 pp 1, 5

[Article by Mba-Nguema]

[Text] Accompanied by a large delegation of officials from his department, Minister of Labor and Social Security Hervo Akendengue visited Brazzaville in the People's Republic of the Congo from 14 to 16 January. During his stay in Brazzaville, Akendengue engaged in discussions with Congolese authorities concerning the terms of application of the labor agreement signed in Franceville by President Nguouabi and President Bongo in October.

The minister emphasized that the accord "is part of the general cooperation agreement concluded between Gabon and the Congo at the end of 1976. Its purpose is to develop and strengthen the bonds of friendship and cooperation that have existed between our two countries for so long.

"With respect to the labor agreement itself, as soon as it goes into effect, it will make possible an increased and continuing exchange of workers between the two nations. Once workers are recruited and settled on Gabonese or Congolese soil, they will be governed by the social security system of the host country and will also benefit from a standard work contract stipulating the obligations of the employer and worker as well."

The drafting of the standard contract caused the Congolese and Gabonese delegations at the Brazzaville negotiations no difficulties, Minister Akendengue said. "Within the framework of good understanding and cooperation, we rapidly defined the rules as well as the provisions covering Congolese workers in Gabon and Gabonese employees hired by Congolese enterprises. The accord is therefore reciprocal and is very different from those concluded between Gabon and other African countries, particularly Senegal and Upper Volta. Unlike the Congo, those countries do not employ Gabonese workers."

The minister emphasized that although there are very few Gabonese workers in the Congo, they "must be governed by very precise rules known to the Gabonese authorities with respect to working conditions, job security, housing and old-age pensions."

The new labor contract concluded by our two governments will only be valid for the hiring of new workers from the two countries. According to the terms of the agreement themselves, health conditions, housing and transportation of workers, as well as their repatriation, will be provided by the host country. The same will be true of their social security. "But no provisions in the agreement will be retroactive with respect to the benefits bestowed by the labor contract, except in the case of social security, regarding which old and new Congolese workers employed by COMILOG [Ogooue Mining Company], COMUF [Franceville Uranium Mining Company] or OCTRA [Trans-Gabonese Railroad Office] will receive family allocations, health care, housing and old-age pensions along with the Gabonese workers."

Within the framework of the good-neighbor relations we have with the Congo, and with a concern for strengthening solidarity between African nations, the Gabonese delegation, acting on the instructions of the president of the republic, agreed at the time of the signing of the accord to extend the advantages of Gabonese social security to Congolese workers already retired who worked in our country. As a result, the old-age pension and other benefits to which they have a right will be paid to them in the Congo by our Social Security Fund, which will then proceed to transfer the funds to the workers.

The minister concluded his address by noting that following the signing of the agreements, "the Gabonese employers can now go to the Congo to recruit workers locally so as to supply their projects in Libreville or the interior with a fresh supply of labor."

11,464
CSO: 4400

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

ZAIRE, BURUNDI, RWANDA MEETING--The state commissioner for foreign affairs and international cooperation, Nguza Karl-I-Bond, left Kinshasa yesterday morning for Kigali, Rwanda, where for 2 days he will attend the first ministerial meeting of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries. The meeting, which began yesterday afternoon at 1500 hours, will be presided over by Lt Col Aloys Nsekaliye, Rwandan minister of foreign affairs. It will deal with the drafting of the organization's budget, the establishment of the operating code of the permanent executive secretariat and the appointment of the assistants of the Community's permanent secretary, the first of which is Zairian and the second Rwandan. The permanent executive secretary of the Community was named by the three chiefs of state at the time of their meeting in Bukavu. He is Kidinguira Bonaventure of Burundi. The ministers will also take up the subject of the main lines of the cooperation objectives defined by the chiefs of state. [Text] [Kinshasa ELIMA in French 8 Jan 77 p 1] 11,464

CSO: 4400

ANGOLA

GABRIEL GARCIA MARQUEZ WRITES ON CUBA'S INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA

Lima LA PRENSA in Spanish 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 Jan 77

[Seven-part feature article by Gabriel Garcia Marquez]

[10 Jan 77, p 8]

[Text] Cuba and Its Intervention in Angola

Following is the first part of the lengthy, documented article written by the Colombian author, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, for the Mexican magazine PROCESO, on Cuba's participation in the liberation of Angola. The transcription was made by the Cuban news agency, PRENSA LATINA.

The United States disclosed the presence of Cuban troops in Angola for the first time in an official statement on 24 November 1975. On that occasion, it estimated that 15,000 men had been sent. A few weeks later, during a brief visit to Caracas, Henry Kissinger told President Carlos Andres Perez: "How deteriorated our intelligence services must be; for we did not learn that the Cubans were going to Angola until they were already there." However, at the time he changed the figure, claiming that only 12,000 men had been sent by Cuba.

Although he never explained the reason for changing the number, the fact is that neither of the two figures was correct. At that time, there were many Cuban troops, military specialists and civilian technicians in Angola, more than Henry Kissinger ventured to guess. There were so many Cuban ships anchored in the harbor of Luanda that, upon counting them from his window, President Agostinho Neto shuddered with a modesty that is quite typical of his character. He remarked to an official who is a friend of his: "It isn't fair; Cuba will destroy itself doing this."

It is likely that not even the Cubans themselves had anticipated that the aid based upon solidarity that was to be given the people of Angola would reach such proportions. What they did, indeed, understand clearly from the very outset was that the action had to be peremptory and swift, and that they could not by any means lose.

The contacts between the Cuban revolution and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola [MPLA] had been established for the first time and were very intensive starting in August 1965, when "Che" Guevara was taking part in the Congo guerrilla activity. The following year, Agostinho Neto himself was in Cuba, with Endo, the MPLA's commander-in-chief, who was to die in the war.

Both met with Fidel Castro at that time. Later, owing to the conditions which typified the struggle in Angola, these contacts became sporadic. It was not until May 1975, when the Portuguese were preparing to withdraw from their African colonies, that the Cuban commander, Flavio Bravo, was in Brazzaville with Agostinho Neto, who requested assistance from him in transporting a shipment of arms, and also inquired about the possibility of more extensive and specific aid. As a result, 3 months later Comdr Raul Diaz Arguelles went to Luanda heading a Cuban civilian delegation, and Agostinho Neto was then more precise, though not more ambitious: He requested that a group of instructors be sent to found and direct four military training centers.

Only a superficial understanding of the Angolan situation would be required to realize that Neto's request was also typical of his modesty. Although the MPLA, founded in 1956, was the oldest liberation movement in Angola, and the only one established with a very extensive popular base, offering a social, political and economic program geared to the conditions germane to the country, it was nevertheless the one in the least advantageous military position.

It had Soviet weapons, but lacked trained personnel to handle them. On the other hand, the well-trained and supplied regular troops from Zaire had penetrated Angola as early as 25 March and, at Carmona, had proclaimed a de facto government headed by Holden Roberto, leader of the Angolan National Liberation Front [FNLA] and Mobutu's brother-in-law, whose associations with the CIA were in the public domain. In the west, protected by Zambia, there was the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA], under the command of Jonas Savimbi, an unprincipled soldier of fortune who had been in constant collaboration with the Portuguese military and the exploiting foreign companies. Finally, the regular South African troops had crossed Angola's southern border through Namibian occupied territory on 5 August, on the pretext that they were protecting the dams of the Raucana-Caluaqua hydroelectric complex.

All these forces, with their vast economic and military resources, were ready to encircle Luanda invincibly on the eve of 11 November, when the Portuguese army left that vast, fruitful and beautiful territory where it had been happy for 500 years. So, when the Cuban leaders received Neto's request, they did not abide strictly by its terms, but decided to immediately send a contingent of 480 specialists who were to build four training centers and organize 16 infantry battalions, as well as 25 mortar and antiaircraft

machine gun batteries within a period of 6 months. To supplement this, they sent a brigade of physicians, 115 vehicles and suitable communications equipment.

That first contingent was carried on three improvised vessels: The "Vietnam Heroico," which was the only passenger ship, had been purchased by the dictator Fulgencio Batista from a Dutch firm in 1956, and converted into a school vessel. The other two, the "Coral Island" and the "La Plata," were merchant ships which were overhauled on an emergency basis. However, the manner in which they were loaded is a very good illustration of the spirit of anticipation and daring with which the Cubans were to confront their commitment to Angola.

It seems strange that they should have carried the fuel for the vehicles from Cuba. Angola is actually an oil producer, whereas the Cubans have to obtain their oil from the Soviet Union, halfway around the world. Nevertheless, the Cubans preferred to play it safe and, on that first trip, they carried 1,000 tons of gasoline distributed among the three ships. The "Vietnam Heroico" carried 200 tons in 55-gallon tanks, and sailed with its holds open so as to allow the gas to be eliminated. The "La Plata" carried the gasoline on deck. The night on which they were loaded coincided with a popular Cuban celebration, and fireworks were exploding with a large-scale display of pyrotechnics even on the docks in Havana, where a stray spark might have pulverized those three floating arsenals. Fidel Castro himself went to see them off, as he was to do for all the contingents leaving for Angola; and, after observing the conditions under which they were sailing, he made a very typical comment which nevertheless seemed fortuitous. He said: "At any rate they are traveling in more comfort than on the 'Granma.'"

There was no assurance that the Portuguese military would allow the Cuban instructors to land. On 26 July of that year, when Cuba had already received the MPLA's first request for assistance, Fidel Castro asked Col Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, in Havana, to seek permission from the Portuguese government for the shipment of resources to Angola; and Saraiva de Carvalho promised to obtain it, but his reply had not as yet arrived. So, the "Vietnam Heroico" arrived in Puerto Amboim at 0630 hours on the morning of 4 October; while the "Coral Island" arrived on 7 October, and the "La Plata" reached Punta Negra on 11 October. They arrived without anyone's permission, but likewise without anyone's opposition.

As anticipated, the Cuban instructors were met by the MPLA, and immediately put the four schools for instructors into operation: one in Delatando, which the Portuguese called Salazar, 300 kilometers east of Luanda; another in the Atlantic port of Benguela; and still another in Saurimo, the former Enrique de Carvalho, in the remote, eastern desert province of Luanda, where the Portuguese had had a military base which they destroyed before leaving it; and the fourth in the enclave of Cabinda. At the time, Holden Roberto's

troops were so close to Luanda that a Cuban artillery instructor giving his students from Delatando their first lessons could see the mercenaries' armored cars advancing from the site where he was located. On 23 October, the South African regular troops penetrated from Namibia with a mechanized brigade; and, 3 days later, they had occupied the cities of Sa de Bandeira and Mocamedes without any resistance.

[11 Jan 77, p 8]

[Text] "Che" Guevara in Africa

Following is the second part of the aforementioned article:

It was a Sunday outing. The South Africans had cassettes installed in the tanks playing festive music. In the north, the commander of a mercenary column was directing the operations from a sports Honda, seated next to a glamorous blonde.

It was progressing as if on vacation, without a scouting column, and did not even notice where the missile came from which blew the car to pieces. All that was found in the woman's traveling bag was a party dress, a bikini and an invitation to the victory celebration which Holden Roberto had already planned in Luanda.

By the end of that week, the South Africans had penetrated over 600 kilometers into Angolan territory, and were advancing toward Luanda at about 70 kilometers per day. On 3 November, they had attacked the small number of personnel at the instruction center for recruits in Benguela.

So, the Cuban instructors had to leave the schools in order to fight the invaders with their apprentice soldiers, to whom they gave instruction when there was a lull in the battles.

Even the doctors resumed their practice as militiamen, and took to the trenches. The MPLA leaders, who were prepared for a guerrilla struggle but not for a mass-scale war, then realized that this conspiracy of local residents, backed by the most predatory and devastating resources of the imperialists, could not be defeated without an urgent appeal for international solidarity.

The Cubans' internationalist spirit is an historic virtue. Although the revolution has defined and magnified it in accordance with the principles of Marxism, its essence was very well entrenched in the conduct and endeavor of Jose Marti.

This persuasion has been evident (and controversial) in Latin America, Africa and Asia.

In Algeria, even before the Cuban revolution had proclaimed its socialist nature, Cuba had already lent considerable assistance to the National

Liberation Front (FLN) troops in their war against French colonialism. So much so that General De Gaulle's government banned Cuban Airlines' flights over French skies, by way of reprisal. Later, while Cuba was being devastated by Hurricane Flora, a battalion of Cuban internationalist troops departed to defend Algeria against Morocco. It may be claimed that, at that time, there was not one African liberation movement which did not have Cuban solidarity, whether in the form of materiel and weapons, or in the training of military and civilian technicians and specialists. Mozambique (in 1963), Guinea-Bissau (in 1965), Cameroon and Sierra Leone sought and obtained aid based upon solidarity from the Cubans on various occasions and in various forms. The president of the Republic of Guinea, Sekou Toure, repulsed a landing of mercenaries with the assistance of a unit of Cubans. Comdr Pedro Rodriguez Peralta, who is now a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, was captured and jailed for several years by the Portuguese, in Guinea-Bissau. When Agostinho Neto called upon the Angolan students in Portugal to go to socialist countries to study, many of them were received by Cuba. All of them are now associated with the construction of socialism in Angola, some in very high-ranking positions. This holds true for Mingas, an economist and the present minister of finance in Angola; Enrique Dos Santos, a geological engineer, commander and member of the MPLA's Central Committee, who is married to a Cuban; Mantos, an agricultural engineer and present head of the military academy; and N'Gdalo who, as a student, distinguished himself as the best soccer player in Cuba, and who is currently second commander of the first brigade of Angola. (Some of these names are pseudonyms used underground and in the war, which they still retain in the government. For example, Jacobo Caetano still keeps his name, "Immortal Monster.")

However, none of this illustrates the long duration and intensity of Cuba's presence in Africa as much as the fact that "Che" Guevara himself, at the high point in his career and age, went to fight with the guerrillas in the Congo. He left on 25 April 1965, the very date of his letter of farewell to Fidel Castro in which he gave up his rank as major and everything that legally associated him with the government of Cuba. He went alone, on commercial airlines, with his name changed on a counterfeit passport, his appearance altered by just two master strokes, and a briefcase containing literary works and many inhalers for his insatiable asthma, spending his spare time in hotel rooms playing endless games of chess alone. Three months later, he was joined in the Congo by 200 Cuban troops who had traveled from Havana on a ship loaded with weapons. "Che's" specific mission was to train guerrilla fighters for the National Council of the Revolution of the Congo, who were fighting against Moises Tshombe, the stooge of the former Belgian colonists and the international mining companies.

Lumumba had been assassinated.

The acting head of the National Council of the Revolution was Gaston Soumaliot, but the one directing the operations was Laurent Cavil, in his hiding

place at Kigona, on the opposite shore of Lake Tanganyika. That situation undoubtedly helped to conceal "Che" Guevara's true identity and, for the sake of greater security, he himself did not act as principal head of the mission. That is why he was known by the pseudonym "Tatu," which means the number two in the Swahili language.

"Che" Guevara remained in the Congo from April to December 1965. He not only trained guerrilla fighters, but also led them in combat and fought alongside them. His personal ties with Fidel Castro, concerning which there has been so much speculation, did not decline at any time. Their contacts were constant and cordial, through the use of highly efficient communications systems.

When Moises Tshombe was overthrown, the Congolese requested the withdrawal of the Cubans as a means of facilitating the armistice. "Che" Guevara left as he had arrived, without making any noise. He departed from the airport in Dar Es-Salaam, the capital of Tanzania, on a commercial plane, keeping upright and backwards a book on chess problems in order to cover his face during the 6-hour flight; while, in the adjoining seat, his Cuban aide tried to entertain the political commissioner of the Zanzibar army, a long-standing admirer of "Che" Guevara, who discussed him constantly throughout the trip, attempting to obtain news about him and needlessly reiterating his desire to see him again.

That brief, anonymous trip made by "Che" Guevara through Africa left a seed planted which no one was to eradicate. Some of his men moved to Brazzaville, where they instructed guerrilla units for the African Independence Party of Guinea and Cape Verde [PAIGC], headed by Amilcar Cabral, and for the MPLA in particular. One of the columns which they had trained entered Angola secretly through Kinshasha, and joined the battle against the Portuguese, using the name "Camilo Cienfuegos Column." Another infiltrated Cabinda, subsequently crossing the Congo River and establishing itself in the Dembo area, Agostinho Neto's birthplace, where the struggle against the Portuguese had been carried out for 5 centuries. Hence, Cuba's action in Angola based on solidarity was not an impulsive, incidental act, but the result of a constant policy of the Cuban revolution in Africa. But there was a new, dramatic element in that crucial decision. This time, it was not merely a matter of sending potential assistance, but of undertaking a real war on a large scale over 10,000 kilometers of the country's territory, at an inestimable economic and human cost, with unforeseeable political consequences.

The possibility that the United States might intervene overtly rather than through mercenaries or South Africa, as it had done thus far, was unquestionably one of the most disturbing enigmas. Nevertheless, a quick analysis warranted the expectation that it would consider this at least more than three times after it had just left the swamps of Vietnam and the Watergate scandal, with a president whom no one had elected, with the CIA harassed by Congress and discredited in the eyes of the public, with the need to be careful not to appear as an ally of racist South Africa not only to

the majority of the African countries, but also to the black population of the United States itself, and, in addition, at the height of the election campaign during the new bicentennial year.

