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TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

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TRADITIONS OF GUARDS CHAPAYEV DIVISION STRESSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 May 77 p 2

[Article by Guards Maj Gen G. Grakhov, commander of the Guards Motorized Rifle Sinel'nikovo-Budapest Red Banner, Order of Suvorov and Order of Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy Division Imeni V. I. Chapayev of the Red Banner Kiev Military District: "The Springs of Courage"]

[Text] During these spring days, a particularly holiday and uplifted atmosphere reigns in the units and subunits of our division which carries the name of the legendary V. I. Chapayev. The personnel of the division are greeting the brilliant holiday of Victory in the jubilee year with the complete fulfillment of the socialist pledges in the winter training period. The first goals have been successfully reached in the struggle for the title of leading formation of the Armed Forces.

The difficult and intense time of testing is over. For the time being the roar of engines on the tank training grounds has died out, and shots are no longer heard on the training fields. But the mind returns again and again to the stirring events of the recent inspection. The personnel in the inspection exercises showed high organization and dedication, and carried out the missions with great enthusiasm. The officers, warrant officers ["praporshchik"], sergeants and soldiers--everyone who had the high honor of being the direct inheritors of the glory of the Chapayev troops--were linked by common goals and thoughts.

During one of the pre-May days I visited the exercises in the company commanded by Guards Lt Ye. Yerokhin. Hero of the Soviet Union, Guards Sgt I. Panganis has been entered in perpetuity on the rolls of the subunit. The company both in firing and in driving excellently carried out the required exercises. The commander set the example in everything for his subordinates.

In assessing what has been achieved by Guards Lt Yerokhin and the personnel of the company headed by him, I experienced a feeling of satisfaction. The recent workers and kolkhoz members, having become soldiers, in a short period of time have successfully mastered the powerful military equipment

which the people have entrusted to them. Hence the commanders, political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations have not invested so much labor in vain in the responsible task of raising combat readiness and the teamwork of the units and subunits. Thus, still another successful step has been taken in the struggle for the leading formation.

The heart is filled with a warm feeling when one thinks of the officers who during the entire winter training period constantly, day in and day out, led their subordinates to high goals. One cannot help but say a good word about Guards Lt Col F. Dobizha-Kazarov who was awarded the order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces," Third Degree, or about Guards Capt A. Vlasenko, the battalion of which won the title of outstanding. I read carefully the columns of figures showing the results of the inspection exercises in the battalion. Behind them one can feel the military inspiration of the guardsmen. The personnel of the subunit completed the winter period with indicators which they planned to attain by the end of the training year. They were helped by the reserves found in the course of the competition. All the officers and warrant officers here have become specialists first and second class. The men of the battalion exceed the military standards by 15-20 percent.

For several years the men of the battalion where Guards Sr Lt S. Fastovetskiy is the deputy commander for political affairs, the combat training missions have been fulfilled with only good and excellent grades. And they showed their best during the present inspection as well. Everyone who should have become class specialists, and 50 percent of them had a higher class rating. Here a large role has been played by the subunit commanders Guards Capt P. Rykov and Guards Sr Lt V. Kopylov who possess high professional training and procedural skills.

When one visits the division, one immediately enters the alley of Heroes of the Soviet Union. These are the frontline soldiers who came from the formation. Courageous faces looking at us from the flames of war.... Here is the portrait of Guards Lt Pavel Grishko. In December 1944, near Budapest, the officer with a small group of soldiers, captured the edge of a small population point. For 6 firey days, the continuous attacks of the Nazis were broken on the iron strength and courage of the handful of courageous soldiers.

Next to this are the portraits of the Shironin soldiers. Having engaged the Nazi tanks in a duel, 25 soldiers of the platoon under the command of officer Petr Shironin destroyed 13 tanks, 2 assault guns and an armored vehicle. All the Shironin men, including 20 posthumously, were awarded the title of Hero. They did not let the enemy pass, having shown unprecedented tenacity and loyalty to the motherland, to the party, and to military duty.

Here, in the compound, are photographic stands telling about the military feats of the men of the 1970's and the leaders in the competition of the jubilee year. Look at the portraits of the frontline soldiers and the photographs of the guardsmen who were born after the war and you can literally

hear the roll call of the generations. Both those who fought for Soviet power under the immediate command of V. I. Chapayev, and those whose lot it was to undergo the severe testing of the Great Patriotic War, and those who unstintingly are mastering the weapons of our times and who combine wholehearted loyalty to the cause of the Leninist party and a feeling of personal responsibility for defending socialism.

The sources of our successes are in the unshakeable loyalty of the men to the military traditions of their fellow soldiers. These traditions are fervently protected in the formation, they are held sacred and added to.

...The motorized rifle company was preparing for field firing. On the eve of leaving for the range, the unit political worker again told the men of the feat of Sgt I. Panganis. The officer was able to find words that were inspiring and at the same time simple, words which reached the depths of the human heart. The men joined the struggle for hitting the targets with the first shot or round. One must see the enthusiasm of the firers and the responsibility which they show for carrying out the exercise. As a result, the firing skills of our subunits are high and stable.

The struggle for the title of best specialists has also become an effective form of the competition in our division. The moral aspect is particularly important and valuable in it. Only one who in mastering the equipment and weapons at the same time is a model of discipline, high civil awareness and moral purity can become one of the best specialists.

Understandably the title of best is given to few. But for all there is an elevated, noble goal for which they constantly strive. This mobilizing factor in the competition is an important reserve for us in the struggle for a leading formation. The feeling of responsibility for the safety of the motherland and an awareness of the continuous and vital link of the times and generations grow stronger in the men day in and day out.

The Chapayev guardsmen fought their way more than 1,500 km over the firey roads of the Great Patriotic War. The division has been awarded orders and presented honorary names. The Chapayev division made a worthy contribution to the Great Victory. For feats shown in the battle against the Nazi invaders, 85 men of the formation were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Four of them have been entered in perpetuity in the rolls of the division subunits.

Need it be said what a great honor this is to serve in a formation which has a legendary geneology. The personnel of the division are carrying out the training plans and the socialist pledges with great tenacity. The communists of the formation set the example for everyone.

To be a member of the Chapayev division means to be able to defend the motherland in the Chapayev manner. For those who stand beneath the glory-wreathed guards colors of the division, the demand is a double one. This

is felt with particular force when the division is visited by guests such as veterans of the formation as well as persons from the homeland of V. I. Chapayev. The latter follow with particular closeness our successes in military training. In the homeland of Vasiliy Ivanovich, among the preinduction youth, a competition is underway for the right to serve in our division.

When the formation is visited by fellow countrymen of Chapayev or Chapayev veterans, the men answer their question of whether they carry the colors of the home division high, and whether they are justifying the title of guardsmen. The desire to continue the traditions of their fathers and to be worthy of the glory of the older generations, and a feeling of responsibility for defending the victories of the revolution--these are like deep springs which give the men an inexhaustible supply of strength, tenacity and courage. It is pleasing to note that our men are not content with what has been achieved, but clearly see the unsolved problems and the unused reserves. In the division, the search has not ended for ways to improve the training process and effectiveness of the socialist competition. At present preparations are being completed for the start of the summer training. Each minute is strictly accounted for. All the deeds and thoughts of the Chapayev guardsmen are aimed at properly celebrating the 60th anniversary of Great October.

10272
CSC: 1801

FOLLOWUP ON PERSONNEL PROBLEMS AT DEPOT REPORTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 May 77 p 2

[Article by Lt Col (Ret) I. Moshkovskiy, part-time correspondent of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "Arrogance"]

[Text] Maj V. Shishkanov and Maj (Res) G. Drach have worked in one collective, a depot, for more than a year. Comrade Shishkanov heads this collective, and Comrade Drach is his subordinate. It happened that Shishkanov criticized Drach for something and demanded that he rectify the designated shortcomings. Communist Drach, in turn, at times criticized communist Shishkov at party meetings for mistakes and omissions made by him. In a word, there were reciprocal complaints. However, things did not reach the point of conflict.

But then in the autumn of last year, Grigoriy Anisimovich Drach, upon a recommendation of the party organization, was elected the chairman of the local [trade union] committee. Having become the head of the trade union organization, Grigoriy Anisimovich decided to revive its activities and raise its role in the production life of the collective. Seemingly such a desire on the part of the local committee would be approved and supported in every possible way by the chief of the depot. Particularly as the former membership of the local committee was little concerned with these questions and carried out its work passively.

However, Vasiliy Fedorovich Shishkanov did not consider it necessary to seek the advice of the chairman or the members of the local committee or listen to their opinions. He remained aloof from the trade union organization and did not even feel it necessary to learn when the local committee met or what it would be discussing. Out of his old custom, the depot head continued to settle the questions which were the competence of the local committee himself.

In December, the driver V. Gordeyev and the depot worker T. Nikiforova had received their leave at the same time. Several days later the depot chief at a production meeting announced that Gordeyev and Nikiforova should be called back from leave. He based this upon production necessity. The

chairman of the local committee argued and endeavored to show that there was no need to call them back, and that this should not be done according to the law. The year was ending. When would the people get their vacation? And the leave could not be transferred to 1977.

The arguments were valid, but still the depot chief did not consider them. As has now been learned, the reason for calling back V. Gordeyev and T. Nikiforova was not production necessity, but rather their personal desire not to use the leave and receive monetary compensation for it. And they received this, in spite of the explanation given in the Labor Law Code that it is prohibited from paying compensation instead of leave.

Furthermore, the local committee decided to instruct its commission to verify whether or not the wages had been correctly figured for the employees. As soon as the commission requested certain documents, there was the immediate reaction: "Who do you think you are, auditors, who has given you the power," and so forth. And one of the depot employees, Capt Ul'yanov, categorically refused to acquaint the commission chairman R. Mokhova with the book of documents.

The officials, obviously, were endeavoring in this manner to conceal certain illegal financial operations. For example, to conceal from outside eyes the material that for more than 7 months they had faked the work record of a certain Goryachev and paid him wages of 90 rubles. He was listed as a mechanic of refrigeration units, but he had never even seen these units, but when he had the time he visited the warehouse and installed a warning system there. Probably the depot leaders were also concerned with keeping secret their "fake" deals with construction workers. The washing unit for the vehicles had been built by their own forces. But in the financial documents there was inserted a labor agreement with the outside workers M. Volkov, I. Olenets and V. Kuznetsov, and which stated that these persons obliged to complete the construction of the washing unit by no later than 30 November 1976, and the administration promised to pay them 180 rubles for this.

As can be seen from the facts, Maj Shishkanov in his actions in relation to the local committee did not always follow the requirements of the law. Certainly the chairman of the local committee acted correctly when he did not overlook this. However, Comrade Drach was not always consistent in showing forthrightness. He did not endeavor to resort to help from the party organization or the political body, but rather limited himself to collecting various facts in order at a convenient time to turn them into an accusatory statement against the depot chief.

In analyzing his letter to the editors, G. Drach told in detail how with the knowledge and permission of Maj Shishkanov, exaggerated documents had been fabricated and money paid out to outside persons for the washing unit supposedly built by them. Everything that he said was true. Only one thing is amazing: Why, in knowing about these deals, did communist Drach sign the act of acceptance for the washing unit along with the other members of the commission?

The depot workers with whom I was able to talk noted that Comrade Drach had written correctly in his letter to the editors about the shortcomings, but why did he merely accuse others, and wash his hands of it? Certainly he in his official position was responsible for certain of the oversights about which he wrote.

Unfortunately, this was the case. But still in the conflict situation which arose at the depot, the basic blame rested on his chief. Having encountered from the chairman of the local committee arguments against his illegal decisions, Comrade Shishkov became arrogant.

