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TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS
No. 1374

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COMPLAINTS: FOLLOW-UP REPORTS AND CORRECTIVE ACTION

Poorly Organized Battalion Competition

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Apr 78 p 2

[Article: "Following a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Article: 'Inflated Marks'"]

[Text] An article by Maj A. Khorunzhiy published with the above title on 28 February mentioned shortcomings in the organization of socialist competition in the battalion commanded by Capt V. Voznyuk.

As the chief of the unit [soyedineniye] political department informed the editors, the newspaper article was discussed at a conference with managers and political officials of the unit [chast'].

The political department held a seminar at which political officials exchanged working experience in ensuring high effectiveness of weapons training classes and high quality performance of firing exercises. Supervision was stepped up over progress of combat training and steps were taken to preclude instances of inflated marks.

Capt Voznyuk was given disciplinary punishment for shortcomings permitted in the organization and conduct of firing authorized rounds from infantry combat vehicles and for poor organization of socialist competition.

Leningrad MD Sports Teams

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Apr 78 p 2

[Article: "Following a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Article: Lost Positions"]

[Text] That was the title of an article by M. Shlayan published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA for 2 March 1978. It mentioned a considerable reduction in recent years in results of appearances by sportsmen of the Leningrad

Military District, about a reduction of attention paid to training masters of sport of an international class, and about a low level of work to indoctrinate sportsmen.

As Deputy District CIC Lt Gen. M. Polokhov informed the editors, the article was discussed before an expanded session of the party bureau and coaches' council of the district sports club. The district sports committee and heads of the SKA [Army Sports Club] (Leningrad) outlined a number of steps aimed at improving the training of combined teams and indoctrination of reserves.

Poor Post Housing

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Apr 78 p 2

[Article: "Following a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Article: House in the Background"]

[Text] An article published under the above title on 3 March 1978 criticized officials of one of the posts who displayed indifference to personal adversities of families living in an old house.

As Col V. Romanovski informed the editors, the criticism was recognized as just. Unit supply officer Col I. Bannykh was strictly admonished for omissions in the organization of operating available housing.

Repairs have been made in the apartments, and the heating, electricity and water have been fixed. The post command element together with local agencies is resolving the problem of giving families living in the old house well arranged and managed housing.

Post Housing Criticized

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Apr 78 p 2

[Article: "Following a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA ARTICLE: Table Service and Hot-Water Bottle"]

[Text] An article published under the above title on 8 January 1978 told of problems with heating and water in residences in post "X."

District Chief of KEU [billeting directorate] Engr-Col V. Drozdov informed the editors that a large amount of work had been done on post to repair the boiler room and hot water lines. The heat had been fixed in the residences, and at the present time they also are being provided with hot water.

The post KECh [billeting unit] chief, Engr-Lt Col B. Tokarev, and Lt Col V. Tishchenko were given a strict reprimand.

Everyday Living

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Apr 78 p 2

[Article: "Steps taken in Response to Readers' Signals"]

[Text] Comrade L. Gilyazetdinova reported in her letter that there were serious shortcomings in political indoctrination work among families of post service personnel. The letter was sent to the higher political entity, which informed us that unit political deputy Maj G. Mokhryakov was reprimanded for neglect of political indoctrination work with members of service families. Steps have been taken to improve the work of the local committee, the women's council and the comrades' court.

Comrade Yu. Pavel'chuk, a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reader, wrote about interruptions in mail delivery to a remote post. Rear Adm N. Usenko, first deputy chief of political directorate of the Navy, informed the editors that these facts were confirmed. Now a helicopter pad has been prepared not far from the settlement, which will allow mail delivery by aircraft. The command element of the military unit where Comrade Pavel'chuk serves was strictly admonished as to the need for a more sensitive and attentive attitude toward requests and petitions by service personnel.

Patriotic War Invalid A. Pushkarev complained that a great deal of noise hindering normal life and rest is created due to malfunctioning equipment in a store situated under his apartment windows. The letter was sent to the Kaluga Executive Committee of the city soviet of people's deputies. V. Aldoshin, deputy chairman of the ispolkom, reported that the gorpishchetorg [city food trade] had performed work to eliminate the noise. Protective fire alarms had been repaired. Store workers had pledged to observe production discipline strictly, especially during loading and unloading work.

Warrant Officer Political Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Apr 78 p 2

[Article: "Following a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Article: Wandering Groups"]

[Text] The article by Col Ye. Babynin published under the above title on 25 February spoke about shortcomings in the organization of warrant officer political training in units of post "X".

As the editors were informed by the regimental political deputy, the article was discussed with subunit political officers as well as with warrant officer political study group leaders. Capt V. Atroshchenko was admonished as to the inadmissibility of poor preparation for lectures. The group he heads has been given a special classroom for studies. Supervision has been stepped up by the party committee over attendance at the classes. In conclusion, the answer from the regimental

political deputy also reports that he personally "had been strictly admonished by the unit [soyedineniye] political department chief."

It would appear that the political department chief himself should have reported this to the editors. He could have informed us as to what is being done to eliminate shortcomings in warrant officer political training in another unit as well, about which the newspaper also wrote.

One can hardly consider the position of the political department chief as correct.

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CRITICISMS, COMPLAINTS AND SHORTCOMINGS

Shortage of Repair Parts

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 May 78 p 2

[Article by Sr Lt V. Ryazanov: "Acute Signal. How About Sending a Messenger?"]

[Text] I have long wanted to write to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on the difficult time our repair enterprise is having obtaining kits of spare parts, tools and accessories (ZIP). I just could not make up my mind, until I read in the 21 March issue of this newspaper a report by worker V. Trokhov entitled "Mountain of Spare Parts." He touched upon a subject which is a sore spot for repair personnel. I am speaking from experience. I have long been working in the repair field, and I am presently a shop superintendent.

Our enterprise is small. Sometimes we also repair equipment designated for management and control needs. Our team is aware of the importance of our job and endeavors to do the fastest and highest-quality job possible. But unfortunately we do not always succeed. For example, right now there has been lying around in our shop for quite some time equipment on which representatives of a military unit requested priority repairs. We would have done so, and particularly since the entire repair job requires only 10 minutes. But we cannot fix the equipment because we lack one little component. The ZIP kit did not contain this part. The only solution was to obtain a replacement part from the plant which built the equipment. This is no simple matter, however, for the plant does not like this added aggravation, since we are not the only ones sending such requests to the plant. There is no way to avoid a lengthy correspondence.

It is true that there is one possibility of speeding things up -- send a special "messenger" to the plant for the missing part. We are presently thinking about using this method of obtaining replacement parts. Of course such endless trips will cost our enterprise a pretty penny. However, as they say, we can't just sit at the beach and wait for the weather. The chief of our enterprise, Engr-Maj V. Aksenov, I and other of our people have time and again drawn the attention of higher-echelon commanders as well as the commissions operating at our enterprise to the fact that the ZIP we receive

do not meet the enterprise's needs. The problem remains unresolved, however, although I believe it can be solved. How about doing the following: send out to all repair entities of the different services and arms specifications for the equipment we repair with the request that the makeup of the ZIP be revised on the basis of these specifications. And then all materials should be grouped on the basis of equipment types, with optimal kits worked up and put together.

This will help meet the needs of enterprises in repairing equipment in various types and modifications.

Unauthorized Disciplinary Practices

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 May 78 p 2

[Article by Engr-Lt Col B. Lyapkalo: "Punishment in Haste and Anger"]

[Text] The letter to the editors was short, only one page. It related how technical battalion commander Maj G. Sakalovskiy does not always skillfully utilize methods of indoctrinating subordinates and exceeds his disciplinary authority....

We visited the subunit together with the unit commander. It was a harsh, northern area. The lieutenant colonel had told me that there were still many difficulties at the "point" with living conditions and services. But the men were doing an excellent job, and the battalion was one of the best.

We entered the barracks. It was immediately evident that exemplary order was maintained here. The men were neat in appearance and of smart military bearing.

"Major Sakalovskiy knows how to organize things," noted the unit commander. "It seems to me that somebody with an ax to grind wrote that letter to the editors."

He noted that some people are pampered and capricious and cannot take the difficulties of military service. Such an individual may not like strict demandingness.

However, talks with the men indicated that Major Sakalovskiy indeed underrated indoctrinational work with subordinates, the method of persuasion, and excessively utilized punishment.

As we know, any disciplinary punishment as a measure for strengthening military discipline and indoctrination of military personnel should correspond to the gravity of the perpetrated act and the degree of guilt. Regulations state that in determining the type and degree of punishment the commander shall take into consideration the nature of the infraction, the circumstances under which it occurred, previous conduct of the guilty party, how long he had been in military service and the degree of his knowledge of service regulations.

Unfortunately Major Sakalovskiy did not always adhere to these points of regulations. For example, he gave Sgt A. Magonov 5 days detention for being late with his report when he was serving as subunit duty NCO. The fact was that the sergeant was at that moment engaged in receiving a weapon from one of the men. But the officer did not pause to determine the reason or analyze the circumstances.

And this was not the only case of its kind. Major Sakalovskiy, acting in haste and anger, meted out a punishment on Pvt A. Garmaza which exceeded his disciplinary authority.

This officer also displayed a lack of tact and sharp words to his men, toward Pvt R. Mashnovskiy, for example.

Major Sakalovskiy was not in the unit when I arrived. He was a correspondence student and had left for a higher military school to work on a senior paper. I met him some time later, when I traveled to that city on business. We had a talk in my hotel room.

"The men in the battalion are fine, hard-working," stated Gennadiy Vikent'yevich. "Of course there will also be one or two who are remiss. But that's the way things are."

There were signs of tiredness on the major's lean face. It had been an examination day. He had spent the previous day studying hard, and now he was having a not too pleasant conversation with a correspondent.