Moreover, the Cubans were sure of having the solidarity and material assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries; but they were also aware of the implications that their action might hold for the policy of peaceful coexistence and the easing of international tensions. It was a decision with irreversible consequences and a problem too great and complex to be solved in 24 hours. In any event, the leadership of the Communist Party of Cuba took no more than 24 hours to decide, and it decided without hesitation on 5 November, at a long, calm meeting. As opposed to the comment that has been made so often, this was an independent, sovereign act by Cuba; and it was after and not before the decision was made that the pertinent notification was given to the Soviet Union. On another 5 November like this one, in 1843, a female slave from the Triumvirate Sugar Mill in the region of Matanzas, called "Negra Carlota," had risen up holding a machete and leading a band of slaves, and had died in the uprising. In tribute to her, this act of solidarity in Angola was named for her: "Operation Carlota."

[12 Jan 77, p 8]

[Text] 'Operation Carlota' on the March

Following is the third part of the aforementioned article:

"Operation Carlota" began with the dispatch of a battalion reinforced with special troops, consisting of 650 men. They were shipped by plane in consecutive flights over a period of 13 days from the military section of Jose Marti International Airport in Havana to the airport in Luanda itself, which was still occupied by Portuguese troops.

Their specific mission was to deter the offensive, so as to prevent the capital of Angola from falling into the hands of the enemy forces before the Portuguese left, and then to support the resistance until reinforcements arrived by sea. But the men who departed on the first two flights were already convinced that they would arrive too late, and harbored only the final hope of saving Cabinda.

The first contingent left at 1600 hours on 7 November on a special Cuban Airlines flight, aboard one of the legendary Bristol Britannia BB-218 turboprop planes which by then had been discontinued by their British manufacturers and withdrawn from service throughout the world. The passengers, who remember very clearly that they numbered 82, because that was the number of men on the "Granma," had the healthy appearance of tourists tanned by the Caribbean sunshine. They were all wearing summer clothes, without any military insignia, and carrying briefcases and regular passports bearing their own names and actual identities. The members of the special troop

battalion, who are not subordinate to the Revolutionary Armed Forces but rather to the Ministry of Interior, are very well trained fighters, with a high ideological and political standing, and some of them have academic degrees and are constant readers showing concern over their intellectual improvement at all times; so the fiction about "Sunday civilians" should not seem like anything new to them.

But they carried submachine guns in the briefcases and the plane's freight compartment, instead of carrying luggage, contained a large supply of light artillery, individual weapons for war, three 75-millimeter guns and three 82-millimeter mortars. The only change that had been made in the plane, which was served by two regular stewardesses, was a hatch on the floor for removing the weapons from the passengers cabin in case of emergency.

The flight from Havana to Luanda was made with a stop in Barbados to take on fuel in the midst of a tropical storm.

There was another stop, for 5 hours, in Guinea-Bissau, the main purpose of which was to wait until nightfall so as to fly to Brazzaville secretly. The Cubans took advantage of those 5 hours to sleep, and it was the most frightening sleep on the trip, because there were so many mosquitoes in the airport's storehouses that the sheets on the cots were covered with blood.

Mobutu, with his proverbial arrogance, has said that Brazzaville is illuminated with the brilliance of Kinshasha, the modern, resplendent capital of Zaire. He is correct about this: The two cities are located opposite one another, with the Congo River between them, and the respective airports are so close that the first Cuban pilots had to study them very carefully so as not to land on the enemy's runway. They did so without any trouble, with their lights turned off so as not to be seen from the other shore; and they remained in Brazzaville only long enough to become informed by radio of the situation in Angola. The Angolan commander, Xicto, who had good relations with the Portuguese commissioner, had obtained permission from him for the Cubans to land in Luanda. They did so at 2200 hours on the night of 8 November, without assistance from the tower and under a torrential downpour. A second plane arrived 15 minutes later.

At that very moment, three ships were leaving Cuba, carrying an artillery regiment, a battalion of motorized troops and the reactive artillery personnel who would begin landing in Angola starting on 27 November.

Meanwhile, Holden Roberto's columns were so close that, a few hours earlier, they had shot an old native woman to death while she was attempting to reach the Gran Farni barracks where the Cubans were concentrated. So, the latter did not even have time to rest. They put on the olive drab uniform, joined the ranks of the MPLA and took off for combat.

For security reasons, the Cuban press had not published the news about the participation in Angola. But, as is usually the case in Cuba, even with

such sensitive military matters as this, the operation was a carefully guarded secret kept by 8 million people. The First Congress of the Communist Party, which was to take place a few weeks later and which had been a kind of national obsession all year long, acquired a new dimension at this point.

The procedure that was used to form the volunteer units was a private summons of the members of the first reserve, which includes all males between the ages of 17 and 25, and those who have been members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces. They were summoned by telegram to the pertinent military committee, with no mention made of the reason for the summons; but the reason was so obvious that all those who considered themselves militarily fit hastened to their respective committees without having first received a telegram, and it was very difficult to prevent that massive application from becoming a national disorder.

Insofar as the urgency of the situation allowed, the criterion for selection was rather strict. Not only were military fitness and physical and moral status taken into account, but also the records on work and political training. Despite this strictness, there were countless instances of volunteers who managed to evade the selective screening. It is known that there was a trained engineer who succeeded in passing himself off as a truck driver, a high-ranking official who pretended to be a mechanic and a woman who was about to be accepted as a recruit. It is known that a youth left without his father's permission and later met him in Angola, because his father had also gone without the family's knowledge. On the other hand, a sergeant with 20 years' service was unsuccessful in all his attempts to be recruited, and yet had to put up with his wounded masculinity when they sent his mother, a journalist, and his girlfriend, who is a doctor.

Some common criminals in jail asked to be accepted, but none of them were considered. The first woman to leave, at the beginning of December, had been rejected several times with the argument that "this is too difficult for a woman." She was ready to go as a stowaway on a ship, and had already put her clothes in the hold, in collusion with a comrade who was a photographer, when she learned that she had been chosen to go legally, and by plane. Her name is Esther Lilia Diaz Rodriguez, and she is a former schoolteacher with 23 years' service who joined the armed forces in 1969 and has a good rating in infantry marksmanship. All three of her brothers, Cesar, Ruben and Frineldo, went along with her.

Side by side, and without reaching an agreement, the four of them told their mother the same story: that they were going to the military maneuvers in Camaguey which were being held to mark the party congress. They all returned safe and sound, and their mother is proud of the fact that they were in Angola, but she has not forgiven them for the lie about the Camaguey maneuvers.

Conversations with those who returned have proven that some Cubans wanted to go to Angola for a wide variety of personal reasons. At least one

passed the screening for the sole purpose of deserting, later hijacking a Portuguese plane and seeking asylum in Lisbon. No one was forced to go. Before departing, they all had to sign a sheet attesting to the fact that they were volunteers. A few refused to go after they had been selected, and were subjected to all kinds of public mockery and private disdain. But there is no doubt that the vast majority went to Angola fully convinced that they were performing an act of political solidarity, with the same consciousness and the same courage with which they had repulsed the landing at the Bay of Pigs 15 years earlier; and, therefore, "Operation Carlota" was no mere expedition of professional soldiers, but a people's war.

[13 Jan 77, p 24]

[Text] A Feat of Daring

Following is the fourth part of the aforementioned article:

For 9 months, the mobilization of human and material resources was a total feat of daring. The decrepit Britannias, repaired with Soviet Ilyushin 18 brakes, kept up a constant and almost unimaginable traffic. Although their normal take-off weight is 185,000 pounds, they often managed to fly with 194,000, which put them beyond all the charts. The pilots, whose normal flying hours are supposed to be 75 per month, flew more than 200 hours. Generally speaking, each one of the three Britannias in service carried complete crews, which worked on shifts during the flight. But one pilot recalls having remained in his seat for up to 50 hours on a round trip, with 43 hours of actual flight. He said, without any pretensions to heroism: "There are times when one is so tired that he can no longer rest." Under those conditions, owing to the difference in time, the pilots and stewardesses lost track of time, and their only guide was the body's needs: They ate only when they were hungry, and slept only when they were tired.

The route from Havana to Luanda is unprotected and deserted. At the cruising height of the Britannias, which is between 18,000 and 20,000 feet, information on winds is non-existent during this jet age. The pilots took off in any direction, not knowing the condition of the route, flying at improper altitudes in order to economize on fuel and without the slightest idea of what the conditions would be when they arrived. They had no alternate airport between Brazzaville and Luanda, which was the most dangerous span. Moreover, the military traveled with loaded weapons, the explosives were carried without boxes and missiles lacked vacuum containers in order to reduce the load.

The United States took aim at the weakest aspect of the Britannias: their slight cruising range. When it had the government of Barbados refuse to allow a refueling stop, the Cubans established a trans-Atlantic route from Holguin, in the extreme eastern part of Cuba, to the island of Sal, in Cape Verde. It was an operation of trapeze artists without nets, because on the outgoing flight, the planes arrived with barely enough fuel for 2 hours

of flying; and, on the return trip, owing to the unfavorable winds, they arrived with reserves for only 1 hour.

However, that circus route was also terminated, to preclude harm to defenseless Cape Verde. Then, the airplane cabins were adapted to accommodate four supplementary gasoline tanks, which enabled them to fly from Holguin to Brazzaville without stopping, but with 30 fewer passengers. The intermediate solution of stopping in Guyana did not prove feasible, first because the runway was very short, and secondly because Texaco, which is the petroleum exporter in Guyana, refused to sell the fuel.

Cuba tried to solve this by sending a ship loaded with gasoline to Guyana, but, as the result of an unexplained accident, it was contaminated with dirt and water. In the midst of these many grievous obstacles, the government of Guyana remained steadfast in its solidarity with the Cubans, until the United States' ambassador, in person, threatened it with the bombing and destruction of the Georgetown airport. The maintenance was carried out in less than half the normal time, and one pilot recalls having flown several times without radar; but no one remembers a failure in his instruments. Under those unbelievable conditions, they made 101 flights until the end of the war.

The maritime transportation was no less dramatic. On the only two passenger vessels, each of which was 4,000 tons, all empty spaces were turned into sleeping quarters, and latrines were set up in the cabaret, the bars and the corridors. Their normal quota of 226 passengers was tripled on some voyages. The freighters designed for a crew of 80 carried over 1,000 passengers, as well as armored cars, weapons and explosives. Field kitchens had to be set up in the holds and the saloons. Disposable plates were used to economize on water, and yogurt containers were used instead of glasses. The ballast tanks were used for cleaning up, and about 50 latrines were set up on deck and were flushed overboard. The tired machines of the oldest ships began to give way after 6 months of unusual operation. This was the only occasion when the first repatriates became exasperated, when their long-awaited return was delayed for several days because the filters of the "Vietnam Heroico" were clogged. The other convoy units were forced to wait for it, and one of its passengers then understood "Che" Guevara's comment to the effect that the progress of a guerrilla movement is determined by the individual who progresses the least. These obstacles seemed more critical at the time because the Cuban ships were being subjected to all kinds of provocation by North American destroyers, which harassed them for days on end, and the combat planes took photographs of them and plagued them by flying low over them.

Despite the difficult conditions which prevailed during those trips which took nearly 20 days, no serious health problem occurred. During the 42 trips made during the months of the war, the medical services on board performed only one operation for appendicitis, and another for hernia; and had to combat only one outbreak of diarrhea caused by canned meat.

On the other hand, a more serious epidemic had to be curbed, namely, the one among the crew members who wanted to remain fighting in Angola at any cost. One of them, a reserve officer, managed to obtain an olive drab uniform somehow, and landed mingling with the troops; and he succeeded in remaining illegally. He was one of the fine intelligence officers who distinguished himself during the war.

Moreover, the Soviet material assistance which was arriving through various channels required the constant presence of skilled personnel to handle and give instructions in the handling of new weapons and complicated equipment which were as yet unknown to the Angolans. At the end of November, the Cuban chief of staff went to Angola in person. Then, everything seemed possible except losing the war.

Nevertheless, the historical fact is that it was at the point of being lost. During the first week of December, the situation was so desperate that consideration was being given to the possibility of establishing a stronghold in Cabinda and setting aside a beachhead around Luanda in order to begin the evacuation. To make the critical situation worse, that gloomy prospect occurred at the most inopportune time for both the Cubans and the Angolans.

The Cubans were preparing for the first party congress, from 17 to 24 December, and their leaders realized that a military setback in Angola would be a fatal political blow. As for the Angolans, they were preparing for the approaching conference of the Organization of African Unity [OAU], and wanted to attend with a more favorable military position, so as to incline the majority of African countries in their favor.

[14 Jan 77, p 8]

[Text] Angola: Poverty and Setbacks

Following is the fifth part of the aforementioned article:

The adversities of December were due, first of all, to the tremendous firing power of the enemy, which by then had received over \$50 million in military aid from the United States. It was due, secondly, to the lag in Angola's request for Cuban assistance and to the unavoidable slowness in transporting resources. And, finally, it was due to the conditions marked by poverty and cultural backwardness left behind in Angola by 500 years of heartless colonialism. It was the latter situation, rather than the first two, which created the most difficulties in the decisive integration between the Cuban troops and the armed people of Angola.

Actually, the Cubans found the same climate, the same vegetation, the same chaotic downpours and the same twilights infused with the odor of molasses and crocodiles. Some of them resembled the Angolans so closely that, very

soon, the humorous story was circulating to the effect that they could only be differentiated by touching the tip of the nose; because the Africans have soft cartilage owing to the way in which the mothers carry the infants, with their faces pressed against their backs.

The Portuguese colonists, who were perhaps the greediest and meanest in history, built beautiful modern cities in which to spend an entire lifetime, containing air-conditioned glass buildings and a hodge-podge of shops with huge lighted signs. But they were cities for whites, like the ones that the gringos were building around old Havana, which the peasants were astonished to see when they came down from the mountains for the first time carrying rifles on their shoulders.

Beneath that veneer of civilization lay a vast, rich country filled with poverty. The native population's standard of living was one of the lowest in the world; the illiteracy rate was over 90 percent; and the cultural conditions were even closer to the stone age. Even in the outlying cities, the only ones who spoke Portuguese were the men, who lived with as many as seven wives in the same house. The primitive superstitions were an obstacle, not only to everyday life, but to the war as well. The Angolans were permanently convinced that bullets would not penetrate the whites; they had a supernatural dread of airplanes; and they refused to fight in the trenches because they claimed that graves were only for the dead. "Che" Guevara had already observed in the Congo that the warriors wore a necklace to ward off gunfire, and a bracelet against submachine guns; and that they singed their faces with firebrands in order to face the dangers of war. He took such an interest in these cultural absurdities that he studied African idiosyncracies in depth, and learned to speak the Swahili language, in an attempt to change them from within, aware of the fact that there is a pernicious, deep-seated force that is instilled in the hearts of men and cannot be overcome by bullets: namely, mental colonization.

The health conditions were, of course, atrocious. In San Pedro de Cota, the Cubans managed to treat, virtually by force, a child whose body had been nearly all burned with boiling water, and whose family was keeping a vigil for him while he was still alive, because they considered him a hopeless case. When the Portuguese departed, there were only 30 doctors left, concentrated in the capital. On the very day of his arrival in Puerto Amboim, a Cuban pediatrician saw five children die, without being able to do anything about it, because of lack of resources. For a 35-year-old doctor trained in a country with one of the lowest infant mortality rates in the world, that was an unbearable experience.

The MPLA had made great progress against primitivism during its long, silent years of struggle against Portuguese rule, thereby creating the conditions for final victory.

The Cuban doctors encountered diseases with which they were not even familiar. Under Portuguese rule, there were in Angola only 90 physicians for 6 million inhabitants, and most of them were in the capital.

In the liberated territories, the population's political and cultural standing was improved, tribalism and racism were combatted and both free schooling and public health were fostered. It was the seed of a new society.

Nevertheless, these remarkable and praiseworthy efforts were miniscule when the guerrilla war turned into a large, modern war; and it became necessary to appeal not only to the individuals with military and political training, but also to all the people of Angola.

It was a brutal war in which one had to be as cautious about mercenaries as about snakes; and as wary of guns as of cannibals! At the height of one battle, a Cuban commander fell into an elephant trap. The black Africans, conditioned by their atavistic hatred of the Portuguese, were at first hostile toward the white Cubans. On many occasions, especially in Cabinda, the Cuban scouts felt that they were being informed upon by the primitive telegraph of the drums used for communication, the beating of which could be heard as far as 35 kilometers away. As for the white military of South Africa, who fired at ambulances with 140 millimeter guns, they were sending up smokescreens on the battlefield. In the residence of a UNITA minister who lived in the comfort befitting his rank, the members of the MPLA found leftover entrails in the refrigerator, as well as several bottles containing the congealed blood of prisoners.

