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TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

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OFFICER'S EXPULSION FROM CPSU DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 May 77 p 2

[Article by Col A. Kozlov, party commission secretary, Political Directorate, Southern Group of Forces: "Fruits of Compromise"]

[Text] The members of the party commission did not notice that 3 hours had passed. They all realized that a matter of great importance to a certain person was being decided. In addition, we were so well acquainted with the facts of the case that we could definitely say: party punishment will be exactly what he deserves. However, the members of the party commission of the group of forces political directorate did not hasten with their conclusions, but endeavored to elucidate whether Capt M. Valiullin, who had submitted the appeal, was deeply cognizant of his errors and just how sincere he was. In the meantime he had been readily explaining the reasons for his actions, "objective" reasons for the most part, while when we demonstrated the bankruptcy of his arguments with cold, hard facts, he energetically repented.

The officer's conduct left with us a feeling of dissatisfaction and annoyance. We rejected his appeal against the decision of the political agency party commission which had expelled Makhmut Miniakhmetovich Valiullin from the CPSU. We even felt some embarrassment for this person who was making such a great effort to wriggle out of his own responsibility and to whitewash his conduct. We had this feeling that even his repentance was nothing but a maneuver he was being forced to make. We involuntarily began to pursue the question: how did he become what he now is? After all, he had lived for many years in a communist milieu, in a party group. Could the moral countenance of their fellow serviceman really have remained a secret?

M. Valiullin came to our group of forces as a lieutenant right out of communications school. He did not show any extraordinary abilities in his occupational specialty, nor can one always expect that of an officer just beginning his independent path -- everything lies ahead. One thing, he did show versatility. This trait was not unnoted and, when one of the subunits needed a deputy commander for materiel support, the lieutenant's candidacy raised no objections. He definitely had a flair for management. The

facility was under construction at that time, and the young officer proved highly effective, "acquiring" materials and finding the appropriate specialists. It is true that sometimes this "securement" went somewhat beyond the bounds of generally accepted relations between client and executing agency, but some of his superiors shut their eyes to these violations of ethical standards: construction on the facility was proceeding on schedule....

As time passed the lieutenant gained the reputation of being an indispensable specialist who can obtain anything and would deliver it on schedule. Years passed, and his reputation as a manager grew; new stars were added to his shoulder boards. He himself became transformed. A kindly attitude toward his fellow soldiers was replaced by a superior attitude and impatience with them. More and more frequently he lacked the tactfulness to hear his interlocutor out and to use persuasion if the latter was mistaken. His procedure was much simpler: he would rudely cut him off, demeaning the comrade and subordinate.

Awareness of personal superiority over others was frequently encouraged by alcohol fumes. Things became progressively worse with time. Becoming involved in machinations connected with obtaining a personally-owned automobile, he neglected his work, for which he bore professional responsibility. He kept supply records carelessly, and audits revealed some items short and others in greater quantity than records indicated. In short, the captain was becoming a poor worker. For the sake of fairness we must state that he did receive official reprimands for these deficiencies. We cannot very well say how many disciplinary punishments he received due to his negligence: one of his service cards mysteriously disappeared.

How did the communists and the party organization, of which Valiullin was a member, respond to all this? Things begin to get a bit puzzling at this point. It so happens that the deputy commander for materiel support had a reputation in the unit of being omnipotent, a person with "protection." While performing increasingly more poorly, he did nothing to dispel this view; on the contrary, he sought to reinforce it, hinting that he could ruin a person's career if he chose.... In actual fact he of course had no "protection" whatsoever. It was something else altogether. It was complacency on the part of some of his superiors, who by force of inertia considered the captain to be indispensable. On this basis they even granted him various indulgences. He took skillful advantage of this latter circumstance. See, he would say, what weight I carry!

The situation was complicated by the fact that the former party organization secretary felt he could not openly raise the question of this party member's unworthy conduct. It seems that the secretary was at personal odds with Valiullin, and the secretary believed that people might think that he was merely settling personal accounts. Nor did the unit's deputy commander for political affairs display party principledness. Lt V. Martynyuk, a young political worker, came to the subunit with only a year

of experience following graduation from service school. Little-experienced in such matters, he was unable to stand up under Valiullin's devastating assertiveness and sometimes outright cunning. It is true that at first he appealed to the political agency for help. They replied: "Influence, indoctrinate, rely more boldly on the party organization." His senior comrades had stated it correctly. But at the same time they failed to take a real look at the state of affairs in this party collective.

In the prevailing situation the young political worker did not dare openly condemn the "artistry" of Valiullin, nor did he dare place before the other party members the facts about his unworthy conduct, which disgraced the lofty title of party member.

Valiullin decided to enter a service academy, and for this he needed a party fitness report. "We should give him what he deserves!" acting secretary Lieutenant Martynyuk thought to himself, but he suppressed this desire and took the path of compromise with his own conscience. The actual report went as follows: "During the time he has been a member of this party organization, from October 1973 up to the present time, he has done a good job. He performs his party duties conscientiously...." Then Martynyuk thought for a moment, and added: "One deficiency is rudeness toward his subordinates and equals. Assuming he corrects these shortcomings, the party organization recommends CPSU member Comrade M. M. Valiullin for enrollment in the Rear Services and Transport Academy." The other party members approved the fitness report -- without looking each other in the eye. "Valiullin is arrogant. He should not have been given a favorable report. We know his defects, but we did not want to correct his party biography. We figured, let him go," acknowledged Warrant Officer V. Nikitin, explaining why he and his comrades had unanimously voted in favor of such a nonobjective fitness report.

Thus the communists themselves, like it or not, promoted the further development of their fellow soldier's already far-advanced sickness.

The denouement came unexpectedly. For some reason Captain Valiullin changed his mind about enrolling at the academy. He probably figured that the timid recommendations in the fitness report pertaining to correcting shortcomings might alert more highly-principled people. But he had miscalculated; there turned out to be highly-principled individuals in his unit as well. The former subunit commander -- a mild individual who was indulgent toward the escapades of his deputy commander for materiel support, was discharged into the reserves. A new commanding officer arrived, who was truly party-principled. He was not intimidated by the hints of some fearful subordinates about certain "higher-ups" who were allegedly protecting the captain. The commanding officer demanded of him a proper job and behavior worthy of an officer and communist. Observing his commanding officer, Lieutenant Martynyuk also became bolder. In addition, at that time the party organization was headed by a genuinely high-principled individual. Together they finally declared loudly in unison: there has been enough deception around here; it is high time to answer for one's deeds. They duly informed the captain of this. To no avail, however. Subsequently he happened to arrive at the

barracks somewhat inebriated and insulted the duty officer. He finally became the subject of a party organization censure meeting. But even now, we must confess, some of the comrades still were hesitant about coming out publicly and stating their opinion about the misdeeds of their fellow party member.

Perhaps herein is expressed the greatest detriment done to indoctrination of the party organization communists by the cowardice and lack of principles of its officials and the lip-service attitude shown by the political agency personnel. They should be particularly reproached. If they had responded in a timely manner, and as they should have, to the request of the young political worker, things would not have gone so far. And they would not have been forced to take what now were inevitable steps -- to expel a person from the party.

3024

CSO: 1801

SUMMER COMBAT TRAINING TASKS AND METHODS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 May 77 p 1

[Editorial: "Highly Effective Summer Training"]

[Text] The men of the Army and Navy are now proceeding to implement the programs and schedules of the summer training period. During this time, which is favorable for intensive training, they will be performing complex and responsible tasks. Each hour and each minute will be particularly valuable. To utilize them with maximum effect means to mark the jubilee year with a further improvement in the qualitative indices of military labor.

Personnel are entering the summer training period enriched with the experience of the first months of the training year. Winter training was productive. Extensively engaging in socialist competition to perform the tasks assigned the Armed Forces by the 25th CPSU Congress and to honor the 60th anniversary of the Great October Revolution, Soviet fighting men have constructed a solid base for further improving field, air and sea combat proficiency and are resolved to reach new high points in strengthening troop combat readiness. Those regiments and naval ships which initiated socialist competition in the Armed Forces branches constitute an example of efficiency and persistence in meeting training schedules and fulfilling pledges.

Achievements in military labor are greater wherever one approaches organization of the training process in an innovative manner, constructing it on the foundation of advanced methods, creating at drills and exercises a situation approximating actual combat, and where socialist competition has become an inseparable part of training and indoctrination. This is persuasively indicated by the excellent winter training results achieved by many subunits, units, and naval ships.

The quality of the training process, however, has not always corresponded to actual demands. Some subunits on inspection have failed to demonstrate preparedness for swift and skillful actions, particularly at night and under

Conditions of "aggressor" employment of nuclear weapons. Not all tactical and special tactical exercises yet display originality of plans and emphasis on full utilization of the combat capabilities of the new equipment and weapons and employment of techniques and modes of waging combat which are not standard and which take the adversary by surprise. Meriting greater attention are problems of organization of the meeting engagement, coordinated action among subunits of the various arms and services. It is important in each and every unit and on each and every naval ship to draw object lessons from the results of winter training, to make the necessary adjustments in the training process, and to correct deficiencies as quickly as possible.

The summer of this jubilee year will be a busy season for military personnel. Intensely packed with tactical exercises, missile firing drills, practical bombing exercises, and long cruises, it will become a great school of military skill and the forming of excellent moral-fighting qualities in personnel. Subunits will be compelled to operate in diversified tactical situations, to solve suddenly-arising problems, and will learn to defeat a powerful opponent armed with sophisticated equipment. Tactics, equipment, fire; a comprehensive approach to performing the tasks of field, air and sea proficiency training; emphasis on high-quality results -- the entire process of summer training should be characterized by the above.

Heightened demands are imposed on the professional preparedness of officers, their breadth of tactical knowledge, military technical knowledge, and methods skills. Some military districts and combined units unwarrantedly emphasize large-scale measures in the system of commander training. Many times they fail to attain their goal. Considerable benefit is derived from flexible forms of training, staff drills, utilization of all possibilities for individual work with officers. It is necessary to work persistently to develop in commanders the ability to control combat in a complex situation, fully to utilize the firepower, mobility and striking force of the subunit, unit, and naval ship, to organize coordinated action intelligently, and to reach decisions displaying initiative.

A special concern of commanders and staffs is improvement in the methods skills of personnel directing training classes and drills. The inability of some officers correctly to train their subordinates and effectively to utilize training facilities and modern simulators in particular, frequently becomes the principal reason for the inadequate degree of training of subunits and their failure to meet pledges in competition.

Securement of a precise rhythm in the training process and highly effective training is a task which is inseparably linked with strengthening discipline and organization, with establishment of strict procedures according to regulations and a high degree of efficiency at each echelon in the army and navy organism. It is essential from the very first days of summer training to campaign vigorously against signs of slackness, violations of the daily routine and schedules of training activities; it is important to prevent losses of training time and distraction of personnel from training drills.

A high pace of summer training is inconceivable without utilizing the powerful mobilizing force of socialist competition. It is important consistently to implement the Leninist principles of its organization and to increase the responsibility of each for carrying out adopted pledges. It is the duty of the commander to create at training drills and exercises an atmosphere of competition, to focus the energies of one's subordinates toward high-quality performance on each training topic and item. Hit the target with the first round, burst, missile, expertly operate complex equipment, surpass established performance standards -- personnel should go out to each and every training drill with these patriotic aspirations.

Combat training cannot be effective without well-organized party political work. Profound in content and diversified in form, its purpose is to ensure maximum activeness of personnel on the gunnery range and tank practice area, at airfields and at sea -- wherever combat training is in progress. Exerting influence on all categories of military personnel and penetrating deeply in all aspects of the activities of military collectives, party and Komsomol organizations should focus their efforts on accomplishing the main tasks of the jubilee year. Communists are called upon to display an example of a self-critical, demanding appraisal of achievements, to teach all personnel to view them as a point in forward movement, a springboard for assaulting new heights in combat improvement.

Soviet fighting men are proceeding with summer combat training with a feeling of great responsibility to the party and people for the security of the socialist homeland. Each and every officer, warrant officer, petty officer, sergeant, and enlisted man will make every effort to honor the 60th anniversary of the Great October Revolution with new achievements in military labor.

3024
CSO: 1801

TANK COMPANY NIGHT FIRING TRAINING RESULTS CRITICIZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 May 77 p 1

[Article by Col R. Dukov: "Fire and Tactics"]

[Text] Sr Lt V. Shnut, sheltering the map against the abrupt wind gusts, proceeded to mark the situation on it. The company had been advancing all day and now, toward evening, had reached another position in the "aggressor" defense.

Penetration of defense during hours of darkness always means additional difficulties and risk. But it is also more difficult for the "aggressor" to repel an attack at night. In this situation he will scarcely succeed in effectively utilizing his antitank weapons, of which he possesses large numbers, according to intelligence. This fact was of great importance to the tank crews, penetrating the defense without motorized riflemen.

Are the crews prepared to make the night their ally? They are, decided Senior Lieutenant Shnut and scheduled the attack precisely at midnight.

An artillery bombardment served as a signal to shift to the attack. In the defended area shellbursts described fiery orange plumes. This was a critical moment. While the "aggressor" was pinned down by artillery fire, it was necessary to close swiftly and stun him with the element of surprise.

But actual events developed differently. The tanks advanced slowly and cautiously. And not because of the rain-sodden ground. The company commander felt that a slow rate of advance was advantageous.

"I wanted to study the 'aggressor' more thoroughly," he later explained his actions. But he failed to realize that the "aggressor" would be delivering aimed fire on the attacking force during all this time. The commander was guided by the desire to hit as many targets as possible.

The tanks did not increase their rate of advance even after penetrating the first defensive position. The reason was the same: the desire to hit as many targets as possible.

Encountering a swampy area, a tank on the left flank came to a stop. A few minutes later another tank on that flank was also out of action. There was now an acute need to adjust fire: some of the "aggressor" anti-tank weapons on the flank were not receiving fire. Senior Lieutenant Shnut, however, did not amend instructions to his crews, for otherwise it would have been necessary to fire at considerable angles to the target. He preferred expending ammunition on knocking out targets on the assault frontage: hits would be certain.

I suddenly recalled something said by one of the officers in giving the company commander "instructions" prior to the attack: "Remember that first they count the holes in the plywood and only after that begin talking about tactics."

Following the exercise the target inspector indeed assiduously recorded the number of destroyed targets. The percentage of destroyed targets ensured the highest mark in gunnery. The company received only satisfactory as an overall mark for the exercise.

I later talked with the regimental commander, who was unhappy with the mark. Could the subunit have done better, did it possess the requisite potential? Unquestionably it did. Senior Lieutenant Shnut, in spite of his youth, is a well-trained commander who possesses a breadth of tactical knowledge. A number of other observed exercises convinced us that he possesses the ability to control his subunit and delivery of fire in the dynamics of combat. At the exercise in question he was done a disservice by a profoundly faulty attitude: a hole in a target is a concrete, visible thing; it must be the prime object of concern, with tactics secondary.

At this exercise the "holes" in the targets did not save the situation. But not all exercise evaluators are as high-principled.

The effectiveness of an exercise involving live fire is determined in large measure by the character of the presented target situation. It should reflect the picture the men will encounter in actual combat. It is very important to combine targets with various obstacles and barriers, doing away with a straight-forward movement in the attack.

The position of the exercise director is quite important. He can always complicate the situation in the requisite area by adding data received from various sources.

A tactical exercise with the company under the command of Sr Lt P. Portnov left a good impression. The exercise director did an excellent job. Here are some high points of the exercise, attesting to his methods skills.

The company shifted to the attack, and the first group of targets appeared. Suddenly "landmines" began exploding in front of the motorized riflemen, who were preparing to fire. Confusion set in for a second. In the meantime the targets were withdrawn.

The attacking troops had just opened fire on a second group of targets when several smoke grenades burst downwind, and a cloud of smoke rose along the line of riflemen.

At the next position a ravine and an area of barbed-wire entanglements forced the company commander to send one of the platoons around the obstacle. The motorized riflemen advanced approximately 6 kilometers, continuously shifting their combat formation and adjusting fire, before the situation enabled them to shift to pursuit of the "aggressor" on infantry combat vehicles.

In spite of the complexity of the conditions, the company hit a large number of targets. They hit the targets while performing just as one can and must perform in combat, and this is the main point.

Sometimes they say: initially tactics, and then fire. This is wrong. There are no known modes of waging combat without delivering fire for effect. On the other hand, even a subunit which is expert in delivering fire will find itself in a most difficult predicament if tactical miscalculations are made in organizing for combat.

I recall an incident in the Great Patriotic War. Our battalion had taken the town of Zmiyevka. The neighboring unit on the left had fallen behind. Our flank was exposed. The fascists discovered this fact. They brought their reserve up secretly to a point of terrain to the left of Zmiyevka and prepared to counterattack. Scouts spotted the enemy just as we were moving out. The situation was critical. The battalion commander made a bold decision. One of the platoons, taking advantage of terrain irregularities, went into prone position, while the rest of the subunits continued moving, offering the enemy a tantalizingly exposed flank. As soon as the Germans began their attack, they were hit hard in the flank by the platoon which had remained in ambush. An engagement which, as they said at the time, was of "local significance" became a model of organic relationship between fire and tactics.

...The summer training period is beginning. Soon the topics to be covered in the first tactical exercises -- the highest form of combat training -- will be entered in the schedules of the companies and batteries. The quality of these exercises will determine to a decisive degree the level of field performance proficiency of the subunits and their meeting of socialist pledges in honor of the 60th anniversary of the Great October Revolution.

3024

CSO: 1801

PARTY WORK IN THE FAR-EASTERN MILITARY DISTRICT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 May 77 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen M. Druzhinin, member of the military council, chief of the political directorate of the Red-Banner Far-Eastern Military District: "Lofty Duty of the Communist"]

[Excerpt] The success of any military collective is always a victory of the organizing talents of the officers in charge, their volition, pedagogic and professional skills. It is one of the central tasks of party organizations to indoctrinate such leaders.

Let us examine as an example the performance of the party bureau of the artillery regiment where Maj V. Gladkiy serves as secretary. At the present time they are engaged in painstaking, persistent work aimed at confirming the title of excellent regiment, in the year of the 60th anniversary of the Great October Revolution, for the third time in a row. The goal is very ambitious. But it is entirely within the capabilities of this collective, because it is a characteristic trait of the communists of this unit not to be satisfied with what has been achieved, as well as the ability to concentrate efforts on the main areas, on unresolved problems. These problems include concern about young commanders.

More than a year ago the communists noted at a party meeting that while the artillery battalions are close to one another in the principal indices, the gap between the batteries occupying first and last place in the competition was too great. Some time later young communist officers were appointed commanders of the lagging batteries. They included Lt V. Krylov.

Inspired by the confidence and seeking to bring up the lagging subunit as quickly as possible, the lieutenant spent both days and nights in the battery. No matter how he tried, however, there were no changes for the better. Then Maj V. Gladkiy, party members Lt Yu. Ponomarev and Capt G. Martynets, at the request of the party bureau, examined how the young battery commander was leading his men, and to what extent he was relying on Komsomol. It turned out that Lt V. Krylov was committing a mistake which was

quite common among officers of little experience -- he was trying to do everything himself. The commanders of the fire platoon, pushed back from performing their duties by an excessively active battery commander, were working entirely on their own. They in turn were ignoring their sergeants. The role of Komsomol activists, agitators and combat leaflet editors was depreciated. While they were still noticeable in the barracks, this was not the case at the firing range, in the gunnery training area and in the practice area. The result was that Lt V. Krylov was working alone with his endeavor to boost the subunit's performance standards.

The party bureau members, the secretary and regimental commander opened this communist's eyes to his mistakes. The young officer drew appropriate lessons from this comradely criticism. Things improved, although not to the extent which had been hoped. Therefore the party bureau had two additional meetings with the officer. Krylov's work style improved month by month.

The party activists paid equally close attention to all young commanders. In the regiments they began to hold open party meetings, at which problems of the development of recent graduates of service schools were discussed. Frequently prior to the meeting competition winner officers would be honored. This procedure made a strong impression on those present. Recognition by the group was the most exciting reward for a young officer.

It was finally Lt V. Krylov's turn for such an event. He had worked hard and brought the formerly-lagging battery up to a performance level of excellent. Equal success was achieved by another young battery commander, Lt N. Malakhov. Party groups were operating in these subunits by this time -- a consequence of a growth in party ranks with the addition of the finest young officers.

Thus with the aid of party activists the regimental command brought two young battery commanders up to a leading performance position. Of course nobody did their job for them. They did everything for themselves, under the supervision of experienced officers. Now Sr Lts V. Krylov (he received an early rank promotion) and N. Malakhov are capable of effectively conducting political and military indoctrination of their men, with excellent quality. Characteristic of both is demandingness on themselves and on others, firmness and tactfulness in dealing with others, and the ability to assess the achieved level critically and objectively. A high feeling of responsibility for the assigned task in the final analysis is formed of all this.

And yet something else is also encountered at times: inertness, coolness toward performance of one's duties, and sometimes a personal lack of discipline on the part of some lieutenants and young commanders. One begins to look into the matter and becomes convinced that an ardor-dampening desire for peace and quiet appears wherever in party organizations there is depreciation of a feeling of responsibility for everything taking place in a unit, where in working with young officers one relies primarily on

remonstration and reproach. Life never forgives such a neglectful attitude toward indoctrination of leaders of military collectives.

Here is what happened, for example, in the motorized rifle regiment where Capt V. Lopatkin serves as party committee secretary. Some time back this unit was considered one of the best in the district. The motorized riflemen had achieved fine results in combat and political training through persistent labor. But a new party committee secretary was elected. There was also a turnover in party committee personnel, and there were also new staff officers. The former links between commanding officer and party committee, party committee and subunits gradually began to weaken. There was failure to note the fact that commander training classes with officers began to be held less regularly. Nor did the party committee take warning when certain party members began to speak with alarm at meetings about the fact that some officers were losing their professional skills. Young commanders, encountering difficulties, were no longer turning to their senior comrades for assistance. Externally this seemed to be the collective that it had been, but the invisible virus of complacency and sometimes indifference as well had already penetrated deep into its organism. Then came the thunderclap. An inspection determined that the regiment had not met its pledges.

Recently the district military council discussed the responsibility of veteran personnel for the indoctrination and training of their younger colleagues. The point under discussion was a comprehensive approach to working with graduates of service schools, particularly with officers at the company level. A good deal of factual material was synthesized. It was noted that for the most part higher-echelon personnel show deep party interest in and responsibility for the professional development of the young commanders and political workers. Party committees and party bureaus focus attention on this problem daily. However, many facts were also cited which indicated that some superiors still rarely get together with young officers in an informal situation and do not take a comradely interest in how their subordinates are developing. Failing to be well acquainted with the men, they are hasty both in promotion and in removal from position, forgetting that the first steps in a new career do not immediately begin with major success, and that sometimes a setback which appears to be trivial causes considerable inner suffering in a young commander.

Who if not one's superior should show understanding and patience, demandingness and tact? For it is true that in order to instill efficiency it is necessary to be closer to an officer. It is necessary to create conditions which would help form in a young commander methods and organizer abilities. The party organization plays an important role in creating such an atmosphere.

Speaking at the 16th Congress of the USSR Trade Unions, L. I. Brezhnev noted that the present stage of development of the Soviet Union imposes on all of us the greatest responsibility and prompts each of us to impose higher demands on ourselves and our work, to make a worthy contribution toward accomplishment of the tasks assigned by the party.

One of the most important aspects of this responsibility is the responsibility of the senior comrade for his subordinate, for the development and growth of the young officer. This high sense of duty is akin to that which during the war years prompted the Communist leader always to bear others in mind. It compelled him to go to them, to work with them, and if necessary to arouse them to attack, inspiring them to victory through word and personal example. To show concern for young people in a party manner is one of the outstanding socialist traditions engendered by the Great October Revolution.

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CSO: 1801

DEFENSE MINISTRY FURNITURE FACTORY WORK METHODS AND RESULTS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 May 77 p 2

[Article by Col (Res) V. Arkhipov: "For the Soldier's Home"]

[Excerpts] This modest enterprise has its nook within the vast enterprises of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Officially it is called the industrial combine of the Housing Operation Directorate of the Kiev Military District. In actual fact it is a furniture factory, which manufactures many of the customary items in the barracks.

Barracks are barracks. The entire way of life in the barracks is subordinated to the interests of military service, combat training and combat readiness. Therefore barracks furniture differs sharply from furniture in one's home. They call the barracks quite aptly, however, the soldier's home. And just as any home, it should be comfortable for those who live there, it should be clean and bright, warm and cozy. Yes, cozy; let us not be embarrassed to use this word. The furniture combine helps military units and service schools create warmth in the soldier's home.

At one's very first acquaintance with the people in this combine one learns that many have been here a long time. Valentin Andreyevich Ponomarev, for example, has served as director for 17 years now.

At the combine they do not wait for somebody else to come up with improved furniture. They design the pieces themselves, and always with an eye to those for whom the furniture is to be used. Will it be comfortable, attractive, and how will it fit into the barracks interior scheme? The combine recently designed a new wardrobe for cadet parade uniforms. They fabricated samples and took them to the service school where the wardrobe was to be employed. They obtained comments and suggestions, incorporated changes into the design, and only then did they put the wardrobe into production.

The military man needs the most diversified furniture, and various demands are placed on this furniture. When hotels order desks, chairs, and wardrobes,

elegance and comfort are the most important criteria. The officers' clubs and other clubs which the combine supplies with armchairs are concerned with comfort and beauty. Headquarters and classrooms at service schools need veneer-top desks, while in other cases a good coat of paint is sufficient. In addition to comfort, strength and durability are the main criteria in describing the features of desks and chairs designed for Lenin rooms and military classrooms.

Concern with strength and durability, however, does not mean that one ignores attractive appearance. Many readers undoubtedly remember the ponderous stools of indeterminate color found in the barracks of the 1930's. They survived the war and served long into the postwar period. The Kiev Combine also makes a stool, perhaps not as steel-sturdy, but comfortable and attractive in appearance.

The quality of the product in the final analysis is determined by the production workers, who adopt improved equipment and utilize it skillfully. At one time the combine produced prefab panel buildings and employed framer-carpenters for this operation. When the enterprise changed its production profile, the framers were retrained into cabinetmakers. Today as well the people on the work force are learning, mastering new machine tools and equipment. Many are enrolled as correspondence students at higher educational institutions and secondary technical schools.

There is good reason for mentioning bonuses. Rising together with labor productivity are earnings, more than one third of which constitute bonuses for overfulfilling the target and for excellent quality.

The factory's work force is also vitally interested in production efficiency. Five apartment buildings have been built, a sixth, 9-story unit is being started, and a children's facility is under construction, financed by profit contributions. In 9 years the combine's workers have received more than 300 apartment units! It is not so easy, however, to generate profit. Furniture quality is improving, but the wholesale factory price remains unchanged. Wholesale prices on lumber have risen. Under these conditions it would seem that production costs must rise. But they are steadily declining.

The combine is constantly seeking new reserve potential to reduce production costs. Take the following example. In the past a loaded freight car carried 130 tables. They decided to make the tables so they could be taken down. The customers liked this innovation. Now a loaded freight car carries 800 tables.

The manufacture of furniture inevitably results in large quantities of scraps of wood, veneer, and plastic. What should be done with this waste? They contacted the Young Technician stores and began making various laths, planks and poles for Pioneers. Scraps of veneer were used to make tags. Scrap began to be used to press out slabs, producing good-quality desk lids.

Last year 28,800 rubles worth of various products were produced from scrap, with 5,500 rubles net profit. That is not a bad sum for this combine. But how can numbers measure the joy of the tens of thousands of young technicians who are receiving materials from the combine for their interesting projects!

The combine also has unresolved problems. Most of them involve interruptions in supply. Only 37 percent of the required quantity of polishing cloth was allocated this year, and without it it is difficult to obtain an ideally smooth surface. The combine receives plywood and veneer from six suppliers, although it would be better to deal only with two or three. Then it would perhaps be easier to convince them that army furniture is an important product and that its manufacture requires plywood and veneer in conformity with State Standards.

There are many difficulties, but it is not their habit to refer to them when meeting targets and pledges. Respect for one's word is instilled in the combine work force. Last year the furniture makers pledged to turn out 50,000 rubles worth of above-target production. They actually over-target produced by 76,000 rubles without increasing the work force. Preparing to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Great October Revolution, the combine pledged even higher figures. The results of the first month indicate that they also will be overfulfilled. New consignments of attractive furniture will be providing warmth and comfort in barracks, service schools and clubs.

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SHORTCOMINGS NOTED IN MILITARY SCHOOL INDOCTRINATION TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 May 77 p 1

[Editorial: "Firm Skills of Indoctrinators for Students and Cadets"]

[Text] Each year all branches of the Armed Forces receive replacement manpower in the form of graduates of service academies and schools. From their very first days of service in military units and on naval ships, yesterday's students and cadets assume full responsibility for the combat readiness of their subunits and crews, for training and indoctrination of personnel. The overwhelming majority of graduates of military training establishments successfully accomplish these important and responsible tasks. Comments received from line units give high praise, for example, to the level of knowledge and ability to indoctrinate subordinates, as well as the professional and political qualities of graduates of the Ul'yanovsk Guards Higher Tank Command School imeni V. I. Lenin and the Leningrad Higher Combined-Arms Command School imeni S. M. Kirov.