The people both at the unit and here at the school had told me about Sakalovskiy's high level of engineer training. I also took a look at his personnel file. Judging from his personal record and fitness reports, Gennadiy Sakalovskiy had throughout his entire service, from officer candidate school on, been distinguished by curiosity, initiative, and purposefulness. Documents also attest to the fact that he was an excellent organizer and demanding commander. They also noted such traits as a high degree of efficiency and industry. And there was one more highly interesting detail. Officers from his unit who were of equal or higher position unanimously emphasized that in personality Major Sakalovskiy was a cheerful, convivial individual, with the ability to get close to the men quickly and to lead them. I could not help but ask myself why he was not fully utilizing such valuable commander qualities in his work with his men?

I showed Gennadiy Vikent'yevich the letter which had been sent to the editors. He read over it for a long time. From time to time he would frown and shake his head. His face flushed very slightly. It was obvious that it is not easy to read such a letter for a person who dedicates himself totally to military service.

Having read the letter and hearing everything I had been told in the unit, the major leaned back in his chair, lowered his eyes, as if he had unexpectedly

caught a glimpse of his subordinates and fellow officers and unfortunately had just now learned their opinion of his work style. Sakalovskiy noted, it is true, that enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers, even those whom he especially singled out and commended, were restrained in their relations with him and did not have that confidentiality and respect that they had shown for the previous battalion commander, Engr-Lt Col Nikolay Nikolayevich Ryzhov. For some reason the men lacked their former initiative and productive enthusiasm. Discussing a certain day in the battalion, Major Sakalovskiy commented that he had been too abrupt with one individual and had offended another person with sharp words. In his heart he was sorry and vowed never again to let that happen. But on the following day things would go on as before. And perhaps only now had the question been stated to him with such clarity: why had he permitted such a distortion in his work style?

Engineer-Lieutenant Colonel Ryzhov told me that in the past he had noted in Sakalovskiy certain deviations in disciplinary practices and had corrected him. And it had seemed that the officer comprehended the substance of his errors and was endeavoring not to repeat them in the future. But having become a battalion commander, instead of continuing the fine traditions of organic combination of a high degree of demandingness with painstaking indoctrinational work and relying on the military community, he began excessively resorting to extreme measures.

Yes, Sakalovskiy had a difficult time working into his new job. He had taken over command of the battalion a year previously, while still a captain. The battalion was excellent-rated. But time went by, there were changes in personnel, and there began to occur problems with discipline. In addition the former deputy commander for political affairs left the battalion, and for a long time a replacement was not designated. And Sakalovskiy decided to impose the requisite order, relying only on severe administrative measures and disciplinary authorities he did not possess. Now, analyzing events from the side, as it were, Gennadiy Vikent'yevich realized that the indoctrinational effect of his measures aimed at putting an end to disciplinary violations was frequently diminished due to his abruptness and hasty, ill-conceived decisions. This was the case in the incidents involving Private Garmaza and Sergeant Magonov.

"I flew off the handle," acknowledged Major Sakalovskiy.

I was told about the exceptional punctuality of Major Sakalovskiy in servicing combat equipment. In this area he never allows departures from specified instructions and standards. And that is very praiseworthy. But as we see, he does depart from regulations in indoctrinational work with his men and in his disciplinary practices.

Why did the unit commander and chief of the political section not correct Major Sakalovskiy? After all, they frequently visited the battalion. Apparently they were made complacent by performance results: the training process and combat work were proceeding without interruptions -- and well. And yet what was the price, what was the cost in indoctrination of personnel

at which the results were achieved? No time was found for a thorough analysis of this.

I believe Major Sakalovskiy will draw the proper conclusions from his mistakes and will rigorously adhere to regulations and constantly rely on party and Komsomol activists as well as the military community as a whole in his campaign for strong military discipline, consolidation of the collective, and strengthening of a healthy moral atmosphere. We also believe that the unit commander and political section chief will do their part. The main thing is to help this capable officer master the art of indoctrination, establish proper relations with his subordinates, and strengthen the moral atmosphere in the collective with the assistance of the party and Komsomol organizations.

Sending Complaint Letters

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 May 78 p 2

[Article by Maj V. Zhitarenko: "First Resort"]

[Text] "Our subunit -- a regimental equipment maintenance unit -- has been excellent-rated for many years. We are striving to consolidate our success. But something is hindering execution of these plans and meeting our high pledges. Sometimes we are taken away from our training and service activities -- sometimes to unload freight cars containing supplies for neighboring enterprises and sometimes for other work outside the unit's area.... And in addition, the subunit commander is not always tactful in dealing with his men: he will say something insulting to one of us, and this ruins everybody's mood...."

(From a letter to the editors received from a training regiment at the Yeysk Higher Military Aviation Pilot School)

"If the author of this letter had turned to us, we would have taken all necessary measures. We would have sent a representative to the regiment and analyzed the state of affairs in the subunit," commented Maj Gen Avn V. Cherepakhin, Chief of the Aviation Political Section of the Northern Caucasus Military District, on the contents of the letter.

He was of precisely the same opinion about the reaction of the political section at the Yeysk School: if they had received the letter, they would have handled things just fine on the spot.... It would be quite logical to continue from there: if the author of the letter had gone to the training regiment deputy commander for political affairs or to the party committee to present his complaints, everything would have been corrected! But the fact is that the author had reason for preferring to bypass that echelon....

A great democratic achievement of Soviet rule is contained in the USSR Constitution, which states that each Soviet citizen has the right to present suggestions to government and public organizations on improving their activities and to criticize shortcomings in their work. "One of the important forms of link between our party... and the masses is letters by toilers," stressed Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in his Report to the 25th CPSU Congress. "The number of such letters is steadily growing, reflecting increasing civic activeness on the part of Soviet citizens.... The most important suggestions and opinions are examined by the Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat and are taken into consideration when drafting decrees and new legislation."

Greater attention is also being focused on letters being received by army and navy staffs and political agencies; considerable socially useful work is being done on the basis of these letters. In that same aviation political section of the Northern Caucasus Military District, the author of this article was briefed on the procedure of handling mail during the current year. It was not difficult to note that the overwhelming majority of letters were examined by the Communists themselves -- officials from the district Air Force political section and headquarters. This of course attests to a responsible approach to such an important matter.

One could not, however, help but notice something else: many letters are received which deal with problems which could certainly be resolved locally, that is, in the units and subunits.

Here is a typical example. Examination of a letter from enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers in one of the subunits of the Kachinskoye Higher Military Aviation Pilot School, which complained that the barracks lacked a room for drying clothing and footgear, was handled by the chief of the political section and the district deputy aviation commander for rear services. The required facility was set up in extremely short order. Maj B. Kostyukov was reprimanded for failure to care properly for his men. This was a principled, immediate response to a letter!

The reader, however, will undoubtedly ask the following question: but could not Maj B. Kostyukov himself not have corrected this obvious deficiency in his men's quarters? Why did his men not follow the chain of command, that is, why did they bypass him and appeal directly to the political section?

The answer is ridiculously simple: party member B. Kostyukov of course knew that there were no driers in the barracks. But he was accustomed to that situation. He evidently felt that his men would be able to get along without a drying facility. It was for this reason that his men did not approach him. They figured that although their problem was not of "global" significance, but even if they forwarded the letter from the political section to the unit, it would force the local command properly to address the problem. This reasoning proved correct. In the final analysis it was

precisely Major Kostyukov who was compelled to have a drying room set up, and it cost him just as much time, energy and, quite frankly, nerves: it would have been much simpler to carry out his duties promptly, without the participation of the "Higher echelon."

A different situation developed in the training regiment at the Yeysk School, from where the letter was sent to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, although in this instance as well the commander and his deputy for political affairs, as we have already stated, were not "bypassed" by the complaint through mere happenstance.

The technical subunit in which the authors of the letter serve was considered a top performer, including in the area of discipline and order in the subunit. When the senior commander visits the regiment, what do they usually suggest he inspect? The maintenance unit barracks, of course. I can certify that the barracks stand out among all the others with their attractive and... costly finish and trim. The first thought which pops up in my head is how did Capt D. Makarenko, chief of the technical maintenance unit, obtain those materials and at whose expense? And one also wonders how the unit commander and party committee members failed to think about that question. If they had thought about it and looked into things, they would have elucidated without any particular effort that the captain's men, on his instructions, were engaged, to put it in figurative terms, in "seasonal work off the farm." If they unloaded at the freight yards a car consigned to a neighboring enterprise, they would receive in exchange particle-board panels, metal for flashing, etc. Of course they worked during hours designated for training. The regimental party committee secretary is presently intending to initiate a party investigation of the doings of party member D. Makarenko. And yet early in the game it would have been sufficient merely to point out to Makarenko his mistake. Unfortunately the party committee found out about the technical maintenance unit chiefs' enthusiasm for under-the-counter dealings only after a letter had been sent to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

The fact that the command and party committee were not informed on Capt D. Makarenko's predilection for questionable methods of indoctrinating his men seems even more strange. Both the deputy regimental commander for political affairs and the party committee secretary were unspeakably amazed when it was learned that Makarenko had been insulting his men's dignity. Now he explains that he was doing this "in order to strengthen indoctrinational effect." After all this should one be surprised that many enlisted men, including outstanding performers in training and Komsomol members, signed the letter complaining about their superior? They were impelled to do so by the sense of personal dignity inherent in each of us. They well understand that they are subordinate to their superior and are obliged to carry out his orders unquestioningly. But nobody has the right to insult them.

One only regrets that such incidents were not noted by the regiment's political workers and Communists, although it would seem that it was simply impossible not to see them.