In the eyes of the angered Vasilii Fedorovich, it was no longer the same depot worker G. Drach with whom he had worked for 4 years, as they say, peaceably and amiably, whom he considered in the right place and had repeatedly commended. From a certain time, and precisely from the very hour when he heard from the chairman of the local committee Drach "I do not agree" or "I contest," for him the same Drach now became "irresponsible and inefficient." And the depot chief resorted to stern measures: in about 1 month he issued two penalties to Drach, a reprimand and a strict reprimand. Need it be said, the measures were decisive. But in taking them, Vasilii Fedorovich did not consider that G. A. Drach was the chairman of the local committee and G. A. Drach, his subordinate, were the same person. And in order to punish such a person, it is required, as is stated by the 99th Article of the Labor Legislation Principles, to obtain preliminary approval from the superior trade union body.

Incidentally, he also does not know many other provisions dealing with questions of trade union life, and leads a collective where an absolute majority is employees of the Soviet Army and trade union members. And this to say the least causes perplexity.

10272
CSO: 1801

LACK OF OFFICER PARTICIPATION IN KOMSOMOL WORK CRITICIZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 May 77 p 2

[Article by Sr Lt V. Brusov, deputy chief of the political department for Komsomol work: "To Indoctrinate Active Fighters"]

[Text] The special morning meeting at which they honored the winners of the socialist competition was a success. Speaking to those assembled in the unit club were advanced soldiers, war and labor veterans, as well as prominent persons from the city and oblast. Their tales were interesting. And here the young officers could have gained much that was of interest for themselves if they had attended the meeting.

"Some of them are inactive and do not participate in Komsomol measures," said the secretary of the unit Komsomol committee about the lieutenants with bitterness. "We just can't get them interested in social work."

I have often heard such complaints about the young officers. What is the reason here?

Possibly because the lieutenants do not have experience in the Komsomol organizations. It turns out that this is not the case. A majority of the young officers who have arrived in recent years in the formation during military school or at the enterprises where they worked prior to induction into the army, or at school had been members and even secretaries of the Komsomol committees and bureaus, and had carried out other assignments. But, unfortunately, this was not always known in the units.

Several lieutenants were assigned to regiment X of our formation after completing military school. Soon thereafter one of them was elected the secretary of the Komsomol committee. And after several months the regiment realized that in their hurry they had made a mistake, and this officer, regardless of his conscientiousness, could not handle his duties as he had no inclination for this work. Now the Komsomol committee is headed by Lt I. Apresyan who arrived in the regiment at the same time. Things are going well for him. It has turned out that he while in school was the deputy secretary of the Komsomol committee, and had experience in Komsomol

work. And if they had studied the young officers better in the regiment, probably I. Apresyan would long ago have been the committee secretary.

The attracting of young officers to active work in the Komsomol organizations is not an end in itself. The young officers can become true leaders in the work with the youth and a dependable support for the Komsomol committee of the unit in all useful undertakings. Among them are many involved persons, however their knowledge and abilities still do not always find use in the military collectives.

As an example, take Lt A. Chugunov. The officer loves equipment, he follows innovations in the special literature, and is himself a designer. In the subunit where he serves, a technical circle has been set up, and its aim is to help the commander in training high-class specialists, and in improving the training facilities. No matter how strange it might seem, Komsomol member Chugunov takes virtually no part in the work of the circle. In the school recommendation of Lt A. Ivashchenko, it states: "He gives a great deal of attention to military scientific work, and has often given lectures, abstracts and reports to the soldiers and sergeants." But in the regiment, the officer has spoken not once during the year.

All of this can be explained only by the absence of attention on the part of the Komsomol committees to the young officers. Certain youth leaders feel that no indoctrination work should be carried out with the lieutenants at all as they, supposedly, are so aware. Moreover, at times the committee members and the secretaries cause the lieutenants to lose the will to take an active part in Komsomol measures.

Here is the story of what happened with Lt N. Kubitskiy. At school he was extremely interested in amateur artistic activities. But when they began to prepare for a talent contest in the regiment, the young officer did not take part in these preparations. Here is what he said about this:

"I went to the secretary of the Komsomol committee immediately upon arriving in the regiment. I told him that I could prepare a number of numbers in the program. But he replied that this was not the time, and there were other more important tasks. After such a reply, I no longer had any interest in offering my help. Since then I have no longer turned to the Komsomol committee.

It cannot be excluded that over time, Lt Kubitskiy for the secretary of the regimental Komsomol committee will become one of those who does not like Komsomol work. And the Komsomol member can scarcely be blamed for this.

The involving of the lieutenants in active work in the Komsomol requires a special approach to them. And more complicated assignments must be given them, and higher demands placed on them. However, these questions are still awaiting their solution in many youth collectives.

Of course, it might be argued that it is not merely a question of having little knowledge of the young officers, or that they themselves do not always show a desire to partake in social work. This is a valid argument. And although this is the subject of a separate discussion, I would like to say the following. I know Komsomol officers who, in referring to their business and at times to their supposed "non-Komsomol" age, endeavor to avoid carrying out their Komsomol duty. There are many forms of work with these people, but here, in my view, the main thing is to convince a person that the work in the Komsomol organization and contact with people not only within a service context help the officer himself and the subunit which he commands to attain successes in combat training and in strengthening military discipline. This fact alone affirms this notion.

Lt G. Krutov, having arrived from the school, took over a lagging platoon and resolved within the first year to bring it up among the outstanding. Krutov was an industrious officer, he worked hard, but for a long time there were no tangible changes for the better. And he did not respond to the proposals to participate in social work.

"What does that have to do with me?"

However, the members of the unit Komsomol committee were able to convince Krutov that active participation in Komsomol work would help him in attaining the set goal. The committee members helped the young officer in unifying the platoon collective. A meeting of the Komsomol group was held at which the negligent soldiers were sharply criticized. Outstanding men in training were assigned to the laggards. The activists made a number of proposals aimed at improving the quality of military and political training and organizing the competition.

In speaking at one of the Komsomol meetings of the unit, Lt G. Krutov said that he had brought the platoon into the ranks of the outstanding due to the great help of the activists and due to the fact that he himself had begun to participate in Komsomol work.

In the units of our formation, there are many examples of effective work in raising the social activeness of the Komsomol member lieutenants. As an example, the Komsomol committee of which Lt V. Timofeyev is a member, makes it a practice to have regular hearings of young officers on their contribution to the Komsomol organizations. As a result, a majority of the lieutenants participate in the social life of the subunits. They go willingly to the Komsomol committees and bureaus with their proposals, and endeavor to make their contribution to successfully solving the problems of military and political training, the strengthening of military discipline, and the fulfilling of the socialist pledges. And the Komsomol committees must in every possible way support this initiative. Certainly the more young officers there are involved in social work, the more effective the indoctrination of the personnel will become, and the more rapidly the young officers themselves will grow.

IMPORTANCE OF OBJECTIVE POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION WORK STRESSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 May 77 p 2

[Article by Maj. A. Naumenko of the Red Banner Odessa Military District:
"Not for the Sake of Quantity"]

[Text] Once among my political worker comrades the question was raised of why we at times do not obtain the proper return from the indoctrinational measures carried out. They recalled many of them which did not stir the young audience. The conversation involuntarily came around to the fact of whether or not we consider everything when we are planning and preparing one or another measure.

For example, take the plan of party political work which was compiled by the political worker, Maj V. Kukhar'. In terms of appearance, everything had been adhered to. The measures corresponded to the tasks being carried out, and were conducted at the stipulated time. The forms of indoctrinational work were varied. Consequently, is it possible to draw an affirmative conclusion? Unfortunately, we often proceed in this manner on the basis of only these facts. But the main question remains unnoticed on the sidelines, namely what these measures have given the men, and whether they remain in their conscience or not. Finally, what responses have been obtained about them?

When we asked Maj Kukhar' about this, he was unable to say anything. And one can understand why. The political worker was unaccustomed to analyze the quality of indoctrinational work and its effectiveness was judged solely from the number of measures carried out.

Objective analysis should be carried out systematically for the basic areas of work. We often speak about this, but, unfortunately, far from all the political workers and party activists have been trained in this. At one time, in a conversation with a secretary of a primary party organization, Capt V. Skalimovskiy, we were talking about the activities of the speakers group. The secretary mentioned the lectures and the names of those who gave them. The secretary was accurate in the figures, but it seemed he did not know for what they stood. And a curious detail appeared: some 12 lectures out of the 20 given were by just 3 communists. Many members

of the speakers group did not speak even once. And certainly this is merely the simplest, most accessible analysis!

The main object of our indoctrinational efforts is man, a personality with its inherent complex internal world. And we must know without fail what the reaction to our measures is for the collective as a whole, for a certain group of servicemen and even for the individual person. To neglect this means to neglect a scientific approach to ideological indoctrination.

In one of the collectives, for example, prior to an inspection, many measures were carried out for 3 days including a meeting of the officers, warrant officers ["praporshchik"] and sergeants, a session of the party bureau, open party and Komsomol meetings, a general meeting of the personnel, a seminar with the party and Komsomol activists.... Out of noble motives, the subunit commander everywhere gave a report, posing tasks for the personnel, and urging them to precise actions and high discipline. The political worker and the party activists spoke also about this. But still in the inspection, the young soldiers acted with excessive restraint, and were unable to demonstrate the knowledge which they had received. A significant portion of the efforts expended by the indoctrinators had not achieved the aim. The reason was because, in choosing the forms and methods of work, they did not take into account the psychological and other particular features of the young soldiers, and they did not anticipate their reaction during the inspection to a situation which they had encountered for the first time.

Unfortunately, the inability to foresee the results of one's indoctrinational efforts is encountered not so rarely. This was clearly apparent in a detailed analysis of certain mass measures. We acquainted the political workers and the secretaries of the party and Komsomol organizations with the results of the analysis. With the activists we organized several practical exercises and colloquiums, where we spoke of the ability of the indoctrinators to anticipate the results of their efforts, to provide a correct evaluation of the reasons for the conduct of subordinates, to promptly distinguish and respond properly to any moods arising in the collective.

Our task was to convince the indoctrinators that it is impossible to achieve high effectiveness from the measures carried out without objective and complete information on the state of affairs in the collective. There are various methods for obtaining such information. But the most reliable and tested one is a systematic study of the needs and proposals of the servicemen in the course of the training and indoctrinational process, youth debates on moral questions, question and answer evenings, that is, those forms of work which impel the youth to state their views and share their opinions. At present, we have begun to use small studies and questionnaires which provide valuable information making it possible to draw important generalizations and conclusions.

Thus, in the company where Sr Lt Ye. Shchukin is the deputy commander for political affairs, at one time they began to observe instances of improper relationships between the servicemen. The commander and the political worker carefully analyzed these instances, and endeavored to find the source of them. A questionnaire was used. An analysis of the replies indicated that not all of the activists in the subunit had the confidence of their comrades. And "unofficial" leaders were discovered.

The data of the questionnaire forced the commander and the political worker to significantly strengthen and correct the work with sergeants. Procedural exercises, special subject evening meetings and meetings with the leading sergeants of the unit were held. The communists showed a more critical attitude toward the content and effectiveness of the individual work with the sergeants and the soldiers. At the same time, the obtained data suggested more rational ways of strengthening proper relationships in the collective. And after a short time, the situation in the company improved markedly. Here not so long ago, a repeated study was carried out. It showed that the junior commanders had begun to take a more active part in the indoctrination of the personnel, and their authority among the fellow servicemen had increased noticeably. And the authority of the "unofficial" leaders in the collective was also used rationally.

