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PARTY POLICY TOWARD OFFICER PERSONNEL DISCUSSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 10, May 77 signed to press
5 May 77 pp 24-35

[Article by Col Gen V. Goncharov, First Deputy Chief of Main Personnel Directorate, Ministry of Defense USSR: "Raise and Bring Up Personnel in the Leninist Manner"]

[Text] An important problem which has received comprehensive and profound illumination at the 25th Congress of the CPSU is the party's personnel policy. In the Central Committee's summary report to the Congress it is called a mighty lever by means of which the party influences the course of social development.

V. I. Lenin pointed out that the practical implementation of party policy in controlling society must occur through the appropriate assignment and up-bringing of cadres. The Leninist instructions are especially urgent today when the increasing scales and complexity of the tasks for communist construction are imposing ever higher demands on the selection, assignment, and up-bringing of personnel. Under conditions of a developed socialist society, the building of communism, and the scientific-technical revolution an increase in the level of leadership of all aspects of society's life and all organizational and political work among the masses is inseparably linked with the party's personnel policy.

Personnel policy plays an important role in the Soviet Armed Forces. High ideological conviction, profound political, military, and technical knowledge, the organizational abilities of generals, admirals, officers, warrant officers [praporshchik and michman], and extended servicemen, their firm will, state of discipline, and persistence in the attainment of the assigned goal determine the combat readiness of the troops to a great extent.

It is possible to have excellent equipment and a sufficient number of personnel as well as the best operational and tactical decisions and miss the opportunity to gain victory if knowledge and experience as well as the organizational

capabilities of the army's command personnel are not equal to the occasion. "We have everything necessary to ensure the high and reliable combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces," said General Secretary of the Central Committee CPSU, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, at a reception in the Kremlin in honor of graduates of the military academies. "Therefore, a further rise in the level of combat readiness of the army and navy depends to a great extent on the practical activity of the military personnel and on their ability, will, energy, and persistence" ("Leninskim kursom" [By the Leninist Course], Vol 2, p 49).

The Communist Party is organizing all its work on the training of officer personnel on the strength of the Marxist-Leninist understanding of their role in strengthening the Armed Forces, in raising the combat readiness of the troops, and in ensuring victory in battle, considering the objective regular laws for the development of military affairs under contemporary conditions. The Central Committee CPSU, its Politburo, and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Chairman of the Defense Council, Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, are constantly devoting attention to questions of the training and upbringing of military personnel and improving the style of their activity.

The officers are the pride of the Soviet people. As a result of the tireless concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet state, our army and navy have a sufficient quantity of ideologically tempered, highly qualified command, political, and engineering personnel. Each year, a considerable detachment of young officers who are boundlessly devoted to the cause of the party and who passionately love their important and noble profession is poured to the units and large units.

The party's personnel policy in the Armed Forces is directed primarily toward the training, selection, assignment, instruction, and upbringing of officers in the interests of the steady raising of the troops' combat readiness and the strengthening of the defensive capability of our motherland and the entire socialist commonwealth. The basis of this policy is formed by the principles for work with personnel which were worked out by V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party.

V. I. Lenin valued personnel highly. He considered that no policy can be conducted without expressing it in the assignment of personnel and in the distribution of party forces. Thousands of the best party workers and professional revolutionaries were sent for the organizational development of the Red Army and Navy and for the organization of the armed rebuff to the forces of intervention and internal counterrevolution. The party raised and brought up such outstanding proletarian military leaders as M. V. Frunze, K. Ye. Voroshilov, and many other important military leaders, commanders, and commissars from among the revolutionaries.

In building the Red Army, V. I. Lenin and the party displayed wisdom and flexibility in work with personnel. We need only recall the solution of the problem of military specialists. The experience of the war against the interventionists and the White Guardists showed that a mighty regular army with well trained command personnel is necessary for the defense of the socialist fatherland.

But, at that time it was impossible to train the necessary number of commanders from among the workers and peasants. Therefore, the party boldly decided on the broad inclusion of military specialists in the ranks of the Red Army--officers and generals of the old army. As a result, hundreds and thousands of regular military personnel firmly tied their fate with the Red Army. Prominent military leaders and chiefs such as A. I. Yegorov, M. N. Tukhachevskiy, B. M. Shaposhnikov, S. S. Kamenev, and others grew up from among their number.

The party made wide use of competent revolutionary soldiers and seamen as well as noncommissioned officers of the old army who had received combat experience during World War I in command duties. Who does not know of the combat exploits of S. M. Budyenny and V. I. Chapayev--prominent military chiefs and true popular heroes who were raised by the party!

During all the years from the Civil War to the Great Patriotic War the party tirelessly raised and brought up officer personnel and continuously improved the forms and methods for their training. Without delving into the history of this question, it is necessary to stress again and again that the work which was done in this period laid the foundation for the skillful leadership of units, large units, and formations in the fierce battles against the troops of the fascists bloc which were unprecedented in their scales. In the course of the Great Patriotic War the party ensured the training of thousands and thousands of new commanders, political officers, engineers, and technicians and brought forth and educated an entire Pleiad of outstanding military leaders.

After the Great Patriotic War the party and its Central Committee, considering the tasks for the reliable defense of the achievements of socialism and the building of communism as well as the trends in the development of military affairs and the scope of the scientific-technical revolution in a comprehensive manner, consistently improved and are continuously improving work on the training, education, and upbringing of officer personnel. It is sufficient to note those changes which the forge of military personnel--the system of military educational institutions of the Armed Forces--has undergone. The overwhelming majority of our schools are now higher educational institutions. Today, more than half the officers have a higher military and special-military education. If we take such an important category of military personnel as regimental commanders, then more than 90 percent of them have a higher military education.

At the same time, even today the problems of the further improvement of the teaching personnel in the schools and academies, the intensification of the ideological tempering of the cadets and students, the raising of the quality of their training and education, the instilling of skills in practical work with people in them, the mastery of new equipment and weapons, and the organization and conduct of contemporary battle remain urgent in the training of officer personnel. It is no secret that omissions in service and behavior by individual officers, especially young ones, are often the result of gaps in their training and education in the military educational institutions. In some schools, insufficient attention is devoted to instilling love for the

military profession in the cadets and students and leading troop experience is not always utilized effectively. Furthermore, the selection of candidates for the military educational institutions is not conducted thoroughly everywhere.

In the raising and education of personnel, an important role is played by the purposeful use of that tremendous experience which has been accumulated during the almost 60 years which have passed since the Great October Socialist Revolution. Brought up by the party on the revolutionary, combat, and labor traditions of the Soviet people, the officers of our time are worthy heirs to the glory of the heroes of former battles. Their selflessness in serving the motherland, bravery and steadfastness, and high ability are now finding confirmation in distant ocean voyages, the performance of combat duty, and in daily strained combat and political training. Many of the officers have been awarded orders and medals including the recently instituted order, "For Service to the motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR," for bravery and valor, for the mastery of contemporary military equipment, for the skillful instruction and education of the personnel, and for their exemplary accomplishment of their military duty.

The system of training and education of military personnel which has been proven by life and time is constantly being improved and enriched with new experience. The decisions of the 25th Congress of the CPSU requires the even more active and deeper conduct of this work with consideration of the prospects for the development of military affairs. We are speaking about the further strengthening and improvement of the Leninist principles for the selection, assignment, and upbringing of the personnel. It is necessary that all questions of work with personnel be decided in an integrated manner and that the quantitative and qualitative relationships of commanders, political officers, staff officers, officers of the rear, technical-engineering personnel, coworkers of the scientific institutions, and other officers of the branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms be substantiated in a strictly scientific manner.

The requirements for personnel at the contemporary level of development of our society are set forth in concentrated form in the summary report of the Central Committee to the 25th Party Congress. "The modern leader," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee CPSU, stressed at the Congress, "should organically combine within himself a party spirit with profound competence and discipline with initiative and a creative approach to matters. At the same time, on any sector the leader is also required to consider the socio-political and educational aspects, be sensitive to people as well as to their needs and requirements, and to serve as an example in work and in living" ("Materialy XXV s'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th Congress of the CPSU], p 70).

The training and education of officer personnel is constantly in the field of view of the Central Committee CPSU, the Ministry of Defense USSR, military councils, commanders, political organs, staffs, and party organizations. Nor can we fail to mention the increasing activity of our personnel organs in this

plane. An ever larger place is being occupied in their activity by long-range planning of work with personnel and by the striving to study the professional and political qualities of officers thoroughly and on the spot in order to introduce comprehensively weighed suggestions on their assignments and placement. The reinforcing of the personnel organs with commanders, political officers, and engineers who have the proper education and rich troop and fleet experience deserves every approval.

The measures which have been planned are imbued with the Leninist concern for the growth and education of the officers. They present each of them with an even wider field for activity, initiative, and independence on the sectors which have been assigned and they create favorable prospects for their service growth depending on ideological level, military and methodological skill, work experience, and a specific creative contribution to raising the combat readiness of the troops.

The experience in the training and upbringing of personnel which has been accumulated in the Armed Forces is truly great and many-faceted. It is pleasing to note that more and more works which shed light on this experience are being published. However, a number of publications have not delved sufficiently into the essence of new phenomena which have been engendered by the achievements of a mature socialist society and the development of military affairs under conditions of the scientific-technical revolution.

A harmonious system of ideological tempering and political education of the officers is functioning in the army and navy. The forms and methods for Marxist-Leninist training and party education are continuously being improved. The molding of the necessary moral-political and combat qualities among the officers is being accomplished in accordance with the decrees of the 25th Congress of the CPSU on problems of the upbringing of the personnel. The decree of the Central Committee CPSU, "On the further improvement of the system for raising the ideological-theoretical level and professional qualifications of the leading party and Soviet cadres" which was adopted last August is a new expression of the concern of the party's Central Committee for the further creative growth of our personnel. The decisions of the October (1976) Plenum of the party's Central Committee and the decree of the Central Committee CPSU, "On the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution," have enriched the ideological life of the officer corps.

Our personnel are continuously growing as ideological fighters of the party who are able to give a rebuff to any manifestations of bourgeois ideology. The majority of the Soviet officers are communists and Komsomols. Active participation in party, Komsomol, and social-political life of the army and navy is the genuine school for the instilling in them of the qualities which are necessary for the Soviet military leader.

The Minister of Defense USSR and the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Armed Forces are turning their attention to the importance of molding a Marxist-Leninist world outlook, communist conviction, devotion to the cause of the party and the Soviet motherland, political vigilance, and

loyalty to their military oath and their patriotic and international duty among the officer personnel. The profound mastery of the materials and decisions of the 25th Congress of the CPSU and the propositions and conclusions expressed by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in his summary report to the Congress by all military personnel is a necessary condition for strengthening the effectiveness of Marxist-Leninist training and its influence on the moral appearance and service activity of the officers.

I should especially like to note the role of the organizational and educational work of the officer personnel which provides the decisive contribution of the officers to the strengthening of discipline and the solidarity of the military collectives.

Each officer's strict and precise accomplishment of the Soviet laws, military regulations, orders and directives, instructions and manuals is a mandatory condition for ensuring genuine military order in the units, on the ships, and in the subunits and one of the most important factors for the high combat readiness of the troops. When an officer displays a lack of discipline he depreciates the effect on the personnel of all the measures which are directed toward strengthening military discipline.

The personal example of the commander and chief, strict but fair demandingness, clear control and check of execution, criticism and self criticism, assistance to the young officers in mastering the skill for the military education of subordinates--this is a far from complete list of what constantly influences the raising of combat readiness.

Effectiveness of work with military personnel can be achieved only by being concerned about their ideological tempering, professional training, exemplariness in performing service, and high discipline. For this, it is important to see each person, to help him in his self improvement in good time and thoroughly, to instill in subordinates the striving to master the classical works of Marxism-Leninism, to know the decisions of the party profoundly, and to propagandize its foreign and domestic policy and the great achievements of the Soviet people ardently. In his daily activity, the officer should be guided by the provisions of the decree of the Central Committee CPSU, "On raising the role of oral political agitation in the accomplishment of the decisions of the 25th Congress of the CPSU" and he should participate personally and actively in the social-political life of the military collective.

The most important function of supervisory personnel is control. But in order to control, V. I. Lenin taught, "it is necessary to be competent, it is necessary to know all the conditions of production completely and down to the finest details, it is necessary to know the technology of this production and its contemporary level, and it is necessary to have a certain scientific education" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 40, p 215). To raise and bring up military personnel in the Leninist manner means to implement steadily and creatively the behests of the great leader who called for the study of military affairs "in a genuine manner."

The Minister of Defense of the USSR especially stressed the importance of the mastery, and first of all by the officers, of tactics and operational art, contemporary equipment and weapons, the leading procedures for training and education, combat experience, and experience in combat operations under difficult conditions which approximate combat conditions. Here it is important not to be distracted by the number of exercises and lessons which have been conducted but to achieve their quality and effectiveness, that is, instructiveness and maximum use for the growth in the men's combat skill.

The arsenal for increasing knowledge in all fields of military affairs is very rich and varied. The equipping of the troops with the latest equipment and weapons and the training-material base in the units have made great progress. The system of command training which relies on the demonstration and mastery of everything new and advanced which has been achieved in the course of combat and political training is being improved. Correspondence training, courses, assemblies, seminars, methodological, military-technical, scientific, and scientific-practical conferences, and other forms of professional improvement of the officers have become a firm part of life. The principle that each chief teaches his subordinate is being steadily implemented.

Unquestionably, the main thing in the work of the officer is his practical activity in the training and upbringing of subordinates and concern for the high quality and effectiveness of each lesson or field trip which he conducts. Thanks to the striving of our personnel for self-improvement, the rank of officer is becoming a synonym for the title of master of fire, master of driving, first-class specialist, and so forth. Only after having profoundly mastered military affairs, his own specialty, and skill in the training and upbringing of subordinates does an officer understand completely what tremendous experience of preceding generations in the armed defense of the achievements of the revolution and socialism stands behind each line of our regulations and manuals, behind that volume of military knowledge which each man must master.

How bitter it is to see at times that one officer or another has poorly mastered his weapons or conducts a lesson in the field at a low methodological level. And of course, the unconscientiousness of the officer and the attempt to embellish the true level of combat training and condition of equipment and weapons can cause only resentment. Therefore, the most important criterion which determines the genuine concern for the upbringing of military personnel is the results of the service and soldierly labor of the officers, the growth in the military skill of the commanders and chiefs themselves, their conformance to contemporary requirements, and the combat readiness of the units and sub-units which have been entrusted to them.

To raise and bring up military personnel in the Leninist manner means to create a situation of high demandingness and dissatisfaction with what has been achieved in the troop collectives and to stimulate the striving to capture newer and newer heights of military skill. And here it is proper to recall that there is no limit to raising the level of combat training because we are speaking about the constant and high combat readiness of the troops.

The party is displaying tireless concern that all military personnel master the Leninist style in work--a style which is creative, foreign to subjectivism, and imbued with a scientific approach to all social processes. This style, as Comrade L. I. Brezhnev points out, presumes a high level of demandingness toward oneself and toward others, excludes complacency, and opposes any manifestations of bureaucratism and formalism. The Leninist style of leadership organically includes communist ideology and party principle, the unbreakable tie with the broad masses and tireless concern for their needs, planning in work, timely monitoring and checking of execution, criticism and self criticism, and the ability to find those means, procedures, and methods which are capable of providing maximum and strongest results with the least expenditure of forces.

In speaking about the necessity for the more active development, in the officers, of a sense of what is new and a striving to find reliable ways for the accomplishment of the missions which arise and to demonstrate a personal example of a state approach to any matter, we cannot fail to note the important role of instilling in them a high sense of responsibility for the assigned work sector, efficiency, and the ability to achieve the proper practical results even under difficult conditions. The role of socialist competition in this matter is tremendous. In a speech at the 16th Congress of Soviet Trade Unions, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev devoted great attention to improving the organization of competition which today is inseparable from the scientific-technical revolution, from the problems of effectiveness and quality of work, and from the communist upbringing of the masses. "Competition" stressed Leonid Il'ich, "is an irreplaceable means for the upbringing of the new man which helps his political growth and moral perfection."

Here, we cannot fail to consider that competition in the army and navy is at a new stage of development. Now the units--the initiators of competition--are found in each service of the Armed Forces and in the combat arms and a movement has been initiated for the best large unit. Therefore, the task of each commander and chief has been determined even more sharply--to teach the personnel the skill of organizing combat and effective socialist competition, the ability to raise its mobilizing and educational significance highly, and to participate in it personally.

The experience of Soviet military organizational development teaches us that the most important principle in organizing the Armed Forces and the most expedient form of troop control is unity of command. Without it, there can be no implementation of strict centralization or efficiency and flexibility of leadership of the military organism nor is it possible to ensure the unity of will and actions of many thousands of armed people in the interests of ensuring the high combat readiness and accomplishment of the assigned missions.

The party and the Soviet state have assigned high duties to the one-man commander and have granted him great rights. Unity of command increases the commander's responsibility for the training and education of the personnel, their discipline, the political-moral condition, combat effectiveness, and combat readiness of the subunit, unit, and ship both in peacetime and in battle.

Military councils, commanders, political organs, and party organizations are constantly working on strengthening unity of command and are concerned about instilling the Leninist style of leadership in one-man-commanders. The best trained and most authoritative officers who are able to rely on the party and Komsomol organizations as well as the officers' collectives daily and who display party spirit and state approach in everything are assigned as one-man commanders. Direct work as part of party election organs, participation in seminars, conferences, and meetings of the party activists, attendance at sessions of the military councils and reports at them--all this contributes to the party education of the one-man commanders, the development of their maturity, and the augmentation of experience in troop leadership. The greatest effectiveness here is achieved when the senior commanders and political officers teach the commanders the skill of leadership personally on the spot and serve as examples of a skillful approach to the accomplishment of difficult missions in a most difficult situation.

To raise and educate military personnel in the Leninist manner means to observe party principles for their selection, assignment, and education in the strictest manner. Questions of the selection and assignment of personnel of and by themselves are subdivided into a number of important directions. We have in mind assignments, promotions, transfers, replacements, selection for training, call-up from the reserve, release to the reserve, retirement, and so forth. But all this is subordinate to the main thing--to the interests of the matter, to the tasks facing the Armed Forces. The Leninist principle of evaluating people in accordance with their political and professional qualities and the instructions of the 25th Congress of the CPSU on the careful and concerned attitude toward personnel are observed in all this work.

The party teaches the assignment of officer personnel in such a way as to wisely combine the old and young personnel, the experience of some and the energy of others, and to achieve the stabilization of personnel and clear functioning of a politically and professionally mature, dynamic, skillful, and coordinated military apparatus in all elements of the army and navy.

The Armed Forces have priceless capital available: the veterans of the Great Patriotic War are continuing to serve fruitfully and to transmit their combat experience to new generations. True, there are fewer and fewer of them among our ranks. The officers and generals who have gone into the reserve or retired are continuing to work actively for the well-being of our Motherland and are conducting important defense-patriotic work. Remaining as members of the officer corps, the overwhelming majority of them are serving in important headquarters and installations as well as in military educational institutions. And this is correct. It is expedient to utilize the experience and knowledge of officers of the older generation in just this manner.

In the army and the navy politically mature young officers who have shown themselves up in practical work are being boldly promoted to the basic command and staff duties. Special attention is devoted to such most important categories of command personnel as commanders of regiments and ships. Much work is conducted with candidates for promotion. The practice of organizing assemblies with them, probationary periods, and the passing of tests for permission to accomplish important functional duties has developed.

The young personnel are working successfully, displaying great initiative and diligence. Thus, all the young officers of the nuclear missile carrier commanded by Captain 2d Rank A. Kazakov are passing their tests on schedule for the independent control of the subunit and the standing of underway watch and are mastering knowledge and skills for a step higher than the occupied post.

However, a close study of the political and professional qualities of subordinate officers by commanders and chiefs is not ensured everywhere to the proper degree. Individual instances of hasty, inexpedient, erroneous assignments are occurring. When some officers are promoted superficial efficiency reports are sometimes prepared which do not completely reflect the command qualities, professional training, and organizational abilities of the rated officers.

Unquestionably, subjectivism in evaluating officers is intolerable. It is important to be convinced that a candidate for promotion has shown himself sufficiently and is able to cope with the more important work in a successful manner. In one of the large units, Senior Lieutenant M. Sobol' was appointed with a promotion. Literally in several months he had to be reassigned with a demotion in duties. Is it necessary to prove the worthlessness of such a reassignment of personnel? The advancement of officers in service who have not manifested organizational abilities or high political and moral-combat qualities cannot be justified in any way.

To raise and educate military personnel in the Leninist manner means to be tirelessly concerned for the most rapid formation of the graduates of military educational institutions and officers who have been promoted to higher duties. It should be noted that this problem is attracting more and more attention of commanders and political and personnel organs. In accordance with the instruction of the Minister of Defense USSR, various and interesting forms and methods for working with personnel who have been promoted to higher duties and with all young officers are being employed effectively. Special pride is caused by the fact that many young commanders, political officers, and engineers have been awarded government rewards and promoted in military rank ahead of schedule for successes in combat and political training and the mastery of new equipment.