"You attended our Komsomol meeting, Major, and we discussed it at that meeting!" Komsomol member Pfc A. Nazarov, an excellent performer in training, reminded the deputy regimental commander for political affairs.

Yes, the political worker attended the meeting, but that is all. He failed to pay attention and attached no importance to the acute alarm signal. He considered it to be a trivial matter.

"Trivial matters".... Many such items rose to the surface in the course of checking the facts laid out in the letter. Party activists once thought up a fine practice: to set up a special table in the enlisted men's mess for persons whose name-day it happens to be. Although some people tried to assure the correspondent that this practice was still being followed, the heavy layer of dust on that table compelled one to doubt the truthfulness of this statement.... For a long time now soldiers in their first year of service have been refused without valid reason a pass to leave the post....

And the party committee seems not to notice all these things.

We must state that the party activists spare no effort in working to ensure safe air operations and excellent flying skills in the school's instructors and cadets. They help the regimental commander diversify the forms and methods of indoctrinational work with personnel and to increase its effectiveness. They organize and conduct necessary, useful activities. And it would seem that they do not avoid or shun work with individuals. But this work frequently boils down essentially to a hastily put inquiry, in passing: "How are things going, comrade enlisted man (noncommissioned officer, warrant officer, lieutenant)?" They never have the time: today flight operations, tomorrow flight operations, followed by a conference on theory, a meeting or session.... The result is that they were unaware of many things, could only guess at the situation in some areas, and failed to pay attention to other things. Therefore the men considered it to be a better bet to write a letter "to the top" on the problems concerning them.

Thus the regimental command and party committee, in place of becoming the first and only point of appeal in settling what are in general rather simple problems, proved to be the last....

"The regimental command consists of young people who have not yet worked into their jobs. They are having some difficulty," stated the chief of the district aviation political division.

It is true that almost all the regiment's top-echelon officers were replaced fairly recently. The regiment previously was distinguished by excellent performance results. So they promoted and transferred to other units practically all the senior-level officers. Their successors are presently having a difficult time of it. Perhaps the assistance given by the district command and aviation political section in this connection should consist in teaching the regimental command as quickly as possible the ability to conduct

lively, daily indoctrinational work with personnel as well as the ability to reach intelligent, efficient resolution of various questions pertaining to daily life and routine.

Request for Early Discharge Mishandled

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 May 78 p 2

[Article by Col A. Drovosekov: "Irresponsibility"]

[Text] A great tragedy came to Pvt Yelubay Zhetekenov: his mother died. The soldier's two brothers and one sister -- all minors -- now had nobody to take care of them. The orphans were taken in by their grandfather, Ye. Baymanov -- a pensioner, born in 1905.

At Private Zhetekenov's request, his unit commander submitted a request to the Kungrad Combined City Military Commissariat, where the soldier had been inducted, asking to be informed whether Zhetekenov was entitled to early discharge into the reserves as specified by Article 40 of the law on universal military service obligation. The reply received from the military commissariat was astounding in unexpectedness of content. It stated that the boy's mother was alive and well.

Although the document was executed quite properly, the unit commander, upon reflection, had doubts about it. He was inclined to believe that a careless error had been made somewhere, because nobody is going to joke about such things as the death of their mother. Saying nothing to Private Zhetekenov about receiving a reply, he sent a new request to the Kungrad Military Commissariat. He received the same reply: the soldier's mother was living.

It would seem that the people at the military commissariat could not have made the same mistake twice. However, even now the unit commander did not hasten to jump to conclusions. He made another inquiry, this time to the military commissariat of the Karakalpak ASSR. A reply was sent by Lt Col V. Krasnoshchekov, Military Commissar of the Karakalpak ASSR. I quote: "In reply to your request, No 15, of 10 January 1978, be informed that replies were sent to all your requests to the Kungur Military Commissariat, the last of them being No 757, dated 13 December 1977.

"Serviceman Yelubay Zhetekenov is not eligible for early discharge, since his mother, Rabiga Zhetekenova, born 1937, is classified in disability group 3 and can work in light employment, and his brother, Kuralbay Zhetekenov, born 1961, is employed on a sovkhoz."

Now the unit commander could call Private Zhetekenov in for a talk with a clear conscience. As before, the soldier insisted that his mother was dead and that his brother Kuralbay was not working but going to school. To determine the truth of the matter, the unit commander decided to resort to a last means -- to inquire with the civil registry office and the school.

The first reply to come back was from Secondary School No 83, Kungrad Station, which stated that Kuralbay Zhetekenov was enrolled in the 10th grade at that school. Then the mail brought a copy of Rabiga Zhetekenova's death certificate, issued on 5 July 1977 by the rayon civil registry office. Now the unit commander was faced with the question of whom to believe. The report from the military commissariat of the Karakalpak ASSR or the copy of the death certificate and the reply from the school? Without reaching a decision, the unit commander sent all documents to the editors with the request that we assist him arriving at the truth.

I placed a call to the Kungrad Military Commissariat. The phone was answered by Sr Lt D. Chervyakov, the deputy military commissar.

"The Zhetekenov affair? Yes. Major In'kov, the military commissar, looked into the matter as soon as we were alerted by your paper."

"What did you find out?"

"Private Zhetekenov's mother did indeed die last summer. Kuralbay is going to school. The Karakalpak ASSR Military Commissariat replied on the basis of our information."

"Was it really so difficult to establish the truth?"

The reply was incomprehensible. It seems some relative of Private Zhetekenov had told them that his mother was living and that the people at the military commissariat should not trouble themselves: let the boy serve out his time.

So somebody reported something, and this was sufficient for them, without looking any further, to keep sending back the same replies, not even taking the trouble to really look into this inquiry received from the military unit. One must be totally irresponsible and absolutely callous to go on month after month without doing such an extremely simple and at the same time such a very important thing.

3024

CSO: 1801

SMALL UNIT TACTICS IN MOUNTAIN DEFILE DESCRIBED

Moscow ZNAMENONOSETS in Russian No 5, May 78 signed to press 20 Apr 78
pp 4-6

[Article by Col A. Shakhbazyan: "Along the Floor of A Gorge"]

[Text] Guards WO ["praporshchik"] I. Gordeyev began to prepare ahead of time for the battle drill exercise on the subject "A Motorized Rifle Platoon in Protection on the Move in Carrying Out a March on Foot in the Mountains."

The practical exercise was to be carried out to study the mountain gear and the rules for using it, the techniques for crossing obstacles, and the procedures for firing with large angles of sight and orientation. The following training questions were planned to be worked on: 1. The procedure for the movement of the point (front of vanguard) [GPZ] and the examination of the mountainous terrain. 2. The actions of the GPZ with an "enemy" air attack, and in detecting mixed minefields and destruction. 3. The actions of the GPZ in encountering the "enemy."

The route for the actions of the platoon was worked out ahead of time by the senior commander in such a manner that it ran along a gorge, through a narrow defile, down the steep slopes of mountains, across rocky areas and over the crest of a snow-covered range, with ascents and descents of varying steepness. The individual mountain obstacles planned to be crossed were readied ahead of time and tested out by a mountain training instructor for ensuring safety measures against possible rock slides, avalanches, and so forth.

WO Gordeyev who had taken special mountain training courses (otherwise the platoon commander would not be allowed to take the exercise) selected the place for conducting the exercise, he carried out reconnaissance and determined under what tactical situation and in which sequence he would work through each training question with the subordinates and also established the procedure for designating and simulating the "enemy."




Diagram No 1

Key: 1--Airplanes; 2--Starting Point; 3--Helicopters;
 4--Bypass Route; 5--Mixed Minefield; 6--Route of
 GPZ; 7--Mined Barrier; 8--Bypass Route of GPZ;
 9--Area of Destruction.




Diagram No 2

Key: 1--Route of Advance of GPZ; 2--Starting Point.

Then the motorized rifle troops took to the field. At the beginning of the exercise, the platoon commander inspected the readiness of the personnel, the equipment, having paid particular attention to the proper fitting of the mountain gear. Then he gave the subject and the training missions of the exercise, he organized the socialist competition and began to work

on the first training question by the various elements: The formation of the platoon for actions in the GPZ; the order of march for the GPZ across the mountain routes; the inspecting of the terrain and the characteristic mountainous land forms. For this he introduced his subordinates to the tactical situation and gave assignments to the platoons.

The "enemy" was to advance in a direction of the MTF, the pass and the farm of Krutoye. The first MR [motorized rifle] platoon of the fourth MR company with the attached grenade launcher squad was to be the GPZ. It was to advance along the route of the main forces with the mission of supporting the column to be protected against sudden "enemy" attack and to reconnoiter the route.

The first squad was the patrol. It was to move along the route of the GPZ within a range of visual contact, with the mission of ensuring it against surprise "enemy" attack and by observation and inspection of the terrain to promptly establish the enemy's presence and the direction of its movement.

The formation and order of march for the basic forces of the GPZ were: The second, the grenade launcher and the third squads. The speed was to be 5-6 km per hour. The distance between the squads was 30 minutes and the signals were the regular.

The squad commanders were to assign observers for the ground and air "enemy" and for the patrol platoon as follows: the second squad would watch ahead and to the right, and the third would watch to the left and to the rear. The second and third squads were to assign one two-man patrol for inspecting the terrain of the route.

The platoon commander then explained that in the mountains surprise "enemy" actions could be expected in narrows, in narrow passages, gorges, ravines, and on roads and paths. Precisely here the enemy most frequently sets up ambushes and carries out raids. For this reason these places must be subjected to careful inspection. Particular attention must be given to high points adjacent to a narrow place. Here the members of the patrols should climb their slopes on both sides of the gorge and carefully inspect them from above.

The inspecting of a high point is carried out by moving up its slopes and along the crest. The groves, brush, the rocky areas, caves and so forth found along the slopes must be examined with particular care.

