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RESULTS OF POLITICAL WORK IN THE GSFG

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Jun 77 p 2

[Article by Col R. Orlov, deputy chief of the division of propaganda and agitation of the political directorate of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG): "Not Quantity But Quality"]

[Text] Not long ago I visited a motorized rifle unit. I was interested in how the men were living and what issues concerned them. Battalion political worker Sr Lt N. Chernyuk and I walked around the subunits.

The schedule for the day called for political educational work at this time. But the men had been left to themselves. Not a single discussion, lecture or report had been planned on any of the company's schedules. Not on that day or the following days of the week. I asked Senior Lieutenant Chernyuk which officers had presented lectures or reports to battalion personnel recently.

"We used to have members of the report group of the party committee speaking sometimes," the political worker answered. "But in recent weeks we haven't seen them for some reason."

Such an answer could not fail to alert me, especially when the CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "Raising the Role of Oral Political Agitation in Carrying out the Decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress" calls for developing the activity of report groups by all possible means. This document is permeated with the idea that there cannot and must not be any vacations from ideological indoctrination, that oral agitation has been and remains an important sphere of party activity, one of the active forms of maintaining the party's constant tie with the masses of common people.

In the conditions of our group of forces the spoken word of the propagandist is especially important. Far from their native land, soldiers, sergeants, ensigns, officers, and members of servicemen's families show a heightened interest in the life of their country and in international events. While agreeing with all this, Senior Lieutenant Chernyuk was still ready to justify the members of the report group, saying they had neglected the battalion for objective reasons beyond their control.

The conversation was continued at the unit party committee: what conclusions had the leaders of the party organization drawn from the CPSU Central Committee decree, and specifically, what had they planned to vitalize the work of the report group. It turned out that the party committee was not ready to give thorough answers to the questions at the time.

During the same day I was able to talk with several members of the report group.

"What lecture did the party committee assign to you for the winter training period?" I asked Maj G. Grozdov.

The officer could not remember. At the same time he assured me that he often spoke in the subunit subordinate to him. But he spoke extemporaneously, so to speak, without a prepared text, using his old knowledge. My conversations with the other comrades were on approximately the same plane. The lectures there were not normally discussed collectively and no one reviewed them.

Just one conclusion suggested itself: the work of the report group in the unit had really been allowed to go its own way. The party organization had lost sight of it. To simplify, no one demanded that the non-staff propagandists speak regularly to the men. No one took a real interest in the content of the very rare talks that were given. The party committee did nothing more than ratify the membership of the report group at the start of the year and announce who was assigned to prepare which lecture. Things went no further. The party committee did nothing to carry out the plan which had been ratified and never came back to the subject at its meetings. This is exactly the kind of formalism which the CPSU Central Committee decree on oral political agitation obliges us to resolutely oppose.

Multifaceted agitation and propaganda in preparation for celebration of the anniversary of Great October has begun in the group of forces. In large part its effectiveness is determined by the skillful choice and variety of propaganda measures and the activities of the entire detachment of non-staff propagandists brought together in agitprop collectives attached to political agencies and report groups attached to party committees and bureaus. These activities, certainly, depend on the level of party management of agitprop collectives and report groups, on thorough, uninterrupted work in this key sector of communist indoctrination of the fighting men. Unfortunately, a formalistic approach is still taken to this work in some places.

We once encountered the following case. The roster of the agitprop collective of the political branch of the N unit contained 36 names. That is surely an impressive figure. The question arose: what principle was used to recruit the agitprop collective? The principle proved to be very simple.

"We felt that the more members we had the better," we were told at the political branch.

Indeed, the agitprop collective did look impressive in terms of number of members. But with respect to the quality and effectiveness of its work, the members of the political branch had hardly done anything practical at all. During the winter training period the political branch had not discussed a single lecture or report prepared in the agitprop collective. The headquarters party organization had not looked into its work either. None of the communists who were members of the agitprop collective had reported on how they were fulfilling this assignment.

A check showed that the impressive figure was only a mark on paper. Most of the members of the agitprop collective took no part in agitation and propaganda work.

The division of propaganda and agitation of the political directorate of the GSFG gives a high-principled evaluation of all negative phenomena. We work hard to see that the state of mass agitation work in the units and subunits is thoroughly analyzed by political agencies and party organizations and at meetings and seminars with commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol activists.

Oral political agitation based on direct contact with people is an important form of political influence on our fighting men. As V. I. Lenin wrote, it cannot be replaced "by anything now or at any other time." The high ideological level of oral agitation and its intelligibility and persuasiveness are linked to the personal training of the propagandists and their ability to carry the party word to the masses of fighting men. In the first place, there can be nothing accidental in the selection of people who are assigned such important party work as oral political agitation. In the second place, we must work with these people, help them grow as propagandists and arm them with knowledge, know-how, and methodological skills.

Most of our political agencies, party committees, and party bureaus in the units are guided by the demands of the CPSU Central Committee and give daily attention to the work of staff and non-staff propagandists. This can be said, for example, of the party committee to which Capt V. Abramenko belongs. After ratifying the membership of the report group and its work plan he did not neglect them, but rather took a lively interest in how non-staff propagandists work, what lectures and reports they prepared, where they presented them, and what traces their speeches left behind. The speaker group regularly discusses the elections and reports that have been prepared, with participation by members of the party committee, summarizes the results, and outlines plans for the future. After the CPSU Central Committee decree on oral political agitation was made public there was a business-like discussion at a meeting of the party committee concerning how to increase the activism of all categories of propagandists and improve

the work of the report group. And we can say for sure that this report group has no "honorary" members; each of them is well known and welcome in the subunits.

The members of the agitprop collective directed by Lt Col O. Zolotarev enjoy the same respect and popularity. They are now actively involved in explanatory work on the materials of the May 1977 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, presenting lectures and reports. They are usually the direct organizers of various mass political events.

We consider it one of our missions to see that the know-how of such agitprop collectives and speaker groups is made available to all the enormous detachment of non-staff propagandists working among the troops. On this level it is very important to do everything possible to develop the Leninist tradition of regular and mandatory participation by leadership personnel in the political indoctrination of the men. We must be clearly aware of the fact that the level and state of ideological work and the contribution of agitprop collectives and speaker groups is determined not by the number of lectures and other mass agitation activities, but above all by how these activities help inspire the creative energy of the men and direct them to improving the quality and effectiveness of combat training and successfully fulfilling socialist obligations for this anniversary year.

11,176
CSO: 1801

PRE-DRAFT PHYSICAL TRAINING SHORTCOMINGS NOTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Jun 77 p 4

[Article by Col N. Tikhonenkov, all-Union category judge, Capt G. Lebedev, honored master of sport, and Maj L. Golovnev: "One Hundred Percent - on Paper"]

[Text] Work on physical training for students and performance of the standards and requirements of the GTO [Ready for Labor and Defense] test is going poorly at certain schools.

The subject of this surprise inspection was suggested to us by the commander of the Prague Guards Tank Regiment. "Most of the soldiers of the new generation know the machinery pretty well and handle it with fair confidence," the officer said. "But the physical conditioning of some of them causes me concern. If we believe the signed and sealed papers all our young men have mastered the standards and requirements of the GTO test before entering the army. But when we check we sometimes find that some of the soldiers who have just entered the military are unable to pull themselves up on a horizontal bar, do even a single strength exercise, or match the standards for grenade throwing. For example, certain draftees from Bukharskaya Oblast make a poor showing."

We set out for the Bukharskaya Oblast military commissariat. Together with workers from the commissariat we laid plans to conduct selective check training periods with young men from the Bukhara Sovkhoz and the Karakul' school.

This was our first "surprise." It turned out that testing pre-draft young men at the secondary school of the Bukhara Sovkhoz was not so simple. There was no gymnastic equipment in the gymnasium and, as we learned, before our arrival none of the senior students had ever thrown a grenade (the school has none) or pulled themselves up on the horizontal bar.

We asked the school's military instructor V. Shodmonov: "Do you have winners of the GTO badge?"

"Certainly..."

"But how did they pass the tests if you have no equipment?"

"They ran," the military instructor replied imperturbably.

But only half of those tested were able to meet the established standard for the cross-country run.

It turned out that no documentation of fulfillment of the GTO standards had been carried on at the school during the school year. One may then ask: What data did they use when they reported that 100 percent of their graduates had met the standards and requirements of the GTO tests?

This was plainly a case of falsification of records. Mass sports events were held at the school sporadically. There was no tie to the rayon sports committee. But more important, those comrades who had been assigned to physical training for young people had lost their sense of responsibility. That was an alarming symptom.

We found another shortcoming at the Karakul' school. It will soon be a year that the physical training teacher and the military instructor have been quarreling. This has a negative effect on the training of the young men. The school director and party organization should have gotten to the bottom of this prolonged conflict long ago and straightened out physical training periods and tests for the GTO standards.

The physical training of young men must be watched by military commissariats, enterprise and school directors, and party organizations. And where this is done, where constant checks on the sports training of tomorrow's fighting men are maintained and the standards of the GTO test are successfully passed, the young men leaving for the army are in good, all-around physical condition. But the withdrawal of certain comrades from work to manage the physical training of pre-draft young men and failure to realize the full importance of sports make themselves known later and retard the entry of young men into military life.

At the Namanganskaya Oblast military commissariat we were advised to visit two schools. They warned us that these schools had better organized physical training. In each collective we selected for testing 30 young men who, according to the information of the military commissariat, had successfully passed the requirements of the GTO test. Indeed, at the school where R. Rustamov is military instructor virtually all the senior students confirmed that they had passed the corresponding requirements. But at the other school (military instructor R. Sotvaldyev) some of those tested were unable to pull themselves up on the horizontal bar, run one kilometer cross-country, or throw a grenade. They showed a poor level of physical conditioning.

Why did this happen? Both rayons have good training facilities and conduct varied sports events on a regular basis. These are mass events,

which is good. But we should be careful; sometimes in the bustle of sports holidays involving large numbers of participants the individual is overlooked. Then it turns out that some young men stand out for activity and sports work while others are in the shadow. Their training to pass the requirements and standards of the GTO test is neglected. But, strange as it may seem, this does not particularly upset the leaders of the military commissariat.

Of course, there are not very many examples of insufficient attention to sports training for future fighting men. Serious, careful work is done in the republic on physical training for the adolescent generation. The Tashkent Unified Technical School of DOSAAF, for example, has accumulated interesting experience in training pre-draft young men. All cadets who are studying the specializations of radio telegraph operator, driver, and the like at the school must win the GTO medal; it is mandatory. The reports coming in from the troops speak of the high level of professional and physical training among graduates of the school. Substantial credit for this goes to Lt Col (Res) N. Samarov, who worked out and is successfully employing an individual system of sports training for cadets.

Yes, it is very important to select intelligent, knowledgeable military instructors and physical training teachers for work with young people. Sometimes, however, people who are far from army life and not particularly well qualified are appointed to this important work. But every city and rayon has many reserve and retired officers. They are usually experienced teachers and methodologists. If they can be interested and given appropriate help, there is no doubt that we can achieve great success in comprehensive preparation of future fighting men in a short time.

11,176
CSO: 1801

STRICT OBSERVANCE OF FLIGHT RULES STRESSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Jun 77 p 1

[Editorial: "Strictly Observe Flight Rules"]

[Text] The summer training period is at its peak. Soviet fighting men face new, even higher goals in combat improvement and socialist competition to greet the 60th anniversary of Great October in a worthy fashion. For aviators the period of most intensive flying has arrived. And the greater the intensity of combat training at the airfields and proving grounds, on distant flights, and in aerial combat zones, the stricter requirements must be for observance of flight laws and rules.

Precision and organization in the entire training process and strict discipline and order in all elements of flight control are becoming especially important. These requirements are observed absolutely, for example, in the aviation regiment where Guards Maj B. Zotov is deputy commander. There they have established tough, effective checks on observance of the requirements of controlling documents. Party political work in the unit is purposeful and takes account of the complexity of missions being performed. A system of steps to prevent violations of flight rules has been worked out and is being steadily implemented. Every pilot error or failure by a technician is thoroughly analyzed, causes are revealed, and preventive steps taken. The regiment has operated without flight accidents for many years now, which helps this leading collective in the competition for high quality air training.

The long years of accident-free flying work by most of the units of the Air Force, the aviation of the National Air Defense Forces, and naval aviation demonstrate convincingly that where all the requirements of controlling documents are precisely followed, there is outstanding knowledge of the equipment, and proper checks are maintained on preventive activities there is no possibility of crisis situations occurring in the air. And by contrast, where commanders' standards and party principles in evaluating the quality of preparation of men and equipment and observance of order and flight rules by each aviator grow slack potential causes of air accidents occur.

In the unit commanded by Lt Col A. Markyavichus methodological sequence in pilot training was sometimes violated and various kinds of shortcuts were allowed in crew training. The flight control group was not always entirely prepared to perform its duties. So it was not accidental when a critical situation in the air occurred during a certain flight shift: two planes approached to within an unsafe distance of one another.