Life shows that senior commanders and chiefs should be concerned even more thoroughly about rendering assistance to young personnel in the acquisition of skills for the leadership of military collectives on the basis of contemporary pedagogical, psychological, and legal knowledge and about improving their methodological training and practical ability to train and educate subordinates. The experience of the leading officers is not always disseminated skillfully. Individual work on the upbringing of young personnel has not become a system everywhere. In some places, instead of working patiently with the officer who has been promoted to a higher duty they are distracted by administration and punishment.

Of course, demandingness and exactingness should be strictly observed and the one who is actually unable to cope with his duties must be assigned to work in accordance with his strengths. The instructions of the 25th Congress that

"the one who loses his ability to evaluate his activity critically, separated himself from the masses, produces flatterers and toadies, and who has lost the confidence of the communists cannot be a party leader" pertain in full measure to the military personnel ("Materialy XXV S'yezda KPSS," p 71).

The main thing in work with personnel consists of doing everything possible to realize the fundamental ideas and propositions put forth by the 25th Congress of the CPSU in troop and fleet practice. This is required by the interests in raising the defensive capability of the motherland and the improvement of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Generals, admirals, officers, warrant officers, and extended-servicemen of the army and navy are answering the party's concern with new successes in the implementation of the decisions of the 25th Congress of the CPSU and in strengthening the defensive might of the Soviet state. Military personnel are striving to greet the 60th anniversary of the Great October as well as the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces in a worthy manner. Rallied around the native party and its Leninist Central Committee closely as never before, they are always ready to accomplish their sacred patriotic and international duty with honor.

Recommendations for the Seminar Lesson

"The activity of the Communist Party for the further improvement of the Soviet Armed Forces. The requirements for military personnel which follow from the decisions of the 25th Congress of the CPSU".

The seminar lesson on the subject is called upon to assist the students in groups of Marxist-Leninist training to understand the essence of the party's military policy under contemporary conditions more deeply as well as the role of officer personnel in ensuring the high combat readiness of the army and navy.

On the lesson, it is first expedient to listen to the paper, "The 25th Congress of the CPSU on the aggressive nature of imperialism and the necessity to defend the socialist fatherland," and then to discuss the questions: 1. The CPSU on the sources of military danger and the necessity for the further strengthening of the country's defensive capability. 2. The basic directions in the activity of the Communist Party in raising the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces. 3. Urgent problems in improving the Leninist style of work in the activity of the officer personnel in light of the requirements of the 25th Congress of the CPSU.

In the paper, it should be noted that thanks to the Leninist peace-loving policy of the CPSU and the realization of the program for peace which was put forth by the 24th Party Congress, in recent years positive shifts have occurred in the system of international relations. As was stressed at the October (1976) Plenum of the Central Committee CPSU, as a result of the efforts which were undertaken by the Soviet Union together with the other socialist states and with the support of all peace-loving, realistically thinking forces, we succeeded in removing the threat of nuclear war and in making peace more desirable and

firmer. At the same time, we cannot fail to see that the enemies of detente have not stacked arms. Although the possibilities for imperialism's aggressive actions have now been considerably reduced, its nature remains as formerly. This is why our party also declared at its 25th Congress its resolve to do everything so that the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union will henceforth have available all necessary means for the accomplishment of their important mission--to be the guardian of the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the bulwark of universal peace. "We have never waived and are not waiving the security of our country and the security of our allies," stressed Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in a speech at a ceremonial session in the city of Tula.

In the discussion of the /first question/ [in boldface], primary attention should be devoted to the disclosure of imperialism's aggressive essence and its specific manifestations.

The aggressive essence of imperialism finds expression in the formation of military blocs which are pointed against the socialist countries and the liberation movement of peoples. Thus, immediately after World War II, not desiring to accept the revolutionary changes in the international arena, the imperialist circles initiated the "cold war," created a wide network of military bases, and organized aggressive blocs and military-political alliances in various regions of the world.

The aggressive essence of imperialism is displayed in the quantitative and qualitative growth of the armed forces and an increase in the military expenditures of the main capitalist states. In the United States, for example, a record military budget is planned for the 1977 fiscal year--about 113 billion dollars. Last year the FRG expended 31.7 billion marks on military needs. In general, in the countries of Western Europe which are NATO bloc members military expenditures during the last five years have more than doubled. In Japan, 1 April of this year marked the beginning of the implementation of the next five-year program for increasing the armed forces on which 2.5 times more resources have been allocated than were expended in the preceding five-year plan.

The growth of supplies of weapons of mass destruction--one of the sources of military danger--is continuing. The nuclear arsenal which has been amassed in the imperialist countries exceeds by two million times the destructive force of the American atomic bomb which was dropped on Hiroshima. But the imperialists have not stopped at this. Today, the process of rearming the strategic offensive forces with a multiple-charge warhead (of the MIRV type) which greatly increases the total supply of nuclear charges is occurring in the United States. Systems of new intercontinental ballistic missiles and the "Trident" sea-based strategic missiles are being developed in an accelerated manner. The development of the B-1 new strategic bomber has been completed and cruise missiles with a flight range of several thousand kilometers which are also strategic nuclear weapons have undergone their first tests. The arms race is also being conducted just as intensively among the NATO troops in Europe.

Speaking in Tula, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said: "It is not us, but certain circles in the west which are unwinding newer and newer coils of the arms race

and, first of all nuclear arms. It is not us but these forces which, throwing hundreds of billions into the bottomless pit of military preparations, are the initiators of the swelling military budgets."

The aggressive essence of imperialism is also manifested in the direct attempts of the enemies of peace to frustrate the relaxation of tension and in broad military demonstrations. Only at the end of last year, for example, the NATO strategists conducted a series of military exercises which encompassed a tremendous territory from Norway to Turkey on which procedures and methods for employing contemporary means of combat were worked out.

As formerly, a source of military danger in the contemporary world is the attempts of the imperialists to retard the development of national-revolutionary movements and social revolutions and open interference in the internal affairs of a number of countries. The intervention in Korea, the dirty war in Indochina, repeated attempts to strangle the Cuban revolution, the creation of centers of war in the Near East--this is far from a complete list of imperialist provocations against the cause of peace.

In considering the /second question/ [in boldface], it is important to stress that under these conditions the Communist Party, its Central Committee, and the Politburo of the Central Committee CPSU are constantly holding at the center of their attention the problems of military organizational development and the equipping of the army and navy with the most modern means of combat so that the Armed Forces of the USSR are a reliable guardian of the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the bulwark of universal peace.

It is expedient for the students to disclose in their presentations at the seminar lessons the basic direction in the activity of the CPSU in raising the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces.

In particular, it is necessary to note that Soviet military science has received further development in our time. On the basis of the Leninist ideas concerning the defense of the socialist fatherland, it has worked out the principles of Soviet military organizational development, the relationship between the services of the Armed Forces, and recommendations for their employment in contemporary war.

At the 25th Congress of the CPSU it was noted that the party always devoted and is devoting proper attention to the strengthening of the defensive capability of our country and the improvement of the Armed Forces. During the period between party congresses the equipping of the army and navy with weapons and combat equipment was improved and the quality of combat training and the ideological tempering of the personnel were improved.

Speaking at the October (1976) plenum of the Central Committee CPSU, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev declared: "Henceforth, too, to keep the Armed Forces of the country on a high level so that the Soviet fighting men always have the most modern weapons with which the imperialists cannot fail to reckon--such is our duty to the people and we will accomplish it in a sacred manner!"

As is known, the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces is characterized not only by the quality of the weapons and combat equipment which are available. To a great degree, it depends on people who master the equipment, their moral-political training, psychological tempering, and professional skill. The best armament, V. I. Lenin pointed out, will not provide an effect "in the absence of people who are able to use the latest improvements in military equipment with knowledge of the matter" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," Vol 9, p 156).

Each student in the group of Marxist-Leninist training who speaks on this question has broad opportunities to tie theoretical propositions with the life of the subunit, unit, or ship and to show using the example of the best men--masters of military affairs, experts in combat and political training, and rated specialists--that people who have mastered equipment to perfection comprise the basis of the high military readiness of units and ships.

An important direction in the activity of the CPSU in strengthening the Soviet Armed Forces is constant concern for the improvement of party-political work in the army and navy. Tremendous significance for raising the quality of all party-political work and the improvement of the upbringing of the personnel is had by the Statute on the Political Organs and the Instructions for the Organizations of the CPSU in the Soviet Armed Forces which were approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU. In disclosing this problem, it should be noted that a significant role in raising party-political work in the army and navy was played by the scientific-practical conference of supervisory personnel in the political organs of the Armed Forces which took place in July 1976 as well as by the army-wide conference of secretaries of party organizations, secretaries of Komsomol organizations, workers in personnel organs, ideological workers, and experts in combat and political training.

In presenting the essence of the /third question/ [in boldface] it should be remembered first of all that the most important principle in the organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces is unity of command. As stressed in the Program of the CPSU, "the party will be tirelessly concerned for the training of command, political, and technical personnel of the army and navy who are selflessly devoted to the cause of communism and who are made up of the best representatives of the Soviet people. It considers it necessary for the command personnel persistently to master Marxist-Leninist theory, to have a high level of military-technical training, to meet all requirements of contemporary military theory and practice, and to strengthen military discipline."

The profound changes in the appearance of the Soviet people which have occurred with the building of developed socialism in our country were properly reflected in the qualitative changes in the personnel of the army and navy. Today, almost all servicemen have a higher, secondary, and incomplete secondary education. About half of the officer personnel are engineers and technicians and 90 per cent are communists and Komsomols. Almost all large-unit commanders, more than 90 percent of regimental commanders, all commanders of ships of first and second ranks, all chiefs of political organs, and four fifths of the political personnel of the regimental level are officers with a higher education.

Our officer personnel--the conductors of the policy of the party and government in the army and navy--comprise the basis and backbone of the Soviet Armed Forces. The leading role in the entire life and combat activity of the army and the navy belongs to them.

In examining the problems of personnel policy, the 25th Congress of the CPSU provided a profound description of those features which the modern leader must possess. He must, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stressed in the summary report to the Congress, combine organically within himself party spirit with profound competence and discipline with initiative and a creative approach to the matter. At the same time, on any sector the leader must also consider the socio-political and educational aspects, be sensitive to the people and their needs and requirements, and serve as an example in work and in living.

All this pertains to military personnel entirely and completely. In disclosing the requirements on the officer personnel which follow from the decisions of the 25th Congress of the CPSU, it is necessary to stress that the Soviet officer was always distinguished by ideological conviction, selfless devotion to the party and the people, discipline and execution, honesty and truthfulness, initiative and independence, and high organizational abilities.

Urgent questions in improving the Leninist style of work in the activity of officer personnel should be discussed thoroughly and seriously. The 25th Congress defined this style as a creative style which is foreign to subjectivism and imbued with a scientific approach to all social processes. At the contemporary stage of development of military affairs, the persistent mastery of the Leninist work style is acquiring special significance for the practical activity of each officer, general, and admiral.

The chief condition for developing and improving a truly scientific work style is the profound and comprehensive study of Marxist-Leninist theory, the raising of the ideological-theoretical level, and raising the moral-political and psychological tempering of officer personnel of all categories. Our social and state system and the entire tenor of our life is forming a high communist ideological content and conviction in the righteousness of our cause in the Soviet people. The moral qualities and psychological tempering of the officers are being polished in the course of strained combat training, on tactical exercises, in flights and ocean voyages, and so forth.

Each one's constant raising of his professional skills has great significance for the improvement of the officers' work style. Profound and firm knowledge of weapons and combat equipment as well as their combat capabilities and means and methods for combat employment is giving the officers confidence in battle, generating boldness and decisiveness, and developing initiative and independence. Knowledge multiplied by experience is the guarantee of success in each matter and the best recommendation for a truly scientific style in command activity.

To master the Leninist style of work means constantly to be engaged in self-education, have a critical attitude toward one's labor, to be able to evaluate failures, errors, and mistakes fundamentally and honestly, to disclose their

reasons, and achieve their elimination. Tens and hundreds of subordinates look at officers, learn from them, and imitate them. Therefore, the leader must always remember the high moral value of words, the irreproachable morals of all his actions and deeds.

The Soviet officer does not forget for a minute the socio-political unity with his subordinates and his high responsibility to the party and the people for his deeds and the activity of the military collective which he heads. To arouse, mobilize, and carry the personnel along with him, to organize socialist competition relying on the support of the party and Komsomol organizations as well as on the active membership--this is the work style of the leading officers. They combine high demandingness with respect for subordinates and concern for their needs. Principled and efficient in solving problems of the combat ability and combat readiness of the troops, the officers organize their mutual relationships with subordinates on the basis of the military regulations. The high demandingness, strictness, and persistence of the officer in the accomplishment of the decisions, plans, and orders reflect his high understanding of responsibility.

The mastery of the Leninist style of work in peacetime means to prepare for leadership of the personnel in a combat situation, too, and to become prepared both militarily as well as morally and politically.

The effective factor in improving work style and methods is the active participation of the officers in the life of party and Komsomol organizations. They consider this as their most important party duty, accomplish the unity of organizational and ideological work in practice, and skillfully rely on the initiative and creativity of communists and Komsomols and on the entire military collective in all their activity.

However, it is necessary to note that individual officers are still encountered who rarely appear before the personnel on political questions and who underestimate the significance of educational work.

To master the Leninist style also means to propagandize and actively introduce into life everything that is new and advanced and which is born in the practice of the daily activity of the best officers, generals, and admirals.

The persistent mastery of the Leninist style in work which was developed in the decisions of the 25th Congress of the CPSU is the most important condition for the attainment of new successes in training and education of subordinates by military personnel and in raising the combat readiness of the Armed Forces of the USSR which have been vigilantly guarding the cause of the Great October Revolution and the achievements of socialism for almost six decades already.

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SENIOR OFFICER ON BORDER GUARDS DAY

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 10, May 77 Signed to Press
5 May 77 pp 36-42

[Article by Maj Gen Gaponenko, Chief of the Political Directorate of Border Troops of the KGB with the Council of Ministers USSR: "Sentries of the Border"]

[Excerpts] The border troops are marking their 59th anniversary on 28 May. Border Guards Day is certainly taking the form of a brilliant demonstration of the rallying of the troop personnel around the Communist Party and its Leninist Central Committee and an inspection of Checkist vigilance and the professional skill of the men.

Examining today the combat path which our troops have covered during the 59 years and reflecting on the history of the formation, development, and improvement of the protection of the Soviet state's borders we see: everything for which the border troops are famous and everything which they have achieved since the time of their creation have been attained thanks to the wise leadership of the Communist Party. The high morale of the Soviet border troops, which is so well known to our people, was molded under its beneficial influence.

An engagement between our men and a group of armed violators took place not so long ago on one of the mountain sectors. Although there were only three border guards in this battle and there were many more violators, the Soviet men emerged from it the winners. For bravery and valor in the defense of the border Sergeant V. Safonov was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and Privates F. Durkin and G. Stepanov (posthumously) -- the Order of the Red Star.

The situation on the border is now quite different from what it was. But there still are sectors where it is necessary to be especially vigilant. Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee CPSU and chairman of the Committee for State Security with the Council of Ministers USSR, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, has said: "As formerly, the border remains that channel across which our enemies are trying to cast their agents and accomplish provocations and other subversive actions. If they do not succeed in this and if the majority of the extraordinary events on the borders of our country do not develop further than attempts to violate the Soviet border, then this is only thanks to the tremendous and persistent labor, the heroism, and the high vigilance of the sentries of our motherland--the border guards."

The fighting men of the border have everything to perform their combat service successfully. They have received contemporary weapons and perfect equipment from the hands of the people--motor vehicles and armored personnel carriers, airplanes and helicopters, fast ships, and the latest means for communication, observation, and signalling. As a result, the reliability of the borders' protection has increased and the guarantees are greater than any scout who tries to find a chink in our cordon will be apprehended.

The living conditions of the border guards have also changed unrecognizably. Recent years on the border have been years of great soldier housewarmings. The men of many outposts have been resettled in comfortable barracks. The number of clubs and libraries has increased and television has come to the majority of the outposts. The feeding of the personnel has improved and has become more calorific and varied. The border guards are passionately grateful to the Communist Party and are responding to its tireless concern by indefatigable soldierly labor. They are performing their service with triple vigilance, persistently, as the party requires, are mastering military and political knowledge, are strengthening discipline, and are increasing the combat readiness of the units and subunits.

With all the tremendous significance of contemporary weapons and combat equipment, as formerly the decisive role in the protection of the border belongs to people. Success in the accomplishment of the missions which are facing the troops depends on the combat and border ability of the men, their consciousness and political maturity, and their ability to operate boldly, resourcefully, and competently in the most difficult situation. The border guard must possess an entire complex of moral-political and combat qualities. In this complex, keen Chekist vigilance stands in one of the first places. This professional quality became traditional among the soldiers of the border long ago. But it did not come by itself. Vigilance is developed in the course of daily service and combat and political training. Commanders and political officers as well as party and Komsomol organizations of the troops are organizing their ideological-educational work on the basis of the instructions of the 25th Congress of the CPSU concerning the necessity for an integrated approach to the formulation of the entire matter of education so that it provides the greatest effect.

Since vigilance is a concept which is primarily political, the primary means for instilling it is the ideological tempering of the men. Only a person with high ideals who is boundlessly devoted to the motherland may be vigilant, not in word, but in deed. If the border guard understands that he is guarding much more than the assigned sector and realizes that he is standing guard over the first socialist state in the world and is protecting the achievements of socialism and if he looks at his service with such a broad and mature view, he will accomplish his duty irreproachably.

Coming from the training center, with the arrival of the young soldiers at the outposts the commanders and political officers tirelessly explain to them the importance of the reliable protection of the border, the international situation, the policy of the contiguous capitalist state, and the actions of

its intelligence organs and they help in the profound clarification of the necessity for watchfulness and vigilance.

When the young replacements arrive, the communists of the posts and other sub-units must meet to discuss their tasks in rendering assistance to commanders in the training and education of the newcomers. And their going out on detail with experienced comrades is envisioned as one of the mandatory elements in the training of the young fighting men. The newcomer feels unconfident on the border at night the first time. He perceives each rustle and shadow in a strained manner because they cause specific sensations which are connected with danger. And at this time, who the chief of the detail is and who is alongside him mean especially much to him. If the detail is headed by an experienced border guard, the young soldier feels much calmer and masters the skills in performing his service more rapidly.

The propagandizing of the leading experience in service plays a large role in the upbringing of the young fightingmen. For this purpose, critiques of the actions of the details are conducted regularly at the posts and soirees for the exchange of experience are organized. Special photo leaflets are devoted to masters of service. Schools of border skill are operating under the direction of officers and sergeants. Our district newspapers are participating actively in propagandizing the experience of the leading men.

Genuine vigilance is unthinkable without the border guard's profound knowledge of his work and without the ability to shoot accurately, camouflage skillfully, "read" the trails of the violators quickly and correctly, and recognize the enemy's tricks. It is namely observance and acute instinct which permitted Warrant Officer [praporshchik] Varlam Kublashvili to expose two hardened contrabandists recently who had traveled from one of the capitalist countries to the Soviet Union under the guise of tourist. The contrabandists were confident that their operation would proceed successfully; therefore, they did not utilize traditional hiding places. They placed their reliance on the fact that the trick to which they had recourse would not cause the slightest suspicion. However, the hopes of the contrabandists were not justified. Warrant Officer Kublashvili turned his attention to the fact that the sandwiches which were lying on the table were somewhat thick.... It turned out that they were filled with... gold.

Many cases are known where representatives of the capitalists world tried to draw our border details into non-service contacts for provocation purposes and tried to seduce them "with the charms of a bourgeois paradise." But the border guards, true patriots, never submit to provocations and never compromise when the discussion concerns the honor of the border men or the honor and security of our state. They worthily represent the Soviet people and the Soviet way of life before the entire world.

The enemy whom the border guards are encountering is experienced and treacherous and possesses various methods for subversive activity--from espionage to subtle lies. The reactionary circles of the imperialist countries and their intelligence organs as well as various types of foreign anti-Soviet centers are trying to exploit the relaxation of international tension for their own treacherous purposes. In trying to undermine our socialist society from

within, they are intensifying the export of bourgeois ideology in every possible way and are trying to cast literature envenomed with the poison of anticommunism and anti-Sovietism across the border using the expansion of economic and cultural ties of our country with other states and the development of international tourism. This is a form of sabotage without dynamite.

Two such saboteurs recently appeared at our "Vyborg" traffic control point in the guise of motor tourists. Senior Lieutenant Rudenko, Junior Sergeant Trapeznikov, and Private Romanov, examining the microbus in which they were travelling, discovered more than 1,500 books, journals, anti-Soviet and pornographic leaflets in specially installed hiding places which were intended for illegal dissemination in our country. Each such booklet is the praising of bourgeois "democracy" and slander against the Soviet way of life. Each illustrated sex bulletin is a coarse, cynical outrage against the human conscience.