In inspecting a ravine, one member of the patrol moves along its bottom and the second on top, covering the actions of the first man. In inspecting mountain rivers, it is essential to seek out the fords, to determine their depth, width, the speed of the river current, the condition and steepness of the banks, concealed approaches, as well as the possibility of crossing the ford by the personnel and the military equipment.

After a brief explanation, the platoon commander appointed several two-man patrols from the patrol squad and the main forces of the GPZ, he determined the areas of the ravine to be inspected by each two-man patrol and began the training of inspecting the ravine. The remaining personnel of the GPZ, in staying in a concealed place, observed the actions of the members of the patrol and the "enemy." After this, the platoon commander carried out an analysis, having noted the following shortcomings: Pvt Andryushchenko forgot to cover the actions of his partner, while Pvs Mamedov and Andreyev did not detect a machinegun in the brush on the edge of the ravine. In approximately the same procedure the warrant officer worked through the inspection of the fords, the narrow areas of the gorge and the heights.

For developing boldness, initiative and decisiveness in the trainees in the course of the movement of the GPZ, in crossing obstacles and in inspecting the terrain, by giving the signals "Stop," "Continue Advance," and "Enemy on the Right (Left), Form Extended Line!," the warrant officer achieved preciseness in the actions of the patrol squad and the basic forces of the GPZ.

In reaching the southeastern slope of elevation 3890.0, Gordeyev trained the platoon in crossing a scree, and then conducted a brief analysis, and went on to working through the second training question of the actions of the GPZ with an attack by "enemy" aviation, in detecting mixed minefields and destruction (Diagram No 1). Here the commander clarified the tactical situation and the mission for further actions and assigned the second squad as the patrol.

The GPZ was approaching the pass. The platoon commander through the members of the patrols gave the signal "Air," and then the command to repel an air attack. The sergeants basically commanded their subordinates correctly. The squads increased their distance, moving as close as possible to the projection of the road and using its natural protective properties.

Only the squad of Sgt Kharchenko was late in repelling the air attack as his command to take cover from the fire was verbose, it contained superfluous information, while the personnel incorrectly prepared for firing, and no result was obtained from the salvo.

"Under mountain conditions," the warrant officer explained, "the zone for observing an air enemy is reduced by several fold in comparison with the ordinary. A target can appear suddenly and in just a few seconds. The squad commander in such a situation is better expressing the usual maximally short command with a gesture," that is pointing in the direction of the appearing target and merely saying one word "fire."

The platoon commander several times trained the squad commanders in opening fire in different directions. No one made any more mistakes, and everyone acted quickly and precisely.

In training subordinates to conduct reconnaissance in mixed minefields, WO Gordeyev recalled their camouflage features in the terrain, and demanded that the patrol members carefully inspect bridges, defiles, narrow parts of the gorges, and so forth.

...The patrol squad, in crossing a small pass, approached a narrow defile. In front was a ridge of precipitous rock which the members of the patrol did not examine immediately. The squad commander Sgt V. Chiligin demanded that the members of the patrol carefully examine the rocky slopes hanging over the road. "If the 'enemy' had been able to place even one mine here," he recalled, "the explosion could block the path and prevent the carrying out of the mission.... Where could the 'enemy' organize a surprise in the mountain narrows?"

The attention of the men in the patrol was drawn to the small stones on the roadbed which had been strewn somewhat to the side. In other places there were none. And all of a sudden the men of the patrol spotted a thin steel rod which protruded shamelessly from the rocks on the right. It was not difficult to guess that this was the core of a detonator for an anti-vehicle mine.... The member of the patrol Pvt Kublashvili signaled to the squad commander that a mine had been found and next to this he set out a special marker. The patrol squad acted just as ably and intelligently in encountering a large stone slide on their route and this again had been formed in a narrow point along the road. Here using stone the entire squad by hand laid two tracks of the corresponding width of the infantry combat vehicle and they crossed the obstacle.

Another patrol acted somewhat differently in an analogous situation. It limited all its actions to merely reporting to the senior chief and began to wait for instructions from it. The warrant officer, in analyzing the situation in detail, emphasized that under no circumstances should the patrol become flustered and that it should creatively approach the solving of any unexpected problem, showing initiative, resourcefulness and boldness. In beginning the third training question, the actions of the GPZ in encountering the "enemy" (Diagram No 2), the platoon commander followed the sequence: initially to work on the element of encountering small groups by the GPZ, and then superior forces. The plan of the exercise envisaged that these elements would be repeated in returning along the range.

The leader of the exercise, having announced the training question, reminded the personnel of what the patrol squad and the basic forces of the GPZ should undertake in the event of encountering small groups and superior forces of the "enemy" along various sections of the route, namely, in the gorge, along the slopes of heights, the range and so forth. And then he began to train the platoon. At first he gave the following mission:

"The 'enemy' by the fire of the retreating forces and by creating destruction on the route was endeavoring to hold up the advance of our troops, and to simultaneously bring up reserves from the direction of Stoybishche toward the gorge. The mission of the GPZ was to continue the advance along

the planned route and support the column being defended against a surprise 'enemy' attack. The third squad was the patrol. Reconnaissance was to be carried out for the 'enemy' and the terrain along the route of the GPZ. Small groups were to be destroyed by firing without stopping, and in encountering superior forces, an advantageous position was to be taken up, the 'enemy' was to be destroyed by firing and the engagement of the basic forces of the GPZ was to be ensured."

In training the personnel for actions in encountering small "enemy" groups, the platoon commander periodically changed the positions of the squads, and made sure that the patrol squad gave precise reports on the forces of the "enemy," and carried out bold and decisive attacks from a march formation, making skillful use of the mountainous terrain for maneuvering, while the squads of the basic forces of the GPZ were to provide continuous observation of the developing situation and the signals from the platoon commander.

The commander of the third squad, Jr Sgt S. Kharchenko, carried out his duties with fervor. Both the subordinates and he himself carefully examined the terrain, while maintaining a high speed in doing so. Where the situation required, Kharchenko sent on additional members of the patrol ahead. In one area, in truth, in working for a rapid pace, the squad endeavored to attack the "enemy" head on without sufficient fire support, and did not use the advantageous conditions for maneuvering a portion of the forces. The platoon commander halted the patrol squad and pointed out the error, as a result of which, in actual combat, the patrol could not have carried out the mission.

In continuing the training, the platoon commander gave the command "forward," and simulated targets designating the "enemy" battle outposts which equaled in strength the forces of the GPZ. The patrol squad in this instance promptly detected the "enemy," and correctly assessed its forces. The leader taught his subordinates to make skillful use of the folds in the mountainous terrain for taking up advantageous positions. The main forces worked on the tactical standards for deploying in a battle formation and for rapidly attacking the "enemy" flank and rear from above from the cliffs of elevation Gorbataya. In repeating this episode several times and in changing the places of the squads, the platoon commander achieved smooth and precise actions by the trainees, as well as coordination between the squads and weapons.

During the ensuing combat, the basic forces of the GPZ, in using the ravines for maneuvering and by a bold and decisive rush reached the false crest of elevation Gorbataya, from whence they caught in surprise fire the "enemy" GPZ. The third squad, after destroying the patrol, immediately shifted its fire to the basic "enemy" forces. Then the GPZ rapidly attacked the "enemy" from the front and the flank.

For working out actions of the GPZ in encountering superior "enemy" forces, the leader of the exercise by using targets simulated the advance of a column up to an infantry company from the direction of Stoybishche, and

then began to train the personnel. Here he taught the squad to take up advantageous positions, to organize a tiered plan of fire in a short period of time and to maneuver over the slopes of the heights and the range.

He trained the patrol squad to advance rapidly to the southwestern slope of Mount Kamennaya and by firing from an advantageous position to force the "enemy" to deploy under conditions which were disadvantageous for it and to support the maneuvering of the main forces of the GPZ.

The main forces of the GPZ, in using the folds of the mountainous terrain, reached the northern slopes of the elevation with a designation of 3630.1, and trained in attacking the "enemy" from the flank. Here the grenade launching squad of Sgt V. Gafurov trained in taking up advantageous firing positions and in firing at maximum ranges.

Having worked on the actions of the GPZ in encountering the "enemy" in a gorge, the platoon commander led the platoon across the slope of elevation 3890.0 to the range, and repeated the working through of the same actions in carrying out the march in the reverse direction along the range, paying particular attention to the little-studied procedures.

In the region of the farm of Krutoye, the platoon commander held an analysis and summed up the results of the socialist competition. The battle drill exercise was instructive and contributed to the combat teamwork of the platoon and to preparing it for the forthcoming exercises in mountainous terrain.

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PARATROOPER TACTICS UNDER MOUNTAIN CONDITIONS OUTLINED

Moscow ZNAMENONOSETS in Russian No 5, May 78 signed to press 20 Apr 78
pp 6-8

[Article by Col I. Kononov: "To the Mountain Plateau"]


[Text] Combat in mountains is carried out, basically, along roads, valleys, ranges, and on the gentle slopes of mountains. Combat to take heights and mountain passes is carried out with particular intenseness. The enemy has an opportunity ahead of time to organize strong defenses here and prepare for the destruction of passes through canyons, bridges over mountain rivers and other narrow pass areas.

For the troops fighting from the front, the capturing and holding of inaccessible mountain areas by landing troops ensures a high pace of advance. An important, and in a number of instances decisive role in carrying out this mission is played by small subunits such as a crew, squad or platoon.

In the mountains, more frequently than under ordinary conditions, they must fight independently, a significant distance away from their troops conducting reconnaissance, seizing and clearing mixed minefields, carrying out flanking and enveloping movements in order to attack the enemy from the flank and the rear, and defending themselves stubbornly and strongly. Let us examine the particular features of conducting combat in the mountains using the example of the actions of the second paratrooper platoon [pdv] in the conducted tactical exercises.