Nothing but bad news was reaching Cuba. On 11 December, in Hengo, where the FAPLA [Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola] were setting forth against the South African invaders, a Cuban armored car with four commanders aboard ventured along a path on which the sappers had already left the blacks at the disposal of the vultures. Despite the fact that four cars had already passed unharmed, and the natives had warned the armored car, which only stood to gain a few minutes that did not seem necessary anyway, scarcely had the car started on the path when it was hurled into the air by an explosion. Two special troop battalion commanders were seriously injured. Arguelles, the general commander of internationalist operations in Angola and a hero in the struggle against Batista, beloved in Cuba, was killed outright.

This was one of the reports, but it was not to be the last in that streak of misfortune. The following day, the Catofe disaster occurred, which was perhaps the worst setback of the entire war. This is how it happened: A South African column had succeeded in repairing a bridge on the Nhia River with unexpected speed, and had crossed the river under cover, surprising the Cubans in the tactical rearguard.

The analysis of this setback proved that it was due to a mistake on the part of the Cubans. A European military man with long experience in World War II, who felt that this analysis was too harsh, later told a high-ranking Cuban leader: "In war, you don't know what a mistake is." But, to the Cubans, it was one and a very serious one, only 5 days before the party congress.

[15 Jan 77, p 20]

[Text] Fidel: Observing the Victory

Following is the sixth part of the aforementioned article:

Fidel Castro, personally, had kept abreast of even the most minor details of the war. He had attended the departure of all the ships and, prior to their departure, he had addressed the combat units in the auditorium in Havana. He himself had gone looking for the special troop battalion commanders who were leaving on the first flight, and had taken them as far as the airplane ramp, driving his own Soviet jeep. It is likely that on this occasion, as well as at any of the departures, Fidel Castro had to repress a hidden feeling of envy at those who were leaving for a war in which he could not personally participate.

By that time, there was no point on the map of Angola that he could not identify, nor any feature of the terrain that he did not know by heart.

His concentration on the war was so intensive and meticulous that he could quote any statistics on Angola as if they were on Cuba, and he discussed its cities, customs and people as if he had lived there all his life.

At the beginning of the war, when the situation was critical, Fidel Castro remained as long as 14 consecutive hours in the staff control room, sometimes without eating or sleeping, as if he were in the field. He followed the events relating to the battles with colored pins on the detailed maps as large as the walls, and was in constant communication with the MPLA's high command on a battlefield where the time was 6 hours later. Some of his reaction during that uncertain period revealed his assurance concerning the victory. An MPLA combat unit was forced to blow up a bridge in order to stall the advance of the South African armored columns. In a message, Fidel Castro suggested: "Do not blow up any more bridges because, later, you will not have any way of pursuing them." He was right. Scarcely 2 weeks later, the Angolan and Cuban engineering brigades had to repair 13 bridges in 20 days in order to reach the fleeing invaders.

On 22 December, at the closing ceremony for the party congress, Cuba officially acknowledged for the first time that there were Cuban troops fighting in Angola. The status of the war was still uncertain.

In the final address, Fidel Castro disclosed that the invaders of Cabinda had been crushed in 72 hours; that, on the northern front, Holden Roberto's troops, which were 25 kilometers from Luanda on 10 November, had had to retreat over 100 kilometers; and that the South African armored columns, which had advanced 700 kilometers in less than 20 days, were surrounded over 200 kilometers from Luanda, and could not advance further. It was an accurate and reassuring report, but victory was still very far off.

The Angolans had better luck on 12 January, at the OUA conference held in Addis Ababa. A few days earlier, the troops under the command of the Cuban commander, Victor Shues Colas, a huge, friendly black who had been an auto mechanic before the revolution, drove Holden Roberto from his illusory capital of Carmona, seized the city and, a few hours later, took over the military base in Negage. The aid from Cuba then became so intensive that, at the beginning of January, there were 15 Cuban ships simultaneously sailing to Luanda. The unrestrained offensive of the MPLA on all fronts turned the situation definitively in its favor. So much so, that, by mid-January, it started its offensive operations on the southern front which had been planned for April.

South Africa had Canberra aircraft, and Zaire was operating with Mirages and Fiats. Angola lacked aircraft, because the Portuguese had destroyed the bases before withdrawing. All it could use were some old DC-3's which the Cuban pilots had put into service, and which sometimes had to land by night loaded with wounded on runways dimly lit with improvised torches, and reached their destinations with reeds and garlands of flowers from the jungle caught in their wheels.

At one time, Angola had a squadron of MIG-17's, with its respective crew of Cuban pilots, but they were regarded as a reserve for the military high command, and would only have been used for the defense of Luanda.

[16 Jan 77, p 22]

[Text] The Time of Liberation

Following is the final part of the aforementioned article:

Early in March, the northern front was liberated by the defeat of the British and gringo mercenaries whom the CIA had recruited, second-hand, in a desperate operation at the last minute. All the troops, with their complete staff, were concentrated in the south. The Benguela railroad had been liberated, and the UNITA had fallen into such a state of disorder that, in Gago Cutinho, an MPLA missile destroyed the house which Jonas Savimba had been occupying only an hour earlier.

The South African troops had begun dispersing in the middle of March. It was supposed to be a supreme decree, because of the fear that the MPLA's pursuit would continue across subjugated Namibia and bring the war onto South African territory itself.

That possibility would undoubtedly have had the support of all black Africa and of the vast majority of countries in the United Nations opposed to racial discrimination. The Cuban troops had no doubt of this when they were ordered to move, en masse, to the southern front. But, on 27 March, when the fleeing South Africans crossed the border and took refuge in Namibia,

the only order which the MPLA received was to occupy the abandoned dams and guarantee the well-being of the workers regardless of their nationality. At 0915 hours on the morning of 1 April, the MPLA vanguard, led by the Cuban commander, Leopoldo Cintras Frias, reached the Raucana dam, at the very edge of the chicken-wire fence on the border.

An hour and a quarter later, the South African governor of Namibia, General Ewepf [sic], accompanied by two other officers from his army, requested permission to cross the border and begin discussions with the MPLA. Commander Cintras Frias received them in a wooden shack built in the 10-meter neutral zone which divides the two countries; and the delegates from both sides, with their respective interpreters, sat down around a large dining table for the discussion. General Ewepf, in his 50's, heavy-set and bald, did his best to reflect the image of a kindly person with great experience, and accepted the MPLA's terms unconditionally. The agreement took 2 hours; but the meeting lasted longer, because General Ewepf had a tasty lunch prepared on the Namibian side brought in for everyone. While they had lunch, he made several toasts with beer, and told his adversaries how he had lost the little finger of his right hand in a traffic accident.

At the end of May, Henry Kissinger visited the Swedish prime minister, Olof Palme, in Stockholm; and, upon departing, jubilantly told the international press that the Cuban troops were evacuating Angola. It was claimed that the announcement was contained in a personal letter which Fidel Castro had written to Olof Palme. Kissinger's joy was understandable, because the withdrawal of Cuban troops lifted a burden from him in the eyes of the U.S. public, which was in a state of upheaval over the election campaign.

The fact is that, on this occasion, Fidel Castro had not sent any letter to Olof Palme. However, the latter's information was correct, although incomplete. Actually, the plan for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola had been agreed upon by Fidel Castro and Agostinho Neto in their meeting on 14 March in Conakry, when the victory was already a fact.

They decided that the withdrawal would be gradual, but that as many Cubans as necessary would remain in Angola for as long as they were required to organize a strong, modern army capable of guaranteeing the country's internal security and independence in the future, without help from anyone.

So, when Henry Kissinger committed the treason in Stockholm, over 3,000 troops had already returned to Cuba from Angola, and many more were en-route. An attempt was also made to keep the return a secret, for security reasons. But Esther Lilia Diaz Rodriguez, the first young woman to leave and one of the first to return by plane, experienced further proof of the Cubans' genius for finding out everything. Before informing her family of her return, Esther had been confined in the Havana naval hospital for a routine physical examination. After 48 hours, she was permitted to leave, and she took a cab at the corner, and was driven home without any comment.

But the driver refused to charge her for the service, because he knew that she was returning from Angola.

"How did you know?" Esther asked him, bewildered. The driver answered: "Because I saw you yesterday on the naval hospital veranda, and only those who have returned from Angola are there."

I arrived in Havana about that time and, at the airport, I had the distinct impression that something very profound had happened in the life of Cuba since the last time I was there, a year before.

There was an undefinable but all too noticeable change, not only in the people's spirit but also in the nature of things, in the animals and the sea, and in the very essence of Cuban life. There was a new men's style of entire outfits made of light material with short-sleeve jackets. There were new Portuguese words in the vocabulary on the streets. There were new accents in the old African accents in popular music. There were more noisy discussions than usual in the queues at shops and on the crowded buses among those who had been strong advocates of the action in Angola and those who were just then beginning to understand it. However, the most interesting and unusual experience was the fact that the returnees seemed aware of having helped to change the history of the world, but behaved with all the naturalness and propriety of someone who has simply done his duty.

On the other hand, perhaps they themselves were not aware that, on a different level which was possibly less generous but still more human, even the Cubans who were not overly impassioned felt compensated for their lives after many years of unjust setbacks. In 1970, when the sugar harvest of the 10 million failed, Fidel Castro asked the people to turn the defeat into victory. But, in fact, the Cubans had been doing that for a long time, with a steadfast political consciousness and a moral fortitude when put to any test. Since the Bay of Pigs victory, over 15 years earlier, they had had to bear with clenched teeth the murder of "Che" Guevara, in Bolivia, and that of President Salvador Allende, in the midst of the Chilean catastrophe. They had borne the extermination of the guerrillas in Latin America, and the endless night of the blockade, as well as the hidden, inexorable gnawing of so many internal mistakes of the past which at times kept them on the brink of disaster. All of that, apart from the irreversible, but slow and arduous victories of the revolution, must have created among the Cubans an accumulated sensation of undeserved punishment. Angola finally gave them the satisfaction of the great victory which they needed so much.

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CSO: 3010

ANGOLA

PAN-AFRICAN LABOR UNION SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE OPENS

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 1 Feb 77 pp 1, 2

[Unattributed article: "Solemn Inauguration of the Pan-African Labor Union Conference of Solidarity With the Oppressed Peoples of South Africa"]

[Text] The Pan-African Labor Union Conference of Solidarity with the Oppressed Peoples of Southern Africa (CSPASTPAA) began solemnly yesterday morning at the Ministry of Agriculture meeting hall of the People's Republic of Angola [RPA].

The important event that attracts the attention of all the Angolan people, and which has been the object of demonstrations of support from the workers of all the provinces, brings together delegates and guests from countries of the entire world.

As Comrade Jose Eduardo, member of the MPLA political bureau said, the selection of Luanda, capital of the RPA, as the site for the CSPASTPAA honors the MPLA and all our people.

Inaugural Sessions

Around 0945 hours, the secretary general of the UNTA [Angolan National Workers Union] opened the inaugural session and then gave the floor to the associate secretary general of the OUA [Organization of African Unity] Union Organization (OUSA), who proposed the nomination of Comrade Aristides Van-Dunen as president of the conference. The proposal was accepted by acclamation.

The introduction over, he invited the members appointed to make up the presidium of the CSPASTPAA to occupy their respective places at the table that orients the workers.

The presidium is made up of 11 members from various labor union organizations. The secretaries general of UNTA, OUSA, WFTU, CISAL (International Confederation of Free Unions), CMT (World Labor Confederation), a member of UNTA the associate secretary general of the OUSA, representatives of the People's

Republic of the Congo and the liberation organizations of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa are also part of it.

In the hall, in addition to the delegates, were guests of whom we point out, among others, the ambassadors in Angola of the USSR, Cuba, and Vietnam.

Solemn Inauguration

The appointment of the members of the presidium accomplished, the session was recessed. Around 1100 hours, comrade Jose Eduardo, member of the MPLA political bureau and first vice prime minister of the RPA, entered the hall of the conference amid warm applause, accompanied by the UNTA secretary general and other members of the presidium. Comrade Jose Eduardo, who represents comrade Agostinho Neto, president of the MPLA and the RPA, took a place at the table, occupying the place of honor.

Then the UNTA secretary general read a message of welcome. In the name of the Angolan Union Organization he greeted the delegates and thanked them for the choice of Luanda for the celebration of this event.

"Our union organization," he said, "the workers and all the Angolan people, reaffirm their determination to struggle to expel every form of exploitation and oppression from African soil and reiterate that we shall continue forward with the objectives of building a new society from which tribal differences, racial hates and exploitation will disappear forever and in which the young, men, women, and elderly, united around their leadership vanguard, the MPLA, will forge a people united in the high ideals of unity, fraternity and solidarity."

Demonstrate Solidarity

Comrade Jose Eduardo then spoke. He solemnly affirmed our intention of constructing a socialist society and he noted the importance of the conference as a special manner of showing militant support and solidarity with the peoples of the countries of southern Africa who are subjected to exploitation and oppression.

He reminded us of the importance of that help and he placed in evidence the examples shown throughout our liberation struggle by the world progressive forces.

Comrade Jose Eduardo warned of the strengthening of the imperialist presence in this part of the African continent after its defeats in Indochina and the former Portuguese colonies.

He emphasized the determination of our people, the MPLA and the government to continue their support for the liberation forces of SWAPO, the Patriotic Front, and the ANC. He recalled the support we gave to those organizations despite our present difficulties. He hoped that universal support will be extended to the financial, material and military fields.

Comrade Jose Eduardo ended his speech wishing the delegates success in the work of the conference in the name of the MPLA, its president, Comrade Agostinho Neto, and the Angolan people.

Finally, in the midst of warm and emotional applause, he congratulated some of the members of the presidium.

Recording Committee Elected

Before the second intermission took place, the associate secretary general of the OUSA took the stand to make a speech of thanks in which he praised the initiative that shows the desire of the African workers to show that they support the peoples and workers of Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa.

After the intermission, after work had been reinitiated, the commission that will write the record of the conference was elected. It consists of three representatives (Angola, Congo and South Africa).

At around 1220, the first plenary session of the CSPASTPAA was ended. Work will begin again at 1500 hours.

The second session of the conference began at 1530 hours with a brief speech by the president of the conference, which was followed by speeches by Comrades Lundamo of UNTA, Pierre Gensous of the WFTU, Kalumbu of the CISL, Auguste Dominique of the CMT, Sequera of the Latin American Workers Permanent Congress for Trade Unity [CPUSTAL], Kumbassa of the National Confederation of Workers of Guinea-Conakry and Antonio Bordieri of the CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor].

The speeches pointed out the need for the [words missing in the original] given to the peoples of Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa, which will accelerate the process of their liberation from racism and colonialism.

The speakers also made a very special reference to the role accruing to the People's Republic of Angola and our people in the struggle for the complete liberation of this part of the African continent.

Before the closing of the session, the conference presidency read the various messages that had arrived at the site of the conference from different countries, specifically from the Unions of Finland, the International Federation of Food Workers with headquarters in Bulgaria, the Union Council of Czechoslovakia and the Council of Unions of Yugoslavia.

Work, which ended around 1900 hours, will continue today at 0900.

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MINISTER DISCUSSES 1976 BUDGET, PETROLEUM RECEIPTS

Paris AFRIQUE INDUSTRIES INFRASTRUCTURES in French 1 Jan 77 pp 62-63

[Interview with Finance Minister Alphonse Poaty]

[Text] AFRIQUE INDUSTRIE: Can you describe in general terms the Congolese budget for 1976?

Mr Poaty: The 1976 budget is marked by the strictist austerity. Whereas the 1975 budget came to 70 billion CFA francs, the 1976 budget has been reduced to 58 billion CFA francs, which is a rare occurrence since expenditures generally tend to increase. But after determining that the 1975 budget had no firm financial basis, we believed it necessary to reduce the 1976 budget and to base it on our current financial capabilities.

Obviously, investments have suffered the most from this reduction to more reasonable proportions. In fact, the slice set aside for investments comes to only 3 billion CFA francs. However, this figure should be considered in light of the fact that several items of the operating budget relate indirectly to investments in state enterprises. Fellowships are also time-investments for the training of cadres. Therefore, investments have not been neglected in spite of the reduction in the funds allocated for them. Thus, several sectors have benefited from them in 1976 to the extent of the possibilities open to us. Actually, we did not want to go back to the experience in past years when the budgets were based on the prospects of outside loans. That is why, although the matter is not yet closed, we think we can put the 1976 budget into effect as planned.

AFRIQUE INDUSTRIE: Within this context of austerity, which are the principal sectors benefiting from investments in 1976?

Mr Poaty: The transportation sector, through the ATC [Trans-Congolese Communications Agency], is the principal beneficiary with 2 billion CFA francs in investments. Agriculture and industry have been the principal beneficiaries of the remaining billion. It should not be forgotten either that within the framework of transfers numerous state enterprises have benefited from investments in 1976.

AFRIQUE INDUSTRIE: You have spoken of basing the budget on the actual situation in the Congo. Along the same line of thought, what have been the principal changes made in the triennial development program which has deservedly been called far too ambitious?

Mr Poaty: Numerous sectors will be affected by these changes. We have emphasized priority operations which may concern agriculture, immediately profitable operations which can be self-financed, transportation, and putting state enterprises back on a firm footing. These are the key sectors on which we are placing special emphasis. As for the other projects which are beyond our capabilities for the moment, we shall perhaps set them aside temporarily, but we have not yet taken a final decision, for the triennial program is in the process of being examined by the governmental and political authorities of the country so that definitive changes can possibly be made in it.