When our border guards set out a screen in front of the imperialist emissaries a sensation is raised in the West about the so-called "iron curtain," a "closed society," and so forth.

"No, the countries of socialism are not a 'closed society,' " said Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev in his speech at the Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties of Europe. "We are open for everything truthful and honest and we are ready to multiply contacts in every way exploiting the favorable conditions which detente is creating. But our doors will always be closed to publications which propagandize war, violence, racism, and misanthropy. And they will be closed all the more to the emissaries of the foreign secret services and the emigre anti-Soviet organizations which they have created. For you see, in interpreting 'freedom' of contacts, some people in the West at times are concerned about obtaining a free hand for extremely dirty matters. We do not suffer from 'spy mania.' But we will not allow freedom for subversive acts against our system and our society."

The border guards have all the necessary conditions to stop the subversive activity of the ideological saboteurs. First of all, these are the general interest and responsibility for the reliable protection of the border. They are the vigilance and professional skill which permit exposing and defeating the enemy's tricks. This is furthered by the entire system of training and educational work, the entire tenor of the life of the military collectives, and our entire Soviet reality. We have remarkable personnel and wonderful officer cadres who have good military and Marxist-Leninist training and who skillfully organize the service, training, and education of the men.

The strength of the border troops is in the support of the people and in the closest tie with the workers in the border area. Without the constant and active assistance of the population we would not be able to guard the boundaries of our motherland successfully on their entire tremendous length. Great support is rendered to the border guards by the central committees of the union republic communist parties, kraykoms, obkoms, and raykoms of the party,

and by local Soviet organs. Commanders, political organs, and troops are constantly concerned about strengthening the friendship of the border guards with the local population and the coordination with voluntary people's detachments and detachments of young friends of the border guards. They also conduct meetings with the Komsomols of the cities and villages of the border region, joint vigilance raids, and Komsomol-youth relay races along the border which are directed toward the active involvement of the local population in the guarding of the fatherland's borders.

On the decision of the 6th Komsomol Congress, the Komsomol assumed the sponsorship of the border troops. Since then, the work of the Komsomol organizations of the border region in involving the youth in protecting the Soviet frontiers has become considerably more active.

A great friendship links the border guards with the men of the Soviet Armed Forces. The men of the border are adopting their combat experience and borrowing everything advanced and valuable which has been attained in the training and education of the personnel. The border detachments, outposts, and ships often visit the motorized riflemen, tankers, flyers, and seamen. The border guards are desired guests in the army units. Joint meetings of servicemen, soirees, and sports competitions are conducted in the border-guard garrisons.

Being in the same formation and accomplishing common missions in the protection and defense of the socialist fatherland the men of the Soviet Army and Navy, just as the border guards, are vigilantly guarding the inviolability of our motherland's borders. Many of them have been awarded the medal, "For distinction in Guarding the State Border of the USSR."

The border guards are marking their holiday with high indices in improving their combat and professional skill. An ardent response was caused among them by the call of the Communist Party to mark the anniversary year of the Soviet state with shock work and new successes on all sectors of communist construction. On Border Guards Day, they are assuring the party and the government that they are applying every effort to ensure the inviolability of the motherland's sacred borders. They always keep their sharp weapon--vigilance--at the ready. This weapons functions faultlessly.

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COMMANDER OF OUTSTANDING SUBMARINE ON CREW TRAINING

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 10, May 77 signed to press 5 May 77 pp 43-49

[Interview with Capt 2nd Rank A. Kazakov, commander of outstanding submarine: "On Ocean Watch"]

[Text] As we all know, the patriotic initiative of the personnel of the outstanding missile-carrying atomic submarine of the Red Banner Pacific Ocean Fleet and other leading units of the branches of the Armed Forces has found an enthusiastic response in all fighting men of the Soviet Army and Navy. Competition to greet the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution in a worthy fashion, to realize the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, improve combat and political training, master modern weapons and equipment, and guard the peaceful labor of the Soviet people vigilantly and reliably has unfolded on a broad scale in our units and on our ships.

Capt 2nd Rank A. Kazakov, commander of the outstanding ship, recently visited Moscow. Along with other leaders in the socialist competition in honor of the 60th anniversary of Great October he was taking part in the meeting held at the military council of the navy. Our correspondent arranged a meeting with him and they discussed the current concerns of the submarine sailors, their training and work. The record of this discussion is published below.

[Question] The winter training period has come to an end and summer combat training has begun. The fighting men of the army and navy, inspired by the great achievements of the Soviet people in communist building, are steadily improving their training, struggling for complete and high-quality performance of training plans and programs and socialist obligations and for a further rise in the combat

readiness of their units, ships, and subunits. Tell me, Aleksandr Konstantinovich, how has the past training period been noteworthy for the crew of your ship?

[Answer] Like all Soviet people, the submarine sailors are living and laboring under the indelible impression made by the resolutions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the October 1976 Plenum of the Party Central Committee. The CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "The 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution" has given a new impetus to the combat training and service of our sailors. The patriotic feelings and intentions of our sailors have been reflected in the socialist obligations assumed by them in response to General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's call to celebrate the glorious sixtieth anniversary of October with new achievements and new feats of labor in all sectors of the great struggle for communism. After thoroughly and carefully discussing and weighing their capabilities, the submarine sailors assumed lofty obligations and called on all personnel in the navy to become actively involved in socialist competition to greet the sixtieth anniversary of Great October in a worthy fashion.

The day when we were notified that our crew's initiative had been supported by the military council and political directorate of the Navy was memorable for all our sailors. That is understandable. To be the initiator of a new stage in the all-Army socialist competition is a great honor and, at the same time, a great responsibility. Every member of the crew understands that. And from the first days of winter combat training the sailors devoted their efforts to showing by concrete actions that they deserved this trust and completely fulfilling their socialist obligations.

The crew's obligations are high, but realistic and sound. They are based on results achieved last year, when the submarine sailors accomplished all combat training missions successfully, completely fulfilled socialist obligations, and earned the title of outstanding for the ship.

In their anniversary obligations the crew wrote the following: retain the title of outstanding submarine, achieve new qualitative indices in maintaining constant ship combat readiness, perform tactical and fire missions with good results and all missile fires with outstanding marks only. Cut normative indices by five percent and achieve full mutual replaceability in teams for 50 percent of the battle posts.

The submarine sailors have resolved to have 85 percent of the crew specialists 1st and 2nd class by the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Every other officer is to pass examinations for authorization to perform independently in the position one step above that occupied; the ranks of outstanding sailors in combat and political training are to be increased. Other obligations were also recorded.

These obligations reflected concern for improving the individual military skill of the submarine sailor and for the level of combat training and combat readiness of the entire crew.

From that memorable day when our socialist obligations and appeal to all naval personnel were approved and supported not much time has passed, but it can already be said that these obligations are being realized.

During the winter training period the crew of the missile-carrying atomic submarine worked its hardest and completed the period successfully, taking one more step forward in improving sea skills, mastering complex combat equipment and weapons, and learning modern techniques of armed combat at sea. The most noteworthy events during this period were a long ocean cruise and performance of difficult combat training missions. In the course of the competition which developed among sailors, teams, groups, and subunits the ranks of outstanding sailors, rated specialists, and masters of military affairs grew. Now almost two thirds of ship personnel are outstanding in combat and political training and every other fighting man is a highly rated specialist who is confidently mastering a related specialization and can, if necessary, replace a comrade at a battle post. All the new sailors passed tests for their positions at the established times.

Among the ship's subunits the best indices belong to the collectives headed by Capt 3rd Rank Valeriy Nasulich, Capt-Lt Vladimir Yeres'ko, and Capt-Lt Vladimir Ivshin.

Captain 3rd Rank Nasulich heads the department which is rightly considered the best on board ship. Month after month it has consistently high marks in combat and political training and military discipline, insures confident, safe cruising in the ocean depths and successful performance of the combat training missions given to the ship. It is distinguished by a high level of combat and professional training and strong solidarity. Every specialist in it, no matter what post he may occupy, understands thoroughly the responsibility imposed upon him, performs his duties honestly and conscientiously, and, not content with that which has already been achieved, works hard toward new, better results in training, service, and discipline. For example, let us take Warrant Officer Vladimir Ryadinskikh, petty officer of a group. He is an exemplary, disciplined, Komsomol fighting man who has won the title of first-class specialist and received the badge "Outstanding Naval Seaman." He manages an intricate navigation complex which is always kept in model condition ready for immediate use. A person who is always searching, Warrant Officer Ryadinskikh knows this complex in fine detail, services it skillfully, and sees that his subordinates do the same. He willingly comes to the aid of anyone who needs help. Thanks to his help and support the new warrant officers in the group mastered their official duties well and became specialists 2nd class.

These facts are certainly gratifying, but each sailor knows that we have before us the intensive season of summer combat training and new, more serious trials. This needs to be mentioned especially because we still have our difficulties, unresolved problems, and shortcomings. For example, we have not achieved an atmosphere of creative searching and high responsibility in every single subunit. The commanders do not always uncover the causes of mistakes by particular specialists at the right time and take steps to eliminate them, and sometimes propaganda for the achievements of leaders, their know-how, and examples of comradely mutual assistance is inadequate. We have run into a few cases where certain communists underestimated the importance of individual work and were indifferent to the requests of their fellow servicemen, which caused a lessening of interest in the work and lowered the sense of responsibility.

We know our shortcomings and are taking all possible steps to eliminate them. The results of winter training gave reason to be confident that the obligations taken on by our sailors will be fulfilled. We draw this confidence from the growing activism of our communists and party organization and their daily work to continue raising the combat readiness of the ship.

[Question] Can you tell us about this in more detail? What roles are communists playing in the crew's struggle to fulfill its obligations?

[Answer] I've already said that the members of the submarine crew are working hard to realize their socialist obligations. As always, communists and Komsomol activists set the tone in this. They are the pioneers in socialist competition and that competition has become an inseparable part of the entire training and educational process on the ship.

In the current phase competition is acquiring new features, new characteristics. This was discussed by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev in his speech at the 16th Congress of Soviet Trade Unions. He stressed that competition today is inseparable from the scientific-technical revolution, that it is increasingly concentrated on problems of efficiency and quality and aimed at achieving optimal final national economic results.

The final result of military labor is high, constant combat readiness. For us, submarine sailors, this means above all a high level of combat and sea training, weapons and equipment in top condition, irreproachable military discipline and organization, high moral-political and psychological characteristics in personnel, and ability of commanders to lead subordinates and achieve victory under any conditions, even the most complex. These things do not come of themselves, they are the result of hard training, intensive military labor, and skillfully organized socialist competition.

Socialist competition is a process of multilateral relations in a collective, encompassing both moral aspects of the men's behavior and growth in their combat qualifications and technical creativity. We try to take all of these problems together, striving for effective party political work. On our ship party political work is organized by Capt 3rd Rank Viktor Vasil'yevich Morozov, deputy commander for political affairs. Purposeful, effective party political work is one of the important components of the ship crew's success.

Viktor Vasil'yevich and I work in close contact. He and the secretary of the party bureau keep track of the practical activity of the party organization, regularly instruct and train the aktiv, and work to see that communists fulfill their missions. And among us virtually all officers and many warrant officers are party members or candidates for membership. There are also communists among the petty officers. The party influence reaches all battle posts.

They are the ones, the communists, who originate all the useful initiatives on the ship. They are able to lead a movement and bring the men along with them. No matter what sector a party member or candidate may work in, no matter what post he may occupy, he always tries to be an example to fellow servicemen in everything, to execute functional duties conscientiously and stand watch in an exemplary manner. Party members work for strict observance of the norms of communist morality and ethics by all fighting men and for high standards in evaluating the results of military labor. They wage an implacable struggle against formalism, stereotypes, and routine thinking in socialist competition and use every means to develop the competitive spirit at training periods, drills, and during watch.

Measuring themselves against the communists, Komsomol members struggle for the overall success of the ship collective. They are bold and daring and strive to master complex equipment and weapons outstandingly and show their best qualities in standing duty. The party organization provides everyday direction for the Komsomol organization's activities in developing socialist competition, increasing the ranks of outstanding sailors in combat and political training, masters of military affairs, and rated specialists, and seeing that the men master related specializations, show creativity and initiative, and take part in efficiency work.

The initiative of the best men is the moving force of competition. It is the creativity of the men, their constant searching, that gives rise to new work methods and procedures, new ways of using the weapons and equipment in combat, and helps the collective accomplish its missions and surpass standards. Like all Soviet people educated by the Leninist party, our sailors have a feeling for new developments that is seen clearly in their boldness, inquisitive searching, and patriotic deeds. In the crew's socialist obligations, for example, it is written that the sailors will try to introduce at least 24 efficiency proposals, constantly seek reserves to save state capital, and

use motor resources, electrical energy, and fuel and lubricants economically. They are doing a great deal toward this end and toward improving training facilities and using them effectively.

The ship command gives active support to useful and patriotic initiatives by personnel; we notice everything new and valuable that promotes better quality training and improved combat readiness in the early stages, evaluate it critically, and then introduce it in practice. The communists also see that there is broad propaganda for the know-how of outstanding sailors in combat and political training, rated specialists, and masters of military affairs. Our innovators and developers of progressive know-how such as Capt-Lt Vladimir Ivshin, Warrant Officer Vladimir Ryadinskikh, and other masters of their work enjoy great respect with the ship's crew.

The progress of competition and fulfillment of socialist obligations is reviewed regularly at party and Komsomol meetings and at sessions of the party bureau and Komsomol committee.

It has become a practice to hear communications by communists, in particular those whose experience in organizing combat training and directing competition can be used by others. At sessions of the party bureau, for example, communist Vladimir Mikhaylovich Yeres'ko presented a report. He told how he mobilizes submarine sailors to fulfill socialist obligations, and how he organizes help for sailors preparing to take the examinations to become rated specialists. These reports are always useful.

Nor do those who perform their party and military duty without the proper diligence, those who need help, go without attention. For example, when Lt Mikhail Kabanov was having trouble preparing to take the independent control examination members of the party bureau came to his assistance. They carefully reviewed the whole situation, invited the officer to one of their sessions, discussed the question thoroughly, and gave him advice and recommendations. On commission from the party bureau communist Vladimir Mikhaylovich Yeres'ko began helping the young officer. The help of a senior comrade added to the lieutenant's own diligence enabled him to overcome his difficulties.

Our main challenge today is to organize effective propaganda for the decisions of the twenty-fifth party congress and the October 1976 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and to see that all personnel study these and other party documents thoroughly and work tirelessly to implement them. Our goal is to instill a conscientious attitude toward overcoming the real difficulties of combat training in our sailors, to give each individual a solid understanding of the fact that he is expected, as demanded by the party, to be a reliable guard of the peaceful constructive labor of the builders of communism, of the great gains of October.

Service in the navy involves many hardships. Submarine sailors spend most of their time on prolonged cruises. For many days in succession, continuously following one another on watch, the sailors stand duty, labor at their posts, insure that the complex mechanisms and aggregates work precisely and flawlessly, improve their theoretical knowledge and reinforce practical skills, and perform combat training missions. This takes men of strong spirit with solid volitional and psychological characteristics, and that is exactly the kind of young patriot that serves on our ship. The years spent on a submarine are for them a real education in endurance and discipline, higher political training, and acquisition of technical and professional skills.

Solid military and specialized knowledge, thorough professional training, and general naval sophistication are compulsory conditions for conscientious fulfillment of their functions and duty. This was reaffirmed by our ocean cruise. That was a difficult test of the combat maturity of the crew, and they passed it with honor, demonstrating increased combat skill and an ability to perform combat training missions under complex conditions. During the cruise all the specialists with the right to try for the title of master of military affairs prepared themselves for the examination and upon return to base passed it and received this high rank. Most of the sailors earned authorization for independent control at a position one higher than the position occupied. In short, the crew gained valuable experience while cruising the ocean depths.

[Question] What kind of experience is that?

[Answer] Our experience was multifaceted. Specifically, it showed once again that we are proceeding correctly to put special emphasis on the quality of training for junior officers, not overlooking, of course, warrant officers and petty officers. But our overall successes and the ship's constant high combat readiness depend significantly on the officers' profound understanding of their duty and personal responsibility for the assigned work sector and on their professional and methodological skill, initiative, and creative approach to training and educating subordinates.

If a junior officer is thoroughly trained, disciplined, and hard-working and does everything at the combat post irreproachably his authority among his fellow servicemen is generally high, perhaps even indisputable. At the same time his competence in specific questions of operating complex ship equipment gives him great confidence at work. This is especially important in the age of the scientific-technical revolution when the swift and continuous process of technical re-equipping of the army and navy makes it essential that military men not only have an outstanding knowledge of the equipment now in use but also that they have sufficient knowledge and experience to be able to master new models of weapons and equipment quickly and achieve full mutual replaceability in teams, groups, and crews.

In military service there is an order of battle replacement, generally moving one step up. However, this does not preclude, indeed it assumes, a mastery of the obligations one, and sometimes even two, steps lower. After all, in a complex situation, especially in battle, there may be cases where the officer will have to substitute for a warrant officer or petty officer, not the other way around. This is foreseen in regulations. The commander of a group, for example, must know the posts of his subordinates and the layout of the ship well enough that he can perform actions for his subordinates at any moment.

The necessity of such training for specialists is confirmed by our experience, in particular the service successes of such young officers as Aleksandr Skiba, Mikhail Kabanov, and Nikolay Albul. For example, take Lieutenant-Engineer Albul. He came to the ship quite recently, but he has given a good account of himself. The group he heads is one of the leaders, and the commander deserves credit for this. He studies hard, improves his theoretical knowledge and practical skills on his own, and comes to experienced comrades for advice and help. This enabled the officer to pass the examination for second class. He is now preparing to become a specialist 1st class. His fellow servicemen believe that he will reach his goal. It is equally important that the communist skillfully combines his service duties with public work. The Komsomol members of the ship elected Nikolay Albul secretary of the Komsomol committee and he is now showing that this high trust was well placed.

A great deal is being done on our ship to train highly rated specialists. While struggling for quality and effectiveness in combat training we combine the problems of training and education. The foundation of success in this important work lies in the spiritual growth, political conditioning, and consciousness of the sailors, in their moral maturity. Therefore, insuring that Marxist-Leninist officer training, political training for warrant officers, and political training periods with petty officers are conducted on a high level is a matter of constant attention to us.

All our submarine sailors are making thorough studies of the materials of the twenty fifth party congress and have outlines of them. The ship has set up a permanently operated lecture bureau which helps greatly in improving theoretical knowledge and promoting a thorough understanding of the teachings of V. I. Lenin and the decisions of party congresses, Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, and other important documents.

The growth in the ideological conditioning of the sailors is reflected most favorably in their work, in performance of military duty.

The struggle for high quality combat training requires great efforts from us. Intensive training periods, systematic drills, and assistance to new sailors by senior comrades — these techniques and many others are used to improve the theoretical knowledge and practical skills of our submarine sailors, above all junior officers. We

patiently teach them how to educate subordinates, give them methodological skills, and try to see that they set personal examples in service and discipline and strictly observe the requirements of the military oath, regulations, manuals, and instructions.

Among us study of the physical equipment is closely tied up with practical use of it. The sailors draw a great deal from training periods in their specialization during which experienced methodologists give clear explanations of complex theoretical questions and help them master the equipment entrusted to them and use it intelligently, to its full capacity. We make extensive use of technical conferences, teaching methods, and demonstration training periods; they are usually conducted by the commanders of the departments. Exchange of work practices, research reports on technical topics, and talks by experienced specialists such as Valeriy Petrovich Nasulich, Vladimir Mikhaylovich Yeres'ko, and Vladimir Valentinovich Ivshin are very useful.

During ocean cruises we make extensive use of the individual assignment method. Because of the time shortage during a cruise there are limited opportunities to conduct training periods or extra drills. Experienced submarine sailors have found an answer to this difficult problem. They give new specialists concrete individual assignments: in a certain period study an appropriate section of a training topic independently. From time to time they check to see how things are going with their subordinates, help them understand difficult questions, and then at an appointed time test them. Then they give a new assignment. This kind of training allows our sailors to master their functional duties quickly and prepare better to take the examinations for specialist ratings.

Many officers provide examples of skillful work with new specialists. Capt-Lt Vladimir Valentinovich Ivshin, commander of one of the best groups, is among them. An experienced methodologist, he spent a good deal of time and effort helping Lt-Engr Aleksandr Skiba, a recent graduate of naval school, take his place in the battle order of the submarine crew. In a short time the young officer overcame all difficulties and was able to prepare for and pass the independent control examination for his position. He is now continuing to work with his former diligence to improve his theoretical knowledge and practical skills and has stepped up preparations to take the examination for authorization for independent control in the position one step higher. In this too his experienced comrade is helping him. Such help produces good results: the training level of the sailor and of the entire crew grows and the ship's combat readiness is higher.

In conclusion I would like to assure you that the personnel of our missile-carrying atomic submarine, like all Soviet fighting men, are profoundly aware of their responsibility to the Communist Party, Soviet Government, and people for the defense of the sea frontiers of our socialist fatherland. In close solidarity around the Leninist

party, completely devoted to the people, our sailors are always on guard, keeping a vigilant watch, always combat-ready.