Analysis of the reasons behind potential causes of air accidents shows that most of them originate from shortcomings in preparation and organization of flights, flight control, and servicing the equipment. The slightest breach of discipline or carelessness inevitably has unpleasant consequences in the air. The modern fighting airplanes and helicopters which our units and subunits have adopted demand exemplary organization of military labor, technical sophistication, and special care at work from flight and technical personnel; every airman must be profoundly aware of his personal responsibility for the success of the flight and performance of complex combat training missions.

In his talk at the 16th Congress of USSR Trade Unions Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, speaking of the need to be stricter with violators of discipline said: "We cannot fail to consider the new requirements which new machinery and technology make. The damage resulting from each violation of labor, plan, and technological discipline is growing unbelievably today."

This is fully applicable to Soviet fighting men, whom our country has entrusted with first-class equipment and up-to-date weapons. These are generally collective weapons. Improper work by just one specialist may have a negative effect on performance of the assigned mission and create conditions which endanger the life of the crew. Therefore, commanders and party organization must always apply high standards for observance of the rules of operation of combat equipment and raising the accountability and diligence of all duty personnel. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the personal example of superior officers with respect to strict observance of flight rules.

The comprehensive approach to solving all problems of combat training, strict discipline, model order, and an atmosphere of high party standards help insure accident-free work. These things are, in turn, indexes of command maturity, the level of work of staffs, political agencies, and party organizations, and the solidarity of the military collective. In the last analysis, these are fundamental conditions for successful performance of missions under any tactical and weather conditions.

The officers of the flight safety service have an important part in working out the most effective preventive steps. They are expected to monitor the organization of flying methods training for the leadership personnel of units and subunits, the level of training of pilots and navigators in performing exercises under the most complex tactical and weather conditions, and the objectivity of evaluations of crew

training. They must monitor all stages of flight work, from formulation of the flight mission to its review.

In this anniversary year of Soviet power socialist competition among the troops is especially enthusiastic. One of the most important goals outlined by personnel of aviation units, squadrons, and flights and by support subunits is to carry out combat training plans without air accidents. In most military collectives all the rules of the flight service are followed strictly, significant experience has been accumulated, and progressive methods of training and indoctrination and preparing the aviation equipment for flights are used. But this know-how is still not always disseminated widely. It is the duty of commanders, political agencies, staffs, and party organizations to improve the organization of socialist competition, see that communists play a leading role in it, propagandize the achievements of first-class pilots, navigators, and aviation specialists broadly, and follow high party principles in holding people responsible for the slightest manifestations of carelessness.

All categories of flight and engineering-technical personnel must observe rules absolutely. Guaranteeing accident-free flight work is a matter of great state importance and an essential condition for further raising the combat readiness of aviation units and subunits.

11,176
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CONTRASTS IN COMMAND STYLES AND RESULTS DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Jun 77 p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Kalachinskiy, commander of a radar unit: "The Style Determines the Results — Superior and Subordinate"]

[Text] This radar site stands among fertile fields in a land of plenty. My service duty has led me there many times. But I especially remember one time when an exceptional circumstance brought me there. Maj V. Malevanyy, a subunit commander, had petitioned to have Capt A. Kashin, his subordinate, tried in an officer's court of honor.

As I traveled to the site that time I thought about Kashin and could not understand. What had happened to the officer? Perhaps a misunderstanding or accident was the cause of it all? But then I came to the familiar post. As always, the commander, erect and proper, came forward to greet me. His glance was confident and his voice resonant and firm. I could not help wondering if he had been too strict in the Kashin case.

Without hurrying, I studied the events of recent days detail by detail. No, the commander had not gone too far. There was every reason for taking the strictest measures with the captain. For some time his work had been going downhill; the recent offense was, as they say, simply too much. He himself had forced the commander to make his decision. The court was soon held and Captain Kashin was strictly punished.

But somehow I, the unit commander, was left feeling upset and unsatisfied. After analyzing Kashin's offense and the commander's disciplinary practices the state of affairs in the subunit presented itself in a completely different light.

We expected a great deal of Major Malevanyy. He had an outstanding knowledge of the equipment and was strong-willed and hard-driving at work; when assigned to his new position Malevanyy had gone to work enthusiastically and assured the command that the unit would be outstanding within a year.

The first results soon became known. One of the inspections showed that the subunit had grown markedly stronger; the working harmony of the teams improved and the number of specialists working at a highly rated level increased. "There they are, the promising sprouts!" people at headquarters thought. Then unexpectedly there came a flagrant violation of discipline in the subunit, followed by another.

Major Malevanyy argued that they were accidental and said they would straighten things out immediately. And indeed, things were quiet for some time. It seemed that things were fine. But after an inspection we learned that the radarmen's overall score in combat training had dropped.

So the subunit had not attained the goal outlined by Major Malevanyy.

Why do things go wrong for this officer?

A thorough analysis enabled us to uncover the problems with Major Malevanyy. He raises his voice too much and is rude to the men. The unit staff officers tried to correct him and pointed out his hot temper and over-confidence. But he continually countered with the same argument: "The complainers are those who are used to an easy time." This seemed to disarm his senior comrades. They saw that the commander was trying, making every effort, and that was why he held others strictly responsible.

It is too bad that we did not make a principled evaluation of the weakness in Malevanyy's workstyle in time because he, believing that he was following a correct line, not only failed to eliminate his mistakes, he even made others. Malevanyy increasingly relied on disciplinary measures and gave less attention to educational work. His senior comrades tried to correct and teach him, but he did not draw the necessary conclusions.

As soon as we look more closely at Major Malevanyy's activity it becomes clear that his errors indicate poor pedagogical training and a lack of self-control and tact. Consider the following case. Lt V. Bylina was given the assignment of equipping a classroom. The commander set a time and allocated men to help. The lieutenant was grateful to be entrusted with this job. Everything seemed to be fine. But as soon as he got to work he ran into trouble: materials were lacking and the men appointed to help were sometimes taken off to other sectors. Realizing the time was passing but the work was not progressing the lieutenant went to his commander for advice. But Malevanyy cut him off in mid-sentence, saying: "Think for yourself!"

The classroom was not ready by the assigned date. Lieutenant Bylina, who had done everything possible, still received a reprimand. It takes no special acumen to understand what kind of feelings this left in the young officer, just beginning his service career. For some

lieutenants one or two such complications is enough to make them begin doubting their own abilities and begin declining. And if we remember that Major Malevanyy's insensitivity in mutual relations with his subordinates manifested itself every day, it is not hard at all to imagine the effect this had on the mood of the men. A detail which describes the case well is that Major Malevanyy could spend 30 minutes in front of a formation of the entire subunit expressing his displeasure at a mistake by one individual. The most heavily used words in his vocabulary were "warning" and "punishment." He tried to justify his tone of conversation with the men by saying that they remembered what he said, whereas pussy-footing would do no good.

The subunit at the radar site is now commanded by Maj Yu. Polyakov, not Major Malevanyy. Polyakov is just as firm and strict as his predecessor. The men of the subunit know that they cannot expect light treatment if they do bad work. But the commander's demands are fair in content and specific in form.

Major Polyakov established close contact with the party and Komsomol organizations from the very beginning and he relies on them. He consults with the officers, ensigns, and sergeants concerning the most diverse questions and gives them a chance to show initiative and creativity. If anyone has distinguished themselves the commander will be sure to support the individual and praise him to everyone that will listen. It has become a tradition to note the successes of the teams and platoons and of each individual fighting man. For example, suppose a radar operator has won the title of best specialist in competition. He is given a certificate in a ceremony and his photograph will be placed in the display for winners of socialist competition. If a soldier earns the rank of sergeant his parents are informed: your son, they say, has been entrusted to serve as an NCO.

To put it figuratively, the "microclimate" of the subunit soon warmed up.

When you arrive there today nothing seems to have changed. The physical equipment at the position is the same, the barracks are the same, and the same trees surround the post. But when you meet the men and talk with them you can sense their involvement in the successes of their comrades and the entire collective. Lieutenant Bylina, who had fallen so low 18 months ago, has now squared his shoulders and feels quite confident. He recently carried out an assignment which was just as difficult as the one Major Malevanyy once gave him. He performed it successfully and earned a commendation. Major Polyakov deserves considerable credit here. He gave the young officer a detailed explanation of what to do, helped him draw up a plan of work, and took care of material supply.

Let me say that the commander spent a good deal of time on this and, at first glance, it would seem that he might have given the assignment to another, more experienced specialist. That would have been less

trouble for him. But when he gave this important job to the young officer Major Polyakov was also thinking of the psychological consequences of the assignment. This is the point. After performing the assignment Lieutenant Bylina experienced the joy of success and his wavering self-confidence was bolstered. Certainly this is not a small thing! Certainly the commander's "lost" time will be paid back manyfold in the near future!

I cannot help recalling Captain Kashin too. Major Malevanyy was convinced that he was a "worthless officer." But I would like, without excusing Kashin for the mistakes he made, to analyze how the indifference and irresponsibility in the service began to develop at a certain time.

In an effort to set a personal example in every respect Malevanyy not only issued orders and instructions, but also took up the tools and instruments himself, adjusted the equipment, and sat in his office until late at night working on the schedule of training periods. That would seem fine; the commander leads his men by personal example. But in reality the effect was negative. By indiscriminately doing his own work and that of others, whether he wanted to or not Malevanyy pushed his assistants out of the way. They got the impression that they were "not measuring up" and therefore he did not trust them. Even the best specialists, of whom Kashin was one, gradually lost their initiative and became nothing more than followers of orders.

Major Polyakov was able to see in Kashin that which his former commander had not seen: his self-reliant character and inclination for initiative. He "went to work" on this and at every convenient opportunity let the officer know that he trusted his knowledge and experience completely.

Once the unit headquarters faced the question of replacing a subunit commander who was ill. The matter could not be postponed because the men of the subunit were just setting off on a journey to perform an important mission. Learning of this Polyakov suggested Kashin as the substitute. The people at headquarters were surprised and thought Polyakov might be joking. But he was able to substantiate his proposal.

Kashin and the subunit were gone for a long time. The radarmen had to accomplish the most difficult combat training mission; they faced many harsh trials. Even under such conditions Kashin was flawless in his work. The subunit returned with an outstanding evaluation and a commendation from the senior officer.

This was not just an isolated performance. Kashin is now handling his duties quite successfully.

That is what a correct understanding of the commander's standards can mean. One leader improves his abilities in influencing the men step by step, purposefully and consistently, joins their effort, and on this

reliable basis accomplishes the missions of combat and political training; the other underestimates the importance of educational work and forces achievement of the percentages and figures mentioned in obligations at any price. This also explains the difference in the results of their labor.

I recently visited Major Polyakov at the site again. I found him in his office reading letters. Catching my look Polyakov smiled and explained, not without pride: "These are letters from former men of the regiment. They have finished their service, but they haven't forgotten the site."

After reading several letters, with the major's permission, I fell to thinking. There was so much warmth, sincere empathy, and gratitude to the commander in every line! But the main thing was interest and concern for the life of the collective and the way it would be greeting the anniversary of Great October. This indicated that service at the remote site under the leadership of Major Polyakov was for them a true school in which to mature and grow strong, a place to learn collectivism.

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COMMENTS ON U. S. ELECTRONIC GUNNERY RANGES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Jun 77 p 3

[Article by I. Alimov, engineer: "'Electronic' Ranges — Military-Technical Thought Abroad"]

[Text] The swift development of military aviation in recent years, the improvements in the flight performance of aircraft, and their increased fighting capabilities have, in the opinion of foreign specialists, made the problem of crew training extremely critical. Noticing the discrepancy which has arisen abroad between the system of military pilot training and the demands of modern aerial battle, the journal AEROSPACE INTERNATIONAL wrote: "Realistic drill in waging aerial battle or firing at ground targets has become almost impossible with conventional methods of flight training. This was convincingly demonstrated by the war in Vietnam where American fighter planes were much less successful than expected." Official Pentagon circles, analyzing the experience of combat action in Vietnam, have also acknowledged the plainly inadequate level of training of American fighter pilots to wage mobile aerial battles.

In the search for ways to eliminate the weaknesses that have been identified American aviation specialists assign a special place to using new technical equipment for training and drilling flight crews. They placed their greatest hopes on what are called "aerial combat maneuvering ranges" or, in ordinary terms, "electronic" ranges. What are they?

We are referring to a complex of special radar and radioelectronic equipment capable of improving conditions for monitoring the course of aerial training battles and methods of post-flight review of pilot actions.

Seven radio stations are set up on the range to track the aircraft. One of them is the main, "master" station and the other six are auxiliary, "slave" stations. The stations are arranged around a circle with a diameter of 48 kilometers and the position of each is chosen so that the neighboring stations are within the range of direct visibility. The subsidiary stations are completely automated and work

without service personnel. The main station is a mobile variation mounted on two trucks.