It is particularly important to know the opinion and mood of the servicemen in carrying out measures related to an analysis of personal problems. I remember a recent instance when one comrade was sharply criticized at a party meeting for an infraction. And when the meeting was over, there were persons who went up to the guilty party and advised him not to lose heart or pay particular attention to the criticism. This happened because the party organization secretary, in preparing the meeting, was not interested in what the attitude of the persons was to the instance, and did not help them delve deeply into the infraction and develop the corresponding viewpoint.

Life itself and the practice of the struggle of the party organizations for high effectiveness of ideological indoctrination and for the comprehensive character of its organization force us from scientific positions and creatively to reason out the causes, processes and phenomena occurring in the troop collective. We feel that certain questions need a more profound elaboration by the military academies and the scientific research institutions. In particular, a great need is felt for materials which disclose the procedure for obtaining objective information and its analysis in work under field conditions.

To learn to struggle more effectively for increasing efficiency--this is how L. I. Brezhnev in a speech at the October (1976) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee formulated the task of today. This party demand has direct bearing also upon the organizing of our indoctrinational work which should be erected on a strict scientific basis and even more actively contribute to developing a communist ideology in the men, and mobilize them to successfully carry out the tasks of strengthening the combat readiness of the troops.

IMPORTANCE OF FIELD TRAINING FOR MOTORIZED RIFLE TROOPS STRESSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 May 77 p 2

[Article by Col A. Sgibnev: "Concern Number One"]

[Text] "In my opinion, they were strict, too strict...."

I stopped, hearing the familiar voice. It belonged to the senior lieutenant who had just spoken at a meeting with the regimental commander. In defending his position, the young officer did not want to hear other arguments or other views. And here, on the staff, in stopping to talk with one of his friends, he continued to show that with the present diversity of equipment and weapons, there is scarcely any justification in placing such rigid demands upon the professional training of a military man.

Perhaps the senior lieutenant had misunderstood?

Not at all! There, with the regimental commander, it was a question of the fact that a profound knowledge by officer personnel of tactics, equipment and procedures is assuming ever greater significance. But some people --and there are few of them--at times show a negligent attitude toward improving their skills, in assuming that the newer the equipment is the simpler and humbler the role of the military specialist. And here specific names were mentioned, including his, Sr Lt Stetskov.

And the idea was emphasized by many: never before had the situation demanded such broad and precise knowledge from us, those wearing shoulderboards. Particularly from the commanders of the motorized rifle and tank subunits, the organizers of combined arms combat.

Each person who stands at the head of a subunit or unit, said Lt Col Viktor Ivanovich Zherybyat'yev, the regimental commander, should be a master of military affairs. And this is an indispensable duty, the number one concern. All-round tactical preparedness and excellent mastery of the weapons and equipment are major components of an officer's authority. For example, is it permissible for us, the motorized rifle troops, not to have a detailed understanding of the combat capabilities and design of the missile, artillery, mortar, antiaircraft and engineering equipment? Or not to have

sufficient experience in talking by radio? Or not to possess the required knowledge in the area of nuclear physics, radioelectronics and jet propulsion theory? How else then can the results of the firing be used with all effectiveness or how can we expect everything from the attached and supporting weapons that they are capable of?

Incidentally, at that conference the regimental commander mentioned the name of one of the battalion commanders. He was mentioned as a person capable of drawing the correct conclusions from criticism. And 3 months previously he received plenty of it from Lt Col Zherybyat'yev. At that time they were summing up the results of the competition for January. Let me explain to the reader that the battalion commander, generally speaking a strong officer, neglected his personal technical training, and this told immediately in firing and driving, and set the subunit back as a whole. First place in the competition went, naturally, to the rival who had been more tenacious in mastering the weapons and the equipment, and who was more knowledgeable and able in the procedures of organizing and conducting the exercises. Now the battalion commander has regained first place, he is leading for all indicators, and for this reason has been publicly commended by the regimental commander. "You are a fine man in two ways," he said. "You have not only recovered the lost positions in the competition, but have also shown the personnel that the failure was accidental, and that in expertise you do not intend to be inferior to anyone."

And, in addressing everyone, he concluded with conviction: "Nothing has such a negative effect on subordinates and so undermines our authority as an officer's neglect of his own professional development or his impotence in tactical questions. The soldier of today is a technically knowledgeable specialist, and all his pluses and minuses as a commander are apparent. Let us not forget this!"

I intentionally started this story about the life of the Carpathian motorized rifle troops precisely from this conflict situation. Because in the regiment which had become one of the initiators of the pre-October socialist competition, with great demandingness they are struggling against the slightest manifestations of complacency or the elements of conceit. It is pleasing to see the intensity which gives one heart. It is pleasing to see the responsibility which permeates all matters and all thoughts. Particularly praiseworthy is the desire of the officer personnel to improve professionally and to raise their military technical level. Here one feels not isolated enthusiasm but rather a collective unity and a politically aware responsibility to each other. The entire atmosphere of regimental life, and the commanders' and party exactingness visibly contribute to developing in the officers strict criteria in the struggle for effectiveness and quality, to uniting the troop collective, and to establishing communist morality born out of the competition, and an overall concern for the fulfilling of obligations. The personal example of the commanders and the political workers in studying tactics, in mastering the equipment and the weapons, and in the bold and decisive reevaluation of the achieved levels is becoming a material force.

One other thing is striking. If you need someone, don't look for him at the staff or in the barracks. Go to the training center which is both similar and dissimilar to the others as there is so much that is new at it, and go there at any time of the day or in any weather. Here is where the basic mass of people is, here they polish their skills, and here the activity is always intense.

Incidentally, this was not always the case. There were also dissatisfied persons who wondered what was the use of all the fatigue. The party activists whose voice was very authoritative in the regiment, replied: No, friends, this is no fatigue, but rather this is the normal military pace and the full scope of military service. You say that we have good classrooms, and why such passion for the training center? Yes, we have equipped the classrooms in a modern way, we have put in them all engineering and technical inventiveness, but the main classroom, understand, is the field. Only field conditions with their dynamic situation, with long marches and deployment into battle formations, with the firing of regulation ammunition and real aviation, and with the rolling over by tanks best temper the troops, shape them up, and teach coordination and maneuvering.

It must be pointed out that both the regimental commander personally, the party committee and all the political staff have carried out and are carrying out this line with unabated tenacity. They do not overlook either the planned exercises in the classrooms, the independent study of the regulations, manuals and diverse special literature by the officers, or technical conferences and seminars. But, Lt Col Zherybyat'yev stressed in one of the first meetings with me, field skills, the attitude toward them and the return from them are always in the forefront.

"Just take the last party meeting...."

I listened to the regimental commander and regretted that I had not arrived sooner. The agenda focused the attention of the communists on the most important thing, that is, on the struggle for the high tactical training of the officers, and on the struggle for high military technical skills. Certainly the ultimate aim of professional skills is combat readiness, for this is the number one concern!

Of course, much in the process of preparing and holding the meeting was known and customary, but there was something truly original and instructive. On the day before in the club the stand appeared: "Remember this advice." They took to heart the words of V. I. Lenin that "either foolish or even criminal is the conduct of that army which is not ready to master all types of weapons and all the means and procedures of combat which the enemy does or can have," as well as the words of many outstanding military leaders and excerpts from the decisions of the party congresses and from the speeches of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev.

In truth there were arguments over the tables where opposite each name of the communists there stood indicators showing who had achieved what and how

they looked against the background of the general requirements. However, soon the passions died down because these indicators more than visibly attested both to the advanced persons as well as those who in their professional training had been satisfied with the lot of the "average," who had not been in a hurry to improve the class rating and had not shown eagerness in broadening their knowledge. Passivity was measured strictly and sharply. Party exactingness did not spare either position or rank.

And this was not all. The regiment, as is known, is an order-bearing one, and is part of the famous Iron Division. It is closely tied to those to whom it owes its glory and successes, as the veterans often come here and they write letters and recollections.

"And why not use all this material?" asked the members of the party committee.

And they themselves, without delay, set to work, having read hundreds of letters, documents, leaflets and pamphlets. And here was living evidence from a former frontline soldier how the heroes of the battles, regardless of hellish difficulties, mastered all that was new which the war created. Here were episodes showing that a commander who knew his job perfectly was never confused in battle and would find the most progressive and the cleverest procedure to defeat the enemy.

When the meeting had been opened, when the agenda and the rules had been approved, the veterans were the first to have the floor, with the strong approval of those present. Their paternal appeal to their sons, the officers of the 1970's, as read by one of the members of the party committee and embodying the wisdom of long army life, in a way unified the generations and set the mood for the entire discussion.

In the regiment, one feels that here they are proud of their officers for their professional level, the scope of their tactical viewpoint, and their keen view of tomorrow so as not to fall behind in anything. And it is not accidental that when the subunits begin a new subject, over the drill or training field one inevitably hears: "Do like I am!" No, this principle which has come down through the centuries is not obsolete. It has not lost its inspiring force. The example of the officer guides. Infallible skills increase the confidence in him. An expertise which brings together knowledge, boldness and artistry becomes the standard which causes among the personnel a passionate desire to imitate what has been seen and to attain the desired goal.

Guests often pay a visit to the battalion commanded by Capt Vladimir Kundyukov. Either Lt Col Zherebyat'yev brings them or they come themselves, having encountered a certain difficulty. There is much to learn from Kundyukov. In both mastering the equipment where he is a real virtuoso, the multiplicity of procedural innovations developed by him in daily practice with great meticulousness, but most importantly, the ability in a self-critical and party manner to assess an achieved level and to promptly abandon the customary but already obsolete.

Today, for example, one of the companies is working out the procedures for combating tanks. Externally everything is going on normally: the tanks approach at a slow speed, as if accelerating, and the motorized rifle troops are able to hit them with grenades. "Good, good," said the company commander. But the battalion commander is silent, and sees farther than the company commander. Then the machines, roaring, accelerate, and the grenades virtually do not reach them, but fall behind. What is the reason? The company commander explains the failure by poor training. And only this! Kundyukov does not agree. Everything, in his mind, is based upon procedures. The fighting speeds of the tanks have increased, but we are still teaching by the old methods and are aimed at yesterday.

"It is essential to think," said the battalion commander. "It is essential to seek out! Otherwise...."

What about otherwise? Broad personal training helps him to precisely see the outcome of the duel with the tanks, if the training procedures are not altered. In combat, there can be no pat formulas.

The captain views his job with a broad sense of responsibility. Like a communist should. And like a motorized rifle officer should who with his whole heart voted for high October pledges. And there is not only honor for the initiators, but also the demands made on them are different, they are higher. Hence one cannot spare oneself. Particularly if with all the endeavor things still do not turn out as one would like. On that day the battalion commander visited another company. The soldiers were studying, but the combat vehicle was standing idle. Why? Why had it been taken out to the field? In order to report that the exercise had material support?

"I feel," said Kundyukov to his deputy for political affairs, "that there is a question for the next party meeting...."

Capt Vladimir Kundyukov and Sr Lt Valeriy Fridman work closely and with enthusiasm. And I have no doubt that they would not delay with the party meeting, but would hold it with great exactingness in order to inspire the men, and to raise them against the slightest manifestations of ostentatiousness, passivity or laziness.

Recently the regiment was visited by Gen Arm S. L. Sokolov, the first deputy minister of defense. He inspected the barracks of one of the subunits, the Lenin room, the mess, and together with the motorized rifle troops went out to firing. The officers told me how carefully the general studied the course of the socialist competition, and repeatedly stressed that to honorably fulfill the pledges assumed in honor of the 60th anniversary of October is the highest duty of each man. In turning to the commanders and the political workers, the general said:

"The main task of the personnel is the greatest possible rise in field skills, and particularly tactical training. Success can be attained on the basis of the skillful organizing of the exercises and the high procedural training of

the officers. Procedures do not stand still, but rather they are continuously developing. The officers should consider this, and should constantly improve the procedures and methods for training subordinates. The basic responsibility for the quality of training the soldiers and sergeants and the teamwork of the subunits lies precisely on them [the officers]. It is important that they fully recognize this responsibility."