Similar responses are received by other military educational institutions. There still occur, however, some cases attesting to the fact that some graduates of service academies and schools lack the ability to indoctrinate personnel. At times young officers do not fully realize, for example, that military discipline in the Soviet Armed Forces is grounded on awareness by each and every serviceman of his military duty and personal responsibility for defending the homeland. In conducting indoctrinational work with subordinates, some individuals count primarily on stern disciplinary punishment and substitute rudeness for genuine demandingness. It still occurs, albeit rarely, that young officers misuse the authorities granted them by military regulations, fail to see the difference between commander volition and willfulness, while sometimes displaying spinelessness and undue familiarity with their subordinates.

The experience of leading military training establishments indicates that the skills of organization and conduct of indoctrinational work are formed in students and cadets in the course of the entire training process. This

demands a high ideological and methodological level of teaching of all disciplines, particularly the social sciences. Greater attention should be devoted to a thorough study of psychology, military education science, and development in the future indoctrinators of the ability innovatively to apply in a practical manner various forms, methods and means of influencing personnel.

The course in party political work plays an important role in forming in students and cadets the ability to indoctrinate subordinates. When organizing classes in this subject, one should work hard to achieve a further improvement in the ideological thrust of lectures and seminars, seeking to ensure that they promote the acquisition of solid practical skills in planning and organization of party political work and engender the inner need for active participation in the civic affairs of the military collective and a strong desire to assist in every way the consolidation of the collective on the basis of proper relationships between military personnel and standards of communist morality.

Party and Komsomol organizations should render considerable assistance to the administration and political agencies at military training establishments in accomplishing these important tasks. It is necessary to work more vigorously to involve students and cadets in publicizing the resolutions of the 25th CPSU Congress, the October (1976) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, and the points and conclusions from speeches by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. In the year of the 60th anniversary of the Great October Revolution, in preparing to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the USSR Armed Forces, Communists and Komsomol members can present numerous reports and speeches at enterprises, general-curriculum schools, secondary technical schools, higher educational institutions, sovkhoses and kolkhozes. The experience of the Military Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin, the Novosibirsk Higher Military-Political Combined-Arms School and other military training establishments indicates that by participating actively in military-patriotic and mass defense activities, students and cadets acquire practical skills which in the future help them correctly indoctrinate their subordinates.

Of great importance in the development of an officer as an indoctrinator is skilled, comprehensively-planned organization of tours of duty in line units and on naval ships. In the course of daily classes, exercises and drills, training flights and naval cruises, students and cadets are placed into specific conditions of conduct of indoctrination work with personnel, learn to coordinate its main areas with the tasks being performed at the given moment, get their hand on the pulse of the military collective, and receive the opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of various indoctrination methods. Therefore the correct thing is being done at those military training establishments where performance tasks for the period of tour of duty in units, in addition to items specifying improvement of military and specialized knowledge, include points requiring probation-duty personnel to take active part in political indoctrination measures. It is essential

that students and cadets on a tour of duty in line units be watched continuously by commanders and political workers, receiving from the latter practical assistance in acquiring firm skills of organization and conduct of indoctrination work with personnel and learning disciplinary practices.

One of the most effective means of indoctrinating subordinates is the personal example of the commander, political worker, engineer, and technician. Therefore at all stages of training high demands should be imposed on students and cadets in all matters connected with mastery of training material, service, the forming of excellent political, moral-fighting qualities, and broadening of one's cultural horizons. The administration, political sections, teaching faculty, party and Komsomol organizations at military training establishments must be concerned not only with training highly-skilled specialists but also comprehensively developed officer-leaders who enjoy authority and respect, who will become for their men an example of meeting the requirements of the military oath and military regulations, and an example of industriousness, cool collectedness, and purposefulness in carrying out one's military duty. Only this kind of officer is capable of genuinely unifying a military collective and making it a genuine school of life, a school of indoctrination.

Today's students and cadets will tomorrow become commanders of subunits, units, naval ships, political workers, staff officers and officers of support services. Each and every one will be performing responsible tasks connected with further strengthening the defense capability of the socialist homeland, increasing the combat readiness of units and naval ships, training and indoctrination of personnel. It is the important duty of military training establishments to make every effort to prepare them to carry out these complex and honorable duties.

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SOCIALIST COMPETITION SHORTCOMINGS IN MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 May 77 p 2

[Article by Col S. Tomchuk: "Optimism... on Paper"]

[Text] As we know, meeting of socialist pledges by the men of military subunits depends in large measure on how actively unit staff officers participate in the competition. Hence there is a broad area of activity for headquarters party organizations: working in close contact with the commander, it is their job to encourage communists to take active part in socialist competition. This of course is not a new idea. But it needs to be reiterated.

Fairly recently I visited a motorized rifle regiment where Maj M. Berkovich was the chief of one of the services. He also serves as secretary of the headquarters party organization. Major Berkovich gave the following reply to my question on how competition was proceeding among headquarters party members: "Fine."

As proof he pointed to a neatly-stacked pile of sheets of paper containing the individual pledges of all regiment staff and headquarters officers. He then pointed to a nicely-prepared diagram, which also indicated the pledges made by party members for the period of a command-staff exercise.

At first glance everything seemed in order. But it became clear following a thorough study of these documents that all the pledges were as alike as two drops of water. Suffice it to say that almost all officers resolve to receive nothing worse than a grade of 4 in tactical and weapon training as well as other disciplines. These neatly-stacked papers indicated not competition but complacency. Nobody was very concerned by the fact that there was not a single specialist 2d or 1st class among the regiment staff and headquarters communists. Even officers P. Martynyuk and A. Pushkarev, who possess considerable experience, not to mention entirely adequate training in theory, have been wearing for quite a few years now badges carrying the number 3. Other party members as well have failed to advance very far along the path of improving military skills. Why are they resting on their laurels?

In part because, we must state quite frankly, there has been a lip-service approach here to organization of competition among headquarters communists: lists of "competitors" would be typed up in advance, these lists would be handed out to the officers at a conference, and that would be the end of it. Judging from all indications, this "optimism on paper" suited the party bureau just fine.

Naturally this is no easy matter -- genuinely to assist a commanding officer in organizing competition among his staff officers. It requires a certain amount of analytical work, expenditure of time and energy, as well as certain skills. It is necessary thoroughly to study people's capabilities and to specify clear, concrete goals. It is necessary to specify stages of competition, to arrange for verification and regular totaling of results. It is necessary to elaborate forms of moral incentive which are effective for competitors of this level. It is necessary to determine objective evaluation criteria in such a complex area as innovative attitude toward one's job, display of an innovative approach to organization of the training and indoctrination process in the subunits, etc. In short, there are many concerns and complexities. And this at times instills in headquarters party organization activists a disinclination to penetrate deeply into the state of affairs. Hence the lip-service approach.

The same applies to the party bureau headed by Maj M. Berkovich. During the entire winter training period it failed to take essentially any measures in order to get the officers genuinely involved in competition and to assist the regimental commander in developing initiative among those who themselves should be actively fostering this process in the subunits. Although all now agree that the arsenal of the headquarters party organization contains many work forms and means of influence with the aid of which competition among officers could have been activated, all this remains unutilized.

We have many party organizations which skillfully assist the commanding officer in increasing the effectiveness of officer competition. They include the headquarters party organization where Maj I. Geziyatov serves as secretary. For the fourth year now the men of the unit have earned the right to the designation excellent. Of course this involves a substantial contribution by headquarters communists. They initiate and pioneer useful undertakings, themselves take active part in competition, and help organize it in the subunits. Majs Yu. Khryuchikov and V. Kuz'minykh as well as Capt A. Zaplechnyy, for example, have done much to promote such remarkable patriotic initiatives on the part of their men as mastery of several adjacent occupational specialties, driving vehicles at increased speeds, hitting targets with the first round fired, and night gunnery with daylight performance standards.

Party bureau members direct the innovative activeness of headquarters communists toward prompt and full meeting of personal pledges, but they always mandatorily consider who is working on improving the training process in the subunits and how this is being done. All this appears in personal pledges of each officer, garbed in concrete indices. The party bureau

frequently receives reports from party members on how they are meeting their pledges, how they are increasing their military skills, mastering advanced work methods and adopting new elements in training of personnel.

This example graphically demonstrates what additional capabilities are opened up by well-organized competition among staff officers and how it helps develop initiative among communists, and innovativeness in finding new ways to increase the effectiveness and improve the quality of combat training. In the summer training period precisely these tasks will require even greater effort on the part of party organizations. It will be very difficult to accomplish them without active participation by staff officers in socialist competition.

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CSO: 1801

TRAINING RESULTS IN REPAIR AND REBUILD BATTALION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 May 77 p 1

[Article by Engr-Maj V. Moshnin, commanding officer of a repair and rebuild battalion: "Important Element of Combat Readiness"]

[Text] For the maintenance personnel of our subunits the winter training period was a time of hard work and tireless search for new reserve potential for increasing combat readiness.

The repair and rebuild battalion is an important element in the complex military organism. Its mission in combat is to put damaged equipment and weapons back into operation. It also performs in peacetime difficult tasks connected with equipment repair. The knowledge and skills required of repair personnel are just as solid and thorough as those required of the men of any other occupational specialty. At training drills we seek to create a situation approximating actual combat, assign repair personnel unexpected tasks, and require that they be performed in a minimum amount of time.

The results of the winter training period and the first phase of socialist competition in honor of the 60th anniversary of the Great October Revolution suggest that battalion personnel have worked well. Under both base and field conditions all specialists are performing confidently and knowledgeably. They did a particularly fine job at the special tactical exercise which concluded the winter training period. A fine job was done by the mechanics, fitters, arc and gas welders, forge shop personnel, and lathe operators. Capt V. Gurdus's men, for example, met their target quota by double. Many of the men substantially reduced equipment repair time and saved considerable motor fuel and electricity. The battalion now contains more men with an excellent mark in training as well as high-rating specialists. All this places us in a good position entering the summer training period, which in this subunit has begun in an organized manner. Every man realizes that in the summer it will be necessary to work even harder.

Appraising what has been achieved with the measure of combat, one can also clearly see deficiencies and unutilized reserve potential. We must frankly admit that there are some men in the battalion who have not yet learned to work effectively in a combat situation. Some officers and warrant officers are not fully familiar with their duties. The fact is that there is plenty to be accomplished by the battalion command, party and Komsomol organizations. We see as one of our tasks improvement in the effectiveness of competition between individual specialists and subunits.

On the eve of the summer training period we made adjustments in the group pledges and helped the men draw up personal performance targets. They are aimed at more fully revealing the capabilities of each specialist. We revised some grading indices.

In the past, for example, no individual could be assigned the blame for delay in performance of a given operation or for insufficiently high quality of work -- everybody was "guilty." The labor of the specialists and the deficiencies as well were depersonalized. Now we stress more precise organization of competition on tasks and performance standards. Each specialist is responsible for a specific operation, and his performance is monitored more closely. We already possess experience in organizing things in this way. At the first drills in the summer training period it was tested and approved in the company under the command of Lt V. Vityugov. Well organized competition on tasks and performance standards enabled the subunit greatly to overfulfill the day's assignment. Its results are a fine point of reference for all.

Having begun summer training, we also see considerable reserve potential in improving the quality of facilities. A major contribution toward facilities improvement was made by our efficiency innovators: Warrant Officer N. Shevtsov, holder of the Order of the Red Banner of Labor, Warrant Officer M. Zakolesnik, and many others. They designed and built a stand for breaking in tank gearboxes and gear trains. They are presently putting the finishing touches on an electrical equipment test stand. It has been calculated that testing and adjustment of a single stabilizer with a test stand will reduce by severalfold the time required to repair a combat vehicle. In short, innovative activeness, initiative and enthusiasm on the part of the men are producing excellent results and promoting combat readiness.

However, as long as we are discussing training facilities and support of the training process in general in repair subunits, I must voice some complaint. They frequently forget about us. Repair personnel receive almost no training equipment through central channels. The situation has not changed at this stage of training. We must teach the men with the aid of models, diagrams and other primitively-fabricated devices. One cannot help but envy the commanding officers of other subunits who have at their disposal the most advanced automated and remote-control equipment as well as effective simulators. We have also long been waiting for a training film on advanced methods of repair and rebuild operations.

Organization of the training process in repair subunits, just as in any other support subunits, is by no means a secondary area. If the repair of a given piece of equipment is delayed due to inadequate performance capabilities of specialist personnel, this will immediately affect the quality of performance in a line company. The time required to effect repairs is even of greater importance in a combat situation. The performance capabilities of all subunits, regardless of their function, should be equally high. This is why we feel that the higher echelon should devote greater attention to combat training and competition of repair personnel and give them the required assistance.

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COMMAND TRAINING OF YOUNG OFFICERS IN MISSILE BATTALION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 May 77 p 2

[Article by Col L. Linnik: "School at the 'Site'"]

[Text] The battalion was proceeding to the missile range. A scenario change was received, and the column was forced to halt. And yet the time schedule was tight. Battalion commander Lt Col L. Paleyev realized that now even the slightest delay was undesirable. What should be done? He reached a decision: the majority of his men, acting in conformity with the scenario, would remain at that spot, while a group headed by guidance officer Sr Lt A. Terekhov would proceed to the missile range at full speed.

The higher-echelon staff officer accompanying the battalion column agreed with this decision. But at the same time he wondered whether the lieutenant would be able to handle the situation if the crew would have to fire missiles.

Lieutenant Colonel Paleyev, however, had full confidence in Senior Lieutenant Terekhov, to whose indoctrination and training he had devoted so much effort. And the guidance officer justified this confidence. The missile personnel took their fire position and prepared for combat. The appearance of a target in the overcast sky did not take them by surprise. They hit the target with the first missile. In the final analysis the entire battalion did an excellent job. Lieutenant Colonel Paleyev himself once more confirmed his reputation as one of the best commanders in the unit, a top expert in indoctrination and training.

Officer Terekhov came directly from service school to the small garrison on the high, rocky shore, pummeled heavily by the surf. He looked around and was pleased: autumn-gilded, sharp-peaked hills, groves of darkened-bark birches, and the dark-blue surface of the sea -- plenty of open spaces! But he was less enthusiastic upon meeting the battalion commander. He learned from his conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Paleyev that he, Terekhov, must start training hard immediately, as if he had not just graduated from service school. Within a week or two the commanding officer sternly pointed Terekhov's attention to the fact that he was avoiding working with the men....

Initially the young officer did not attach particular importance to the comments made about him. He decided that the commanding officer would be paying "close attention" to him only at first, since he was a newcomer. Therefore very little changed in his attitude toward his men. As before, Terekhov endeavored at the first opportunity to get off by himself in the radar shack.

But the harder Terekhov tried to avoid indoctrination of subordinates, the more frequently he found himself compelled to give a talk or prepare a draft resolution for a Komsomol meeting. In short, Lieutenant Colonel Paleyev made things so that assignments and direct instructions from his superiors came one after the other. At first Terekhov carried them out without any particular enthusiasm. He experienced the joy of inspiration only in the radar shack. But gradually he began to develop a liking for working with others, for indoctrinating his men. He gave particularly serious thought to these matters following a discussion with his commanding officer, who had emphasized: "You are not always going to be only with equipment. You are a future commander. What kind of a commander can one be without the ability to work with others?"

Paleyev had in the past encountered other lieutenants who were primarily interested in the equipment and avoided indoctrination work with their subordinates, because they lacked appropriate experience and skills. They had to be taught the art of indoctrination patiently and persistently.

The colonel lavished both time and energy on Terekhov. The lieutenant was made leader of a political instruction group. Frequently Paleyev would attend his classes. He would sit there in silence, as if addressing his own thoughts, but he missed nothing. Terekhov found this out as soon as the two of them were alone: the commanding officer had noted every good and bad point.

Soon Anatoliy Terekhov was accepted as a probationary member of the CPSU. In their recommendation the Komsomol members emphasized that he was one of the finest members of the Komsomol committee. Lieutenant Colonel Paleyev commented at the meeting: "Terekhov is a proficient specialist and a competent methods specialist."

During those years when Paleyev was in command of the battalion, a great many commanders and excellent specialists developed at the "site." They are Paleyev's pride and joy: officers develop, acquire experience, and subsequently are promoted. Capt S. Vasilevich, Maj P. Mukhin.... A slight sense of sorrow now begins to be added to his joy over Senior Lieutenant Terekhov. Soon he too would have to receive a recommendation for promotion and would leave the "site." That is life in the military. Experienced experts are replaced by lieutenants, and everything begins all over again, but on a higher foundation -- for Lieutenant Colonel Paleyev himself also acquires greater experience and know-how.

On the day Lts V. Machigin and V. Lyutrov arrived at the "site," they already knew that the battalion had maintained an excellent rating for a number of years, that recently the missile crews had returned from the gunnery range, where the crew under the command of party member Senior Lieutenant Terekhov had done an excellent job. They realized immediately that they were fortunate to serve in a unit with such fine traditions.

The battalion commander helped the lieutenants draw up a familiarization schedule. Now they knew when they would be tested to see if they were ready to stand alert duty without supervision and when they would be testing for specialist 2d class. From the very first day they worked hard and persistently to master the skill of training and indoctrinating subordinates.

Machigin and Lyutrov progressed on schedule. Lyutrov was in a happy mood, caused by the awareness that things were going well. Machigin, on the other hand, frequently was dissatisfied with himself, although he was progressing as well as if not better. Machigin sought a maximum result in all things, including work with his men.

This pleased Lieutenant Colonel Paleyev. But there was something in Machigin's work style and conduct which caused the battalion commander to take warning. Endeavoring to achieve the stated goal faster, Machigin sometimes failed to take into consideration the individual features of his men. At times, failing to study thoroughly the circumstances of a minor violation, he was inclined to mete out the severest punishment. He turned to the battalion commander to give him greater "authority." At this point a detailed discussion on the topic of indoctrination was initiated. This was repeated every time the lieutenant committed a pedagogic error.

The battalion commander's lessons were very useful to Machigin. They opened his eyes to many things and helped him make adjustments in his work style.

Finally the time came when Lieutenant Colonel Paleyev bade farewell to Terekhov, who had been promoted in rank and assigned to a new and more important job. The commanding officer was joined by Lieutenants Machigin and Lyutrov in seeing Terekhov off. Paleyev was pleased with them. Machigin had done much to improve the smoothness of his missile crew. Lieutenant Lyutrov was preparing to take the test for 1st class.

Recently tactical drills were again held, reminiscent in their complexity to the memorable gunnery range test. In the welter of urgent matters and concerns, Lieutenant Colonel Paleyev found the time and opportunity to check the performance of Machigin and Lyutrov. Time and again the thought came to him that they were somewhat reminiscent of the departed Terekhov -- in their businesslike way, their energetic nature and their endeavor to perform the training mission in the best possible way. This discovery filled his heart with pride. But a bit of sorrow was mixed in: the time

would come when he would be saying good-bye to these officers, matured and enriched with knowledge and experience, and they would depart for a new life and new jobs. It is not surprising that the battalion is called a school of commander maturity for young officers.

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CSO: 1801

MILITARY SCIENTIFIC SOCIETY ACTIVITIES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 May 77 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen (Ret) M. Burtsev: "Disseminators of Combat Experience: 20th Anniversary of the Military Scientific Society at the Central House of the Soviet Army imeni M. V. Frunze"]

[Text] The first primary units of the military scientific society date from the harsh civil war times, when the young army of the world's first socialist nation was waging a savage struggle with the enemies of the revolution. Artillery was still booming on the Perekop, and fighting was still in progress on other fronts, but the necessity had already arisen to analyze the experience gained in battle and to focus military theory on solving vital problems of military organizational development under the new conditions.

The first military scientific study groups in the Soviet Army appeared at the end of 1920. Within a very short time military scientific societies began drawing into their activities large numbers of command and political cadres, while in 1923 they began to extend their influence to reserve command personnel and higher educational institutions. Dissemination of military knowledge among the civilian population was stepped up. The first national-level conference at which the tasks of the military scientific societies was discussed was held in Moscow in 1925. A report on their role in the system of national defense was delivered by M. V. Frunze. The principal duties of the military scientific societies were also formulated at that time.

Following the Great Patriotic War voluntary military scientific societies began to be established at officers' clubs. Twenty years ago a military scientific society was established at the Central House of the Soviet Army imeni M. V. Frunze. Members included reserve and retired officers, general officers and flag officers, representatives of military science, experts from the various branches of the Armed Forces, experienced political workers, engineers, and inventors. Army and navy veterans share their wealth of

experience, amassed during their years of service in the army and navy, knowledge and methods skills with the younger generation.

Today the Military Scientific Society at the Central House of the Soviet Army imeni M. V. Frunze has 700 members. They include 25 doctors and 114 candidates of science, 19 Heroes of the Soviet Union, and 5 Heroes of Socialist Labor. They are all veterans of the Great Patriotic War, and many of them also are combat veterans of the civil war.

Sections established for the individual Armed Forces services and arms constitute the center of the society's entire productive activities. Their activities are organized and supervised by the Military Scientific Society Council, through its committees: planning and organization, military science, publishing, and military-patriotic. The sections are directed by Adm (Ret) N. Vinogradov, Lt Gen Avn (Ret) Ye. Beletskiy, Lt Gen Arty (Ret) S. Popov, Maj Gens (Ret) F. Smekhotvorov, M. Smirnov and B. Sokolov; Maj Gen Engr Trps (Ret) F. Savelov, Cols (Ret) F. Mashoshin, G. Nazaryan, and F. Florent'yev. The society's highest body is the council, elected by the society members, with professor Col Gen (Ret) N. Lomov, Doctor of Military Science, serving as chairman, and Capt 1st Rank (Ret) N. Pashigorev as scientific secretary.

The society has to its credit numerous research projects, on the basis of which 320 books have been published (monographs, war memoirs, collected volumes, textbooks, and training manuals), more than 2,400 articles have been published in various periodicals, and a great many scholarly papers have been written. These figures represent a high degree of productive, scientific and sociopolitical activity on the part of a large group of communist veterans.

The following were produced at the initiative and with the participation of society members: a multiple-volume study entitled "Voyna, narod, pobeda" [War, People, Victory], the books "Trudnaya nauka pobezhdat" [The Difficult Science of Winning], "V ogne tankovykh srazheniy" [In the Flame of Tank Battles], "Morskoy flot" [The Navy], "Voyennaya svyaz" [Military Communications], "Na glavnom napravlenii" [On the Main Axis], "Vpered i Berlin" [Ahead Lies Berlin], "Krasnogvardeytsy" [Red Guardsmen], "50 let inzhenernykh voysk" [50th Anniversary of the Engineer Troops], "Stalingradskiy dnevnik" [Stalingrad Diary], "Osvobozhdeniye Sakhalina" [The Liberation of Sakhalin], "VVS v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne" [The Air Force in the Great Patriotic War], and many others. A group-authorship book entitled "Politrabotniki na fronte" [Political Workers at the Front] is ready for publication, and society members participated in preparing materials for the six-volume "Istoriya KPSS" [History of the CPSU], "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945" [History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945], "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II, 1939-1945], and the Soviet Military Encyclopedia.

Actively participating in producing these and other studies were Col Gens (Ret) N. Lomov and A. Pokrovskiy, Col Gen Tank Trps (Ret) M. Solomatin, Lt Gens (Ret) A. Blagonravov and K. Telegin, Maj Gen (Ret) V. Agafonov, Col (Ret) K. Ryanni, Capt 1st Rank (Ret) P. Miroshnichenko, Lt Col (Ret) I. Danishevskiy, Maj (Ret) I. Gavalov, and many other officers, general officers and flag officers.

The subject matter and content of the studies which have been produced attest to the increasing effectiveness of research. Guided by the theory and method of Marxism-Leninism, the authors of research projects analyze the most important problems of military science and combat experience taking into account the demands of the present day. Society members publicize Soviet military science, elaborate problems of military history, and investigate the military theory legacy of V. I. Lenin and the experience of combat operations in defense of the socialist homeland.

In published works and oral propaganda, society members relate to young people how Vladimir Il'ich Lenin and the Communist Party made preparations for the armed insurrection in October 1917, how victory was won in the great battle between the Soviet people and the fascist hordes, on the guiding and directing role of the Communist Party in defeating Nazi Germany and militarist Japan, and in strengthening the defense capability of the world's first worker-peasant state. At the same time they conduct extensive work among the population disseminating military, political and technical knowledge.

Problems of operational art and tactics, views on the role and significance of artillery and missiles in the contemporary war, development and utilization of radar and radio electronic equipment, cartography, military engineering, air defense complexes, military aviation and the navy, the role of man and machine in the war of today, moral-political and psychological training of military personnel, problems of management and control, party political work -- all these things occupy the attention focus of society members. Synthesizing and disseminating the combat experience of the Soviet Armed Forces, they reveal the sources of our victories and expose the aggressive nature of imperialism and fabrications invented by the falsifiers of military history.

The forms of the society's oral propaganda and military-patriotic activities are diversified. The society maintains contacts with regional studies museums, military commissariats, schools and various public organizations. DOSAAF members frequently appear on radio and television and get together with colleagues from the socialist countries. In the last 20 years members of the society have presented approximately 40,000 lectures and reports, have conducted more than 2,000 courage lessons in the schools, and have on numerous occasions visited the military districts and fleets.

The society maintains close contacts with the General Staff Military Scientific Directorate, corresponding central and main directorates of the USSR Ministry of Defense, with military educational institutions, with the

All-Union Znaniye Society, with the Central Museum of the USSR Armed Forces and other organizations. Lectures, reports, seminars, military scientific conferences, productive discussions, get-togethers with military personnel and toilers, as well as consultations -- these are the work forms employed by society members in their activities.

Propaganda and military patriotic work has assumed a particularly large scope in this jubilee year. Guided by the CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution," the society is organizing all ideological-indoctrination work in such a manner as to reveal more deeply and comprehensively the world-historic significance of the October Revolution and the points and conclusions contained in the writings of V. I. Lenin, CPSU documents, in the reports and speeches of CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, in order to indoctrinate our young people in the glorious revolutionary and fighting traditions of the Leninist party, the worker class, the entire Soviet people and their glorious Armed Forces.

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CSO: 1801

MOTORIZED INFANTRY BATTALION COMBAT TRAINING DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 May 77 p 1

[Article by Maj V. Ryazantsev, Order of Lenin Transbaikal Military District: "The Road to the Pass"]

[Text] The sun hung above the horizon for a short time as if it had caught on the jagged caps of the pines at the top of the pass. Battalion commander Capt. A. Kuznetsov looked steadily toward the bright orange hemisphere for several minutes, holding a map in his hand. He seemed to be admiring the brilliantly flaming sunset. But in fact Kuznetsov was completely oblivious to it because he was working out a problem with many unknowns. By morning the battalion had to capture the pass for tactical purposes and hold it until the main forces approached. A night march through the hills would require him to muster all his strength, knowledge, and skill. And although it would be difficult to completely foretell the probable development of events, still everything would have to be anticipated. Most of all he would have to choose a type of movement that would keep the march concealed.

There were two possibilities for advancing toward the target: battalion columns and company columns. In battalion column it is easier to control the subunits and the battalion's firepower, gathered into one central place, can be employed at any moment. After carefully weighing everything the battalion commander nonetheless chose the second variation. He was figuring that the enemy, who had not yet managed to dig in at the assigned line, had begun hurriedly regrouping forces and therefore there was a possibility of meeting them unexpectedly along the way. This would be undesirable in any case. But moving in company columns has its advantages. Even if one of the companies were to be tied up in premature fighting, the other two could follow their own routes and carry out the order.

With this in mind Captain Kuznetsov gave missions to the company commanders and platoon leaders. Soon the gathering dusk had concealed the column of combat vehicles. As planned, each subunit took a different route at the three-way road junction. About an hour later a message was received from Lt V. Shcheglov, commander of the

third company: a reconnaissance patrol had found an enemy strongpoint in its route. It had not been there earlier. This meant that the enemy was using the regrouping to try to cut off the approaches to the pass. If he were successful in this, it would be much harder to accomplish the mission.

Two solutions to this situation suggested themselves: go around the strongpoint or wipe it out with a sudden attack. But neither of them suited the company commander. While reporting the situation to the battalion commander Lieutenant Shcheglov remarked that the terrain on both sides of the rise where the strongpoint stood was swampy and difficult to cross. Rocket launchers, tanks, recoilless guns, and antitank guided missiles had been observed at the strongpoint. So precious time would be lost inevitably, in any plan.