The operating principle of the tracking system to follow aircraft over the range is as follows. The main station sends query signals out. Transponders on board the aircraft give response signals. The signals are received by the subsidiary stations and relayed to the main one. The coordinates of the aircraft are determined by triangulation according to the difference in times of arrival of the response signal from the aircraft received by the particular stations on the ground. Because the ground stations at the range are spread over the entire territory an aircraft above the range is "visible" to at least three stations at any moment. The maximum range of communication for the aircraft with any of the ground stations at the range is reported to be 160 kilometers and the accuracy in determining distance is 1-2 meters. The system is capable of tracking more than 20 aircraft simultaneously.

Instead of conventional ammunition the planes are loaded with containers holding onboard range equipment. These containers have the dimensions, weight, and center of gravity of the American Sidewinder aerial combat missile. The container is 2.84 meters long and 127 millimeters in diameter and weighs 55 kilograms. Loading it does not require any special modifications of the fastening assemblies and circuits to connect to aircraft systems designed for launching air-to-air guided missiles.

Inside the container is a miniature inertial navigation system, a system to measure atmospheric parameters, and a transponder. The system to measure atmospheric parameters is designed to determine air velocity and barometric flight altitude. The navigation system makes it possible to measure the angles of orientation and the values of different aircraft accelerations, including such important indexes for a fighter plane as the vertical G-load which occurs during aircraft maneuvers. Upon receiving a query from the ground the transponder automatically responds with an encoded signal which contains information on the velocity, altitude, and course of the aircraft and the hypothetical launch of an aerial combat missile.

All information received by the range radio stations is fed to a computer complex consisting of three high-speed computers. One of them processes incoming data on the aircraft above the range. The second supports the work of ground data display devices. The third is assigned to simulate the flight of the missiles when they are hypothetically launched from the aircraft waging "aerial battle" above the range. The computer complex is not located at the range, but rather at a nearby airbase from which the planes take off. It is connected with the main radio station by radio lines.

The command post of the "electronic" range is set up in a trailer 15 meters long and 4.3 meters wide. It has two identical sections which can work completely on their own and independently. This was done not

only to back up the equipment in order to raise reliability but also so that two entirely different jobs could be done at once: flights over the range can be controlled from one section while "aerial battles" that are already completed can be reviewed in the other.

Two people are expected to work in a section of the command post: a pilot-instructor and an operator. The pilot-instructor performs the role of flight control officer for the range while the operator monitors the work of range equipment. The command post console has three large screens. One of them gives a spatial picture of the air situation, the second shows the basic flight parameters of all aircraft being monitored, while the third gives what is called static information: the names and ranks of the pilots, types of aircraft, number of missiles hypothetically loaded, evaluations for exercises performed, and results of missile launches.

On the display each aircraft is seen at the appropriate aspect angle and its lower surface is hatchured for better visibility. The trajectory of movement is shown by the line of movement of the tips of the wings of each aircraft for the preceding 10 seconds. In addition to the aircraft and their flight trajectories the display shows mountains and other vertical obstacles in the range area as well as the points on the earth's surface above which the aircraft are located at the particular moment. All this enables the instructor to notice and give crews timely radio warnings not only when they come dangerously close to other aircraft but also when there is a danger of colliding with obstacles at the range. When the missiles are hypothetically launched the computers calculate their trajectories and draw them on the display, indicating whether they hit or miss.

All the information collected in the course of flights over the "electronic" range is recorded. Talk over the air is also recorded. Everything possible is done to make an objective review of the "aerial battle" possible and to reproduce it for the participants as many times as necessary to establish what mistakes were made. The pilot can look at his actions from outside, so to speak, and understand why they are correct or incorrect.

American specialists consider experience with using the first "electronic" range to have been satisfactory. In assessing prospects for such ranges specialists note also that they can be used for research-type experiments as well as training missions.

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GROUND FORCES OFFENSIVE TACTIC DEVELOPMENTS IN POSTWAR PERIOD

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 7, Jul 77 signed to press 24 Jun 77 pp 37-45


[Article by Col P. Tsygankov, Candidate of Military Science: "Development of Offensive Tactics of Rifle (Motorized Rifle) and Tank Subunits in the Postwar Years"]

[Text] Two periods are distinguished in the development of offensive tactics of rifle (motorized rifle) and tank subunits in the postwar years: the first period runs from the end of the Great Patriotic War to the introduction of nuclear weapons in the Soviet Armed Forces (1945-1953); the second period is connected with equipping the Soviet Armed Forces with nuclear weapons and missiles. The latter contains two principal stages: arming forces with nuclear weapons (1954-1959), and adoption of diversified missiles (from 1960).

In the first postwar period offensive tactics of rifle (motorized rifle) and tank subunits developed on the basis of study of the combat experience of the last war, taking into consideration the adoption of more sophisticated weapons and combat equipment. The following were determined in this period: most optimal variants of subunit offensive frontage; depth of combat missions taking into account means of waging combat; structuring of combat formations; subunit commander work methods in preparing for an offensive action; modes of assault on enemy forward positions and penetration of the defense at a rapid pace.

The experience of the last war demonstrated that in offensive engagements (particularly in the third period of the war) there occurred a substantial increase in personnel and weapons per kilometer of breakthrough sector: rifle battalions -- 6-8; guns and mortars -- 200-300; tanks -- 20-30.¹ Rifle subunits, units and even combined units operated in narrow sectors and in many cases sustained excessive casualties and losses from the defending adversary. In view of this fact, as well as the increased combat capabilities of subunits, a number of standards were revised in the first postwar period. It was considered expedient that a rifle company, with

approximately 80 men in an extended line and spacing of 4-6 m between rifle-
men, could attack on a frontage of 320-480 m, and a rifle battalion, formed
in two echelons -- a frontage of 700 m, and in one echelon -- 1,000 m.
(Diagram 1).



Offensive Diagrams for Rifle (Motorized Rifle) and Tank Subunits in the Postwar Years

Key to Diagram 1 on preceding page: 1 -- diagram 1; 2 -- diagram 2; 3 -- diagram 3; 4 -- position of regimental reserves; 5 -- first position; 6 -- concentration area; 7 -- without employment of nuclear weapons, battalion offensive frontage is 1,000 m, company -- 500 m; 8 -- medical aid station; cp -- rifle company; mp -- tank company; mб -- tank battalion; MCP -- motorized rifle company; MСб -- motorized rifle battalion

Subunit missions were also refined in connection with an increase in the depth of missions of the rifle division and its regiments, as well as significant reinforcement of the rifle battalion with artillery and tanks.² For example, the immediate mission of the rifle (motorized rifle) battalion was penetration of the first position, while its subsequent mission was to capture the position of the enemy's regimental reserves. After this it would be assigned an additional mission to exploit the advance deep in the defense.³ No substantial changes occurred in the rifle company and platoon. As during the war, they were given a visible assault objective and an axis of subsequent advance.

The combat formations of rifle (motorized rifle) subunits underwent some change in the first period. This was promoted in the first place by a substantial reinforcement of the battalion (company) with tanks and artillery, which substantially increased the force of their initial attack, and secondly, an increase in the attack frontage, which improved the maneuver capabilities of the battalion, company and platoon combat formation. As a result, based on the experience of postwar field exercises, the battalion began to be formed up more frequently into two echelons when attacking a fortified defense. The single-echelon formation predominated in advancing on a secondary axis. The rifle company formation consisted of the rifle platoon formations, and the weapons directly under the company commander. The rifle platoon and company attacked in an extended line.⁴

The sequence and character of work performed by commanders of rifle (motorized rifle) subunits were determined in each specific instance in conformity with the mission, features of the terrain and time available. However, even now they would work out all principal measures in the field. The battalion and company commander would be given at least 24 hours for this purpose.⁵ While no significant changes occurred in the work sequence of the battalion commander, the volume of tasks performed increased greatly in connection with significant reinforcement of the battalion with artillery, tanks and combat engineer subunits. He would refine the battalion mission and attack objectives, and would establish in particular detail the procedure of coordinated action between infantry, tanks and artillery; he would determine infantry attack positions; fire positions for guns assigned to direct fire; he would specify the deployment line for direct infantry-support tanks and their timetable for advancing to the deployment line; he would announce the sequence of artillery preparation and would specify on the terrain objectives to be neutralized and destroyed, the first and subsequent rolling barrage line; he would determine the sequence of small-arms fire delivery before and during the assault phase, as well as utilization of smoke-generating devices, flamethrower subunits, etc.

In the first postwar period rifle (motorized rifle) subunits would shift to the attack as a rule from direct contact with the enemy. Mounting of a simultaneous assault on the forward edge of the battle area was considered a very important element thereby, as was also the case in the last war. Field service regulations demanded that the enemy's forward defensive positions be attacked simultaneously by tanks and infantry at a precisely specified time (H-hour).⁶ Toward this end the signal for the tanks to move to the attack would be given by the regimental commander with the permission of the division commander, and would be repeated by the battalion commander. The moment to give the signal to the tanks and infantry would be determined in advance, proceeding from the specified time for attacking the forward positions, the distance of the attack position, as well as the possible speed of advance.

Experience at field exercises indicated that attack-echelon tank and infantry, supported by artillery fire and delivering fire while advancing, should hit the forward edge of the battle area precisely at H-hour and continue advancing without a halt, without falling behind the friendly artillery shellbursts. The efforts of the advancing subunits were directed toward ensuring that the first position was penetrated in a sustained manner. The close-support tanks, swiftly crushing enemy resistance on the FEBA, would destroy infantry and weapons impeding the advance of the battalion's rifle subunits and would shift their efforts to defense depth. Self-propelled guns would advance directly at the heels of the tanks, for the most part in the gaps between tanks, destroying primarily enemy antitank weapons. Close-support guns would advance in the company combat formations and, delivering fire from brief halts, would support the advancing subunits. A sustained advance would depend on artillery support, which would be provided by the rolling barrage method. Surviving and newly-spotted enemy weapons would be neutralized and destroyed by the close-support guns and attached artillery battalions. Antiaircraft artillery subunits as well as attached machinegun subunits, with the mission of delivering fire on low-flying hostile aircraft, would advance directly in the battalion combat formations and would provide them cover against hostile air attacks.

Consequently penetration of the forward position of the enemy's forward defense area would be effected by mounting a powerful initial assault by rifle (motorized rifle), tank and artillery subunits. The sustained assault would be supported primarily by a rolling barrage, by airstrikes provided by bombers and ground attack aircraft, and would proceed at a faster pace than was the case in the last war. Based on the experience of field exercises, the rate of penetration would be almost twice that of the war years.

Following penetration of the forward position, rifle (motorized rifle) and tank subunits would direct their efforts toward penetrating without a halt the positions of regimental and division reserves. The following would promote maintaining a high rate of advance at depth: bold maneuver; skillful subunit actions in repelling enemy counterattacks; prompt buildup of efforts in the course of the advance.

If assaults on well-defended strong points and centers of resistance were unsuccessful, which had a negative effect on the pace of advance, the rifle (motorized rifle) and tank subunits would seek to bypass them and, utilizing fire and smoke, would advance resolutely forward. In those cases where this could not be accomplished, the enemy would be neutralized with artillery fire and airstrikes and would subsequently be destroyed with a resolute assault.

Enemy counterattacks would be repelled by two methods, depending on his manpower and weapons: either by a decisive attack into the flank and rear or by stationary fire after taking an advantageous position. If counterattacks were mounted by large forces, they would be repelled with intensive subunit fire, taking a tactically advantageous position. In this case the enemy would be hit by organized artillery and tank fires. After his combat formations were disorganized and he was brought to a halt, his final destruction would be completed with a decisive attack into the flank and rear.

The experience of field exercises indicated that with penetration of the first position, the attack by rifle (motorized rifle) and tank subunits would usually be characterized by nonuniformity of advance and would develop in a complex and rapidly-changing situation. In this case maneuver of fire and subunits, swift annihilation of the counterattacking enemy and prompt engagement of support echelons (reserves) would acquire decisive significance in achieving a high rate of advance.

Thus one of the most important problems of offensive tactics was resolved in the first postwar period -- penetration of the main defense area quickly and at a rapid pace. This enabled the rifle (motorized rifle) and tank subunits, engaging support echelons and reserves, to complete penetration of the enemy's entire tactical defense zone on the first day of the offensive, which we always sought to achieve in the last war.

A new period in development of the offensive tactics of rifle (motorized rifle) and tank subunits of the Soviet Army began with the appearance and rapid development of nuclear weapons and the further improvement of other weaponry. Views on determining offensive frontage for subunits, depth of missions, combat formations, commander work methods and pace of penetrating the enemy defense were once again revised under these conditions.

The threat of nuclear weapons employment by defending forces on attacking subunits dictated the necessity of dispersing attacking troops in such a manner that one nuclear strike would not hit simultaneously two rifle (motorized rifle) and tank battalions. The subunit attack frontage was doubled, and became: for the battalion -- up to 1,500 m, for the company -- 500-700 m, platoon -- 150-200 m, and squad -- 50-70 m (Diagram 2).