...As before, the compound is empty and everyone is at the training center. Concern for new successes in the socialist competition and concern for professional military growth remain the number one concern.

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DEFICIENCIES AND CORRECTIVE ACTION REPORTED

Conditions in Quarters, Hostels

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Feb 77 p 4

[Article by inspection brigade of Lt Col Just I. Vashkevich, Capt S. Gonchar, and Cadet N. Ivanov: "What Makes a Hostel Attractive -- KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Surprise Inspection Tour"]

[Text] Fortunately, there were rooms at the hostel attached to the Kaliningrad garrison Officers Club and in a few minutes we had already "moved into" the room that was assigned. The door opened and the attractive manager warned us, "Just remember that we do not have the conveniences here."

"It's all right!" we said in embarrassment already quite satisfied to be in out of the cold and forgetting our fatigue at just the sight of the snow-white bed clothing. Also any courteous concern is pleasant, even expressed in such an unusual way...

That is how our KRASNAYA ZVEZDA surprise inspection tour began. Our objective was to find out how garrison hostels and officers dormitories were kept, to see how they are made attractive to residents. The members of the inspection brigade visited a number of these establishments belonging to the Baltic Military District and the Baltic Fleet. We saw that they are differently furnished and receive different amounts of attention from commanders, political agencies, and rear services. And we came upon a very singular principle for evaluating these dwellings: if the roof does not leak, the lights work, and the radiators are warm everything is fine.

Then we recalled our own confusion at the statement that the hostel had no conveniences. We thought that military people are not generally capricious, they are used to the hardships of the nomadic life. But still a question arose: how are residents supposed to find out what our army and navy domestic establishments offer them in addition to a roof over the head? We did not find a list of services in a single hostel or dormitory. But there were lists of the obligations of residents posted in every one.

We are convinced that just posting a modest framed sheet in a prominent place telling travelers where to eat, have clothing mended, how to spend free time usefully in a small city, and other necessary information would do a great deal to improve the hotelkeeping service. In any case it would eliminate many misunderstandings which we encountered during our trip. The lights went out while we were at the hostel for married servicemen managed by G. Bochkareva. It happened during the day, but the women preparing the noon meal noticed immediately. Because of weak gas pressure in the kitchen ranges some of the women were using electric hotplates and did not know what they would do.

"Well," sighed the wife of Maj V. Starostin, "now you yourself see the 'conveniences.' But they charge for them regularly. And for the showers we don't have, the windows without glass, the unpainted ceilings..."

The dormitory managed by Z. Antoshina can hardly offer officers and ensigns any services at all. Even the rooms are not cleaned regularly there. But it appears that the employees of the rear unit, who were represented by Maj V. Tuchin, consider it normal for those who are supposed to insure comfort and good service at our hostels and quarters to take it easy.

But with this approach paradoxes sometimes arise. The hostel managed by V. Makarova has many opportunities to organize domestic services for travelers, but they do not even suspect it. For example, they have a fine large room where the television could go but it is set in a narrow hallway above the stairway which makes it easier for the matron to watch it. There is not a single picture or print to decorate the dull painted walls. This makes it easier to keep the walls clean. One does not see table lamps or even shoe brushes in their proper places. The reason is that it is much simpler to make residents sign them out. Is it any surprise, after all this, that the public library which used to operate in the hostel has been closed for some time? The hostel manager is not sure how many residents have wardrobes or night tables.

While agreeing with our words, V. Makarova said suddenly, "My daughter went to Vil'nyus recently and says that there is a fine hostel there..."

But is it true that one must go to the capital city to learn how? Not far from Makarova's place we visited the hostel and quarters of a branch of the naval engineering service headed by Col V. Filippovich. The men living there, officers N. Kukhta, L. Tupchiy, and B. Nikitin and the cadets receiving on-the-job training, N. Sytsevich and I. Anfert'yev, were unanimous in their assessment of their temporary home. It is clean, convenient, and comfortable. And they explained that it offers everything necessary for one to eat fully and on time or rapidly fix up one's uniforms. In the lobby of the hostel one may look at a train schedule or make long distance phone calls, while theater tickets can be bought from the quarters matron. There are even special food cupboards so that dormitory residents do not clutter up the rooms with

piles of food. And it would not be unusual there for a maid to talk with the hostel director about the color of curtains that would look best in a certain room.

The members of our inspection party learned of such forms of service as washing underwear and dry cleaning uniforms in the officers quarters of a certain remote garrison. At the invitation of manager T. Dedulya city tailors travel there to take orders for sewing uniforms. So here we have found progressive know-how! What is strange is that it is not being disseminated.

The chiefs of garrisons and their deputies, unit commanders, and political workers are expected to do this. These officials are obliged to coordinate the efforts of different services. Unfortunately, even the annual inspections of quarters are not always used to disseminate progressive know-how while many problems go unsolved precisely because such coordination is lacking.

Eighteen months ago the officers and ensigns of one of the units of the Kaliningrad garrison received a new dormitory to replace the old one. It was built with the latest design, as pretty as a picture! But the military builders headed by Col-Engr A. Kobzarev had gotten the building accepted with a number of deficiencies. In the cellar where drying rooms and storehouses could be set up construction waste materials were piled up one meter deep. The lovely showers do not work. Because water does not circulate in the heating system the residents have to release the cooling water every now and then. The unit commander and chief of the garrison should have held the builders responsible for all this and called the attention of Lt. Col-Engr S. Karpunin, chief of the KECh [billeting operations unit] to this mismanagement.

And can it be impossible for military trade employees to broaden the assortment of services offered to persons living in the hostels and dormitories?

"Of course we can do it," says Col T. Bozhko, head of the military trade enterprise. "For example, we can set up unmanned kiosks in the hostels to sell buttons, stars, hooks, and other accessories, and unmanned canteens in the officers quarters..."

It is plain that carrying out these and other proposals would have a positive effect on the domestic life of those living under this temporary roof. But the initiative here, it seems, should also come from both sides.

The officers, ensigns, and warrant officers living in the dormitories can themselves do a great deal to improve everyday domestic life and recreation. This is a broad field of action for the dormitory councils. In many places, however, such councils exist only on paper. Not all commanders and political workers keep an eye on the everyday

life and leisure of their subordinates in the dormitories. Lt Col A. Shekhovtsev even turned down a personal invitation to attend a meeting in the officers quarters, although it was just the place for him to have learned many important things about his work with the men. This is probably because in the dormitories we saw there is no competition for most orderly room and leisure activities for young officers, ensigns, and warrant officers are not organized; by contrast, one may find unmade beds, messy cupboards, and tasteless pictures on the walls.

The garrison hostel and officers quarters. We must remember that their condition is reflected in the everyday organization of people's lives and also affects their attitude and ability to work well. It is very important that those whose service duty requires them to look after the everyday needs of subordinates and educate them remember this.

Corrective Action Report

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 May 77 p 2

[Article: "Follow-Up on KRASNAYA ZVEZDA article 'What Makes a Hostel Attractive'"]

[Text] The article referred to was published on 8 February of this year. It told of a surprise inspection tour by a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA brigade which looked into the operation of a number of hostels and dormitories in the Baltic Military District and Baltic Fleet.

As Col V. Filippovich reported to the editors, the newspaper article was studied by employees of the naval engineering service of the Baltic Fleet. The fleet commander ratified steps to eliminate the deficiencies noted in the article. The working know-how of the dormitory managed by K. Lopatko has been recommended for introduction at all fleet dormitories.

An answer has also been received from Col-Engr Ye. Shakhov, chief of the billeting operations directorate of the Baltic Military District. He reports that the material from the surprise inspection has been reviewed at meetings at the directorate, in the units, and at the rayon billeting operations units referred to in the article. Meetings of officers and ensigns living in the dormitories have been held universally and conditions have been worked out for competitive inspections for best dormitory and best room. The shortcomings noted in the organization of the hostel at the Kaliningrad Officers Club and at the dormitory managed by G. Bochkareva have been basically eliminated. The shower rooms are to be put into operation in May and June.

Unfortunately, neither response to the published material from the inspection mentions offering residents of the hostels and dormitories various domestic services. We must assume that during preparation for the all-Army meeting on improving the domestic arrangements of servicemen this question will be given proper attention by commanders,

political agencies, and rear services so that the garrison hostels and officers quarters will offer all essential services to those living in them.

Election Irregularities

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 May 77 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank (Res) Ye. Korovin: "How They 'Cleared Things Up' - Party Life: Following up a Letter"]

[Text] A report and election trade union meeting was underway at the ensign school which trains cadres to be military builders and where there are many civilians among the teachers and students. The report was heard and discussed and a resolution was adopted; everything was going smoothly. But when they began electing the local committee there was a hitch; two additional candidates were added to the list of those discussed earlier.

Well, it was done and no harm; this is a natural procedure that everyone is familiar with. But some seemed to find it undesirable. The reason was that V. Palladich was one of the candidates. He had been a political worker and teacher at a higher naval school, and now he was one of the best teachers at this school. He was a frank, direct man and this was what some did not like. Capt S. Nemerovski, chief of the drill training section of the school who Palladich frequently criticized for shortcomings in organizing the training process, overconfidence, and improper treatment of subordinates, especially disliked Palladich.

They waited for the results of the voting. When N. Ryzhkov, chairman of the election commission, announced that the ones not elected were the additional candidates Nemerovski was openly relieved and became more cheerful.

But his pleasure was premature -- there were election irregularities. The chairman of the unified trade union committee, who was present at the meeting, took the floor and said that Ryzhkov was mistaken, that all the candidates nominated had been elected because they had been given more than half of the votes.

The local committee met and re-elected V. Fedyashchin as chairman and chose V. Palladich as his deputy. With this the organizational affairs ended. But the mistake by Ryzhkov, an experienced man who knew election laws well, left an unpleasant taste with many and gave rise to doubts: could it have concealed an attempt to "adjust" the results of the voting? To dispel these doubts Palladich suggested that the chairman of the local committee recount the votes.

They were recounted and it was found that the election commission had added 6 "no" votes to Palladich's total and 11 "yes" votes to

Fedyashchin's total. Votes were added on and taken away for other comrades too.

The next question was what attitude to take toward this.

Fedyashchin suggested that Palladich "not make a fuss." But Palladich went to Lt Col. V. Gerasimovich, deputy chief of the school in charge of political affairs, and reported everything.

The political worker pondered for a long time. Report it to the political branch and you will probably turn up later in some report — "He is supposed to teach others, but he himself cannot run a proper trade union meeting." But would it really be possible to "not make a fuss," to assemble the members of the trade union and announce "new, more accurate" results of the voting?

It has long been known that if a leader, upon learning of someone's negligence or mistake (deliberate or accidental) retreats from principle and does not take a clear, definite position, the situation will become more complicated and grounds will be created for conflict.

Although "new, more accurate" voting results were announced as the political worker wanted, the "fuss" which he feared arose all the same: there were too many strange coincidences in the mistakes of the election commission. Furthermore, it was learned that for some reason an outsider had been in the room with them when they were working.

Now it seemed that everything would be straightened out. The election commission's mistakes would be reviewed, it would be criticized for negligence and irresponsibility, and new elections would be held. But the only thing new in the elections was that it was the second round. They did not even suggest that a new election commission be chosen. There was a kind of implicit message here: nothing unusual happened. Some votes were added on to some candidates and elected candidates were declared not elected — no big thing.