AFRIQUE INDUSTRIE: The "ambitious" side of this program was due to larger predicted petroleum revenue than actual receipts. What petroleum receipts are expected for 1976?

Mr Poaty: This is a problem essential to our development. In fact, in 1975 we were thinking that our petroleum revenue would be larger based on what our petroleum operators told us. As the drilling proceeded we were told, but we still did not have the proof, that the petroleum production of the Congo was declining particularly because of a drop in pressure which made drilling difficult. Our 1975 difficulties were thus due to the fact that the predictions on which we had relied were not realized. In 1976, therefore, we have learned our lesson, although we are not completely in agreement on the reasons but forward by the petroleum operators, and we have reduced our budgetary predictions to about 12 billion CFA francs for the petroleum revenue. It was on this basis that we built our 1976 budget. Let me add that in view of the fact that our difficulties in the matter are due to reasons which are beyond our control, we decided to diversify our petroleum partners which were ELF [Gasoline and Lubricants Company of France] and AGIP [Italian Petroleum Enterprise]. We decided to call upon Getty, which is engaged in petroleum exploration in the Congo. Up until now ELF was the only operation which had reached the stage of marketing. From now until the end of the year, AGIP will also be able to produce petroleum commercially, and we believe that the 1977 budget may benefit from these new flows of capital which will come from ELF-Congo, AGIP, and later, Getty.

AFRIQUE INDUSTRIE: Do you have any idea yet on these receipts in 1977 and is it possible to speak of the 1977 budget as a take-off budget?

Mr Poaty: No final decision has yet been made on the 1977 budget, and we are going to discuss it shortly with our petroleum partners. We shall calculate our revenue on the basis of the production figures that they are going to give us.

AFRIQUE INDUSTRIE: In addition to petroleum, what are the main revenue sources for 1976?

Mr Poaty: Customs and tax revenue obviously come first. These are the two traditional budget revenue sources. Potash and lumber are also important resources. Furthermore, we have taken measures to increase the production of lumber. Basically, we encourage lumbering by Congolese lumbering firms; the state itself is going to exploit a part of the forest, either directly through state enterprises or through private capital. Let me mention in this connection that we have benefited from 1.9 billion CFA francs in aid from the EEC within the framework of the STABEX [expansion unknown], as a result of the decline in our lumber export revenue.

AFRIQUE INDUSTRIE: In this regard, what is the amount of foreign, international, and bilateral assistance for the development of the Congo?

Mr Poaty: The Congo has been the beneficiary of a sizable sum from the World Bank. In this regard, I shall mention the financing of the realignment of the CFCO [expansion unknown], for which we obtained an allocation of \$38 million, as well as the financing of livestock breeding and raising projects. Other projects are currently being studied at the Bank level, and we hope to obtain satisfaction relatively quickly.

Although we are no longer eligible under the International Development Association since we have exceeded the minimum revenue required of \$375, we have in the past obtained substantial assistance from this agency.

Under a bilateral aid program, we are continuing to receive aid from France in several sectors of Congolese economic, social, and educational activity. Several friendly Eastern countries have also been outstanding in substantial accomplishments and assistance. This is true particularly in the case of China, which among other things has built a large textile plant, and the USSR, which has financed the construction of a hospital and a luxury hotel.

AFRIQUE INDUSTRIE: How does the Congo intend to solve the difficult problem of inflation?

Mr Poaty: Without simplifying things too much, I shall say that the main cause of inflation lies in the continual increase in the price of manufactured goods at the international level, which is itself due to the monetary crisis and certain production factors. The developing countries such as the Congo directly suffer the consequences of this inflation all the more severely the more the relative amount of the price of the basic goods which constitute the essential part of their exports drops, that is, in relation to the price of manufactured goods. It is the eternal problem of the deterioration of trade terms, which you know about and which is on the agenda of several international conferences, in both the United Nations and in the North-South Conference through UNCTAD.

One of the most serious consequences of this situation is the continual decrease in the purchasing power of our great masses. In this regard, the principal measures taken to attempt to curb inflation have been the temporary freezing of the prices of indispensable goods and the limiting of the profit margins on large consumer goods. Let me add that, although the price of luxury items is not controlled, the government checks them constantly, so that we can speak of their status as being that of "monitored freedom."

AFRIQUE INDUSTRIE: You have represented the Congo at the annual assembly of the IMF and of the World Bank held in Manila. What is the Congolese position on the problems which were brought up there?

Mr Poaty: I can say that the Congo has no special position on the problems raised by these institutions, for as you know, Africa has a common position in the face of these problems.

This position has been expressed by a spokesman which this year was RCA. In addition to the traditional problems of the insufficient number of Africans employed in these institutions, there has been the problem of the worsening of the conditions governing access to credits from the Bank and the relative as well as absolute insufficiency of the aid made available for the development of the African countries. On all these matters, the voice of Africa has been raised, particularly to condemn the increase in the interest rates of the IBRD, the shortening of the repayment times, and the decrease in the absolute value of the aid from which we have benefited. Undoubtedly the objection has been raised that up to the present time Africa has received in relative value more credits per inhabitant than the other continents eligible under the IBRD and the IDA. But to look at the matter more closely, this criterion does not take into account the real situation involving Africa, a continent which is barely emerging from a long night of colonial exploitation and which thereby finds itself faced with numerous economic, social, cultural, financial, and other problems.

Consequently, comparing the young African states with other states, which are underdeveloped, no doubt, but older by several tens of years, even several hundred years, in the matter of financial aid is just as unjust as it is inconsequential, especially if we consider the special self-financing efforts made by the African governments as compared with other states which have benefited before them from international aid.

Thus the problem of aid to the African countries should be examined not by comparison with other continents and on a per capita basis, but considering the immense needs of this continent--needs which have been the object of ambitious development programs.

CSO: 4400

ETHIOPIA

SOVIET AMBITIONS SEEM TO BE AT ROOT OF COUPS

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 11 Feb 77 p 19

[Article by Iqbal Ahmed: "The Latest Military Coup in the 'Horn' of Africa"]

[Text] Two military coups occurred almost simultaneously last week in the area known as the "horn" of Africa. And, although at first glance it may not appear to be so, the fact is that both have a certain connection. The first, which broke out in the Sudan, was unsuccessful. The second, in Ethiopia, produced the desired results. Last Friday, less than 24 hours after the confirmation that Col Haile Mariam was master of the situation and the "strongman" of the country, the Cuban ambassador in Addis Ababa, Jose Perez Nova, conveyed a message of congratulations from Prime Minister Fidel Castro. On the same day, Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Ratanov was received by Col Haile Mariam, to whom he expressed his "admiration for the measures taken against the counterrevolutionaries."

The "counterrevolutionaries" to whom the ambassador from the Kremlin referred were President Teferi Bante and six members of the "Dergue," or military council that has governed Ethiopia since the coup that overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974, and the measures taken for which that diplomat had expressed his "admiration" were the executions of the aforementioned seven members of the "Dergue" that had been officially announced. The "crime" of those executed, despite the fact that they were avowed Marxists, was the fact that they did not share the Kremlin's aim of transforming Ethiopia, and with it the "horn" of Africa, into a future Soviet military gateway in the Red Sea -- the shortest sea route between Western Europe and the Persian Gulf oil region.

In the meantime, the official version of the events was not only different but contradictory. After the seven men had been executed, a government communique in Addis Ababa announced that they had been preparing "a fascist coup d'etat with the help of imperialists and the reactionary governments of the neighboring countries." Later, the military council itself announced over the radio that the seven were executed for having been connected with the Revolutionary Party of the Ethiopian People (EPRP), a well-known clandestine Marxist group. But this double version had at least one merit:

It succeeded in causing enough confusion to disguise the violent seizure of power by the Kremlinist faction of the "Dergue."

Col Haile Mariam did not lose time in proving his loyalty to Moscow publicly. Speaking in the center of the capital to frenzied crowds, he violently attacked the neighboring "reactionary governments" of the Sudan and Saudi Arabia, adding that the new Ethiopian regime had only one friend in the area: South Yemen. No more nor less. South Yemen is one of the countries in the area that have long revolved in the Soviet orbit. The other is Somalia. Relations between the latter and Ethiopia were never good due to the claims by both sides over the Territory of the Afars and Issas, better known by the name of French Somalia, which will become independent at the end of July. A few days before his execution, Gen Teferi Bante had termed the situation on the Somalia border "critical." But Col Haile Mariam ignored this country in his violent attacks, a gesture that hides the ideological inclination of the Ethiopian leader and which did not go unnoticed by international observers.

The question of Eritrea, former Italian colony annexed by Ethiopia in 1962, is at the root of the coup and represents the basis of the dispute between this country and the Sudan. For the past 15 years, the Ethiopian regimes have been fighting without success against the guerrillas of the Eritrean Liberation Front. Arab countries of different social systems such as Saudi Arabia, Syria, Kuwait, Libya and the Sudan are cited as financing the rebels who, according to international commentators, enjoy the almost total support of the local population. Last year, Col Atnafu Abate, now the number two man in the Addis Ababa regime, organized a "people's army" made up of 40,000 peasants to march on Eritria. Badly organized and badly equipped, more than half of these "soldiers" were killed by guerrillas before they entered the territory. The Ethiopian governor of Eritrea at the time, Gen Getachew Nadew went to Addis Ababa immediately after the massacre and demanded the "Dergue" take immediate measures with a view to opening negotiations with the guerrillas, arguing that it was useless to continue the fight. His arguments were not accepted. That night he was dead.

The importance of Eritrea rests on its geostrategic location. Overlooking the Red Sea, it represents a sort of advanced military position in this area. The Kremlin, striving to control the vital sea routes to the West through naval bases in strategically located countries, has had its eyes on the region for a long time. And although the interests of the West and the Arab countries in the area require that that this does not happen, Col Haile Mariam's rise to power may make this dream of the Kremlin's come true, henceforth, without nightmares.

The dispute between the Sudan and Ethiopia dates from last December when President Numayri, regarded as a moderate socialist, accused the Addis Ababa regime of training troops and rebels with the aim of intervening in his country. Ethiopia expressed its "surprise" at that charge, which did not prevent the Sudanese chief of state from recalling his ambassador in Addis Ababa and demanding that the OAU headquarters be transferred from

that capital to another African country. In view of the aggravation of the border situation between these two countries, Egypt announced on 15 January that it would support Sudan against any aggression. The aggression came but in the form of the attempted coup d'etat which was promptly put down. The near synchronization of the coup in Juba in southern Sudan, far from the capital, with the the military "putsch" in Addis Ababa leads one to believe that it was a destabilizing maneuver to prevent any surprise at the time of the seizure of power in Addis Ababa. It is recalled in this connection that President Numayri has already survived three attempted coups d'etat in the past 6 years. Responsibility for the first two was officially attributed to the Moscow-oriented Sudanese Communist Party.

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PLANS MADE FOR FURTHER MINING DEVELOPMENT

Paris BULLETIN DE L'AFRIQUE NOIRE in French 26 Jan 77 pp 17532-17539

[Article: "Gabon's Third 5-Year Plan: 1976-1980." Part I, here omitted, is entitled "Forestry Development."]

[Excerpt] II. The Mining Sector

A. The mining policy will remain "liberal with regard to private investors," just as under the Second Plan, when "the state essentially relied on private companies to carry out the prospecting for as well as development of mining resources. But the government will play a larger role in orienting mining activities."

1 -- Given the "importance of the oil sector and the need to prepare for any possible drop in mining resources," objectives will be a stepping up of prospecting on the one hand, and on the other hand, a maximum increase in the value of production before export.

"With 178 billion, including 162 billion for oil alone, the added value of the mining sector made up 48 percent of the GNP in 1974. In 1975, oil and the whole mining sector brought in 59 and 64 percent of all tax receipts respectively."

2 -- The strategy "will consist of setting up adequate structures and measures": a structuration of the geological service in order to make it operational, adaptation of the Gabonese tax system to that of competing countries and to future changes in the international context, and an evaluation of the costs and advantages of mining products based on their national interest.

B. Mining research and prospecting are the object of an important effort of the public sector during the Third Plan, with investments totaling 5.54 billion compared with 709 million for the Second Plan and 361 million for the First Plan. "Besides such research and prospecting done by the government, either alone or in partnership with mining groups, private enterprises (the BRGM [Geological and Mining Exploration Office], COMILOG [Ogooue Mining Company], COMUF [Franceville Uranium Mining Company], SOMIFER [Mekambo Iron Mines Company]) are carrying out research and prospecting in their own

behalf" (18 billion spent on oil research, including 14 billion for ELF-Gabon [Gasoline and Lubricants Company of France]).

1 -- The objectives of the Third Plan in the field of mining research and prospecting concern the structuration of the geological and mining prospecting service, improvement of geological cartography aimed at multidisciplinary use, a general survey of mineral resources, development of known indications, and the training of Gabonese geologists and prospecters.

In the oil field, the special objectives will be "to improve knowledge of hydrocarbon potential and evaluate the amount of gas available so as to program its use."

2 -- The research and prospecting program is fourfold:

Drawing up a detailed geological map will require an expenditure of 3.15 billion, including 1.13 billion for radar coverage and infrared photographs, 1.44 billion for aeromagnetic and spectometric coverage and 580 for actually drawing up the map.

A general survey of mining resources will be undertaken by the BRGM and Gabonese geologists in the eastern Makokou region in 1976, 1977 and 1978 and in the Nyanga syncline region in 1978, 1979 and 1980, for a total cost of 1.11 billion.

The eastern Makokou region, one of the least known in Gabon from the mining standpoint, could help, if research should be successful, make the future Booue-Belinga railroad profitable. The Nyanga sedimentary syncline, located in the hinterland of the future Mayumba port, is the extension of the Congolese Niari syncline, where traces of copper and lead have been discovered.

Systematic and detailed prospecting represents a total cost of 780 million for three operations: a study of lead indications in the Kroussou region east of Mouila by a syndicate made up of the state, COMILOG, ELF-Gabon and the BRGM (190 million), resumption of studies and work on the Tchibanga iron deposit by a syndicate (the state and the BRGM), which should lead to a feasibility study for development and the establishment of a small iron and steel complex (70 million), and prospecting of certain indications discovered within the framework of the general survey, as well as the establishment of an inventory of building materials (530 million).

In 1962, a BRGM study of the Tchibanga iron deposit led to the conclusion that it was possible to set up an iron and steel industry to make iron bars for reinforced concrete and sections, while previous studies (BRGM-CECA [African Commercial Development Company]) deemed that working of the ore was not profitable.

C. Oil is the subject of an estimate of private investments based on 150.2 billion CFA francs for research, development and extraction.

1 -- The current situation of the oil sector was presented in Nos 874 and 877 of BULLETIN DE L'AFRIQUE NOIRE. Production has exceeded 10 million tons since 1974.

At the end of 1975, Gabon's cumulative production was 68.25 million tons, including 56 million tons for ELF, and the amount of all investments for exploration and production were some 250 billion, including 192 billion for ELF.

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
1,000 T	1,264	1,447	3,444	4,642	5,028	4,523	5,786	6,319	7,598	10,202	11,315

In 1975, Gabon's oil exports totaled 167.4 billion for 10.4 million tons and and tax receipts from oil totaled 102 billion (out of a total of 163 billion in regular receipts).

2 -- Prospects depend on the discovery of new deposits, since fields being worked are generally small, including the largest among them: Gamba-Ivinga, Grondin, Anguille and Barbier, which are the only ones to date to exceed 10 million tons in reserves.

Two production hypotheses were therefore established: on the one hand, a basic hypothesis corresponding to the absence of any discovery between now and 1978, although providing for the working of part of the deposits discovered in 1976, and on the other hand, a high variant corresponding to the discovery of large deposits before 1978, which would make it possible to return to the 1976 production level in 1980. (Without discovering any new deposits, production could drop from 15 to 20 percent beginning in 1980.)

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1976-80
Basic hypothesis	11,315	11,300	10,700	9,000	8,600	8,300	47,900
High variant	11,315	11,300	10,800	9,800	10,000	11,000	52,900

3 -- Following the basic hypothesis, investments would be on the order of 10 billion per year for research, about 50 billion total for the years 1977, 1978 and 1979 for the development of new deposits, and around 60 billion for deposits now being worked.

Taking amortization expenditures into account, operating costs should go from 34.8 billion in 1976 (3,100 CFA francs per ton) to 38.3 billion in 1977, 39.8 billion in 1978, 42.7 billion in 1979 and 42.1 billion in 1980 (5,070 CFA francs per ton).

4 -- Based on the high variant, investments are an estimated 195 billion for development investments and investments for the working of current and new deposits and 80 billion for research investments.

5 -- Prospects for the industrial valorization of oil, which also depend on new discoveries that could ensure a sufficient supply over 15 to 20 years, would represent an investment of 21.6 billion taken from the processing industries column.

The second oil refinery was put into service (tests) at the end of July 1976 on the site of the SOGARA [expansion unknown] refinery at Pointe-Clairette by the ELF-Gabon Refining Company (COGER), 30 percent of whose capital is held by the state and 70 percent by ELF-Gabon within the framework of the PID [expansion unknown]. The crude oil processing capacity is 1.2 million tons per year. Investments total 14.4 billion CFA francs, including nearly 8 billion for storage and transport. (The SOGARA refinery, with a capacity of 1 million tons of refined oil processed 906,284 tons in 1975.)