The development of nuclear weapons changed the content of combat missions of rifle (motorized rifle) and tank subunits. The battalion combat mission began to be subdivided into immediate and subsequent, with indication

of axis of subsequent advance. The depth of the immediate mission increased substantially in comparison with the first period. It began to consist in destroying the enemy at strong points and centers of resistance in the first and second positions. The battalion's subsequent mission consisted in penetrating the third position and reaching the second defensive area, although it was not limited to a specified line. Following defeat of the opposing enemy force, it was to advance swiftly in the indicated direction. Combat missions for the company, platoon and squad would be determined on the basis of terrain features. Usually the assault objective and direction of subsequent advance would be specified. The company assault objective would be personnel and weapons situated in an enemy platoon strong point. A new element in comparison with the preceding period was the fact that the company began to be assigned an immediate mission.⁷ The platoon and squad assault objectives would be observed enemy personnel and weapons. Having captured the designated objectives, the subunits would then advance in a sustained manner in the specified directions.

The combat formations of rifle (motorized rifle) and tank subunits in the second postwar period were not subjected to substantial change. The combat formation of the motorized rifle battalion consisted of one or two echelons, close support tanks, reserve and weapons directly under the battalion commander. The rifle company combat formations consisted of the combat formations of the rifle platoons operating alongside, and the weapons under the motorized rifle company commander.

A new element in the offensive tactics of the 1950's was the employment of a motorized rifle regiment tank battalion to perform independent missions. The tank battalion combat formation would be in one or two lines and consisted of the combat formations of the tank companies, reserve, and in many cases attached rifle subunits as well. The companies in the battalion began proceeding in relation to the situation: in a line (all companies side by side), echelon right, echelon left, arrowhead, or inverted arrowhead.

Under conditions of employment of nuclear weapons, the battalion commander's work sequence and volume were determined, as in the past, by the assigned mission, the situation, and available time. It was believed that all the work should be completed prior to taking the attack position. This applied when subunits were readying for an attack from a position of direct contact with the adversary. However, with practical adoption of the method of shifting to the attack without a halt in attack position, the conditions and sequence of the commander's work fundamentally changed. In this case all work would be completed prior to moving the subunits out from the assembly area.

Particular attention began to be devoted to coordinated action, which was organized by missions, lines (objectives) and time to the entire depth of the engagement. The sequence and procedure of coordinated action between infantry, tanks and artillery, for swift exploitation of the results of nuclear strikes, would be carefully elaborated thereby. A new element in

organization of coordinated action was coordination of the actions of rifle (motorized rifle) and tank battalions with airborne assault subunits dropped in their zone of advance, as well as subunits advancing from assembly areas with subunits in direct contact with the enemy.

A fundamentally new element in offensive tactics was organization of anti-nuclear protection. The battalion commanders now would work out in detail chemical reconnaissance and radiological survey missions, the procedure for warning subunits of a nuclear attack threat, the requisite quantity and nature of equipment of shelters, provision of protective gear to personnel, procedure of crossing areas with high radiation levels, etc.

Of great significance under conditions of threatened enemy nuclear attack were measures to ensure concealment of subunits in the attack position and while advancing from the assembly areas.

The subunit offensive engagement also began to be executed in a new way. Nuclear strikes would be delivered with the initiation of preliminary artillery bombardment and airstrikes, on the main defensive positions. At this time those subunits which were in direct contact would take to the shelters, while troops advancing to penetrate without a halt in attack position would not cross the risk distance line. In shifting to an attack without a halt in attack position, attack-echelon battalions would sequentially break up into company and platoon columns as they approached the forward edge of the battle area. On approaching the final coordination line, tanks and infantry would quickly deploy into a combat line and extended line and would proceed with the assault phase without halting. Sometimes (very rarely) the subunits would be given time at the final coordination line to refine their combat missions. At designated H-hour the tanks and infantry would swiftly hit the enemy's forward defensive positions and, advancing behind friendly artillery shellbursts, would destroy personnel, weapons, combat equipment and move forward with good speed.

Penetration of the first position, as the experience of field exercises indicated, is effected at a faster pace than prior to the time troops were armed with nuclear weapons. Rifle (motorized rifle) and tank subunits boldly and resolutely attacked surviving strong points and continued their sustained advance. A special role was assigned to tank subunits. They were immediately to exploit the results of nuclear strikes in order to complete penetration of the first position at a rapid pace. In spite of the fact that nuclear strikes were delivered on the first position, artillery support was provided in the form of a rolling barrage or sequential concentration of fire to the depth of the entire first position.

A new element at the first stage of the second postwar period was the employment of forward detachments, beginning with penetration of the first position. Therefore in order to increase the pace of penetration of the first position, motorized rifle and tank subunits also utilized the success of the forward detachments for a swift advance. The result was that the first position, which was twice as deep now, was penetrated faster, at a more rapid pace.

Under conditions of employment of nuclear weapons, combat deep within the enemy's defenses began to be characterized by a high degree of nonuniformity of forward movement and a rapidly-changing situation. The forward-echelon battalions, boldly utilizing breaches created as a result of nuclear strikes, as well as gaps in the enemy's combat formations, advanced swiftly.

In the course of the advance the subunits were forced to cross areas which had been subjected to nuclear strikes. In this case they would employ approach march formations. Infantry would advance behind the tanks mounted on armored personnel carriers or would cross mounted on the tanks. This was also the procedure followed by subunits advancing on those axes where the enemy did not offer organized resistance. Upon encountering large enemy forces, the infantry would dismount, deploy into combat formation and, in coordination with tanks and with artillery support, would attack the enemy in the designated direction.

The tank subunits were to drive forward particularly swiftly and resolutely. Exploiting the results of nuclear strikes, they would boldly bypass enemy strong points and centers of resistance. The main defense area, the depth of which had increased by 50% in comparison with the first period, would be penetrated considerably more rapidly.

Further changes took place in the offensive tactics of motorized rifle (tank) subunits at the beginning of the 1960's. Acquisition of diversified missiles, improvement of nuclear weapons, and subunit acquisition of new tanks, armored personnel carriers and other more modern combat vehicles exerted direct influence on the organization and modes of conduct of the offensive engagement. Views appeared on the conduct of the offensive engagement not only with the employment of nuclear weapons but also with conventional weapons.

In this connection there occurred refinements in subunit attack frontages, depths of combat missions, combat formations and other items.

The motorized rifle (tank) battalion, depending on situation conditions, began advancing on a frontage of up to 2 km, and the company -- up to 800 m (Diagram 3). When nuclear weapons were not employed, the offensive frontage decreased: to 1,000 m for the battalion, and 500 m for the company.⁸ The platoon and squad were to attack on a frontage of 200 and 40 meters respectively.

The content of the combat mission changed considerably. The immediate mission of the battalion (company) attacking in the forward echelon usually was to destroy personnel and weapons in the enemy's forward-echelon strong points. Subsequently, advancing in the designated direction, the battalion, acting in coordination with other subunits, was to destroy the enemy at defense depth.⁹ If the battalion was to attack in the direction of employment of nuclear weapons, its combat mission would be considerably increased. Consequently, at the beginning of the 1960's the combat missions of motorized rifle (tank) subunits were deeper than previously.

The combat formations of motorized rifle (tank) subunits also underwent changes. They were determined by the modes of attack. The battalion combat formation usually was in a single echelon with designation of a reserve, while that of the motorized rifle company mounted on armored personnel carriers consisted of platoons deployed into a line, with intervals of up to 100 m between vehicles. An extended line was provided for a dismounted assault phase. A motorized rifle platoon attacking in an extended line maintained intervals of up to 40 meters between squads. The tank company combat formation consisted of platoons deployed into a line, with intervals of up to 100 meters between platoons.

In the 1960's the attack without halt in attack position became the principal mode of action of motorized rifle (tank) subunits. If it was possible to ensure secrecy of all measures connected with organization for combat, another possibility was the attack from direct contact with the enemy.

In an attack without halt in attack position, particular importance was attached to moving motorized rifle (tank) subunits forward from the assembly areas. It would be effected with maximum secrecy and concealment. When preliminary artillery bombardment began the artillery battalion attached to or supporting the battalion, as well as tanks, guns and antitank missiles would destroy enemy personnel and weapons on the FEBA and at immediate defense depth. Combat engineer subunits would be clearing lanes through obstacles at this time.

When delivery of fire on the defending adversary began, the motorized rifle battalion would initiate sequential deployment into company and platoon columns, and on approaching the final coordination line would redeploy into combat formation.

With an attack from a position of direct contact, the motorized rifle battalion (company) would take its attack position in the night prior to the attack. As a rule a company would deploy in a single trench. The tank subunits attached to the motorized rifle battalions would shift to the attack from assembly positions.

Having breached the obstacles, the motorized rifle subunits, acting in coordination with tanks and supported by artillery fire, would penetrate the enemy's forward defense positions and destroy him with fire from all weapons. A new element here was the fact that armored personnel carriers would not be pulled into shelters as had been the case previously but would offer supporting fire to the attacking subunits.

In case nuclear weapons were employed, tanks subunits would be employed to mount an attack on independent axes. They would not be dispersed, however; they would usually operate as elements of a tank battalion.

Having completed destruction of the enemy on the FEBA and exploiting the results of nuclear strikes, airstrikes, artillery fire and fire from other weapons, as well as gaps in the enemy's defense, the subunits would continue their sustained advance to depth.

Counterattacks were to be repulsed with fire and attack without a preliminary halt. If the counterattacking enemy was superior in manpower and weapons, he would be defeated with the fires of a portion of the forces from an advantageous position, while the remaining forces would attack the flank.

Consequently tactics of waging an offensive engagement, both with the employment of nuclear weapons and with utilization only of conventional weapons, were elaborated in the 1960's.

Thus in the postwar years offensive tactics experienced further development, as a result of change in the character of enemy defense, continuous growth in the combat capabilities of rifle (motorized rifle) and tank subunits, their full motorization and improvement in the skill of military personnel.

There was a clear trend toward widening the offensive frontage, increasing the depth of missions, and dispersing subunit combat formations.

The offensive frontage of the rifle (motorized rifle) battalion almost doubled in the first postwar period. With the appearance of nuclear weapons on the battlefield, the battalion offensive frontage became even broader, extending to 2 km.

The depth of combat missions of rifle (motorized rifle) subunits had almost doubled prior to the appearance of nuclear weapons and reached 3-4 km for the battalion. Under conditions of employment of nuclear weapons, the combat mission of the motorized rifle (tank) battalion reached up to 6-8 km in depth. Its division into immediate and subsequent missions promoted improvement in organization of coordinated action and improved stability of control during combat.

Dispersal of subunit combat formations provided for ensuring their survivability under conditions of potential enemy employment of mass destruction weapons.

In the course of an offensive engagement tactics called for a sustained penetration of a fortified enemy defense at a rapid pace. Skillfully exploiting the results of nuclear strikes, artillery bombardment and airstrikes, the attacking subunits would boldly and decisively penetrate through the breaches and gaps in the enemy's combat formations, would conduct deeper maneuver, would attack preferably in the flank and rear, and extensively employed envelopments.

Consequently, the combination of nuclear and conventional firepower with increased troop motorization created the prerequisites for sharply increasing the rate of advance. The experience of postwar field exercises confirmed that modern motorized rifle subunits, mounted on armored personnel carriers

(infantry combat vehicles), are capable of advancing at the heels of nuclear strikes and artillery bombardment at a pace several times greater than the rate of advance of tank subunits in the last war.

Equipping of subunits with qualitatively new combat equipment, increasing the responsibility of personnel for its mastery and skillful employment in combat, and increase in the swiftness and complexity of combat operations enhanced the role and significance of party-political work in the subunits. Instilling of a strong, aggressive spirit under the complex conditions of nuclear war and overcoming of the psychological barrier caused by the enemy's employment of mass destruction weapons constituted most important tasks for political workers, party and Komsomol organizations. Adoption of the position of deputy company commander for political affairs constitutes an indication of the concern of the Communist Party and Soviet Government for instilling in enlisted personnel, noncommissioned officers and officers a love of the homeland and the Soviet people and preparedness to defeat the enemy with modern weapons.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Taktika" [Tactics], Voyenizdat, 1966, page 79.
2. A rifle battalion operating on the main axis of advance would receive the following reinforcements: 2-3 tank companies, 1-2 self-propelled artillery batteries, 2-3 artillery battalions.
3. "Polevoy ustav Sovetskoy Armii (polk, batal'yon)" [Soviet Army Field Service Regulations (Regiment, Battalion)], Voyenizdat, Article 124.
4. Ibid., Article 145.
5. "Boyevoy ustav pekhoty Sovetskoy Armii (otdeleniye, vzvod, rota)" [Soviet Army Infantry Field Manual (Squad, Platoon, Company)], Voyenizdat, 1953, Article 24.
6. "Polevoy ustav...", op. cit., Article 164.
7. "Boyevoy ustav...", op. cit., 1959, Article 80.
8. "Boyevoy ustav Sukhoputnykh voysk (batal'yon-rot)" [Ground Forces Field Manual (Battalion-Company)], Voyenizdat, 1964, Article 89.
9. Ibid., Article 90.