Capt 2nd Rank V. Filippenko, deputy chief of the political branch of the construction directorate, representatives of the unified trade union committee, and the deputy chief of the school (the chief was on leave) attended the meeting; all of them are experienced men with years of party service behind them. They should have intervened, stressed the correct thing, and evaluated everything that had happened earlier as a flagrant violation of trade union democracy. But they kept silent. There was, as we later learned, a reason.

After the meeting events took an unexpected turn: a personal case was begun against Palladich. At first he and the chairman of the local committee were reported at a session of the party committee (and properly) for incorrectly checking the results of an election without special authorization. Then a second, special issue was brought up, to review Palladich's behavior in making the election commission's mistake public, in other words washing dirty linen in public.

This was a strange hearing. Everyone seemed to be concerned for the interests of the collective and its solidarity, but they were criticizing Palladich for speaking the truth. It seemed that it was just this, the truth, that most threatened solidarity.

A decree was passed: Palladich was "reprimanded for incorrect behavior after the election which did not promote a healthy atmosphere in the collective of workers and employees."

Thus, they had turned a comparatively simple question whose solution required no great acumen into a real problem. Now it could no longer be brushed off nor could they demand that it not be spoken of (for the sake of a "healthy atmosphere"). After all, the members of any elected body reviewing any conflict are working in full view of everyone, and in this respect the point is not simply correct or incorrect statements and actions, it is correct or incorrect moral lessons.

If the political worker and secretary of the party committee, on whose opinion a correct resolution of the question mainly depended, had reflected on the matter everything would probably have been different. But considerations of prestige and irritation at a man who "dared" to wash dirty linen in public won out.

Not agreeing with the decision of the party committee Palladich submitted an appeal to the party commission of the political branch of the construction directorate. When they did not review the matter for more than a month he wrote to the newspaper. But that only added fuel to the fire. "Look how pig-headed he is," the astonished party committee said. "A silly little (!) punishment and he complains."

Our pig-headed servicemen with their categorical approach and demand for absolute clarity sometimes make things hard. But it is even harder without them. If they were not so persistent a fair solution might give way to a doubtful compromise where it seems that everyone is a little bit right and a little bit wrong, but nothing is clear-cut.

N. Shalagin, secretary of the party commission who received Palladich's appeal, had probably encountered such compromises and seen their fatal effect on the development of criticism and self-criticism and instilling party principles. Unfortunately, he also preferred the compromise position.

He later explained it this way: "We did not review Palladich's appeal, but rather advised the members of the party committee themselves to change their decision. They violated procedure. (This, it turns out, was their principal mistake!) Palladich's first hearing should have been in the primary party organization."

I also looked at the party committee's second decision. It said nothing about procedure nor did it mention an erroneous reprimand. They simply cancelled the earlier decision without mentioning why. This was petty diplomacy. It allowed them, the authors of the second

decision thought, to save face (that is, not acknowledge their mistakes) and preserve the appearance of objectivity.

This might have been the end of the story of how they "cleared things up" if it had not been for one remarkable incident. At the height of the events being described Lt Col A. Alekseyenko, chief of the school, returned from leave. Learning what had happened, Aleksander Nikolayevich ordered Palladich called in and in the presence of the deputy for political affairs, secretary of the party committee, and chairman of the local committee began chewing him out for critical remarks, accusing him of inability to get along with others, of a desire to set himself against the leaders, and of other sins. Apparently Lieutenant Colonel Alekseyenko hoped that he would break down his obstinacy, give him a little scare, and everything would be all right again.

When we met Aleksander Nikolayevich suggested in a friendly way that we walk around the school and look at the classrooms and offices. We did so and I shared his pleasure in seeing that everything was clean and neat, organized in a strict manner which reflected the chief and his labors.

We met Palladich three times during our tour. Once he looked at us from the Board of Honor of the best methodologists in the school, while the second time it was from the Board of Honor of the shock workers of communist labor. On the third occasion he himself was standing off to the side in the methods office. Aleksander Nikolayevich pretended not to notice him and walked by without saying hello or shaking hands.

I could not help thinking how we are sometimes unable to rise above hurt feelings, to overcome our hostility toward those who speak the truth to our face, who are outstanding public activists. Healthy party criticism and self-criticism is one manifestation of such activism. It must be encouraged. That means encouraged, not simply tolerated like a toothache or a bitter taste in the mouth.

The chief of the school must have known this. He himself explains such things as a member of the party commission. That is the same commission which still holds and has not reviewed communist Palladich's appeal.

That is the not very pleasant story.

As for Palladich's subsequent fate, he submitted an application to leave. The application was reviewed quickly and his request was gladly granted.

When I learned this I recalled the honor boards on which Palladich's portraits stood and I regretted that the school had lost a good teacher. But that was not all I regretted. I cannot help thinking of the inevitable moral losses which are much more significant than the departure of one teacher.

Corrective Action Report

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 May 77 p 2

[Article: "Follow-Up on KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Article: 'How They "Cleared Things Up"']

[Text] On 15 March of this year KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published an article by Capt 1st Rank (Res) Ye. Korovin which related the facts of a violation of the Instructions for Elections to Trade Union Bodies and told about the irresponsible attitude toward preparation for and conduct of a report and election trade union meeting at a certain ensign school, leading to an unhealthy situation in the collective.

Col Ye. Kabanov has reported to the editors that the facts set forth in the article have been confirmed. The newspaper article was discussed at a meeting of employees of the political branch and a session of the unified trade union committee. The party committee also met. Steps were taken to improve party leadership of trade union organizations and to solidify the collective. Communists N. Shalagin, V. Gerasimovich, N. Ryzhkov, L. Kondratskiy, and others at fault in violations of party rules and the requirements of the Instructions on Election to Trade Union Bodies have been called to accountability before the party.

11,176
CSO: 1801

TANK CREW COMBAT TRAINING PROCEDURES DESCRIBED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 5, May 77 signed to press 20 Apr 77 pp 4-5

[Article by Sgt N. Pil'gayev, tank platoon deputy commander: "Combining Fire and Maneuver"]

[Text] A tank on the defense destroys enemy armored targets, fire means, and personnel. It can be employed in an ambush or in combat security. In all instances, tank operations have a maneuvering, dynamic character. Tactical formation lessons help in developing these operations. This is how one such lesson on the theme "Tank on the Defense" went. The mission assigned to the crew involved developing skills in conducting a defensive battle.

Our training section was divided into three crews prior to the start of the lesson. But, all were to operate based on the identical scenario under the overall direction of the platoon commander.

It is considerably easier to develop a dynamic scenario if the lesson can be conducted in a tactical training area equipped with targets and mock-ups of combat equipment and weapons. One or two individuals to mark targets must be assigned if the training is done on unequipped terrain.

The following tactical scenario was devised to work out the first training problem: "The enemy is attacking from the populated point Yelan' in the direction of Figurnaya grove. The crew is in combat security and occupies a position near the ruins with the mission of delaying the movement of the attackers, forcing them to prematurely deploy in combat formation, and confusing them as to the location of the forward edge of our defense."

Developing the first element, the crew commanded by student V. Bagapov quickly and furtively occupied the assigned position. Student E. Khaydarov, the loader, detected a column of tanks and armored personnel carriers moving out of Yelan'. Student N. Osokin, the gunner, determined the initial firing data.

At my signal, the target marker raised the target designating tanks and infantry in attack combat formation. Bagpov decided to immediately open

fire from the ambush when the range to the "enemy" was at least 1,500 meters. An obvious mistake. I explain to the trainees that, operating in ambush, it is very important to open fire from close range after accurately determining the moment to open up with surprise fire. I develop the training problem anew until the subordinates firmly assimilate it.

I then complicate the scenario and make an input: the "enemy" tanks are by-passing the strong point from the flank. I order their destruction by fire from the left side. The students now have an opportunity to train in solving fire missions and to give target designations using various methods.

The initial position selected for working the second training problem was on the southwest edge of Ulitka grove. I set up a short training scenario for the students.

The crew sets up a defense in a primary position in a platoon strong point. It has a basic fire sector between reference points 2 and 3, a supplemental sector between reference points 1 and 2, and an alternate position on the southeast edge of Ulitka grove.

Student Sabirov, who was designated tank commander, gave the command to move out. Student Bagapov, the driver-mechanic, drove the tank along the edge of the woods. The tankers reached the assigned position quickly and stealthily. The target marker designated a tank attack in the direction of Ulitka grove. Sabirov did not get rattled and gave the command to open fire. Khaydarov, the gunner, reported the initial firing data. Since the purpose of the tactical formation lesson was to work out combat drills and operations rather than training in solving fire missions, I restricted things to a total of one episode of destroying the targets by fire from the primary position.

When working out the second element, approach to the alternate position, I monitored to see that the trainees quickly and furtively move to the alternate position, are able to detect the "enemy" in a timely manner, and accurately note his activities. As soon as we reached the eastern edge of Ulitka grove, I signalled the target marker to designate an "enemy" attack in armored personnel carriers. The target appeared in the gunner's zone of observation. Khaydarov detected it in a timely manner, but made a very significant error. He did not report that the "enemy" is moving in combat formation. Of course, moving in dismounted formation, the students themselves also noted the incongruity of the report. But, had they been in the tank, the incorrect information from Khaydarov could have serious consequences. This all had to be explained and the gunner was requested to give a repeat and accurate report. He did it correctly that time.

The third element -- the return to the primary position -- was worked out in the same manner.

The content of the third problem involved training the students to operate as a part of the reserve during a counterattack. Three elements were worked out: approach to the deployment line, the counterattack and destruction of

Lesson Progress

Commander's Activities

Diagram of Crew Activities



Training Problems

I take the section to the start point at the north-west edge of Figurnaya grove. I explain the lesson theme and sequence of activities. I break the section down into crews and give the order "Begin the lesson." I begin training the students by elements:

1. Stealthy occupation of the position and conducting fire against an "enemy" column from a halt.
2. Defense of the position near the ruins and destruction of the "enemy" from a halt.

I brief the trainees on the tactical scenario and begin to work out their actions:

1. Stealthy occupation of the primary position and destruction of the attacking "enemy" with fire from a halt.
2. Approach to the alternate position and destruction of the "enemy" breaking into the defense.
3. Return to the primary position and destruction of withdrawing tanks.



1. Activities of the crew in combat security -- 30 minutes

2. Activities of the crew when defending a position -- 30 minutes

Lesson Progress																									
Training Problems	Commander's Activities																								
<p>3. Activities of the crew during the counter-attack -- 30 minutes</p>	<p>I explain that the crew is employed as part of the battalion reserve. I brief the scenario. I train the crew to execute the combat drills:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Approach to the deployment line for the counter-attack and conduct of fire from the halt against the "enemy". 2. Counterattack and destruction of the "enemy" from the march. 3. Maneuver for the purpose of conducting fire against an "enemy" breaking into the defense to the flank. 																								
<p>Diagram of Crew Activities</p>	<p>Lesson critique -- 10 minutes</p> <p>Diagram of the crew formation when moving dismounted by tank:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Tank Gun. Driver-Mech. CO Loader <p>Key:</p> <table> <tr><td>(1)</td><td>Yelan'</td><td>(7)</td><td>South</td></tr> <tr><td>(2)</td><td>Barn</td><td>(8)</td><td>ULitka</td></tr> <tr><td>(3)</td><td>Dvugorbaya</td><td>(9)</td><td>Start</td></tr> <tr><td>(4)</td><td>Ruins</td><td>(10)</td><td>Small woods</td></tr> <tr><td>(5)</td><td>Figurnaya</td><td>(11)</td><td>Hut</td></tr> <tr><td>(6)</td><td>North</td><td>(12)</td><td>Pologaya</td></tr> </table>	(1)	Yelan'	(7)	South	(2)	Barn	(8)	ULitka	(3)	Dvugorbaya	(9)	Start	(4)	Ruins	(10)	Small woods	(5)	Figurnaya	(11)	Hut	(6)	North	(12)	Pologaya
(1)	Yelan'	(7)	South																						
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(6)	North	(12)	Pologaya																						

the "enemy" by fire from the march, and execution of the deep envelopment. This is all clearly portrayed in the diagram.