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REQUIREMENTS FOR PARTY MEMBERSHIP DISCUSSED

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[Article by Lt Gen L. Vakhrushev, responsible secretary of the party commission of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "Concern for Party Recruitment"]

[Text] CPSU leadership is the main and decisive condition in the Soviet people's victories in communist building. Our party exerts a profound influence on all aspects of material and nonmaterial life in society and our country's strong position in the international arena. It leads the Soviet people along the true Leninist road.

The growth in the party's leadership role is directly dependent on further strengthening of the party itself and improvement in its style and methods of guiding society. The strength of the CPSU, the inexhaustible source of its successes, lies in the monolithic unity of party ranks, in loyalty to Leninist ideological, political, and organizational principles, in the creative activism and initiative of all party organizations, and in the lofty responsibility of each party member and candidate member for party work, for the interests of the people. V. I. Lenin said: "Our goal is to preserve the hardness, endurance, and purity of our party. We must try to raise the title and importance of party member higher, higher, and higher" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 7, pp 290-291).

The 25th CPSU Congress stressed that as we move forward towards communism the conscious influence of the party on all aspects of society's life grows, and this includes questions related to strengthening the country's defense capability. The congress revealed the concrete directions of further party development and increasing its leadership role under conditions of developed socialism and gave precise instructions on one of the key questions of the theory and practice of party building, the question of further growth and qualitative improvement in the ranks of the CPSU, membership in the party.

The instructions of the congress on this issue are of fundamental, lasting importance. That is natural because successes in communist building and defense of the gains of Great October, whose 60th anniversary will be celebrated this year by the entire Soviet people and all progressive humanity, depend on the state of the party ranks, on the authority and activism of each party member and candidate for membership.

When they bind their fate to the party Soviet people know that membership in the party promises no privileges but one: to be in front, to be where things are hardest, where the success of the cause is decided. The entire historical experience of our party testifies that communists have been true to this wise Leninist teaching. This was seen especially clearly during the Great Patriotic War. Fighting men from the party of Lenin were the most courageous and steadfast in defense, the most active and determined on the attack. They were in the thick of the fighting and many gave their lives in battle for our just cause.

The main requirement of the party has always been and remains high-quality recruits for party membership. "The CPSU is not pushing its numerical growth," it says in the Accountability Report of the Central Committee to the twenty fifth party congress. "It admits to its ranks only those who have proven in practice that they are entering the party, as Lenin said, not to gain any advantages but for the sake of selfless work on behalf of communism" ("Materialy XXV S'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 63). Following Lenin's teachings, the party does everything possible to elevate the title of communist even more. The CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "The Work of Party Organizations in Kirgizia on Admission to the Party and Education of Candidates for CPSU Membership" was new evidence of this. This important party document is directly relevant to party organizations and political agencies in the Armed Forces as well.

With publication of the CPSU Central Committee decree the activity of party organizations and political agencies in the army and navy to increase the ranks of the party and educate new communists became more purposeful and concrete. The Central Committee decree and the tasks which follow from it have been studied at district and fleet assemblies for chiefs of political branches, senior instructors in party organizational work, and secretaries of party commissions and committees. For example, the political directorate of the Red Banner Belorussian Military District held a seminar for the secretaries of party commissions. Participants at it heard a series of lectures on various issues of party building and exchanged working experience on admission to the party and educating new communists. In addition, reports on this question were presented at the political directorate by several chiefs of political agencies.

At the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy a report by Lt-Gen I. Lykov, member of the military council and chief of the

political directorate of the Red Banner Siberian Military District, concerning the work of political agencies and party organizations on admission to the party and education of candidates for membership in the CPSU in light of the demands of the 25th CPSU Congress and the CPSU Central Committee decree "The Work of Party Organizations in Kirgizia on Admission to the Party and Education of Candidates for CPSU Membership" was discussed.

A certain amount of work is being done in this district to improve the qualitative composition of party ranks, selection for the CPSU, and education of candidates for party membership. Most of the new party recruits are officers, ensigns, cadets at military schools, and the very best servicemen, in other words, those on whom the combat readiness and fighting effectiveness of units and subunits decisively depend. This insures an increase in the party influence in the subunit and a broadening and strengthening of the network of party organizations. More attention has been given to the ideological conditioning of new communists and insuring that they set an example in service, training, and discipline. All this has a positive influence on the effectiveness of work by party organizations and on performance of the missions of combat and political training.

Nonetheless, shortcomings in the work of district political agencies and party organizations on admission to the party and education of candidates for CPSU membership have not been entirely eliminated. Some political agencies are still weak on monitoring and directing the work of party organizations in this area of party building and fail to give them adequate practical help.

Political agencies are now taking steps to further improve the qualitative composition of army and navy party ranks, raise standards for admission to the CPSU, and improve the education of new communists.

Questions of membership in the party, observation of the principle of individual selection, and the quality of new recruits to party ranks have been and remain a subject of fixed attention for all political agencies. Specifically, there was a thorough discussion of them at the science-practice conference for executive employees of political agencies of the Soviet Army and Navy held in July 1976.

The basic principles and norms of membership in the party are organically interrelated. Precise observance of them is a guarantee of party strength and ever-growing effectiveness. While observing general party requirements concerning improvement of party composition political agencies and party organizations in the military also take account of specific army and navy characteristics, social structure, the role and significance of different categories of servicemen, workers, and specialists, and the special features of units, ships, and large units. They regulate party growth, attempting to find out the best solutions to the problems advanced by life. And it is noteworthy that army and navy party organizations find new members among

those who have earned the recognition of the primary party organization and entire collective, those who set an example in service, training, discipline, and public life. This is eloquently demonstrated by the fact that 90 percent of those admitted to the party in recent years have been outstanding in training and rated specialists and 80 percent serve right in the subunits located at the key positions where the success of combat training is decided.

Many examples of growth in party organizations by recruitment of tested, progressive fighting men could be given. For example, the primary organization whose secretary is Sr Lt N. Reznik admitted Lt G. Simonov, a platoon leader, as a candidate for CPSU membership. In his application he wrote: "I will devote all my efforts and knowledge to performing the duties assigned to me by the party with honor; I will achieve good and outstanding results in combat and political training work with personnel." G. Simonov kept his word. He prepared carefully for training periods and used every minute of training time effectively. He combined high standards with concern for his subordinates. Party organizations secretary N. Reznik kept a constant watch on the candidate's work and his ideological and professional growth. After a few months Simonov reported at a meeting of the party organization that he had completed the candidate period. The communists who spoke, including member of the party commission A. Sluka, addressed a few critical remarks to the candidate and advised him how to improve his work. All this helped Simonov make even better use of existing opportunities to improve the quality of training periods and their effectiveness. At inspection the platoon commanded by Simonov took a leading place in the unit for results of socialist competition. As a leading officer who had successfully gone through the period of candidacy Simonov was admitted to CPSU membership. He was recently appointed a company commander.

Constant work by party organizations to choose the best people for the party makes it possible to systematically improve the placement of communists, increase the fighting effectiveness of party organizations, and enhance their role in mobilizing personnel to perform combat training missions well. Here is a demonstration of this. In the subunit where Maj Yu. Belyayev is political worker, the new party recruits were men from the leading professions, with a high ideological level, active fighting men who devoted all their efforts to raising combat readiness. All the fighting men admitted to the CPSU in 1976 were outstanding in combat and political training and specialists 1st and 2nd class. Many of them reported to party bureaus and meetings that they had completed the period of candidacy. This thoughtful approach to admission to the CPSU made it possible to have party organizations in every subunit. The example set by communists in service and training and their influence on the fighting men are having a positive effect. Personnel are mastering modern weapons and equipment. In the last three years the unit has been outstanding and held on to the challenge Red Banner of the District Military Council.

While imposing high standards on those entering the party we must firmly avoid and condemn any instances of speeded-up admission to the CPSU and prevent formalism, haste, or lowered standards when reviewing the applications of persons wishing to enter the party. Party organizations and commissions are expected to study the practical, political and moral qualities of persons entering the CPSU thoroughly and hold communists more responsible for persons they recommend to the party and for the objectivity of references given to them. One who has given a recommendation not only vouches for the person recommended but is also expected to assist in his ideological, practical, and moral growth.

Lowered standards in this matter, which are still encountered, unfortunately, in certain organizations, are a violation of Leninist principles of party building. Even isolated cases of admitting persons unworthy of the title of communist to the CPSU harm the party, undermine its prestige, and lower the fighting effectiveness of party collectives.

In one of the party organizations of the Turkistan Military District Jr Sgt V. Netsvetayev was accepted for candidacy for CPSU membership, but after five months he had to be expelled from the party for improper behavior. Among those who recommended him was Officer V. Kulakov, a deputy commander for political affairs, who thereby set a bad example in meeting the requirements of the CPSU By-Laws.

A recommendation is a political warranty by a party member for a comrade whom he knows from work together; it is a responsible assurance that the one recommended is worthy of becoming a communist. This document tells objectively how the person entering the party has conducted himself in the service, at work, in public life, and in a moral respect. It should be apparent from the recommendation itself that the party is receiving a worthy member in the new comrade. According to the CPSU By-Laws persons making recommendations are responsible to party organizations for the objectivity of their description of the political, practical, and moral qualities of their comrades. It is the duty of party organizations to carefully check the validity of recommendations and see that they meet regulation requirements.

Most persons admitted to the CPSU are Komsomol members. It is important, therefore, that party organizations and political agencies take a more careful and strict approach to the recommendations of Komsomol organizations for admission of Komsomol members to the party.

It is commonly known that the question of admission to the party is discussed and decided by a general meeting of the primary party organization with subsequent ratification by the party commission. The decision of the party organization is considered passed if at least two thirds of the party members in attendance at the meeting vote for it.

In regiments (on ships) and units equivalent to them where there are party committees the decision on admission to the CPSU passed by the primary party organization is reviewed by the party committee and, as the Instructions to CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy stipulate, turned over to the party commission of the political branch for ratification only if the party committee so decides. Despite this clear instruction, however, the party commission (where Lt Col M. Zemlyanko is secretary) overturned the decision of the party committee of the military unit to reject Lt V. Karsukov for membership in the CPSU and admitted him to party membership.

There was a flagrant violation of the CPSU By-Laws at one of the military schools when Cadet V. Ivanov was admitted to candidacy for party membership. The party organization (secretary Cadet V. Sadokhi) refused to admit this cadet because he was poorly prepared. But the party committee, and then the party commission of the school after it, admitted Ivanov as a candidate for CPSU membership without reviewing the essential facts of the case. Not until four months later was the error corrected by the higher-ranking party body.

Such cases are encountered where party commissions take a formalistic attitude to reviewing the decisions of primary party organizations on admission to the party, limit their activity to familiarization with documents submitted, failed to investigate the essential facts, do not trouble themselves with a thorough study of the political, practical, and moral characteristics of persons entering the party, and do not watch to see that the principle of individual selection to the CPSU is strictly observed.

Needless to say, such things are intolerable. And they do not occur where the party commissions watch over observance of party requirements for recruitment of new members. For example, the party commission headed by Lt Col V. Afanas'yev watches the work of primary party organizations in selecting fighting men for CPSU ranks closely. Members of the party commission often visit the units and subunits, study the men thoroughly, and attend party meetings which review applications. They talk with the secretaries of party organizations and with persons making recommendations and help the party aktiv fill out documents correctly for admission to the CPSU. Members of the party commission and employees of the political branch analyze party growth in the party organizations, generalize experience in this work, help eliminate existing shortcomings, and do everything possible to preclude the possibility of unworthy persons being admitted to the CPSU. And it must be admitted that admission to the party in party organizations of this unit is ordinarily done in exact conformity with party requirements taking full account of the opinions of communists and non-party comrades. In most cases applications are reviewed at open party meetings with thorough, comprehensive discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the people involved and the questions are decided publicly, in view of the collective.

Of course, a person reveals himself and is tested in actual, practical work, in the struggle for party policy. This is the purpose of the period of candidacy. It allows the party organization to study those who want to enter the party more thoroughly and to familiarize them with the CPSU program and By-Laws and with party standards and it gives candidates an opportunity to prepare themselves better for membership in the CPSU.

The twenty fifth party congress acknowledged that it is necessary to enhance the importance of the period of candidacy. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said: "A thorough check on the political and practical qualities of the candidate for party membership and Marxist-Leninist education of the candidate must be handled with full strictness" ("Materialy XXV S'yezda KPSS," p 64). The period of candidacy, as V. I. Lenin taught, should be a serious test, not an empty formality.

Most army and navy party organizations revere these standards. They have established an atmosphere of high responsibility for the education and molding of party candidates. For example, more than two thirds of the candidates in the unit where Lt Col R. Rakhmatulian is political worker work in the Komsomol organization while the others are performing different party assignments. This enables the new recruits to gain experience working with people and to grow politically.

In work with candidates many party organizations have them give reports at party meetings and sessions of party bureaus and committees and help the new communists study the works of V. I. Lenin, materials from party congresses, and other documents. The secretaries and members of party committees, bureaus, and commissions talk with the candidates, find out how they are doing with preparation for entering CPSU membership and increasing their ideological and political knowledge. Lectures and discussions on the materials of the 25th CPSU Congress, the October 1976 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the CPSU By-Laws, and Leninist standards of party life and principles of party leadership have been organized at many party organizations for candidate members. In the Belorussian, Kiev, Odessa, and other military districts up to 96 percent of candidates for CPSU membership are raising their ideological level in evening party schools and study circles.

These proven forms and methods of educating candidates and testing their practical and moral-political characteristics deserve to be used extensively in the future as well. It is important to establish an atmosphere of strict, high standards for the period of candidacy in the party collectives.

Today, on the threshold of an outstanding date — the 60th anniversary of Great October, there are special features to work with candidates for party membership. Those party organizations which direct propaganda and agitation to seeing that all communists have an even deeper understanding of the majesty of the October Revolution and the heroic history of the CPSU and become permeated with exalted

responsibility for party work, for irreproachable performance of duty to the party, are proceeding correctly. In this respect, it is difficult to overestimate the readings and meetings with old Bolsheviks, veterans of the October Revolution, and veterans of the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars that are held in the units and on board ships.

However, work with candidates is not always properly organized in all places. Sometimes party leaders do not find out how these comrades are improving their ideological and theoretical knowledge, do not give them assignments, and do not hear reports by them on how they are using the period of candidacy to prepare for entry into the CPSU. As a result, some candidates are not prepared for admission to party membership.

In one of the headquarters party organizations of a unit Capt Yu. Alekseyev was refused admission to the CPSU on the basis of Article 16 of the party By-Laws. He proved unprepared to become a communist. The leaders there did not think it would be necessary to work with him at first and he was soon neglected. But then when the time came to admit Alekseyev to CPSU membership it turned out he had not raised his ideological-theoretical level, not performed his assignments, and had not become accustomed to the work of a communist.

Here is another case. The political branch of the Dzhezkazganskaya Oblast Military Commissariat did not take care to see that rayon military commissariat officer A. Kugamov, a candidate for party membership, was taken onto the rolls of a primary party organization. As a result, the requirement of the By-Laws stating that a condition for membership in the party is work in one of the party organizations and that "the party organization must help the candidate prepare himself for entry into the CPSU and check his personal characteristics" was not met.

Upon expiration of the one-year probationary period the party organization reviews the question of admitting the candidate to CPSU membership. If the candidate has not proven himself and by personal characteristics is unworthy to be admitted to the ranks of the CPSU the party organization refuses him admission. After ratification of this decision by the party commission the person is considered eliminated from candidacy. It should be noted that certain party organizations act incorrectly when, faced with serious misdeeds by certain candidates, the question is not raised on a party basis until expiration of the one-year period, after which they act in conformity with Article 16 of the CPSU By-Laws. This is often done deliberately to avoid "spoiling" the record, to have fewer communists called to account for violations of party military discipline.

All party organizations and communists consider it their duty to be constantly concerned for the purity of party ranks. One who violates the CPSU By-Laws and behaves in a manner unworthy of the lofty title of communist cannot remain in the party. V. I. Lenin considered the

purification (purging) of unworthy persons from party ranks to be one of the important signs of the party's ability to strengthen the unity of views and actions among communists.

The chief method of educating communists as ideologically loyal, highly disciplined party fighters has been and remains the method of persuasion, developing habits of conscious discipline which inspire initiative and creativity, not teaching them blind, mechanical subordination.

In carrying out the demands of the 25th CPSU Congress the primary party organizations and political agencies attach paramount importance to Marxist-Leninist education of communists. The system of party education is always being improved and its influence on growth in the awareness and activism of party fighters is rising. Studying Lenin's theoretical heritage, the party Program and By-Laws, the decisions of party congresses and decrees of the CPSU Central Committee, and the speeches of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and other party leaders always teaches lessons in party loyalty, organization, and high responsibility for the assigned work.

The primary party organizations have special responsibility for admitting new communists to the CPSU and for educating them. These organizations must give the opinions of communists and non-party comrades who know the candidates in everyday life and work greater attention and consideration.

The creative life of a party organization should be such that all members and candidates for membership in the CPSU feel themselves involved in its work and experience the beneficial influence of the party collective. One such collective is the party organization where Capt S. Turchin is secretary. Its primary efforts are concentrated on increasing the responsibility of each communist not only for personal indices but for the state of affairs in the collective. More than four fifths of the communists in the organization are outstanding in combat and political training and all are rated specialists. The subunit has raised seven outstanding crews and has been the best subunit in the district's airforce for the last three years. The party organization attaches great importance to seeing that new communists study the glorious sixty-year history of our country. Lectures, discussions, meetings with veterans of the revolution, labor, and war expand the political horizons of new communists and condition them ideologically. The party organization also sees that the personal qualities of the candidates are molded and that they show themselves actively in practical work, in the performance of party assignments. This subunit finds work to suit everyone and expects high standards of every individual.

The experience of this and other party organizations is convincing evidence that constant, unflagging concern for the education of candidates and taking an interest in how they are preparing for entry into

CPSU membership makes it possible to replenish party ranks with people who are truly tested and prepared and worthy to bear the lofty title of communist with honor. By contrast, failure of a party organization to keep track of whether candidates are familiarizing themselves with the CPSU Program and By-Laws and with their rights and duties and whether they are taking part in practical activities, results in a situation where some comrades do not pass the test of the probationary period of candidacy.

Testing the personal qualities of candidates and helping them are interrelated. While checking on the candidate every day the party organization offers assistance, and while giving assistance it is checking to see whether the person can be a CPSU member, whether he has demonstrated in practice that he is worthy of the lofty title of party member, whether the candidate sets an example of precision and discipline, a creative attitude toward the work, and a public-minded approach to solving large and small problems.

An absolute majority of army and navy communists fulfill their party and military duty in an exemplary manner and are active political fighters. At the same time, there are still cases in the military where certain members and candidates for party membership do not set an example in training and discipline, sometimes deviate from the requirements of the CPSU By-Laws, Soviet laws, and the standards of communist morality, and excuse failures and errors by those around them. And it is not out of place to recall that the paramount measure of the party discipline of a communist fighting man is how he performs his party duties in his primary form of activity: the struggle for high combat readiness and firm regulation order in all things. Behavior which is out of line with the requirements of party discipline is strictly punished in the party collective, ultimately leading to expulsion from the CPSU.

The interests of further bolstering the ranks of the party, educating communists, and instilling an active life posture in them demand that Leninist standards of party life and principles of party leadership be observed in every party organization and that an atmosphere of true collectivism, comradeship, and high-principles criticism and self-criticism be established. The decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress are permeated with a concern for this. In the decree "The 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution" the Central Committee states that "The CPSU is devoting substantial attention to strengthening and developing Leninist standards of party life and principles of leadership, deepening intraparty democracy, increasing demands made of each party member, and improving the qualitative composition of the party."

It is enormously important for political agencies and party commissions to devote constant attention to the work of primary organizations in selecting and educating new candidates for party membership. They must see that the requirements of the CPSU By-Laws are strictly observed.

Party organizations and political agencies have accumulated significant experience in solving this basic problem of party building, educating new party members, and fulfilling the demand of the 25th CPSU Congress that "Every communist should be an ideologically loyal, active party fighter, a leader in the ranks of the builders of communism" ("Materialy XXV S'yezda KPSS," p 64).

To select candidates for party membership correctly and educate new communists means above all to insure strict observance of the CPSU By-Laws and impose high standards on candidates. All work on admission to the party and education of new communists is expected to increase the battle effectiveness of party organizations, strengthen their ties with the masses, and promote successful performance of the missions given to the Armed Forces by the 25th CPSU Congress and the obligations assumed in honor of the 60th Anniversary of Great October.

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OPERATIONS OF PEOPLE'S CONTROL GROUPS IN THE ARMED FORCES

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 10, May 77 signed to press
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[Article by Maj Gen V. Volovich: "People's Control Groups"]

[Text] In letters to the editor comrades V. Snitko and A. Bogomolov ask us to tell how people's control groups are formed in the Armed Forces and how they operate. We satisfy their request below.