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MARSHAL PERESYPKIN ON ORGANIZING WARTIME COMMUNICATIONS

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24 Jun 77 pp 56-62

[Article by Mar Sig Trps I. Peresypkin: "Organization and Execution of Communications in Defensive Operations of Combined-Arms Armies"]

[Text] The experience of defensive operations of combined-arms armies in the Great Patriotic War convincingly confirmed the important role of all means of communication in ensuring continuous troop control. As a rule organization of communications in combined-arms armies was effected by special organic subunits and units. In the defense army headquarters employed wire, radio and mobile means of communication.

Considerable difficulties arose in organizing communications in army defensive operations in the first period of the war, difficulties which led to numerous troop control disruptions. We shall mention only the main incidents. As a result of the enemy's treacherous and sneak attack, penetration by the enemy's panzer forces and the operations of numerous raiding parties, many communications facilities, particularly permanent lines and centers, were destroyed, while there was not enough time to construct new ones.

The abolishment of rifle corps in 1941 also had a negative effect on army headquarters activities aimed at ensuring uninterrupted troop control and organization of stable communications.

With the existence of corps, the total number of army line signal units was based on providing communications with 3 or 4 corps. Following their elimination and the disbandment of their signal battalions, the number of combined units and units directly subordinated to the army commanding general increased substantially, which greatly complicated management and organization of communications in the army. During the defense of Moscow, for example, the 30th Army of the Western Front had more than 20 combined units and independent units, the 16th Army had 14, and sometimes as many as 24, while the 49th Army had 14. A similar situation was also observed at that time in

the armies of the other fronts. It is quite obvious that under these conditions it was exceedingly difficult to maintain continuous control and uninterrupted communications within the armies.

Also influencing the organization of communications was the fact that at the beginning of the war the majority of combined-arms armies did not contain the designated number of line signal units, while their planned deployment in the western frontier military districts was thwarted by the sudden outbreak of hostilities. The 8th and 11th armies of the Northwestern Front, for example, contained only approximately 10 percent of such units in the first weeks of military operations. Similar difficulties arose at that time on the other fronts. This could not help but affect the performance of signal personnel.

At the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War, army signal units and subunits were significantly underequipped with communications gear, a result of substantial losses of communications equipment and increased communications equipment requirements for supplying a large number of newly-formed units and combined units of all arms, which contained organic signal subunits. There was at that time an acute shortage of telephone-telegraph and radio equipment, as well as various line equipment. A lack of line supplies required for building permanent and laying pole and ground cable communications lines forced senior signal troop commanders to utilize all authorized supplies plus various materials at hand.

Thus the difficult situation conditions forced army signal troops commanders to organize communications in defensive operations with limited manpower and means. Many armies began employing small, lightweight lines.

We shall examine organization of communications in an army defensive operation with the example of the 16th Army (Lt Gen K. K. Rokossovskiy, commanding; chief signal service Col P. Ya. Maksimenko) of the Western Front in the fall of 1941.

At that time it contained 14 combined units, which had sustained considerable casualties and losses, and up to 10 independent units. In mid-November wire communications with the combined units employed permanent wires, on three axial routes: with the cavalry divisions -- through the army commanding general's auxiliary command post, situated in Timonino; with the rifle divisions, L. Dovator's cavalry group, and the tank brigades -- via the towns of Nudol' and Istra. Army headquarters also endeavored to make extensive use of radio communications and mobile equipment for troop control. When hostile aircraft destroyed the communications center at Shestakovo, wire communications operated with serious interruptions. During this period radio communications were the principal and frequently the sole means of communication.¹ The command of the Western Front reinforced with communications gear the 16th Army, which was defending on one of the most important axes -- the Volokolamsk. As of 30 November the army command post located in Korostovo had communications with the following: with front headquarters -- telegraphic (two permanent wire lines via Skhodnya-Moscow, by ST-35 and Morse), shortwave, and telephone

(by permanent line via Khimki-Moscow); with headquarters of the 5th and 30th armies -- by an 11-AK radio transceiver; with headquarters of the 7th, 8th, 9th Guards, 18th, 126th, 354th Rifle divisions, the II Guards Cavalry Corps, the 27th, 145th, 1st Guards, 28th and 146th tank brigades -- wire and telegraph (by permanent lines, radio and liaison aircraft), and with the army headquarters support echelon, located in Zagorsk -- by radio and mobile means.²

One important feature of organization of wire communications in a defensive operation of the 16th Army, as of other armies, was the extensive employment, alongside T/E equipment, of stationary civilian communications facilities. In Moscow and its suburbs there existed at that time an extensive network of buried cable and permanent overhead communications lines operated by the People's Commissariat of Communications, the People's Commissariat of Railroads, Internal Affairs, the Main Administration of the Civil Air Fleet, Mosenergo, the Moscow subway, and other agencies. In addition, there were operating in Moskovskaya Oblast, in its rayon centers and major towns various stationary communications centers operated by the People's Commissariat of Communications. All this enabled army headquarters to conduct wire communications with divisions and sometimes even with regiments, employing for the most part permanent lines.

Extensive utilization of fixed civilian communications facilities for satisfying the army's needs was to some degree a solution to the most difficult situation, since it enabled communications chiefs to establish reserve field line communications facilities.

Another feature of organization of communications in the armies was the construction of new permanent lines bypassing major towns, rail lines, highways and graded unpaved roads, in order to lessen vulnerability to hostile aircraft, which were attacking these rail lines and roads.

Consequently wire communications were the principal means of communication in army defensive operations in 1941. Communications were organized as a rule along axes, and during withdrawal along an axis which most frequently coincided with the directions of displacement of army headquarters, where communications centers would be sequentially deployed, and in some cases message collection centers. At intermediate points wire communications would be set up between army headquarters and subordinate combined units by one of the indicated modes, depending on the situation.

The large number of combined units and units operating in the armies, the substantial frontage of defended areas, and systematic destruction of communications lines by hostile aircraft greatly complicated the job of maintaining stable wire communications. Radio communications were employed under difficult combat situation conditions.

In the armies radio communications on the most important axes were being organized with increasing frequency not in radio nets but radio links. This

effective method was first employed for communications with combined-arms units and combined units operating in a state of encirclement, during withdrawal, as well as with tank and cavalry units. We should note that the RB, RBM and Sever low-power portable shortwave radio sets were first employed for long-range communications in the armies of the Western Front during the period of defense.

Messengers on horseback, skis, and liaison officers employing automobiles and motorcycles were frequently used in army defensive operations, and liaison aircraft were also extensively employed. This helped army commanders and staffs maintain continuous control over the combat operations of the subordinate units and combined units.

The 12th Independent Signal Regiment of the 16th Army first became famous in the historic Battle of Moscow. The 12th Signal Regiment, Maj D. V. Letkov, commanding, was renamed the 1st Guards Signal Regiment for valor displayed in fighting for the homeland, for staunchness and courage, discipline and organization, and the heroism displayed by its men. It was the Soviet Army's first guards signal regiment.

The signal troops which took part in the Battle of Moscow utilized all their knowledge and ability in order successfully to perform the tasks of ensuring uninterrupted communications. Army Gen G. K. Zhukov, commanding general of the Western Front, evaluating the state of communications in the period of defensive engagements and battles, stated: "The nearness of the capital and utilization of all government and civilian communications lines enabled us, thanks to the indefatigability of N. D. Psurtsev, the front's communications chief, and his subordinates to maintain reliable communications via telephone and telegraph lines with Headquarters, Supreme High Command (Hq SHC), the General Staff and all the front's armies.... When necessary front headquarters or the front's command posts could establish direct communications with a given division."³

In the summer-fall campaign of 1942 it was extremely difficult for the signal troops to secure uninterrupted communications in the armies of the Stalingrad Front, and particularly the 62d Army (Lt Gen V. I. Chuykov, commanding; chief signal service Col I. A. Yurin), the troops of which were defending the heart of Stalingrad. Thanks to the selfless labors of the signal troops, skillfully utilizing both field and surviving underground cables of the city's telephone system, succeeded in successfully establishing headquarters communications and connecting wire communications to the rifle battalions and sometimes to the companies and platoons.

During the fighting in the city field cables were run through building basements, sewer lines and, where possible, buried in the ground. In spite of all measures to protect them, however, they were frequently damaged by hostile artillery fire and airstrikes. Intelligent initiative was displayed in this difficult situation by Sr Lt A.D. Listrovoy, signal company commanding officer of the 37th Guards Rifle Division. He set up special repair teams in order to achieve rapid repair of damage and the establishment of communications,

and he set up along the lines around the clock small duty teams and individual signal personnel. We must particularly emphasize the heroic actions of many signal subunits of the rifle battalions, regiments and divisions.

By the end of the first period of the war the signal units and subunits of the combined arms armies were practically up to authorized strength. The quantity of available equipment had increased. All this played an important role in securing troop control.

Let us examine organization of communications in the army defensive operation of the 64th Army (Lt Gen M. S. Shumilov, commanding; Lt Col A. N. Borisenko, chief of signal service) at Stalingrad.

As of 1 November 1942 this army (the headquarters of which were situated on Sarepta backwater (south of Beketovka), had established communications with General Headquarters by RAF radio; with Stalingrad Front Headquarters (Krasnyy Sad)⁴ -- by radio and Baudot, ST-35 and Morse telegraphy, high-frequency telephonic communications by overhead wire via Krasnoarmeysk, and low-frequency telephonic communications by permanent wires via Krestovyy, as well as with mobile equipment; with the front auxiliary command post (Okhra) -- telephone and radio communications; with 62d Army Headquarters -- radio; with 57th Army Headquarters -- radio, Morse telegraphy and telephone communications by permanent lines, and with mobile equipment; with headquarters of the 1st Brigade of the Volga Flotilla -- radio and telephone communications by pole line; with the headquarters of the army combined units -- radio and telephone communications by cable line, and by mobile means (see diagram).

The army alternate command post and auxiliary control facility maintained communications: with front headquarters -- by radio and telephone; with the headquarters of the combined units and army rear services directorate -- by telephone, permanent lines.

Such elaborate and dependable wire communications, which had been rarely encountered prior to the Battle of Stalingrad, enabled 64th Army Headquarters to direct its subordinate troops firmly and uninterruptedly.⁵

We should emphasize that in the defense of Stalingrad the signal troops of the 62d and 64th armies acquired considerable experience in organizing communications across a major river (Volga), experience which was utilized in subsequent operations.

Organization of communications in army defensive operations experienced further development and improvement in the second period of the war. The headquarters of all armies maintained telephone and radio communications with the General Staff, as well as multiple-link telephone, telegraph and radio communications with the headquarters of fronts and adjacent armies. Army headquarters maintained stable telegraph, telephone and radio communications with all combined units and units.

A distinctive feature of organization of wire communications in army defensive operations on the Kursk Salient was the extensive employment of auxiliary communications centers and monitoring-testing facilities, establishment of communications between headquarters employing from two to three links, establishment of bypass links, as well as placement of authorized line communications facilities on backup status by utilizing permanent lines. Here army signal units began extensively utilizing two-wire pole lines for communications between army, corps and division headquarters, a practice which had not been followed in our army prior to the war. Their advantage over a single-wire line lay in the fact that they had a simultaneous telephone and telegraph communications capability. At that time this was a great achievement, and in addition they could be constructed much faster than permanent lines of the same capacity, and communications conducted on these lines were quite dependable. Two-wire pole lines began to be extensively employed in all subsequent operations. Such wire communications were organized, for example, in the 13th, 6th Guards and other armies.

Thus wire communications also remained the principal means of communication in army defensive operations of the second period of the war. Communications maintained an extensive multiple-channel network providing reliable securement of troop control to two command echelons, and even to three in armies defending on the main axes (down to the regiment level inclusive).

During this time organization of radio communications underwent further development in army defensive operations. As an example we shall cite the 13th Army, which in the summer of 1943 was occupying a very important area of the Kursk Salient (Lt Gen N. P. Pukhov, commanding; Col I. F. Akhremenko, chief of signal service).

Army headquarters maintained communications: with the General Staff -- by radio link; with front headquarters -- by two radio links (see diagram). Radio communications was maintained with all corps⁶ by the army headquarters radio net, and in addition with each corps by separate links. The army commanding general had his own personal radio which he used to communicate with the commanders of all subordinate combined units. Echelon-bypassing radio communications were established in the army, for which three radio nets were established, maintaining communications with division headquarters.

There was considerable development of radio communications at the headquarters of commanders of artillery, armored and mechanized troops. For the first time they had six radio nets at their disposal.

An important role was played by radio communications in securing control of rocket artillery. In the 13th Army, for example, which received a heavy German attack, there were five independent rocket launcher regiments and one division. This comprised more than 60 percent of the front's total rocket launcher battalions. A specially established radio net was the principal means of control of these units. It made it possible, when necessary, rapidly to concentrate the fire of the rocket launcher units on an army scale.

The following was typical of organization of communications in army defensive operations in the second period of the war: comprehensive utilization of all facilities and multiple-channel communications; placement of the communications centers of all combined units and the majority of armies not in buildings but in dugout shelters equipped in conformity with requirements of special regulations, which increased their survivability; establishment of telephone monitoring and test facilities; reliable security and defense of communications centers and stations; establishment of duty-monitoring radio nets.