"Plans for more expansions are not justifiable. In fact, these units are too small to ensure good profitability and a unit of optimum size (nearly 20 million tons) would be too large for Gabonese production and goals."

A lubricant formulation and packing plant (mixture of basic oils with the addition of additives and other improvements) is now being studied. Its capacity would be 15,000 to 20,000 tons, that is, the 1980 consumption (some 10,000 tons at the present time; an average 17-percent increase per year). Investments would amount to 700 million without the equipment necessary for the manufacture of barrels.

An ammonia manufacturing plant is being built at Port-Gentil, also within the framework of the PID. The work is being done by the GABO-REN [expansion unknown] company, whose capital of 1.6 billion is divided between the state (33.15 percent), the American N'REN Corporation (35 percent) and ELF-Gabon (31.85 percent).

Production capacity will be 62,000 tons of ammonia per year (two units, each having a daily capacity of 90 tons), made from naphtha from COGER, whose other products will be exported. Production, worth 3.7 billion, is to be exported. Estimated investments will total 6.5 billion.

D. Manganese, "of which Gabon has supplied about a fourth of the Western world's imports since 1971," will be the object of planned investments totaling 15 to 17 billion.

1 -- Manganese ore mining has been done since 1962 by the Ogooue Mining Company (COMILOG), whose capital of 7,855,000,000 is divided among U.S. Steel (44 percent), the BRGM (19 percent), the Mokta Company (17 percent), the government (10 percent since January 1973), and the Auxiliary Mining Company (9 percent).

The Moanda deposit is one of the world's finest metallurgical manganese deposits. "The ore requires only limited processing."

Reserves represent some 200 million tons of marketable ore (50.5 percent), found in two deposits: the Bangombe plateau, located in the south and oriented toward the Congolese shipping line, the only deposit now being worked (85 million tons), and the Okouma plateau in the north (115 million tons), whose working will be made possible by the Trans-Gabonese Railroad.

The capacity of COMILOG's facilities, which since 1964 have included an ore concentration plant for the fabrication of manganese dioxide for batteries, has been increased from 2 to 2.4 million tons of marketable ore in 1974.

Production, which has increased steadily (doubling between 1964 and 1972), exceeded 2 million tons for the second time in 1975 (first time with respect to metallurgical ores alone).

(1,000 tons)	1964	1968	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Metall. ore	955.4	1,305	1,451	1,875	1,910	1,036	1,995	2,185
Dioxide	4	32.7	24.1	36	34	42	68.6	44
Total	959.4	1,067.7	1,475.1	1,911	1,944	1,978	2,063.6	2,229.8

Since the beginning, production has totaled nearly 20 million tons (19,845,785 tons).

Turnover doubled between 1970 (8.6 billion) and 1974 (17.1 billion) and between 1973 (11.8 billion) and 1975 (24.1 billion).

Investments totaled 35.4 billion at the end of 1975 (some 40 billion at the end of 1976 with expansions and diversification of production and the increased capacity of the telpher railway).

In addition, COMILOG participated in the establishment of the Gabonese Electric Battery Company (SOGAPIL), with a participation of 20 percent, and the Gabonese Ferrous Alloy Company (SOGAFERRO).

2 -- The program of the Third Plan "will depend on the system of transport (telpher railway and the Congo-Ocean Railroad), which could limit exports before the Trans-Gabonese goes into service." Two projects are planned.

Development of ore mining should increase exports to 2.5 million by 1980. The cost of investments is an estimated 8 billion.

The project will be "spread out between 1978 and 1980 so that the new facilities will go into operation at the same time as the Trans-Gabonese, around 1980. Working of the Bangombe deposit will then be increased to 2 million tons, while that of Okouma will produce the rest."

The Moanda iron alloy plant project is being studied by SOGAFERRO, whose capital of 1 billion has been distributed since April 1975, when new shareholders were sought by COMILOG, between the government (10 percent),

COMILOG (15 percent) and foreign interests (25 percent for the Japanese firm Okura Trading, 10 percent for each of the following five companies: the American Union Carbide, the Norwegian firm of Eckem, the Belgian firm of SADACEM [expansion unknown], the Italian firm of Tassara and the French Paris-Outreau Company). "Feasibility studies lasting 2 years (1976 and 1977) allow one to envisage the construction of the plant toward the end of the decade."

Production contemplated at the present time would be 85,000 tons of ferromanganese and 50,000 tons of silicomanganese, mainly based on some 300,000 tons of manganese from Moanda. The great consumption of electricity (450 million kilowatt-hours) would be supplied by the Grand Poubara Dam. Investments are on the order of 7 to 9 billion (1975 francs).

E. Uranium, of which Gabon supplies about 16 percent of the French consumption, is the object of planned investments totaling 12 billion.

1 -- The mining of uranium ore has been underway since 1961 in the Mounana region north of Moanda, by the Franceville Uranium Mining Company (COMUF) (25 percent held by government).

Definite reserves are estimated to total 20,000 tons of metal.

The processing capacity was increased at the end of 1976 to 240,000 tons of ungraded ore (some 1,000 tons of metal), compared with 100,000 tons in the beginning and 170,000 tons in 1975 for the concentration plant (using sulfuric acid), with the capacity of the sulfuric acid unit being 6,000 tons per year using imported sulfur.

Total investments amounted to 10.2 billion at the end of 1975.

Production, which came only from the Oklo deposit after 1975 (strip mining since 1970), approached 1,000 tons.

Tons	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Concentrates	1,371	1,388	1,077	1,274	522	1,412	1,772	1,386
Uranium	467	508	382	545	208	646	773	931*

*Including 515 tons of normal uranium and 415 tons of low-grade uranium.

11,464
CSO: 4400

MADAGASCAR

MADAGASCAR ASKS CARTER FOR RECOGNITION OF SOVEREIGNTY, FULL ROLE

Tananarive LA PRESSE MALAGASY in French 20 Jan 77 pp 1-2

[Article: "To President Jimmy Carter," reprinted from the 17 January 1977 issue of the Malagasy-language daily ATRIKA]

[Text] This is the week of your inauguration as president!

It is a great and powerful nation that you will henceforth lead.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that your interest (the interest of the American people) and our interest (the interest of the Malagasy people) are often incompatible and are therefore opposed.

As far as we Malagasy are concerned, within the framework of our policy, it is respect for our national sovereignty that constitutes the very pillar, the fundamental basis of cooperation (with other nations). Moreover, what we are seeking, that which we want, is for the Indian Ocean to be a zone of peace!

Therefore, as you now take office, Mr President, let it be said, even in passing, that we have already closely followed your election campaign and the statement(s) that you have made so far. As you take office, we ask that you devote a chapter to relations between the United States and Madagascar. If your foreign policy changes, it will have repercussions everywhere, even here in Madagascar.

Finally, do not forget, Mr President, that henceforth, we shall no longer be content merely to observe the march and evolution of our history (the history of our Malagasy nation). Rather, we are going to forge it ourselves!

11,464
CSO: 4400

CONDUCT OF 'INDIAN' GROUP CONDEMNED

Expulsion of Indian Wrongdoers Urged

Tananarive LA PRESSE MALAGASY in French 15 Jan 77 pp 2-3

[Text] We must apprehend and punish Indians found to be wrongdoers, for they hurt and cause harm to the reputation of many other Indians!

In connection with the warning issued by the government twice within the space of only a few months and concerning Indians living in Morondava, the MARESAKA gives the following viewpoint:

"It is nevertheless suitable to recognize that although they are all labeled as "Indians," that is, all those living in Morondava (and the rest of Madagascar), they are not all of Indian ancestry, but rather, are natives of other countries (Pakistan, Afghanistan, and so on). However, for Malagasies, they are all lumped together under the same label as Indians.

After reporting the facts in connection with the matter and with which we are all familiar, MARESAKA concludes:

"There is no smoke without a fire," as they say. If people have spoken about these things (improper acts committed by the Indians in question), it is because some individuals are actually guilty of them.

"That is why we say:

"Let us finally catch the 'bad' Indians and punish them in accordance with the law -- that is, those Indians who are guilty of arbitrary and improper acts, because they are actually bringing pity upon the other honest Indians of good character due to the fact that they are all put in the same sack, they are all treated alike and in the same fashion, although there are indeed those who try to go by the rules and to live on good terms with the Malagasy people."

Indians Likened to French Colonialists

Tananarive LA PRESSE MALAGASY in French 17-18 Jan 77 pp 1-3

[Text] The Indians have taken the place of the French colonialists!

With respect to the actions, conduct, fury, disdain, insolence, racism, trickery, abusive exploitation, "robbery" (to wit, dishonest practices in commerce), as well as the buying off of the voice of conscience of people who allow themselves to be easily deceived, the misfortune and misery inflicted on the working masses, and the abuse of trust, the presumption of being a race superior to the Malagasy people and all the rest: It is the Indians who have taken the place of the French colonialists, to such an extent that a shadow is now cast over the full, real, natural development of our national sovereignty.

It should be noted that these Indians are absolutely immutable as far as their nature and manner are concerned, as just mentioned. Rather, they only become more aggressive and even dare to let it be understood that nothing could make any change in their domination because, they say, they are able to defend themselves.

First of all, it has not yet been made clear what the charges against and responsibility of Indians in the recent Majunga affair are!

The Indians are very high-handed in everything. One would say that they are even absolutely capable of buying that western coast of the island of Madagascar. Whether it be the ships (ocean shipping), or overland transportation (various vehicles or appropriate cars), everything belongs to them.

Next, all trade in general is in their domain and part of their activity, from wholesale to retail commerce. The same is true for industrial enterprises and everything that ensues from them.

It should be noted here that some Indians even give the impression of owning certain islands, at Nosy-Be, for example, hinting that they acquired the islands through their own money.

In this western part of Madagascar, Indians are practically the only owners of trucks used to haul products and merchandise, while SINPA (National Interest Company for Agricultural Products, only recently set up, has none.

Consequently, the Indians, the masters of transportation, do not want to hire people to work or operate their trucks for SINPA, even though the latter is a government company or organization. It should be noted that what annoys them and gets under their skin is that SINPA was set up to take their place, the place of these Indians, in the area of the collection of various products, which once enabled them to exploit and abuse with impunity the poor Malagasy peasants.

The newspaper MARAINA VAOVAO briefly reported the fact that Indian barmen practice discriminatory measures to the detriment of Malagasy nationals: glasses for foreign customers (in general) and kapoaka (cans) for Malagasy habitues. At Antokazo-Manekambahiny, one Indian family alone has monopolized a 4,000-hectare concession, without developing it.

We fully approve of the clear words of President Ratsiraka, who said:

"Madagascar is not xenophobic. However, the Malagasy people will absolutely never allow anyone else to come and walk all over them!"

Finally, one must bear in mind that the evil done to a single Malagasy is considered by all Malagasy as an improper act committed against all the Malagasy people.

We have but one wish, one desire: As soon as the people's government is well established (fokonolona, fokontany, firsaisam-pokontany [levels of people's community economic advancement associations], and so on), as soon as a decentralized people's organization is instituted, we shall see how and to what extent these "buyers of consciences" can provide their own self-defense!

11,464
CSO: 4400

MOZAMBIQUE

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, IDEOLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES EXPLORED

Paris LE MONDE in French 27, 28 Jan 77

[Serialized article by Rene Lefott: "Mozambique on the Defensive"]

[27 Jan 77, pp 1, 6]

[Text] Maputo [Lourenco Marques]--The song of cicadas drowned out the noise of rocks rolling under their ankle boots. The footpath they followed ran down the side of a hill, crossed the sandy soil of a dry river bed, and climbed other boulders, zigzagging in a forest of uniformly gray trees, twisted, bare, without foliage to give shade. In the distance, the chain of hills that emerged from the haze was already Rhodesian territory. The overwhelming heat exceeded 40 degrees Centigrade in the shade. Without exchanging a word, their faces streaming with perspiration, their shirts striking to their skin, their Kalashnikov automatic rifles or bazookas slung over their shoulders, the fighters of the FPLM [Popular Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique] who accompanied us marched with the regularity of a metronome. The rhythm of footsteps became so obsessive that "one got to the point of no longer thinking about anything," one of these veterans of the armed struggle told us.

Some of these veterans were among the first group of FRELIMO [Mozambique Liberation Front] activists trained in Algeria from 1963 on. They had to get reacquainted with the exhausting marches, hunger, thirst, and daily clashes in the brush. Because it decided to support the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe [Rhodesia], the young People's Republic of Mozambique is practically in a state of war.

On a gentle slope which ends in the bed of the Luia River the burned-out ruins of Gento, one of the five bases of the FPLM in Tete Province, can be seen. It was attacked by Rhodesian forces early in November 1976. The ground is strewn with mortar shell fragments and shell casts. The fighting was short but violent. All the huts in the camp were burned down.

On either side of a destroyed Land Rover the bodies of the driver and his passenger were barely covered with earth. In the shade of a tree, under a

mound covered with branches, two fighters of the ZIPA [Zimbabwe People's Army] are buried. They were part of a detachment ambushed while they were evacuating some wounded to a Mozambican hospital. When the pressure of the guerrilla fighters grew increasingly strong, the Rhodesians wished to destroy the Mozambican bases a few weeks before the start of the rainy season which was to make most of the trails impracticable and the resupply of stocks very difficult.

The Rhodesians Have the Initiative

Less than 15 days later the guerrillas of Zimbabwe launched their fifth important offensive since the start of 1976. The local political commissioners assert that the Mozambican population accepts the sacrifices "because it fought the war to liberate its own country and understands very well that the same thing is now taking place in Zimbabwe." However, the inhabitants of the region take flight at the approach of any vehicle. A week after the attack, most of the women and children continued to remain hidden in the brush.

Maputo asserts that it did not fall into the trap laid by Salisbury aiming at transforming the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe into a war between Mozambique and Rhodesia with all the international consequences that would flow from it. Rather, the Mozambicans will continue to "support in a material and moral way" the ZIPA while allowing it to pursue its struggle. The orders are explicit: There is no question of the FPLM crossing the Rhodesian border.

"The situation has changed a lot," a commander told us with regret. "We are now the soldiers of an independent country and must defend it." The FPLM fighters were trained in guerrilla warfare and have learned lately that in order to win they must always retain the initiative. Today, however, it is Salisbury which has the advantage of surprise by attacking when it so decides with considerable means, mastery of the skies, and the large-scale participation of former Portuguese settlers in Mozambique and "harkis" [native troops who had sided with Portugal] of the Portuguese colonial army completely familiar with the terrain.

Facing them the Mozambican units are few in number, scattered along a border that is 1,500 km long, is covered with forests and crossed by thousands of rivers and ravines. The Mozambicans have only a few heavy weapons, telecommunication facilities, and vehicles. We have seen battalions which did not even have a Land Rover on a permanent basis. It is on the shoulders of men that those wounded by the Rhodesian attack had to be evacuated to Tete hospital, in the provincial capital, over a distance of nearly 200 km. The Mozambican army does not have the means to close the border to Rhodesian incursions or even, undoubtedly, to interdict a Rhodesian raid on a vital center of Mozambique. In such an eventuality, Maputo plans to counterattack with vigor and to inflict such heavy losses on the assailant as to deter it from pursuing its operations.

Antonio Thai, the youngest governor in Mozambique, put aside his civilian attire in order to don his coarse canvas fatigues. Convinced that the latest

Rhodesian attack is the prelude to offensives of greater magnitude, he wants "to organize the province so that it may be able to live in a state of permanent warfare."

Relations With Pretoria

Pretoria needs an annual contingent of about 100,000 miners, electric power from Cabora Bassa, and to a lesser degree the Mozambican market. Maputa takes advantage of the proximity of South Africa to buy imported products more inexpensively and to have them delivered faster. In addition, the share of the miners' wages paid to the Mozambican Government in the form of gold figured at \$42 per ounce represents by far the country's leading foreign exchange resource. But does the haste with which the South Africans are striving to meet all the demands of Maputo not hide Pretoria's intention to influence in the long run Mozambique's political evolution and, by severing its commercial ties at a well-chosen moment, to provoke the toppling of FRELIMO by plunging the country into a grave economic crisis?

In contrast, Rhodesia's hostility is at least unequivocal. Mozambique's support of the ZIPA is no longer sufficient to justify it. Salisbury has welcomed those nostalgic for the colonial period who still refuse to accept FRELIMO's victory and has placed sizable means at their disposal in the past few months to attack the neighboring country without respite. Malawi, whose hostility vis-a-vis Mozambique seemed to have been mitigated, has once more become a secure rear base for all attempts at infiltration into Mozambique.

The internal situation continues to be entirely under the control of FRELIMO. To those newsmen who ask whether there is an antigovernment underground movement, the Mozambican authorities answer that they are ready to take anyone who wants it on a tour "to any part of the territory." No observer, no diplomat has had the slightest evidence that an underground opposition movement exists in Mozambique. However, the persistence of rumors on this subject as on the subject of an imminent "assassination of [President] Samora Machel" or some other important personality, and the sudden escalation of the dangers at the borders have convinced the leaders of Maputo that a conspiracy is being hatched against them. In their eyes, while Henry Kissinger's visit to southern Africa aimed in the first place at promoting the accession of moderate black regimes to power in Rhodesia and Namibia, the United States Secretary of State also wanted to "isolate" Mozambique and Angola in order to make it easier to topple FRELIMO and the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola].