After dropping the airborne party on area No 1 (see the diagram) located on a mountain plateau to the west of Mount Shukcha, the commander of the second pdv, WO ["praporshchik"] I. Klevtsov in the assembly region was given the combat mission in the terrain by the commander of the third pdr [paratrooper company]:

The second pdv, with a sapper squad was to advance along the road, to destroy the "enemy" radar post in the area of Mount Gorbataya and by 0930 hours take elevation 836.0. Then the platoon was to go over to the defensive on this elevation and not let the "enemy" infantry and tanks break through in the direction of Danchev and the ruins. After taking Shukcha Pass the company by 1200 hours should reach the position of the platoon.



As can be seen, the platoon had around 3 hours of combat in isolation from the company and it was to cover the actions of the basic landing forces to capture the mountain pass.

Having explained the mission, WO I. Klevtsov oriented the squad commanders in the terrain and having made certain that they were ready to carry out the mission, sent the point vehicle on ahead, and then gave the signal for the platoon to move out. The platoon commander decided, in carrying out continuous observation of the road and in moving from one shelter to another, to bring the platoon to Mount Gorbataya at the maximum possible speed, to destroy the "enemy" by an attack from a march position and to reach the defensive area. The rugged and close in terrain limited observation and such a method of moving ensured concealment of the actions, excluding the opportunity of a surprise attack on the subunit.

Soon the commander of the point vehicle reported: "I see the 'enemy'." In looking through the binoculars, the warrant officer detected that up to a squad of infantry, in rapidly dismounting from an armored personnel carrier, were quickly taking up the defensive along the southern slopes of Mount Pologaya. Obviously this was the reconnaissance. In order not to allow the "enemy" an opportunity to dig in, the warrant officer decided initially to neutralize it by concentrated fire from the platoon, and then by a rapid attack from the BMD [point vehicle] to destroy it.

At his command, the platoon assumed combat formation and in firing on the move and from brief halts, advanced rapidly toward Pologaya. Here the second and third squads outflanked the "enemy" and destroyed its BTR [armored personnel carrier] concealed behind a rock ridge. The active and coordinated combat brought success. In continuing the advance, the platoon moved out

to the north of Pologaya. From here the object to be taken was clearly visible. By personal observation the platoon commander established that up to an infantry squad occupied the defenses on the southern slopes of elevation Bezymyanny and up to two squads in the region of Gorbataya. By firing from two directions the "enemy" had securely covered the pass along the road.

Having assessed the situation, the warrant officer decided to send a platoon forward on the BMD to elevation Bezymyanny by a foot attack to destroy the "enemy" initially on its southern slopes and then, in developing the offensive, without halting to capture the radar post. Before the start of the attack, by firing the BMD weapons using a fragmentation grenade, the infantry in the trench at the foot of the elevation was to be reliably neutralized. The second squad was to be sent around the "enemy" for an attack from the rear timed to that of the platoon. In using the terrain, the platoon reached the height, upon the signal from the commander it sped up and under cover from the fire of the BMD went over to the attack.

The paratroopers fought tenaciously and steadily. By small arms fire, they covered their vehicles, in destroying first of all the close-combat antitank weapons. The platoon commander moved 40 meters behind the extended line, controlling the fire and movement of the BMD over a portable radio. Then he moved ahead and personally led his subordinates in the attack.

Having destroyed up to a squad of "enemy" infantry, the platoon, in developing the offensive, reached the road where it encountered heavy small arms and machinegun fire from Gorbataya. The "enemy" strongpoint had tiered firing positions. At the foot of the mountain a BTR and gun were detected in previously built positions. The frontal attack was not successful. The terrain was well exposed to firing, and in addition the "enemy" had anti-tank guns.

In this difficult situation, the platoon commander acted confidently. Over the radio he ordered the commander of the second squad by firing from a halt to tie down the "enemy" from the front, and at the same time the remaining forces of the platoon, by maneuvering on the BMD, would reach the saddle of Gorbataya. Here the warrant officer deployed the platoon for combat and in a battle formation, in firing from above, attacked the "enemy" from the rear.

In the mountains such an attack is the most effective. In acting boldly and decisively and in making skillful use of the weapons, grenade launchers and hand grenades from close ranges, the paratroopers destroyed the "enemy" on the defensive, and by the appointed time had gone over to the defensive, covering the mountain road leading down to the valley.

Having reported this by radio to the company commander, WO Klevtsov designated the reference points and clarified the mission for the squad commanders. He pointed out to them the positions of the squads, the arcs of fire, the basic and alternative positions of the BMD and their sectors of fire.

The third squad was to be in ambush, taking up a position at the foot of the elevation. The sapper squad set out antitank and antipersonnel mines ahead of its fronts.

The first and second squads built positions on the slopes of elevation 826.0, in providing dependable fire cover from the upper level for the actions of the third squad. The BMD were dug in and camouflaged. In having a good field of view and arc of fire, they could also change positions covertly in order to cover the platoon from the rear. The platoon commander assigned a spotter the mountain path, since from the position of the subunit it was out of view, and he defined the order of covering it for the commander of the second squad.

In organizing the defenses, the warrant officer considered that it was impossible to take up positions directly on the crest of the elevation, since this would facilitate visual observation for the "enemy," and allow it to establish the position of the weapons and fire at them with aimed firing. On the crests of the elevations, dummy positions should be prepared for ultimately alternative ones for maneuvering, in the event of repelling an attack from the rear.

The platoon commander also considered that the ruggedness of the terrain caused many dead uncovered areas and concealed approaches. In order to provide fire cover for them, on the flanks of the squads, alternative firing positions for machineguns had to be prepared ahead of time.

In the course of defensive combat the personnel showed high skill, courage and tenacity. In fighting under strong "enemy" fire, under conditions of smoke and fires, and in repelling the "enemy" attacks wearing antigas equipment, the soldiers skillfully fought against the incendiaries, the tanks and helicopters.

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ANTITANK GRENADE LAUNCHING PROCEDURES DESCRIBED

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pp 10-11

[Article by Sgt I. Khamrayev of the Red Banner Turkestan Military District:
"A Tank in the Sight of the Grenade Launcher"]

[Text] A grenade launcher is a powerful and effective weapon against tanks, assault guns, armored personnel carriers and other armored targets. Firing this type of weapon has a number of particular features which require definite training for accurate firing.

The first particular feature consists in the fact that in firing, greatly heated powder fumes are produced. These are released through the breech of the barrel and form a dangerous zone and this zone should be kept clear of personnel, ammunition and combustible substances. The depth of this zone in firing can reach several meters. For this reason the positions must be skillfully selected for firing. In the tactical exercises and training we give great significance to this. I endeavor to prepare trenches, ditches, craters, large ditches as well as the ruins of structures for this. They are convenient for firing and do not give away the position of the grenade launcher. But if it is not possible to find well sheltered areas, then two or three alternative positions should be prepared ahead of time, and I make communication trenches between them for rapid shifting of position.

The second particular feature is the significant steepness of the grenade's trajectory, and this requires great accuracy in aiming the weapon at the target.

I recall my first unsuccessful shot from a grenade launcher. I determined that the moving "enemy" tank was at a range of 500 meters, and opened fire at it having put the sight on 5 and aiming the weapon at the middle of the target. But the tank, in moving frontally, was actually at a range of 450 meters. Although the mistake was just several score meters, there was no hit. The grenade passed over the target. The subunit commander analyzed the firing and explained to me that with the sight on 5 at 450 meters the lead of the trajectory would be 2.5 meters, while the height of an average

tank, as is known, is up to 3 meters. This is why the grenade launcher must aim with an accuracy up to 25 meters, considering here the speed and direction of the target and the side wind. If several moving armored targets appear simultaneously, then the grenade launcher should select one of them which is the most important at the given moment. One other feature is that a grenade has a low velocity, and this requires definite skills in accurately considering the amount of the lateral lead. For selecting the lead, it is essential to be able to correctly determine the speed and direction of the movement of the targets. For example, the speed of the tanks with their movement in a combat formation of motorized rifle troops will be up to 10 km, during an attack of the forward edge up to 20, and in developing a success on level terrain over 20. The direction of the target relative to the plane of fire is determined considering the ratio of the width and the length of the target. Here I use a simple rule. If only the front of the tank is visible, then motion is frontal, if its length is approximately equal to the width, then the movement is oblique and the target is moving at an acute angle. But if the entire length of the tank can be seen, then the movement is flank and the target is moving at an angle of 90° to the plane of fire.

In observing these particular features of detecting the targets and firing at them using a grenade launcher, it is possible to hit a tank at a range of 500 meters and nearer with the first round. This is also determined by the sufficiently high grouping of fire from a grenade launcher.

However the accuracy of firing depends largely upon the ability of the firer to aim accurately.

What methods do we use for improving the accuracy of fire? When the distance to the target with no wind equals even hundreds of meters, the aiming point coincides with the corresponding division on the sight scale. It is more difficult when the armored object is at intermediate distances. In such instances we should endeavor to locate the point on the hairlines of the optical sight between the horizontal lines. For example, if the distance to a tank in a pit equals 450 meters, then the point of aiming should be between the lines designated by the figures 5 and 4. Experience, as is known, does not come by itself. This is acquired by constant training in planned exercises and particularly in the field when the situation puts a soldier under difficult conditions. First of all the grenade thrower should have a perfect knowledge of the sight attachment and most importantly the design of the grid and sight scale, without which it is impossible to hope for precise firing.

How can all of this be learned in a short period of time?