Mobile equipment was also extensively utilized during this period. It fully ensured performance of the tasks of the command and army headquarters.

In the third period of the war organization of communications in army defensive operations did not undergo substantial changes in comparison with the second period. This was dictated by the fact that in this period the Soviet Army was mounting primarily offensive operations, and only in the area of Lake Balaton was a defensive operation conducted. Hq SHC promptly ordered the Third Ukrainian Front to shift to the defense. This decision was well-advised. The front established a deeply-echeloned and well-fortified defense and successfully repelled an enemy counteroffensive.

The Balaton defensive operation was conducted in March 1945 by the forces of the Third Ukrainian Front and was the last major operation, in the conduct of which our headquarters once again skillfully organized and maintained uninterrupted communications and continuous troop control in a complex situation.

Let us examine as an example organization of communications in the 27th Army (Col Gen S. G. Trofimenko, commanding; Col V. P. Agafonov, chief of signal service). An extensive wire communications network was set up to serve the command, headquarters staff, commanders and chiefs of arms and services, aviation, rear services. Thanks to this, even numerous disruptions of communications lines by hostile aircraft and artillery did not disrupt stable army troop control.

A new element in this army defensive operation in comparison with past operations was the existence of a large number of bypass communication lines, additional auxiliary communications centers and monitoring-test facilities, which made it possible flexibly to maneuver communications channels.

The 27th Army extensively employed radio communications and mobile equipment for troop control. At the same time they merely supplemented wire communications and were actively incorporated only in heavy periods of fighting (during partial withdrawal of the army's forces, during regroupings, maneuver, and when wire communications were disrupted). Radio communications were most frequently organized in radio links. This was the highest level of organization and securement of communications in a combined arms army defensive operation, achieved thanks to skillful utilization of the wealth of experience gained by signal troops during the war years and increased performance skills in signal personnel.

In conclusion we should note that wire communications were the most extensively employed for securing troop control in army defensive operations, constituting the principal means of communication. Permanent, pole and ground cable lines were employed for this purpose.

Local permanent communications centers and lines were extensively utilized for troop control in defensive operations when possible.

Army headquarters also employed radio communications in defensive operations. Experience indicated that as a rule radio communications were employed for troop control in the dynamics of combat operations, when maneuver and mobility of all arms determined the success of an operation. An exceptionally important role was played by radio communications in organizing and maintaining close coordination between combined arms armies, their combined units and supporting air forces, as well as combined units and units of armored and mechanized troops. Without radio it is difficult to conceive of successful control of coordinating-action troops on the battlefield. Radio communications were effectively employed to warn troops of threat of attack from the air and for control of air defense units.

Various mobile means were also extensively utilized for troop control during the Great Patriotic War. The units and subunits had runners, mounted messengers, ski messengers, and motorcyclists. Army headquarters and combined units employed for the most part automobiles for this purpose, and in some cases armored cars and even tanks. Liaison air squadrons serving army headquarters performed considerable and useful work during this time.

The experience of the war confirmed the correctness of our views that stable and reliable communications are achieved by the combined employment of all means of communication at the disposal of army headquarters. This most important principle of organization of communications was carried out by the majority of chiefs of signal service and always brought success in securing troop control. Many questions pertaining to organization of communications in army defensive operations have retained their significance and can be utilized in the combat and political training of signal personnel.

FOOTNOTES

1. Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Fund 208, List 2559, File 98, Sheet 47.
2. Ibid., Fund 358, List 7161, File 3, Sheet 171.
3. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 10, 1966, page 75.
4. Command post locations are indicated in parentheses.
5. Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense, Fund 341, List 5334, File 2, sheets 27-30.

6. Rifle corps were reestablished in the summer of 1943. Normally a combined-arms army contained three rifle corps.

CAPTIONS

1. Caption to diagram on page 59: Diagram of Wire Communications of the 64th Army in the Defense of Stalingrad.
2. Caption to diagram on page 61: Diagram of Radio Communications of the 13th Army in the Defense at Kursk.

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SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DRAFT OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 13, Jul 77 signed to press
17 Jun 77 pp 11-17

[Editorial: "In the Interests of the People, in the Name of Communism"]

[Text] The life of the Soviet people--the builders of communism--has been marked by epoch-making events and high dynamism. The enormous political and work upsurge, evoked by the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, by the struggle to implement them and by the preparation for the 60th Anniversary of Great October, has reached new heights in connection with the publication and the general discussion which has begun of the draft of the new USSR constitution. This historically important document, produced under the leadership and with the active participation of the CPSU Central Committee, its Politburo and the CC general secretary--comrade L. I. Brezhnev, and basically approved by the May (1977) Plenum of the CC CPSU and Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, expresses an extremely important frontier in the life of our motherland and in its onward development toward communism.

Great October brought our country to the front lines of world social progress. In six decades it has covered a journey equal to centuries. Such an accelerated rising development was achieved to a decided degree thanks to the creative potential which is found in the socialist system and in the basic law of a workers and peasants state. V. I. Lenin and the party always proceeded from the fact that the Soviet constitution is not only a judicial act but also an important political document. They regarded the constitution as a confirmation of the revolution's accomplishments and at the same time a declaration of the primary tasks and goals in constructing a new society. V. I. Lenin said that the Soviet constitution "serves and will continually serve the workers. It is a mighty weapon in the struggle to implement socialism."

Such was our first basic law - the 1918 RSFSR Constitution, which consolidated the accomplishments of Great October and defined the class nature of the Soviet state as a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Such also was the 1924 USSR Constitution which defined the principles for forming a

unified socialist state. Such is also the 1935 USSR Constitution which is now in effect. It legally consolidated the victory of socialist public relationships in the USSR and, in accordance with this resulted in the entire system of power and central organs and election procedures. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, the general secretary of the CC CPSU and chairman of the Constitutional Commission, said in his report at the May (1977) Plenum of the CC CPSU: "The constitutional framework for the development of society, which was developed at that time, has withstood the test of time."

Having given a high rating to the constitutional experience and the majestic achievements of the motherland, comrade L. I. Brezhnev thoroughly analyzed the historical changes which have occurred in our country, in our society and in all the world during the four decades since 1936. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's report is an outstanding political, ideological and theoretical document. It contains the scientific basis for the objective necessity to adopt a new constitution for the USSR. It reveals its enormous importance for the country's internal life and its international significance. It assigns practical tasks connected with the general discussion of its draft.

The new USSR constitution has been called to life by the very progress of social development. It has been caused by the universal and historical accomplishments of socialism which have been achieved by the Soviet people under the wise leadership of the Leninist party, and by great fundamental changes which have affected all areas and all aspects of public life in our country. Indeed, when the USSR constitution now in effect was adopted we had in essence just completed the formation of the foundations for socialism. Now, a developed and mature socialist society--today's highest achievement in social progress--has been built in the Soviet Union. During this stage socialism, developing now on its own base, is ever more fully revealing its creative capabilities and its deep humanistic nature.

The economy of our country has changed beyond recognition. Socialist property predominates completely in it. A single and powerful national economic organism has been put together and successfully operates. It is being improved by combining the scientific and technical revolution with the advantages of the socialist system. Mature socialism is also characterized by a decisive turn toward intensive development of the economy and by a qualitatively new level and scope of production which permit the tasks of creating the material and technical base for communism to be solved immediately, the uninterrupted growth in the workers' well-being to be ensured, and important successes in the economic competition with capitalism to be achieved. The USSR now occupies first place in the world in the production of many basic types of industrial products.

The past decade gives an especially graphic and clear picture of the colossal capabilities of a developed socialist society. Based on its saturation with events of enormous historical significance in the life of the country and in the international arena and on the large scale and complexity of its social and economic development, it occupies a prominent place in the heroic chronicles of communist construction. During these years, the economic potential of our motherland, which had been created during the preceding

50 years, practically doubled. About 4,000 large scale industrial enterprises were constructed and thousands of existing factories and plants were remodeled. The implementation of gigantic and complex programs, which are transforming vast areas of the country, have been expanded on a broad front.

The Soviet Union's international economic position has changed and been strengthened in a very substantial way. At the time the constitution now in effect was adopted, our country in a technological respect was still far from being an **industrially** developed state. Today, the USSR occupies first place in the world in the production of cast iron, steel, oil, iron ore, manganese, chrome, coal, **coke**, cement, tractors (based on total power of engines), diesel locomotives, electric locomotives, and many other types of products.

Our agriculture has taken a large step forward. In 1936 the kolkhoz system was still quite young and not strong. Now, we have created large-scale socialist agricultural production. A total of 2.3 million tractors, 680,000 grain harvesting combines, and many other various types of equipment work within it. During the last decade alone almost twice as many resources were invested in it than during all the preceding years of Soviet power. As a result grain yields grew 1.4 times during the decade despite extremely unfavorable weather conditions.

Such is the tempo and scope of our economic growth. And they are constantly increasing. It is sufficient to say that the carrying out of the plans in the Tenth Five-Year Plan will permit the industrial potential of the country to be doubled by 1980 in comparison with 1970.

Based on achievements in the economic sphere, the material and cultural level of life is steadily increasing and the genuine guarantees of the social and economic rights and political freedoms of the Soviet people are being strengthened. The entire social aspect of Soviet society has been fundamentally transformed. Today, our heroic working class, whose labor lies at the basis of our motherland's power and prosperity and whose ideology, Marxism-Leninism, serves as the guiding light for our movement to the heights of social progress forms two-thirds of the country's population. The Soviet working class today is composed of tens and tens of millions of educated, technically trained and politically mature people. The public activity of the workers and their participation in controlling the state have grown significantly. Our peasantry has also changed. The psychology of today's kolkhoz farmer has been formed on a socialist basis and the level of his literacy and his way of life differs little from those of city dwellers. Soviet intelligentsia, whose proportion in society is invariably growing, has become really popular and socialistic. Finally, the equality of nationalities has become not only judicial but also actual for us.

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said at the May (1977) Plenum of the CC CPSU that the growing social homogeneity of Soviet society is the common denominator of all these changes. The unbreakable union of the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry and the popular intelligentsia has become even stronger. The

differences between the basic social groups are gradually being obliterated. The nations and nationalities of our country are drawing even closer together. A new historical community of people--the Soviet people--has taken shape in the USSR.

Developed socialism, therefore, expresses in itself the high maturity of the economy and the entire system of public relationships which are gradually developing into communist relationships. With the building of mature socialism, with the transition of all layers of the population to the ideological and political position of the working class, our state, which arose as the dictatorship of the proletariat, has developed into a state of all the people. Naturally, all this objectively required the development and adoption of a new constitution for the USSR.

The goals and principles and the basis for the organization of our socialist state of all the people are in the draft constitution being discussed. From beginning to end they are permeated with enthusiasm for the struggle for a better future for the Soviet people and for communism. They are enunciated and subjected to legislative consolidation. It is written in the draft:

"The Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics is a socialist state of all the people which expresses the will and interests of the working class, the peasants and the intelligentsia, of all nations and nationalities in the country.

"All power in the USSR belongs to the people.

"The people exercise state power through the councils of people's deputies which form the political basis of the USSR.

All other state organs are under the control and are accountable to the councils."

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union exists for the people and serves the people. Its actual place in our society and state is accurately reflected in the draft constitution. It says that the CPSU is the leading and directing force in Soviet society and the heart of its political system and of all state and public organizations. This proposition in the draft reflects the real requirements of our development. With the growth in the scope of and with the growing complications in the tasks of building communism and of various international problems, the leading role of the Leninist Party is justifiably growing. Armed with Marxist-Leninist teachings, the CPSU determines the general prospects for society's development and the USSR's domestic and foreign policy line. It directs the Soviet people's great creative activity. It imparts a planned and scientifically based nature to the struggle for the victory of communism.

The selection of comrade L. I. Brezhnev, the general secretary of the CC CPSU, as president of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR is

responsive to the high interests of Soviet society and the state. A prominent figure in our party, in the Soviet state, and in the international communist and workers movement, comrade L. I. Brezhnev is devoting his outstanding talent as an organizer, as a far-sighted politician and as a Leninist-type leader to whole-hearted service to the people. He enjoys the boundless trust and love of the party and people. The selection of comrade L. I. Brezhnev as president of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was also an expression of the people's will. As is written in the draft constitution, the Soviet is the highest organ of state power in the USSR.

The Soviet people have accepted with great satisfaction the fact that the main thrust of the new propositions in the draft constitution for the USSR is the broadening and deepening of socialist democracy. In the document being discussed the basic ways for further developing socialist democracy are defined with extreme clarity: ever wider participation of the workers in controlling the affairs of society and the state, improvement in the state apparatus, increasing the activity of social organizations, improving popular control, strengthening the legal basis of state and public life, expanding publicity, and the continual consideration of public opinion.

According to the new constitution, the democratic principles for the formation and activity of the councils, which it suggests be called Councils of People's Deputies, will first of all receive further development. It provides for strengthening their role in solving the most important questions in the life of our society and in exercising control over executive and administrative organs and over the activity of organizations and officials. It points out the necessity of strengthening the ties of the councils and their deputies with the masses.