To meet these threats Mozambique has turned to those whom it qualifies as "natural allies"--the socialist countries. President Machel announced that the People's Republic of China was going to help his country establish a navy and an air force. Reportedly, the Soviet Union has supplied heavy military equipment. However that may be, all the weapons that we saw at the sites of clashes were several years old. The activists of FRELIMO do not manage to conceal their disenchantment with the socialist countries which reportedly

charge a high price for their aid or impose political conditions unacceptable to intransigent nationalists.

Indeed, Mozambique has reluctantly become the epicenter of the Sino-Soviet conflict in southern Africa. With clumsiness on the Soviet side and more subtlety on the Chinese side, each of the adversaries seems to be especially concerned with trying to ensconce its influence to such a point that not too much insistence is needed to have a diplomat from an Eastern bloc country admit that the "major adversary" of Mozambique is not South Africa but rather China, while the diplomat's Chinese colleagues point their finger with equal ease at the USSR.

Additionally, the "mutual assistance" pact concluded by the heads of the five so-called African "frontline states" will necessarily have limited effects. However, the intervention of the Zambian, Tanzanian, and especially Angolan air forces could reduce the air supremacy widely enjoyed by Salisbury.

To maintain its policy of nonalignment and revolutionary options, Mozambique is today obliged to suffer the consequences of a certain degree of isolation. Even though it does not presumably have too many of its few means to spare to accelerate its "national reconstruction," Mozambique is obliged to earmark a very high portion of its human and financial resources to national defense. And it is known in Maputo that the evolution of the crisis in southern Africa will weigh heavily on the density of the Mozambican revolution.

[28 Jan 77, p 5]

[Text] Maputo.--Xiconhoca, part thief and part dandy, "lives during the day from what he steals at night." He offers a bottle of spirits to an adolescent and thinks: "He will soon be one of ours." Xiconhoca listens to Radio Free Africa, Radio South Africa, and the Voice of America to spread "boatos"--slandorous rumors. As a bureaucrat, he obliges the humble citizen to fill in mountains of forms "to complicate the life of the people." Xiconhoca, a personality drawn by the crayon of an anonymous cartoonist, has become Mozambique's "negative hero" in a few months. He embodies all the scourges being fought by the young people's republic beginning with the most serious among them: Xiconhoca does not work.

"To produce is a militant act" and "productiveness is the gauge of political consciousness" are slogans printed day after day in red headlines at the bottom of page one by the two Mozambican dailies. Yet, production in the modern sectors of the economy continues to drop. Despite the lack of any reliable statistics, it is considered that an agricultural or industrial enterprise which turns out half of what it produced in 1974 is praiseworthy.

The majority of Mozambique's cadres used to come from Lisbon. Their exodus is continuing. About 10,000 of them, many getting ready to leave, form the remainder of the 180,000 Portuguese who used to live in the colony before the "revolution of the carnations." Despite remuneration far higher than what

they would earn in Portugal, despite the permission that they have, once they sign a contract with the government or a private enterprise, to repatriate between 25 and 50 percent of their wages in hard currencies, the Portuguese, stuck with the memory of lost privileges, have distrustful and tense relations with a FRELIMO that is determined to break with the old order.

Lisbon left Mozambique a poisoned gift--industrial plants and plantations which the Portuguese colonists alone were able to operate. The accelerated promotions that have been granted and the appeal to foreign technicians are far from having filled the void. In the cities unemployment, touching especially household personnel, has become a major problem. In the countryside the peasants, responding to the appeal of FRELIMO, had deployed major efforts, individually or in "collective fields," to raise production. For lack of transportation facilities and because of the commercial structures that have been dismantled by the departure of the Portuguese middlemen, a sizable portion of the surplus obtained could not be sold on the markets. Mozambique will have to pay for a long time still the cost of too hasty decolonization.

President Machel's Brief

Now, it is also necessary to fight against the widespread myth of an independence which, by the stroke of a magic wand, was supposed to secure general prosperity without effort. In a very tough speech that he made on 13 October 1976, President Machel put things in their place. While noting that the departure of the Portuguese and "economic sabotage" had contributed to the general drop in production, he attacked especially the generalized lack of discipline, the ambitions, the lack of punctuality, the intrigues, theft, and corruption prevailing in enterprises. The crumbling of dreams could not help but generate some disenchantment. Summarizing a fairly common feeling a petty official told us: "We have won our dignity but lost material advantages."

"We have no intention of running a moribund capitalist system," the leaders of FRELIMO have stated and keep repeating. There is then no question but that, in order to solve the economic problems, the Mozambican revolution has fallen back, made concessions, or even marked time. Methodically, the destruction of the old order is continuing. The results obtained in the field of education and health are exemplary. The efforts made in transportation, trade, and banking circuits are beginning to bear fruit. But the new production structures have not yet had time to become operational. Their outline, their research, their adaptation to concrete realities, and their establishment are being accelerated.

Agriculture continues to be at the base of the development which the "communal villages" must provide. In order to make social services available to all, in order to generalize new agricultural techniques and produce more, each village of this type has to consolidate approximately 200 families scattered in hamlets until now. But the traditional peasantry is unhappy at breaking with its lifestyle and its environment. In the recently colonized regions attachment to property continues to be deep. In addition, the transition from an agriculture premised on densed fields to crop rotation demands very

intensive technical research and thus time. The authorities seem to have decided to temper the ardor and authoritarianism of some local cadres and to have "communal villages" established by peasants convinced that they will benefit from them. The future will have to prove to those who hesitate or are opposed that they are wrong. Similarly, before moving to the collective method of production, the cooperative stage was deemed to be necessary.

In industry, "activizing groups," workplace cells of FRELIMO, at times experienced even paralysis because of the ambiguity of their position. On the one hand they were the spearhead of the "generalized political offensive on the production front" decided by the central committee and thus often found themselves on the same side as management. But on the other hand they had to defend the interests of the workers. Henceforth their task among the workers will be essentially political, production problems being entrusted to workshop and enterprise production councils. The members of these are chosen by the activists, choices which have to be ratified by all the workers.

The "New Class" of Functionaries

A "seminar on the state apparatus" reached the conclusion that the public administration, inherited from the colonial system, was unable to play its role in the revolutionary process under way. Now, after the nationalization of the education and health sectors, most enterprises, banks, and the land, this public administration has duties that are much more onerous than during the colonial period. The new state of Mozambique proposes "to serve the interests of the people" and to recruit its agents on the basis of a "class option." However, most of the functionaries in office were trained during the colonial era. They were promoted in short order and are relatively well paid. Between FRELIMO, consolidated around its leaders but whose cadres are too few to occupy all the important positions at the regional and national levels, and the rank and file of the population the functionaries are growing more and more aware of the capital role that they play. Knowing that they are indispensable and irreplaceable, they feel that they have elbow room to form a new caste.

FRELIMO is determined not to allow them free play. "It is necessary to kill the crocodile when it is still too small to swim in the middle of the river," President Machel likes to repeat to illustrate FRELIMO's tactic vis-a-vis those who "aspire to form a new bourgeoisie." But where will such a small avant garde turn for forces to execute this death sentence?

"The working class is the leadership class of our country. It is the only one that is able to plan the transformation process of our society, to get it going, and to lead it," the head of state declared in his speech of 13 October 1976. The peasantry had been the "physical force" of the revolution. Only recently, according to FRELIMO's theoreticians, the peasants and workers were to blend into the new society, the former learning their technology from the latter and losing on contact with the workers "the vices they had inherited from colonialism." However, there is no more talk of "evacuating the cities."

FRELIMO insists on the need to build "heavy industry." Yet, Mozambique is not particularly rich in natural resources and is desperately short of skilled manpower and cadres. It is felt in Maputo, however, that this is the price of true economic independence.

If the Mozambican revolution has altered its strategy, its methods continue to be the same: The country has become a permanent forum. Whether at seminars or colloquies, each category of workers constantly finds itself at meetings at the national or provincial level to exchange its experiences, sharpen its analyses, and launch plans that are to be submitted to the scrutiny of a criticism without any complacency. The training of new cadres continues to be an obsession.

The major success of the first 19 months of Mozambique's independence resides in this accumulation of daily experiences and in the precise evaluation of a reality not familiar to many of FRELIMO's leaders.

Some 1-1/2 years after the end of Portuguese sovereignty in Mozambique, FRELIMO feels that it has sufficient resources under its control to spell out the new path of the revolution. Its first congress had established the Mozambique Liberation Front. The second in 1968 approved the strategy of the "protracted people's war" and thus signified the transformation of the nationalist movement into a revolutionary movement. The third congress, scheduled to meet in February 1977, will have as its goal "the establishment of the avant garde party to build socialism." "We are not familiar with any African socialism, only with scientific socialism," it is said in Maputo.

What remains to be done is to define the nature of this socialism and to determine the ways to achieve it. Despite the threats that weigh on Mozambique's borders, a very debilitated economy, and a spirit of wait-and-see among large sectors of the population, the activists of FRELIMO are counting on their determination, their cohesion, and their discipline to wipe out the sequels of the past, achieve profound popular mobilization, and establish a socialist society whose equivalent they are vainly seeking in Africa.

2662

CSO: 4400

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

CAREERS OF BLACK LEADERS SOBUKWE, MANDELA, BUTHELEZI DETAILED

Mandela May Be People's Choice -

Johannesburg DIE TRANSVALER in Afrikaans 21 Dec 76 p 4

[Text] The man who has been called a future premier of South Africa by the American ambassador-elect to the United Nations has played a leading role since his student days, first in the now forbidden ANC and also in the forbidden PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress].

Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe was sent to prison in 1960 for three years, immediately after the happenings in Sharpeville. Since that time he has never again enjoyed full freedom of movement.

But the American ambassador-elect to the United Nations, Mr Andrew Young, looks upon him as the Martin Luther King of South Africa--and if a majority-rule government should ever come into being, even possibly as the nation's prime minister.

Mr Young and Robert Sobukwe have been friends since 1974 when the American came to South Africa in the company of tennis player Arthur Ashe. Mr Young says there is no one who speaks more favorably about South African Premier Vorster and Minister of Justice Jimmy Kruger than Mr Sobukwe.

That opinion of Sobukwe has never been documented. We have to take Mr Young's word for it. The rest of Sobukwe's history is quite thoroughly substantiated: the facts show that over the last 16 years, not a year has gone by in which he did not make news.

But long before Sharpeville, Sobukwe was already involved with the ANC. In the Forties he was a student companion of the chief minister of KwaZulu, Captain Gatshe Buthelezi, chairman of the Fort Hare student council, and simultaneously secretary-in-chief of the youth division of the ANC. At Fort Hare he earned an honors diploma in Bantu languages plus a teaching certificate.

In 1952 Sobukwe became a lecturer at Wits [Witwatersrand University] after he had been dismissed from his teaching post at Standerton because of his passive defiance of authority.

He never lost his interest in the ANC, but about 1958 that organization evidently became too tame for him, and he founded the then more militant Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC).

The PAC was founded exclusively for black Africans. Sobukwe believed that they alone would wage a merciless struggle against apartheid.

When the PAC began its campaign against the passbook laws early in 1960, the common belief was that it would not be a violent one. It did develop, however, into the bloody riots of Sharpeville.

Sobukwe himself turned in his passbook to the Orlando Police. He was thereby accused of inciting the people to transgress the pass laws, and he was sent to prison for three years.

After this he was held at Robbeneiland for six years under the provisions of the Law on the Suppression of Communism. Special legislation was speedily passed by Parliament to make his an arrest without possibility of trial.

Immediately after Sobukwe's release from Robbeneiland, his movements were restricted to the magistracy of Kimberly, and he was placed under nighttime house arrest. He has received several offers of work in the United States and in 1971 even obtained a permit to leave the country for good. Mr Peet Pelser, however, then minister of justice, wanted the restriction order amended so that Sobukwe could not go to any port or airport.

Sobukwe's first restriction order expired in 1974, but a new restriction of five years was immediately imposed on him. At Robbeneiland he obtained a B.S. degree in economics via correspondence courses from the University of London, and in Kimberly he passed his solicitor's examinations. Last year he was admitted to the North Cape Province branch of the Supreme Court.

Sobukwe enjoys great esteem among the home black leaders. Last year a number of homeland leaders requested the prime minister, as a test case, to lift his restriction order. Captain Gatsha Buthelezi stated that he is ready to offer this Xhosa leader a cabinet post. Albert Luthuli's widow has already pleaded on his behalf.

Then, too, his name is known abroad in other places than America. Earlier this year, President Tolbert of Liberia had wanted Sobukwe to be present at a celebration in his honor. Permission was refused.

In this context it is worthy of remark that it was not Sobukwe's name that was on the lips of young insurgent blacks in South Africa during the past year.

There is another well-known figure for whom they cherish an almost unnatural veneration: Nelson Mandela, formerly the Transvaal leader of the ANC, who was sent to Robbeneiland for life after the Rivonia affair.

During the disturbances of this year, Mandela's name was on a great many placards. During public demonstrations and later before the Cillie Commission, his name was mentioned with great respect as "our father who is imprisoned at Robbeneiland for us." Sobukwe's name was never mentioned. As to whether the South African blacks agree with Mr Young about the possible prime minister of a South African majority-rule government, no one knows.

The Many Images of Gatsha Buthelezi

Johannesburg DIE TRANSVALER in Afrikaans 11 Dec 76 p 9

[Text] In this final article about Captain Gatsha Buthelezi we are told about a man with many masks, a man with a British colonial background, a Zulu prince, someone who adopts American political methods so that the spotlight will fall on him, a Christian, and a man who wears a khaki uniform yet rides in a Mercedes.

Gatsha Buthelezi is a media man. He has charisma. Actually, however, this means that the press favors him. The Kennedys fall in his class. And Muhammad Ali.

He is a newsmaker. There is nothing about which he will not make a statement, and usually it is a newsworthy one. It has made him the flashiest black leader in the country. He is rapidly becoming known worldwide.

You can hardly believe all this if you try to judge by his private office in Mahlabatini. It is an unassuming little asbestos house just outside the village, on a mountain ridge, adjacent to the mission compound. There is a rusting motorized gate to keep out animals, for someone is making half-hearted attempts at gardening here.

It is difficult to make a connection between this place and the colorful jet-setter who keeps company overseas with the wealthy and the powerful, but it does nicely suit "Comrade Buthelezi" with his khaki uniform and his pink prose. It goes along with Inkatha's socialistic ideology.

But it does not jibe with Buthelezi's black Mercedes Benz 280SE number ZG-1, which stands in the full glory of its chrome beside the asbestos house.

In Mahlabatini, one enjoys an endless panorama of hills nubbled with the flat bushveld shrubs, each sitting beside its own shadow and the round, brown thatched huts that look as if they have always been there. The sounds are local sounds: a cow lows, a rooster crows and flaps his wings, the ibises cry and the servant girls walk down the path to the village calling out to one another. The atmosphere is tranquil. The pace is unhurried.

This is Buthelezi's home territory.

He is a tall strapping man--several centimeters above the average height--with broad shoulders and the characteristically wide hips that fascinate children so when they see illustrations of Zulu kings in their history books.

He is relaxed, friendly, glowingly healthy and extraordinarily energetic. If you do not know who he is, you might take him for a successful business or professional man in any city; but he is a true Zulu, and if you put overalls on him, you could not separate him from the other members of a pick and shovel brigade.

His office has a red wall-to-wall carpet, much in the spirit of the Mercedes, just like the modern reclining chairs and the chrome and glass table that constitute the furnishings of his luxurious little sitting room.

An invisible line divides this side of the room from the "proletariate" side: here a simple desk stands, but so filled with clutter that it looks as if six people are using it; and beside it a shelf loaded with folders, all piled up helter-skelter one upon the other a dozen deep. Unopened newspapers with foreign postage stamps stick out everywhere, and clippings from newspapers flutter like flags out of drawers, books, and folders, folders, and more folders, all filled with that sickening faded gray official paper that you remember from school or January tax evaluations. It is a depressing picture.

This is the work place of a man who has too much work.

They say that he does not smoke, drink or pay attention to women; and he works eighteen hours a day.

Buthelezi has an academic bent. He reads everything he can get his hands on--and sometimes, as the customs agents at Jan Smuts can verify, he also reads things that, in a way, one should not be able to get his hands on!--and he lives by theory.

On the surface he is a cautious man. He thinks before he speaks, and he thinks swiftly. His point of view is thoroughly weighed before he airs it. He thinks things out from the international angle, and his understanding of local politics is based on that broader insight. He has the flair of the American politician, and his terminology leads one to surmise that he has read the writings of a great number of American authors.

Yet his British colonial, Anglican background shows on him like an old school tie sticking out from under his Inkatha uniform. He grew up in Natal. Because he was a prince, he had the best education available; and the constant attention of well-meaning, idealistic servants of the British crown, aware of history and of his place in it.

They were good teachers and they made a student out of him. His thirst for knowledge is phenomenal.