Pvt E. Khaytmatov with whom I am competing pays particular attention to this. He has made an entire set of silhouettes of tanks and infantry combat vehicles with a definite scale and considering the angle of approach. By employing one or another silhouette on the rangefinder scale, it is possible to determine at what distance the "enemy" vehicle will be. And he also taught me this method.

In practical training in aiming at targets located at actual distances, in turn we checked one another for the accuracy of aiming using an orthoscope. We focused attention on such "details," for example, as holding our breath and smoothly squeezing the trigger. This is an important element as it is possible to aim very carefully and consider all the particular features of firing, but at the last minute to pull the trigger abruptly and not obtain a hit as the grenade launcher is moved in the plane of fire.

In studying together with a comrade, we have used drawings which we made on sheets of paper, on the classroom blackboard or in the field on sand. The divisions which corresponded to the range of fire were plotted from certain reference points such as individual structures or large stones. Then we asked questions of each other, and solved problems in reinforcing them using examples from our personal experience.

I will give one of them. Let us assume that we must determine the divisions of the sight grid for firing at a fixed tank at a distance of 400 meters with a heavy wind from the right. In this instance it is essential to know the correction for a moderate wind at an angle of 90° to the plane of fire. For the designated distance this equals 1.5 divisions for the aim-off graticule. Now from the tables it is not difficult to set the corresponding point for aiming. It is always necessary to realize particularly that the fin of a flying grenade is deflected in the direction of the influencing wind, that is, the heavier head turns slightly in the opposite direction and the grenade deviates from the plane of fire. Here to avoid mistakes, it is essential to consider the correction in that portion of the scale from which the wind is blowing or shift the point of aim in the direction of the wind, using the appropriate table. It is always important to remember that only regular training helps in determining skillfully and accurately the direction and speed of the wind. I do this by observing the nature of the effect of the wind or in watching the movement of the branches of trees or the direction in the moving of smoke, threads or kerchiefs. Under any conditions it is essential to know how to distinguish a weak, moderate and strong wind using articles around, and to make able use of the results of the observation in preparing to fire.

From my own experience, I would say that with a strong wind (approximately 8 meters per second), I use a correction that is double the amount, and with a weak wind, one-half the amount. In this instance the mistakes in firing are minimal. I would like to draw attention to the fact that under mountainous conditions, the results of the firing are strongly influenced by the particular features of the terrain. In mountains, most often gusty winds blow. Here it is not easy to select a convenient moment for firing and the required corrections for a strong or weak wind. Everything will depend upon at precisely what moment the grenade is launched toward the target. It is essential to know how to determine the conditions of its flight, and this depends largely upon experience. Before releasing the trigger, I advise one to carefully consider those conditions under which the grenade will be launched toward the target. Although we say that in

combat the time factor sometimes plays the decisive role, still a grenade launcher under the given conditions will find it better to wait a second more in order to hit the target with the first round. For a second shot takes significantly more time for preparation and this is reflected on the results of carrying out the combat mission.

I move on to firing against moving targets only after I have perfectly mastered the procedures for firing at stationary armored targets.

In what sequence are these skills improved?

Initially I learn to determine the speed of the target. Then I train in determining the ranges to the designated target and the direction of its movement. I work on this question using the range scale of the optical sight and by eye. Since a grenade launcher in the process of combat does not have time to calculate the lead using a formula, I also endeavor to learn by heart the table for rounded-off corrections and the lead in amounts which can be counted from the middle of the target. Then I go on to practical training.

In firing from a grenade launcher at moving armored targets, two methods are used as in firing from smallarms: tracking and waiting for the target. I use both methods.

In training for firing against a moving target by the tracking method, I pay attention to learning how to properly shift the point of aim in the direction of its movement and strictly by the amount of the lead, while aiming is done smoothly in shifting the grenade launcher along with the movement of the target. At the moment when the aiming has been carried out and the necessary lead has been taken, I let off the round. I most frequently use this method of firing with the movement of a target over comparatively open and level terrain, when it is moving without taking cover in the terrain folds.

I use the method of waiting for the target when the target is moving at times taking cover behind brush, structures or uneven areas in the terrain. In this instance I endeavor to accurately shift the line of sight in the direction of the target's movement by an amount which exceeds the calculated lead. Then I aim and wait without moving the grenade launcher until the target has covered the distance of the amount of the lead. I fire strictly at the moment the target approaches the amount of the lead.

With the frontal movement of a target, the direction of fire remains fixed, while the distance to the target changes continuously. For this reason, as in firing from a smallarm, I determine the sight setting and the point of aim corresponding to that distance at which the armored target will be at the moment of firing.

After acquiring the necessary practical skills, I restrict the time for making the shot to 10 seconds and subsequently to 5-6 seconds.

At present in the course of training I have succeeded in bringing the normal rate of applied fire up to eight rounds per minute.

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MILITARY MEDICAL SERVICE CAPABILITIES DESCRIBED

Moscow AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA in Russian No 10, May 78 signed to press
15 May 78 pp 20-22

[Article by Maj Gen Med Serv I. Sinopal'nikov: "On Guard Over Health"]

[Text] The concern for people's health has always been regarded by the Communist Party as one of the most important social tasks. During the years of Soviet power public health has achieved exceptionally large successes, having been transformed into a powerful "health industry" with a wide network of medical institutions and an almost six-million man army of workers.

The in-patient capacity of the country's institutions exceeds three million beds. In providing the population with doctors the Soviet Union occupies first place in the world and far outstrips the developed capitalist countries. The number of doctors in our country during the post-October period increased almost thirty-fold and has reached 865,000 individuals. There are now more than 33 doctors of various specialities for every 10,000 people. This is the highest indicator in the world. Many infectious and professional diseases which were widespread earlier have been eliminated and industrial accidents are being lowered. All this makes for a significant improvement in the health of the population. In comparison with the pre-revolutionary period the childhood death rate has decreased more than tenfold. Average life expectancy has increased from 32 to 72 years.

The right of a Soviet citizen to public health services has been proclaimed by the new Constitution of the USSR. The purposeful activity of all links in the state system and of public organizations in the matter of protecting and improving the health of Soviet people has been widely reflected in it. More than 20 articles in the constitution contain statements having a direct relationship to this question.

The successes achieved by Soviet public health once again testify to its superiority over public health in capitalist countries. The distinctive

feature of socialist public health is its state nature, freedom from charges, the availability of medical assistance to the population, and its preventive nature. The numerous agreements on medical problems with a number of foreign states testifies to the international authority of the Soviet system of public health protection.

A new and clear witness of the tireless concern of the party and the Soviet government for the health of the people is the resolution, "Concerning Measures To Further Improve Public Health Services" which was recently adopted by the CC CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers. The strategy and tactics of Soviet public health have been determined for many years in advance in this programming document and a long-term program of measures to improve the protection of the people's health has been outlined.

This year medical workers are celebrating their own professional holiday after the 60th anniversary of Great October and of our armed forces. Soviet military medicine has travelled a difficult and glorious path. It was created in the fires of the civil war. Military medical personnel honorably performed the tasks imposed on them under conditions of devastation, an imperialist blockade, hunger and an epidemic.

When the civil war was over, the Red Army's medical service was faced with such urgent tasks as the rationalization of military work and living conditions and the organization and conduct of preventive measures aimed at preserving and improving the health and combat capabilities of the fighting men. As a result of correct medical selection for the army, preventive inoculations against a number of infectious diseases, and systematic medical supervision of the servicemen's work and living conditions, the sick rate among Red Army personnel has decreased considerably.

The Great Patriotic War was a true test for the entire military medical service system. At the front military medical personnel displayed mass heroism, courage and high professional skill. They successfully coped with providing timely medical assistance and the latest treatment to wounded and with returning them to duty as quickly as possible. The medical service honorably performed the tasks assigned to them. During this fiercest and bloodiest of all wars it achieved exceptionally high treatment indicators: 72.3 percent of the wounded and 90.6 percent of the sick fighting men were returned to duty.

The heroic work of Soviet military medical personnel during the Great Patriotic War received a high rating from the Communist Party and the Soviet government. A total of 42 military medical personnel were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 19 individuals became full bearers of the Order of Glory, and more than 116,000 were awarded orders and medals of the USSR.

During the postwar period the efforts of military medical personnel were directed toward eliminating the medical consequences of the war and the provision of therapeutic, preventive, sanitary, hygienic, and anti-epidemic

support to the troops and naval forces. The personnel of the medical service, in preserving and developing the glorious combat traditions of the older generation, are steadily improving their knowledge and experience and are displaying high skill, discipline and infinite devotion to their duty. Military doctors are performing a continuous watch to protect the health of Soviet fighting men in remote garrisons and on the expanses of the world ocean.

Capt Med Serv N. Kolmakov has made about 100 parachute jumps during nine years service in the airborne forces. Courage, decisiveness and high professional skill are the characteristic features of this military surgeon. Under the conditions of the medical battalion he unhesitatingly began open heart massage and saved the life of a sick man.

The work of military medical personnel receives the party's and government's high rating. During recent years hundreds of medical workers have been awarded USSR orders and medals and have been conferred the honorary titles of honored doctor, honored scientist, and state prize laureate.

Quite a few military medical workers have been conferred the high title of Hero of Socialist Labor. Among them is Col Med Serv M. F. Gulyakin, an honored doctor of the RSFSR and a highly qualified cancer specialist and surgeon. During the Great Patriotic War while participating in combat operations as the chief surgeon of a medical battalion, he provided timely surgical help to many thousands of wounded. The respected veteran of frontline medicine is now continuing to struggle for the life and health of Soviet fighting men along with his colleagues and students.