The other two companies were advancing successfully by parallel routes. Captain Kuznetsov took this into account. He ordered Lieutenant Shcheglov to remove the camouflage from his column and direct it along the route which the second company had covered secretly earlier. Soon another report came from Shcheglov: to judge by everything the enemy was moving additional forces over from the pass. Upon hearing this Captain Kuznetsov smiled for the first time in the evening. Events were developing as he had expected. If the enemy came down from the pass he would be met by an ambush, the second company. He gave the corresponding order.

This multistep tactical combination lived up to expectations completely. The second company, commanded by Sr Lt I. Osipenko, let the enemy column pass by and then attacked it by surprise from the flanks and rear, blasting the enemy combat vehicles from point-blank range from cleverly camouflaged positions at the side of the road.

The first company reached the pass right on time. It had met an unexpected obstacle along the way, a ruined bridge over a mountain stream. They had to use several extra kilometers looking for a ford. But the motorized riflemen made up for lost time by increasing their march speed. Soon the other subunits of the battalion rejoined the first company.

At sunrise Captain Kuznetsov reported to the regimental commander that the mission was accomplished. The battalion had taken the pass and was ready to hold it until the main forces approached. Outstanding — that was the score which the battalion received. And having won the title of outstanding in the winter training period, the battalion began its summer training with confidence.

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EMPHASIS ON TIGHTER CONTROL BY MILITARY PARTY COMMITTEES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 May 77 p 2

[Article by Col Ye. Mashkov: "When the Decision Has Been Adopted — Workstyle in the Party Committee"]

[Text] First one communist then another came up to Lt Col-Engr V. Gilyarov, secretary of the party bureau, and asked: "How is fulfillment of our decision going, Vladimir Mikhaylovich; it seems that some comrades are in no hurry. Perhaps help is needed?" The subject of discussion was a decision of the party meeting which defined steps to insure that communists set an example in the competition to celebrate the 60th anniversary of Great October in a worthy fashion. Not much time had passed since the meeting, and communists were worried that there were no tangible results.

In the past we did not often encounter such demonstrations of concern by communists for fulfillment of a decision adopted at a party meeting. Usually it would be the secretary himself who would remind someone of the commission and ask him not to forget that work time was passing.

A year has passed since the 25th CPSU Congress. I remember how we, members of the party committee, gathered at our session and returned once more to the words of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev from the Accountability Report: "Monitoring and checking on performance of decisions that have been adopted is a key part of organizational work. It is the work of every party, Soviet, and economic leader, every party body, and every primary party organization."

We went back because, as the facts showed, some of our decisions were not being fully carried out owing to poor controls. Time would pass and a new decision, in large part a repetition of the first, would be adopted on the same matters. As a result, of course, the work suffered. The men could not help becoming used to the idea that some things did not have to be completely finished because, they would say, we will be coming back to this.

This was probably why at party meetings as soon as the secretary would complete his report on fulfillment of past decisions one of the communists would immediately move to "accept the report." Usually this was where talk stopped. No questions, no proposals. But the decision of the meeting was only partially fulfilled, and additional steps were needed to realize it. But certain people had become accustomed to thinking that the secretary and the party bureau were the ones to take care of such matters, while regular party members could simply "accept reports."

In order to tighten controls the party committee set a goal of holding all those responsible for failure to fulfill decisions strictly accountable. We decided to work toward a situation where the decisions of party meetings, which expressed the collective will of all the communists, would be checked by the communists themselves, by the entire party organization. After all, that is what the party congress demanded.

Party committee members V. Grafskiy, A. Chigrin, and K. Fedotov spent days in the subunits, talked with the men, and studied the minutes of party meetings and bureau sessions. They learned that the decisions most often not fulfilled were ones in which missions were not clearly established and times and performers were not determined. For example, what is this point in a decree worth: "All communists must work hard to improve their technical knowledge."

They wrote it down, then a certain time passed and what do we see? But of course, the officers have improved their technical knowledge! In addition, the members of the party bureau would occasionally invite one of the communists to a session and hear a report on the subject. It seemed that the decision was being fulfilled. But because it was so general and declarative, it was practically impossible to say precisely what had already been done and what remained to be done. It would have been quite different if the decree had stated specifically where communists should set an example, what results they should achieve by a certain time, and precisely which members of the party bureau would organize checks and when. Then there could have been informative discussion of performance of the decision.

We saw something else as well. Even a sound, business-like decision may go unfulfilled if checks on performance are not organically combined with organization of the work and concrete assistance at the site. In their statements members of the party committee admitted that owing to the scarcity of time their assistance to the secretaries of party organizations did not go beyond "advice on the run." It would also happen that a member of the party committee would find deficiencies in the work of the party organization, write them neatly into his notebook, and go to the next session. There he would present the results of his inspection. "What help did you give the secretary?" we asked. "I pointed out his shortcomings to him. As for help, what

could I alone do? Now let's discuss the criticisms, and later we can see what is to be done."

Certainly it would have been easier to figure out the causes of the problem there, in the subunit? But the member of a party committee is inclined to think that monitoring means discovering shortcomings. And it turns out that he is not ready to give help. From this we drew one more important mission: teach the members of the party committee who lack experience in party work how to skillfully organize effective help in the local areas. And this means help from the point of view of party influence, not simply coming and giving orders. I must mention that in this we were supported by our senior officers, the communists A. Ryazhskikh and Ye. Yevstratov. Their recommendations and suggestions were reflected in the training plan for selected party workers which we developed.

We began to give greater attention to improving the forms and methods of monitoring fulfillment of decisions and the obligations of communists. For example, we already made extensive use of reports by communists on specific questions as a form of monitoring. But in some party organizations reports by comrades were events in the life of the collective, containing concrete information and having a real effect on improving the activism and militance of the men, while in others, to be frank, the reports were formalities.

This form is used skillfully in the party organization where communist V. Gilyarov is secretary of the party bureau. They were once discussing the question of increasing the accountability of communists for improving their technical knowledge and thorough study and practical mastery of the combat equipment. The talk at the meeting was lively and excited. A decision was adopted which contained the following point: have a report by officer G. Kichigin, the party group organizer, on preparation of communists to defend technical research papers.

The party bureau did a great deal of preparatory work. During the check on fulfillment of personal plans for technical training by communists it was learned that the time allocated to officers for independent work was not always used productively and that checks on the quality of preparation of talks on technical topics were weak. Before the session of the party bureau the matter was studied in detail and concrete proposals were worked out. This made it possible, immediately after listening to Comrade Kichigin's report, to draw up a plan of steps to assist new specialists in technical improvement and increase the accountability of communist leaders for precise organization of independent study by officers.

Party activists were assigned to check on fulfillment of the plan. This type of monitoring proved very effective. In carrying out the decision of the party meeting each communist knew that his work would be evaluated by his comrades applying high party standards, that they would point out deficiencies and help him overcome difficulties.

We studied the working experience of the party bureau headed by communist Gilyarov. We worked out and disseminated recommendations for the secretaries of other party organizations and party group organizers and held a seminar for them. After that, when progressive know-how had been made the property of all, we expected that the situation would change for the better. But this did not happen right away. Time was needed for the secretaries and party group organizers to become convinced in practice of the usefulness of the know-how accumulated by party bureau secretary Gilyarov. At this stage considerable credit goes to party committee members officers V. Trubnikov and G. Ustimenko who skillfully, without too much guidance, helped party activists introduce useful and advanced ideas in their organizations.

We also recommended that every party organization have a special journal for monitoring fulfillment of decisions. This innovation, it must be admitted, also encountered resistance. Some secretaries of party organizations felt that it would simply make their work more complicated: we already have to make up all kinds of papers, they said, and this is just one more!

This matter was discussed at one of the seminars for exchange of know-how in intraparty work. Communist N. Gabelko came to the defense of the innovation. He convinced those in attendance that keeping such a journal would greatly simplify the work of the party leader and make it possible to keep constant checks on fulfillment of each point of a decision and, in accordance with this, distribute the efforts of communists and plan party activities for the upcoming period.

The participants of the seminar visited a subunit and there Comrade Gabelko, secretary of the party committee, familiarized them with how he keeps the monitoring journal. Seminar members made the necessary notes for themselves. They were convinced that well-organized record-keeping and monitoring of fulfillment of decisions can have a considerable mobilizing and organizing influence on communists, help develop their initiative, and promote high-quality performance of combat and political training missions.

A correct combination of political and organizational work, unity of decision and performance, word and deed — this is a characteristic feature of the activity of our party. Lenin's teachings on monitoring and checking performance are being elaborated in the decisions of party congresses and resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee. Consistent implementation of these decisions is, we believe, an effective means to strengthening the influence of party organizations on the training and life of military collectives.

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COMMENTARY ON WESTERN MINE-LAYING PROCEDURES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 May 77 p 3

[Article by Col I. Osadchenko, candidate of technical sciences: "Mine-Laying at a Distance — Military-Technical Thought Abroad"]

[Text] Minefields, which have shown themselves to be an effective means of combating armored tank and mechanized forces, are becoming even more important in modern warfare, in the opinion of foreign military specialists. At the same time, in view of the highly mobile actions of forces and their saturation with various combat vehicles the requirements for speed in mining an area have increased greatly. Speed requirements have increased so much, it is believed abroad, that large-scale mine-laying in the ground is no longer feasible. Further improvement must follow the other, much faster method of mine-laying — dropping them on the surface of the ground. New means of remote mine-laying from the air have been developed abroad in recent years for precisely this purpose. What are they like?

First of all we should mention the salvo fire systems for firing unguided missiles whose warheads contain cassettes of antitank and anti-infantry mines. In the FRG, for example, there is the 36-barrel Lars launcher with a firing range of 15-18 kilometers. New ammunition for it has now been developed using a cassette warhead containing eight AT-1 antitrack-type antitank mines. The fuse of the mine has a self-liquidator which blows it up after 24 hours. This makes it possible, when necessary, for friendly forces to operate freely on terrain that was mined earlier.

West German specialists are also testing the new AT-2 antitank mine which has a hollow charge. These mines are capable not only of breaking a track but also of piercing the bottom of a tank and wounding the crew. The cassette warhead of the missile will contain five such mines.

According to the press, the Lars launcher can drop 288 AT-1 mines over an area of 300 × 300 meters in 18-20 seconds. A battery of eight Lars launchers can release 2,304 mines in the same period of

time and form a minefield up to 2,500 meters long. Judging by press reports, joint development of such a salvo fire system with firing range of 40-60 kilometers is underway in England, the FRG, and Italy. In addition, the NATO countries are working on shells for antitank and anti-infantry mine launchers using conventional artillery. At the same time, the possibility of using existing tactical missile systems as remote mine-laying means is being reviewed.

In recent years the armies of the leading NATO countries have devoted particular attention to building means of remote mine-laying from the air. For example, the U. S. Army has now adopted the XM 47 helicopter system. It is intended to lay special anti-infantry high-explosive mines which are small fabric envelopes containing an explosive charge (lead azide). The mines are placed in two cassettes suspended from a helicopter. Each of them holds 1,200 mines. The cassettes are loaded at the factory. A few minutes after falling the mine switches from safety to armed position and goes off when pressure is applied to it. With one battle load a helicopter can mine an area up to 1,000 meters long and 200-600 meters deep depending on flight altitude. The XM 47 system was used in combat in Indochina.

The U. S. Army also has the XM 56 helicopter system for laying antitank mines. The cassette in this case is a streamlined container with 40 cylindrical guides, each of which has two antitank mines. When laying mines the lower part of the cassette opens and propelling cartridges fire the mines from the guides in pairs.

The mine itself has an aluminum casing and the shape of a semicylinder. Spring surfaces, stabilizers, are secured to four sides of the flat part of the mine housing. They open in flight, stabilizing the fall of the mine and reducing its velocity. The electromechanical fuse switches to an armed position 1-2 minutes after falling to the ground. The mine goes off when a vehicle strikes it, regardless of its position on the ground. The mine's dimensions are 254 x 114 millimeters and it weighs 2.7 kilograms.

Foreign experts also figure to use tactical aviation for remote mine-laying from the air. In the United States, for example, the Gator and Piranha systems are under development. The cassette warhead of the Gator system will be adaptable for antitank or anti-infantry mines. It is assumed that the mines will be given an aerodynamic shape which causes them to rotate in flight and spread over a large area. The mines will have self-liquidators and anti-lift elements. The Piranha system is designed to knock out armor and tanks crossing water on the bottom or floating. The mines of this system are to be laid in shallow water where it is much harder to detect them than on land.

Concurrently with development of technical means for remote mine-laying foreign military specialists are determining the most advantageous methods of using mine fields in battle. As the journal WEHR UND WIRTSCHAFT remarks, two basic variations are proposed at present. The

first is dropping the field onto the enemy, where mines are suddenly "dropped onto" an area where enemy forces are located. Finding himself in a minefield, the enemy is forced to make breaches, leading to additional losses of manpower and machinery and constricting mobility.

The second variation is laying fields. The point here is to lay a segmented minefield directly in front of tanks (or infantry) or on their route of possible advance. In this case it is easier for forces to carry out a maneuver or make breaches in the minefield than with the first variation. Therefore, it is considered that this kind of mine-laying is most effective when the minefields are reliably covered by artillery and rifle fire. This prevents the enemy from making a breach and forces him to go around the minefields, creating a certain tactical advantage.

In evaluating the prospects of new means of remote mine-laying foreign specialists note that the surprise, large-scale use of explosive mines in all types of battle creates a possibility of seriously restricting the mobility of enemy forces and inflicting significant manpower and machine losses. There is no doubt that the appearance of new procedures and techniques in mine-laying will entail special features in the tactics of waging combat actions by ground forces and will be reflected in the nature of modern battle.

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IMPORTANCE OF MILITARY ENGINEERS STRESSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 May 77 p 1

[Editorial: "The Military Engineer"]

[Text] There are many thousands of engineers working in the army and navy. They are in artillery, missiles, tanks, radar, aviation, atomic submarines, surface ships, communications, and metrology. Each year a new batch of engineers arrives in the units and on ships with diplomas from higher military educational institutions. Steady growth in the number of specialists with higher education in the Armed Forces is dictated by the interests of further strengthening the defensive might of our socialist fatherland and the fact that the army and navy are equipped with the latest weapons and combat equipment.

Our armed forces today have all kinds of missiles with all operating radii, various types of automatic devices, radio electronic equipment, infrared and other instruments, and intricate composite units. This machinery is complex. Only people with broad technical outlooks, outstanding theoretical knowledge, and solid practical skills can master this equipment.

Lt Col-Engr V. Shevchenko, deputy unit commander for aviation engineering, enjoys an excellent reputation among the men. He received the order "For Service to the Homeland in the USSR Armed Forces" 3rd degree for mastering new equipment. Maj-Engr D. Sokolov, a highly qualified specialist and secretary of a primary party organization, also enjoys an excellent reputation. Capt-Lt-Engr Ye. Shil'nikov, commander of a subunit of an atomic missile submarine, artfully combines theoretical erudition with practical resourcefulness and diligence. Many other army and navy officers could be named who carry the title of military engineer with honor.

The engineer has an important and honorable role in the Armed Forces. He is the commander's first helper in solving the full range of questions related to increasing the combat readiness of the unit or ship and training and educating personnel. His duties include organizing preparation and operation of combat equipment and weapons,

maintaining them in constant combat readiness, timely and full performance of scheduled maintenance, and repair jobs and metrological checks, and monitoring strict observance of the instructions and regulations which define rules for the handling of the equipment. The engineer is an enthusiastic, enterprising organizer of invention and efficiency work by fighting men who skillfully orients himself in the development of different branches of science and technology and possesses sophisticated communications and teaching skills.

Many military engineers today are also the direct leaders of military collectives. They are responsible for their subordinates, technicians, mechanics, and junior specialists who perform a whole range of jobs on the machinery and deal with intricate energy and power systems. The professional training of young specialists and the effectiveness and quality of their mastery of weapons and equipment, and the success of combat training depend greatly on the military engineer. To infuse the men with a desire to use each day of combat training effectively and well, to take full advantage of socialist competition, and to bolster military discipline — these are the duties and calling of the engineer-leader.

This variety of functions reflects not only the importance of the engineer's profession but also the enormous responsibility which sits on the shoulders of the engineer of a unit or ship, military construction detachment, repair enterprise, staff division, or scientific laboratory. No matter how great the differences between the spheres of engineer's labor may be there is some main thing that determines the success of the activities of each specialist in this large detachment of military cadres. Life demands that the engineer be able to orient himself in the development of the social sciences, have a profound understanding of the issues of party international and economic policy and solid political knowledge, and be able to anticipate the future of science and technology. The engineer combines ideological conviction and an activist posture in life with a constant striving for the heights of knowledge and professional skill.

The path to the engineering heights begins at the higher educational institution and continues right in the unit or ship, in the military collective where a person gains practical skills, acquires experience, and develops and reinforces in himself party and command qualities and pride in his profession. And if the academy or higher school graduate is to become a mature military specialist he must have the support and attention of the collective and the help of senior and experienced comrades. In this a great deal depends on the actions of commanders, chiefs, political agencies, and party organizations. They should direct their attention to helping engineers master the Leninist workstyle, instilling in them a feeling for new developments, and intolerance of all manifestations of conservatism, and a desire to set a personal example that promotes a further increase in combat readiness.

When speaking of the engineering profession we often use such concepts as "authority," "prestige," and "engineering art." The prestige of a profession is not related only to the popularity and content of a profession, it also refers to a person's love and loyalty in relation to it, the awareness of the importance of what one is doing. Prestige and authority are inconceivable unless one constantly updates knowledge. It is a paramount obligation of the engineer to study military affairs constantly and deeply, make fuller use of all the potential of science and technology, and introduce and propagandize military-technical knowledge and everything new and progressive.

Searching and self-improvement, party responsibility for the assigned work — these are distinguishing characteristics of our leading engineers. Every step in the career of a military engineer should raise the officer to a new stage of professional training. There are many innovative engineers in the Armed Forces who have been singled out for successes in combat and political training and given government awards and military titles (honored inventor and efficiency worker, honored figure of science and technology), as well as many who have defended dissertations. Projects by military engineers have been awarded diplomas and orders of the Exhibition of the Achievements of the USSR National Economy.

While preparing to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution in a worthy manner, like all fighting men of the army and navy the military engineers are laboring heroically and enthusiastically at their posts, taking part in exercises, flights, and sea cruises. They are making a worthy contribution to increasing the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces.

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PROCEDURES FOR AWARDING CLASS RATINGS TO OFFICERS CRITICIZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 May 77 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen V. Zudin, Southern Group of Forces: "When Class Ratings for Officers Are Neglected — The Reader Asks"]

[Text] In recent years the requirements for officer tactical, fire, and military-technical training have risen sharply. The struggle to master the weapons and equipment is today the main item of professional training and socialist competition among officers. That is why the officer's class rating is especially important among the indicators of his level of personal training. But does the class rating have the authority it should have everywhere?

We happened recently to attend a company exercise with field fire. On his chest company commander Sr Lt V. Trapeznikov wore a badge with the number "2," testimony to the officer's maturity, to his possession of the knowledge and skills necessary for an organizer of battle. But the senior lieutenant did not demonstrate excellent command skills at the exercise. I will refer only to the details directly relevant to class rating. In the course of the battle the company commander was afraid to operate communications equipment independently. Every command and target indication he gave was duplicated by a radio operator. There is surely no need to recall that in battle an extra word, a repetition, is a lost second which may be crucially important. Was the officer's ability to use regular communications equipment tested when he was tested for his rating? No, it was not.

I asked Sr Lt V. Trapeznikov who gave him his qualifying examinations. "The regimental commander," the officer answered. But this is the prerogative of higher officials. No authorized commission came to the unit, so they decided to conduct the "event" with their own personnel. The rating was awarded on the basis of a general impression of the officer's work. If a comrade was trying and had not fallen behind he received a second class. The incident at the training ground demonstrated graphically what such formalism ultimately leads to.

In the battalion where Senior Lieutenant Trapeznikov serves the struggle for class ratings is not reflected at all in the individual obligations of many officers. Only after intervention by the senior officer was the gap filled. Battalion commander Lt Col Levagin admitted that he considered class rating a completely personal matter. He did not ordinarily touch on the question of class rating when summarizing competition. And how could he initiate a discussion on the subject when he himself has just a third class rating?

How did the commander develop such an indifferent attitude toward rating? The reason is apparent. Simplified tests, minimal attention to the problem of ratings by certain senior officers, and finally the variability of results among highly rated specialists. For the battalion commander all these things made the class rating a secondary matter and he oriented himself to what he considered more "realistic" indexes.

Something else must also be mentioned. Up until now the officer rating has usually been equated with the rating for enlisted specialists. For example, one may meet a company commander who calls himself a "mechanic-driver second class" or a "gunner first class." He does this because he passed almost the same test as regular mechanic-drivers or gunners. But the controlling documents make different demands for a rated officer-specialist.

Another factor which certainly does not increase the prestige of the officer rating is the fact that certain staff officers wear badges with rating numbers that have not been renewed for many years. And although they have lost the right to this badge automatically, when the results of socialist competition are totalled they are invariably included in the "percentage fulfilled."

Of course, in many units the struggle for high ratings is organized on a different basis and produces real results. For example, I remember the enthusiastic words of Sr Lt L. Safronov concerning his subordinate officers, each of whom had a high rating. "We can operate in the field without a technician," the subunit commander told me. "When there is a hitch we are in no hurry to call for a specialist in armament or communications."

I will add that the subunit finished the winter training period with excellent marks.

To establish an atmosphere of respect for class ratings everywhere means to put an important reserve for further increasing tactical, fire, and technical training into practice. A great deal here depends on higher headquarters. They must decisively cut off simplifications and indulgence in qualifying tests, pay attention to the class ratings of officers at all inspections, unconditionally strip ratings from those who have "outlived their time," and intelligently summarize the know-how of the best units and subunits. Class ratings must be

remembered, needless to say, in deciding personnel questions, certifying officers, and assigning them to schools.

The quicker the deficiencies revealed in competition for a high officer rating are eliminated the greater the combat readiness of units and subunits will be.

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SHORTCOMINGS NOTED IN SERVICEMEN'S KNOWLEDGE OF MILITARY LAW

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 May 77 p 2

[Article by Lt Col Just I. Vashkevich: "Translated From Legal Language — Notes on Legal Education"]

[Text] The training period at the guard post was coming to an end. Reports on the duties of the sentry and characteristic features of protecting installations were being given. The soldiers confidently related how they would act if the lights on posts went out or a fire occurred. Then company commander Sr Lt P. Bunyayev reminded the men going on guard duty that three years earlier a criminal had gotten into post No 2 and disarmed the sentry.

"But why did this happen?" the officer said turning to the men, then after a short pause answered himself. "Because the sentry lost his vigilance, stopped observing for a certain time, and right here," the officer pointed to a place on the mock-up, "carelessly approached the corner of a building. The bandit was hiding behind that very corner."

The company commander said just a few sentences. And what he said was not new to the soldiers. But the lines of the regulations which they had memorized suddenly became extremely meaningful. "To serve alertly, not be distracted by anything, carefully observe the approaches to the post, keep the weapon loaded, always be ready for action." So, it turned out, these things referred to each one of them standing in the formation! Personally. For practical use. This very day. Now.

I was at the guard post of the N regiment then and saw how the faces of the men grew serious. I reflected that this is the element of legal education which complements the political and military aspects by explaining exactly why the particular rule is written this way and no other way, which shows what lies behind the concise phrasing of the regulations and law, and on this basis instills a profoundly conscious yearning in the soldier to observe the rules of our military life absolutely.

A few days later I happened to read the following in the post news: "I commend Pvt V. Sveshnikov for good knowledge of his duties and practical performance of them. Lt Col N. Perfilov." Other members of the guard team also handled their missions successfully and this was the tangible result of purposeful educational work with the men and thorough explanation of the legal precepts which govern guard duty.

Needless to say, it is not just a matter of the eloquent and persuasive incident related by the company commander during the training period at the guard post. It is important that the officer's words fell on soil that was already prepared. The regiment holds a number of training periods, discussions, and evening meetings to prepare soldiers for standing guard duty. The soldiers and sergeants are given a clear idea of the importance of the installations they are guarding for regimental combat readiness and told their role in protecting them; they also know their own special legal status in the guard area, when traveling to the post, and at the post. The organization of guard duty corresponds strictly to regulation requirements. Inspectors enter the slightest shortcomings in the post records so that they can be a lesson for others. In short, they have a whole set of propaganda and organizational measures which insure that the servicemen have a conscientious attitude toward fulfillment of this important and honorable duty.

But here is the, at first glance, strange thing: it is precisely a conscious, profoundly responsible attitude toward the service that other servicemen of the regiment are plainly lacking when they perform their everyday duties. According to the figures of the garrison military procurator the number of absences without leave in the regiment is not decreasing and there are cases of soldiers abusing alcohol. Even in the platoon which had just stood guard duty very well there had been a problem not long before when Pvt A. Andreyev went AWOL and was arrested in a drunken state. Does this mean that the educational system sometimes fails to produce the desired effect?

The regiment has a broad and quite varied plan of legal propaganda activities. Corners of legal knowledge have been set up in the companies. The regimental propagandist has dozens of film strips on legal subjects. He can obtain necessary films from the film center. But it seems that all these possibilities are aimed at nothing more than repeating over and over that which has already been said in the laws and regulations without deepening knowledge of legal principles or broadening the legal outlook of the servicemen. And whereas the soldiers, sergeants, ensigns, and officers really can give the texts of articles from legal documents, often word-for-word, the meaning of some legal precepts escapes many of them and sometimes they are completely unable to apply the precept.

Jr Sgt N. Atroshchenko, for example, gave a precise answer at a training period to the question who was his superior and who was his direct superior. But he became confused when asked who had the right to give him orders and who could punish him. While Sr Lt V. Vlasov knew that

a person could not be punished twice for one offense, he still believed that a soldier who had been reprimanded was also "automatically" deprived of his next leave.

And how about understanding the legal elements of being absent without leave? Some comrades do not know when this offense becomes a crime and are completely unaware that there are certain legal relations between servicemen and the state which are violated as soon as a soldier goes outside unit boundaries without authorization. The question of whether there is a difference in granting a disability pension for an accident to soldiers when one was on leave and the other had left the unit without leave plainly baffled the men.

Such legal illiteracy in the face of an impressive number of varied activities can only be explained by the fact that the topics chosen for talks to the men are too broad and the speakers selected to "translate" legal documents into the language of fact, concrete situations, and concrete actions have poor professional training.

I spent almost the entire day before arriving in the regiment in the small office of Col Just V. Kuznetsov, member of the military tribunal of the Leningrad Military District. Tape recordings conveyed the breathing of various audiences and diverse voices, the voices of military jurists, spoke of the situation in the subunits and explained the requirements of the military oath, regulations, and laws.

As we listened to the speakers Vladimir Ivanovich and I noted places where the talks lacked intelligibility, persuasiveness, and depth of analysis of the particular legal principle and when the students in the last rows inevitably began getting drowsy.

While in the regiment I often recalled the office, the tapes, and my thoughtful fellow officer. How much he and his colleagues were missed at activities with regimental officers: methods conferences on legal propaganda and seminars for leaders of political training period groups in the appropriate subjects.

At the political training period the leader asked a soldier how much one would "get" for failure to carry out a commander's order? An oppressive silence hung in the classroom and I realized that I myself did not know exactly. But such questions are not asked in criminal law examinations for future lawyers. And judges going off to the deliberation room still do not know what period will be considered adequate to rehabilitate the particular, concrete individual who has committed a particular, concrete crime. It is not fear of punishment, but rather an understanding of the need to obey the law at all times which lies at the basis of socialist legal consciousness — that is what the training period leader had forgotten.

It is an immutable rule of legal propaganda that one should not teach what not to do, one should teach the correct way, how to apply legal

norms correctly. But the training period leader failed to take account of this also.

Unfortunately, there was no one to caution him against such mistakes.

But as we know, the men are educated not only by lectures, discussions, and evening meetings; the situation in which the fighting man serves also educates him. And how important it is here that the entire life of the unit or subunit be organized in strict conformity with regulation requirements so that the servicemen can see an example of respect for legal norms in every act by commanders and superiors.

Unfortunately, substantial deviations from the requirements of the laws and regulations are found in the regiment. Despite the requirement of Article 206 of the Internal Service Regulations the regimental commander signs leave papers for soldiers and sergeants. It is the duty of the platoon commander to "periodically attend reveille and evening inspection in the platoon," but in the regiment they have substituted a schedule of officers who are, as they say, "responsible" for order in the subunits.

I asked the regimental commander why the chief of the garrison military vehicle inspectorate, who is subordinate to him, believes that he can take away drivers' professional certification. The colonel opened up the Garrison and Guard Duty Regulations and read an excerpt from the duties of the chief of a garrison military vehicle inspectorate: "He is obligated to keep records of detained vehicles and confiscated documents." He looked at me triumphantly, as if to say nothing could be more clearly stated.