People's control groups are expected to assist commanders, political agencies, and party organizations in checking on fulfillment of party and government directives and the requirements of the regulations and orders in relation to questions of management, financial, and production activity and strengthening state discipline and legality. In their work they are guided by the Statute on People's Control Agencies in the USSR ratified by the 19 December 1968 decree of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers and the orders and directives of the USSR Minister of Defense, the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, and the commands and political directorates of the various branches of the Armed Forces, military districts, groups of forces, air defense districts, fleets, and border and internal forces.

People's control groups are formed in military units, institutions, and production and trade enterprises. Group members are selected from the servicemen, workers, and employees by open vote at general meetings of the personnel of units and subunits, enterprises, and organizations. Experience shows that it is most convenient to elect members for people's control groups in large units at meetings of personnel of the appropriate headquarters, services, and troop units at their primary place of work or service. People's controllers should report on their work regularly to the collectives that elected them. The CPSU Central Committee decree "On Party Management of People's Control Agencies in the Latvian SSR" points out that people's controllers must be high-principled and disciplined comrades who are demanding of themselves, relentless, and "will not say a word that goes against their conscience," as V. I. Lenin expressed it, when it is a matter of defending state and social interests.

Years of experience have resulted in a uniform approach to managing people's control agencies. Commanders and political agencies direct their activities jointly, giving them assignments and reviewing and ratifying their work plans. They adopt decisions based on the results of inspections and to eliminate weaknesses that have been identified. They give encouragement to the most outstanding people's controllers and organize training for them.

Party committees (bureaus) recommend the most principled communists for people's control groups, stimulate and coordinate their activity, hear regular reports from them on their work (at their own sessions and at party meetings), organize appearances by people's controllers on local radio, and generalize and disseminate useful know-how.

Management of people's control groups by party committees (bureaus) helps enrich the forms of party influence on many aspects of the life of units, enterprises, and organizations and makes this attention more effective.

Groups are composed in such a way as to encompass all important sectors of the work and life of subunits that, in the opinion of the command, need systematic checks or constant supervision.

The basic form of work by people's control groups is checks (audits) on specific questions. They are done according to a plan of work developed by the group, usually for the quarter, coordinated with the political agency (party bureau), and ratified by the commander. If necessary, specialists are involved in the checks alongside members of the people's control groups and posts. Groups carry out surprise checks with the authorization of the commander and political agency.

During planned and surprise inspections the groups have the right to see documents and material relevant to the question being checked and hear public reports on the results of the check by officials responsible for breakdowns in production plans and assignments and violations of state discipline, bureaucratism and red tape, mismanagement, and abuse of position. Depending on the nature and content of the results of the check, the conclusions and suggestions, they are reported to the commander and political agency and may be brought up for discussion at the party committee (bureau) or at a party meeting, meeting of officers, or meeting of personnel. In this case the group has the right to submit proposals on punishment of the guilty to the command. If steps are not taken the group may appeal to the higher-ranking command, political agency, or people's control committee all the way up to the central bodies.

Checks are the basic form of work by people's controllers, but not the only one. In light of the requirements of the 25th CPSU Congress, more and more attention in the units, at production enterprises, and at institutions today is being devoted to searching for effective methods of preventing mistakes and problems. To achieve this people's control groups are supporting and disseminating progressive know-how, organizing talks by people's controllers to personnel on the causes of problems they find,

holding individual and collective discussions, and writing for the army press. The multifaceted activities of the people's controllers are ultimately aimed at promoting the education of cadres and molding public opinion in military and production collectives against poor management and violations of state discipline as well as other weaknesses.

The CPSU Central Committee decree "On Party Management of People's Control Agencies in the Latvian SSR" called attention to the still-low effectiveness of control work and demanded that steps be taken to improve all its practices. It is recommended that people's control agencies not scatter their efforts but rather concentrate attention on checking the most important and timely matters and strive for integration of checking and preventing and correcting problems. They are expected to follow a true party-minded approach to work in all their activities.

Carrying out party instructions, commanders, political agencies, and party organizations search persistently for ways to substantially improve the work of people's control groups. A great deal that is useful is being done in this respect, for example, in the regiment where political worker Maj M. Dzyuba is head of the people's control group. The group has a chairman, a deputy chairman, and three sectors. One sector supervises the maintenance and operation of machinery, the second watches material and domestic services, and the third checks financial and economic activities. In addition, certain members of the group have permanent assignments: study and summarize the work experience of people's control posts in the subunits, make up people's control displays, and turn out broadsheets, photo newspapers, and radio magazines. The chairman, deputy chairman, and sector heads make up the bureau of the group, which reviews ongoing questions, draws up a draft plan of work, discusses the results of particular checks, and resolves other organizational questions.

People's control posts of 3-5 people have been elected in all the subunits of this unit. The heads of the posts are at the same time members of the group. Members of the posts, 80 percent of whom are ensigns, sergeants, and soldiers, are enlisted by the group for inspections, keep track of the elimination of problems revealed by inspections, and take part directly in this work. At the same time they perform jobs for their commanders with respect to control on specific questions in the subunits and regularly inform the group and subunit personnel of the results of their work.

The people's control group chooses the most important questions of the given period for study. For example, in the second quarter of this year it planned two inspections: one planned by the district committee (on the state of records for fuel and lubricants and economical expenditure of them) and one at the suggestion of the group as approved by the commander (control of the quality of repair, servicing, and putting into storage the transport vehicles used to gather the 1976 harvest). Plans call for study of the work experience of one of the posts and discussion of its results at a seminar of people's controllers. The plan also envisions training periods for people's controllers and a meeting of the group. It contains assignments for members of the group and posts: who is to speak to personnel and where, when photo news sheets will be put out and on what subject, and so on.

General meetings of the group are assigned an important role. The times for holding them are not regulated. The group itself decides when to have them. The meetings review organizational questions and discuss work plans, results, and proposals for the most important inspections. The last question is especially important. It is the group, as the people's control agency, that is given the right to hear the explanations of those responsible for shortcomings and abuses. Experience testifies that this is beneficial for improving the work, makes officials feel more responsibility, and teaches high principles to the controllers themselves.

One occasionally hears the question: how can duplication in control work be avoided? At first glance the danger of duplication really does exist because the objects and goals sought by different forms of control in many cases coincide. But this danger is eliminated in practice where proper attention is given to coordinating inspections and when people's control groups are given the role they are supposed to have.

In this connection I would like to cite the following case. In one of the leading repair enterprises, where V. Makarov is secretary of the party bureau, control functions in the production sections are performed by the trade union organization and internal auditing commissions in addition to the people's control posts and groups. Nonetheless there is no duplication there. This is achieved because the party bureau and administration determine concrete jobs for each control agency on the basis of analysis and evaluation of tight spots. The efforts of controllers are coordinated by the party bureau. This work is done directly by the deputy secretary of the party bureau who is chairman of the group.

One productive form of work by people's control groups that helps them achieve good results while reducing the number of inspections is organizing comprehensive study of the causes of shortcomings that recur frequently. This is demonstrated by the experience of many units. These matters usually require joining the efforts of staff and service employees and various specialists under the direction of commanders and political agencies.

The productivity of work by people's controllers is determined in large part by how concretely and seriously the commander manages the people's control group subordinate to him. This was pointed out in the resolution of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy which reviewed the work of people's controllers in the Red Banner Kiev Military District. It was recommended that political directorates give command and political personnel more thorough training in the management of people's control agencies. It was further proposed that broader use be made of their activities in performing the tasks that follow from the decree of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Council of Ministers, AUCCTU, and Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Komsomol entitled "On All-Union Socialist Competition to Raise the Efficiency of Production and Quality of Work and Successfully Fulfill the Assignments of the Tenth Five-Year Plan" and the orders of the USSR Minister of Defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy concerning organizational and political work in light of this document.

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TRAINING RESULTS IN AIRBORNE UNITS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 11, Jun 77 signed to press 19 May 77 pp 26-32

[Article by Lt Gen I. Bliznyuk, chief of the Political Directorate, Airborne Troops: "Introduction of Leading Know-how -- A Party Matter"]

[Text] The personnel in the Airborne Troops, like all Soviet soldiers, are steadfastly bringing the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and of the October (1976) CC CPSU Plenum to fruition, unceasingly improving combat and political training, and persistently assimilating contemporary weapons and combat equipment. The ranks of otlichniki in training and of class-rated specialists in units and subunits [chasti i podrazdeleniya] are multiplying during the competition for a worthy reception for the 60th anniversary of Great October. The teamwork of sections, teams and crews, subunits, and units is improving. Commanders, political organs, party, and Komsomol organizations are placing close attention to raising the quality and effectiveness of combat training, actively searching for unused capabilities and pushing for new progressive mobilization of people for unconditional fulfillment of socialist pledges, and further improving combat readiness.

The way things are done in the twice decorated artillery regiment of the Guards Airborne Chernigov Red Banner Division is illustrative. The regimental commander and his deputy for political affairs are doing a great deal to insure that all the airborne troops without exception strive for excellent development of every theme and model execution of combat training missions, norms, and socialist pledges.

The regimental party committee participates actively in solution of these problems. It concerns itself with communists setting the best example in improving combat knowledge and practical skills, with military discipline, actively assists commanders in finding reserves, achieving high results in combat and political training, making competition more realistic, and introducing the best examples of comradely labor into daily life.

The party committee continually monitors the improvement of the methodological and professional mastery of those who organize and direct the training-indoctrinational process. Based upon the initiative of party committee

members, lectures and reports on themes of military pedagogy and psychology are regularly organized for officers, warrant officers [praporshchiki], and sergeants. Opinions are exchanged with the leading personnel from training and competition. In the recent past, lecturers gave presentations to officers and warrant officers on such themes as "The Principles and Methods of Training and Indoctrinating Airborne Troops," "Methodological Problems in Raising Military Mastery," "Scientific Recommendations -- Into Practice in Training and Indoctrination," and others.

The unit [chast'] methodological council assists commanders and political workers in improving skills in training-indoctrinational work. Its members -- highly qualified communists G. Mashchenkov, B. Kunenkov, Yu. Abrikin, L. Mikhalev, and others pass on their rich experience to the young officers.

During the competition in the subunits, patriotic initiatives were widely used: "A Related Specialty For Each Soldier," "Today the Gains of an Otlichnik, Tomorrow the Gains of the Subunit," "Not One Lagger Along With the Otlichniks." Supporting these initiatives, the command and the party organization are concentrating their efforts on broad dissemination of the achievements of those on the right flank of the competition and on propagandizing progressive know-how at the team, platoon, and battery level, i. e., at the level where combat mastery is forged. All of this, in combination with other measures, provides excellent results. The regiment has maintained its rank of excellent for 5 years. It was awarded the Travelling Red Banner of the Airborne Troops for high indicators in combat and political training and in military discipline.

The creative initiative of the troops, not only in this regiment but in our other units and subunits as well, is most clearly manifested as they carry out their assigned missions and fulfill their socialist pledges. It is also clearly evident in the struggle for effectiveness and quality in combat training, high class ratings, assimilation of related specialties, complete inter-changeability in teams and crews, and fulfillment of established norms. The communist consciousness of the personnel, their striving to steadfastly achieve continuous improvement in combat readiness are most fully reflected in their search for that which is new. The growing level of special knowledge and skills of the soldiers and the professional mastery of the sergeants, warrant officers, and officers are reflected in the leading know-how and the broad capabilities of modern weapons and military equipment are revealed.

Often visiting the troop units and achieving further improvement in the quality of the training-indoctrinational process, the generals and officers of the political directorate, headquarters, and services of the Airborne Troops strive to find, generalize, and implement everything rational and instructive to facilitate raising the quality of combat and political training and the viability of socialist competition. Thanks to this, for instance, they were able to considerably reduce the time required to prepare for an assault landing, form the assault landing force, as well as improve methods of operation after the landing and the assignment of missions to the personnel.

Leading know-how is not usually a surface phenomenon. One often has to scrupulously and carefully search out interesting details and drills. Visiting classroom lessons, at firing ranges, and exercise areas, analyzing the quality of training, as well as drills and methods of organizing varied measures, using time studies and photography of the training-indoctrinational process, comparing results, our comrades bring to light everything valuable and instructive for practical use and provide recommendations on the spot on how best to solve certain problems.

After visiting units, the officers must report their observations, conclusions, and proposals to the chiefs of troop services, the staff, and the political directorate. It has become our rule that, after each trip, we write up critiques which generalize positive know-how in training and indoctrination.

Work devoted to generalization and implementation of the new and progressive is regularly discussed at meetings of the leadership of the Airborne Troops, where the tasks are refined and specified, and the trends for further activities are determined. Generals N. Gus'kov, A. Kolenko, and P. Kalinin, Colonels M. Arabin, S. Buzanov, A. Kukushkin, A. Koshcheyev, and others actively participate in this work.

Everything valuable that is learned and that merits practical repetition is disseminated to and then implemented in the troop units. Various methods are employed to propagandize the new and progressive, including officer meetings, methodological conferences, demonstration lessons, seminars, and the like.

Implementation of positive know-how is an intricate and complex matter. And, it would be a mistake to reduce it to a simple display of drills and ways of working on equipment, with weapons, etc. There is no need to point out the import of an interested and serious approach by every commander, political worker, and party organization to dissemination of leading methods of training and indoctrination. The ability to repeat know-how is the most important Leninist principle of organizing competition. Success in the struggle to raise the effectiveness and quality of combat and political training is impossible without careful generalization of the practices of leading commanders, party, and Komsomol organizations. Contempt for this important work unavoidably leads to materiel and moral costs.

We strive to deeply study the activities of commanders, staffs, and political workers, analyze their work style, and examine their skill in using the party-Komsomol aktiv. This makes it possible to bring to light how they achieve success, determine the most advantageous way to generalize and disseminate their know-how, and uncover deficiencies. Here, we strive to provide a forum in which the creators of the leading know-how themselves can share their achievements. This is accomplished, as a rule, at party committee meetings, officer methodological conferences, or at special seminars organized with the leading personnel. Thanks to this very approach, we succeeded in generalizing and disseminating to the troops valuable know-how on solution of such problems as the struggle for high quality training when assimilating

contemporary equipment, organization of operative party-political work when training personnel for an assault landing in compressed time frames, effectiveness of military-technical propaganda, etc. Gatherings of various categories of specialists and demonstration lessons are widely used for this purpose. Thus, thanks to demonstration lessons conducted with assault landing specialists and armor services specialists, a significant time reduction was achieved when unloading parachute equipment, rigging it, and loading it aboard aircraft. Procedures for maintaining combat vehicles in readiness for rapid dispatch from the motor pool have been improved.

The Airborne Troops continue to develop. Yesterday's "winged infantry" sat firmly at the wheel of the combat vehicles and, becoming one with the equipment, became a powerful combat force. Rapid technical progress required acceleration of the process of improving technical knowledge and solidifying the corresponding personnel skills.

The command of the unit where Captain N. Sosonnyy heads the party organization understands this well. Propaganda of the troops' military-technical progress has been skillfully established here. These questions are regularly discussed at party meetings. Special concern is devoted to high quality knowledge and the methodological and professional training of leaders -- the officers, warrant officers, and sergeants, on improving the work of technical lecture bureaus and other forms of propagandizing technical knowledge. Fulfilling party assignments, communists I. Brakorenko, A. Buy, A. Podorvanov, and other experienced specialists regularly give interesting reports and lectures. They actively participate in training and in running technical conferences on varied topics, and assist officers in preparing papers which provide the profound basis of new means and methods of assimilating combat equipment. They also organize lessons on coordination within teams and crews.

The work of technical circles organized at the initiative of communists and Komsomol members, contests, and competitions for the title of best specialist, crew, or team are in the center of the party organization's attention.

Officers from the Political Directorate of the Airborne Troops visited this unit and carefully studied all the positive features which facilitate improving military-technical propaganda. The know-how that they generalized was then discussed at meetings with unit commanders and chiefs of political organs, as well as during seminars with the secretaries of party and Komsomol organizations.

The results of winter training show that a majority of the units and subunits skillfully put leading know-how to use and adopt those measures that aid other military collectives in achieving high indicators in training and service. A good example is Parachute Regiment "X", where a great deal is being done to raise the level of methodological mastery of the officers, the young officers particularly. Using material found in such brochures as "First Steps," "The Word of an Officer's Youth," "For In-Depth Political Knowledge," prepared by the Political Directorate of the Airborne Troops, as well as know-how accumulated in the unit, they are arming the young indoctrinators here with the skills of how to work with subordinates.

The party committee really assists the commander. Vital questions of combat and political training, in particular improving tactical, field, and airborne training and the moral-political and psychological tempering of the troops, in within its cognizance. These questions are solved in a comprehensive manner by the common efforts of the commander, staff, and party committee. Visiting the lessons in the companies at the commander's suggestion, party committee members take an in-depth look at how the training process is organized and the socialist competition is progressing. They evaluate the state of affairs in principle, eliminate deficiencies efficiently, take note of new and worthwhile happenings during combat training, and make all efforts to support their implementation.

Party committee activities provide useful assistance to commanders and subunit party organizations as the latter prepare for scheduled exercises. At one meeting, the question of communists' personal example at every stage of the exercises was discussed: during the preparatory phase, when completing the march, rigging the equipment on the platforms and loading it aboard the aircraft, during the en route flight, during the assault landing, and when fulfilling the combat training mission. The discussion covered the fact that, due to further improvement in equipment and how it is employed in combat, it is insufficient to just see that the troops possess firm knowledge and skills. More is required so that personnel firmly trust their weapons and are able to employ their full capabilities in any situation, without panicking. Therefore, communists were counseled to intensify their assistance to commanders in indoctrinating the troops with high moral-political and psychological qualities, to use a differentiated approach to the indoctrinational process, taking into account the various specialist categories and stressing individual work.

The measures outlined by the party committee members and approved by the commander covered a broad range of questions. Also useful were meetings between young soldiers and experienced troopers, technical conferences, and contests to pick the best specialist, gunner, jumper.

Subunit commanders, political workers, communists, and Komsomol activists concerned themselves primarily with seeing that personnel developed the ability to excellently assimilate their weapons, actively and decisively operate in unfamiliar terrain both day and night, with indoctrinating the airborne troops with bravery, courage, and the ability to rapidly and accurately solve problems. Tactical-drill and instructional-methodological lessons and drills in the field were devoted to these goals. Members of the battalion party committee and bureau, visiting the companies, strived for effectiveness in every class and field lesson. Thus, communists V. Vyrodov and Yu. Kiselev noted that the lessons in several platoons were conducted according to a simplified scenario without integrated development of tactical and firing missions. In spite of a sufficient level of training, some commanders do not always teach their subordinates, in a methodologically correct way, to use their weapon in a specifically set manner. Party activists also noted that the results of training and comradely labor in these platoons are not always critically evaluated.

The deficiencies were reported to the commander and he took stern measures. At the same time, a principled discussion about elimination of lapses and shortcomings ensued at subunit party and Komsomol meetings. Also, the party committee devoted its meeting to these problems and invited officer-directors to attend. The party committee outlined a plan of measures to take to assist those falling behind. The members of the party committee and bureau in the subunits, possessing in-depth military knowledge and rich know-how in party-political work, made a weighty contribution to elimination of deficiencies. Based on their initiative and approved by the commander, demonstration lessons were conducted with the driver-mechanics and officers Zh. Lifashin and V. Murygin conducted a seminar with subunit commanders on the theme "Party-Political Work at Exercises."

Training of combat vehicle commanders, gunner-operators, machinegunners, and communicators was also conducted under the guidance of communist-directors. By order of the commander, demonstration lessons were also organized for them and, during the evening, they watched such training films as "Equipment Maintenance Under Field Conditions," "Preparation and Assault Landing of the Combat Equipment of the Airborne Troops," "Learn to Destroy Enemy Tanks," and others.

Radio broadcasts were widely used. The best specialists and those on the right flank in the competition -- Junior Sergeant Z. Chuchmanov, Corporal I. Khabirov, Private A. Smolin, and Sergeant S. Golovatskiy -- were given the opportunity to discuss their know-how on local radio. And, communists comrades D. Semak and A. Rudyuk presented to the officers reports entitled "Firm Direction of the Subunit -- The Key to Victory in Combat" and "Tactics of the Operations of the Probable Enemy's Armies." Also useful were instructor-methodological lessons with the sergeants corps during which they discussed preparation of young commanders for exercises. Then, meetings of sergeants were held in the subunits on the agenda entitled "Continuously Improve Your Knowledge, Teach Soldiers That Which Is Required In Contemporary Combat." The regimental commander, battalion commanders, and regimental chiefs of services gave reports at these meetings.

The party committee organized a seminar for the subunits' aktiv. Each communist received a specific assignment. Party committee members then monitored fulfillment of these assignments and informed their secretary about the most effective forms and approaches to working with people, about lapses and discrepancies. This made it possible to actively influence the quality of the measures taken in the subunits.

The goal-oriented work of commander, political worker, staff officers, party and Komsomol organizations made it possible to mobilize the personnel and successfully conduct the next exercise. The activities of the troops were rated highly.