Further development of our socialist democracy will be implemented along the line of increasing the role of the trade unions, the Komsomol, and cooperative and other mass public organizations. Their right to participate in the solution of political economic, social, and cultural questions and their right of legislative initiative is consolidated. At the same time it is once again emphasized that the state of all the people takes into consideration the interests of all social layers and population groups. A statement on the role of workers' collectives is also included in the draft USSR constitution. This answers the fundamental policy of our party concerning the development of a democratic basis for controlling production.

The chapter in the draft constitution, which establishes the essence and prospects for the USSR economic system's progress is permeated with a concern for the further development of democracy. In preserving the fundamental proposition that the basis of this system is socialist ownership of the means of production, the draft contains a substantial addition to this confirmed wording. It proposes along with state and kolkhoz and cooperative forms of property to legalize the property of trade unions and other public organizations. There are constitutional provisions for securing such an

important start for the socialist economy as the combining of planned centralized direction with the economic independence and initiative of enterprises and associations.

The level of social, economic, and political development which has been achieved permits the proposition in the basic law of the USSR concerning Soviet citizens' rights to be significantly improved. A broad set of social and economic rights as well as the Soviet people's political rights and freedoms are guaranteed in the constitution now in effect. At the present time the substance of these rights has been deepened considerably. The guarantees standing behind them have become richer and weightier. That is why the new constitution proposes to introduce substantial additions. Let us mention that formerly it talked about the right to work. Now, it is contemplated adding the right to select a profession, type of occupation and work in accordance with a citizen's vocation, abilities, professional training and education as well as--and what is no less important--considering public requirements. According to the new constitution, not only the right to material security in case of sickness and loss of ability to work but also the right to health protection will be guaranteed.

The draft USSR constitution completely confirms freedom of speech, press, assembly, meetings, marching and demonstrations. At the same time it contains such important additions as the right of citizens to introduce suggestions to state and public organizations, to criticize shortcomings in work, and to lodge a complaint in court against the actions of officials and the right to legal defense against encroachments upon life, health, property, personal freedom, honor and dignity.

Naturally, exercise of the rights and freedoms is inseparable from a citizen's performance of his duties to society and the state. To observe the constitution, Soviet laws, and the rules for a socialist society, to work conscientiously, to safeguard socialist property, to respect people's dignity, to strengthen the friendship of nations and nationalities, to be implacable toward anti-social acts, to contribute in every way possible to the protection of public order and to the development of friendship and cooperation between the peoples of other countries, to maintain and strengthen universal peace--all these constitutional duties of a USSR citizen are dictated by the interests of Soviet society and by the norms of our communist morality.

The workers in the cities and villages and the fighting men in the army and navy have greeted with special satisfaction and understanding the articles in the draft USSR constitution which oblige each citizen to defend the interests of the Soviet state, and contribute to strengthening its power and authority. The defense of the socialist motherland is the sacred duty of every citizen of the USSR. Military service in the ranks of the USSR's armed forces is the honorable duty of Soviet citizens. The Soviet people carefully observe developments in the international situation. Of course, during the 40 years since the adoption of the constitution now in effect, the international position of the Soviet Union and the entire social and political appearance of the world has greatly changed. The capitalist encirclement of the

USSR has been built. Socialism has been transformed into a world system. A mighty socialist commonwealth has been formed. The positions of world capitalism have been substantially weakened. Dozens of young sovereign states have risen in place of the former colonies. The international authority and influence of the country of the soviets have grown immeasurably. As a result the ratio of forces in the world arena has become quite different. A real possibility for averting a new world war has appeared. However, the realization of this possibility still requires a lot of persistent work.

Considering these realities, the Soviet state is organizing its own international activity. It, as the draft USSR constitution says, is consistently following a Leninist policy of peace. It comes out in favor of strengthening the people's security and of broad international collaboration. The USSR's foreign policy is directed toward securing favorable international conditions for building communism in our country, toward strengthening the positions of world socialism, toward supporting the people's struggle for national liberation and social progress, toward preventing aggressive wars, and toward the consistent implementation of the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.

Consistently and firmly following this foreign policy line, the Soviet Union together with the other countries in the socialist commonwealth have made a decisive contribution to the normalization of the international climate and to the relaxation of tensions. However, the relaxation of tensions has quite a few enemies. They operate actively in different ways and from different directions. Although the possibilities of aggressive actions by imperialism have now been significantly curtailed, its nature remains as before. In the camp of imperialism, military budgets are growing excessively. New types of weapons are being created. Military bases are being constructed and military demonstrations are being undertaken.

Under such conditions the defense of the socialist motherland is an objective necessity, the state's most important function and a matter for all the people. The draft constitution says with all certainty: The armed forces have been created and universal military service has been established in the USSR in order to defend socialist accomplishments, the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. The state ensures the country's security and defensive capability. It equips the USSR's armed forces with everything necessary. The duty of the armed forces to the people is to reliably defend the socialist motherland and to be at constant combat readiness in order to guarantee a swift rebuff to any aggressor.

Just as throughout our country, a lot of work on thoroughly studying the materials from the May (1977) Plenum of the CC CPSU has been displayed in the army and navy. A widespread and active discussion of the draft of the new USSR constitution has been organized. Concrete measures to publicize and explain these documents among army and navy men, workers and employers have been planned and are being implemented by military councils, commanders, political organs, and party organizations. Communists are setting the tone in this great political campaign. The results of the May Plenum of the CC

CPSU and the tasks proceeding from comrade L. I. Brezhnev's report to it, are being discussed at party aktiv meetings and in primary party organizations. The draft USSR constitution is being discussed during meetings of the personnel, workers and employees of units, military training institutes, establishments, and production enterprises of the Ministry of Defense as well as during meetings of the members of servicemen's families. Army and navy fighting men heartily and completely approve the draft basic law of the Soviet state.

All this is only the beginning of a lot of work which it is necessary to conduct during this present and very important political campaign. Military councils, commanders, political organs, and party organizations must arrange matters so that the explanation and study of the materials from the May CC CPSU Plenum and the discussion of the draft USSR constitution are integrally linked with publicizing the decisions of the 25th Party Congress and the Soviet people's historical achievements in building communism and so that they are inseparably fused with the preparations for the 60th anniversary of Great October. It is important to thoroughly reveal the leading role of the Leninist party in creating the first socialist state in the world and to show the democratization of Soviet society, the great advantages of the socialist way of life, and the objective necessity to strengthen the motherland's defensive capabilities. It is necessary to unmask energetically and logically the intrigues of our ideological enemies and reveal the anti-humanistic essence of capitalism. These tasks will be solved quicker if all forms of propaganda, of mass agitation, of cultural and educational work, of the men's political training, of party education, and of Komsomol enlightenment are used better. One should not weaken the concern for propagandists and for constantly deepening their knowledge and improving their instructional methods skills.

The party points out: The general discussion of the draft constitution must become a powerful stimulus for further activating the country's public life and for increasing the creative initiative of the masses. Within the armed forces, it is necessary to direct all the work of studying the materials of the May CC CPSU Plenum and of discussing the draft USSR constitution toward further rallying the men around the CPSU and its Leninist Central Committee, toward increasing the vigilance and combat readiness of large units, units and ships, toward strengthening military discipline and regulation procedures, toward successfully performing the tasks assigned by the 25th Party Congress to the army and navy, and toward greeting the 60th anniversary of Great October in a fitting manner.

Our motherland is going to its important jubilee under the sign of new victories in the building of communism. The adoption of a new constitution for the USSR will be still another historic contribution by the party and Soviet people to the great cause of building socialism. It will at the same time be a contribution to the international cause of the struggle of all the world's workers for freedom, for the progress of humanity, and for stable peace on earth.

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INSTRUCTOR GUIDE FOR INDOCTRINATION ON COMBAT TRADITIONS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENIYKH SIL in Russian No 13, Jul 77 signed to press
17 Jun 77 pp 69-77

[Article by Lt Col G. Solov'yev: "Carefully Preserve and Increase the
Glorious Combat Traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces"]

[Excerpts] A total of ten hours is allotted for classes on this topic. It
is possible to use them as follows: to conduct two lectures (presentations)
two hours each, two hours are allotted for the students independent prepara-
tion and four hours for holding a seminar (discussion).

During the lecture (presentation) it is advisable to throw light on the
following questions: 1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the importance of the
party's and people's revolutionary traditions. The 25th CPSU Congress on Soviet
patriotism and socialist internationalism. 2. The substance and importance
of the Soviet armed forces' combat traditions. 3. Increase the combat
traditions of the Soviet army and navy by excellent training and firm military
discipline.

When starting to present the material, a propagandist must emphasize that the
CPSU attaches great importance to indoctrinating Soviet people on the heroic
revolutionary, combat and work traditions of the party and people. It is
necessary to explain to the fighting men that it is customary to consider as
traditions stable customs which have historically taken shape, and rules and
standards of conduct of the people which are passed from generation to
generation, accumulated, and become a moral law for certain groups of the
population, collectives, classes, and entire nationalities.

Traditions have a class nature and express the interests of this or that class.
Some traditions are revolutionary and progressive, others - reactionary and
backward. In the capitalist countries, for example, those traditions which
reflect the interests of the ruling class, the class of the exploiters, are
essentially deeply reactionary because the goal which they pursue, in the
final analysis is the oppression of the people and the receipt of maximum
profit for capitalists at the expense of the cruel exploitation of the working
masses.

At the same time the working people, the proletariat in the capitalist countries, have their own revolutionary and progressive traditions. They are carefully preserved and augmented by new generations. The striving of the popular masses for liberation from the yoke of the exploiters is distinctly and clearly reflected in them.

The CC CPSU resolution "On the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution" points out: "During the 60 years of development along the path of October, outstanding socialist traditions, in which the richest experience of the revolutionary struggle and building are consolidated, have gained a foothold in our society. To preserve these traditions carefully means to develop them creatively. The party skillfully combines and enriches the experience of every generation of warriors who are fighting for the victory of the revolution and for socialism and communism and who are united by common interests and ideals. The guarantee of new victories in the great cause of October lies in the firmly established unity of all classes and social groups, of all nations and nationalities, and of all generations of Soviet society."

I. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the importance of the party's and the people's revolutionary traditions. The 25th CPSU Congress on Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism.

The Communist Party created by V. I. Lenin roused the multi-million mass of workers in Russia to a decisive assault on the bourgeois-landlord system. For the first time in history the workers' struggle against exploitation and social and national oppression ended with their complete victory. New and progressive traditions of the party and people were born, developed and strengthened in this sacred struggle. V. I. Lenin regarded them as a powerful means for indoctrinating the workers. More than once he emphasized the enormous importance of revolutionary traditions in indoctrinating youth and in instilling into their consciousness customs and standards of living formed in the struggle for the workers' cause and for socialism.

The revolutionary traditions of the Communist Party and the Soviet people are customs which have historically taken shape and which have great social value. They are firmly established norms of conduct and modes of thinking and action which are inherent in revolutionary Leninists and in warriors fighting for the workers' freedom and happiness and for communism. They were born in the fierce class battles for freedom and for the building of socialism. They have been strengthened in deeds and actions and in the consciousness and feelings of the Soviet people. On the first anniversary of Great October V. I. Lenin, when unveiling a memorial board to the fighting men of the revolution, said: "We will honor the memory of the October fighting men by swearing an oath before their memorial to follow in their footsteps and imitate their fearlessness and their heroism ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collection of Works], Vol 37, p 172). The Soviet people carry their faithfulness to this Leninist precept. From generation to generation Vladimir Il'ich foresaw that, in the struggle for the victory of the socialist revolution, Russia would be able to put out heroes in the hundreds and in the thousands. Now, all the world has been

convinced of the insight of our leader not only from the examples of revolutionary battles but also during the Great Patriotic War.

Our people's military and work exploits during the past 60 years, their mass heroism, very great steadfastness and courage, and inexhaustible enthusiasm and selflessness both in defending revolutionary accomplishments and in building a new life are unparalleled. The Soviet people have confidently proven that there is no force on earth which could conquer a people who have experienced the happiness of emancipated work and that there is no force which could push them from the path of October and destroy the social system created by these people and native to them--socialism!

All Soviet people and army and navy fighting men have greeted with hearty and unanimous approval the decisions of the May (1977) Plenum of the CC CPSU, at which comrade L. I. Brezhnev, the general secretary of the CC CPSU and chairman of the Constitutional Commission delivered his report, "On the draft of a constitution for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's report at this plenum emphasized that during the four decades since the adoption of the constitution now in effect, profound changes have taken place in our country and in all our society. A developed and mature socialist society has been constructed in the Soviet Union. Great and fundamental changes have affected all aspects of public life as a result of the successes of building socialism under the Communist Party's leadership. All these changes have found their embodiment in the draft of the new constitution for the USSR which reflects a new stage in the development of our state, the most important achievements of the Soviet people, and the tasks which are facing them in building communism. First of all, the further broadening and deepening of socialist democracy-- a democracy of a higher type--is characteristic of the draft as its main direction.