But let us ask ourselves: what relationships are regulated by the military regulations? Military ones. To be more specific, only military, not, for example, family relationships. No one would think of taking away a serviceman's marriage certificate because of some wrongdoing. Then why does this officer so easily deprive his subordinates of their right to labor as vehicle drivers? After all, these relationships are not regulated by the regulations; in our country only agencies of the state vehicle inspectorate have this power.

The colonel listened silently to this "translation" from legal language and remarked: "Possibly you are right. But in order to know what each word of the law means you have to have a precise interpretation by professional jurists. Unfortunately, we seldom meet, and they do not go so deep."

I cannot reject the regimental commander's reproach. There were three visits to the regiment by military jurists during the year, all related to activities for the soldiers and sergeants and these activities differ little from those conducted in school. Then shortly before my arrival in the regiment an inspection of the state of legality was made on a procurator's supervisory basis. "No violations of law or

military regulations were found," Maj Just L. Tyuzhin reported. I think that the regiment did have a right to expect more meaningful and effective help from military justice agencies.

Legal education is an important area of work with the men. Success in this work is crucial for further strengthening military discipline and legal order in the units and subunits. Experience shows that this challenge can be met only when the efforts of commanders, political workers, and military jurists are combined. Unfortunately, this has not yet been done in the N regiment.

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METHODS OF IMPROVING WORK OF STAFF OFFICERS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 May 77 p 2

[Article by Col I. Terekhov, candidate of military sciences: "But What Was the Result? — Practicality, the Creative Approach"]

[Text] Ways to raise the effectiveness and quality of the work of staff officers are frequently discussed at service meetings and theoretical conferences in the units. This is natural. The ability to get maximum results with minimum expenditures of effort, means, and time is not an easy thing, and it must be mastered by using every opportunity available among the troops.

The effectiveness of training time, for example when the soldiers are working through a certain task, is measured by appropriate standards. It is much more difficult to determine the effectiveness of the labor of a staff officer. Many aspects of his work are difficult to analyze qualitatively or quantitatively.

Nonetheless, experience shows that this problem can be resolved. At a certain headquarters I was shown a technique for recording what they called the "productive and unproductive losses" of officers' service time. The technique is interesting because it uses a definite characteristic to classify the most typical kinds of work and has approximate time norms allocated for their performance. I do not think they have thought everything through completely and some specific points are debatable, but in general their experience is convincing: much of the work of staff officers can be normed by time and evaluated qualitatively.

All labor, including military labor, is based on the principle of planning, which makes it possible to organize the work in a sequential, rhythmic manner. But some staff officers take a simplified approach to the planning system and really care about just one thing, that their plans look impressive and contain many activities. But questions such as whether one activity duplicates another or whether the plan is realistic are sometimes overlooked. This approach to drawing up plans

inevitably leads to mistakes and trouble later. Perhaps this is why the omnipotent press of current activities disrupts plans and training schedules in some subunits.

Of course, it is not possible to foresee and plan everything ahead of time; new problems of some type or other will always arise. But one can hardly be effective working without a system, emphasizing only the number of activities and not their quality and not strictly monitoring performance of orders, instructions, and plans.

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev warned against such defects in the workstyle at the 16th Congress of the USSR Trade Unions when he said: "One should not go chasing after a large number of activities. Let's size this up, don't we have too many meetings that last too long? Don't we generate too many different kinds of paper — instructions, decisions, and decrees — sometimes forgetting to check what difference these papers make in life itself?"

It is not the number of papers nor the number and length of meetings that should be used to evaluate work, it is the precise political orientation, practicality, and practical results. These party demands apply fully to the activity of military personnel.

The ability to plan work on the basis of an optimal number of truly important activities and a precise consideration of personnel and time required and opportunities available is one of the important conditions for effective work by a staff officer. It assumes coordinated actions among the employees of different services and strict checks and assistance by the commanders and service chiefs. This is the approach that is typical for officers of the leading staffs.

"We start work with a brief planning session," officer Yu. Kalgin of the N unit told us. "Each officer reports to the chief of staff or his deputy on what was done the previous day, what tasks were not fulfilled and why, and what he plans for the upcoming day. At this meeting assignments are made more concrete and questions requiring participation by representatives of different services are coordinated. This does not take much time, but labor productivity is noticeably improved."

A firm selection of the optimal number of training and educational activities and planning and precisely coordinating them are unquestionably important. But the main thing, that which determines success, is careful preparation for these activities to see that they prove useful. Sometimes we see the following. Suppose a training period, exercise, or drill is underway. Everything is going according to the classical rules, without a hitch as they say. but if we analyze the effect of such a training activity on the men, it sometimes turns out that it has virtually no practical usefulness. In most case this happens because the accent in the conception itself and the orientation of the activity has been put on the formal side only, just to carry it out and put the notorious "checkmark" in the plan.

A science-practice conference on problems of improving the methodological skills of officers was once held in the N unit. This is an important and necessary activity. But what it amounted to was hearing a few extensive, general theory reports which had little to do with the concrete experience of the unit or the tasks it was facing. The conference did not produce a single recommendation deserving of attention for raising the pedagogical skills of officers. The conference took up a whole day and involved a large number of officers. But what was the practical result? It was very small.

A staff officer cannot get along without the recommendations of science. There are proper documents and scientific recommendations for planning combat and political training, organizing personnel training and education, and summarizing progressive know-how. That is why officer A. Petlenko, for example, when giving a complex assignment to his staff officer always advises him what to read before starting work and then checks to see how he has grasped the theory of the matter and what sequence he will use to accomplish the assigned task. This has a positive effect on the quality of work of staff officers.

Unfortunately, one still hears the opinion expressed that an experienced officer has no reason to look into various documents and training materials on every occasion. His long experience will carry him through in all situations, they say. Of course, experience and knowledge gained earlier are very valuable, but they must be enriched and brought up to date. It is extremely important for a staff officer to master military theory and study generalized work experience in managing military collectives.

I once had occasion to talk with the commander of the N unit on this topic. He complained that his staff officers, made wise by long years of military experience, were going into the reserves and with them precious experience, often gained through the trials of testing, searching, and errors, would be lost. New officers would take their places and begin from the start, looking for the techniques and problem-solving methods which had been found already by their predecessors.

There is much bitter truth in these words. The main way young people learn from experienced officers is through personal observation and contact. And it is very important for experienced staff officers to generously share the "secrets" of their skill with their new colleagues.

A high level of professional training for staff officers is an important component of an effective workstyle. But knowledge, no matter how profound it may be, provides no more than the possibility of achieving good results. Much depends on ability to apply the knowledge and know-how in practice, especially when organizing work in the units and sub-units.

Let me refer to the example of the staff headed by officer N, Morgunov. The staff workers have a creative approach to their work and try to influence the multifaceted life, work and training of personnel.

Staff officers attach great importance to teaching subunit commanders advanced procedures and work techniques. Their method of summarizing the results of staff officer work in the local areas is, in our opinion, interesting. They have given up on extensive reviews with large audiences. Each staff officer analyzes only those questions which he has studied and speaks only to those whom he checked. The work concludes with drawing up a detailed plan of activities to eliminate deficiencies which have been found. It is typical that many gaps and omissions are eliminated during the course of the inspection itself, and staff officers take an active part in this. The subunit commanders always have a good word for the assistance which staff officers give them in the struggle for high efficiency in the training process and socialist competition and for establishing regulation order.

The ability to analyze information correctly, make sound decisions, and give orders quickly and precisely is an important quality of the staff officer, especially in a combat situation characterized by great dynamism and tension. But decision-making in a hurry, without an analytic assessment of all possible variations, is harmful.

I have met staff officer I. Dragov a number of times. He has considerable service experience but, unfortunately, he sometimes makes hasty decisions that are not fully thought out and ignores the opinion and advice of those who will carry out the decision. But then when the time comes to carry it out it often develops that the decision failed to take account of many important factors and therefore does not produce an optimal result.

In this way, the soundness of decisions made by officers influence the qualitative indexes of their labor. Therefore, the staff officer should always look ahead, take account of new phenomena arising from the development of military affairs and advanced by training practices and competition, and orient himself to the advanced achievements of military science and the art of war.

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IMPROVING PARTY MEETING PROCEDURES DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 May 77 p 2

[Article by Col I. Lun'kov, chief of the political branch of the headquarters and directorate of the Red Banner Odessa Military District; "To Avoid Spoiling Relations — Party Life"]

[Text] The question of further raising the professional training of officers was under discussion at a party meeting in one of the directorates of our military district. Both the speaker who gave the report and those who participated in the discussion took note of deficiencies in party work to insure that communists set an example and improve their own political and military-technical knowledge. They spoke of the need to organize socialist competition among branches. One could feel that the questions under discussion concerned the communists deeply and that they were inclined to talk about them in a business-like way. There was no shortage of speakers.

In short, one might have felt that the meeting was going along on a high level, as they say, if it had not been for one circumstance. In the hall during the break the communists who had just spoken to their comrades were expressing their views on the same question more definitely and critically. They named the officers who were not growing as leaders, showed indifference to performance of their obligations, and thus held up the work. The exchange of opinions in the hall was much more frank.

Why was it different at the meeting? There the criticism was not directed at concrete individuals, but employed various phrases such as "there are comrades who," "in certain branches," and the like. A mild reproach was given to just one communist, A. Mironchikov, because he was in debt for seminar training periods at the evening university of Marxism-Leninism.

I talked with communist Yu. Ivanov and V. Tribuntsov, officers of the directorate, to learn why the names of officers who permitted defects in work had not been given at the meeting and why shortcomings were discussed in general, not in particular. The communists answered that

it was quite clear to them who was referred to. But when they talked of shortcomings in the work of the branches, everyone understood that this was criticism directed at them all. In general, they felt, there was no reason to shoot it out at the meeting; it is better, they said, to decide touchy questions on a working basis.

I heard the same phrase at one other meeting, but in a different direction. They were discussing the question of improving the workstyle of officers. When the talk reached the necessary level of sharpness and communists began to express their critical opinions more concretely, the chairman of the meeting suddenly made it clearly understood that it would be better to "talk about this later."

Another characteristic feature of some party meetings at staff party organizations is that communists make remarks and sharply criticize only shortcomings occurring in subordinate units and the party collectives of these units, while preferring to discuss their own problems "in general." All this forces one to realize that not all communists are yet deeply aware of the importance of criticism and self-criticism for raising the militance of party organizations. Some fear spoiling relations with fellow servicemen, thus putting their own personal interests above public interest.

The substance of the method of criticism has been clearly defined in the CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "On the State of Criticism and Self-Criticism in the Tambovskaya Oblast Party Organization" and in the materials of the 25th Party Congress. What is it? "The essence," L. I. Brezhnev pointed out in the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the Congress, "is seeing that all aspects of the activity of the particular organization and the particular employee receive an objective evaluation, that existing shortcomings are thoroughly analyzed for the purpose of eliminating them. We must not permit a liberal attitude toward shortcomings and those at fault for them. Trust and respect for people must be combined with high demands for assigned work. This is a law of party work; more than that, it is a law of all our work."

Practice convinces us that such qualities as activism, high principles, and practicality are developed in communists when a favorable situation is created at meetings for the development of criticism and free exchange of opinion. Unfortunately, we must say that some reports presented by chiefs of directorates and branches in our district do not create a proper atmosphere for free exchange of opinion and do not encourage communists to make critical statements. Sometimes they are presented in a tone that differs little from that used at service meetings and instruction sessions. But this is, as they say, not so bad. It is worse when we meet comrades in executive positions who acknowledge the criticism in words but actually make it known by various "delicate" retorts and hints that the critic has gone too far or stepped in where he should not have. The communists sense this and ultimately some of them stop being active.

Headquarters party organizations have the most mature communists, people with substantial experience of life and the service. Where if not in such organizations can a frank, party-minded, business-like discussion of shortcomings and omissions be held? After all, it is perfectly apparent that when they exercise their right to criticize and self-critically evaluate their own activities, communists thereby strengthen party qualities in themselves, rid themselves of shortcomings more rapidly, and grow as leaders and organizers. The communists of headquarters party organizations have specific service duties. They are expected to set an example in the struggle against bureaucratism, red tape, and indifference and act as initiators of new things in troop training and education. There is no need to prove that it is much more difficult for party organizations where criticism is veiled to accomplish these difficult tasks.

One occasionally hears the view that mutual reproaches and accusations can generate a tense atmosphere in the collective. Such fears are groundless. If mutual relations among communists are founded on frank, sincere concern for the common cause, this is the best guarantee against criticism which pursues selfish ends.

Although this type of criticism is still encountered, it must be fought resolutely. "When you hear such criticism," V. I. Lenin taught, "criticism without content, criticism for the sake of criticism, be on guard, look around, maybe the self-esteem of the criticizing comrade has been wounded somehow, maybe something has personally annoyed or irritated him."

Officer G. Tatsiy was "annoyed" and "irritated." At a meeting the communist severely criticized his direct superior. If we disregard G. Tatsiy's motives, he acted correctly; a check confirmed the facts he presented. But it is important here to emphasize something else. The party investigation revealed that G. Tatsiy himself had an unseemly role. This gave reason to think that his criticism of the other communist was motivated by personal considerations, a desire to "settle accounts."

This example illustrates once again that the boldness of a critic must be viewed integrally, together with his unselfish concern for the work and internal readiness to receive criticism himself just as honestly.

We are aware, of course, that the political branch of the staff and directorate has an important job in raising the educational role of criticism and self-criticism. We have done a good deal recently to activate the work of headquarters party organizations to make communists more accountable for carrying out decisions adopted and to establish a practical, demanding milieu in the organizations. The state of criticism and self-criticism is regularly reviewed at sessions of party bureaus and seminars of secretaries of party organizations and party group organizers.

I would especially like to mention the fact that we instruct party bureaus to periodically analyze the speeches of communists to determine their content and character, to identify those who, even though they speak often, do not make concrete proposals directed to improving the workstyle, who essentially are not criticizing either themselves or their fellow-servicemen.

The summer training period is now in full swing. This is the decisive period before a celebration that is dear to us all — the 60th anniversary of Great October. There is no need to prove, I think, that successful accomplishment of the missions of combat and political training will depend largely on the high principles, practicality, activism, and organization of all party members.

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MILITARY CONSTRUCTION UNIT FALSIFIED RECORDS

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 May 77 p 4

[Article by Lt Col-Engr L. Kulikov: "The Fetters of Deceit"]

[Text] The factors which give rise to deceit, fakery, and falsification of records are extremely diverse. One of them is confidence that there will be no punishment. How else can we explain the falsification permitted in the UNR [project manager's office] headed by Col-Engr M. Pitkin. Three 16-story buildings built by the UNR are, according to the report and in conformity with the act of the state commission, considered introduced at the end of 1976. But in mid-May 1977 not a key has been turned over to an apartment dweller.

And it appears that this does not alarm the construction chief. The plan for turning over the housing was fulfilled; that is what is important! Why should he worry about the fact that no one has lived in the buildings for six months except the guards, especially when his falsification of the report was sanctioned by someone higher up. Mikhail Samsonovich refused to specify exactly who had sanctioned it; he merely pointed his finger upward and said evasively:

"This matter was decided up there. And it wouldn't be fair not to include the buildings in last year's plan and deprive the collective of their bonus because we finished our construction work on time."

In this, to be blunt, he was not telling the truth. I learned that in January, February, and even March of 1977 the noise of the pre-acceptance rush work rang out on several floors of the buildings. Floors were being laid in the apartments and halls and finishing work was being rushed through. Nonetheless, the state commission's acts accepting the buildings for use had already been signed and ratified.

Whereas I was unable to establish who the mysterious leader "up there" was, the names of the commission members who signed the document could be learned. There were 15 of them, 15 officials intoxicated by this deception, including commission chairman V. Kalinin, purchaser representative Lt Col-Engr V. Duplin, Comrade Pitkin who is already known to us, and N. Frolov, representative of the planning organization.

The method of "fulfilling" production buildings used by the above-named comrades also received support from L. Serykh, director of another UNR. He also wanted to finish the report year of 1976 happily and added two buildings, a total of 337 apartments, to his report. Several thousand rubles are due to construction workers for turning over this work "on time."

"The bonus has not been received yet," Lt Col-Engr V. Panferov, chief of the planning division of the UNR, specified, "but we are counting on it because the ratified act of the state commission is grounds for receiving the bonus from the purchaser."

The act was ratified "at a proper time," but before all jobs related to operation of the building had been completed. Comrade Serykh told me in full detail why people could not move into the buildings. He said they were built very fast and during the entire construction period the purchaser and local organizations were unable to reach agreement on simple formalities. The dispute was only settled in April, after which came a command to begin billeting service acceptance of the housing.

A dispute is all well and good, but housing that has not been completed cannot be considered turned over for use. And one need not be very observant to see the sad consequences of such bureaucratic she-nanigans. This is a falsification of reports, deception.

A similar falsification related to turning over buildings "crept into" the report of the builders directed by Lt Col-Engr L. Meytuv.

For almost half a year 1,000 apartments have produced no rent payments. Unlawful bonuses were paid. Moreover, hundreds of military construction workers are still engaged in catching up on 1976 work. As a result we have losses and unjustified expenditures running into tens of thousands of rubles. Who will pay the state back?

One cannot help looking at these cases from the standpoint of communist morals. Entire collectives had been drawn into a dirty game related to turning housing over for use. Many conscientious workers had been forced to be accomplices in shady affairs. No figures in the production plan can cover this loss.

The popular wisdom says that there is no worse mistake than to leap over a chasm in two jumps. Only an exact and honest accounting fosters real success; deliberate lies and the self-deception of false reports do not.

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ARTILLERY UNIT FIRING TRAINING METHODS DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 May 77 p 1

[Article by Lt Yu. Zhdanov: "Not for the Sake of the Evaluation — The Main Things Are Effectiveness and Quality"]

[Text] Sr Lt A. Dergachev was agitated all morning. The battery was facing an important firing session. The exercise conditions were rigid: The target, a permanent emplacement, would be considered hit only if a shell entered an embrasure. The fire had to be highly accurate.

But when Dergachev stepped up to the site, first as the battery commander should be, his agitation ceased. It was replaced by that extreme form of concentration when one feels almost a part of the gun. The battery held its breath.

Data began to arrive from the command and observation post. In a minute the targets rose. Working smoothly with experienced hands the officer laid the gun on the target. The command "fire!" merged with the roar of the gun. At the same moment the air crashed on the left and right. This was platoon leaders lieutenants V. Dobrovol'skiy and V. Boldyrev opening fire. The wind blew away the distant clouds of dust and everyone could see: the targets were gone. A perfect fire! Other firers immediately stepped up to the sights.

I recalled one other firing session in the battery. The overall evaluation then was outstanding. The artillerymen were returning from the range happy and excited. Only the commander, who had listened carefully to the comments at the review, did not share the general delight. Later when reviewing the results of the firing, he set forth his point of view:

"We do not fire for the sake of the evaluation! A high score cannot cover up shortcomings. The team commanded by Sergeant Sin'ko hit the target with its last shell. Lieutenant Dobrovol'skiy's shell only grazed the face of the target. We just barely got our high mark."

The battery began searching for reserves to improve training. They looked at everything new and returned to old ideas which had been

undeservedly forgotten. When Senior Lieutenant Dergachev proposed that a small-caliber rifle be secured to the gun barrel and drills be held at the rifle range some shrugged their shoulders and said that it was an old idea and there were sub-caliber tubes also. The battery commander agreed but pointed out that they could only be used when firing on a fairly large field and that firing a cannon, even a low-caliber one, is much more expensive than firing a rifle.

The first drills proved very useful. Interest in training periods grew greatly. Everything was in plain view: you aimed and fired and hit or missed. Drills at the "little" range helped the battery perform big missions.

Many generations of artillerymen remember the drill exercise of drawing the so-called "envelope." In the electronic age it has come to be neglected. But Senior Lieutenant Dergachev decided it should not be: the exercise develops a "feeling" for the gun, dexterity, and skill.

It is true that the subunit refined the old technique. When everyone had learned to draw the "envelope," letters of the alphabet made of sheet iron was substituted for it and electricity was called in. As soon as the ejector rod left the narrow strip of iron a lamp flashed on: the count had begun. Then they would outline the figures in a limited time, counting the seconds. It proved to be a very difficult drill, but it was unquestionably useful.

Gradually all members of the battery became involved in searching for improvements. One of the teams tested a new way of delivering the shell to the loader which stepped up the pace of combat work. They began laying the gun from the bottom upward in most cases. This gave a smoother movement of the barrel.

The subunit also took the obligation to hit the target on the first shot very seriously. Lt V. Dobrovol'skiy proposed that records be kept not only on normative time and expenditure of ammunition, as usual, but also distance of shotholes from the center of the target. Lt. V. Boldyrev constructed a special table for this. If several gunners received the same mark, the tie could be broken easily by referring to the table. Competition became more meaningful and effective.

Among artillerymen there are situations where the gunner, after receiving the command, reports: "I see the target!" In the battery commanded by Senior Lieutenant Dergachev everyone sees the common target: to steadily improve the quality of training periods and drills, to find reserves, and to move forward from one frontier to the next.

The last group had finished performing the exercise. The senior lieutenant had recorded the hits on the first shot. And he announced the evaluation: "outstanding." Then a minute later I saw

the battery commander draw some kind of diagram in his notebook. It was clear that for him the fire session was just another stage passed. He was already concerned about the next day.

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CAREER DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL OFFICERS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 May 77 p 2

[Article by Rear Adm O. Volgin: "With an Eye to the Future"]

[Text] Appointment to a new position. For an officer this is a portentous and exciting event which opens up future prospects. For a senior officer the appointment of a subordinate to a new position is noteworthy too; after all, looking after the early development and growth of officers is his direct obligation and party duty.

It was not so long ago that Capt-Lt A. Kolesnikov was appointed commander of the large antisub ship Sposobnyy. The promotion of a young officer to such an important position did not arouse any questions but, even with full tribute to Kolesnikov's intelligence, energy, and purposefulness, a doubt could have been raised, for example, concerning the adequacy of his experience. So there was some risk to the appointment. Still, both his commanding officer and the personnel workers decided that Kolesnikov was worthy of this high position.

Before too much time passed the question arose of another promotion for Kolesnikov, who had, incidentally, received the next rank, captain 2nd class, early. He was offered a new ship. There is no need to say what satisfaction this gave not only Kolesnikov, but also his senior officer, who had recommended him for his first command position, and the personnel branch officer who had judged him to be a promising officer. Kolesnikov had lived up to their hopes. He had made the Sposobnyy an outstanding ship, received outstanding scores for two ocean cruises, managed to win two first places in navy championships with his crew, and received an order.

The demands on officers, especially commanders, are steadily growing. When a ship sets off on an ocean cruise the command is concerned most of all about its commander. For the success of the entire crew's actions depends decisively on him, the sole leader and educator, the tactician and navigator, the one who is given great authority and independence. During a long cruise the commander's qualities, his

training, skills, and suitability for his lofty post, are thoroughly tested.

Unfortunately, there are cases, even though they are infrequent, where commanders being tested in practice reveal that they are not yet prepared to accept this great load of responsibility and duties. And no matter how much the commander himself may be at fault here, the mistakes of the personnel branch must be acknowledged as well as the inadequate standards of senior officers with respect to promotion of subordinates.

Although failures are rare they are long remembered. That was how it was, for example, with Capt-Lt B. Timchenko. The documents submitted to propose this officer for a command position were entirely in order, as they say. The senior officer wrote an irreproachable letter. Capt-Lt Ye. Kul'tinov, the personnel branch worker, agreed with the application and strongly supported the officer's promotion. But Capt-Lt B. Timchenko could not handle the position.

In both the first and second cases the command and personnel agency were in complete agreement concerning the question of promoting the officer. But how different the results were! What matters is the basis on which agreement was reached. And when we speak of the importance of interaction and coordination between commanders and political workers in the units and workers at the personnel branches, we mean agreement constructed on party principles.

Such interaction is becoming especially important today. The navy is constantly receiving new officers who have every opportunity for advancement in the service, vigorous growth, and confident development. This increases the volume and intensity of work by personnel agencies and gives senior officers many more personnel questions to work on. The problem is to study personnel thoroughly and be able to see both current needs and future prospects and decide questions of promoting energetic, promising officers while at the same time looking after stability and avoiding unjustified shifts and personnel moves. In short, the demands of the 25th CPSU Congress concerning personnel policy should be met in full.

There was a time when officers could settle into their positions completely and show themselves in full to senior officers and personnel agencies. The process of early development of officers and promotion in the service is more dynamic today. Now we cannot wait and hope for the man to reveal himself. We must help him in this, identify capable, energetic officers on time, help them acquire and polish the necessary qualities, and develop commanders from them.

The command, political agencies, and party organizations unquestionably have the paramount role here. They have opportunities to make a thorough evaluation of each officer and to exercise an educational influence on him. For example, this occurred with Capt 3rd Rank

A. Kolesnikov, who was discussed above. His former commander officer G. Kudryavtsev noticed Kolesnikov while he was commander of the torpedo department. He carefully groomed him to be the executive officer, and then when Kolesnikov was appointed executive officer Captain 2nd Rank Kudryavtsev began to prepare him for the captain's bridge. Soon Kudryavtsev himself entered the academy. The command did not have to hunt for an officer to fill the vacated position. The executive officer did very well.

We should note that the officers of the personnel branch also had a very complete picture of Kolesnikov. But they are by no means always able to know a particular candidate for promotion well on the basis of personal contact and observations. This is where close working contact between the command, staff, political branch, and personnel agencies comes in. This makes it possible to predict and plan forthcoming changes and to show systematic concern for the growth and development of officers.

It is precisely in view of the need for future planning that experienced, modern-thinking officers in personnel agencies, such as Capt 1st Rank A. Kuzhim, themselves try to put their activity on a planned basis and involve the commanders in the local areas in deciding these matters.

Capt 1st Rank A. Kuzhim and his subordinates with the assistance of commanders and political workers try to identify those officers among recent school graduates who show the greatest talent for command activity. Special checks are made on their training, development, and growth and they are controlled by a special plan. This plan outlines the basic stages in the service growth of an officer and gives approximate times for appointment as commander of a department, executive officer, ship commander, and study at an academy. Keeping and following such a plan helps the command and personnel agencies have a fairly clear picture of the growth prospects of officers and reserves to fill command positions while giving the men an opportunity to show themselves fully and gain necessary education.

To be frank, we have significant deficiencies in personnel work. They come out in different ways: poorly conceived appointments, neglecting the opinion of party organizations, ill-considered shifting of officers, and shortage of candidates for promotion and assignment to study. This reflects the inability of some comrades to think about the future and their yearning to live only for the present day.

In the unit where officer N. Yanin serves, for example, the plan for sending officers off to study is regularly not fulfilled. They usually excuse themselves by reference to current difficulties, performance of complex missions which, they say do not allow them to release experienced specialists from the ships. But then when it is necessary to fill vacated positions in the same unit it turns out that they have no candidates.

Of course, it is sometimes difficult to measure exactly the degree of credit or blame that should attach to officers of personnel agencies for successful and unsuccessful appointments. In every case, however, we consider them responsible for the fate of the officers whose files they work on. Therefore we demand that they use every opportunity to study the men and their political, work, and moral qualities. Workers in personnel agencies cannot limit themselves to studying and writing out papers. Today they must to some extent be psychologists and sociologists, in short, specialists who have intuition, sense, a feeling for the times, breadth of outlook, and above all party loyalty, readiness to consider the work from the point of view of state interests.

A competent, respected personnel branch officer can caution other commanders against incorrect action and suggest the true, most rational way to resolve personnel questions at the right time. After all, it is the overall mission of senior officers, staff, and political and personnel agencies to determine the service prospects of each officer for the coming year and through joint efforts to create a situation which is most favorable for the growth of officers in order to insure a steady supply of thoroughly trained commanders capable of efficiently, in an up-to-date manner, resolving the questions of further raising naval combat readiness.

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STRESS ON PHYSICAL TRAINING IN MOSCOW MILITARY DISTRICT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 May 77 p 2

[Article by Capt A. Drozhzhin, senior instructor, division of Komsomol work, Political Directorate of the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District: "Sports — a Komsomol Concern"]

[Text] The company commanded by Sr Lt I. Balayev showed a poor level of physical conditioning at the check inspection. Many of the soldiers had not met their obligations and the subunit itself had failed to fulfill its plan for training rated sportsmen.

Of course, this represented a failure by the commander and he was held strictly accountable for omissions in this important part of combat training. But as a Komsomol worker I wondered whether the company Komsomol organization had done everything possible to avoid substantial shortcomings in personnel physical training? After all, sports are a young people's activity and give Komsomol activists a field to develop, a place where they can show initiative and enthusiasm and struggle to see that all soldiers try to improve their physical condition and earn VSK [military sport set] medals and become rated sportsmen and part-time instructors and coaches. But here is the picture that developed. It had been proposed many times at Komsomol meetings and bureau sessions, for example by Sgt V. Mikhaylov and Pvt O. Disenov, that the best conditioned soldiers be given an additional assignment to work with men who were lagging in physical training. It was also suggested that competition in power gymnastics and other tournaments be organized. But for some reason the Komsomol activists did not heed these suggestions. Moreover, some of them failed to set an example in their attitude toward sports. At the check inspection just half of the Komsomol members met their goals, while the others received only satisfactory scores.