An information handbook, information flyers, and multiple edition soldiers' newspapers in particular are operative ways to publicize competition, generalization, and dissemination of the new and the progressive things that occur

during combat training and service. The newspaper SOLDATSKAYA PRAVDA has enjoyed many creative successes in this regard. Regularly appearing on its pages is material discussing the know-how of otlichniks in training and leaders of the competition in honor of the October jubilee. Much of this material is printed under recurring rubrics such as: "We Discuss Victors in Competition," "Otlichniks About Their Know-how," "Lining Up On Those On the Right Flank of Competition." Lately, readers have become interested in "Height After Height," "Authority Born By Deeds," "Hit the Tank Without a Miss," plus others. The lead story "And Obligated To Be A Pedagogue..." was a success. It discusses the know-how of Senior Lieutenant V. Andronov, leader of a political lesson group, and gives specific examples of how he always achieves a high degree of activeness and progress on the part of his students.

The officers in the editorial bureau maintain close contact with unit party organizations. This permits them to feel the pulse of life in the subunits at all times and to note in a timely manner everything new that occurs during interactions among people. Thus, for example, communist N. Smakhten in the communications subunit showed excellent initiative when he organized a technical circle. The lessons in the circle assisted many servicemen in raising their specialty class rating. This fact was the basis for publication in the newspaper of a report "This Is What Enthusiasm Does," making this leading officer's know-how available to all.

SOLDATSKAYA PRAVDA in its articles strives to widely advertise how, in answer to the call of the 25th CPSU Congress to be in the advance ranks in all matters, candidates and party members clearly exhibit their organizational capabilities, influence combat training, direct individual work, and struggle to see that there are no laggards in their ranks. Articles such as "How To Become A Communist" and "If Your Name Is Communist" illuminate the activities of party members Sergeant V. Kuznetsov and Master Sergeant S. Rachkulov to improve the combat mastery of their coworkers, to preserve the leading role of communists in all matters and undertakings.

There are many examples of editorial boards of soldiers' multiple edition newspapers conscientiously fulfilling their mission -- to actively propagandize leading know-how and facilitate its immediate implementation. Commanders and political workers in a majority of our subunits skillfully employ newspapers and see them as sources for dissemination of know-how.

Unfortunately, there still are subunits which find themselves in identical circumstances, but the results of their combat and political training differ: one rightfully bears the title excellent, other fall "in between," and still others lag behind. A lot is done in the subunits to pull the laggards up to the level of the leaders. Success here, as life shows, depends upon a skillful approach, coordinated work of the command, staff, party and Komsomol organizations. A great deal depends upon the activeness of the communists, how they through personal example, inspired words, and organizational activities facilitate propaganda and implementation of the best examples of comradely labor.

It is not difficult to identify the laggards. It is more difficult to assist them in assimilating firm skills and progressive work methods, to bring them up to the level of the leaders. Unfortunately, this does not always happen. The reason sometimes lies in the fact that young commanders and political workers who do not possess in full measure the know-how to lead military collectives, who still have not assimilated the skill of comprehensively solving training and indoctrinational problems, are serving in units and subunits. In a word, they are not quite competent yet. And senior comrades assist them in every way, considerately and demandingly inculcate commanders' skills in them.

Meetings, seminars, and other measures are often organized in our units and subunits to disseminate know-how. But, they do not always achieve their goal. Often, they only list the measures taken and gloss over the specific achievements of the leaders and reasons for failures, rather than discussing the sources and content of the know-how in detail and in a business-like manner. The know-how is there and it is considerable. But, it is treated superficially, sometimes without considering how applicable the know-how is to a given collective. To be systematic and to plan are the main conditions for introduction of positive experience.

It is something else again when voluminous generalized know-how is condensed. The condensed version contains no clear, convincing examples, no detailed illustrations of the achievements of the leaders. Also, there are instances when individual commanders and political workers generalize a wealth of information, limit themselves to a cursory presentation to officers at a meeting, then forget about it. We will decisively oppose such deficiencies.

Recently, a group of officers from the political department headed by A. Zubov worked in one of the units. Along with other problems, the question of progress in competition and introduction of leading know-how within the troop units was discussed. It turned out that the valuable know-how of the struggle of commanders, political workers, and party organizations to improve propaganda of military-technical knowledge is not being properly put to use. Here, access to the information is limited to officers and party organization secretaries at a seminar. This fast became an item of serious discussion at a meeting of the regimental party committee. The matter is now being corrected by the unit.

The Political Directorate of the Airborne Troops made a detailed analysis of whether the party organizations of a number of units are taking a comprehensive approach to the training and indoctrination of personnel. Specific measures for further improvement in the use of leading know-how in troop units were outlined at party meetings and at meetings of the party committees and bureaus. The problems of studying, generalizing, and implementing everything new and progressive was also discussed at a meeting of the unit and subunit ideological workers.

The know-how accumulated by the Airborne Troops during the competition for a worthy reception for the 60th anniversary of Great October is invaluable. It is the duty of every commander, political worker, communist, and Komsomol member to skillfully and assiduously disseminate these riches in the party manner.

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PSYCHOLOGY AS AN AID TO TRAINING AND INDOCTRINATION

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19 May 77 pp 48-53

[Article by Colonel M. D'yachenko, Doctor of Psychological Sciences, Professor, and Colonel I. Pavlenko, Candidate of Pedagogical Sciences, Docent:
"Knowledge of the Psychology of Subordinates and the Effectiveness of Training and Indoctrination*"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] Increasing the effectiveness of military training and indoctrination based upon knowledge of the psychology of subordinates is a broad and multifaceted problem. It assumes taking a full complex of measures directed at the study of soldiers, and calculating their socio-typical, individual-psychological, age, and other special features during the military training process. The key factor is the ability of commanders, under the conditions of the scientific-technological revolution, to direct the service activities of subordinates, to create a situation for fuller discovery by them of their subordinates' inclinations, abilities, and talents.

Successful formation of discipline, readiness for combat, and other qualities is linked with influencing all aspects of a soldier's psychology, primarily the characteristics of his personality. Psychology separates four basic qualities of personality -- concentration, temperament, character, and ability, the first being the determinant, the leader. The value of /concentration/ is greater the larger the place within it devoted to ideological aspirations and social motives of conduct. Commanders, political workers, party, and Komsomol organizations strive to form a communist world outlook in the troops and, in this manner, create in their consciousness the ideological concentration which calls forth vital activeness, a desire to direct all efforts towards our great task -- the building of a desire to direct all efforts towards our great task -- the building of communism. Mastery of a military specialty starts with a deep understanding of the importance of one's labor, a certitude of its necessity for the military collective and for society as a whole. It is this

*This article is recommended for use in the commander's training system when studying the theme "Comprehensive and In-depth Knowledge of the Social and Individual-Psychological Features of a Soldier's Personality -- A Vital Condition For Raising the Effectiveness of the Military-Pedagogical Process."

very soldier, one possessing good ideological tempering, technical training, and having excellent mastery of weapons and combat equipment, that should be indoctrinated.

The study of combat equipment and weapons and mastering them is not a simple matter. V. I. Lenin pointed out that military training requires not an impulse, not an appeal, but decisive, intense, stubborn work. In leading units [chasti], a soldier from the first days of service enters a psychological atmosphere which facilitates the development within him of high ideological aspirations, attunes him to conscientiously fulfill combat training tasks and service. The rule to immediately acquaint newly arrived soldiers with the combat traditions of the unit, with the requirements service makes upon them, with modern weapons and contemporary combat, has existed for a long time in the unit commanded by Guards Colonel F. Kochetov. The young soldiers become familiar with powerful combat equipment. Experienced officers tell the soldiers about the capabilities of the equipment, about the otlichniki in training and the class-rated specialists. Discussions and demonstrations make a powerful impression on young soldiers and mobilize them to successfully assimilate combat systems and complexes.

Estimating the special features of /temperament/ is another important indoctrinational factor. Study of this quality of personality allows a commander to foresee the conduct of subordinates and select the most effective type of influence relative to each one. It has been established, for example, that a soldier with a choleric temperament relates actively to training, does not like to aimlessly sit around, and energetically participates in practical lessons. However, lack of self control and irascibility are traits of this type of person. An even temper is characteristic of the sanguine and phlegmatic. The latter is also distinguished by sluggishness usually combined with his great accuracy and stability in acquisition of knowledge, skills, and habits. Soldiers with a predominant trait of melancholy temperament require special handling. They are hard to bring into a group, show indecisiveness, touchiness, usually have no faith in their strengths and abilities. These are badly injured personalities who need to be supported and given approval during training and indoctrination.

The sluggishness of the phlegmatic, the lack of self control of the choleric must not drive the commander to exasperation during training and indoctrination, must not make him nervous or "lose his temper." In such cases, the old saw applies: "When teaching, never get cross!" Self control and tact protect the commander against pedagogical errors.

Along with personality concentration and temperament, during training and indoctrination a commander must study and take into consideration the /character/ of the subordinate -- his stable psychological storehouse, the integral combination of traits which influence his entire conduct. Characters are categorized as strong and weak, introverted and extroverted, socially directed and egotistical, balanced and contradictory. Knowing a soldier's character, one can, to a certain degree, foresee how he will act in certain situations.

Practically speaking, it is important to determine positive character traits and deficiencies. Character is formed by the entire training-indoctrinational process depending upon the motives for a soldier's conduct, his attitude towards service, his assimilation of knowledge and skills. Mobilizing soldiers for accurate and complete fulfillment of combat training tasks and service, an officer tempers their character.

Due to the scientific-technical revolution, the /abilities/ of a soldier -- those special psychological features which make it possible for him to successfully assimilate a certain specialty and to improve himself in it -- acquire ever greater significance. These include attentiveness, specific qualities of memory, mentality, imagination, etc. Categories include mental, physical, technical, mathematical, and other abilities. An officer must always consider that the interest and love of the subordinate for his specialty, his activeness and steadfastness in labor, his understanding of his responsibility for combat readiness will serve as a condition for his successful development.

A soldier's stability in combat is determined not only by the qualities of his personality but also by the level of functioning of cognitive processes. Therefore, the formation of a soldier's personality assumes the study, activization, and improvement of these processes in accordance with the demands of the specialty and military activities as a whole.

/Sensations and perceptions/ -- the reflection in a person's consciousness of subjects and phenomena directly influencing his sense organs -- are the initial stage in the knowledge of activities in general and assimilation of training material in particular. With the aid of sensations and perceptions, primarily visual and aural, a soldier receives the greatest amount (up to 90 percent) of the information about military equipment, weapons, work drills with them, etc.

The fullness and accuracy of a soldier's perception of varied information in the course of training and indoctrination depend upon many factors. They depend upon whether the officer takes the correct methodological approach to the lessons, at what speed (tempo) the training material is presented, how well the new material is linked in concept with that already familiar to the soldiers, etc.

The effectiveness of training and indoctrination is, to a great degree, determined by the qualities of such psychological processes of a person as /memory, impression, and imagination/. A. V. Suvorov fittingly described memory as the storeroom of the mind. A soldier must firmly store a significant reserve of knowledge in this storeroom. Memory is linked in the closest manner with thought and gives way well to training. It can be long-term or short-term. The former stores for many years those facts and events which are linked with vivid emotional experiences or which are often repeated, as well as the knowledge linked with a person's specialty.

Information perceived by soldiers is firmly retained in the memory for permanent storage if, during the course of the training and indoctrination, they consciously strive to remember for a long time the necessary facts, drills, and actions. Soldiers must be taught to more rapidly link the theoretical knowledge they gain with practical matters.

An important role in the knowledge process falls to impressions -- to the types of earlier perceived phenomena and subjects. The clearer and richer a soldier's impressions on tasks and the conditions of their activities are, the more successfully they fulfill their functional responsibilities. The formation of impressions requires that the corresponding objects and phenomena become the goal of the soldier's action. For example, only an active goal-oriented perception of the terrain (for conduct of the offensive, passage of tanks, etc.) creates a clear impression of it. Use of visual aids and graphic descriptions and comparisons facilitate creation of the impressions required by the soldier.

Developed imagination is the psychological prerequisite for optimum understanding of training material, finding new drills for solving problems, and skillful operation of combat equipment. Its role increases when studying complex weapon systems since they cannot always be seen visually in operation. A soldier's imagination is formed when solving problems which require foresight based upon active independent use of knowledge and impressions.

Under contemporary conditions, such psychological cognitive processes as /thought and speech/ have acquired exceptionally important significance during the training and indoctrination of soldiers. Saturation of the Armed Forces with complex military equipment and new forms of weapons enriched the intellectual content of comradely labor. Now, to a much greater degree than before, a soldier's combat training activities are replete with problems and changeable situations requiring flexibility, speed, independence, and mobilization of thought. Therefore, when training and indoctrinating soldiers, stress needs to be placed on helping them to develop creative thought.

A soldier's thought is developed and manifests itself in unity with his speech. Words are the means of forming and expressing concepts, opinions, and inferences. Development of speech assists a soldier in assimilating knowledge and improving his thought and memory. It is very important that soldiers expand their general and their military vocabulary, develop the ability and skill to accurately verbalize ideas, and assimilate the manner of verbal intercourse of servicemen envisioned by regulations and directives, especially those between seniors and juniors.

/Emotional and volitional processes/ are included in a soldier's combat training activities. Individual and collective enthusiasm, inspiration, bravery, and dedication are impossible without strong emotions and feelings. Higher feelings -- moral-political, intellectual, and aesthetic -- have special significance for successful activities. Their activation assumes increased consciousness and expanded world outlook on the part of soldiers, the participation of each of them in solution of combat training problems,

in the social life of the unit, establishment of proper mutual relations in military collectives, and propaganda of traditions.

A soldier's fulfillment of training and service missions is coupled with surmounting difficulties, mobilization of forces, i. e., it requires manifestations of will. A commander or a political worker influences subordinates' will by acting upon the positive motives of their conduct and accumulation of experience in operating in complex situations.

A special role in soldiers' training and indoctrination falls to their /attention/. K. D. Ushinskiy did not accidentally refer to it as the only door to the spirit through which passes everything that is in our consciousness. And, that door must always remain open.

Experiments show that a person is usually able to concentrate his attention on theoretical activities for up to 40 minutes and on practical activities for up to 2 hours. Attention can only be maintained for 15-20 minutes when a lesson director's methodological preparation is weak, the soldiers are tired, or when other negative factors come into play. Therefore, an officer must think through the course of each lesson ahead of time to check both content and methodology, be able to shift the subordinates in a timely manner from one type of activity to another, introduce new elements, slow the pace, provide a break, then again introduce the troops to intensive work.

An integral component of personality are its /psychological states/ (elation, inspiration, interest, depression, anxiety, absent-mindedness, etc.). Psychological states influence achievement of results in training and indoctrination since they influence the functioning of psychological processes, manifestation of personality qualities, all activities of a soldier. Taking root in activities, psychological states can transfer to stable traits of the personality. Such states can be divided into two groups, based upon the dominant influence on activities: /positive/ (certainty, vigor, elation, excitement, concentration, readiness for active deeds) and /negative/ (uncertainty, depression, doubt, fear, absent-mindedness, irritability).

Psychological states depend upon many things: emotions and feelings, temperament, character, successes, failures, living conditions, etc. Mutual relations between soldiers, between commanders and subordinates have a great deal of influence on them. These relations give birth to a psychological climate which can accelerate and facilitate the formation of combat mastery and raise the effectiveness and quality of training-indoctrinational work or, on the contrary, slow down, retard this process.

Socialist competition is an effective way to create a positive psychological climate within military collectives and increase the activeness and creativity of the troops as they carry out training missions. Struggling to fulfill pledges, to fulfill and overfulfill norms, to achieve high indicators, soldiers experience elation, inspiration, which facilitates raising the quality of the training process.

Thus, officer-indoctrinators encounter soldiers with varied characters, abilities, interests, and needs, with varied levels of development of attention, memory, and thought. The effectiveness and quality of the entire training process hinge upon the knowledge and calculation of these and other special features of subordinates.

Practice in leading units shows that skilled officer-indoctrinators attach primary significance to thorough study of subordinates. In the interests of the matter at hand, they literally research the traits and qualities of each soldier -- his views, interests, aptitudes, character traits, abilities, level of development and quality of his memory, thought, speech, imagination. When studying the psychology of the collective, commanders and political workers classify its composition by years of service, age, party status, nationality, education, social origin, level of social activeness, authoritativeness. Officers are interested in the mutual relations in the collective, the mood, public opinion, traditions, level of its solidarity, discipline, combat skills, and readiness for combat.

Correct understanding and evaluation of subordinates is the key to further successful indoctrinational influence on each one of them. And, it is very important here to avoid manifestations of subjectivism. One cannot hope to have an adequate opinion of a person in the event of an indifferent or preconceived attitude towards him, an inability to put yourself in his place. The indoctrinator must himself be indoctrinated, K. Marx said. This is also fully applicable to officers and to all commanders.

Officers use varied methods when studying the special features of subordinates.

First, /observation/. Its place in the study of people is determined by the fact that their traits and qualities, states, and approach to activities are reflected in actions, deeds, various statements, external appearance (habitual expression, expression of the eyes, gestures, etc.). Decisive among all these manifestations are the soldier's deeds and actions in which his personality is most fully reflected. One can study moods, feelings, mental, volitional, and other qualities of a person by observation. It brings results if the external picture of conduct and the internal world of a person are coordinated on the basis of scientific knowledge. Goal-oriented systematic observation of soldiers' actions during their preparation for lessons, as they serve, as they participate in combat firing, exercises, when carrying out the daily routine, and so on allows one to determine with certitude their attitude towards duty, motives for certain types of conduct, abilities, and character traits.

Second, /experiment/. This method is more active than is observation. It provides the data required both for describing and for explaining psychological phenomena. It creates the conditions for evoking and changing the flow of the processes being studied, to obtain thereby their quantitative and qualitative characteristics. The experiment is often conducted in a specially created situation, usually using instruments, apparatuses, and varied technical devices. It is practiced in a number of units when selecting operators and other specialists.

A natural experiment is conducted under normal living conditions: at political lessons, during exercises, etc. It can be designed to form skills, thought, collectivism, discipline, etc. For example, the commander decides to check whether or not the subordinates' retention of training material improves thanks to use of new visual aids or how a certain combination of explanations and drills affects the soldiers' state of readiness for combat firings.

The /discussion method/ is widely used. It supplements observation and enriches it with new data. A person can describe in a relatively detailed manner his experiences and actions in a certain situation and, consequently, provide valuable material for psychological analysis. Using a discussion, it is possible to study service difficulties, interests, desires, soldiers' mutual relationships, etc. When discussing, one should bring the subordinate to your location, insist upon frankness, take his internal state into consideration. A person opens up in a simple sincere chat when he is listened to with respect and with a desire to understand him correctly.

The role of a commander's /direct contact/ with subordinates cannot be overstressed. It allows the officer to intensify and refine his opinion of a particular soldier based, for example, on a preliminary observation of his actions. The Internal Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces oblige a commander (chief) to comprehensively study his personnel through contact with them on and off the job.

Other methods are also used to study soldiers. They include questioning, compilation and dissemination of character references, use of questionnaires, testing (solution of varied problems, checking reaction times, etc.), and studying biographies.

An officer always functions as an organizer, a methodologist, and an indoctrinator. The force of his authority is in his ability to not only productively work himself but to also guarantee the diligent actions of subordinates, to lead them. He must constantly learn to make a goal-oriented, planned, and objective appraisal of the special features of subordinates. It is impossible to do so without a personal plan and a pedagogical diary. Major-Engineer B. Lunev, commander of a leading subunit [podrazdeleniye], has planned all his work for many years carefully and on a daily basis. He achieves strict execution of what he plans. The plan calls for observation of the subordinates' combat and political training, plus checking and evaluating the levels they achieve. Major-Engineer B. Lunev tries to develop the soldiers' initiative and creativity and exhibits self-control and tact in his dealings with them. The commander monitors the dynamics of peoples' orientation and character, tries step by step to intensify their interest in their military specialty, on the basis of which the corresponding aptitudes and abilities are developed in them. Practical use of subordinates' knowledge to improve lesson structure and careful and rational planning of training time thus will serve as an important means for raising the productivity of the military-training process.

/Self-instruction and self-indoctrination/ play an important role today in the training and indoctrination of soldiers. They will become a supplemental

means, along with the rising general educational and cultural level of personnel and the growth in their political consciousness, for the struggle to achieve new levels of combat readiness of units, ships, and subunits.

The requirements formalized in the CC CPSU Accountability Report to the 25th CPSU Congress fully apply to the officer as the leader who accomplishes the training and indoctrination of soldiers. He must organically unite the party nature within himself with in-depth competence, combine discipline with initiative and a creative approach to business. In addition, he is obliged to also take into account the socio-political and indoctrinational aspects, be sensitive towards people and to their needs and wants, set an example in training and service. He must be able to employ all means of influencing personnel in a goal-oriented manner, especially the energy and initiative of the party and Komsomol organizations, the knowledge and experience of otlichniks and those knowledgeable about combat equipment and weapons. An officer requires good psychological-pedagogical training so as to be able to more rapidly gain authority over his subordinates, to insure the requisite quality and effectiveness of their indoctrination and training as highly qualified military specialists and skilled defenders of our socialist Motherland.