Dams Mission, near Amanzimtoti, where he went to school, was in those days one of the showplaces of black education, and it still is today in a certain sense; from there he went on to Fort Hare, in the days before the Government had begun to water down its British flavor.

That is the picture of him that makes the strongest impression there in Mahlabatini--the privileged, talented young prince who has become a good student and a smart theoretician in the hands of British academicians.

But over and above this picture, like two snapshots that are slightly out of focus, one sees quite another person--the media man who reads non-stop yet highly selectively and who knows how to make good use of the press.

He knows the latest American political methods and the emerging ideologies of people who are still alive. He is familiar with the thoughts of Marshall McLuhan and Herbert Marcuse and the new best-selling philosophers who are so highly regarded by the Americans.

This is the man who puts on his khaki uniform and goes out to sway the people, certain that the press will be there to record his every move. This is the avant-garde politician seeking a place for himself in the new politics of Africa, who knows that bread and butter still control more votes than dreams, for a long time to come.

There is yet a third picture, also out of focus with the other two. It is that of the Zulu prince born higher than other men, who has inherited the leadership and who, from his earliest years, has been accustomed to the praises of his subjects. He is eleventh in line for the kingship. He is the angry young man of the Buthelezi hierarchy, who has written a new constitution for his people, and from whom the king, his cousin, has taken away his political toys for himself. He knows how attached the Zulus are to their traditions, and he supports them to the point of sometimes exchanging his Inkatha uniform or safari back-pack for Kaffir towns and animal skins. He is most photogenic.

And over and above all these images, with all the potential of a really decisive vote-getting factor, there is still another; and it does not harmonize with the other three. It is that of the practicing Christian who neither smokes nor drinks and has not taken a wife, who opens his conferences with prayer and is invited by church leaders throughout the world to converse with their members, the man who wants the Ten Commandments to harmonize with the future political life of Africa.

Together these images form a picture that is probably precisely in focus as far as Buthelezi is concerned. They are like masks which he dons one after the other, according to the nature of the ball he is attending.

He is full of contradictions. He is the man in the khaki uniform who rides in a Mercedes. He is the Christian who admires Herbert Marcuse. He is the man with the panoramic view from his window who turns his back to it in order to work.

The question which most urgently needs to be answered concerning Buthelezi is: Who are his advisers?

This is a difficult question to answer, for he seeks his supporters among both leftists and rightists, wherever he can find support. This creates confusion for those who want to evaluate him according to his relationship with individuals.

Administratively speaking, the Pretoria people in Ulundi serve him as advisers.

Politically or ideologically speaking, he has no counselors, white or black, who work for him, that is. Under normal conditions he sees thousands of people every year, both at home and abroad, and you have to be a black man to appreciate how readily whites themselves will claim to have given him advice. Nevertheless he comes into contact with brilliant people, and they must exercise influence upon him, for he has no prejudice against white counsel.

He is sometimes sharply criticized for being so receptive to what others say. Leftists in London claim he is gullible. He will listen to anyone. The Government thinks so, too. If you look back on all the alliances he has made already, it might just confuse you.

My personal impression is that of an overworked man who wants to move the world and will accept any help he can get to this end, whatever its source. I know of no single intimate friend or confidant on whom he firmly relies, either white or black.

He tends to disappear now and then for a week or two of "private" visits to the Cape. When you see how at home he is in the company of the foremost Progrefs [Members of the Progressive Party] it is difficult to resist inferring that if there is actually any group that advises him in any serious, ongoing way, it must be these men. But they sometimes get fed up with him, too. The militant tone of his Soweto conference this year did not please Colin Eglin. And there has already been one occasion on which he had to make it clear to Helen Suzman--tactfully--that he is "his own man."

I believe him!

8117
CSO: 4408

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

SOVIET HELP TO BLACK NATIONS MAY RESULT IN THEIR ENSLAVEMENT

Johannesburg DIE TRANSVALER in Afrikaans 14 Jan 77 p 10

[Editorial: "Kaunda: They Should Think About It"]

[Text] Straight off from the start of the New Year it is clear that the struggle at the border between Rhodesia and Mozambique is about to enter a new phase.

Sophisticated weapons are now being brought into play against the Rhodesian Air Force and these have already claimed some victims. It can be expected that this trend of things is going to be felt more and more to the extent that the communist helpers entrench themselves.

It is, of course, the black neighbors of Rhodesia who have opened the door to communism to carry on the fight for them at an increasing pace; the reason being that, with the exception of a great political fracas, militant Black Africa could do nothing against tiny Rhodesia.

But now the time has come to ask the question as to what the ultimate price will be for countries like Zambia and Tanzania for the help they are accepting from the Kremlin and elsewhere.

They must remember one thing: The communists are regarding their actions in this part of the world as a part of their power struggle with the West and especially the United States.

The West's reaction to this expansionism is so weak as to make it possible for the communists to send this sort of weapon to this region and now we have seen the result of this with the shooting down of a Rhodesian aircraft.

If Rhodesia should yield before this onslaught, will the communists turn back at the Zambian border? And if they refuse to do so will the West step into the breach for Zambia and the other threatened countries?

These are the answers that people like President Kaunda will have to find. However, what they should realize very clearly is that they along with the whole of Southern Africa will be drawn into a communist bid for power the extent of which will be so great that they will be able to exercise little influence on it.

7964

CSO: 4408

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

SOUTH AFRICA SEES A POSSIBILITY OF CIVIL WAR IN RHODESIA

Johannesburg DIE TRANSVALER in Afrikaans 11 Jan 77 p 10

[Editorial: "Black Plan for Rhodesia"]

[Text] In a statement made in Dar-es-Salaam in January Robert Mugabe said: "A solution for Rhodesia will come from the battlefield and not from Geneva."

Now this weekend leaders of the five front line nations decided to align themselves wholeheartedly behind Mr Mugabe's (and also Mr Joshua Nkomo's) Patriotic Front.

The only logical deduction is that Tanzania, Botswana, Zambia, Angola and Mozambique have also committed themselves to war instead of peaceful negotiations in Geneva or elsewhere.

The implications of this drastic and amazing decision can be far reaching (last week none other than President Machel had expressed himself in a rather constructive manner over Mr Ivor Richard's hopping diplomacy).

This is putting a gigantic question mark behind Mr Richard's mission which yesterday had him running from Nairobi to Lusaka so that he could consult with President Nyerere of Tanzania (the spokesman for the front line nations) in the Zambian capital.

In connection with the above, it may now be entirely impossible for Mr Smith to settle.

A third point is that the possibility of bloodshed among the Rhodesian blacks themselves, and even a future civil war, is definitely not excluded. The more moderate ANC [African National Congress] faction of Bishop Muzorewa, which apparently has most of the internal Rhodesian support, is not going to throw in the towel very easily and the same is true for the ZANU faction of Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, while it is also taken for granted that Mr Nkomo is the junior partner to Mr Mugabe and many of the former's supporters are now carrying out terrorist attacks against Rhodesia from Botswana.

Thus there is the possibility that cook and cook's mate in the Patriotic Front may end up fighting each other.

South Africa too will be following the latest developments with the greatest interest. Mr Richard should be coming back to talk with Mr Vorster once again after the first rounds of talks at Oubos took place in a good atmosphere. Everybody knows that South Africa will welcome a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia, but it is simply obvious that the Republic does not wish to see in power a person such as Mugabe, with his known connections with the [South African] ANC [African National Council] and communist expatriates from South Africa.

Just as unavoidable is the deduction that the Russians must have played a role behind the scenes even with regard to the above decision. Vietnam was another occasion where they employed the tactics of "fighting while talks were going on."

Everything will now depend on whether Mr Richard will succeed, but as of now things do not look too good.

7964
CSO: 4408

COMMENTATOR SUGGESTS A DRASTIC CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA'S POLICY.

Johannesburg DIE TRANSVALER in Afrikaans 19 Jan 77 p 8

[Article by Otto Krause: "Those Racist Ideas Will Not Succeed in South Africa"]

[Text] One of the tricks of warfare is to see to it that your enemy is not the one to choose the battlefield. You must maneuver shrewdly so that it will be up to you to determine the ground that will provide the best advantage for you and not for him.

This is also true with regard to both international and domestic politics. You must choose the issue of major concern; you must not allow your opponent to choose the issue which is most advantageous to him, otherwise he will get the best of you.

If we squarely recognize the fact that we Afrikaners are finding ourselves in a particularly delicate position, then it follows that we have actually made mistakes either in determining or in carrying out our national strategy. In connection with what I have mentioned what we have done is to allow our enemy to determine the issue of major concern...and clearly this is putting us at a great disadvantage.

The issue is of course the question of racism where we are finding ourselves in the wrong footing.

Racism

However, there is an explanation to everything and by thinking back a little bit we can gain a good grasp of the reason why we find ourselves concerned with racism. First of all it was a matter of recognizing our enemy. History determined that for us by identifying two enemies: At first the black man and later the Englishman; at one stage or another both of these were a threat to our existence.

During the modern period of our Afrikaner revival only the Englishman has actually remained our opponent; it was he that conquered our country and later essentially returned it; yet up until World War II he exercised such a powerful influence that we could have lost our identity with respect to him.

Finding ourselves in this situation after the war, we seized upon the issue of racism as a handy weapon against him (at that time we were not yet too sure of our Afrikanership; for this reason we considered it necessary to devise another weapon against him).

Successful

As far as domestic policy was concerned the weapon of racism was extremely successful. It put the English speakers on the wrong footing, because despite all their denials, they had even more than just a trifle of racism in their hearts. Now as far as our own people are concerned the cry of racism has certainly found adherents, because although the blacks of South Africa were "tamed" a long time ago we have not as yet lost sight of our enemies of the past century. In the course of time they can always become a danger and the thought has passed through our mind that racism is the answer to them.

While the issue of racism was of great advantage to us in the struggle against the English, there were some of our people who perceived that after all this was not the correct long term strategy for a people who wanted to exist in Africa. If you want to live in Africa you cannot be a racist in the western sense. We must therefore look for a different answer with regard to our coexistence with the blacks.

Thus at the start of the Fifties the Afrikaners considered a better and healthier strategy. This was the replacement of the issue of racism with that of nationalities considerations. This led to the birth of separate development, a policy which renounces racism.

Not Necessary

In the secure position in which South Africa found itself then our Nationalist Party rulers did not consider it necessary to move away drastically or dramatically from racism (or 1948 type apartheid). There was a tendency to carry on with both policies, because giving up apartheid in the old sense of the word would have certainly created embarrassment in party politics.

During the latter Sixties John Vorster realized that racism is not an advantageous issue to bring up in South Africa and he began to move away from it at the cost of a great deal of consternation within the Nationalist Party (those big guns among us considered ideology as being more important than national interest).

The fact is that the grounds on which our nation's future is to be decided was then shifting from the domestic to the international scene, and Vorster was right. While racism might still have served a purpose in practice, party politics and domestic purposes in the days of South Africa's isolation,

it has certainly turned out to be a nationally dangerous matter in the changed circumstances of the Seventies when our country was suddenly thrown into the international arena of Africa and the outside world.

Only Enemies

Our racism has only gotten us enemies around our neck. No longer were our enemies limited so much to the local English speakers, though they still peddle policies which could give us a blow if they should assume power, but to a more or less extent the entire outside world became our enemy and years of anti-South African propaganda has been the result of this.

On top of this we have acquired a new regional enemy--Communist Russia--who saw a vacuum in Africa and filled it. Thus it is that today we suddenly find ourselves in a precarious position.

In brief this is what I have to say:

This is my account of how we now find ourselves trapped on the wrong foot of racism. We saw the danger of this, we started to make changes, but not fast enough. Our image abroad remains that of racists. We have not succeeded in bringing out an image of South Africa having as a main ingredient an acceptable national set-up. To that extent we have allowed our enemies to choose the grounds of the issue.

Understandable

One can understand why it all turned out this way and as the French say: To understand everything is to forgive everything. Insight into the reasons for neglect and certain measures taken is worthwhile. One can learn from this for the future. Finding the reason why at the moment we find ourselves in a precarious situation and why we have allowed our enemies to choose the ground of dispute should tell us something about ourselves. The most important thing that must now be done is to look about us for a way to extricate ourselves out of the present precarious situation...which we of course can and shall do.

In a nut shell we must realize that we live in Africa where western ideas of racism simply cannot succeed and we cannot afford to dwell too long on policies or doctrines which run counter to our national interest in the long run even though somehow these points of views have served our purposes in the past.

7964
CSO: 4408

SOUTH AFRICAN BLACKS WARNED ON HELP FROM ABROAD

Johannesburg DIE TRANSVALER in Afrikaans 19 Jan 77 p 8

[Editorial: "They Are Playing With Fire"]

[Text] Here at the very beginning of the New Year there are indications that the gap is widening between those who are striving for a peaceful solution for South Africa's problems and those who would try to settle everything by force.

Among the latter there are also people who evidently would not give a second thought about calling in foreign elements to help them. Thus press reports yesterday revealed that Chief Buthelezi of KwaZulu reportedly told a group of American businessmen that he would welcome Cuban help for the blacks of South Africa. Unfortunately this fits in with controversial statements of this nature made by the Zulu leader in the past, including those he (and Mr Beyers Naude) has made regarding foreign investments in the Republic.

According to another report Marxist Mugabe has gone knocking at the doors of the Irish Republican Army asking for help in training his ZIPA [Zimbabwe Patriotic Army] terrorists.

One wonders whether these black leaders, among whom Sam Nujoma of SWAPO figures as one of the ring leaders, realize the sort of fire they are playing with.

It is easy to talk about a "liberation," but they are apparently forgetting that "servitude" to foreign bosses may be the frightful outcome of what they are doing.

7964
CSO: 4408

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

CHANCE OF REALISTIC U.S. APPROACH TO SOUTH AFRICAN PROBLEM SEEN

Johannesburg DIE TRANSVALER in Afrikaans 13 Jan 77 p 12

[Editorial: "The Carter Administration and South Africa"]

[Text] Seldom have ever spokesmen of a new American administration gone out of their way to threaten a friendly non-communist country as the Carter group has done with South Africa during the last several months.

There can be very little doubt that the West's leading country is finding our racial policy completely unacceptable and in one way or another will be taking measures against us.

Yet those who are down-hearted (or those who are rejoicing) over this would do well to pay attention to the pronouncements made by Carter people during the last few weeks. A clear realism has emerged from their statements.

Thus Mr Cyrus Vance, the Secretary of State designate, did not appear to have put extremist Senator Dick Clark much at ease when the latter asked him questions about the Carter government's policy vis-a-vis South Africa.

Basically he repeated the old American standpoint that Washington would show its repugnance of apartheid in word and deed.

This inclination towards realism with regard to South Africa will progressively become more apparent. This is because the United States is not involved in a life and death struggle with little South Africa, but rather with the mighty and steadily rising Soviet Union.

Indications are that this year Moscow is going to act with so much self confidence that the Carter Administration is going to think twice before sacrificing friendly non-communist nations on the altar of local political expediency.

We in South Africa should make this easier by applying more effectively our policy of doing away with discrimination simply on the basis of race.

7964

CSO: 4408

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

BISHOP DEFENDS CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 10 Feb 77 p 5

/Text/ The Roman Catholic bishops' statement defending the right of conscientious objectors was aimed at black and white in and outside South Africa, a spokesman said today.

But a concerned white Catholic from Randburg, who did not want to be identified, said: "All my cousins in Rhodesia are in the army. If they had to adopt that attitude and down guns, the terrorists would be all over the place in 5 seconds. These are facts of life. Our white skin is a death warrant."

While the bishops recognised in their statement that whites felt threatened by communist-backed indiscriminate violence, they were also of the opinion that a "significant sector" of blacks, who are in the majority in the church, were looking to violence for "liberation."

Father Dominic Scholten, secretary general of the Catholic Bishops' Conference, stressed that the statement applied to war situations in all countries.

It also applied to black and white.

Whether white youths decided to do military service or not, as long as they had made their decision after acquainting themselves with all the facts they could, the bishops defended their right to follow their own conscience.

But it was important, said Father Scholten, that judgments should be well informed.

The bishops would be publishing reflections on the situation from time to time to help youths to be informed.

Bishop Peter Butelezi of Umtata denied that the bishops took up partisan positions.

Their decision did not mean they condoned the methods used by insurgents or terrorists. Referring to the murder of Catholic missionaries, he said: "It's not that we don't suffer either."

The bishops always preferred to remain neutral. "But it's not a negative neutrality--they would point out faults and mistakes on both sides."

CSO: 4420

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

BLACKS TO FORFEIT UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 10 Feb 77 p 7

/Article by John Patten, political correspondent/

/Text/ The Assembly. Transkei citizens forfeit benefits from the unemployment insurance fund if they leave South Africa for their homeland.

The minister of labour, Mr S. P. Botha, told Parliament this today.

He said forfeiture would take effect from 26 October 1979--3 years after Transkei's independence date last year.

While Transkei citizens living in South Africa will get unemployment benefits after that date, benefits will not be paid to a contributor living outside South Africa.

Dependants of deceased contributors, however, may still receive payments from the fund despite living outside the country.

Mr Botha was replying to a question from Mr Gordon Waddell (PRP, Johannesburg North).