While analyzing physical conditioning in this subunit, I realized that the same thing could have happened in the tank company commanded by Capt V. Pozhidayev if that officer had not expressed timely concern about the poor training of his young soldiers. They had substantial difficulty with workloads during tactical exercises and grew tired rapidly when doing jobs related to servicing the machinery.

Capt V. Pozhidayev immediately called the attention of Komsomol members to the need to raise the level of physical training for fighting men. Sgt N. Revyakin, secretary of the Komsomol organization, assembled the Komsomol bureau which decided to hold contests in chin-ups, grenade throwing, and weight-lifting in every platoon every day. The commander approved of this initiative. After this the new soldiers competed among themselves during their free time under the direction of Komsomol activists. At the end of every day "operational news sheets" were put up telling about the soldiers who had made the best scores in the sports events. As a result, in just two months all the recent draftees were noticeably stronger physically and fulfilled their socialist obligations in this stage successfully alongside the other tank soldiers. That is what Komsomol initiative can do, even on the scale of a single subunit.

Our district has many Komsomol organizations large and small which are true leaders of mass sports work. In the Komsomol organization of the unit where Lt G. Sysuyev is head of the Komsomol committee, all the activists are 1st and 2nd class sportsmen. It is no accident that they have major sports holidays there with testing for the VSK standards, contests in applied military disciplines, and other mass events which are regularly discussed at sessions of the Komsomol committee and at Komsomol meetings.

At the suggestion of Komsomol members all soldiers of the unit took on increased socialist obligations for sports and are now close to fulfilling them and to attaining the right to sign the report of the Leninist Komsomol in honor of the 60th anniversary of Great October. This military collective holds regular meetings with leading sportsmen of the district and organizes lectures and discussions which clarify issues of the interrelationship of physical conditioning and field training and their relationship with the ethical, nonmaterial maturation of the fighting men. Incidentally, one third of the Komsomol members are outstanding in combat and political training and rated specialists.

When one begins to analyze the causes of this success it can be seen that they lie above all in careful individual organizational work. For example, in this unit it was first established which Komsomol soldiers were behind in physical training and why. Good athletes were assigned to these soldiers and persistently, patiently helped their pupils. Lt V. Savilo, Sgts V. Talalykin, A. Sacherbakov, and others were particularly active in the training periods. The results can be seen.

However, by no means all Komsomol organizations show such a serious attitude toward the important problem of physical training. The Komsomol committees of which Sr Lt V. Kuznetsov, Lt V. Tverdokhlebov, and Jr Sgt V. Kudyashkin are members do not publicize sports well and have not assisted commanders and political workers in improving the physical conditioning of personnel. Questions of the role of Komsomol

members in organizing mass sports work have not been discussed in these collectives, neither at Komsomol meetings nor sessions of the bureau, for a long time. In them it is possible to find cases where shortcuts are permitted in passing the standards of the VSK and the soldiers' sports obligations are low (and even they are rarely met on time). Serious corrections had to be made with these Komsomol workers, involving a complete change in their attitude toward physical training and sports.

In general, if one makes a critical evaluation of the capabilities of Komsomol organizations for organizing sports activities, it will become clear that they are not yet using all opportunities for the further improvement of troop physical training. A few years ago the slogan "One plus two" was very popular. The point of it was that a highly rated sportsman would undertake to train two of his comrades. This useful initiative has somehow been forgotten today. But if they would adopt it Komsomol organizations could use the various forms of individual work with young people more energetically. Surprise Komsomol visits to check the condition of sports facilities and sports work in companies and batteries are rarely used and in some places have been completely forgotten. But experience shows that these surprise inspections help maintain effective checks on how Komsomol members are doing with their sports obligations.

Mass sports work in the units should be an object of constant concern to Komsomol organizations. We must teach the young defenders of our native land so that they are strong, courageous, conditioned fighting men.

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CAREER DEVELOPMENT OF YOUNG POLITICAL OFFICERS DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 May 77 p 2

[Article by Col (Ret) V. Arkhipov: "At the Beginning of the Road -- the New Political Worker, Problems of Early Development"]

[Text] Someone once noted correctly that during the first half of a journey we think about the past, what is left behind, and during the second half we think about what the coming days hold for us. Lt Vladimir Gornev was no exception. The steady click of the wheels made thinking natural. At first all his thoughts returned to the Sverdlovsk Higher Military Political Tank-Artillery School which had been his home. It did not seem long ago that he was entering it but, believe it or not, four years had passed. When a person is just 23 years old four years is almost a life by itself. "Almost" because before school he had served as a soldier in a tank regiment.

But now here he was, with brand new lieutenant's shoulder boards, a diploma in his pocket, and a suitcase full of books as his most valuable personal property, racing toward a garrison where his service as an officer would begin. What awaited him in the garrison? What would his first meeting with the soldiers and sergeants be like? How would mutual relations with the platoon leaders, lieutenants just like himself, take shape?

Reflecting in this way Vladimir concluded that he had no reason to be timid. He had been accustomed to military life from childhood because he grew up in the family of an officer who served at the front. His first, regular hitch enabled him to learn about company life from inside. Military school had given him sufficient knowledge to perform the duties of a deputy company commander for political affairs.

"I had it easier than others, but still I made many mistakes," Lieutenant Gornev told me later. "Everything seemed more difficult. It is one thing to be a soldier or a cadet, responsible only for yourself. It is something entirely different to shoulder responsibility for the state of affairs in a company. Of course, the commander's burden was much greater than mine. But he carried it easily and helped me too.

But I worked myself into a lather, tried to do everything myself and could not manage many things."

Needless to say, today, 18 months later, Lieutenant Gornev would do some things better and with less effort. But even then he did not begin badly. His experience as a soldier told him how important it would be to make a favorable first impression on his subordinates. And he tried. He carefully prepared for political information sessions and training periods and in combat training tried to inspire the men with his personal example. But this proved hard. He had to make great improvements in his skills in driving the tank and firing the tank weapon. The lieutenant studied the actions of the best mechanic-drivers and was not ashamed to ask advice from them. Then Gornev received his 2nd class rating in driving and learned to fire outstandingly.

Vladimir Gornev himself soon felt that he had "become part" of the company collective and began to work with greater confidence. At first, however, life gave this confidence some appreciable setbacks.

One of the sergeants once made a serious mistake. Attention had to be called to it and Vladimir Gornev began a talk with his subordinates for this purpose. There is no need now to recall the content of the discussion; what is important is that it did not turn out to be a business-like, high-principled talk. The sergeant was upset and did not want to admit his error, so he took offense. Then the political worker, instead of calmly explaining the mistake to his subordinate, raised his voice...

"Shouting doesn't solve anything" — Vladimir had heard these words many times from his mother, a teacher. Unfortunately, he recalled them only when the talk with the sergeant was at a blind alley. Long afterward the lieutenant was bothered by irritation at his own lack of control.

After reflecting on his failure Gornev realized that to influence the men one must win their trust. What this requires above all is to know the men, their moods and their needs. But "to know" them is easier said than done. He once had occasion to observe a new officer who, trying to study his subordinates, invited them into the company office one at a time, opened up a notebook, and began asking questions. While the soldiers talked about their parents and the school they attended it was a fairly smooth conversation. But the further it went the more cut-and-dried the soldiers' answers became: "Yes, sir" and "No, sir." What kind of frank, open talk is that!

Lieutenant Gornev did not call his subordinates in for such talks. He took advantage of convenient circumstances to simply pass a few words with the various soldiers in the barracks, in the field, or at the motor pool. At first the talk would center on apparently extraneous matters and only gradually would it come into focus. If Gornev felt after the talk that he had established both work and personal contact

with the subordinate then he remarked to himself that the talk had achieved its goal. But how often did he succeed?

Vladimir Gornev was lucky in many respects. He happened to join an outstanding company. His commander Capt A. Demkin had considerable command experience as well as skills in party political work. Not for nothing had he been elected a member of the party committee and secretary of the battalion party bureau. So Gornev is probably most indebted to his commander for helping him find a reliable workstyle.

"Don't try to do everything yourself," the commander told his deputy for political affairs. "All communists and Komsomol members in the subunit should carry on political work. This is doubly beneficial. The collective always has more time and energy and, furthermore, the men grow faster when taking part in public work. And it is our job to make them grow."

Such advice and concrete assistance to a new worker are a precious thing. However, everyone does not fall into an outstanding company with an experienced commander, and many do not have years of service as a soldier behind them. Then the process of the early development of a new political worker is very difficult.

Lt. Nikolay Kravchuk arrived from the same military political school as Gornev at the same time. His desire to work was adequate, but things did not come off. Needless to say, he conducted political training periods and political information sessions, but they were not quite right. Sometimes everybody in the company would be overworked and without free time, but Lieutenant Kravchuk would not know what to do. The company trained, competed, stood out in some respects and lagged in others, but everything seemed to happen without his direct participation.

Kravchuk's personal training was not going well then either. He had learned to drive a tank at school, but the ones in the regiment were different. He could have asked experienced mechanic-drivers for help, but Kravchuk felt that an officer should not learn from sergeants, it would undermine his authority.

This state of "weightlessness" would perhaps have continued a long time if Maj V. Derkach, an experienced political worker, had not directed fixed attention to Lieutenant Kravchuk. He studied company affairs with him, showed him how to plan party political work and publicize competition, how to use the entire arsenal of tested means such as wall newspapers, operational news sheets, graphic materials, Komsomol meetings, and the like, for this purpose.

At the major's suggestion Kravchuk began to plan his own working day. His plan included notes on who to meet, who to talk with, what assignments to give to what individuals, who to check up on, and so forth.

And the lieutenant learned an old truth: if you do not put off until tomorrow that which can be done today you can do a great deal in one day.

The time passed, Nikolay Krachuk became involved in company life and took a place in the collective worthy of the deputy commander for political affairs.

In the N unit new political workers who are recent graduates of military political schools comprise a good third of political personnel. Most of them mastered their duties quite fast and are doing very well. But the first steps come hard to some comrades, and sometimes they are even painful. Commanders, the large unit political branch, the political workers of the units, the party committees, and the party bureaus are doing a great deal to simplify and accelerate the process of early development of political workers. The political branch is trying to coordinate this work and direct it according to plan. All political officers help newcomers, but personal responsibility for their work sector has been given to the experienced political worker Maj V. Klimanov. He takes this assignment very seriously. Klimanov keeps an eye on each new political worker, maintains personal ties with each one, and is always ready to give a person good advice or assistance.

Seminars for company political workers are held regularly on the last Thursday of the month. Speakers include the commander of the large unit, the chief of the political branch, and qualified lecturers. At practical training periods exchange of know-how is organized by groups. Every Saturday the deputy regimental commanders for political affairs assemble the company political workers for practical training periods. These are usually held in one of the companies which accumulated positive know-how in organizing competition and political support for field exercises and scheduled servicing days at the motor pool.

One out of five company political workers studies at evening universities of Marxism-Leninism and some have been admitted to the extension faculties of higher educational institutions. The rest study in Marxist-Lenin training groups under the direction of the chief of the political branch.

In short, the political branch uses many levers to influence the process of the early development of young political workers. But the word "many" does not mean "all." There are still problems for the political branch to resolve. Here is an example.

Self-education is especially important for a political worker alongside organizational forms of training. If the political worker does not educate himself he risks falling behind and losing the right to act as a political and moral guide for subordinates. I once talked on this subject with a number of experienced and new political workers who were successfully achieving their obligations. They all devoted large amounts of time to self-education. Let us recall Vladimir

Gornev, who carried a suitcase full of books with him. He also subscribes to and reads newspapers and journals, studies the classics of Marxism-Leninism regularly, and subscribes to two libraries where he has read virtually all the military memoirs available. Gornev also loves artistic literature.

Most political workers read and think about what they have read. But there are still those who have not acquired a taste for reading. They "skim" the newspaper (one cannot get along without this) and seem to be up to date on the events in our fast-moving life. But when questions of political and artistic literature come up they do not always remember the book and when they read it. Some go no further than adventure stories. Of course, the self-education of new officers must always be watched.

Political work is complex and subtle work. It is not that easy to succeed in this sphere of an officer's activity, to master its principles, methods, and forms and to acquire the necessary skills. It is equally difficult to develop a new political worker, educate him, and arm him with experience. This requires time, substantial patience, and, of course, tact and self-control. But are these circumstances always taken into account?

They expressed concern in the political branch when they showed me the list of company political officers who had managed to acquire reprimands. When it is a question of personal misdeeds, strictness here can be understood. But when you see such phrases as "for poor organization of political training and a low level of control" and "for omissions in educational work," you cannot help reflecting. After all, the men who received these reprimands had taken officer positions for the first time and just begun to understand the intricacies of organizing educational work and checking on its quality. It would be wiser to emphasize something else: teach more, explain, demonstrate...

New political workers...They do not always have adequate experience and skills, but these will surely come. And when senior comrades put more effort and energy into this important work they will come faster.

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OFFICERS URGED TO LEAD BY EXAMPLE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 May 77 p 1

[Editorial: "The Officer's Personal Example"]

[Text] One of the compartments of the submarine had been in complete isolation for more than 20 days. The situation was very difficult: complete darkness, cold, and rolling in gale winds. The navy men faced a test that is rare in peacetime. But none of them trembled, none doubted that they would emerge safely. The submarine sailors were given this confidence by the secretary of the submarine party organization, Capt-Lt-Engr B. Polyakov, who was in charge of compartment personnel. While skillfully inspiring personnel to fight for survival he conducted himself with exceptional self-control and rationality. The officer's example in a critical situation had an enormous influence on the seamen and helped them endure all the hardships without giving up. For courage and skillful leadership of subordinates and setting an excellent personal example in a difficult situation the communist B. Polyakov was awarded the Order of the Red Star.

Setting a good personal example has always been one of the main characteristics of the Soviet officer; it is based on a good understanding of service duty, devotion to the cause of the party and people, and loyalty to the military oath. The first Red commanders and commissars led their fighting men forward confidently at the decisive moment, inspiring them in a Bolshevik manner and drawing them on by their personal example of courage and valor. Soviet soldiers and sailors, seeing the examples of their commanders, performed miracles of heroism at the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. Today too, in combat training and on duty, in the difficult situations of long-distance cruises, tense flights, and difficult marches and battles the personal example of the officers is enormously important for achieving success.

Military service, regulations, and the moral code of the officer collective set the personal example as one of the key techniques by which officers influence subordinates. There is no officer who does not understand the importance of his own example in successful leadership of subordinates. During the socialist competition to celebrate the

60th anniversary of Great October in a worthy fashion in the army and navy the number of outstanding subunits is growing and the struggle to be a leading unit is developing broadly; in this movement commanders, political workers, staff officers, and engineers have a decisive role. Personal example helps them establish strict regulation order, solidify combat collectives, make servicemen more demanding of themselves and one another, and truly involve the men in common causes.

The only time the personal example is really effective is when it comes naturally from the lofty internal qualities and convictions of the officer and shows itself constantly, in all spheres of work and life. The internal service regulations of the USSR armed forces state: "The commander (chief) must set for his subordinates an example of strict observance of moral and ethical norms of behavior, irreproachable fulfillment of the requirements of Soviet laws, the military oath, military regulations, and his service duties."

There is no doubt that the most striking cases of the personal example often occur in critical situations, under unusual, difficult circumstances when accomplishing missions that require courage, strong will, organization, and a high level of professional skill. Skillful, determined actions by an officer have a particularly profound and strong emotional effect on subordinates, inspire them to activity, and produce a quick, tangible result. As experience shows, striking examples of personal behavior in difficult situations are given by precisely those commanders and political workers who are very demanding of themselves in everyday life and try to set an example for their subordinates in every respect.

The pilots of the squadron were as accustomed to flying in a complex situation as in standard conditions. All the same, when Capt A. Zubarev took off to intercept a high-speed radio-controlled target they watched their comrade's actions worriedly: technical and meteorological conditions were too difficult for successful performance of the mission. But squadron political worker Captain Zubarev made his attack confidently and wisely, setting an example of outstanding skills. Communist Zubarev's prestige is also considerable in the subunit because in everyday life as well he sets an example of irreproachable performance of service duty, sensitivity to the men, and high standards with respect to himself.

Unfortunately, some officers, especially new ones, are inclined to underestimate the importance of the personal example in everyday work with subordinates, believing that they will be able to show their qualities under special conditions, when necessary. This view represents not only an incorrect idea of the personal example as an educational method but also a totally mistaken understanding of the role of the teacher. Whereas an officer who is a specialist may, for example, give himself a break after working on the equipment and switching to a different activity, the teacher is performing his functions at all times. This is because, in relation to his subordinates,

he is not only a leader, commander, and pedagog but also a person. The success of all his educational activity depends largely on the influence a commander or political worker exerts on subordinates through his moral and professional qualities, his persuasion, and his attitude toward those around him.

To be exemplary in everything is the foundation of pedagogical skill. Every officer can master this skill. Senior officers, political workers, party organizations, and staffs and political branches in the units and on ships should devote real effort to improving the example set by officers. The timely and skillful assistance of senior officers will help younger men use the pedagogical knowledge and skills they have acquired more fully for practical purposes and will lead them to correct views of their role in the military collective.

It is also important here to note that the officers, especially new ones, are greatly influenced by the personal example of senior officers. This helps them acquire experience quickly, find themselves reliable in complex situations, and work out proper norms of behavior for themselves.

The Soviet Armed Forces are justly proud of their intelligent, experienced, respected officers. Flesh of the flesh of the Soviet people, they enjoy the great respect and affection of the soldiers and seamen. Setting an example in performance of military duty to the homeland, Soviet officers apply all their knowledge, skills, and efforts to improving the combat training and professional skill of Soviet fighting men even further and by their personal example inspiring them to new heights in bolstering the defense capability of our socialist fatherland.

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COMBAT TRAINING OF HELICOPTER GUNSHIP CREWS DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 May 77 p 1

[Article by Maj A. Yurkin, Red Banner Siberian Military District:
"Helicopters on Combat Course — the Main Thing Is Effectiveness and
Quality"]

[Text] The bright blue flame of the missile illuminated the helicopter cockpit, hurtled forward, and disappeared. In a short time powerful explosions flashed above the range. The strike hit the dummies located in the center of a column of vehicles. Maj V. Kuznetsov turned off the weapons system with a satisfied look and closed the safety hood of the firing button. Mission accomplished. Time to return to the air field.

Other crews also delivered accurate missile strikes against ground targets. The squadron has many masters of combat application, and the flights that day demonstrated the skill of the aviators. Every other crew commander is a military pilot 1st class who has mastered all techniques of air support for ground troops. These assignments, which are the most difficult and, according to the aviators, the most interesting, arouse a desire for competition. During this competition in the winter training period the top missile marksmen were determined. Thus, during a strike against an "enemy" air field the first to hit the target with their missiles were party group organizer Maj P. Fetisov and Capt V. Sharov, a new communist. The first flight performed its mission brilliantly, even though it had to operate against the sun with a strong side wind owing to tactical considerations.

But those were daytime flights. The aviators now are mastering the skill of night strikes. The results are good. We can see from the command post at the range how the helicopters are approaching at minimum altitude. The crews are using folds in the terrain and forests for camouflage. Now they make their hump, set the combat course, and the target is lit up by explosions which then roll outward. But the helicopter gun ships are already gone. They dropped down and disappeared as suddenly as they had appeared.

"Major Sazhin's flight it was," says Lt Col V. Aleksandrov, flight control officer. "According to reports from range specialists their hits meet standards for an outstanding evaluation."

Maj A. Sazhin is an aerial fighter 1st class and holder of the Order for Service to the Homeland in the USSR Armed Forces 3rd Degree. The flight which he commands has been outstanding for several years. All the pilots, as well as their commander fire accurately and make skillful use of the tactical situation.

A large majority of the pilots in the squadron are communists. They set the tone in competition. In these night firing exercises two outstanding results were produced by flight party group organizers Capt A. Miroshkin and Sr Lts M. Kadyrov and A. Kuz'min. Their personal example is the best method of party influence on fellow servicemen. After landing the master marksmen shared their know-how in attacking ground targets in specially printed operational news sheets and in talks with new pilots.

During the summer period helicopter pilots will be reinforcing their skills in fire support for ground forces and improving skills in landing parties at unfamiliar sites under taiga terrain conditions, carrying suspended cargoes, and so on.

Judging by the varied nature of the missions, it is easy to see how broad an aviator's training must be. Most of the crews have such training. Take the subordinates of Capt V. Sharov as an example. This is a harmonious military collective. The navigator-pilot of the crew is Sr Lt A. Kuz'min and the flight technician is Sr Lt Tech Serv S. Konarev; both are leading specialists in the subunit. The aviators ordinarily perform all flight assignments of any level of difficulty with outstanding scores.

But there is no limit to combat improvement. Moreover, it is the duty of the experienced and skillful pilots, technicians, and mechanics to bring the new aviators up to the level of the masters. This is also a big job and one of the most important challenges of socialist competition in the summer training period. The first night flights at the range demonstrated that the aviators are ready to celebrate the 60th anniversary of Great October in a worthy manner.

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STATUTE ON PRODUCTION-FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES OF DOSAAF ENTERPRISES DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 1 Jun 77 p 3

[Article by B. Myagkov, deputy directorate chief, USSR DOSAAF Central Committee: "Efficiency of Management"]

[Text] In order to raise the level of economic management, quality of management and the responsibility of heads of DOSAAF committees, organizations and enterprises for the state of production activities, a Statute on Production-Financial Activities of DOSAAF Enterprises was issued by order of the Chairman of the Central Committee of USSR DOSAAF. It applies to all DOSAAF enterprises (associations, plants, combines and shops), both those on an independent balance sheet and those financed by DOSAAF committees and organizations, and aims at ensuring a unified system of organization, planning and supervision of production activities.

This guideline document establishes the concrete tasks and duties of central and local DOSAAF committees in DOSAAF production activities, and in particular:

boosting production capacity at operating enterprises, securing the manufacture of new products required by DOSAAF committees and organizations for comprehensive organization and conduct of mass defense activities;

determination of long-range enterprise growth and establishment of basic technical-economic indices of production and production retooling plans for DOSAAF enterprises;

conduct of special measures and concentration of production by reorganizing small enterprises and shops into larger operations (establishment of specialized combines, associations and republic industrial associations);

supervision of elaboration at DOSAAF enterprises of progressive consumption standards and quotas for supplies, raw materials, fuel and energy, equipment utilization and product labor requirements;

guiding of enterprise activities toward all-out boosting of the technological level of production on the basis of total mechanization and automation of production processes, adoption of the latest achievements of science and technology, modernization of installed equipment and improved use of existing production space, continuous improvement of production processes, as well as securement of effective monitoring to ensure observance of manufacturing process discipline, smoothness, quality and reliability of the manufactured product.

Also determined was the area of responsibility for enterprise executives in the area of securement of production, financial and economic activities.

From a legal respect the statute regulates a number of important elements connected, for example, with the function of DOSAAF enterprises, sale of fixed assets, plan target adjustment deadlines, etc.

DOSAAF enterprises and shops manufacture sports equipment, training equipment, supplies, and visual training aids in conformity with the aims and tasks of DOSAAF; they repair and maintain training and athletic equipment and other gear; they perform other work connected with the training and sports activities of DOSAAF organizations; manufacture of items needed by local economic organizations (by joint decision of the corresponding DOSAAF committees and local planning bodies), with the stipulation that the percentage share of output manufactured for outside organizations shall not exceed 20% of total production volume.

For effective utilization of fixed assets belonging to DOSAAF, the statute states that buildings, other equipment, operating and surplus equipment and other fixed assets assigned to an enterprise, as well as stored materials, may be transferred and sold to enterprises and organizations of other ministries, government agencies and public organizations only with the permission of the Central Committee of USSR DOSAAF.

When this statute goes into effect in April 1977, establishment of new enterprises (associations, plants, combines and shops) by committees, as well as reorganization and liquidation of existing enterprises shall be performed only with the agreement of the Central Committee of USSR DOSAAF.

The statute specifies a uniform procedure, scope and timetable for preparation and submission to government agencies of consolidated draft plans, as well as ratification of technical, industrial and financial plans of enterprises operating both under the new and old system of planning and economic incentive. Indices have been determined for production, labor, finances, capital construction, adoption of new equipment, as well as supply, which shall be ratified by DOSAAF Central Committees and execution of which shall be mandatory for every enterprise. Principal sections of technical, industrial and financial plans have been specified for enterprises on an independent balance sheet, as well as indices and form for preparing production-financial plans for shops on the balance sheet of DOSAAF committees and organizations.

The attention of enterprise managers has been drawn in particular toward submission to the higher-echelon organization for approval, five days before the end of the current quarter, of the production plan for the following quarter, with a month-by-month breakdown. This prevents enterprises from independently understating plan targets for the first few months of each quarter, with the objective of easily meeting them and receiving guaranteed bonuses from the bonus funds, and obliges production managers to ensure smooth enterprise operations throughout each month, quarter, and the year as a whole.

The statute specifies the procedure of formation and growth of working capital, the procedure of settling accounts with suppliers, contractors, customers and other debtors and creditors, as well as the amounts and procedure of transferring payments into the budget.

Promulgation of this statute makes it possible to establish a standard methodology in matters of enterprise production-financial activities, to determine their relationships with higher-echelon DOSAAF committees and, in connection with this, to improve the effectiveness and quality of work in organizing the entire system of DOSAAF production activities.

The Statute on Production-Financial Activities of DOSAAF Enterprises will be communicated in the very near future to DOSAAF committees and enterprises.

3024
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DOSAAF PREINDUCTION TRAINING RESULTS EVALUATED

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 1 Jun 77 p 3

[Article by Engr-Lt Col S. Konobeyev, Senior Officer, Civilian Training Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense: "Capacity of the Training Hour"]

[Text] The trainees took their customary places in the radio training area. They donned earphones and prepared to work with the telegraph key. Suddenly and unexpectedly they heard loud explosions, the roar of aircraft engines and the staccato beat of machinegun bursts.... Some of the boys became confused and were unable to continue communications.

V. Burkovskiy, head of the Brest DOSAAF Radio School, subsequently commenting on this drill, stated that this kind of combat-simulation background during the training process is no rarity. Instructors endeavor to develop in preinduction youth not only solid professional skills but also psychological stability in working with equipment under conditions of jamming and interference, and they endeavor to teach the future soldiers to perform their duties in high-stress situations of actual combat. As it turned out the boys, who did a fairly good job working with the communications equipment, lost their operating efficiency upon encountering noise effect for the first time. Some of them requested that the interference be switched off.

But training in a situation of intensive radio interference and environmental noise continued. Gradually the preinduction youth began to develop confidence in their abilities. Drill activities of this kind make it possible to develop in young people correct views on military service and to develop in them interest in the military and their future military occupational specialty.

Take, for example, the Khabarovsk DOSAAF Naval School, which in recent years has twice been awarded the Challenge Red Banner of the USSR Ministry of Defense for training specialists for the navy. Training organization chief L. Tsukerman presents an example of innovative work with youth. A demanding mentor, he skillfully strengthens order and discipline in the collective, from the very first days of training making the boys enthusiastic over the romance of navy service. His goal is to ensure that the trainees demonstrate

at the final examinations the ability to perform confidently and smoothly under the most complex conditions. Precise organization of internal order at the naval school, in conformity with regulations, develops in the trainees a high sense of duty, discipline, and smartness.

The training day at DOSAAF schools usually begins with formation and trooping the colors. Those training organization chiefs who always pay attention to formation discipline and smartness of appearance of their men are doing the right thing. This constantly occupies the attention focus of supervisory personnel at the Aleksandrovsk-Sakhalinskiy DOSAAF Automotive School, directed by V. Safronov.

Recently this school received a high mark in an inspection by a USSR Ministry of Defense Commission. The success of this training organization is due primarily to the fact that the instructors devote considerable attention not only to establishment of facilities and improvement of their methods skills but also display unabating concern for the proper organization of internal service, order and discipline, and proper military bearing on the part of the preinductees.

In training future military personnel, one should not ignore their physical conditioning. The requisite physical skills, strength, agility, and stamina are best acquired in training drills and competitions for meeting the performance standards of the Prepared for Labor and Defense complex.

The majority of training organizations possess well-equipped sports facilities and utilize the stadiums and swimming pools of voluntary sports societies and other physical culture organizations. As inspections have indicated, there is considerable reserve potential for increasing the level of physical conditioning of preinduction youth. Unfortunately some DOSAAF schools are not yet utilizing this potential in all instances. To judge from reports, sometimes the situation in training organizations is not bad as regards meeting the performance standards of the Prepared for Labor and Defense complex. The percentage of badgeholders is high. But verification sometimes fails to confirm these indices.