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MILITARY SONGS: AN IMPORTANT MORALE FACTOR

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[Article by Maj Gen B. Aleksandrov, Hero of Socialist Labor, State Prize Laureate, People's Artist of the USSR: "A Song Is Also a Weapon"]

[Text] ...Exercises were in progress. The situation approximated combat to the maximum. The subunits [podrazdeleniya] had only just finished a battle and ahead of them lay an enervating march through a roadless area across terrain drenched by the rain and a new engagement with the "enemy."

A sharp wind blew, breaks appeared in the clouds, then the heavy cold rain storm began anew. We got ready for the concert. A stage consisting of two trucks was arranged, the artists hastily changed clothes in a tent stretched behind the "stage."

I said to the commander: "Maybe we should postpone the concert? Your people can barely stand up."

"For the very reason that the people are tired, for the very reason that ahead lies another 'battle' with a very strong 'enemy,' that is why we need this concert just like we need the air we breathe. It was Suvorov who said that music doubles, triples your forces," he answered. "Perhaps the artists cannot appear in such weather..."

But, the artists did not agree. We are also soldiers and exercises for one include all. We would give the show.

And, we did. Water sprayed from the cuffs of my overcoat as a result of the brisk swings of my arms as I directed. But, the complete concert was presented, with both parts presented without an intermission.

When we met this commander later at the headquarters of the unit [soyedineniye], he said:

"We took the strong point back then with one strike, from the march! So, the music did help."

I am in no way attempting to award the laurels of this victory either to myself or to the ensemble, but I knew from many years of experience that a song is a real assistant in combat, both in training and in the real thing. Once, my father, Aleksandr Vasil'yevich Aleksandrov, the founder and first artistic director of today's Twice Red Banner Soviet Army Song and Dance Ensemble which now bears his name, returned from a trip to the Far East. He visited near Lake Khasan and carried letters from Red Army soldiers. The letters contained warm thanks to the ensemble for their songs. "Your songs inspire us and lead us into combat!" the soldiers wrote.

It perhaps was then that, for the first time, I suddenly felt the enormous force of the full power of the spiritual weapon that is the military song. No, this is not simply nice, well planned "cultural leisure," not simply an "emotional shower," which removes nervous stress, refreshing and invigorating. A vigorous gust, the fury and pain of the people, daring and strength, a soldier's pride, valor and honor -- all are enmeshed into one in a song. Music, also including song as one of its most popular forms, is capable of not only, as Beethoven put it, striking fire from a brave soul, calling one forth to perform a feat, to do great deeds. It also is one of the vital components of a person's indoctrination, it participates daily in forming character, forming the entire system of political, aesthetic, and ethical views of personality, i. e., all those things that make this soul brave and whole.

Awareness of this determined my creative path also. The main thing in my life as an artist, in my view, as a composer is creation. As a director, it is all forms of propaganda of an army, patriotic, popular song in all its manifestations -- from a vigorous striking poster to a modest, sincere, lyrical tune, if in its center stands a picture of our soldier, sailor, officer, our Soviet "man with a weapon."

A song is an amazing phenomenon. A unique "musical sheet," the most operative and accessible of all forms of art, it is one of the first to storm new themes, new modes -- and one of the first to reach the people. By its very nature, it possesses the fascinating quality of joining together and inspiring those for whose hearts it is intended. For this reason therefore, it easily and harmoniously became a part of the life of our Armed Forces as early as the dawn of their existence. It is notable that our collective was created at that time as a performer of the songs born by the Red Army masses during the Civil War. That is the source of its first name, the Red Army Song Ensemble, and its first program: "The 22d Krasnodar Division in Songs," "The First Cavalry," "The Special Far East," and "The Red Navy." Also from these programs, in particular, came the great "Through the Valleys and Through the Mountains," written about the troops of one of the RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army] units [chasti] and which entered the golden fund of the world's song treasures.

The RKKA command from the very beginning succeeded in recognizing the operative indoctrinational factor to be found in song.

Many facts speak about the operative nature of this weapon.

June 27, 1941. The White Russian station. The Moscow group of the Red Banner Ensemble (Moscow group since three front groups had already departed to support the troops in the active army) accompanies military trains headed west. The station is packed. People in new, still unwrinkled, uniforms, with packs and carrying weapons. Short commands are given. Subunits [podrazdeleniya] form up and depart to load. Others take their place. Songs now, at such a time?

Aleksandr Vasil'yevich raises his hands -- and, in the commotion in the hall, there rings out just like a clap of thunder:

Let noble fury
Boil up like a wave,
The people's war goes on,
A sacred war!

And the people rise, the people listen to the song while standing -- and we have to play it over and over again. And, again it thunders, but now not from the hastily thrown together stage, but from the heated rail cars, directly from the scaffolds. The song departs for the front along with the troops.

Later, eyewitnesses told us how the commanders of one of the Sevastopol' ravelins sang it. Blockaded by the fascists, they were unable to join up with their own forces and preferred death to imprisonment. Prior to detonating the last charge which blew them up with bastion, they sang "Sacred War."

And, many years later in 1973, we performed in the Park imeni Fuchik in a Prague replete with lilacs. Our concert, dedicated to Victory Day, was attended by 20,000 spectators, with several times that number listening via the park sound system. Again "Sacred War" rang out.

An old man in the uniform of the people's militia came up to us after the concert.

"Along with the Ruda Armada units, I went to Prague from Buzuluk," he said. "Our people have many beautiful songs. But, it was that very song that we sang along with our Soviet brothers during those hard days." He silently offered a bouquet of lilacs. "I know that they will wilt before you get back to Moscow. But, give me your word that you will place this bouquet on the grave of the writer of that song, in my name, in the name of all antifascist fighters, in all our names.

Our weapon is the song. During the Great Patriotic War, those at the front called us the creators of "spiritual ammunition." The effectiveness of its use depends upon the quality of the song itself: a weak, uninteresting work does not reach people, regardless how hard the performer tries. Quality, always quality -- that is the main concern of the troops and commanders of song subunits, as the ensembles of the districts, groups of forces, and

fleets are now named. Ideology and artistry are the dual essence of our criteria. We come to this conclusion, again and again to the materials of the 25th CPSU Congress, to the CC CPSU decree "On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution."

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CC CPSU, in the Accountability Report of the CC CPSU to the 25th CPSU Congress, evaluated the entire system of indoctrinating personnel in the Armed Forces, a system in which military cultural institutions occupy a very significant place. He also pointed out the great indoctrinational role of art.

He said: "We know well that an artistic word, splashes of color, the expressiveness of stone, the harmony of sounds inspire modern men and pass on to descendants the memory of the heart and soul about our generation, about our time, its trials and its conquests. We wish for cultural leaders...to create new works worthy of our history, of our present and future, of our party and people, of our great Motherland."

Now, as we prepare for the wonderful jubilee of our Fatherland, the 60th anniversary of the Great October socialist revolution, we again and again ponder these words.

If songs are spiritual ammunition, then the song sections of composers' and writers' unions are the design bureaus whose products arm us in ideological battles. Receiving our weapons from the "suppliers," we place the most serious attention on how they are made, whether the "design" meets requirements, the epoch, finally, today. Yes, we are fully familiar with the fact that such works as "Sacred War," "Katyusha," "The Dnepr Song," or "An Evening In the Roads," do not come along every day. But, we are largely responsible for today's masterpieces coming to light.

At the 4th Plenum of the USSR Union of Composers recently held in Moscow and dedicated to youth creativity, it was noted that song, more than any other sphere of musical creativity, requires the joint efforts of creative and propaganda organizations. We must reach a position in which the representative of every sector of the ideological front feels an overall responsibility for the vital matter of the aesthetic indoctrination of the people, primarily youth.

For our Armed Forces are an organism that is very young. The overwhelming majority of the personnel are of Komsomol age. And, the fact that song is with us on a daily basis, that it rings out on the concert stage and on the drill field, comes from the movie and TV screen, from the speaker system of radios and tape recorders is very important for us. Song is practically the constant companion in the indoctrinational process, exerting an enormous influence on the formation of a person's taste, character, and world outlook. We must not overlook this in our activities.

At a reception of the country's creative intelligentsia organized by the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and

Navy, it was noted that the theme of the heroic feat of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces during the past war grandly rings out in the new works of leading Soviet composers. This can serve as a firm foundation of that great work in the field of musical art which is closely linked with heroic-patriotic indoctrination. All conditions are there, numerous speeches stressed, to solve the most complex ideological-artistic tasks now facing Soviet art in the matter of patriotic indoctrination of the upcoming generation. This applies fully to such an important type of art as song.

Strong composer collectives are at work in quite a number of cities. Is our influence, the military influence, a factor as regards them? I will say straight out that I have yet to meet the director of an ensemble able to put his hand over his heart and say: "I have no problems with the repertoire." We all experience difficulties with songs, especially those that are goal-oriented (about the services and the branches of troops, about military professions), battle songs, march songs. We all also dream about the appearance of a good song about officers. Interesting, deeply lyrical, humorous songs are always hard to find and each such song is worth its weight in gold.

We examine several hundred songs per year in the Red Banner Ensemble, mainly those on army and navy themes. But, here is the problem: the forms are oversimplified, the flight of fancy is limited, the soldier or sailor is often presented as such a simpleton.

But, visiting the units, we often see technikum badges and even those from institutes on the soldiers' blouses, we admire the fact that the troops are on a first-name basis with the equipment.

All this emphasizes the requirement for active interference in the work on songs as early as at the writer's stage. We are gradually trying to so organize our repertory activities that three-fourths of the songs will be written for us by direct request. "Victory Day," by D. Tukhmanov with lyrics by V. Kharitonov, can serve as an example of such cooperation with writers. The poet and composer wrote the song specially for us, maintaining the closest creative contact with the ensemble, resulting in a smashing success. The people love the song and it is now being performed by dozens of collectives and soloists. In 2 years, it has become recognized as one of the best songs of the year and remains so to this day.

Similar songs include: "We Remain in Songs", a journalistic piece by A. PakhmUTOVA and N. Dobronravov; Ye. Zharkovskiy's song "Commissars" with lyrics by M. Matusovskiy; two works by the young composer M. Minkov -- "Communists, Forward!" with lyrics by A. Mezhirov and "Youth", a choral piece based on a portion of E. Bagritskiy's poem "The Death of a Pioneer Girl," and many others.

We think that, practically speaking, work designed to bring songs to the required high level is the job for all collectives, especially those whose duty location coincides with the location of the largest composers' and writers' organizations.

In this connection, I would like to mention yet another composition which can be considered a success in the field of military song. This is the work of I. Katayev and poet P. Vysotskiy -- the battle song "Iron Infantry." It is notable by the fact that, to a known degree, the authors' success is shared by the political workers of the Transcaucasus Military District and the command and political section of the Motorized Rifle Samaro-Ul'yanovsk Berdichev Iron Division. It is no secret that you cannot write a good song if you don't know those about whom you are writing, if you don't know their life, missions, and moods. The young authors of "Iron Infantry" were given free rein in visiting the division, getting an in-depth knowledge of its past and, most important, its present. Thus came the song, nominally about the Iron Division, but in the long run, a good description of our modern infantry presented in a song. The song is greeted by stormy applause when presented in our concerts.

This fact is vivid witness to the great role of political organs, their assistance to workers in the arts, their influence on creative unions via military-patron commissions. Only political organs have the capability to carry out the entire system of measures, only they are capable of interesting creative workers in creation of songs on a military theme, a theme about the modern armed forces, and to provide them with practical assistance.

The recent meeting of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet [KChF] Military Council specially devoted to the work of the fleet dramatic theater and the KChF song and dance ensemble, in our view, serves as an excellent example of such activities. This is a manifestation of the real concern about creative collectives, an exacting and careful concern. And this has become the rule for the Black Sea sailors. The KChF Song and Dance Ensemble is one of the best Armed Forces collectives and, to a great degree, this is due to that very same constant attention paid to it by the fleet Military Council.

I make no attempt to provide recipes for success. This is an example of a special conversation and it, apparently, occurs at the regular meeting of chiefs, of the artistic directors of the song and dance ensembles of the districts, fleets, and groups of forces devoted to preparations for two notable jubilees: the 60th anniversary of the Soviet state and its Armed Forces. I note only that which, as they say, lies on the surface.

The directors of district and fleet collectives come to the Red Banner Ensemble with one and the same request: "Help us with the repertoire!" But, as they say, we don't have the power to do so. We, of course, assist the ensembles, share everything we have with them, but this only leads to duplicative repertoires. We arrive for a guest spot at the district and explain that their ensemble sings the identical works that we perform. Who needs that?

It seems to me that, on the eve of two jubilees for which all collectives are preparing new programs, it would be most useful to organize a seminar meeting of young authors and the troops at the level of one or two combined arms, aviation, and navel units [chasti]. This would be in the spirit of the

requirements of the CC CPSU decree on work with creative youth. Armed Forces representatives could become useful participants in the All-Union Commission on Work with Creative Youth, which was so constructively discussed at the 4th Plenum of the USSR Union of Composers.

I think that a requirement now exists to also take a number of steps directed towards seeing that award of the Medal imeni A. V. Aleksandrov, instituted as a mark of creative excellence for creation of the best works on a military-patriotic theme, induces greater activity on the part of composers. The firm commitment for annual awards is not fully justified. It is no secret that a certain number of compositions awarded this medal still have not become popular in the subunits or on the stage.

All this, of course, requires more deep thought. In any event, I am firmly convinced that the struggle for qualitative and quantitative indicators of such a powerful ideological weapon as Soviet song should be conducted actively, in a goal-oriented manner, and consistently.

But we, the ensemble directors, must be the ones primarily concerned about the effectiveness of its use.

I recall an episode which, it seems to me, is very characteristic for the life of military creative collectives. During our last tours within the Red Banner Pacific Fleet, a group of artists was invited to be guests of the sailors in the Guards missile cruiser Varyag. The artists toured the ship and heard about service life among the missileers. Then, the shipboard intercom was turned on and an impromptu concert was held in the wardroom. Among others, the old naval song "Varangian" rang out. This seemed to us very natural aboard the ship bearing that name and the sailors' reaction of open joy was just as natural.

But, it all turned out to be significantly more complex. The political worker passed on to us letters from the sailors. This is what one letter contained and it summed up the ideas found in all of them:

"Thank you, bearers of the Red Banner! We love our ship a great deal but duty aboard her is not easy... And, the fact that you sang that song today for us means that you trust us, trust that we will put forth our every effort to be worthy of the name of the sailors in Varyag. Again, thank you, bearers of the Red Banner!"

If there is one song that hits the target so directly during a concert, it is worth going to the ends of the earth for the sake of such a song.

The Red Banner Ensemble is presenting four new programs for the jubilee dates.

The premiere of the first holiday program was 23 February, the 59th anniversary of the Armed Forces. For many years, we appeared on that day with a program completely composed of new works. Things were somewhat different this year.

We always respond very attentively to letters from listeners and spectators and the flow of these letters comes from all ends of our Motherland. Soldiers, sailors, and officers write, "civilian" friends of military art write, as do veterans. The letters contain a lot of valuable advice and interesting comments and requests. Analyzing them, we decided to put together a program in such a way that it would include, besides new songs and dances (on which the main stress was naturally placed), and compositions written at different times for which we received the most requests. This allowed us to compile a relatively interesting and varied concert which received positive reviews by spectators and critics.

We presented the second premiere in May especially for the 60th anniversary of Great October. We again broke tradition by presenting the new program, not in Moscow, but in the Turkestan and Central Asian Military Districts.

We describe in these programs, by means of vocal and choreographical art, how the modern soldiers of the Armed Forces live, how they assimilate "victory through science," we develop the theme of the daily guidance of the Armed Forces by the Communist Party, the theme of the unity of the Armed Forces and the people. A significant portion of the works is devoted to combat traditions and praises the feats of Red Army soldiers and partisans during the Great Patriotic War. The lofty tasks facing us require a high artistic level in every concert as well.

We never thought, nor do we now think, that the military ensemble has the right, "for the sake of success," to include in its repertoire modish "one-day shots." No serious artist has ever come out or will ever come out against innovation such as that. New times require new intonations, new methodological and compositional approaches. But a deeply creative person, whether composer or performer, seeks new approaches that reflect his views, his concept of life, depends heavily on glorious traditions. The new does not grow in a vacuum, it appears as a result of the development of all musical culture, as a fruit of the organic combination of the national and international. The ideological concept of a composition in many ways tasks writers and performers in a variety of ways. It must be embodied in the form of bright, volitional ways, a straight and convincing conception of the total work. Speaking in the name of the people, we must assimilate the musical language familiar and close to the people. It is in this plane that "Far From Home," the new song so popular among the troops written by E. Kolmanovskiy with lyrics by K. Vanshenkin, interests us so. Written at our request, it was created in close contact with the collective. The song is written in very modern musical language but an old form of folk songs is employed in it.

Since we are talking about the creativity of E. Kolmanovskiy, I must mention another of his songs, "Do the Russians Want War?" with lyrics by Ye. Yevtushenko. Overseas, this composition played and is playing an enormous propaganda role and is very important for the repertoires of military collectives even though our army art long ago passed the frontiers of our Motherland. Not only the Red Banner ensemble, but many district, fleet, and

group of forces ensembles also often and with success present the musical culture of the Country of Soviets in both the socialist and capitalist countries.

What is the secret of success? The force of truth, of this main criterion of Soviet art, the art of socialist realism. We bring the truth about our people, the truth about our structure, about the Soviet way of life. We bring the truth about the Soviet soldier, about the representative of the most progressive, most humane Armed Forces in the world, whose goal is directly opposite that of the rapacious strategy of imperialism: defense of the fortune, freedom, and achievements of those who are building communism.

We talk about ourselves with pride: the Red Banner Ensemble, a collective that is not only artistic but one that is political. This is but a small part of total Soviet art which, as was noted at the 25th CPSU Congress, finds itself "in one of the sharpest sectors of the ideological struggle." Speaking graphically, it stands literally on the seven winds of time -- the social, political, and ideological winds.

These winds have been blowing the sails of the Twice Red Banner Soviet Army Song and Dance Ensemble imeni A. V. Aleksandrov, one of the art subunits of our glorious Armed Forces, for just short of five decades. We have many hundreds of thousands of kilometers of tours behind us, having often appeared in all military districts, groups of forces, and fleets. During the Great Patriotic War alone, we gave 1,500 concerts, a large share directly with the operational forces. The Motherland's high honors, the Honorary Revolutionary Red Banner of the USSR VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee], the Order of the Red Banner and Red Star, speak of how highly the role of the ensemble in the patriotic and aesthetic indoctrination of troops, pre-draft youth, and our country's workers is evaluated.

The Red Banner Ensemble, just like all our military creative collectives, is fully equipped to greet the 60th anniversary of the Great October socialist revolution, is ready to mark as well the glorious jubilee of the Soviet Armed Forces. The great tasks assigned us will be fulfilled on time, just as is expected of our soldiers and officers, and in full creative return, just as is expected of artists. For this is our life, our inspiration, our creativity, our humanitarian and political duty.

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INDOCTRINATION GUIDE FOR SIGNIFICANCE OF VICTORY IN GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

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[Article by Maj Gen V. Ryabov: "The World-Historic Victory of the Soviet People and Their Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Excerpts] Lessons on this theme are designed to assist the troops in understanding the basic stages of the historic struggle of the Soviet people and their troops against the fascist occupiers, more deeply comprehending the world-historic significance of our victory in the Great Patriotic War and the guiding role of the Communist Party in winning this victory, and realizing the necessity for high vigilance and continual combat readiness under contemporary conditions.

Fourteen hours are allocated to this theme. The recommended breakdown is 4 hours of lecture (description), 4 hours for independent study, and 6 hours for seminar (discussion).

Sticking to this time breakdown, it is advisable to structure the lessons in the following manner. First, use a 2-hour lecture to cover points one through three, organize independent study of this material, then hold the first two seminar lessons. Then, lecture on points four and five, organize independent study of this material, and follow with the third seminar lesson.

It is advisable to develop the following points /in the lecture (description)/

1. Goals and character of the Great Patriotic War. Measures taken by the Communist Party to mobilize all the country's forces to repulse the enemy.
2. The strategic defense of the Soviet Army. Rout of the fascist troops at Moscow. Failure of the Hitlerite plan of "blitzkrieg" war.
3. Struggle of the Communist Party and Soviet people for a fundamental turning point in the war. The military-political significance of our troop's victories at Stalingrad and Kursk.
4. The victorious conclusion of the war. The great liberation mission of the Soviet Armed Forces. The decisive role of the USSR in the rout of Hitlerite Germany and militaristic Japan.
5. World-historical significance and sources of the victory of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War. The CPSU -- organizer and inspirer of victory.

At the outset of the lecture (description), the propagandist draws the students' attention to the fact that the theme being studied is closely linked to today and is of great indoctrinational significance. It is important to emphasize that the lessons are underway in those notable days of preparation for the glorious jubilee of October, of the national struggle to bring the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress to fruition.