Mr Waddell said that against a background of claims that blacks were only temporary sojourners, the minister's reply meant a Transkeian had to remain unemployed inside South Africa to get the benefits due to him.

CSO: 4420

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

EDUCATION DEPARTMENT INSPECTS PRIVATE SCHOOLS

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 10 Feb 77 p 9

/Text/ Inspectors of the Transvaal Education Department have recently been to certain private schools to ascertain whether they have admitted children other than white.

This was confirmed in the Transvaal Provincial Council yesterday by the administrator, Mr Sybrand van Niekerk, in reply to a question by Mr Peter Nixon (PRP, Johannesburg North).

Mr van Niekerk named the schools as St Catherines, Florida, St Angela's Ursuline Convent, Kensington, Our Lady of Mercy School, Craighall Park, Loreto Convent, Queenswood, Pretoria and St Theresa's Convent, Rosebank.

Asked what methods were used by the inspectors, Mr van Niekerk said information was asked of, and given, by the principals of the schools. The results of the inspection were that the first four schools named had admitted children other than white.

In the case of St Theresa's and Loreto Convent, children of the Malawian diplomatic service had been admitted.

Questions

In reply to another question by Mr Nixon, Mr van Niekerk said no requests from the Catholic Church or other religious orders for interviews concerning the admission of children other than white to their schools had been received by the executive committee in the past 3 years.

The only related approach had come from a Catholic school in Boksburg in March 1975, concerning the admission of children of foreign diplomats. The policy had been set out in a replying letter and nothing further had been heard from this school, he said.

CSO: 4420

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

OPPOSITION SCORES RACE POLICY, OVERSPENDING

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 10 Feb 77 p 9

Text The Assembly. The government's race policy and its mismanagement of the economy were leading South Africa deeper into financial and economic trouble.

This was the theme of opposition attacks when the second-reading debate on the Part Appropriation Bill was resumed.

Both the United Party and the Progressive Reform Party moved amendments, declining to pass the second reading of the R2,922-million minibudget on the ground of government failure in the handling of the country's affairs.

Nationalist speakers persisted with arguments that the government was on the right course and that the economy was basically sound.

Opposition speakers:

Warned that South Africa was becoming poorer.

Urged the government to take steps to ensure political and economic stability.

Called for government action to help small banks and to protect bank deposits by small investors.

Condemned the government's "over-spending."

Mr Harry Schwarz (PRP Yeoville) said there were two threats of socialism in South Africa, one from the state; the other from the mass of underprivileged people.

The tragedy of the situation was that the government did not realize that there was a threat to the free enterprise system by proletarian socialism.

The government, on the other hand, was on the road to socialism through its increasing authoritarianism and increasing state ownership.

Mr Schwarz said small banks in South Africa were losing money while the large banks were "bulging."

He appealed to the government to demonstrate its confidence in the small banks by backing them.

The United Party's chief spokesman on Finance, Mr D. D. Baxter (UP, Contantia) said he was shocked by the prime minister's "unedifying assault" on Dr Wassenaar, Sanlam's chairman, in the Assembly last Friday.

Mr Baxter said it had been "an assault on a man who has been honest in viewing the economic situation and in his criticism of the government.

Referring to the country's economy, Mr Baxter said the picture presented by the minister for finance, Senator Horwood, had been "too rosy" in reality, the economy was anything but rosy. It was in a critical state, Mr Baxter said.

The National Party's main defence of the government's economic policies during yesterday's debate came from Mr G. F. Botha (NP Ermelo).

He accused Mr Baxter of having presented an unnecessarily gloomy picture of the economy and of having "jumped on Dr Wassenaar's bandwagon."

There were, in fact, many positive factors in the economic situation, Mr Botha said. Contrary to Mr Baxter's claim that foreign capital was "drying up," there had been a big inflow of such capital.

The financial and political policies of the government were "dead right" and this had been confirmed by the people of South Africa in their support of the government and the National Party.

CSO: 4420

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

POLICE RESTRAINT ESSENTIAL IN SOWETO

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 10 Feb 77 p 16

/Editorial: "Play It Cool in Soweto"/

/Text/ The latest Soweto student demonstrations have some elements which differed sharply from last year's. The 1976 demonstrators had several clearcut grievances, rallying cries if you like, and although the marches may have been far from spontaneous there is little doubt they enjoyed popular support. Police action on that occasion heightened tensions and swung more support behind the students.

Yesterday was a different matter altogether. The organisers claimed they were showing solidarity with youngsters still in detention and were unhappy with "cosmetic" changes made in black education. But in reality the demonstration was not black students versus the system. It was blacks acting against blacks, and without popular support.

The marchers made a beeline for schools where students wanted to sit their exams. The marches were carefully planned and so were the tactics. Militant students seized books from their own schools, took them to the Orlando High and other schools where things had got back to normal, and burned them there. They tried to get the boys and girls of Orlando High to join them, and failed.

Because these dissidents do not enjoy majority support, it should be possible to avoid last year's violence and bloody confrontation. Police restraint yesterday was commendable, and Brigadier Visser notably honoured his undertaking to keep his men off school premises. He has threatened with some justification to take a tough line with militant truants today, but it should be possible to control them firmly and disperse them without resorting to firearms, because they are a relatively small group.

It is vital that control measures do not alienate moderate blacks and increase support for the militants. Don't let the killing start again.

CSO: 4420

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

EFFORTS MADE TO CURB HUGE FOREIGN EXCHANGE BILL

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 10 Feb 77 p 18

Article by Michael Chester, financial editor

Text The Department of Commerce has turned a few more screws down on importers in a bid to curb the multimillion rand foreign exchange bill for capital goods coming in from overseas.

The screwdriver being used is the import permit system--but, oddly enough, the engineering industries have given a nod of approval rather than the customary yelp about more squeezes.

In short, the Director of Imports and Exports has made a subtle shift of stance away from the old system of issuing import permits for a fixed time period--say 6 to 12 months--and now intends to issue them only on a hand-to-mouth basis.

The policy applies to the whole range of capital goods--plant and machinery down to spare parts.

From now on, import merchants will have to provide proof that the particular item cannot be supplied by a local manufacturer and proof--by recent sales records--that the new imports do no more than replace depleted stock.

It means the abandonment of the system of handing out permits of the guesstimates from merchants on what may or may not be needed on the shelves over the next several months.

Overstocking

"More positively," adds the Department of Commerce, "It should mean an end to unnecessary overstocking in the show rooms and warehouses--a luxury we cannot afford until the balance of payments is in better shape."

No precise estimates have been worked out on the savings in foreign exchange by the squeeze but officials believe they will be substantial while importers are nudged to bring down stocks.

"Merchants need have no fear that they will be starved of essential imports," an official tells me. "They can apply for permits at any time, rather than once or twice a year, as long as they can prove they are only topping up."

Nor does there appear to be a threat of delays to factories which want to import plant or machinery that promises better technology and better efficiency. "Industrialists who want to import direct should have no permit problems at all if the reasoning is sound," say the officials.

Dr E. Drummond, director of the Steel and Engineering Industries Federation, has no qualms about the new permit system:

"A few of the merchants may yell, of course, but overstocking must be cut to the bone. There should be no hardship to industry and we support the new permit plan as very sensible."

CSO: 4420

RHODESIA

NEW ANGLICAN BISHOP OF MATABELELAND NAMED

Salisbury THE SUNDAY MAIL in English 13 Feb 77 p 1

Text The parish priest of Borrowdale, Salisbury, the Rev Robert Mercer (42), was last night named as the new bishop of the Anglican diocese of Matabeleland by the elective assembly of the province of Central Africa meeting in Bulawayo.

The new bishop was born in Fort Victoria in 1935 and later moved to Grahamstown, where he was confirmed.

He attended St Paul's Theological College, Grahamstown, and was ordained deacon in Bulawayo in 1959, becoming a priest a year later.

He then spent 3 years as curate at the Church of the Ascension, Hillside, Bulawayo, before going to Mirfield, Yorkshire, to join the Community of the Resurrection.

He professed and took his vows in 1965 and was posted to Cardiff.

In 1968 he became prior of the order's new priory at Stellenbosch, but was deported from South Africa in 1970 after the distribution of a pamphlet among the Anglican congregation in Stellenbosch.

The pamphlet discussed the decisions of the World Council of Churches to give funds to terrorist organisations in Southern Africa.

CSO: 4420

FORMER WHITE SCHOOL BECOMES COLORED

Salisbury THE SUNDAY MAIL in English 13 Feb 77 p 3

/Text/ Two schools in Salisbury have undergone changes in staff and pupils this year after a government decision that the suburb of Southerton should become a predominantly Coloured community.

The Southerton School, which formerly catered for white children in the area, was closed during the last term of 1976. This was to enable a change to be made for its registration this year as a Coloured and Asian primary school, said a spokesman for the Ministry of Education last week.

Reopened

The school reopened in January with Mr J.A.H. Johnson as the headmaster. It now has about 200 Coloured and Asian pupils ranging from infants to Standard 5 pupils.

In turn the larger Lochinvar School in the neighbouring suburb, largely inhabited by families of Rhodesia Railways employees, is catering for all young European children in the area including those who formerly attended the Southerton School.

The headmaster, Mr Jeremy Holderness, said that sports equipment and various facilities were moved from Southerton School to Lochinvar School during the third term last year.

Deserted

"About 30 European children also changed over to our school, making a total of about 150 pupils last year," he said.

"However, since then the total number of pupils has dropped to about 100 at present."

Today many of the formerly crowded classrooms and extensive playing fields (about 9 ha) are largely deserted and some of the Lochinvar residents are wondering if the school can continue on this basis.

About 5 years ago it catered for between 450 and 500 pupils, but since then the school has suffered a drastic drop in attendance. Some residents have left and many railways employees have moved to live elsewhere.

CSO: 4420

RHODESIA

WOMEN CALL FOR REMOVAL OF ALL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

Salisbury THE SUNDAY MAIL in English 13 Feb 77 p 3

/Text/ The National Council of Women of Rhodesia yesterday issued a call to government and the public for the removal of all forms of racial discrimination throughout the country.

The headquarters of the NCWR in Salisbury issued a statement reading:

"The National Council of Women of Rhodesia, which is a multiracial organisation representative of 50 affiliated societies, welcomes the decision of the government to abolish all forms of racial discrimination and trusts that it will be implemented as speedily as possible.

"NCWR urges members of the public to make known their feelings on the matter through their Members of Parliament."

The statement said that evidence of recent examples of racial discrimination is being collated by the council which believes that with Parliament meeting this week "persistent emphasis" on this problem should be expressed.

For the last year the organisation, which has Asian and Coloured members as well as Africans and Europeans, has sought the removal of discrimination in all forms.

The NCWR was directly responsible for the setting up of the Beadle Commission on the legal disabilities of women in 1957. It was also indirectly responsible for improving old age pension conditions for the Coloured and Asian communities by making regular and persistent approaches to the government.

The statement was signed by Mrs C. Covarr, national president of the NCWR, and by Mrs Pat Cooper, press officer.

CSO: 4420

RHODESIA

BOTSWANA SAID TO BE USED AS 'SAFE' BASE

Salisbury THE RHODESIA HERALD in English 11 Feb 77 p 3

/Text/ Security forces are believed to have found new evidence that terrorists are using Botswana as a "safe" base for incursions into Rhodesia.

A terrorist, Paul Neube (33), who entered Botswana on 18 January, is known to have been handed over to police there.

When he was killed by the security forces on Saturday after re-entering Rhodesia from Botswana, he was wearing a new camouflage uniform and boots and carrying new boxes of 7.62 intermediate ammunition.

Security Force Headquarters last night declined to comment on the incident.

Neube, from the Tjolo-tjo area, is understood to have gone to Botswana for terrorist training early in 1974.

According to a source in Botswana, he entered Rhodesia with a terrorist group which later split up.

Neube is known to have crossed the border on several occasions. When he re-entered Botswana on 18 January, he went to Maroka village where he was taken for a Rhodesian and beaten up, according to the source.

He was then handed over to the Botswana police.

Neube was one of a group of four terrorists on an abduction mission, who walked into a security force ambush in the Shashe TTL on Saturday night.

The group had entered from the Kobojango area of Botswana, a launching pad for incursions by terrorist abduction gangs.

It is also the area to which children were taken after they were recently abducted from the Manama mission.

It is understood that security forces later identified Neube as one of the terrorists who took part in the abduction of 105 Africans from Mapate village and beerhall in the Gwanda TTL on 4 January.

RHODESIA

BULAWAYO ASIANS SHOT, TERRORIST KILLED

Salisbury THE RHODESIA HERALD in English 8 Feb 77 p 1

/Text/ Two Bulawayo Asians were killed and two others wounded when they were shot at close range by a lone terrorist at the upper reaches of the Maleme Dam in the Matopos on Sunday night.

Those who died were Jairaj Giga (15), a Founders High School pupil, and Mr Mahendra Doolabh (29), a businessman.

Mr Bharret Ramchod Giga (29) and Mr Hiralal Naran Dayaram (35) were wounded.

The men, who were in a party of Asians on a picnic near the caravan park at the upper reaches of Maleme Dam, were fishing from a rock. A terrorist approached them and demanded their watches.

An armed Rhodesian student who was examining zoological specimens in the area, saw the incident and opened fire on the terrorist, but before the terrorist was killed he fired a burst from his AK rifle, cutting down the four men.

Mr Giga and Mr Dayaram were taken to Mater Dei Hospital. Mr Dayaram was released yesterday after an operation to remove shrapnel from his body. Mr Giga is still in hospital. His condition is "satisfactory."

Eyewitnesses said the terrorist had first fired shots into the air. Shots from the burst which killed two of the men went close to some women huddled behind rocks.

Mrs Pallvik Giga, wife of one of the wounded men and a sister-in-law to Jairaj Giga, said: "My husband and four others were fishing. The terrorist came and stood by them. He asked them for their watches.

"My husband and his friends were ready to take off their watches when firing started. We hid behind some rocks. Shots came our way, but no one was hit."

A leading member of the Asian community in Bulawayo, Dr D. K. Desai, said the killings would not affect individual support among the city's Asians for the Nkomo ANC.

He said the killings illustrated the fact that no settlement would be effective without the support of the Patriotic Front of Mr Joshua Nkomo and Mr Robert Mugabe.

CSO: 4420

SOUTH-WEST AFRICA

SEGREGATION TO CONTINUE UNDER MULTIETHNIC GOVERNMENT

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 10 Feb 77 p 4

/Text/ Windhoek. Property ownership and occupation in residential suburbs will remain a potential flashpoint after a multiethnic government is installed in South West Africa/Namibia.

A working committee failed to reach consensus in the Turnhalle yesterday on black and brown demands that anyone should be allowed to buy or rent property anywhere.

It was agreed only that commercial and industrial sites would be open to all races.

While the blacks will for the first time be given a right to own residential property in urban areas, suburbs in the existing black, brown and white towns will remain segregated.

Decisions

The decisions announced yesterday provide only that new residential developments could be open to all races.

Political observers regard it as inevitable that the remaining elements of discrimination will come under renewed attack after an interim government is instituted in the territory.

White towns will retain their town councils, while black and brown towns will, for the first time, get elected local authorities.

Proximity

Where the white, black and brown towns are in close proximity, their councils will be represented equally in greater umbrella councils with coordinating functions.

The town complexes in Windhoek and in Walvis Bay--if the South African enclave becomes part of SWA/Namibia--will be declared metropolitan areas and fall directly under the multiethnic central government.

Other towns will fall under second-tier ethnic authorities unless they too are subsequently declared metropolitan areas.

CSO: 4420

ZAIRE

INCREASED COOPERATION IN ALL FIELDS EXPECTED WITH YUGOSLAVIA IN 1977

Kinshasa ELIMA in French 19 Jan 77 pp 1, 7

[Text] In 1977, there will be increased cooperation between the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Zaire in all the technical, scientific, economic and commercial fields, according to statements made by Mr Milanovic, counselor of the Yugoslav Embassy in Zaire, in the course of an interview with an AZAP newsman on Monday morning.

On that occasion, Milanovic also recalled the main phases of Zairian-Yugoslav cooperation, especially all the achievements.

He said that Zairian-Yugoslav cooperation began with the establishment of the joint Zairian-Yugoslav commission whose task it was to study all problems relating to economic, commercial, cultural, scientific and technical cooperation. The commission's first meeting was held in Kinshasa from 21 to 24 May 1974, and the invitation to the second, to be held in Belgrade from 5 to 10 March, has just been sent to the Executive Council by the Yugoslav Government.

Regarding trade, the counselor of the Yugoslav Embassy in Zaire reviewed Zairian-Yugoslav cooperation and recalled the commercial agreements signed between the two nations in Brioni in 1970. Within the framework of commercial exchanges, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has already participated three times in the activities of the Kinshasa International Fair and intends to do so for the fourth time this year.

For their part, Yugoslav authorities have invited Zaire to two international fairs to be organized in Belgrade in cooperation with the CNUCD [expansion unknown] from 8 to 12 June and the Zagreb Autumn Fair from 9 to 12 September.

Regarding scientific and cultural assistance, Milanovic revealed that his country awards ten scholarships to the Executive Council every year for the training of young people.

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