Many school directors, knowing the requirements on physical training of preinduction youth, conduct training classes in their own way. Why is this? Because up to the present time there is no precise methods manual stating scientifically-substantiated recommendations on organization of training activities to meet the Prepared for Labor and Defense complex. We believe that it is high time to synthesize and systematize amassed know-how and experience.

In the current training year DOSAAF training organizations have been holding competitions to increase the effectiveness of utilization of training time and to improve the training of the preinductees. At many DOSAAF schools the methods training of classroom and shop instructors has become more purposeful. But it would be wrong to assume that teaching skill can be improved only by means of teaching methods seminars, instructive, open

and demonstration classes. These forms of training are certainly of importance, but the most important element nevertheless was and remains independent work by teachers and shop instructors to improve their political, specialized and methods knowledge.

As we know, a low methodological level of training classes inevitably affects the quality of training and indoctrination. If the instructor himself has been poorly trained, the class will be boring and dull. A decisive role here should be played by the training organization's teachers' council. Its job is to offer continuous assistance to beginning teachers with methods recommendations, to equip them with advanced know-how. It is advisable to involve in these activities the chairmen of military examination boards, officers from the patron military units and military commissariats, and representatives of the State Motor Vehicle Inspection.

All-out intensification of the training process and elimination of elements of artificiality and unnecessary relaxation of demands from teaching practices constitute a most important foundation for training skilled specialists for the armed forces. This enables teachers and shop instructors to develop in the students firm knowledge and solid skills and to prepare them well for service in the Armed Forces.

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LACK OF DOSAAF DEFENSE-SPORTS, HEALTH CAMPS IN AMUR AREA CRITICIZED

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 8 Jun 77 p 3

[Article by S. Tiro: "Status of Pariahs"]

[Text] Oleg Antonovich Kisten', chairman of the Shimanovskiy Rayon DOSAAF Committee, told us: "Last year a defense-sports health camp was held in the period between Pioneer sessions at the Siletkan Pioneer Camp. Approximately 50 boys, ninth-grade students at schools in the rayon, spent two weeks consolidating the knowledge they had acquired at basic military training classes and were tested on the performance standards of the Prepared for Labor and Defense complex. The Komsomol rayon committee selected a commander for this 'field academy.' We helped prepare visual propaganda aids on military topics, issued small arms and ammunition, and organized competitions.

"At the defense-sports camp the future military personnel engaged in drill and physical training, studied weapons and Soviet Army field manuals, stood guard duty, and took part in various paramilitary games."

Listening to Kisten's report, we could not help but think: this is all very well and good, but is a single defense sports camp adequate or inadequate for an entire rayon? Of course one is not enough. With construction of the Shimanovsk industrial complex of the Baykal-Amur Main Line, the population of this taiga town has increased considerably. The influx of young people to other local enterprises as well has increased. And naturally a single "field academy" cannot save the situation.

It was noted at a recent joint session of Komsomol and DOSAAF rayon committees that it is high time to establish in this rayon several defense-sports camps, to strengthen their facilities, and to provide methods training for instructor-indoctrinators.

Oleg Antonovich is in agreement with this. He says that these items are presently on the agenda. But unfortunately they are being resolved slowly.

And not only in this rayon. We were hoping to see model defense-sports camps in Blagoveshchensk. After all, it is the oblast capital! However, Aleksandr Ivanovich Varin, chairman of the Leninskiy Rayon DOSAAF Committee, shrugged helplessly: "I have never heard about any such camps...."

We hear practically the same response at the Partizanskiy Rayon DOSAAF Committee.

What is the problem? Why is so little attention devoted to defense-sports camps in the Amur area? We attempted to obtain a clearer picture from the chairman of the Amurskaya Oblast DOSAAF Committee, Yuriy Ivanovich Bokin. But he could give us no concrete answers. At the present time nobody in the oblast committee is working on these matters.

At the Komsomol oblast committee Viktor Lobochev, chief of the defense-sports division, attempted to answer all our questions.

"Of course," he began very optimistically. "We have always devoted attention to these camps. Last year, for example, 228 boys and girls attended them. Here are the documents proving it."

He handed us a very thick folder. But it contained primarily reports about... oblast Pioneer camps. The closer we looked at the content of the materials, the more Viktor's optimism evaporated. We can begin by stating that there were seven specialized camps in the oblast, but for some reason there were no defense-sports health camps. There were tourist, labor, and tourist-sports camps in the oblast. But they all serve a quite different function.

It turned out that wishful thinking was being reported as actuality. Lobochev himself finally admitted this. Finally becoming entangled in a labyrinth of terminology, reports and statuses, he candidly confessed: "Probably there are defense-sports camps in this oblast, but we do not know much about them. Judging by all indications, they are totally on their own."

This was in fact the case. In Shimanovskiy, Belogorskiy, Zavitinskiy and several other rayons, public organizations jointly with military commissariats are independently establishing defense-sports camps, not utilizing Pioneer camps adapted for this function, and sometimes paying little or no attention to the matter of selecting instructors and counselors for the future military personnel.

Experience indicates that defense-sports camps play an important role in preparing boys for military service and help them acquire solid practical skills in basic military training.

The land along the Amur River is the land of the pioneer builders of the Baykal-Amur Main Line and the Far East's main supplier of agricultural

products. Every year new towns and villages spring up deep in the taiga, on the former sites of swamps and marshes. Virgin lands are being put into exploitation, and large forest industry combines are being established. The area's population is growing rapidly. The influx of young people is particularly noticeable. Therefore life intself dictates the need to establish such "field academies." But unfortunately this important matter has been neglected along the Amur.

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DOSAAF RADIO-TECHNICAL SCHOOLS AMONG SHORTWAVE RADIO VIOLATORS

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 12 Jun 77 p 4

[Article by I. Kazanskiy: "'Trash' on the Airwaves"]

[Text] That evening dozens of shortwave ham radio operators in Kazan', Gor'kiy and Moscow sought in vain to contact an operator transmitting from distant Vladivostok, who was suddenly and unexpectedly coming in loud and clear in the 80-meter band, an extremely rare occurrence on that band. They failed to establish this rare radio contact. The Far-Eastern ham operator did not and could not hear their calls: two ham operators were on his frequency, holding a leisurely, hour-long conversation about... fishing.

The things one hears on the amateur band! UY5XS shares his reminiscences about a get-together with his college classmates, while UAITAU confidentially reports that he has taken compensatory leave from work and is going to have a nice vacation. The operator working group-owned transmitter UK2RAS talks about his father's occupation. UC2CW is about to go off on a business trip and is inquiring about train arrival times....

May I remind the readers that existing regulations specify that during ham radio communications it is permitted to exchange information pertaining only to ham radio. There is a good reason for this. As we all know, radio waves can propagate both short and very great distances. Therefore transmitted signals reach not only the intended destination. Propagating in all directions, they can become, as in the case mentioned above, a source of interference.

What conclusion should be drawn from this? Should amateurs go off the air entirely? Of course not. But when transmitting, one should not forget about the potential interference; one should strictly observe the rules of radio communications and endeavor to make conversations short.

This would seem to be rather elementary and obvious. Then why do some ham operators so readily violate this obvious rule? Although the answer seems strange at first glance, we must nevertheless assert that it is due to bad manners.

A person who has been brought up correctly is always respectful of others. The ill-mannered person, as we know, respects neither himself nor others. When he wants to transmit, he will not select an open frequency but will occupy the first one he tunes in, totally unconcerned that he may be breaking into somebody else's transmission; if he hears rarely-heard call letters he will "elbow aside" other ham operators on the air, or he will butt into somebody else's conversation.... Many situations can arise on today's overcrowded amateur bands! Usually a ham operator of this ilk is not particularly concerned with the quality of his signal (why should he? He is not the one who is suffering from interference!). As proof, I shall list a few call letters of transmitters which have created incredible interference (they were recorded by operators of centrally-located transmitter UK3A): UA1CKX -- tone T5, wheezing; UA2FDG -- tone T3, a great many harmonics; UK7PAG -- spurious emissions across the band.

One of the first commandments of the amateur shortwave radio operator is rigorous observance of so-called frequency discipline.

Transmission on a frequency not assigned to amateur operators is a most serious infraction, for it can lead to blocking of important commercial or government communications. But here as well we encounter many violations. In a single month, for example, the monitoring service of the USSR Central Radio Club imeni E. T. Krenkel' logged as many as 10 such violations: UA4SB, UA4CEC, UB5CEF, and UA6RAL were CQing at frequencies from 6.984 to 6.993 MHz (the low end of the amateur bands is 7.00 MHz). During international competitions the good old 80-meter band suddenly became crowded for a great many radio amateurs (unfortunately we see among them teams of our leading radio amateurs). Quite honestly it is even embarrassing to mention in this connection call letters which we have become accustomed to seeing at the top of the lists of winners of national and international competitions. But here they are: UK2BBB, UK4LAC, UK6LAZ, UK7OAA, UK9AAA, UK9CAA. One is particularly alarmed by the fact that this list frequently contains the call letters of group-use transmitters of DOSAAF radio-technical schools.

This situation is intolerable. Indoctrination work should become an important task of all federations, technical monitoring services and radio-technical schools.

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DOSAAF TASKS IN CONNECTION WITH DISCUSSION OF DRAFT OF NEW CONSTITUTION

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 15 Jun 77 p 1

[Article: "A Task of Great Importance"]

[Text] The Soviet people, the men of the Armed Forces, and the members of the All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy enthusiastically and unanimously approved the decisions of the May (1977) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the new draft USSR Constitution, elaborated in conformity with the principles expressed at the 25th CPSU Congress.

The address by the Chairman of the Constitution Commission, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, at the May Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, contained profound scientific substantiation of the need for a new Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and revealed its main features, expressing the world-historic achievements of the Soviet people, attained under the leadership of the Communist Party during the last 40 years. Indicated in the address was the enormous significance of the new Constitution for the country's internal affairs and for strengthening the position of the forces of socialism, peace and progress in the international arena.

DOSAAF members see in the draft USSR Constitution another convincing manifestation of the concern of the Leninist party for the prosperity of the Soviet homeland, for strengthening its might and prestige, and for creating the most favorable conditions for development and utilization by the citizens of the Soviet Union of their productive energies, abilities and talents, harmonious development of the individual, and consistent development of socialist democracy.

In order to achieve implementation of the decisions of the May (1977) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and to ensure active participation by DOSAAF organizations in the nationwide discussion of the draft USSR Constitution, the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium Bureau issued a special decree. It instructed the DOSAAF central committees of the union republics, kray and oblast DOSAAF committees, DOSAAF central-subordination organizations and enterprises to take active part in measures conducted by party

and soviet agencies in connection with discussion of the new draft USSR Constitution, and to engage in extensive organizational and mass political effort to achieve thorough clarification of the decisions of the May (1977) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the new draft USSR Constitution among the members of DOSAAF.

The results of the May CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the tasks proceeding from Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's address entitled "The Draft Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" are to be discussed at meetings of DOSAAF committee officials, personnel of DOSAAF training organizations, workers and employees of DOSAAF production enterprises.

Explanation and clarification of the proceedings of the May (1977) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the draft USSR Constitution must be organically coordinated with publicizing of the resolutions of the 25th CPSU Congress and preparations for celebration of the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and must comprehensively demonstrate our country's achievements in building communism and the unswerving growth in the material prosperity and improvement in the cultural level of the Soviet people, the humanistic essence of the Soviet state, the democracy of Soviet society and the Soviet socialist way of life, and party and government measures to strengthen the nation's defense capability and increase the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces. It is necessary to reveal profoundly and in a well-argued manner the role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as the guiding force of Soviet society.

All forms of propaganda and mass agitation should be extensively utilized by members of DOSAAF for explaining and elucidating the decisions of the May (1977) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the draft USSR Constitution: political instruction classes, political information sessions, lectures, reports, discussions, evening functions devoted to specific topics, get-togethers between young people, including preinduction youth, party and government officials, soviet deputies, military leaders and army, navy and labor veterans.

Four hours have been allocated within the political instruction system (this time is to be obtained from topic 5 and reserve time) for studying the draft USSR Constitution with preinduction youth enrolled in DOSAAF training organizations.

DOSAAF clubs should participate extensively in explaining and elucidating the proceedings of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the draft USSR Constitution. These efforts should include skillful utilization of means of technical dissemination and visual agitation. DOSAAF officials, lecturer teams and groups set up under the auspices of DOSAAF committees must be extensively recruited for propaganda work.

Seminars and instruction sessions on content and method of publicizing and studying the proceedings of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the draft USSR Constitution should be organized for political instruction group leaders and propaganda activists.

DOSA AF periodicals have been assigned large and important tasks. They are to give extensive publicity to the nationwide discussion of the draft USSR Constitution and regularly publish propagandist articles, comments and suggestions by DOSAAF members on questions pertaining to the nationwide, popular nature of defense of the socialist homeland and strengthening of the nation's defense capability and activities of DOSAAF.

All DOSAAF committees and officials must devote greater attention to examination of suggestions and statements made in the course of the discussion, ensure prompt response to indications of deficiencies and omissions in the performance of DOSAAF executive bodies, and increase responsibility for taking prompt measures in response to such indications and critical remarks.

Letters and suggestions pertaining to the draft USSR Constitution, received from DOSAAF members, personnel of DOSAAF training organizations, workers and employees at DOSAAF enterprises shall be examined and synthesized by the DOSAAF central committees of the union republic, kray and oblast DOSAAF committees. The synthesized materials shall be forwarded every 10 days to the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee.

All efforts at explanation and elucidation of the May (1977) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the draft USSR Constitution should be directed toward further consolidation of the members of DOSAAF behind the CPSU and its Leninist Central Committee, headed by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, successful performance of the tasks assigned by the 25th CPSU Congress, improvement in the quality and effectiveness of military-patriotic, mass defense, training and sports activities, and a worthy celebration of the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

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MORAL INDOCTRINATION OF SOVIET SERVICEMEN

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 6, Jun 77 signed to press
20 May 77 pp 3-13

[Article by Maj Gen D. Volkogonov, professor, doctor of philosophical sciences:
"Moral Indoctrination of Soviet Servicemen in Light of the Decisions of the
25th CPSU Congress"]

[Text] The great triune task for the building of a communist society -- the creation of the material-technical base for communism, the molding of communist social relations, and the indoctrination of the new man-- is being accomplished simultaneously and in an integrated manner rather than piecemeal and by turns. Here, the molding of a communist personality is accomplished in considerable measure by moral means, on the theoretical basis of Marxism-Leninism.

At the 25th Party Congress, which scientifically substantiated the detailed program for the further development of Soviet society, profound ideas were proposed concerning ways for the improvement of the communist, moral indoctrination of Soviet people. Their significance for molding high moral and combat qualities among the Soviet men--the armed defenders of the socialist Fatherland--is exceptionally great.

I. The Leninist Program for the Moral Development of a Socialist Society

After the accomplishment of the Great October Socialist Revolution, which marked the beginning of ridding mankind of the oppression of the exploiters, the new society faced many most difficult socio-economic, political, military, and spiritual problems. One of them was freeing people from bourgeois morals and instilling new moral qualities in the citizens of the first socialist state in the world and its armed defenders. "A difficult but also honorable role of pioneer in the creation of a new society befell the lot of the proletariat of multinational Russia," it is noted in the decree of the Central Committee CPSU, "On the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution."¹

The revolutionary struggle of the working class, the combat activity of the Red Army's regular units in the defense of socialism's achievements, and the social transformations which were conducted in the workers' state confirmed in life the new moral attitudes and the new morals: class and combat solidarity, fairness, collectivism, triumphant optimism, and an inextinguishable faith in the victory of communist ideals.

This process was not simple, for even the most resolute ideal revolution in society does not completely destroy the old morals and does not at once create absolutely different morals. The latter is confirmed in the fierce struggle not only with the representatives of the defeated exploiter classes, but also with the numerous temporary fellow-travellers. Some "left" theoreticians attempted to convert the struggle against the bourgeois morals into an anarchist crusade against morals in general and socialist morals in particular.²

The party of Bolsheviks waged a stubborn struggle against such views. An important role in it belonged, in particular, to Yem. Yaroslavskiy who showed in his speeches in a well-reasoned manner the social harm and scientific groundlessness of Nihilist trends in theory and in practice.³

The representatives of the leftist points of view on morals denied the significance of the organization and discipline of the proletariat. V. I. Lenin subjected these petty bourgeois ideas to sharp criticism. "...It is time to shout when people reach the point that the introduction of labor discipline will be a step backward, -- and I must say that I perceive in this such an unprecedented reactionary thing, such a threat to the revolution...",⁴ he wrote.

The struggle for strengthening the new revolutionary discipline of the working masses was combined with the persistent efforts of the Bolsheviks which they applied, confirming in morals the socialist attitude toward labor. A remarkable manifestation of this were the communist free labor Saturdays which expressed a fundamentally new approach to the moral significance of free labor. "This is the start of a revolution," wrote V. I. Lenin, "more difficult, more significant, more basic, and more decisive than the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, because it is a victory over stagnation itself, over a lack of discipline, over petty bourgeois egoism, over those customs which accursed capitalism left as an inheritance for the worker and peasant."⁵ The ideas and principles of collectivism, a socialist attitude toward labor, class solidarity, and the readiness to give all one's strength for the armed defense of the state of workers and peasants received wide distribution in the Red Army, too.

As soon as the Soviet military regulations began to be worked out again, regulations in which many moral norms were consolidated, various "Revolutionary Booklets," "Combat Commandments," "Red Oaths," "Rules of Comradeship," and other codes of behavioral norms for revolutionary fighters received wide distribution in daily practice.

The first Soviet military oath, approved by the VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee] on 22 April 1918 played an important role in enunciating the principles for the moral indoctrination of the men of the revolutionary army. It defined the range of class and moral duties assigned to the servicemen.

A special place in the question of establishing the system for the moral indoctrination of the Soviet servicemen is occupied by the service "Notebook of the Red Army Man"⁶ which was approved in 1918 by the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, V. I. Lenin, and the Chairman of the VTsIK, Ya. M. Sverdlov. It became a unique code of Soviet military ethics. It set forth the most important principles which defined the behavior of the serviceman in battle, under peaceful conditions, and outlined the directions for the molding of moral-combat qualities among the servicemen.

V. I. Lenin's speech on 2 October 1920 at the 3d Congress of the RKSM [Russian Young Communist League] had exceptional significance for the working out of the moral program for the development of Soviet society and the indoctrination of the men of the army and navy. In it, and also in the numerous works, articles, and speeches of Vladimir Il'ich, were formed the basic principles for the moral indoctrination of citizens of the new society and ways for the development and confirmation of communist morals. His ideas are, in essence, a detailed program for the molding of a new man, the main propositions of which embrace a broad range of questions. The most important of them are the following.

First, in disclosing the essence of the moral indoctrination of people of the new formation, V. I. Lenin invariably stressed that it can be accomplished only in the daily process of the social rebuilding of society and the struggle for implementing the plans for communist construction in our country. The successful molding of the new man is a task of historical importance and complexity. It can be accomplished, as V. I. Lenin taught, not by "charming speeches," not by dogmatism, and not by "book knowledge of communism," but by the constant struggle for communism and by everyone's participation in the socialist reconstruction of life. Subsequently, when a number of military periodicals appeared, and in particular the journals KRASNAYA PRISYAGA [Red Oath], VOYENNAYA NAUKA I REVOLYUTSIYA [Military Science and Revolution], VOYENNAYA MYSL' [Military Thought], POLITRABOTNIK [Political Worker], VOYNA I REVOLYUTSIYA [War and Revolution] and others, the Leninist ideas about the indoctrinational role of revolutionary practice, the essence and content of which is one of the most important parts of the Lenin program for moral indoctrination, received broad development in them.

Second, we find in Lenin's works the definition of the criterion for the new morals, the evaluation of quality, and the level of moral indoctrination. It is known that in the past, just as now, the bourgeois theoreticians tried and are trying to find a criterion for moral deeds which would permit determining their moral value. But all these attempts are doomed to failure because there can be no single criterion in a society which is divided into hostile, antagonistic classes.

V. I. Lenin formulated the true criterion for the moral behavior of people for the first time in history: "We say: morality is what serves the destruction of the old exploiter society and the uniting of all workers around the proletariat which is creating a new society of communists.... The struggle for the strengthening and realization of communism lies at the basis of communist morality."⁷ This exclusively capacious and profound Leninist principle clearly determines the criterion for society's moral progress and for the moral indoctrination of the workers. Recalling these words of V. I. Lenin, L. I. Brezhnev stressed once again at the 25th Congress of the CPSU that "everything serving the interests of communist construction is moral in our society."⁸

Third, V. I. Lenin taught that the moral development of the workers and their indoctrination are impossible without the constant struggle against any manifestations of bourgeois ideology, to include the sphere of morals. The diametrical opposition of class interests also causes the complete polarity of the ideological conceptions of antagonistic classes. The struggle against a hostile ideology, proceeding from the Leninist instructions, is not only a form of class hostility but also a school for the social tempering of the workers and the development of proletarian understanding of duty, class feeling, and revolutionary instinct in them. V. I. Lenin's ideas concerning the necessity for the constant counteraction against bourgeois propaganda are acquiring special significance now when, as the 25th Congress of the CPSU stressed, "problems of the ideological struggle are being thrust to the foreground more and more."⁹ Without debunking the false ideas with the aid of which the capitalist world is trying to camouflage the moral decline of its way of life which is marked by a great number of social and moral diseases, there can be no successful accomplishment of the process of indoctrinating the new man.

Fourth, V. I. Lenin not only disclosed the essence, content, criteria, and conditions for the moral indoctrination of people of a socialist society, but he also substantiated the necessity for the armed defense of socialism in the moral plane. He formulated one of the most important laws of war in accordance with which "in any war victory, in the last analysis, depends on the morale of those masses who are spilling their blood on the field of battle."¹⁰ And it is impossible to ensure morale without the moral means and the formation of the corresponding moral consciousness and moral attitudes. In one of the first Infantry Combat Regulations, the Lenin proposition concerning the role of moral forces in war was disclosed in the following manner. The task of indoctrinating the men, it said in the regulation, consists of developing in them "those moral-political data which will be able to ensure success of the battle (unanimity, gusto, consciousness of the necessity to attain victory, boldness, and resolve in overcoming all obstacles which may arise)."¹¹ The development of constant readiness and the moral ability to endure the most difficult tests of war and not lose the will to struggle and for victory is one of the leading principles in the moral-political and psychological training of the troops and the moral indoctrination of the Soviet servicemen.

The Lenin propositions concerning problems of moral indoctrination had and have tremendous significance. Subsequently, at all stages of our society's development--in the years of peaceful construction, in the sined years of war-time, in the postwar decades--the party, employing the Leninist methodology of communist indoctrination, improved this process systematically and implemented a broad complex of measures directed toward the successful molding of the new man. The most important result of this work during all the years of the Soviet state's existence, as was stressed at the 25th Congress of the CPSU, became the indoctrination of the new man. "A person who, having won freedom, succeeded in defending it in the most terrible battles. A person who built the future sparing no strength and accepting any sacrifices. A person who, having undergone all tests, himself changed unrecognizably and combined within himself ideological conviction and a tremendous vital energy, culture, knowledge, and the ability to employ them."¹²

II. The 25th Congress of the CPSU on the Tasks of Moral Indoctrination

It is known that the moral-political qualities of the Soviet people are molded by the entire socialist tenor of our life, by the entire course of affairs in society, but, first of all, by the purposeful, persistent ideological-indoc-trinational work of the party and all its organizations. In the total spectrum of qualities of the spiritual make-up, moral qualities occupy a special place. They express the moral value of man in society and the collective and his ability to accomplish his duty, sense his responsibility, manifest fairness, protect his honor, and maintain his dignity. Life has proven that even the highest professional knowledge and qualities, not multiplied by the moral virtues of man, may become a false value. The comprehensiveness of the new man's development, as the party defines it, also includes within itself the necessity to possess communist moral features.

In recent years, the Central Committee CPSU has adopted a number of decrees which develop the requirements and decisions of the 24th and 25th Party Congresses in the field of ideological-indoc-trinational work and, in particular, moral indoctrination. Special importance for this process is had by the 25th Congress of the CPSU at which questions of the moral indoctrination of Soviet people were examined in a broad plane and the corresponding tasks were formulated. The report of the Central Committee CPSU to the 25th Party Congress stressed: "Nothing so raises the personality as does an active living position and a conscientious attitude toward one's public duty where the unity of word and deed becomes the daily standard of behavior. To work out such a position /is the task of moral indoctrination/" [in boldface].¹³

The richest experience of social practice of our society, its army, and navy shows that the basis of the living position of man is always formed by loyalty to our communist ideas and ideals. Back in the middle of the last century K. Marx wrote that the ideas "which capture our thought and subordinate our convictions to themselves and to which reason rivets our conscience--these are the knots from which we cannot break away without breaking our hearts...."¹⁴

Ideological content permits a person to be profoundly convinced of the correctness of his life's position and stimulates the ability for mature, independent judgement and action. Only then can he achieve the moral peaks of spiritual perfection, when the basis of his moral behavior is formed by the ideological principles of Marxism-Leninism.

The entire system of ideological-political indoctrination in the Soviet Army is built with consideration of the necessity to mold communist convictions and a scientific world outlook in the men. A new thing after the 25th Party Congress is the increase in active forms of training (the broad conduct of scientific-practical conferences with the officer personnel, the preparation of papers, and participation in studies having great practical significance). Competition for the exemplary accomplishment of the norms of military ethics began to be widely practiced among the personnel. At the 16th Trade Union Congress the General Secretary of the Central Committee CPSU, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, stressed: "Competition is an irreplaceable means for the indoctrination of the new man and helps in his political growth and moral improvement."¹⁵

An active living position finds its most profound manifestation in the unity of word and deed, thoughts and actions. One of the determining principles of Marxism-Leninism--the unity of theory and practice--finds moral expression in this proposition. Unfortunately, as was noted at the 25th Party Congress, people are still encountered in our life who know our policy and our principles but do not always follow them in practice, do not wage a struggle for their implementation, and have a compromising attitude toward violation of the norms of communist morals. The gap between word and deed, whatever the forms in which it may be expressed, inflicts great harm on the cause of moral indoctrination. The Congress stressed that "the higher our society rises in its development, the more intolerable do the deviations from the socialist norms of morality which are still encountered become. Money-grabbing, private-ownership tendencies, hooliganism, bureaucratism, and indifference to man contradict the very nature of our system."¹⁶ Actually, these phenomena are relapses of a petty-bourgeois ideology and they cannot be underestimated. Bourgeois propaganda, aimed at the social consciousness of a socialist society, is striving to revive the moral vestiges of the past in every possible way and intensify the manifestation of various antipodes of communist morals. And our struggle with them, our implacability toward the amoral, is one of the indices of moral maturity.

Under conditions of army and naval service the possibility of the appearance of these deviations is extremely limited because of the nature of the military organization. But, at the same time, instances of improper behavior of individual servicemen and violation of the norms of mutual relations in the troop collective are still encountered in the military environment, too, reminiscent of various negative phenomena.

We judge the serviceman's adherence to a correct living position first of all from his practical deeds. The classical criterion of man's moral maturity was given to us by V. I. Lenin: "A man is judged not from what he says about himself or thinks, but from his deeds."¹⁷ The 25th Congress of our Party,

proceeding from this most important Lenin instruction, again stressed that the "standard of success in the political indoctrination of the masses, of course, is specific deeds."¹⁸ The results of combat training, the state of military discipline, and the maturity of moral attitudes in the subunit, the degree of irreconcilability toward the foreign and immoral, social activity, and much more characterize the moral positions of people and their readiness and ability to implement the party's decisions and the requirements of the norms of military life.

The living position is supported by the intellect, moral feelings, and will. Harmony is needed in the relationships between them. If the intellect is strong and the volitional and emotional aspects of the position are not sufficiently expressed, then at times we see a weak-willed, contemplative person. When feelings are in the foreground, then expansiveness, a lack of self-control, and excessive emotional excitability may be inherent to the personality. And will, even strong will, is blind without a developed intellect and noble feelings. This is why a developed intellect having a communist direction and warmed with the heat of increased feelings permits man to delve into the essence of the most complex phenomena, distinguish the main thing from many things, and be able to apply knowledge for the complete performance of military duty with maximum effectiveness. A genuine moral living position also requires this.

The 25th Congress of the CPSU, having formulated the tasks of moral indoctrination as an important component part of ideological work, at the same time determined the basic path to increase the effectiveness of all our indoctrinational influences: "It is a complex approach to the formulation of the entire matter of indoctrination, that is, the ensuring of the close unity of ideological-political, labor, and moral indoctrination with consideration of the special features of various groups of workers."¹⁹ Under conditions of military service moral indoctrination is organically interwoven with political and military indoctrination and permeates all army and navy life. In organizing and implementing ideological-indoctrinational work with personnel, the basic requirements of a complex approach should be considered.