The CC CPSU decree "On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution" vividly expresses the results of the struggle of the party and the people and the basic stages of the glorious path travelled by our country during the past decades. This was a difficult, but at the same time heroic, path. Many times the imperialists tried by force to destroy the Soviet state born by October, but they suffered defeat on every occasion. The entire saga of the struggle against the enemies of socialism confirmed V. I. Lenin's conclusion that a revolution can consolidate its victory only if it is capable of defending itself.

The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 is one of the vital ages in the history of our Motherland. The question of the life or death of the Soviet state, the fate not only of the Soviet people but of all the peoples of the world was decided in this war. The flames of gigantic battles, the likes of which the world had never seen, raged across the enormous expanses of Europe for almost 4 years. The struggle against the fascist occupiers required enormous efforts and great sacrifices.

As stated in the aforementioned decree: "In the longest, bitterest war in our Motherland's history, the Soviet people accomplished a feat unequalled in mankind's history. They succeeded not only in upholding their freedom and independence, but also made the decisive contribution towards the salvation of European and world civilization from destruction by the fascist barbarians."

More than 30 years have passed since that war ended and, with each passing year, we more fully understand the enormity of the victory over fascism achieved by the Soviet people under the guidance of our glorious Communist Party. This victory has had the profoundest effect upon the entire history of mankind.

The propagandist notes the enormous significance of the combat traditions of our Armed Forces. The party and government, comrade L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CC CPSU, personally express great concern over immortalization of the feats of the heroes of the past war, provide an example of a respectful attitude towards war veterans, the defenders of the Motherland. A new manifestation of this is awarding the honorary title of "Hero City" to Tula. Leonid Il'ich, in his speech on the occasion of the award of the "Gold Star" to the city, rating highly the heroic feats of the Soviet people during the war said: "The lessons of the past war appeal to our vigilance. Yes, fascism has been defeated. But, fascists and pro-fascist regimes still exist. Some persons still dream about revenge. Aggressive forces exist which are anything but inactive. We must not forget that."

The propagandist switches to elaboration of the main points of the theme.

1. Goals and Character of the Great Patriotic War.
Measures Taken by the Communist Party to Mobilize All the
Country's Forces to Repulse the Enemy

Developing the first point, the propagandist reminds the audience of the complex international situation on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. The flames of World War II, unleashed by German fascism and Japanese militarism with the connivance of the imperialists of the USA, England, and France, raged in Europe and Asia. Having enslaved by 1941 the peoples of many European countries, the Hitlerites considerably strengthened their military-economic might and approached the western borders of the USSR on a broad front. The Country of Soviets remained the main obstacle for Hitlerite Germany in its quest for world domination.

2. The Strategic Defense of the Soviet Army. Rout of
the Fascist Troops at Moscow. Failure of
the Hitlerite Plan of "Blitzkrieg" War

The propagandist recalls that the start of the war was extremely unfavorable for Soviet troops. The misfortunes of the Red Army at the start of the war were primarily caused by the surprise of the enemy attack. The Hitlerites employed temporary advantages: militarization of the economy and of all life in Germany; lengthy preparation for a war of conquest and know-how from military operations in the west; superiority in weapons and troops which were concentrated ahead of time in the border zones. They had at their disposal the economic and military resources of almost all of Western Europe. Hitlerite Germany captured in the countries of Europe the entire arsenal of weapons, enormous reserves of metal, strategic war materials, and metallurgical and military plants. The Soviet Union had to go one-on-one with a colossal military machine.

The historic victory in the Battle of Moscow signalled the start of the war's turning point. The enemy plan of "blitzkrieg war" was completely smashed and the myth of the "invincibility" of the fascist army was dashed. Hitlerite losses in men and weapons were significant. Prolonged war awaited the aggressor.

3. Struggle of the Communist Party and Soviet People
For a Fundamental Turning Point in the War. The
Military-Political Significance of Our
Troops' Victories at Stalingrad and Kursk

In spite of the fact that the German-fascist occupiers suffered a great defeat at Moscow, their forces were still considerable. England and the USA did not keep their promise to open a second front in Europe in 1942. This allowed the Fascist leadership to transfer all new divisions to the east. By the summer of 1942, the enemy enjoyed overall superiority in combat forces. By May, the enemy had 217 divisions opposite our front, this rising to 266

by November. But, just as in 1941, the Hitlerites still could not go on the offensive along the entire front. They concentrated their main forces on the southern wing, with the goal being possession of the oil-rich Caucasus, as well as the regions of the Don, Lower Volga, and the Kuban', all important in the strategic and economic sense.

The main events of the summer and fall of 1942, the Battle of Stalingrad and battles beyond the Caucasus, preceded cruel battles in a number of sectors of the front (in the Crimea, at Khar'kov) during which our troops suffered serious misfortunes and great losses. The enemy again had the strategic initiative. In June, he opened a powerful offensive in the south and, breaching our defenses, penetrated 150-400 kilometers. Resisting stiffly, our troops withdrew to the east and were forced to give up the eastern regions of the Donbass and the right bank of the Don. In mid-July, the Hitlerites reached the great bend of the Don, creating a real threat of breaking through to the Volga and the Caucasus.

The propagandist then describes one of the greatest battles in the history of the world -- /the Battle of Stalingrad/. It had two phases: defensive (from 17 July to mid-November 1942) and offensive (from 19 Nov through 2 Feb 1943) and continued in overall complexity 6.5 months. More than 2 million men participated on both sides.

Especially fierce battles took place near Novorossiysk. In early February, a landing force of sailors commanded by Ts. L. Kunikov was put ashore at Stanichka, a suburb of Novorossiysk. The brave members of the landing force occupied a small bridgehead. Our command began to build up the forces there and expand the bridgehead. During the 7 months at Malaya Zemlya, the landing force repulsed hundreds of enemy attacks.

The spirit of the defense of Malaya Zemlya was the courageous collective of communists of the 18th Army, headed by the chief of the army political section L. I. Brezhnev. The party-political work conducted on a wide scale throughout the 18th Army insured the high morale of those at Malaya Zemlya.

Malaya Zemlya was an example of courage and heroism on a mass scale. The landing at Stanichka (now called Kunikovka) later played a great role in the liberation of Novorossiysk and in the rout of the enemy troops operating there. Novorossiysk was later awarded the honorary title of "Hero City".

During the spring and summer of 1943, both sides prepared for decisive operations. The main event of this period was the /Battle of Kursk/.

Absence of a second front in Europe and "total" mobilization of the entire male population from 17-50 years old allowed the Hitlerites, along with their satellites, to gather large forces on the eastern front. These forces totalled 232 divisions, more than 5.3 million men. Striving to take the initiative and turn the course of the war to their advantage, the fascist leadership prepared a large offensive against Kursk (Operation Citadel). It pinned its main hopes on the new Tiger and Panther heavy tanks. In the

region of the Kursk Salient (point out on a map), the Germans assembled 50 divisions, including 16 tank and motorized, 900,000 men, 10,000 guns and mortars, almost 2,700 tanks, and a large number of aircraft.

Guessing the enemy's intent, the Supreme High Command decided to break the offensive by means of a stubborn defense, to hammer the enemy groupings, and then go over to a decisive counteroffensive and complete the rout of the enemy. The region of the Kursk Salient was heavily fortified in advance. A powerful grouping of our forces was deployed here -- the Central and Voronezh Fronts numbering 1.3 million men, up to 20,000 guns and mortars, about 3,600 tanks and SAU [self-propelled guns], and more than 3,000 aircraft. The Steppe Front, located to the rear, was the strategic reserve.

The enemy opened the offensive on 5 July and met stiff resistance from our troops. All attempts to break through the defense came to naught. Soviet troops exhibited exceptional steadfastness and bravery in repulsing the fierce enemy attacks. Infantry, artillerymen, tankers, sappers supported by aviators inflicted enormous losses on the Hitlerites. For example, the troops of the 3rd Tank Destroyer Brigade led by Colonel V. N. Rukosuyev excelled as they beat back 20 attacks and destroyed 146 tanks in one 4-day period. In the battle for Prokhorovka on 12 July, 1,200 tanks on both sides clashed. Tankers commanded by Generals M. Ye. Katukov and P. A. Rotmistrov battled the enemy valiantly. Aviators I. N. Kozhedub, A. P. Mares'yev, A. V. Vorozheykin, and others showed a high degree of combat mastery and courage. Senior Lieutenant communist A. K. Gorovets in one aerial battle attacked 20 enemy bombers and shot down nine of them. He is the only aviator in the world to have achieved such a victory in a single battle. He was posthumously awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. Air superiority was completely and finally won by Soviet aviation.

Having beaten the enemy offensive back, our troops went over to a decisive counteroffensive on 12 July 1943 in the Orel direction and on 3 August in the Belgorod-Khar'kov directions. Breaking fierce enemy resistance, Soviet troops liberated Orel and Belgorod on 5 August. The first salute took place in Moscow in honor of this victory. Khar'kov was stormed and liberated on 23 August.

The Battle of Kursk was an outstanding victory for the Soviet Army and was one of the vital stages on the route to our victory in the Great Patriotic War. More than 100,000 participants in this battle were awarded orders and medals and 180 of the bravest were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. Firmly retaining the strategic initiative in their hands, our Armed Forces forced the enemy to go over to the defensive on all fronts. At Kursk, the Hitlerites lost approximately 500,000 men, 1,500 tanks, 3,000 guns, and more than 3,700 aircraft.

Our victory at Kursk was of great international significance and exerted a decisive influence on the course of World War II. It showed the whole world that the Soviet Union could, through its own forces, defeat Fascist Germany and its allies, furthered the powerful rise of the national liberation movement in Europe, and exacerbated the crisis in the fascist block.

For the Soviet rear area, 1943 also was a turning point. That year, our industry produced almost 35,000 aircraft, more than 24,000 tanks and SAU, and about 200,000 guns and mortars. Rear area workers displayed the wonder of labor heroism. At the initiative of workers in Tambov and Saratov, a national movement sprang up in the fall of 1942 to collect resources to arm the Red Army. In 1943, additional tank columns, squadrons, and ships reached the front. Workers, kolkhoz workers, and the intelligentsia dispatched to the front thousands of trains carrying gifts for the defenders of the Motherland.

The international position of the USSR was also favorable. The Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference and the Big Three Conference at Teheran greatly strengthened the anti-Hitler coalition.

4. The Victorious Conclusion of the War. The Great Liberation Mission of the Soviet Armed Forces. The Decisive Role of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Rout of Hitlerite Germany and Militaristic Japan

The propagandist points out on a map the front lines at the beginning of 1944 and underscores that our Armed Forces by that time were very large. They numbered 6.3 million men, in excess of 83,000 guns and mortars, 5,200 tanks and SAU, and 10,200 aircraft. Soviet troops had accumulated valuable combat experience and were distinguished by their high morale. They were replete with decisiveness to liberate their native land and defeat the enemy on his own territory.

The fascist occupiers deployed their smaller but still considerable forces on the Soviet-German Front. They had 4.9 million men, approximately 54,600 guns and mortars, 5,400 tanks and assault guns, and more than 3,000 aircraft. Millions of Soviet citizens, a portion of the Ukraine and Belorussia, all of the Baltic area, Moldavia, and a portion of our North were still under the yoke of the occupiers. The peoples of many European countries were sunk under fascist control. They waited hopefully for the arrival of the liberators in the Soviet Army.

Using a map, the propagandist expounds upon the larger offensive operations of 1944.

The war in Europe ended. The Soviet people celebrated Victory Day with jubilation on 9 May 1945. The historic Victory Parade was held on Red Square in Moscow on June 24th. The medal "For Victory Over Germany in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945," which was awarded to more than 13.5 million Soviet troops, was struck.

The propagandist now turns to a discussion of the defeat of militaristic Japan. By 1945, Japan had enslaved the peoples of many Asian countries, was extremely hostile to the USSR, and conducted war against our allies. The defeat of Germany did not deter the Japanese imperialists. They refused to capitulate. A grouping of Japanese troops, the Kwantung Army (in excess of 1 million men), was deployed near the USSR borders in Manchuria and Korea.

The Soviet Union, true to its international obligations, to guarantee the security of its borders, and to provide assistance to the peoples of Asia, declared war on Japan on 8 August 1945 and initiated military operations against her. From our view, this was a just liberation struggle, a component part of the Great Patriotic War. The Kwantung Army was completely routed in 23 days by the 1.5-million man Soviet grouping (the Transbaykal, 1st, and 2d Far East Fronts) in coordination with the Pacific Fleet and the Amur Flotilla, plus the Mongolian Peoples' Revolutionary Army. Northeastern China, North Korea, Southern Sakhalin, and the Kurile Islands were liberated from Japanese occupiers and millions of Chinese and Koreans received their freedom. For courage and combat mastery, 87 soldiers who participated in the campaign were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union and 308,000 others received USSR orders and medals.

World War II ended with the complete and devastating defeat of the aggressors. This world-historic victory was achieved by the joint efforts of freedom-loving peoples. The Soviet people value and appreciate the contribution to the struggle against the common enemy made by the peoples and the armed forces of England, the USA, France, and our other allies in the anti-Hitler coalition. However, the bulk of the struggle fell to the Soviet people and their Armed Forces, who played the main, decisive role in the rout of Fascist Germany and militaristic Japan.

As the CC CPSU decree "On the 30th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945" notes: "Our country became the main force which blocked the path of German Fascism to world domination, took upon its shoulders the bulk of the war, and played the decisive role in the rout of Hitlerite Germany, and subsequently militaristic Japan as well."

Falsifiers of history cannot downplay the fact that the Soviet-German Front was the main, decisive front in the struggle against the fascist occupiers. For almost 4 years, the main mass of Fascist Germany's forces and means were deployed on the Soviet-German Front. From 190 to 270 of the most combat ready divisions from the fascist block operated simultaneously opposite Soviet troops. At the same time, from 9 to 20 divisions faced the Anglo-American troops in North Africa in 1941-1943, from 7 to 26 in Italy in 1943-1945, and, after June 1944, from 56 to 75 divisions faced them in Western Europe.

The main forces of the fascist block, 607 divisions, were routed and captured on the Soviet-German front, while the allies routed and captured 176 divisions during the entire course of the war. The German Fascist armies lost 10 million men in the war against the USSR, 80 percent of their losses. Soviet troops destroyed and captured more than 75 percent of the enemy guns and combat equipment. This is what predetermined the collapse of Hitlerite Germany.

During the war years, Western leaders often stressed the decisive role played by the USSR and its Armed Forces in smashing the fascist hordes.

Thus, U. S. President F. Roosevelt noted in 1942 that "...the Russians are killing more enemy soldiers and destroying more of their weapons than all the remaining 25 governments of the United Nations combined." In 1944, W. Churchill wrote: "...It is this same Russian Army that squeezed the guts out of the German war machine..." The dirty attempts of modern falsifiers to downgrade the role of the USSR in the achievement of victory have been dashed.

5. World-Historical Significance and Sources of the Victory
of the Soviet People and Their Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War.
The CPSU -- Organizer and Inspirer of Victory

Developing the content of this section, the propagandist stresses that the main conclusion drawn from the Great Patriotic War is that the Soviet people and their Armed Forces, guided by the Communist Party, were the victors in that war. The forces of socialism and progress won a victory over the murky forces of reaction and fascism, over the shock detachment of international imperialism. The Soviet people not only defended their socialist Motherland but also aided the peoples of the world in escaping from the enslaver's yoke. They achieved a feat which will never die.

The lessons of the war teach that no forces exist in the world that can break down the might of the Soviet state, deprive the peoples of the USSR of their freedom and independence, stem the course of history's development. The forces of socialism stood the severest tests of the war, strengthened themselves even more, and expanded. A world socialist system was formed, the international communist and workers' movement reached unheard-of heights, and acceleration of the world revolutionary process occurred. The national liberation movement grew to an enormous scale, the colonial system of imperialism came crashing down, and dozens of independent states were formed where there formerly were colonies. Imperialism's position weakened and its sphere of rule was sharply reduced.

The propagandist reminds the students of the sources of the Soviet peoples' victory was completely natural and its most fundamental sources are to be found in the socio-political, economic, and ideological advantages that form the very nature of the socialist structure.

"The victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War convincingly showed the vitality and invincibility of the world's first socialist state. It was the triumph of the new social and state structure born by October, the socialist economy, the Marxist-Leninist ideology, the moral-political unity of Soviet society, the unbreakable friendship of the peoples of the USSR. The chief creators of this victory were the Soviet people who performed a feat never equalled in history." The aforementioned CC CPSU decree described the victory in that way.

Our victory in the war is a victory of the socialist economy. We created a powerful economic base during the prewar years. However, Hitlerite Germany, at that time having enslaved almost all of Europe, exceeded us in the volume

of industrial production by a factor of 1.5-2. But, thanks to the superiority of our structure, the labor heroism of the working class, and the organizing role of the CPSU, we were able during the course of the war to outproduce Germany in guns and combat equipment by a factor of 2, not to mention that our products were of better quality. From 1 Jul 1941 through 1 Sep 1945, we produced 134,100 aircraft, 102,800 tanks and SAU, and 825,200 guns and mortars. The kolkhoz structure survived the severe tests of war. Between 1941-1944, the country received 4.3 billion poods of grain. Our transportation carried an enormous burden. The Soviet people provided the front with everything required and accepted all deprivations and sacrifices. Their voluntary contributions to construction of combat equipment exceeded 100 billion rubles. More than 16 million workers were awarded the "For Valiant Labor During the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945" medal.

Our valiant Armed Forces won a victory over a powerful and ruthless enemy. They were superior to the vaunted Hitlerite army in organization, technical equipment, and military art. The moral superiority of the Soviet troops over the enemy was immeasurable. The socialist structure and the Soviet people provided herculean force to our Armed Forces. The main source of their power is the leadership of the party of the great Lenin. It was this that insured their continual improvement during the war, improved weapons, the growth in combat mastery, strengthening of discipline, the stability of troop morale. The combat ranks of the Motherland's defenders were cemented by communists and Komsomol members. There were five communists per every 100 soldiers during the Civil War, but this ratio became 13 per hundred at the start of the Great Patriotic War and reached 25 communists and 20 Komsomol members per 100 soldiers at the end of the war.

The lesson director points up the harmonious development and close cooperation during the war of all the services of the Armed Forces and the branches of troops, the worthy contribution of each to achievement of victory over the enemy. He emphasizes the superiority of Soviet military art, the services and talent of the commanders and military leaders who were indoctrinated by the party.

The lessons of the past war and historic experience teach vigilance and constant readiness to defend the conquests of October. Although the possibility of aggressive actions by imperialism are now considerably fragmented, the nature of imperialism remains unchanged. That is why strictly fulfilling the Leninist behests on defense of the socialist Fatherland, to be always on guard, to improve military skills, strengthen discipline, and increase vigilance and combat readiness -- these are the sacred duty of Soviet troops.

During the hours of independent study, students study V. I. Lenin's works "Speech at the General Workers and Red Army Conference in the Rogozhsko-Simonovskiy Region, 13 May 1920" (Complete Collected Works, Vol 41, pp 120-121) and "To the Workers and Red Army Soldiers of Petrograd" (Complete Collection of Works, Vol 39, pp 230-231); Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress (Politizdat, 1976, pp 75-76, 79, 83); L. I. Brezhnev's speech at the grand meeting in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses dedicated to the 30th anniversary

of the victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War (PRAVDA, 1975, 9 May); textbook "On Guard of the Motherland" (Voyenizdat, 1974, Chap IV).

It is useful to set up meetings with war veterans, visits to museums and rooms of combat glory, view the epic film "Liberation," feature films "Ballad of a Soldier," "Two Soldiers," "Private Aleksandr Matrosov," "Officers," "Hot Snow," and others, plus filmstrips such as "The World-Historic Victory of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War," and "Be Worthy of our Fathers' Glory."

Visual aids such as a political map of the world, the "Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945" map, and the album "Armed Forces of the USSR on Guard over the Conquests of Socialism", Voyenizdat, 1976, pages 6-14 should be used during the lessons.

The following points should be discussed /at the seminar lessons/.

/First/ lesson: 1. Goals and character of the Great Patriotic War. Measures taken by the Communist Party to mobilize all the country's forces to repulse the enemy. 2. Mass-scale heroism of the Soviet troops. Thwarting the Hitlerite plan of "blitzkrieg war." The historic Battle of Moscow.

/Second/ lesson: 1. Struggle of the Communist Party to create conditions for a fundamental turning point in the war. National assistance to the front. 2. Rout of the fascist troops at Stalingrad and in the Caucasus. 3. The military-political significance of the Soviet victory at Kursk and on the Dnepr.

/Third/ lesson: 1. Victorious Soviet Army offensive in 1944. Complete expulsion of the enemy from Soviet land. 2. Great liberation mission of the Soviet Armed Forces. Decisive role of the USSR in the rout of Hitlerite Germany and militaristic Japan. 3. World-historic significance and sources of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War. The CPSU -- organizer and inspirer of victory.

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