The persistent work of Soviet military medical personnel contributes to lowering the sick rate, improving the health of servicemen, and raising the combat readiness of subunits and units. The results of the army-wide review inspection for the best unit (ship) and financial administration, medical institution and sales and services enterprise which was dedicated to the 60th anniversary of Great October testify to the significant successes in improving the medical support of the troops. Among the medical institutions the Main Military Clinical Hospital of the USSR Armed Forces imeni N. N. Burdenko, the Military Clinical Hospital imeni Z. P. Solov'yev in the Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District, Central Polyclinic No. 8 of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the "Krym" Central Military Sanatorium, and the Pyatigorskii Military Sanatorium were winners in the inspection.

Medical service personnel, in striving to make the year of the 60th anniversary of the Soviet armed forces a year of urgent military work, have actively included themselves in socialist competition and are making a worthy contribution to the further strengthening of the combat might of the Soviet army and navy.

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MILITARY REGULATIONS EXPLAINED FOR READERS

Moscow AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA in Russian No 10, May 78 signed to press
15 May 78 pp 24-25

[Article by Lt Col of Justice (Ret) P. Sazonov]

[Text] Readers of the Journal--V. Chursin, N. Pavlov and others--have asked us to explain what periods of active military duty have been established for soldiers and sergeants, in particular for individuals having a higher education.

In accordance with Art. 13 of the USSR law, "On Universal Military Duty," the period of active military service for soldiers and sergeants in the Soviet army, coastal units and aviation of the navy, and border and internal troops has been set at two years and for soldiers and sergeants having a higher education--one year, six months. For sailors and petty officers on ships, and boats in coastal combat support units of the navy, and in naval units of the border troops it is three years and for seamen and petty officers having a higher education--two years.

The period of active military service is calculated: for those called up in the first half of the year--from 1 July of the year of the call up and for those called up in the second half of the year--from 1 January of the year following the call-up year (Art. 14 of the USSR law, "On Universal Military Duty").

Comrade V. Nekrasov asks in what cases does a first term serviceman released from the armed forces of the USSR go to the same work (position) which he occupied before being inducted into the army.

The executive committees of councils of peoples' deputies and the directors of enterprises, institutes, organizations, kolkhoz, and training institutions are obliged to give first term servicemen, who have been released into the reserves, work no later than a month from the day of the request considering their specialty, including that acquired during the period of military service, and work experience. Those who worked before military service in enterprises, institutes and organizations have the right to go to work in the same enterprise, institute and organization. We are not talking about the position in which the inductee worked before military

service (it normally is occupied) but about work which would correspond to the specialty and experience of the one released into the reserves and which would not infringe on his interests, including material ones.

Servicemen, who for some reason or other (for example, sickness) are released ahead of time into the reserves or dismissed from military training institutions have the right to return to the former place of work (position) if no more than three months--not counting the travel time to the permanent home address--have passed from the day they were called up (enlisted) in the armed forces. Army service time is included in the total work time but it is included in the continuous work time only if the period between the day of being released into the reserves and the day of going to work does not exceed three months.

Serviceman N. Kudryavtsev asks whether students at schools for training warrant officers are paid an allowance for children and at what rate.

An allowance is granted for the children of students at warrant officer training schools who are from the ranks of first term servicemen and individuals called up from the reserves for the period of training at the schools before they are awarded the rank of warrant officer. The families of students at these schools who permanently reside in cities, urban settlements, workers and resort settlements, and in a rural area (but not linked to agriculture) are paid 15 rubles a month for one child and 22 rubles a month for two children. Those permanently residing in a rural area and connected with agriculture receive 7 rubles, 50 kopecks a month for one child and 12 rubles a month for two children.

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ASW WEAPONS ON SURFACE VESSELS DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 78 signed to press 18 May 78
pp 38-39

[Article by Capt 1st Rank (Res) B. Kiselev based on material from the foreign press: "ASW Weapons"]

[Text] The combat capabilities of modern nuclear submarines have forced the creation of new surface ships (NK) with more improved and effective ASW weapons to fight them. ASW ships and even large ASW ships armed with ASW helicopters have begun to be built which are specially earmarked for these purposes.

ASW helicopters are aircraft which are specially constructed and equipped to combat submarines. It is considered that ASW helicopters have extremely good prospects for detecting and destroying submarines.

Having--in comparison with a ship--great speed, a helicopter with the aid of the sonar sets (OGAS), radio-sonar buoys (RGAB), and magnetic measuring instruments which are lowered from it is capable of examining in short periods a considerable area of the sea and, when a submarine is detected, of attacking it with ASW torpedoes and depth charges.

The most common OGAS is the American AN/AQ-13 set. It is lowered on a 150-meter cable and can operate in an active or passive mode and in a telegraph and telephone sonar communications mode. The set which employs a plan-position indicator is interlocked with a radar set. Therefore, the operator in the helicopter sees on the plotting board the movement of his own helicopter, the other helicopters and the ships; the location of the detected submarine; and its maneuvering. Using the weapon control panel located near the plotting board, he can attack the submarine with MK44 torpedoes or MK11 depth charges.

Another system for detecting submarines is the radio sonar buoy (RGAB). It includes sound fixing and ranging elements and radio communications. They are dropped from a helicopter, detect a submarine by its noise or by echoes

from it, and automatically radio this information to the helicopter. For example, the AN/SSQ-2 buoy in the active mode permits a submarine to be detected at a distance of 1.5 - 4.5 kilometers. Its operating time is about 15 hours. After this the buoy ignites. As the foreign press reports, the possibility of placing buoys in the open ocean (with a longer operating time) and of controlling them with the aid of satellites is being studied.

A submarine can also be detected by a helicopter's magnetic measuring instruments which register the changes in the earth's magnetic field caused by the mass of a submarine. The altitude of the helicopter must not exceed 50 meters when doing this. The operating range of such instruments is not great--about 300 meters.

The most common piloted ASW helicopter in the American navy, for example, is the H-30 "Sea King" helicopter which has a flight speed of 230 kilometers per hour and a service ceiling of more than 3000 meters. It is equipped with OGAS having an operating radius of 8 - 9 kilometers and can drop radio sonar buoys. It is armed with several small MK44 or MK46 ASW torpedoes and 12 aerial depth charges.


Nevertheless, the primary method for detecting enemy submarines on the majority of surface ships is considered to be ship-borne sonar sets (GAS). Foreign GAS, for example the American AN-SQS-26 and the improved AN-SQS-26cx permit a submarine to be detected at a range of up to 30 miles (55 kilometers) and under favorable conditions of up to 45 miles (83 kilometers). Such a considerable detection range is achieved by using multiple reflections of the acoustical energy from the bottom of the sea and from the temperature change layer (the layer of the water in which the temperature sharply changes with depth up to several degrees in one meter). Without using bottom reflection the operating radius is usually 8-14 miles (15-26 kilometers).

Modern surface ships, especially the special ASW ones, have extremely well designed ASW weapons: ASW missile systems, rocket launchers and depth charges.

ASW missile systems. Three ASW missile systems are basically found in the armament of ships in the NATO fleets: the American "ASROC", the French "Malafron", and the Australian "Ikara". All of them consist of a launch assembly, a sonar set, and an electronic computer for controlling the firing of the rocket-assisted torpedo itself. For example, the "ASROC" has eight rocket-assisted torpedoes mounted in two rows of four each. The launch vehicle has a control and stabilization unit, a solid fuel engine and a braking parachute. The torpedo is a small electrical, MK44 or MK46 torpedo which seeks the target in two planes. The flight speed of the rocket-assisted torpedo is about Mach 1 and its firing range is from 9 to 18 kilometers. Foreign specialists consider that with the installation of the new AN-SQS-26 cx and the incorporation of radio controlled flight the firing range can be increased to 27-50 kilometers.

The missile is fired at the submarine's predicted location using data from the electronic computer and flies the planned trajectory. The engine separates from the torpedo five seconds after launch and the parachute deploys on command of the programming device in the vicinity of the target. This lowers the torpedo to the surface of the sea. The parachute separates automatically and the torpedo engine is turned on. It begins to search for the target, describing a circular motion in the horizontal plane and then a helical motion to the second planned depth where it conducts another search (Figure 1). Besides TNT a nuclear charge with a TNT equivalent of 10-20 kilotons can be used in the warhead of these torpedoes. The "ASROC" missile system is installed on cruisers, frigates, destroyers, and escort ships.

Figure 1



1-- Surface vessel ASW missile carrier; 2-- launch assembly for the missiles; 3-- point where the parachute system begins to brake the missile; 4-- the homing torpedo when it is searching for the target; 5--the submarine target; 6-- the moment the seeker "locks on" the target; 7-- the surface vessel's sonar beam.

In contrast to the "ASROC" system, the "Ikara" missile is more effective because it is controlled during the aerial portion of the trajectory. Thanks to this, the torpedo is brought close to the target.

ASW torpedoes. The most modern ASW torpedo is considered to be the Mk46 torpedo (United States of America). This is the first American torpedo to use solid fuel. It is fast-- 40-45 knots (74 -83 kilometers per hour), makes less noise and has a great running depth and maneuverability.

At the present time, according to data in the foreign press, an ASW torpedo controlled by wires is being developed. It will be noiseless, comparatively fast and will be able to be employed up to depths of 1800 meters.

An ASW torpedo is fired from the torpedo equipment on surface ships in the direction of the detected submarine. When it hits the water, it rushes to depth in the prescribed direction. The torpedo's homing system is switched on after the passage of a prescribed time or after the prescribed distance has been traversed. It begins to search for the target. When there is a sonar contact with the target, the torpedo switches to the pursuit mode. The torpedo's homing system is rather complicated but it is small in size. It also has hydrophones, which detect sounds, and a small GAS which "locks on" the target. In this case, even the stopping of the vessel (decreasing the noise) will not, they think, prevent the torpedo from hitting the target.