What characteristic mistakes did the trainees make when studying the given training problem? Osokin in his role of commander made an inaccurate approach to his counterattack axis when moving to the deployment line. He performed the enveloping maneuver incorrectly. He oriented the vehicle along the steep slope of Pologaya Hill rather than taking it closer to the base of the hill. Bagapov in his role as tank commander took his comrade's error into account and executed the maneuver skillfully and correctly.

As is evident, we worked out three training problems linked with the dynamic work of trainees on the defense at one tactical formation lesson on a theme. I emphasize this because sometimes the theme "Defense" is considered to be static and the lesson is restricted to selection of the firing position, laying out foxholes, and solution of firing missions to destroy the "enemy" by fire from an occupied position. It is evident in our example that, given the corresponding preparation, a lesson on this theme can be conducted dynamically, including a sufficient number of maneuvers.

A few words about logistic support for a tactical formation lesson and selection of a sector of terrain. One must strive to create a graphic tactical scenario which authentically reflects "enemy" tactics and teaches subordinates skillful and realistic operations. It is very important that terrain suitable for carrying out the requisite maneuver be selected. It is certainly incorrect and unconvincing if the "enemy" artillery firing position is deployed in open terrain and no efforts are made to camouflage it. It is imprudent to use close or deep envelopment in such terrain or try to accomplish an ambush. Other terrain is required for these purposes.

Taking into consideration that, as a rule, a tactical formation lesson is conducted using the dismounted by tank method, one also must reduce the distance to the installations or lines in the area where the training problems are worked out. We carry out repeats of the problem elements in the opposite direction without returning the crew to the starting line in order to avoid wasted trips.

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TANK CREW FIRING TRAINING DESCRIBED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 5, May 77 signed to press 20 Apr 77 pp 8-9

[Article by Col V. Yurenkov: "Tank Firing Training"]

[Text] Everything at the tank range was ready for the firing to begin. The signal "Everyone listen up" rings out. Sergeant V. Nikiforov gives the command "Into Battle" to the crew. The tankers rapidly stowed the ammunition and got the weapon in readiness . . .

And then the tanks moved forward. Attentively observing the range, Sergeant Nikiforov's crew searched for targets. The slightest lapse in the reconnaissance can lead to noncompletion of the exercise.

Before long the tank commander detected an antitank rocket launcher [RPTR]. Noting that the gunner delayed, he gave the command "Machinegun to the right, RPTR, 500, fire from the march."


Sight setting 4, center angle, center of the target. "Burst," reported Private N. Yakovlev, the gunner. A machinegun burst rang out. The shells raised plumes of dust near the target. The second burst was accurate. The gunner at the main gun detected a tank and accurately destroyed it. Right after that, the gunner destroyed a vehicle-mounted recoilless rifle.

The crew exhibited a high degree of mastery in the solution of firing missions. Its success resulted from well-organized, systematic tank firing training. Using varied training instruments, Sergeant Nikiforov skillfully inculcates in the students skills in reconnoitering targets through observation, determining target range, and employment of the gun.

Let's look at how he used the KOP-RM [optical tracking device-R modernized] on the theme "Firing From the March Against Pop-up and Moving Targets."

Prior to the lesson by order of the platoon commander, the sergeant mounted the KOP-RM on the TSh [telescopic link] sight and adjusted it. Often sergeants don't pay sufficient attention to the accuracy and consistency of action when

mounting the instrument, which leads to poor-quality training of subordinates to solve fire missions. Let's look at this problem in more detail.



KEY:

- (1) Burial mound -- reference point 3
- (2) Sight setting 20, center angle, to the right 0-04
- (3) Reference point 2 -- Sight setting 14, center angle, to the left 0-04
- (4) Sight setting 12, center angle, to the left 0-03
- (5) Sight setting 10, center angle, to the left 0-05
- (6) Sight setting 5, center angle, center of the target
- (7) Sight setting 6, center angle, center of the target
- (8) Dugout
- (9) Reference point 1
- (10) Tank on rocker platform

Sergeant Nikoforov rotated the commander's turret 180° and, in order to mount the instrument on the sight, removed the forehead piece and the eye-shade from it, put the optics on 3.5-times magnification, and removed the light filter. Getting a sharp image, he turned the ocular remote seating ring one-quarter turn counter-clockwise, and then mounted the instrument. To do so, he inserted the KOP-RM pintle into the hole in the forehead piece bracket on the sight and, with his hands, drew it tight up against the eyepiece portion.

In such a position, the instrument can have a great deal of play and provide significant errors during training since it is not fastened down securely.

In order to eliminate this problem, the sergeant used his left hand to turn the ocular diopter ring one-quarter turn clockwise to the stop at the instrument's circular seat. Finding free movement by moving his right hand up and down and back and forth, he securely fastened the KOP-RM on the sight, checking the image sharpness at this time.

All that was left was to tie the instrument into the onboard electrical circuitry. The crew commander screwed the light bulb-type base plug into the ceiling light socket, having first removed the bulb.

He then connected the single wire with an adapter to the upper contact on the elevating mechanism plate.

The KOP-RM must be adjusted to the zero line of the organic sight to prepare it for use.

Using the elevation handwheel, the sergeant set the remote scales on the zero graduations. He also set the remote scale micrometer and the deflection correction lever on the KOP-RM to the "0" graduation. Now the last step. Using the adjustment screw and lever, Nikiforov moved the collimator's spot of light to the top of the center angle on the sight. The KOP-RM is ready for operation.

At the company commander's direction, the tank commander drew up a diagram for a training session on solution of fire missions. The diagram showed reference points, targets, target ranges, and initial firing data. A total of six pop-up and two moving targets was envisioned in the diagram and on the target range. Thus, eight firing missions were to be solved.

One minute was allocated per target. No more than three rounds were expended per target. The target was judged to be destroyed if the spot of light on the instrument's collimator appeared opposite the target outline.

The following exercise evaluations were used:

"excellent" -- if all targets were destroyed;

"good" -- at least two-thirds of targets;

"satisfactory" -- at least one-half of the targets.

The sergeant strove during the training to inculcate in the trainees firm skills in independent destruction of targets using the cannon and machine-gun in short time periods. Here, he put the KOP-RM to skillful use for inculcation in the trainees of the skills in exercise completion. The gunner and the tank commander determined firing results without expending ammunition by using the spot of light (long, short, right, left, or on target). The gunner practiced correcting the fire and the tank commander evaluated him and required that deficiencies be corrected.

The crew training was conducted on the firing range in a tank mounted on a rocker platform.

At the company commander's command "Into Battle," the crew, after placing three artillery training rounds and one box with a belt loaded with training rounds in the vehicle, rapidly took their positions, closed the hatches,

turned on the lights, radio gear, and stabilizer, and readied the weapons for battle.

After the command "Into Battle," the sergeant assigned the mission to the crew via the TPU [intercom].

"First reference point -- individual house, second -- individual tree, third -- burial mound. The 'enemy' forward defense line passes from on the right the individual house, straight -- the dugout, on the left -- the ravine. Attack in the direction of the dugout and burial mound, destroy the firing points and the personnel in the strong point."

The operator began to display the targets as commanded by the company commander. The crew did not know the target display sequence.

Private N. Yakovlev, the gunner, attentively reconnoitered the targets. Soon thereafter, he detected a tank and quickly made a decision. "Armor-piercing, by the individual tree, tank 1,600. Sight setting 16, center angle, center of the target."

Sergeant Nikiforov, the tank commander, knowing that the target range was 1,400 meters, the air temperature normal, and the wind blowing from the right at 10 meters per second, introduced the initial data into the instrument. He introduced a sight setting of 14 in the BK [direction of attack] scale, crosswind correction 0-04, and began his observation.

Private K. Yakimenko loaded a training round into the cannon and reported "Armor-piercing ready!"

"Nine seconds. The weapon must be loaded faster," the sergeant noted.

He carefully watched as the gunner set 16 as the initial sight data on the organic sight and moved the center angle to the center of the target. The gunner, warning the crew that he was going to open fire, fired one round from the cannon.

The lamp in the instrument's flash mechanism lit up for an instant and the gunner and sergeant used it to determine the deviation of the spot of light from the target -- over, to the left 4 mils.

Private Yakovlev erred in determining the initial setting by using sight setting 16 vice 14 and not considering the wind correction. Therefore, the device showed a deviation in the spot of light both in elevation and direction from the target.

The gunner reported:

"Over, to the left 0-04. Sight setting 13, correction to the right 0-04."

Based upon exercise conditions, the tank is moving towards the target and, at the time of the second round, target range has decreased by about 50-60

meters. The sergeant decreased the sight setting on the instrument by one graduation, setting in 13, in order to teach the gunner to conduct his fire at a different target range.

At that time, the loader reported "Armor-piercing ready." The gunner fired the second round. That time the spot of light appeared within the target's contour. This signified that the sight setting and the lateral correction on the organic sight coincided with the instrument data.

"The target was destroyed by the second round. More accurately determine the target range, consider the wind correction, correctly assign the initial sight setting, and conduct the fire at a high rate of speed."

The tank commander also evaluated the loader's actions. The remaining firing missions were solved in the same manner without the crew dismounting from the vehicle.

At the critique, Sergeant Nikiforov told the gunner that his exercise score was "excellent" since he destroyed the targets. The loader's score was "good" since he was unable to support a sufficiently high rate of fire.

The gunner acquired firm skills in operations with the panel, reconnoitering targets, and solution of firing missions during the exercise.

The loader solves the fire mission last and the gunner takes care of his responsibilities, training in loading the cannon and machine gun and in correcting weapon malfunctions during the gunnery.

Thus, during one training session the tank commander improves not only his own actions but also learns tank gunnery. The gunner also receives command skills and improves his mastery in the role of loader. At the same time, the loader performs as gunner and brings his skills in loading the weapons to the point of being automatic.

Such a system of training allowed the sergeant to achieve rapid interchangeability in his crew and, thanks to skillful use of the KOP-RM tracking device, masterfully assimilate skills in reconnoitering targets by observation, determining range, correct assignment of initial settings, accurate gunnery from cannon and machine gun, and skillful correction of fire under any conditions, day or night.

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GROUND TARGET RECONNAISSANCE TRAINING DESCRIBED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 5, May 77 signed to press 20 Apr 77 pp 10-11

[Article: "Target Reconnaissance"]

[Text] Land-based target reconnaissance includes optical, sound, radar, and radio reconnaissance, as well as reconnaissance of the enemy through interrogation of prisoners and refugees and study of captured documents, weapons, and equipment.

We will only examine optical reconnaissance based on the use of the direct visibility of targets. Observation of the enemy (visually or via instruments) is organized and conducted under all conditions of the situation, continually, and by all subunits [podrazdeleniya] and units [chasti]. It results in gaining information:

on the disposition of the enemy's forward edge;

on redeployment of enemy troops;

on disposition of the enemy fire means, especially nuclear missile assets, and subunits;


on the disposition and nature of defensive structures and obstacles;

on the nature of enemy behavior;

on the distribution of enemy commander's observation posts [KNP] and radio-electronic means;

on concentration of enemy infantry, tanks, and other combat equipment.