First requirement. In planning and conducting political, moral, and military indoctrination it is important to achieve the encompassing of all spheres of military activity with ideological influence: combat and political training, the servicing of equipment, and the men's living conditions and leisure time. It is important to convince people that the norms of communist morals are universal and they function everywhere: in the collective and in private, in a combat situation, and in peacetime. Moral influence is accomplished using such means as public opinion, moral authority, and the principles of our behavior as set forth in the moral code of the builder of communism. Back in the twenties, our party turned its attention to the devotion of communists and the Soviet people to the accomplishment of certain requirements of Soviet morals. Thus, in 1924 the TsKK RKP(b) [Central Control Commission of the Russian Communist Party (of bolsheviks)] published the "Theses of the Central Committee RKP(b) on Party Ethics."²⁰ Subsequently, the party strengthened the code of norms for communist morals in its Program.²¹

Second requirement. The complex nature of ideological-indoctrinational work is provided by the close interconnection of political and moral indoctrination with the military activity and socialist competition of the personnel. The 25th Party Congress stressed the tremendous moral significance of socialist competition²² which has not only a production effect but also, especially an indoctrinational effect. And socialist competition which is conducted in the units and on ships not only for norms and tasks, but also on various aspects of moral indoctrination, seems to synthesize and strengthen the interconnection of the political and moral component with the military and combat component. At the same time, this unity also presumes the ability to distinguish the main element in a broad spectrum of indoctrinational problems for each specific feature. With the constant attention to all aspects of military life, tasks which were formulated in the decree of the Central Committee CPSU, "On the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution," and also in connection with preparations for the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces are now being thrust to the foreground.

Third requirement. The integrated influence for the molding of an absolutely moral appearance of the Soviet serviceman presumes the necessity for the skillful employment of the entire arsenal of ideological means: political lessons, scientific-practical conferences, lectures, talks, military-historical work with the officer personnel, and the wide use of the capabilities of mass information means. The organic combination of mass forms of work with individual forms is increasing noticeably the effectiveness of ideological indoctrination and its component part--moral indoctrination. This is also furthered by the fact that in recent years commanders and party organizations have begun to make more skillful use of the recommendations of science. This is expressed in systematic analytical work, the selection of the most effective procedures for influence on the consciousness and feelings of people, and consideration of the shifts which occur in the spiritual condition of the personnel.

Thus, the 25th Congress of our party not only formulated the tasks for moral indoctrination, but it also defined specific ways for their realization.

III. Urgent Problems in the Moral Indoctrination of Soviet Servicemen

We will only select several of the many urgent problems in the moral indoctrination of the armed defenders of the Socialist Fatherland.

One of them is the indoctrination of the men in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism. "A tremendous role from this point of view," it was noted at the 25th Party Congress, "was played by the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the formation of the USSR and the thirtieth anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War."²³ The celebration of these outstanding jubilees in the history of our people permitted bringing the heroic past of our Fatherland even more directly within the reach of our country's population, especially of the youth, and contributed to the more profound realization of the sources of our victories which are organically inherent to

the socialist system. An important role in this process belongs to military history. It interprets and systematizes the phenomena of the Soviet people's heroic past, defends them from hostile attacks of the bourgeois ideologists, and carries the great truth about the events of the last war to the people.

"Approval in the consciousness of the workers," it is noted in the materials of the 25th Congress of the CPSU, "and first of all, of the younger generation, of the ideas of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, pride for the country of Soviets and for our Motherland, and a readiness to rise up and defend the achievements of socialism was and remains one of the most important party tasks."²⁴ And in the accomplishment of this task, an important role belongs to military history and the entire system of political and moral indoctrination which exists in our society and its Armed Forces.

The high ideological conviction and stable communist world outlook of the Soviet serviceman is finding especially brilliant expression in his patriotism and internationalism. In the course of ideological-indoctrinational work it should be considered that Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism possess fundamentally new features. First of all, the Soviet man's love for the Motherland, the love of a serviceman indissolubly linked with devotion to communist ideals. This has become the main element in the content of Soviet patriotism. The genuine patriot evaluates all his actions and deeds by the main yardstick--how they serve the cause of communism and the socialist Fatherland. Each serviceman confirms his patriotism by his deeds and manifests it in actions for the further raising of combat readiness, strengthening military discipline, and rallying the troop collective.

At the same time, Soviet patriotism bears an international character. The Soviet man of any nationality is proud, first of all, of the fact that he is a citizen of the great Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The internationalism of Soviet patriotism is expressed by Soviet people's acquisition of many common all-Soviet features of moral make-up: communist conviction, collectivism, lofty responsibility, the profound realization of their duty and social activity, and others.

Soviet patriotism plays a tremendous role in the indoctrination of the population. The moral force of patriotism is what permits a person to tell himself in the Makarenko manner: "Do not squeak," give yourself the order, "You must," at the terrible minute of severe tests force yourself to step across "I cannot."

In the process of indoctrination it is important to see that the specific ideas of patriotism and internationalism merge with his feelings and specific practical deeds. Only then will they become internal convictions and be converted into a specific material force. In patriotic, international indoctrination it is very important to give a person the possibility to touch loftiness directly and to excite and touch his feelings. Who has not seen what people become when coming to monuments of glory, to sacred graves, to the eternal flame?

The experience accumulated by commanders, political organs, and party organizations in the course of preparations for the 30th anniversary of our victory in

the Great Patriotic War may be of tremendous value in patriotic indoctrination, especially now when preparations for the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the Soviet Armed Forces have been widely initiated.

In instilling patriotism and internationalism, an important place is occupied by the explanation of the tremendous social advantages of our system and the enormous role of the great friendship of peoples of the Soviet state which has now achieved world heights in the most varied fields of its development. Our ideological foes are now trying persistently and with increased activity to substitute nationalism for Soviet patriotism and cosmopolitan indifference for socialist internationalism. In touching on problems of the homeland, bourgeois propaganda places emphasis on the existence of a "more common" homeland among all people--the planet Earth. The fact that a number of problems common to all mankind have arisen in the world (demographic, ecological, energy, and so forth) is interpreted in the sense that, they say, now ideological, state, social, and moral contradictions of different societies now have allegedly receded into "the background" and do not play a decisive role in the face of general dangers. In such discourses by bourgeois radio commentators, scientists, and various "specialists" one can clearly trace the attempt to dissolve the only true class, socio-political criteria of patriotism with amorphous ideas of cosmopolitanism and abstract humanism.

Among other urgent problems in the moral indoctrination of the Soviet servicemen there are those which are connected with the further improvement of moral attitudes in the troop collective. As was noted by the 25th Congress of the CPSU, the role of the collective is exceptionally great in strengthening the norms of communist morals.²⁵

The moral attitudes which exist in the troop collective are a concrete definition of socialist social attitudes as applicable to the military sphere. The moral atmosphere, level of military discipline, and order and organization in the subunit, unit, and on the ship depend in considerable measure on their maturity and perfection. In them, figuratively speaking, it is possible to distinguish "vertical ties" which express attitudes of subordination and "horizontal ties" which bear primarily a regulatory load in relations between members of the collective and mainly with the same service status.

"Vertical ties" follow from the essence of military organization which, as V. I. Lenin stressed, is able to subordinate the actions of people to a common will.²⁶ The latter unites the efforts of the men on the basis of the principle of Soviet unity of command which gives the commanders and chiefs the right to issue instructions and orders in the name of society and for its well-being. The moral and political right of some to issue instructions and orders and check their accomplishment and the duty of others to obey them implicitly are secured in the military oath, regulations, and manuals. But they do not detail the entire extremely varied totality of moral ties which comprise the content of the troop collective's moral atmosphere.

The moral atmosphere depends in considerable measure on the moral authority of the command and political personnel. The officer's moral authority is the

strength of his moral influence on subordinates which is based on lofty personal qualities which have received acknowledgement among his associates. They include, first of all, high moral fiber, professional competence, honesty, fairness, and concern for people. Such an officer is able to create in the unit and on the ship a situation of mutual confidence and frankness, honesty, and demandingness. A reliable sign of respect for the commander is the requirement for subordinates to share their innermost thoughts and doubts with their chief and to request advice. The officer who knows and has a fine feeling for the psychological nuances of human intercourse sees more than an object for influence in the men. He constantly relies on public opinion and the authority of moral standards and positive traditions, achieving the conscious accomplishment of all prescriptions of communist morals by subordinates.

The moral atmosphere of the military collective is also determined by the style of contact. With the entire latitude of officers' rights, moral norms require that he recognize the qualities of each personality and possess the ability to listen without interrupting the one with whom he is speaking and to extinguish sparks of anger and vexation which sometimes may entail insufficiently considered actions and rash conclusions and decisions. A negative influence on the moral atmosphere is had by familiarity, "use of the familiar" when dealing with subordinates, and leniency toward shortcomings. As experience shows, the stricter the requirements imposed by the officer on himself, the purer the moral atmosphere of the collective. A personality which does not observe moral standards but requires their observance by others usually does not enjoy moral authority. Moral attitudes cannot be healthy if they contain elements of connivance or mistrust, familiarity or coarseness, arrogance or hostility.

At the same time, the moral atmosphere of the collective depends not only on the ties of subordination, but also on relations of the so-called "horizontal level." There are a number of special features here. Let us take the attitudes between active duty servicemen. They, just as moral attitudes in society and the army as a whole, are characterized by close collectivism, friendship between men of various nationalities, and mutual assistance. But in this sphere of intercourse an extremely large place is occupied by emotional-sensual components, which makes young people extremely receptive to the content and forms of moral attitudes. The youth experiences a special requirement for firm friendship, a close person, frankness, and confidence, although at times young people are inclined toward maximalism, imposing exaggerated requirements on their associates, and at times are inclined toward over- or underestimating their abilities or deeds.

People may appear among the active duty men who have a noticeable influence on their comrades thanks to strong personal qualities. Thus, expert servicemen, rated specialists, and masters of their trade enjoy great authority among young soldiers and seamen. They have a beneficial influence on the youth. But it sometimes happens that the men fall under the influence of personalities with negative inclinations. This does not contribute to the strengthening of a healthy moral atmosphere. And then mutual guarantees, a false understanding of friendship and comradeship, and attempts to stress one's superiority over juniors in an illicit manner may appear. Therefore, it is extremely important to instill in the young servicemen from his very first steps of service in the army a sense of dignity and honor in relation to himself and his subordinates.

If a situation of intolerance toward any manifestation of arrogance, coarseness, and conceit is created in the collective and nobility, a sense of military honor, combat solidarity, and loyalty to one's word and assumed obligations are rewarded in every way, then motives, deeds, and actions which correspond to the principles of communist morals are born in the moral attitudes of the men. The more completely and consistently military order is observed in the unit and on the ship and principled but at the same time comradely relations are maintained between chiefs and subordinates and all fellow servicemen, the more favorable are the conditions for the development and establishment of a healthy moral atmosphere in the collective.

An indoctrinated person always asks himself mentally whether he is doing everything to strengthen the collective and consolidate attitudes of principle and fairness. Properly, it cannot be otherwise. For the essence of all moral rules and customs in the final analysis consists of the ability to think of one's comrades and do everything for the good of the collective. Here, it is important not only to see clearly the tasks connected with the establishment of a healthy moral atmosphere in the collective, but also to find the correct ways and worthy means to attain the assigned goals. It is not by chance that F. Engels stressed in his letter to LaSalle that "the personality is characterized not only by what it does, but also by how it does it...."²⁷ Simplicity, sincerity, seriousness, steadiness, and good humor are the necessary components for healthy moral mutual relations. The ability to create a situation of ease and a good attitude when accomplishing complex problems is a leading method for shaping a favorable moral atmosphere.

Of course, the range of moral problems under army and navy conditions is not limited to the questions which have been considered. Important significance is had by those which are linked with the moral-political and psychological training of the troops, confirmation of the norms for military ethics and the requirements of the military regulations and the oath in life, and the molding of a wide range of moral-combat qualities. Their successful solution now depends to a great extent on the skillful use of the wealth of ideas put forth by the 25th Party Congress by commanders, political organs, and party organizations. Positive results in moral indoctrination also depend in considerable measure on how correctly control of this process is conducted. And it, as is known, includes the planning and organization of ideological-indoctrinational measures, the implementation of decisions which have been made, the persistent struggle against the phenomena of formalism, and many other components.

The moral indoctrination of the Soviet servicemen permits molding the communist type of personality which possesses extremely remarkable features of the armed defender of the socialist Fatherland. The decisions and ideas of the 25th CPSU Congress are opening up new, vast possibilities for improvement in all this work.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 1 February 1977.
2. "Etika" [Ethics], Moscow, 1921, pp 65-66; PROLETKUL'T No 9-10, 1919, p 19.

3. Yem. Yaroslavskiy, "Moral' i byt proletariata v perekhodnyy period" [Morals and Life of the Proletariat in the Transitional Period]. Moscow, Priboy, 1926, p 18.
4. V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 36, p 260.
5. Ibid, Vol 39, p 5.
6. "Knizhka krasnoarmeytsa" [Notebook of the Red Army Man], Moscow, 1918.
7. V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," Vol 41, pp 311, 313.
8. "Materialy XXV s'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th Congress of the CPSU], Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p 85.
9. Ibid, p 10.
10. V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," Vol 41, p 121.
11. "Boyevoy ustav pekhoty RKKA" [Infantry Combat Regulations of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army], Part II. Moscow, Izd. Tsentral'noy tipografii Narkomvoenmora and Izd. Voyenny vestnik, 1927, p 273.
12. "Materialy XXV s'yezda KPSS," p 87.
13. Ibid, p 77.
14. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Sochineniye" [Collected Works], Vol 1, p 118.
15. PRAVDA, 22 March 1977.
16. "Materialy XXV s'yezda KPSS," p 78.
17. V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," Vol 18, p 228.
18. "Materialy XXV s'yezda KPSS," p 76.
19. Ibid, p 74.
20. "K Plenumu TsKK RKP(b)" [On the Plenum of the Central Control Commission of the Russian Communist Party (of bolsheviks)]. Materials, Moscow 1924, p 54.
21. "Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz" [Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union]. Moscow, Politizdat, 1971, p 119.
22. "Materialy XXV s'yezda KPSS," p 76.
23. Ibid, p 75.
24. Ibid.

25. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS," p 78.
26. V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," Vol 26, p 258.
27. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Ob iskusstve" [On Art], Vol 1. Moscow, Iskusstvo, 1957, p 29.

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ACHIEVING TROOP VITALITY IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

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[Article by Army Gen A. Radziyevskiy, professor: "Ways of Attaining the Vitality of Troops in Offensive Operations"; published under the heading: "The Art of Warfare in the Great Patriotic War"]

[Excerpts] Ensuring the vitality of the troops during the years of the Great Patriotic War had great significance for the successful conduct of combat operations. It was one of the important and difficult problems in military art which acquired ever greater significance under contemporary conditions when nuclear weapons possessing a tremendous destructive force have been adopted into the inventory of the armies of a number of countries. The experience of the Great Patriotic War in this regard has not lost its urgency and, to a great extent, can be used in the practice of the training and indoctrination of the troops.

Just what is vitality? In its broad understanding vitality is the ability of units, large units, and formations to preserve and maintain their combat efficiency in various situations and continue to accomplish their combat missions with active enemy counteraction.

During the years of the last war, the basic ways to attain the high vitality of the troops were: improvement in the technical equipping of the troops, improving the combat qualities of equipment and weapons (strength of construction, resistance to wear, vulnerability to fire, adaptation to the terrain, and so forth) and their effective combat employment; improvement of the authorized organizational structure of the units, large units, and formations; the development of the art of the organization and conduct of a battle and operation; improvement in the types of combat and operational support; the timely replenishment of losses of personnel, equipment, armament, and supplies of materiel; instilling lofty moral-combat qualities in the personnel; teaching commanders, staffs, and troops skillful actions in a battle and operation.

The increase in troop vitality was affected first of all by the improvement in the technical equipping, the perfection of the authorized organizational

structure of units and large units, and the development of the art for the organization and conduct of the battle and operation. Let us examine these questions in greater detail.

Technical equipping is the totality of measures which are directed toward the creation and introduction of new combat equipment and weapons among the troops which possessed the best firing capabilities maneuver qualities, increased resistance to the effect of various means of destruction, and reliable protection of the personnel. During the war years the Soviet Army had the best tanks and SAU [self-propelled guns], airplanes (attack aircraft and bombers), rocket launchers, antitank guns, and other types of equipment and armament in the world.

A very important role in the attainment of the high vitality of the equipment and armament was played by the skillful accomplishment of measures for the protection of their personnel. This was attained, for example, by improving the armored protection of the tanks against destruction by shells, by reducing the specific weight of light tanks, and by equipping the troops with various self-propelled artillery mounts (SU-76, SU-85, SU-100, and so forth). It should be stressed that under contemporary conditions this experience is acquiring ever greater significance since, simultaneously with the necessity to increase the protection of the personnel against damage by fire, the problem of the protection of crews and sections against initial radiation has arisen. The requirement for the collective protection of personnel with consideration of new requirements not only in the tank troops but also in the other combat arms--motorized rifle, artillery, missile, air defense, and so forth--has become acute.

It is known that equipment and weapons only create the material possibilities for the attainment of a high level of troop vitality. In order to convert them into reality, there is a need for the great efforts and ability of the men who are employing the weapons and equipment directly in battle. The Great Patriotic War provided many examples of how the skillful mastery of equipment by the men permitted our tank or antitank weapon to destroy three or four tanks or our airplane to shoot down two or three enemy airplanes.

Under contemporary conditions the profound mastery of new combat equipment and the effective use of its combat capabilities have ever greater significance for improving the vitality of the troops.

Vitality presumes the presence of a rational authorized organizational structure of the units and large units. The experience of the war is evidence that the basic directions in improving the authorized organizational structure were: increase in firepower, shock force, and maneuver capabilities of the subunits, units, and large units; the creation of stable control elements; increasing the capabilities to continue combat operations in the presence of considerable losses. It is important to note the expedient proportion of personnel in combat, service, and rear-services subunits and units.

The standardization and qualitative improvement of the authorized organizational structure of troop formations of various combat arms was the basis for the

development and employment of new, more improved methods for the conduct of an offensive battle (operation) which contributed to a reduction in losses of our troops and an increase in their vitality in battle.

The art of the organization and conduct of a battle and operation had great significance for increasing the vitality of units, large units, and formations. In the preparatory period, an important role was played by the skillful em- placement of elements of the combat formation (operational formation) of the troops, control posts, rear-area elements, and logistical means. The experi- ence of the war teaches us that the formation of the troops in a battle and operation should contribute in every possible way to the accomplishment of one of the most important principles of military art--the concentration of efforts at the decisive point at the required moment and it is conducted depend- ing on the specific circumstances, especially with consideration of the nature of the enemy's probable actions, the capacity of the operational directions, and the content of the missions to be accomplished by the troops.

One of the most important measures in raising the vitality is the fortification improvement of troop disposition areas, control posts, and the rear area. Dur- ing the war years great development was received by engineer improvements and camouflage of the attack positions. A ramified network of continuous fire and communication trenches was created which, to a considerable degree, ensured the preservation of the troops prior to the start of the attack.

An important role for the vitality of the troops was played by improving the stability of control and communication posts and their protection against re- connaissance and destruction by the enemy. This was achieved using an entire complex of measures: the creation of efficient staffs and other organs of field control and a reserve of communication means; placement under cover and the reliable protection and defense of control posts; the careful camouflage and strict observance of established operating conditions for radio equipment.

To deceive the enemy concerning the location of the true control posts, dummy posts were developed. Operational camouflage and deception, as a rule, was called upon to hinder the enemy's destruction of the most important objectives and the launching of air and artillery strikes against them by deceiving him. One of its effective methods, as the war experience shows, was the creation and maintenance of a network of dummy positions, first of all for artillery and anti-aircraft weapons, dummy disposition (assembly) areas for the troops with the broad use of simulation sets of combat equipment in them, and by demonstra- tion of the operation of dummy radios and troop actions. Deception of the enemy, false regroupings, demonstration actions, and other operational-tactical measures were widely employed. In the Shyaulyaya operation (October 1944), for example, the command of the 1st Baltic Front accomplished the secret re- grouping of four combined-arms (4th Shock, 43d, 51st, and 6th Guards Armies) and the 5th Guards Tank Armies, two tank, and one mechanized corps in the area of Shyaulyaya in short times.¹ To create a plausible picture of the concen- tration of large formations of troops on the direction of the false blow in the area of Yelgava, units of the 3d Shock and 22d Armies were regrouped. As

¹"Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945 gg" [Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945], Vol III, Voenizdat, 1958, p 562.

a result, the main forces of Army Group "North," and among them three tank corps of German-fascist troops were concentrated on the direction of the false strike and this ensured the successful conduct of the operation. There are many similar examples during the war years.

Of special interest is the question of the effect of skill in the conduct of operations on the vitality of the troops. The essence of this interconnection consists of the fact that more improved skill leads to the preservation of forces and the capabilities of the troops and is an important condition for implementing the concepts which have been planned and the accomplishment of operational missions.

This was demonstrated especially graphically in the operations for the breakthrough of the enemy defense, the increase in the efforts of the troops, and the execution of maneuver by the forces and means in the course of offensive operations. During the breakthrough of a continuous enemy position defense the troops suffered the greatest losses which sharply reduced their combat effectiveness and, consequently, their vitality. Therefore, great significance was acquired by searches for the most effective methods for the breakthrough of the enemy defense and the forms for operational maneuver, primarily through artillery, air, and tank strikes, and also through the swiftness of the infantry's advance.

The difficult conditions at the start of the Great Patriotic War and losses in tanks, aircraft, and other equipment in the Soviet Army's battles near the borders reduced the shock power and mobility of our large units and formations. Attempts to launch an offensive against an enemy with superior strength from the march on a broad front which were undertaken in 1941 were unsuccessful. This required a new approach to the conduct of the offensive. Experience showed that when organizing it it is necessary to create as a minimum a three-fold superiority in forces and means over the enemy, to plan the enemy's destruction by fire in detail, and to accompany the attacking infantry and tanks by fire through the entire depth of the breakthrough.

The skill in organizing and executing the breakthrough affected most perceptively the increase in the vitality of the troops in the counteroffensive at Stalingrad where the principle of the massing of forces and means was displayed in the form of a concentration of efforts of two or three armies and front means on the directions selected for the breakthrough. Thanks to the decisive massing of forces and means opposite the weak sectors in the enemy's defense, sufficiently high densities of troops and an advantageous relationship were created successfully: in infantry 2-3:1, in artillery 3-4:1, in tanks 3:1 or more.² The groupings which were created on the main directions possessed a strong initial strike and could develop the offensive successfully. Because this operation has already been described with sufficient completeness in military-historical literature, we will only note that by the end of the first day (19 November) the rifle divisions advanced 10-19 kilometers and the tank corps 25-30 kilometers and on the fifth day (23 November) they reached the area of Kalach and Sovetskiy, completing the encirclement of 22 divisions and 160 separate enemy units.

¹ "Velikaya bitva na Volge" [Great Battle on the Volga], Voenizdat, 1956, pp 223-241.

Beginning in the summer of 1943, conditions for the breakthrough of the enemy's defense became more difficult in connection with an increase in its depth as well as a growth in the density of the troops and engineer obstacles. The enemy changed from a strong-point to a continuous deeply echeloned defense. It was necessary to seek more improved methods to execute the breakthrough for the successful conduct of the offensive and to preserve the vitality of the troops. The solution of this problem proceeded along several directions. The combat formations of the large units and units were echeloned, higher artillery densities were created, and the duration of the artillery preparation and the force of the air strikes against objectives in the tactical depth were increased. Special significance for increasing the vitality of the troops which had accomplished the breakthrough of the defense was played by the transition to a more powerful support of the attack by the infantry and tanks using the method of a single fire barrage. An important measure directed toward a decrease in losses and an increase in the rates of troop advance was the wide employment of the fire of accompanying weapons, especially of the SAU, to destroy enemy antitank guns and weapon emplacements which had survived in the course of the breakthrough. This eliminated the need to divert infantry direct-support tanks to combat enemy antitank weapons and provided the opportunity to smash centers of resistance which hindered the infantry offensive more successfully.

In the second period of the war, in connection with an increase in the depth and strength of the enemy tactical defense zone, the problem of completing its breakthrough and developing the offensive into the operational depth arose very urgently. In the course of its solution there was a striving to find new methods. If, in the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, the development of a tactical success into an operational success was attained by committing the mobile army groups to battle, in the counteroffensive at Kursk the mobile groups of fronts, including one-two tank armies, were committed.

The experience in organizing and conducting a breakthrough was generalized in the Manual on the Breakthrough of a Position Defense which was published in the spring of 1944.

An important role in raising the vitality and combat effectiveness of the troops in offensive operations belonged to party-political work. It had the goal of rallying the personnel around the Communist Party and indoctrinating them in the spirit of devotion to the Motherland, loyalty to the military oath, the steadfast observance of military discipline, and firm and inflexible will to victory over the enemy. All the activity of the political organs and party and Komsomol organizations was directed toward the successful accomplishment of the combat missions, the explanation of the goals and importance of the battle to the personnel, raising confidence in their strength, and creation of a high offensive spirit and steadfastness and persistence in battle in the men and commanders.

Consequently, the experience of the Great Patriotic War shows that the skillful employment of the varied methods for the organization and conduct of a battle

and operation contributed in considerable measure to the routing of big enemy formations and the preservation of the vitality and combat effectiveness of the troops.

Thus, in the years of the Great Patriotic War the problem of preserving the vitality of the troops was solved by an entire complex of interrelated factors. This ensured the combat effectiveness of the large units and units and gave them the opportunity to conduct continuous battles and operations over a prolonged period of time.

The ability of the troops to preserve and maintain their combat effectiveness and conduct combat operations under conditions of active enemy counteraction, as occurred during the years of the last war, depended on the continuous improvement of the technical equipping and raising of the combat qualities of the equipment and weapons, the improvement of their authorized organizational structure, the development of Soviet military art, the timely replenishment of personnel, armament, and combat equipment, comprehensive logistical support, and a high level of combat and political training.

The basic ways for ensuring the vitality of troops in offensive operations considered above from the experience of the Great Patriotic War have not lost their urgency under contemporary conditions to a great extent and will contribute to the raising of the quality of combat and political training.

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FORMING AND EMPLOYING OPERATIONAL GROUPS DURING A WAR

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[Article by Col (Ret) M. Malakhov, Candidate of Historical Sciences: "From the Experience in the Creation and Use of Operational Groups in the Course of War"; published under the heading: "The Art of Warfare in the Great Patriotic War"]

[Excerpts] The Great Patriotic War has provided many instructive examples of the employment of operational groups of forces. Altogether more than 70 groups were created and operated in the course of the war. They were created on the instructions of the Headquarters, Supreme High Command [Hq SHC] and by the decisions of the military councils of fronts and sometimes even armies.

The appearance of operational groups depended on the specific situation each time. In the first period of the war their creation was accomplished, as a rule, in extremely short times and, in essence, had the nature of an improvisation. In the second period a certain harmony and system appeared in the organization of the groups. And finally, in the third period they were formed in accordance with a table of organization.

Let us examine a number of the most typical examples for the emergence and combat employment of operational groups in the course of the last war.

In the first period, which was distinguished by an extremely complex and rapidly changing situation and great maneuverability, the Soviet troops conducted an active defense and launched many counterblows. Operational groups were employed in them.

An operational group of troops consisting of the XI Mechanized Corps of the 3d Army, the VI Mechanized Corps and 36th Cavalry Division of the 10th Army was created to launch a counterblow against the enemy's Suvalkovskaya force on 23 June 1941. It was headed by the deputy commander of the Western Front, General I. V. Boldin. It was to smash the enemy force on the left bank of the Neman River with a blow in the direction of Belostok, Lipsk, and south of Grodno and prevent it from reaching the Volkovysk area.¹

The counterblow did not achieve its goal. The offensive of the group's troops could not be developed due to the great superiority of enemy forces, especially his aviation. Nevertheless, the enemy advance on this direction was slowed somewhat.

In the zone of the 4th Army of the Western Front tank divisions reached the Shchara River on 24 June 1941 and created the threat of capture of the city of Baranovichi. By the decision of the front commander, our four rifle divisions which had arrived in this area were combined into a group of forces under the overall leadership of General I. N. Khabarov which received the mission to organize a defense along the line of the Shchara River and prevent the enemy's advance on the Baranovichi direction.² The organization of the group proved to be timely. Our divisions slowed up the advance of the enemy XLVII Motorized Corps for a time.

On the Northwestern front, in order to eliminate the threat of an enemy breakthrough from the area of Daugavpils the front commander decided to advance the V Airborne and the XXI Mechanized Corps to that area. The field headquarters of the 27th Army was move up to lead them and the units of the 11th Army which had withdrawn. But prior to its arrival, an operational group was formed on 26 June 1941 under the command of the assistant front commander, General S. D. Akimov.³ It quickly assumed the defense and held up the enemy, which had a beneficial effect on the course of further combat operations.