A lot of attention is devoted in the draft of the new constitution to the elaboration of propositions on the rights of Soviet citizens, including their social and economic rights and their civil rights and freedoms along with the duties of citizens to the state and to the people. Special chapters in the draft of the new constitution are devoted to the peace-loving, Leninist foreign policy of the USSR and to the defense of the socialist motherland.

2. The substance and importance of the Soviet armed forces' combat traditions.

When throwing light on the content of this question, a propagandist points out that the glorious traditions of the Soviet armed forces, who have travelled an heroic path of combat and victory under the leadership of the Communist Party, are a powerful and effective weapon of our army and navy. They are one of the important sources of forming high moral, political and combat qualities in Soviet fighting men. They have been put together and developed in the fire of battles against the enemies of our motherland. They are strengthened and augmented in the military work of soldiers during peacetime. The Bolsheviks and progressive workers, who joined the ranks of the army and navy at the party's call, played an especially important role in the formation of the army and navy's combat traditions.

Soviet combat traditions are basically moral standards of conduct. Many of them have become so important that they are reflected in the requirements of the military oath and military regulations.

Next, it is desirable to characterize briefly the most important combat traditions of the Soviet armed forces.

Infinite devotion to the cause of communism, love for the socialist motherland and for socialist countries, confidence in victory over the enemies of the socialist motherland, constant readiness to defend it--these are the most important combat traditions of our army and navy.

One of the main traditions of Soviet fighting men is their faithfulness to the military oath and to military duty and their mass heroism in combat.

A glorious tradition of Soviet fighting men is their striving to improve combat skill, to strengthen military discipline, and to increase political awareness.

One of the outstanding combat traditions of Soviet army and navy fighting men is military comradeship, respect for a commander and his protection in combat.

The concept of military comradeship has been expanded at the present time. It includes the combat friendship of fighting men in fraternal socialist countries. A new tradition has taken shape--the combat comradeship of fighting men in the socialist countries.

A glorious combat tradition in our armed forces is the love of Soviet fighting men for their unit and faithfulness to the combat banner and the ship's ensign.

The carrying of the combat banner to the battlefield always inspired soldiers and poured new strength into them. The unfurled cloth of the combat banner roused fighting men to attack. The combat banner always streamed where things were especially difficult and where a fight to the death seethed.

Today's defenders of the motherland--the fighting men in our glorious armed forces--greatly value the exploits of older generations. They are proud that banners covered with glory make a noise and flap over them. Decorations and ribbons are attached to the combat banner as a testimony of the men's outstanding combat service. It's as if this binds the young fighting men even more closely to the heroic history of his unit. It calls them to augment its combat glory by excellent training and service.

A combat banner is always found with its unit and on the battlefield--in the area of the unit's combat operations. The regulation requires all unit personnel to protect the combat banner selflessly and bravely during combat and not allow it to be seized by the enemy. If the combat banner is lost, the unit commander and the servicemen, directly guilty of this disgrace, are indictable by a military tribunal and the military unit to being broken up.

It is very important that every young fighting man, arriving in a regiment or on a ship, learn about its entire combat journey, about its heroes and combat decorations, and about all its victories during the war and its successes during peacetime training so that he will be proud of his regiment, ship and large unit and defend its honor everywhere. A knowledge of the history of the regiment, ship and large unit raises the men's moral spirit even higher. It instills pride in their military collective. It arouses them to perform service in an exemplary way and to hold sacred faithfulness to the unit's combat banner, the ship's ensign and the military oath.

3. Increase the combat traditions of the Soviet army and navy by excellent training and firm military discipline.

The combat traditions of the army and navy have great importance in the life and combat activity of the troops. They are an important indoctrination factor and contribute to the formation of high moral and combat qualities in our fighting men. Every Soviet fighting man is required to keep sacred and to increase the combat traditions of the Soviet army and navy. Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, the USSR minister of defense, emphasizes: "Soviet fighting men keep sacred faithfulness to the revolutionary and combat traditions of our people... Closely united around the Communist Party, its Leninist Central Committee, and the CC Politburo headed by Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, they vigilantly stand guard with fighting men in the armies of socialist commonwealth countries over the accomplishments of socialism, universal peace, and the security of peoples."

Combat traditions are also enormously important during peacetime. Combat traditions are a source of inspiration in military work. They evoke in our fighting men a sense of justifiable pride in belonging to the Soviet armed forces and a striving to be equal to their heroes and achieve new successes in training, in strengthening military discipline, and in raising combat readiness. It is desirable for a propagandist to tell about the achievements of the best fighting men in the subunit and unit and on the ship during meetings and to tell about those who are going ahead in the socialist competition to greet the 60th anniversary of Great October in a fitting manner. It will also be correct to talk about shortcomings and still unused reserves in improving combat skill, organization, and order in the subunit. The essence of socialist competition consists of fully revealing and realizing all an individual's and collective's capabilities. However, it is still not used everywhere to successfully perform combat training tasks and to raise the men's combat readiness further.

In everyday working life old traditions are strengthened and new ones appear. The striving to be like front line soldiers in everything, to learn courage and combat skill from them, and to be worthy of the shining memory of the heroes who perished in the struggle against imperialist aggressors gives birth to experts in combat professions, rated specialists, excellent soldiers in training, and excellent subunits, units and ships. Many of them wear this honorable title for several years in a row. They achieve

consistently high indices in training and service. The constant development and strengthening of such traditions is the patriotic duty of all army and navy servicemen.

Our military rituals contribute to the observance of combat traditions and to increasing their indoctrinational role. Taking the military oath in a solemn situation near memorials to the combat and work fame of the Soviet people, carrying the unit's combat banner, raising a ship's ensign, trooping the colors, posting guards, military parades, drill formations, and evening inspections have a strong influence on the men's psychology, mode of thinking and feelings. This means a lot. V. I. Lenin emphasized: "Without 'human emotions' there never was nor can there be any human quest for truth" ("Poln. sobr. soch," Vol 25, p 112). On experiencing a high emotional upsurge, a fighting man becomes aware of the honorable obligation of a defender of the socialist motherland. He feels the need to achieve what is heroic and to augment the fame of his unit or ship and, in the final analysis, of the armed forces. The ardent patriotic feelings, evoked during celebrations and in discussions near the map of the unit's or ship's combat journey, in the rooms of combat glory, in museums, near memorials to heroes, and during evening meetings with war and work veterans, are being strengthened and are actively contributing to the formation of communist convictions, standards of conduct, and high moral, political and combat qualities in the soldiers and sailors.

Soviet fighting men continue to develop the best traditions of our army and navy by a conscientious attitude toward training and service, by irreproachable conduct, by an excellent knowledge and skillful performance of their duties, by an expert mastery of combat equipment and weapons, by the ability to endure all the burdens and privations of military service steadfastly and by the constant readiness to spare no resources or energy and, if required, life itself in carrying out the military oath. This is all the more important under the complicated tasks which the Soviet armed forces, equipped with the newest combat equipment, are solving under modern conditions.

True to army and navy combat traditions, Soviet fighting men are steadily improving their ground, air and sea training. They are increasing their combat readiness. They are improving organization and discipline. During the past winter training period they raised themselves to a new level of combat perfection and of mastering combat equipment and the principles for effectively employing it. In military work they are keeping abreast of the exploits of frontline soldiers and are taking their courage and selflessness as an example.

During the summer training period it is necessary to raise the combat training of the troops and naval forces even higher and to struggle even more persistently for the title of a progressive large unit, unit or ship, and to carry out fully and with a high degree of quality socialist obligations in the competition to greet the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution in a fitting manner. The jubilee year of Great October must become a year of intense and effective combat training and a year of further growth in the qualitative indices of military work.

When finishing the presentation of material on this topic, a prop. grandist again emphasizes that the Soviet armed forces are developing on the basis of the revolutionary continuity of generations. The great grandsons of revolutionaries and the sons and grandsons of frontline soldiers stand under combat banners covered with glory. They are ready to defend skillfully and selflessly that which their grandfathers and fathers achieved and defended in fierce battles. The military glory of our valiant armed forces will never fade. In responding to the call of the CC CPSU to greet the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution with new successes, army and navy fighting men are steadily increasing their combat skill. The immortal exploit of those who defended the achievements of October with weapons in their hands, calls and inspires soldiers and sailors to selfless service to our great socialist motherland.

During the hours for independent work, students study V. I. Lenin's works "Speech at the unveiling of a memorial board to the fighting men of the October revolution, 7 November 1918" ("Poln. sobr. soch." Vol 37, pp 171-172), and "Appeal to the Red Army" ("Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 38, pp 234-235); Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's report "Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Next Tasks of the Party in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy" ("Materialy XIV s'yezda KPSS" [25th CPSU Congress Materials], Politizdat, 1976, pp 75-76 and 83); and Chapter 16 of the textbook, "Na strazhe Rodiny" [On Guard Over the Motherland] (Voenizdat, 1974).

When preparing for the classes and when studying the subject, it is useful to arrange meetings between the fighting men and former frontline soldiers, veterans of the unit, ship and large unit. It is desirable to conduct the classes in rooms and museums of combat glory and to make wide use of technical propaganda equipment.

A showing of the films, "Chapayev," "The Tale of a True Man," and "Life of Aleksandr Matrosov"; the documentary, "From Blade to Rocket"; the slide show, "Be Worthy of the Fathers' Glory"; and others will contribute to a thorough mastery of the material.

It is recommended that the following questions be discussed during the seminar: 1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the importance of the party's and the people's revolutionary traditions. 2. What are the most important combat traditions of the Soviet armed forces? 3. What does it mean today to preserve and increase army and navy combat traditions?

Reading material for propagandists

1. Lenin, V. I. "On the National Pride of the Great Russians" in "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collection of Works], Vol 26, pp 106-110.
2. Lenin, V. I. "Speech to the Workers and Red Army General Conference in the Bog ozhsko-Simonovskiy Rayon, 13 May 1920" in "Poln. sobr. soch." Vol 41, pp 120-121.

3. Brezhnev, L. I. "Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Next Tasks of the Party in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy" in "Materialy XIV s"yeda. KPSS" [25th CPSU Materials], Politizdat, 1976, pp 75-76 and 83.

4. Brezhnev, L. I. "Speech at the solemn meeting devoted to awarding the Gold Star medal to the hero city of Tula" in PRAVDA, 19 January 1977

5. Brezhnev, L. I. "On the Draft of a Constitution for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Report to the CC CPSU Plenum on 24 May 1977" in PRAVDA, 5 June 1977.

6. "Draft of the Constitution for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" in PRAVDA, 4 June 1977.

7. Lotincev, B. F. "A Great Victory" in PRAVDA, 9 May 1977.

8. Yepishev, A. A. "Mogucheye oruzhiye partii" [A Mighty Weapon of the Party], Voenizdat, 1973, pp 248-263.

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INSTRUCTIONS ON IMPOSING PARTY PUNISHMENTS

Moscow KOMEINIST VOORUZHENNIYI SILL in Russian No 13, Jul 77 signed to press
17 Jul 77 p 36

[Article: "How Decisions Are Made on Imposing Party Punishments"]

[Text] Based on the practice which has been established in party organizations, if several suggestions for punishments are forthcoming when a communist's misdemeanor is being discussed at a party meeting, they are normally put to a vote not in the order of their proposal but according to the degree of severity. This is advisable. It can happen that the proposal for the severest punishment, for example, expulsion from the party, is the last one forthcoming. Therefore, it is first necessary to decide whether the individual remains in the party and, depending on this, to examine the other proposals. If the proposal on expulsion from the party collects the number of votes, prescribed by regulations, from those present at the meeting and the decision to expel is made, the voting on the other proposals (if they are not withdrawn by those who introduced them) does not change the substance of the matter.

If the proposal on expulsion from the party does not gather the necessary number of votes, then all party members, including those who voted for expulsion, must decide what punishment it is necessary to impose on the comrade who committed the misdemeanor. First, the proposal on the severest punishment is put to a vote and then the rest. In doing this, all communists, including those who voted for the previous proposal, participate each time in the voting. The results of the voting on all proposals must be entered in the minutes of the meeting.

A decision to expel a communist from the party is considered adopted if no less than two-thirds of the party members present at the meeting vote for it.

The decision to impose other party punishments is adopted by a simple majority of the votes. This means that such a decision is considered adopted if more than half of the party members present at the meeting vote for it. Only under these circumstances will the real will of the party collective be expressed in the decision which is adopted, and any possibility that the minority can pass this or that decision in spite of the will, opinion and views of the majority is excluded.

But what if as a result of the voting none of the proposals gathers the number of votes necessary to pass it? In this case the question of imposing punishments on the communist who committed the misdemeanor is transferred for solution to the higher party department: to the party committee or to the party commission attached to the political section. The decision of these party organs is made in the same way as in the primary organizations. That means that the decision to expel requires no less than two-thirds of the votes and the imposition of other punishments--more than half of the votes of the members of the elected party organ who participated in its session.

COUWRECHT: KOMMUNIST VOORUMLAETTINGEN BEL, 1977

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