Observation is supplemented by eavesdropping, especially when visibility is poor (night, fog, rain, haze from fires, smoke screens). Based on aural signs (noise of vehicle traffic, felling trees, driving spikes, conversations, etc.) an observer can determine:



the nature of enemy operations and defensive work underway;

the approximate direction of rocket and missile launches, antitank guided missile, artillery and mortar, and tank firing, etc.;

the direction of movement of combat equipment and transport vehicles.

Observation is continuous and a network of special posts is set up. Observers are assigned in the section, platoon, and company.

The commander of the section (team, crew) personally studies the enemy. However, to insure continuity, he selects observers from among the best-trained soldiers and assigns corresponding missions to the machinegunner and the riflemen.

The section commander assigns the mission to the observer in the following approximate sequence (see diagram).

"Reference points: 1 -- felled tree near the hill; 2 -- white stone; 3 -- destroyed house; 4 -- single tree; 5 -- farmstead; 6 -- signal. The main line of enemy resistance passes beyond the Bezymyanka River. North of the river is a barbed wire entanglement with three rows of pickets. The first trench line runs between reference points 2 and 3, with the second line behind it. The trench lines are connected by two connecting trenches, one passing close to reference point 2 and the other in line with the windmill. An earth-and-timber pillbox is in line with the A-shaped telephone pole.

"The observer is Private Ivanov. Set up the observation point [NP] here (points to the location), the alternate NP is 30 meters to the left, and observe in a sector from the monument on the right to the church on the left.

"Monitor enemy operations and all changes on the terrain in the assigned sector. Place special attention on the sector of terrain between reference points 2 and 3, on the earth-and-timber pillbox in the first trench line, the connecting trenches, and the destroyed house. Report everything noted to me."

After this, the section commander checks how the soldier assimilated the mission.

The section commander assigns the missions to observers with firing means (automatic rifle, grenade launcher) at the same time he assigns firing missions. Here, the observation sector must coincide with the sector of fire. The sniper and all remaining soldiers in the section study the enemy within the limits of the sectors of fire of their weapons. Thus, the section zone of observation in battle is a field of continuous reconnaissance.

In accordance with the missions assigned by the sector commander, the observer sets up and camouflages a foxhole for conducting reconnaissance in the assigned sector.

One must be a resourceful soldier in order to correctly blend into the terrain. For example, the terrain in which the sector position is located contains mounds and stumps. An experienced scout directly camouflages his foxhole beneath these natural objects. Making a false stump or mound, he mandatorily removes a mound or stump from the terrain so as not to make the enemy suspicious. The enemy carefully makes a strict count of all local objects and reference points. Therefore, the soldier must be able to camouflage himself and blend into the terrain, using folds of terrain and local objects for furtive placement and relocation.

Beginning to carefully survey the terrain, the observer initially surveys the close-in zone, then carefully shifts to monitoring the middle and distant zones. Such a sequence allows him to better study local objects, remember them, and quickly detect the enemy.

A scout can discover targets on the battlefield, determine what they are, and monitor them if he is not only very familiar with possible locations for varied targets in a particular enemy subunit combat formation, but also knows their identification features.

Table
Of Identification Features and Sound Hearability Ranges

Enemy Activity	Characteristic Sound Features	Hearability Range meters
Movement of infantry in formation	Dull even noise on a dirt road on a highway	300 600
Tank traffic	Continuous metallic rattle of tracks along with sharp engine noise on a dirt road on a highway	2,000 3,000-4,000
Automobile traffic	Engine noise on a dirt road on a highway	500 1,000
Chopping and sawing of wood	sharp clunk of the axe or squeal of a saw	300-400
Driving stakes by hand	dull sound of rhythmic sequential blows	300
Falling of a chopped or sawn tree	sharp noise, scraping of branches, dull blow against the ground	800
Digging foxholes	rhythmic dull blows	500-1,000

/Tanks/ [boldface in original] are easy to detect by the noise of the engines and unique metallic clank of the tracks. Movement of a group of tanks is audible at 2-4 kilometers, that of a single tank up to 1.5 kilometers away. The direction of movement can be determined by the shift in the sound.

A dust trail with a length at the earth's surface about equal to the column length follows a column of tanks (BTR, BMP) moving during the day. If the observer is unable to make out the number of vehicles in the column, he can make a determination (approximate) based on the length of the dust trail divided by the reference distance between tanks (BTR, BMP).

A tank in a strong point is noticeable by the gun turret with antenna slightly elevated above the breastwork of the foxhole.

/Antitank guns/ [PTO], as a rule, are deployed on axes accessible to tanks: at bridges, along roads and especially near intersections, in gardens and bushes, at the edge of woods, and on routes to crossing points over river lines. An experienced scout will detect the firing position of an antitank gun by the revealing movements of individual soldiers and by the gun barrel and shield. Smoke, flash, and flight of the tracer round are very visible when a PTO fires.

/PTURS [Antitank guided missiles] positions/ are deployed in the same places one finds PTO. PTURS launch platforms rapidly move out of concealment, discarding their camouflage, when tanks appear. At this time, they can be easily distinguished by the external form of the carriers and by the shells with cross-shaped wings. A PTURS position is detected when firing occurs by the smoke, clumps of dust, and trail of gasses from the jet stream on the flight path.

/Artillery battery positions/ are more difficult to discern. They are deployed on the reverse slopes of hills, in gulleys, and on the edges of groves. Nonetheless, an experienced scout will detect them based on such features as the glitter and sound of the shots and the smoke and dust above the firing position. The reflections of the shots on the background of clouds or edges of woods are very noticeable at night or when visibility is poor. It should be remembered that firing from howitzers is accompanied by a soft sound and that from cannons by a sharp sound. The flight of a large-caliber howitzer round is accompanied by a unique swoosh.

/Mortar positions/ are located 1-3 kilometers from the forward edge behind the steep slopes of hills, in ravines, quarries, and gorges, on steep river banks, and in ruined buildings. They "hide themselves" very determinedly. But, they have many identifying features such a dull reports, spurts or stripes of smoke which rise upwards and point towards the direction of fire. Smoke rings rise to a height of 15-20 meters above the firing position above each mortar which is firing. The smoke rings make it easy to count the number of tubes in the firing position.

Reconnoitering enemy observation points requires special attentiveness and aptitude. The observer attempting to locate a KNP or an NP must place himself

mentally in the enemy's position and determine where he himself would set up an NP. One requires a good view from a KNP or NP. This means that they are to be found on the slopes of hills positioned towards points of interest, in various local objects, on the edges of woods and groves, etc. No matter how cleverly the enemy camouflages observation instruments, they will give off reflections anyway.

A /machinegun/ is a small-scale and inconspicuous target. Nonetheless, the keen eye of a scout can establish its deployment in the defensive system. The grass is cut and bushes trimmed in front of a machinegun firing position. The dirt from a foxhole is somewhat higher than neighboring sectors of trench line. A characteristic pulsing flash is noted as a machinegun fires. A dark trace from powder gasses falls on the snow in front of the muzzle face during the winter.

/Trenches and foxholes/ are clearly visible on slopes and crests of hills and on the edges and outskirts of populated points. Connecting trenches lead from the rear area to foxholes and trenches and their bends are the most noticeable. Presence of foxholes and trenches is given away by dried-out and dead branches and bushes used for camouflage, as well as by the movement of individual soldiers through the trenches and connecting passages.

Some soldiers may get the idea from the very incomplete list of identifying features presented that target reconnaissance is not so tough.

We remind them that the enemy is clever and treacherous, that he uses varied means and methods of camouflage and disinformation in an attempt to hide the true location and nature of his installations. Knowing the enemy's organization and weapons well, the mission involves reconnoitering the true targets skillfully under any situation or conditions, separating the real from the false.

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GUN CREW FIRE CONTROL TRAINING IN THE CLASSROOM

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 5, May 77 signed to press 20 Apr 77 pp 12-13

[Article by Col N. Yezhov: "Prior To Going Into the Field"]

[Text] Methodology for Conducting Fire Control Lessons Using a Terrain Mock-up.

Young commanders in troop units and students in training subunits [podrazdeleniya] acquire basic practical skills in subunit fire control at lessons in the field and during firing drills. Working out several training problems on a terrain mock-up should precede lessons in the field so that the trainees' actions on the terrain show initiative.

Having a sector of terrain in miniature in front of them, the trainees can clearly visualize how best to use the relief and individual objects in the interests of more effectively employing the organic gun to successfully solve the combat missions. Using conventional tactical signs and mock-ups of fire means and combat equipment, the director can illustrate the more desirable place for an observation point or where to set up a firing position for one's gun, tank or armored personnel carrier, how to organize the fire system

It is also advisable to use the terrain mock-up to study fire control problems prior to working out tactical training themes with a section (crew, team) and platoon. It is especially useful for young commanders when such lessons are conducted with them prior to departure for the firing range or before tactical lessons which include combat firing. Sergeants improve their knowledge of how to correctly assign firing missions, learn to issue terse commands to open fire, etc.


The classroom containing the terrain mock-up where the lessons are conducted must meet all the necessary requirements for teaching fire control to sergeants. Here is how the classroom is laid out where platoon commander Warrant Officer [praporshchik] V. Lapin conducts lessons. The terrain relief from one of the sectors depicted on a topographical map is built on a special

table in a spacious room. Sand, paper, sawdust, moss, bits of glass, ground colored chalk, and other materials are used.

Electromagnetic relays mounted in small boxes (made of cardboard, sheet textolite, or glass) were used to display the pop-up targets. A wire is soldered to the relay armature. A detachable target made of stiff material is fastened to the bent end of the wire (Figure 1). The target is painted a suitable color. Up to 5-7 single targets (PTURS [antitank guided missile], guns, mortars) can be attached to the armature of one relay. A window the size of the target is cut in the box top. The two relay leads are fed from a rectifier or from a storage battery. A moving target is also mounted in a box. Its size depends upon the number of targets (target mock-ups) and the length of the paths on which the moving targets must be displayed. A small electric motor turning a drive drum places the target in motion.

Capron lines holding combat equipment mock-ups (there can be up to 10-15) are stretched between the drive and driven drums. Two transverse windows through which the targets appear and disappear are located in the box top (Figure 2). The moving targets are usually used to display the movement of the "enemy" along the route or his counterattack. Varied moving targets are used on the terrain mock-up, including tanks, infantry combat vehicle [BMP], BTR, and trucks.


Figure 1



KEY:

- | | |
|--|---------------------|
| a. Toggle switch off | b. Toggle switch on |
| 1. Electromagnetic relay | 4. Bent wire |
| 2. Armature | 5. Target |
| 3. Spot where wire is soldered to the armature | 6. Window |

Figure 2



KEY:

1. DSD-2 motor
2. Drive drum ($\emptyset = 25\text{mm}$)
3. Driven drum
4. Capron lines
5. Target mock-ups
6. Window (45mm)

The display of all targets is accomplished from a control panel installed in the front wall of the terrain mock-up. One toggle switch for each pop-up and moving target is installed in the panel. The lesson director's station is located next to the panel and is used to assign missions to the trainees and monitor commands when the trainees are provided radios for the lessons. Also, the classroom has a commander's locker containing a selection of targets and conventional signs for changing the tactical situation.

Miniature light bulbs and simulators are used to designate shell bursts. The lights can also be used to illustrate the forward edge, disposition of firing positions, and the boundaries of "enemy" strong points.

Various displays containing diagrams visually depicting the organization and combat formations of our small subunits and those of the enemy, operating procedures in a BMP and in dismounted formation, in battle, and drawings with specifications of combat equipment and weapons are used in the classroom for the sergeants' independent study. The displays also contain conventional tactical signs, tables with callsigns for key personnel and the signals used when assigning firing missions and issuing commands, and the responsibilities of the commander of a section in combat.