Under conditions of the immediate threat of an enemy breakthrough toward Leningrad, Hq SHC decided to use part of the troops of the Northern Front for the defense of the southwestern and southern approaches to the city. As early as July, the front commander, General M. M. Popov, received the order to organize the defense along the line of the Luga River from the Gulf of Finland to Lake Il'men. Seven rifle divisions and one brigade were hastily moved here as was the Leningrad artillery and infantry schools and a number of artillery units which were combined into the Luga operational group of forces headed by the deputy front commander, General K. P. Pyadyshev. It repelled the enemy attack and forced him to assume the defensive on this direction for almost a month.⁴

The situation which developed in the first days of the war in the zone of action of troops of the Southwestern Front also forced recourse to the creation of operational groups in a number of cases. On the night of 26-27 June the commander of the VIII Mechanized Corps received an order from the front commander to launch a blow from the area of Brody in the direction of Verb and Dubno and, in coordination with the XX Mechanized and XXX Rifle Corps to smash the enemy and, by the end of 27 June, to capture the indicated cities. The large units of the corps conducted battles in areas which were at considerable distances from one another. Little time remained for the concentration of all forces of the corps. On the decision of the corps commander, a group of forces which included the 34th Tank Division and a tank and motorcycle regiments was formed for the attack against Dubno. It was headed by the military commissar of the corps, Brigade Commissar N. K. Popel'.⁵ The group began the attack and, although it did not accomplish its mission completely, it inflicted perceptible damage on the enemy and slowed up his advance.

As we see, the formation of operational groups in the initial period was determined by the specific conditions of the situation. Powerful initial enemy blows with a considerable superiority in his forces and means and which he accomplished to a great depth, his complete air superiority, the absence of a continuous defensive front for our troops, and attempts by the Soviet command to stop the enemy's advance by launching counterblows prepared in extremely short periods of time were characteristic of this period. Thus, the first operational groups were created to unite troops of various subordinations under one command on an important direction for the accomplishment of a particular operational mission--delaying the enemy advance.

In the cases presented above, their organization was justified and the results of the combat operations were positive. At the same time, there were also serious shortcomings in the formation and actions of the groups. The main one was the absence of special control elements with the necessary communication means which could lead the troops successfully. In practice, their commanders were forced to control the troops using the staff and communication means of some one large unit which was part of the group. Such control had many weak aspects. In particular, the communication means and the staff were not capable of providing the group commander and their own commander with reliable troop control. For example, in the twenties of November 1941 when the threat of the capture of the city of Klin by the troops of the 3d German-fascist Tank Group arose, an operational group of troops was formed for its direct defense under the command of General F. D. Zakharov. It included the 126th Rifle and 24th Cavalry Divisions, a cadet regiment, and the 8th and 25th Tank Brigades. Relying on the staff of the rifle division which was not able to cope with such broad duties, the group commander was not able to organize the clear control of the troops which were subordinate to him. Furthermore, the large units and units were assigned clearly unrealistic missions--to attack. They were unable to begin it. On the morning of 23 November the German-fascist troops were the first to launch a strike against Klin. And although the troops of the group, especially the tank brigades and cadet regiment, offered strong resistance to the enemy and inflicted considerable losses on him they were unable to stop the advance and he captured Klin. Unquestionably, had the group commander had his own staff with sufficient communication and reconnaissance means control of the troops would have been more flexible and efficient and the outcome of the battles might have been different.

One of the special features of combat operations in the first period of the war was the fact that in a number of cases the combined-arms army, defending an assigned position, simultaneously launched active offensive operations on one of its flanks. Then operational groups of forces were organized.

An analysis of the combat employment of operational groups shows that they were used most widely in 1941 and 1942. Groups were created in the following years of the war, but more rarely. For example, in 1943 the following groups of forces were organized and operated: on the Voronezh Front--of General D. P. Kozlov, on the Kalinin Front--of Generals V. Ya. Kolpakcha and I. F. Dremov, on the Southern Front--of General F. V. Kamkov, and on the Southwestern Front--of General M. M. Popov, and others.

Operational groups were also created in 1944-1945. Thus, in January 1945 the troops of the 2d Ukrainian Front which stormed Budapest were combined on order of the Hq SHC into the "Budapest Group of Forces" (XVIII Guards, XXX Rifle and VII Romanian Infantry Corps and reinforcing units) under the command of General I. M. Afonin. In the Far East a mechanized cavalry group of Soviet-Mongolian troops and the Chuguyeva operational group were formed in August of the same year.

In the course of the Great Patriotic War mechanized cavalry groups functioned effectively. Since cavalry still existed in the last war and the conditions for its employment had changed sharply in comparison with World War I and the Civil War, it was combined with mechanized and tank troops which provided positive results, primarily during the conduct of battle and operations in the spring, fall, and in forest-swamp terrain. The mechanized cavalry groups under the command of Generals I. A. Pliyev, N. S. Oslikovskiy, A. P. Gorshkov, V. K. Baranov, and others fought valiantly. They smashed the enemy in the Ukraine, in Belorussia, in Romania, in Hungary, in Manchuria, and so forth.

It should be noted that during the years of World War II operational groups were also widely represented in the German-fascist army. For example, in the battle at Kursk in July 1943 the "Kampf" group operated against the troops of the Voronezh Front while the "Bakon'," "Bekhter," "Amayzer," and other groups operated on the southern wing of the Soviet-German Front at the end of 1944-beginning of 1945 against the troops of the 3d Ukrainian Front. They consisted of units of various subordination and differed from ours to a great extent in their missions. Their appearance is explained by approximately the same reasons --primarily by the necessity to combine the efforts of various large units and units for the accomplishment of offensive or defensive missions in short times and in a difficult, rapidly changing situation.

Thus, in the years of the Great Patriotic War the operational groups of forces found wide employment. Their emergence was caused by specific conditions in which combat operations were conducted. In the majority of cases they contributed to the overall success of our troops. But frequently attempts to form a combat-effective organism hastily did not provide the desired results.

The fact of the existence of operational groups occurred over the duration of the entire war; however their quantity changed in various periods. Groups were created depending on the missions which they were to accomplish and the availability of forces and means necessary for their formation. The greatest quantity of operational groups of forces--80 percent of their total number on the Soviet-German Front--operated in the first period, that is, when the Soviet Army was conducting primarily a strategic defense. In the second period the number of operational groups did not exceed 16 percent of the total number of these formations in the active army during the war. In the third period they continued to operate although by this time they comprised no more than 4-5 percent of the total number.

The operational groups did not replace the standard operational formations and tactical large units which had been operating; they supplemented them, being

one of the forms for the organization of troop control under difficult conditions. As a result of the employment of operational groups, the number of subordinate echelons was reduced and this had a beneficial effect on troop control and increased the operational-tactical independence of the troops.

The duration of existence of operational groups in the last war is characterized by the following data. Of 72 operational groups, 21 existed for no more than a month, 24--up to two months, 8--up to three months, 3--up to four months, 5--five months, 5--six months, 4--seven months, 1--eight months, and 1 group--nine months. Thus, the basic number of groups existed for one to two months.

A weak aspect of the operational groups was the fact that they inevitably had the character of improvisation with all its inherent shortcomings. Furthermore, troop control in the group was accomplished by one of the large-unit staffs. Usually, these were the staffs of cavalry or mechanized corps. If the staff of a cavalry corps was in control then, as a rule, insufficient consideration of the specific nature of operations by tank or mechanized units was observed, and when the staff of a mechanized (tank) corps was in charge then, conversely, the special features of cavalry operations were not completely considered. With the inclusion of rifle divisions which were less maneuverable, control became even more difficult. However, it should be noted that its organization on the base of the staff of one of the large units nevertheless was much better than the hastily formed incomplete group of officers which did not have sufficient means of communication available. Such improvised cells with commanders of operational groups did not justify themselves. Another serious problem was the organization of combat and operational support under conditions where troops of various subordination were combined into groups.

Experience has shown that it is expedient to have seasoned reserve staffs (commands) manned with trained officers who have the necessary amount of communication equipment for the organization of operational groups.

The emergence and employment of operational groups of Soviet troops in the Great Patriotic War is an objective phenomenon which was caused by an extremely difficult situation, primarily in the first period. It is one of the examples of the creative search for methods for the most effective control of troops by the Soviet command. The experience in the combat employment of operational groups under conditions of a rapidly changing situation and the highly maneuverable operations of troops with open flanks and over disconnected directions can also be employed under contemporary conditions.

FOOTNOTES

1. TsAMO [Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense], fund 208, inventory 4857, file 11, sheet 48.
2. Ibid, fund 266, inventory 2156, file 67, sheet 5.
3. Ibid, fund 221, inventory 2467, file 39, sheets 346-348.

4. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II 1939-1945]. Vol 4, Voenizdat, 1975, p 46.
5. TsAMO, fund 334, inventory 3949, file 4, sheet 33.
6. Ibid, fund 48-A, inventory 1554, file 91, sheets 60-61.

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CIVIL DEFENSE TRAINING ACTIVITIES

City Civil Defense Director

Moscow VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 77 signed to press 12 May 77
pp 22-23

[Article by N. Moskvichev, Deputy Chief, Grodnenskaya Oblast Civil Defense Headquarters: "Civil Defense Chief"]

[Text] After having spent little time in his office that morning, Vladimir Mikhaylovich Logosh, chairman of the city executive committee, headed downtown. He would return that afternoon after visiting a good many economic enterprises, establishments and government offices, meeting with administrators and workers.

Over a period of 8 years his people had grown accustomed to this away-from-office working style of the executive committee chairman of the town of Lida; they do not enter his office on business in the morning but wait until his return in the afternoon. Vasiliy Abramovich Vardoyev, chief of city civil defense headquarters, was, with others, waiting for his return at the designated time. Continuing personal contacts create the most favorable conditions for productive work.

Once Logosh said to his civil defense chief: "At the next meeting of activists we shall discuss our civil defense activities. In the meantime would you please visit the grain products combine tomorrow. I was there recently and feel strongly that they should be inspected and assisted."

Soon the activists met. Comrade Logosh, discussing the grain products combine, made it clear to all enterprise directors attending the conference that none of them would be permitted to shirk his civil defense duties.

"I admit that all of us have urgent matters to attend to," he stated. "But no real executive ignores protection of his work force against mass destruction weapons or problems of keeping production going without interruption."

At that conference there was much discussion about those enterprises which were leaders in civil defense, with analysis of their experience and know-how. The directors of the town's facilities were focused on accomplishing not only immediate but long-range tasks as well. The most important thing was that the conference had an effect on those who were lagging in civil defense, forcing some administrators to take a more conscientious attitude toward their civil defense obligations.

How could it be otherwise, when each had before him the graphic example of the city executive committee chairman himself? He has a great deal of work to do, but he finds time to go thoroughly into detail on the status of civil defense at the city's enterprises and establishments.

A thorough knowledge of production, the ability to concentrate on the main, key points, efficiency and calmness displayed by V. Logosh unquestionably help ensure that growth of the town's economy and fulfillment of the national economic plan targets by the town's enterprises proceed without backsliding. Every year becomes a unique landmark in strengthening production and the economy. The chairman was awarded the Badge of Honor for performance results in the Eighth Five-Year Plan. Soon he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labor. The city of Lida was twice awarded the Challenge Red Banner of the Grodnenskaya Oblast committee of the Communist Party of Belorussia and the oblast executive committee, for the Eighth and Ninth Five-Year plans, for success in socialist competition, including civil defense; it was awarded a certificate 1st class and a prize.

The results of the first year of the 10th Five-Year Plan have been totaled up, and once again the city of Lida has confirmed its claim as one of the top cities in Grodnenskaya Oblast in civil defense and was awarded a Challenge Red Banner, a certificate and a cash prize.

The chairman of the city executive committee has been awarded the "Outstanding in Civil Defense USSR" badge and the USSR Civil Defense Badge of Honor.

How does this city achieve such excellent results? What is the secret?

It is obviously that V. Logosh keeps a constant eye on selection of civil defense cadres and training of city administrative and command personnel in training courses. Well-trained, knowledgeable and correctly-placed people ensure success.

The position of civil defense chief at enterprises and establishments is occupied by businesslike individuals who are genuinely dedicated to work, enthusiastic about it, one might say. In the city there are many genuine enthusiasts and outstanding civil defense achievers. They include S. Yeroshenko, the top production training instructor in the city civil defense courses, V. Vasil'yev, civil defense chief at the shoe factory, which is always a winner in civil defense socialist competition, E. Bantsevich, party organization secretary at this enterprise and active city civil defense headquarters assistant, plus others.

The chairman of the city executive committee is personally acquainted with all activists. The workers and executives at the city's enterprises in turn greatly appreciate their civil defense chief.

He visits their enterprises not as an inspector but to talk with people, to find out about how their work is going, about their plans and difficulties. As soon as he shows up at a plant, factory or establishment, he is immediately surrounded, and a lively conversation ensues. Vladimir Mikhaylovich also invariably asks about civil defense and brings them up to date on the latest civil defense developments. He inquires about how the civil defense units are equipped, whether equipment and supplies are being properly stored, and how protective shelters are being maintained. Each year these matters are examined by the city soviet executive committee.

Keenly aware that without proper facilities civil defense units cannot be properly trained, at one executive committee meeting Vladimir Mikhaylovich brought up the question of building a city civil defense training ground. Several enterprises helped build it. When construction was completed, Logosh said: "I recently saw a similar training center in a neighboring republic. But it was in quite a run-down state! This was because nobody had been assigned to care for it. I therefore suggest that all our enterprises which were involved in construction on our facility assume responsibility for the sections they built and keep them in good working order. Comrade Vardoyev and the training course personnel will keep an eye on things."

This training center has been in operation for 3 years now. It is constantly in use and is being continuously improved.

Comrade Logosh is also taking an interest in reequipping the training center for the city civil defense courses. He is working on establishing good training facilities at general-curriculum schools, occupational training schools and at secondary technical schools. Industrial enterprises have been enlisted to assist the schools. The city executive committee chairman also keeps an eye on dissemination of civil defense information among the civilian population and their training. He frequently writes articles for the local newspaper and speaks on the local radio station, covering civil defense matters, and he takes personal part in the annual socialist competition judging in all indices, including civil defense.

Thanks to the constant concern on the part of the executive committee for the status of the city's civil defense, there has occurred an appreciable heightening of interest in civil defense on the part of workers and the townspeople. Take, for example, the consumer services combine. It always assists any local enterprise conducting a comprehensive enterprise exercise: it will accept orders to make cloth dust masks (PTM-1), will ready personnel decontamination stations for operations, etc. In every store, children's establishment, clubhouse and cinema the personnel know how to respond to a civil defense alert. The city's restaurants have on numerous occasions

set up efficient feeding stations at civil defense exercises. The cinemas show civil defense training films in addition to the full-length features.

Paying frequent visits to the city's enterprises, Vladimir Mikhaylovich takes note of all positive examples and subsequently utilizes them in his talks with people, in his appearances on the radio and in the newspaper. All this helps the civil defense chief of the city of Lida keep up on events and perform in an efficient manner all new civil defense tasks.

The city is preparing to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Great October Revolution in a worthy fashion. Enterprise work forces have made boosted socialist pledges, including in the area of civil defense, which is celebrating its 45th anniversary this year.

PHOTO CAPTION

Caption to photo on page 22: in the photograph (left to right): A comprehensive training schedule is being discussed by A. Dad'kova, chief of the supply and technical service, V. Vardoyev, city civil defense chief of staff, and V. Logosh, city executive committee chairman and Lida civil defense chief.

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Training Exercise Described

Moscow VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 77 signed to press 12 May 77
pp 24-25

[Article by S. Perminova: "Difficult Exercise..."]

[Text] The men of nonmilitary units conduct rescue operations together with military personnel.

The wind had not yet dissipated the "mushroom cloud," and the simulated stricken areas had not yet burst into full flame at the civil defense subunit training center, when the rescue subunits and nonmilitary teams were approaching the enormous piles of rubble blocking their path. Heaps of mangled reinforced concrete slabs and dirt, fire, clouds of smoke and dust obscuring the horizon. Explosions burst here and there. The boiler room had collapsed. Concrete slabs, earth and logs lay heaped on the protective structures.... An ammonia-loaded tank truck was in flames; secondary stricken areas began to form.

Thus began an exercise at which a military subunit and nonmilitary units work side by side. The soldiers and the civil defense personnel worked hand in hand, rescuing "victims."

Reconnaissance vehicles under the command of officer Anatoliy Pokrishen, their tracks clanking, were plowing across the rubble. It seemed that it was not civil defense forces working in a stricken area but Soviet tanks rushing into battle.

The reconnaissance teams had barely had time to put out markers when a traffic support detachment under the command of officer Iosif Savon' literally burst into the rubble area. A powerful crane was moving enormous reinforced concrete structures, clearing a lane for the rescue subunit and nonmilitary teams to enter the stricken area.

A bulldozer reared skyward on an earthen rampart nearby. One pass, followed by another, and something similar to a railroad cut appeared. The reporter-photographer turned 180°, and into his camera lens came an IMR (engineer obstacle clearance vehicle). Adroitly manipulating its blade and snout with its giant claws, it quickly and easily cleared a passage among the concrete structures, bent beams, mangled steel rods and huge earth clumps.

Close at the heels of the heavy equipment, rescue teams, firefighters, medical assistance teams, and welders streamed into the cleared lanes.... A powerful stream of foam lashed into flames near a fuel dump. Fire squad commander Tash-Mukhamedov himself took the wheel of the fire truck. The hard work was paying off -- the fire was beginning to abate.

"Tough exercise. . .," was all Tash-Mukhamedov could say. "But we won." He removed his gas mask and shook off the beads of sweat running down his face.

In the meantime the rescue personnel of Ivan Yelfanov's nonmilitary units together with Sergey Azarin's equipment team succeeded in clearing away the entrance to one of the shelter structures and withdrew "victims." Alongside were the medical assistance personnel led by Valya Gorodnicheva. The girls worked swiftly, rendering first aid.

Utility lines and power-generating equipment had also been "demolished." The emergency repair work advanced swiftly. Communications personnel, plumbers, electricians, soldiers and civilian civil defense team personnel worked together, repairing the damage. A water line had been "damaged" by the blast. It was necessary to remove sections of pipe with the cutting torch and replace them with new sections. Civilian I. Khinazov and Sgt T. Nadriakhimov worked side by side.

The exercise conducted by civil defense military personnel in coordination with personnel of nonmilitary civil defense units was both interesting and instructive. This guaranteed success. All subunits and teams completed their tasks with a mark of excellent.

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Plant Civil Defense Director

Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 77 signed to press 12 May 77
pp 26-27

[Article by P. Gorbunov: "His Routine Workdays"]

[Text] For successful performance of civil defense measures, for the fourth time in a row the challenge Red Banner of the Voronezhskaya Oblast Executive

Committee and Civil Defense Headquarters was awarded to the Ostrogozhsk Automotive Repair Plant. The plant work force now can keep the coveted banner permanently.

At a meeting of civil defense activists, where the ceremony of presenting the banner was held and upgraded socialist pledges were made in honor of the 60th anniversary of the Great October Revolution, many warm words were stated about Nikolay Aleksandrovich Pertsev. For 6 years now he has headed this enterprise's civil defense headquarters.

* * *

Pertsev had just returned from a business trip. The Rossel'khoztekhnika Association had sent him to the town of Davlekanovo in the Bashkir ASSR to a related automotive overhaul plant, for the people in Ostrogozhsk had been the first to conduct a comprehensive plant exercise, which had become a unique standard for enterprises throughout the branch.

Handing him his travel papers, division chief F. Kordyukov had said: "I think this trip will be very beneficial to the people in Davlekanovo. And you can learn something from them as well. Help our comrades do a good job preparing for and conducting the exercise...."

And now, having returned from his trip, Pertsev was thinking about the work he had accomplished on the trip. He recalled his first conversation with director A. Shumakov and party bureau secretary M. Kayenko.

"First tell us about your experience. That is very important to us," the director requested.

The plant activists had gathered in the auditorium: party, Komsomol, trade union officials, production chiefs and commanders of civil defense units. Displayed on special rack stands were diagrams, posters, tables, and other documents brought by Pertsev. Particular attention was drawn by the party-political work plan and clippings from the Ostrogozhsk local newspaper NOVAYA ZHIZN' [New Life], which carried extensive coverage of civil defense.

Nikolay Aleksandrovich stated that prior to this meeting he had endeavored to become briefed in detail on the status of civil defense at the plant.

"Now I can compare both our plants," he commented, "good points and obvious shortcomings."

From the reaction of his audience Pertsev saw that he was proceeding in the right direction. His main concern was avoiding excessive praise for his own plant.

"It is important that the entire work force strongly feel the need of active participation in civil defense measures, in comprehensive performance of production and defense tasks. It is only due to this that we succeeded

in completing our training schedules for a number of years in a row. And I can see that you too have accomplished much."

The Davlekanovites listened attentively to him as he related how a leading enterprise had organized socialist competition for excellent quality of training and how its effectiveness was ensured by purposeful party-political and organizational work in the shops, brigades, training groups and civilian defense units. Pertsev discussed in detail the experience of the special vehicle shop directed by party member V. Kundesh. The workers and white-collar personnel of this shop, which had been awarded the plant's challenge Red Banner, confirm performance standards at practical drills and exercises each year, and improve their skills at civil defense protection and response to civil defense alert. They have set up a training classroom and a civil defense room. Progress in competition is reported on a specially-equipped display stand. Recently the shop superintendent, at the request of oblast civil defense headquarters, held a practical training session for the directors of rayon and city civil defense courses.

Presenting the material in an orderly fashion, which helped the audience remember what was being presented, Nikolay Aleksandrovich noted the interest aroused by the photographs and drawings he had brought of a van truck to carry the gear and equipment of a composite civil defense team, plus other innovations. In short, the hosts learned much from their guest. But he also learned many useful things, particularly pertaining to work methods employed by the assistant director of the comprehensive plant exercise, a role he was performing for the first time. Assistance in drafting the exercise plan, experience in preparing the headquarters staff, services, civil defense units and the entire work force for the exercise, analysis of the performance of the trainees, and a broad exchange of views became for Nikolay Aleksandrovich a genuine school of methods skills.

For example, he highly praised the performance of the composite civil defense team. Mentally comparing this unit with its own composite team, Pertsev found common points between them in the sense of field performance capabilities and smoothness.

...While he was away, a good deal of work stacked up for him at headquarters. Following his army habits, Pertsev planned them by days and even by hours. The following entries appeared on his notepad.

"Relate in the training courses everything you saw in Davlekanovo. Requested by the head of the rayon training courses."

"Medical assistance teams prepare for forthcoming competition. Talk to medical service chief Parkhomenko, commander Reznichenko and political instructor Shmunk. Remind rayon chief of staff Chumachenko."

"Revise plant civil defense plan on the basis of what you learned at Davlekanovo."

Nikolay Aleksandrovich will not tolerate stagnation, marching in place. He is constantly on the move, searching. If he learns something new, he will immediately take a note of it and adopt it. Here are some examples. He read in the journal VOYENNYE ZNANIYA an article by D. Solov'yev entitled "Visit Liyepaya." He took a leave of absence, traveled to Latvia and made a thorough study of their experience in building a training center, and received a briefing on organization of civil defense at the Liyepaysel'mash Plant.

He was also a welcome guest at the Mamontovskiy Experimental Plant of the RSFSR Ministry of Road Construction.

He learned that a new enterprise civil defense model schedule had been drawn up at civil defense courses at Moskovskaya Oblast. He went to Moscow, took the requisite notes, and is utilizing them to improve his own schedule.

This is how it is in all things.

* * *

The workday came to an end. Nikolay Aleksandrovich arrived home at a late hour. His wife, Matrena Vasil'yevna, handed him letters from his children. His daughter Natasha was attending college in Moscow, and his son Vladimir was a military officer. Vladimir wrote that he would soon be transferred to the unit in which his father had served up to his discharge into the reserve. This was good news. His son would carry on for him.

Pushing back the blinds, Nikolay Aleksandrovich gazed out the window at the night lights of the city. As all the rest of the people of Ostrogozhsk, Pertsev loves his city very much and is proud of its history.

Ostrogozhsk is more than 3 centuries old, but it is young. And this youth was brought to the town by the Great October Revolution. On the second day of the revolution Soviet rule was established in Ostrogozhsk, considerably earlier than in the other towns of the former Voronezhskaya Guberniya. Many streets bear the names of veterans of the revolution and the civil war -- Medvedovskiy, Narskiy, Avdeyev....

Seventeen people from Ostrogozhsk became Heroes of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War, while nine workers -- production innovators -- have been awarded the title Hero of Socialist Labor, including K. Naryshkin, a milling machine operator at the automotive repair plant.

The revolutionary, fighting and labor traditions have found a worthy succession in the glorious deeds of Soviet citizens. They include party member Nikolay Pertsev, who is leading a highly active life and is worthily carrying out his professional duties.

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Civil Defense Signals Described

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[Article: "Civil Defense Signals"]

[Text] Eight signals have been designated in the civil defense system. We have already discussed three of them: "Air raid alert," "Close Shelters," and "All clear." Today we shall discuss the other five.

In built-up areas and at economic installations toward which a radioactive cloud is moving and where fallout is expected no sooner than in one hour, the signal "Radioactive contamination threat" will be radio-broadcast and disseminated by other means of communication and warning.

The alert can be transmitted as follows: "Attention! Attention! This is civil defense headquarters! Citizens! There is a threat of radioactive contamination, a threat of radioactive contamination. A radioactive cloud is moving from (name of town given) in the direction of (such-and-such) areas. Radioactive fallout may occur in (a list of names is given) rayons at (such-and-such) a time. The population of the above-listed rayons shall take immediate protective measures."

Upon receiving this warning, one should first of all recheck individual protective gear. Food supplies, water, means of illumination, radio receivers or audio amplifier-speaker units should be moved into a prior-prepared shelter (basement, cellar, etc). It may be necessary to remain in the shelter until the degree of contamination outside drops to safe levels. Tightly seal all doors and openings leading to storerooms, cellars and other places where foodstuffs, vegetables and feeds are stored.

Livestock and poultry must be driven into sealed premises.

As soon as the radioactive cloud approaches the town and radioactive fallout begins, the "Radioactive contamination" signal will be given.

At this signal one should immediately don individual protective gear and proceed to prior-prepared shelters.

One should bear in mind that various buildings substantially reduce the radiation dose which an unshielded individual can receive. Wooden houses, for example, cut the radiation dose in half, production buildings cut it sevenfold, stone and brick buildings 10-fold, and basements of stone and brick buildings -- 100-fold. Fallout shelters protect people almost totally against radioactive radiation.

Procedures to be followed by persons in areas contaminated by radioactive substances shall be determined by local authorities on the basis of information provided by civil defense headquarters.

If chemical contamination is detected, the "Chemical attack" alert shall be sounded. It shall be broadcast by local radio and disseminated by various other means of communications, backed up by audible alert signals -- rapid-frequency strokes on vibrating objects.

The most reliable protection against chemical agents is a well-sealed shelter with a filtration-ventilation system. Duration of stay in such a shelter will depend on the specific situation. Individual protective gear should be donned when the shelter has received physical damage and when contaminated air penetrates the shelter.

If the alert sounds when you are on the street, at home or in a shelter not equipped for protection against chemical agents, immediately put on a gas mask, cloak, stockings and other available protective gear. Following this, proceed in conformity with the situation.

If the alert sounds when you are at work, put on individual protective gear and follow the instructions of the plant management.

Vehicles en route shall keep moving. Drivers shall put on gas masks and gloves, shall shut all windows and increase speed. Passengers shall don gas masks and other available protective devices.

The "Bacteriological contamination" alert shall be broadcast by local radio to warn people that the enemy is employing bacteriological weapons. Rayons in the contamination zone shall be specified, and recommendations shall be given on how to proceed, in relation to the nature and scale of contamination, weather and other conditions.

If a bacteriological stricken area develops, strictly observe rules of quarantine or precautionary observation, and carry out to the letter all instructions given by medical personnel. Bear in mind that a successful effort against dangerous infections is possible only with active participation by each of us in antiepidemic measures.

Do not go outside without putting on a gas mask, respirator, cloth dust mask or gauze and cotton wadding face binding. Explain to your children that they must remain at home in view of the existing situation and that contact with their playmates is dangerous until the quarantine has been suspended.

Call a doctor immediately if it is suspected that one of the members of your family has taken ill.

Civil defense authorities will warn the civilian population of the threat of flooding as a result of physical destruction of water-impoundment structures by broadcasting by radio the "Threat of flooding" alert. All persons residing in flood-threatened areas must evacuate.

Civil defense authorities will organize evacuation of the civilian population to safety with all modes of transportation. If it is only a short distance to flood-safe ground, persons may proceed on foot.

Remember, comrades, that in order successfully to carry out protective measures it is necessary to be thoroughly familiar with civil defense alert signals and to be able to respond in a precise and organized manner. This will make it possible greatly to reduce potential casualties.

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