Lessons conducted in such a classroom are interesting and instructive. Therefore, they are recommended for adoption by young warrant officers for training of various categories of students, where applicable. Without going into detail on each problem, a fire control exercise on the terrain mock-up in general terms goes like this.

The night before, Warrant Officer Lapin received instructions from the company commander, who had approved the lesson plan. Arriving at the classroom containing the electrified terrain mock-up, the platoon commander announced the theme, lesson goal, and training problems. He then checked the sergeants' readiness for the given lesson, their knowledge of prescribed regulations, the procedure for assigning fire missions, and the commands for firing from the gun mounted on the BMP.

Warrant Officer Lapin then oriented the sergeants on the mock-up, pointed out the terrain scale and coded reference points, and briefed them on the disposition of "enemy" firing means.

Convinced that the situation had been assimilated, Lapin shifted to working out the training problems using the group exercise method. He designated the disposition of "enemy" firing means using conventional signs, targets, and mock-ups. He did the same for our troops and for our neighbors and described their operations. He allowed the sergeants sufficient time to evaluate the situation and make a decision, then ordered Junior Sergeant S. Kochetkov in his role as BMP commander to report his decision and assign the firing mission. Lapin listened to the answers from other section commanders, then critiqued them, pointed out errors, and proposed that the assignment of firing missions and issuance of commands be repeated.

Sergeant Yu. Levchenko did the best job. If the trainees erred during the training process, the platoon commander himself formulated a model variant of the answer based on the input data.

Radios were used to work out the dynamics of combat. The warrant officer announced the sergeants' callsigns. Communications were established and then via radio firing missions were assigned, target designations transmitted, commands to open fire issued, etc. Use of radios made the lesson more realistic and more interesting. At the conclusion of the lesson, the director again pointed out the theme, goals, and training problems, repeated the procedure requirements for the problems worked out, and made an overall critique of the trainees' practical actions. He announced the evaluations and assigned independent work to eliminate deficiencies noted and prepare for a practical lesson in the field.

The success of such a classroom lesson primarily results from the skillful use of the electrified terrain mock-up. However, it would not be correct to say that a well-equipped carefully-made terrain mock-up in and of itself makes a lesson instructive since it is vital that lessons portray realistic combat conditions to the maximum. And, this depends upon the lesson director's creativity and methodological mastery.

Warrant Officer Lapin in preparing for the lesson practiced using the terrain mock-up. He also studied the lesson content, goals, regulations, corresponding directives, and manuals. He combined this part of his lesson preparation with compilation of a lesson plan. He usually planned to work out two to three training problems with three or four short briefings during a lesson lasting 1.5-2 hours. The platoon commander pointed out ahead of time what problems needed to be repeated from regulations and directives and described the tactical situation in order to better prepare the sergeants for the lessons.

Naturally, there can be no triteness in organizing fire control lessons on a terrain mock-up. Lesson methodology will depend upon the abilities of the director, availability of time, and support facilities. The content of the training problems and the missions completed will depend upon the category of the trainees and the training theme.

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DOSAAF MILITARY-TECHNICAL SPORTS PROGRAM RESULTS AND OBJECTIVES

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[Article by K. Khodarev, head of Military-technical Sports Directorate of the Central Committee of DOSAAF USSR: "With a Thought About Tomorrow"]

[Text] This year there has occurred a "link-up" of the winter and summer sports seasons. The First All-union Winter Games [or: Sports Festival] dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the Defense Society, barely came to the end of their reign and the summer types of military-technical sports were already initiated. The tempo of the new season is intense. Almost every day information on preparations for all-union competitions and their results is received at the Central Committee of DOSAAF USSR, and our combined teams have been going abroad and returning. Soviet cross-country motorcyclists on 125cc and 250cc class machines have already competed in several world championship ranked meets as masters of the speedway. Rallyists have gone to Greece for the "Acropolis" rally and to Hungary for the first stage of the Friendship of Socialist Countries Cup. Preparations are being completed for demanding international competitions among go-cartists, automobile racers, and motorcycle soccer players.

The present sports season will be especially demanding. After all it is going on during the year of a milestone in the history of our country--the 60th anniversary of October. The Soviet people are now celebrating the motherland's glorious jubilee with labor successes in the fulfillment of plans outlined by the 25th CPSU Congress. Sportsmen are preparing their gifts. It is pleasing to note that their account is already open. In a world championship motor race on ice, Honored Master of Sport Sergei Taraban'ko took the gold medal for the third time in a row. This is the tenth victory by our sportsmen in world championships on an ice speedway.

The new season began at a time when organizations of the Defense Society set about accomplishing tasks posed by the Eighth DOSAAF Congress. There it was emphasized that military-technical sports play an important role in the physical development and technical training of the population, and they have become an integral component in the training of youth for service in the

armed forces. The Sixth Sports Festival of the Peoples of the USSR gave the best confirmation of this: 40 million technical sports representatives participated in it; more than 12 million officially rated sportsmen and 6,000 Masters of Sport have been trained in the past 5 years. During the same time 323 world records were established. The network of technical sports clubs has been significantly expanded and their material and technical bases have been strengthened. In the 1972-1976 period, DOSAAF organizations put into operation more than 100 major sports installations. The motherland valued highly the society's contribution in strengthening our defensive might and observed this with the Order of Lenin. For great achievements in world and European championships, a large group of Masters of Technical Sports were awarded orders and medals.

But however pleasant it is to note the successes and relate the names of the winners, we must first and foremost think about tomorrow. And here we have no end of work. Effectiveness and quality. These words, intoned at the 25th CPSU Congress, now determine the assessment of the activity of all collectives and of every worker. This is the motto of the Tenth Five-Year Plan. For this reason, the Eighth DOSAAF Congress, in accordance with the resolutions of the 25th party congress, obliged the society's organizations to persistently heighten the quality and effectiveness of defense and sports work, especially in primary collectives, and to insure the further development of military-technical types of sports and extensively attract young people to them. The mass character, organization, and results of competition must be enhanced and there must be attained an integral combining of general physical development, technical mastery, high moral and volitional qualities in sportsmen along with their readiness to carry out the tasks in defense of the motherland. The congress has called upon sportsmen and the DOSAAF sports community to raise sports to a new level and to actively strive toward the strengthening by Soviet sportsmen of their leading position in the international arena.

The question concerns a new approach toward development of technical types of sports such as auto racing and motorcycle racing by defense organizations. The necessity for this is obvious. Our sports do not exist for their own sake. They go hand in hand with productivity and the interests of defense of the socialist fatherland. Engaging in automobile and motorcycle competitions, young people master the equipment and cultivate heightened moral, volitional and physical qualities. The pinnacle of sports is reached by those who have complete mastery over the operation of their equipment and who constantly develop creative thinking. After all this is a future skillful soldier, capable of mastering complex military equipment in short periods of time, a rationalizer and inventor who contributes to technical progress and the growth of productivity in labor.

These are the principles upon which the efforts of committees, clubs, sections and the entire active public membership in sports work must be based.

Yes, there is no end to these matters. Let us dwell upon the most important and urgent ones. If we are considering the future of our automotive sports, then the fact that, practically speaking, competition for a place on the first team is missing in all the combined teams cannot help but be disturbing. For several years now, on motorcycle cross-country routes, at auto races, at rallies and on motorcycle soccer fields we see the same sportsmen. The influx of fresh forces is too small.

There are several reasons for this. Obviously one of the main ones is the insufficient qualification of the training cadres. The search for new talent is being poorly conducted. Many are teaching their proteges the same way they themselves had at one time been taught. But life, after all, does not stand still. Each year the training of sportsmen is more and more demanding. And regrettably it must be stated that even among trainers of combined teams, not to mention those who work in subordinate collectives, there is no clear-cut method of training based upon and tested in practice. Up to now the academic and training process in automotive sports has been carried out without the necessary contact with science and medicine. Whatever might be happening in this area, it is still weak and unsystematic. Our trainers, when working with sportsmen, most often search for a pathway to high results by an empirical method, not always analyzing the advantages or shortcomings of this or that innovation.

We have, at the same time, teachers whose experience we need to disseminate in every way possible. Yu. Trofimets is thoughtfully working with cross-country racers. Yu. Stavrovskiy is successfully applying his training method to go-cartists. It is not by chance that their proteges have attained great results in the world championship and the Friendship Cup. And what is important to note is that they were able to create collectives of like-minded people united by a common goal and knowing the way to it. Every trainer must achieve this same unity and sense of responsibility in his own teams.

Serious demands can also be made on the level of political and educational work with sportsmen during the period of time in which they perform and in assemblies. Lectures and discussions alone, which are conducted as a rule only in assemblies prior to departure for competitions, are obviously insufficient. Sportsmen frequently travel around, visiting many cities in the Soviet Union. It is important for the visit not to be limited to performances on the track. Visiting labor and sports collectives and familiarization with the sights of the cities and the achievements of our multinational culture--this too is education and familiarization with the far-reaching accomplishments of the Soviet people. The recently introduced ceremonial send-off ritual for combined teams departing for international meets should also play a large role.

The task for Soviet sportsmen of strengthening their leading position in the international arena is directly connected with the main problems of the development of our mass sports. The most important of these--and it

was again emphasized by the Eighth DOSAAF Congress--is the development of sports work in the primary organizations of the society and the strengthening of their material and technical bases. It would seem that above all there is a need to cultivate automobile and motorcycle competitions in those places where facilities already exist: at automobile and motorcycle factories, at motor transport enterprises and at professional-technical institutions. In the immediate future, for example, a broad network of circles, sections and clubs for model sports is projected to be created at these same professional-technical institutions, in schools, at Young Pioneer Palaces, and at young technicians' centers. Also, one should not forget mass sports reserves such as owners of private automobiles and motorcycles, especially because there is a great attraction among them toward sports.

A large role in the development of mass sports belongs to technical sports clubs (STK), of which there are many hundreds in our country. But unfortunately, to a considerable degree their sports work is lukewarm, while attention is primarily devoted to self-supporting activity. Also, a significant percentage of automotive schools have not turned to sports, although they have a large staff of sports workers at their disposal. Where, if not here, should mass types of sports develop and sports become a true aid to the students for their most rapid mastering of modern equipment. Reality dictates that the level of development in sports must be the main criterion in evaluating the work of technical sports clubs, and many of them must be expeditiously freed from self-supporting activity.

There is an urgent necessity to create in the union republics and in large cities technical sports clubs which would become bases for the development of various types of competition, taking into account geographic locations, available material and technical bases, and traditions. These clubs could become affiliates of the Central Automobile and Motorcycle Club (TsAMKa) DOSAAF USSR in the training of highly qualified sportsmen and reserves for combined teams and the working out of up-to-date methods in the training process.

Finally, we need an orderly system for all sports work: a farsighted plan geared toward several years of all-union and international competitions, and a close link between the chief trainers and teachers in the field in order to improve the work of selection. It is also important to raise the level of activity of the federations. Without an orderly system and without public support it is impossible to solve such important problems of the further development of sports as the preparation of trainers, instructors and judges, the mastery of sports equipment and the expansion of the network of child and youth sports schools.

Technical sports are assuredly gathering strength. Their popularity has been demonstrated in the recently completed First All-union Winter Games, which provided a genuine look at the achievements of DOSAAF sportsmen

during the 50th anniversary year of the Defense Society. Ahead there is the Seventh Summer Sports Festival of the peoples of the USSR (1978-1979), in which technical types of sports will be included in the program. The task of DOSAAF organizations is to raise military-technical sports to a new level of development, guided by accumulated experience and skillfully utilizing growing material and technical capabilities.

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