Rocket-assisted and conventional depth charge launchers and depth charges. Foreign specialists consider that the most modern rocket-assisted depth charge launcher is the Norwegian "Terne" which consists of the following assemblies: a launch mechanism with six release tracks for depth charges with rocket motors; fire control instruments; sonar equipment; and instruments for controlling the mount. The rocket is solid fueled and its warhead is the MK7 depth charge. The launch weight of the missile and warhead is 135.2 kilograms, the ammunition charge is 50 kilograms, and its length is 1.97 meters. The firing range is 2.6 kilometers. All six rockets are fired in five seconds. Reloading takes 45 seconds. The depth charge fuse has several settings: time, depth and distance using sonar.

American vessels are armed with MK108 rocket-assisted depth charge launchers which remind one in their external appearance of a single tube artillery system. "Alpha" depth charges are used as the warhead in the rocket. The launch weight of the rocket is 204 kilograms, its length is 2.6 meters, the weight of the ammunition charge is 90 kilograms, the depth of the explosion is up to 250 meters, the firing range is 350-800 meters and the rate of fire is 2-5 rounds per minute.

Swedish, French, Dutch and FRG ASW ships are armed with the Swedish three-, four-, and six- tube "Bofors" M49 depth charge launchers.


Along with rocket-assisted depth charge launchers, ASW ships are armed with several launchers for the conventional (gun powder) firing of depth charges and with depth charge rails (normally stern ones). Modern launchers, unlike earlier ones, are normally multibarrel ones capable of firing a series of depth charges at once. The control of the launchers has been automated to a considerable degree.

Ships of the English navy are armed for example, with "Squid" launchers which are a three-tube mount. The weight of the depth charge is 200 kilograms, the weight of the explosives is 100 kilograms, and the range of firing is up to 350 meters.

The "Limbo" launcher is considered more modern--it is more mobile on its platform and has a firing range of from 350 to 900 meters. Its depth charges have the same characteristics as the depth charges used in the "Squid" launcher.

Thus, surface ships have available the systems necessary to detect and destroy submarines. However, foreign specialists emphasize that the task of combating them is so complicated that some surface ships even when using helicopters are not capable of solving it effectively. This is why a special ASW defense system (PLO) is organized in fleets. Its basis is the interaction of all ASW forces--surface ships, ASW submarines, ASW aviation and shore based fixed detection systems. Automated control systems (ASU) have begun to be created at the present time to control this great number of heterogeneous forces. In order to explain ASU capabilities, the foreign press takes as an example the ASU PLO structure of a U. S. Navy large unit which is composed of surface ships, ASW helicopters and aircraft and ASW submarines (Figure 2).

Figure 2



1--shore headquarters; 2--shore electronic computer (it classifies incoming data); 3-- the large unit commander; 4-- the headquarters computer (calculations for making a decision [selecting forces] and commands for the PLO forces); 5-- the system for detecting submarines; 6--site for striking submarines; 7-- dropped sonar set; 8-- on-board helicopter electronic computer (determination of the submarine's position in relation to the helicopter; determination of the course, speed and flight time; data for employing weapons; navigational tasks); 9-- television field of view.

The staff of the large unit and its command post are located on a surface ship. The fixed PLO headquarters collate the data on submarines, process it with the help of computer equipment, and transmit it to the command ship. Calculations to determine what forces (ships, aircraft, helicopters, submarines) it is advisable to use to solve more successfully the task of searching for, detecting and destroying enemy submarines are performed in the headquarters of the surface ship large unit with the help of an electronic computer. After this, orders are issued to the selected forces

(for example, in Figure 2-- to the ship-borne helicopters). A helicopter, having received information on the location, course and speed of an enemy submarine flies to the designated area using information from the headquarters computer, its own sources of information (towed or dropped sonar sets, televisions, magnetometers) and the on-board computer, the helicopter determines and displays on a special screen the relative location of the command ship, the helicopter and the target. It firms up the movement elements, calculates the initial data for using a weapon, and employs it.

What are the prospects for the development of ASW ships? In the opinion of foreign specialists the development of ships on hydrofoils and air cushions will receive great attention in the near future. It is reported that such ships are capable of developing speeds of more than 90 knots (170 kilometers per hour) and that they are almost noiseless. This makes their detection by submarines more difficult and they are inaccessible to now existing torpedoes because of their great running speed.

It is necessary to keep in mind that the Soviet Navy also has available the most modern surface ships and other forces as well as powerful modern ASW weapons, created on the basis of the latest achievements of science and technology, to combat enemy submarines. Our ships are capable of successfully solving the most complicated tasks in combating submarines in any area of the world ocean.

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CIVIL DEFENSE TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

In the Latvian SSR

Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 78 signed to press 18 May 78
pp 20-21

[Article by Col V. Ol'shevskiy, chief of Latvian SSR Civil Defense Training Courses: "Taking Into Account Trainee Specialization"]

[Text] For several years now there has been in operation in this country a smoothly-running system of training top-echelon civil defense personnel. And the training course directors are obliged to organize training in such a manner that the trainees acquire knowledge and skills not only in conformity with the position they hold but also specific features of their branch of production. And this depends in large measure on making up the groups correctly and on the specific content on the training program.

First of all Latvian SSR Civil Defense Headquarters analyzed the structure of administrative and command personnel by ministries, agencies, large installations, leading establishments, and executive committees, and specified categories of persons who should go through a training course at a specified time. The analysis indicated that it is possible to make up training groups of persons occupying not only the same or similar position but also of the same or related production specialization. For example, resolving of the problems of stable operation of the economy depends in large measure on the organizations and installations of the construction and power engineering systems, supply and transport services. Therefore we add to incomplete groups of personnel from given ministries main specialists from other agencies which are close in configuration. We apply a similar approach to groups made up of party activists. For example, secretaries of party organizations of facilities in the sphere of material production, educational institutions or medical establishments study in separate groups.

This practice of making up groups was adopted by degrees. Some ministry and agency officials at first were clearly disinclined to agree to remove from the job for a week and to send for training simultaneously all directors of related enterprises or organizations, although each director could be

replaced by his deputy for this short time. We then received the support of party agencies, and things moved. The first to reach agreement with us were the ministries of construction and agriculture, the specific production features of which are of a seasonal nature. They were able to send to us for training simultaneously officials who were homogeneous both in position and branch attribute. Others subsequently followed this example.

It was also necessary to consider more carefully the sequence of training of executive personnel. It has now become a rule to train directors and specialists of civil defense installations and services of cities and rayons somewhat in advance, namely on the eve of holding combined exercises locally. We gather together civil defense headquarters chiefs at the beginning of the training year; executive staff from the sphere of material production -- during the first weeks of the month; the basic contingent from the construction and agriculture ministries -- in January-April.

The training staff is at the present time also resolving other problems, in order to increase the effectiveness of the training process. And we must state that we have been given inestimable assistance by new methods elaborations on all topics of the training course program. They are now focused on area-specialization teaching, taking many years of experience into account, following the principle applied by higher educational institutions.

All our plans were innovatively reworked in connection with the new subject matter. The training staff (particularly instructors M. Sinyugin, A. Tupikov and N. Klychkov, who possess considerable methods experience) worked a great deal on determining the optimal structure of topic schedules. On several occasions we invited representatives of civil defense headquarters of the republic and interested facilities to methods conferences to discuss our plans. Working together, we sought more active forms and methods of teaching the knowledge and skills required by our students in their practical work.

What is characteristic of the reworked topic schedules? In them we isolated and grouped topics pertaining to special training of administrative and supervisory personnel of facilities of the following areas of specialization: construction, design organizations, power engineering, general technical, food processing industry, computer centers, and provided for separate training in all civil defense services. But this is only one aspect of the matter. Another is transition from the lecture method of teaching to a practical method. We have now considerably increased time allocated for group classes and drills with elements of games, practice drills, and for becoming acquainted with the practices employed in conducting civil defense at leading enterprises of the economy -- the base installations assigned to the training program.

Without waiting to be centrally-supplied with all new methods assists and visual-aid training materials on the special topics, as well as methods instructions on setting up base facilities, we proceeded to work on our own.

We established contacts and exchanged information with civil defense training programs in other union republics. We could not delay: the training process was continuing and demanded vigorous actions.

A differentiated approach to training executive and supervisory personnel presupposed reworking and in many cases also the development of new training methods documentation. Focusing onto specific topics was required of each member of the training program staff. Classroom, shop and field instructors were becoming, as it were, overseers of specialized groups of students. And this means that they must conduct group exercises, giving methods assistance taking branch specifics into account, and give consultation on various problems.

It was necessary, for example, to train executive and supervisory personnel of peat enterprises to hold combined exercises at a number of facilities in that branch. The management of the peat industry turned to us for assistance. The program assigned senior instructor M. Sinyugin. How did he begin? He acquainted himself with the specific features of organization of civil defense at peat enterprises and then, working together with the administration civil defense headquarters chief, knowledgeably examined all the finer points of preparation for and holding of exercises.

Specific base facilities of the economy have been assigned to instructors, once again taking into account their area of specialization. Here they hold practical classes with training course students, assisted by local specialists. At the present time many facilities of various branches and sectors of the economy, civil defense leaders, have been assigned to the program. When experience in their utilization had been amassed and training facilities improved with our assistance, the number of facilities doubled. In the future we shall have base facilities in every ministry and agency.

At methods conferences we determined what training stations should definitely be maintained at the base facility and how it should best be utilized for the brief visits of our groups. We unanimously decided that we needed model classrooms for the 20-hour mandatory minimum program and for the program of training nonmilitary units, taking into account the features of the given branch of production. It is desirable to locate these classrooms in a protective structure. It is desirable to be able at the facility to demonstrate to the students exemplary storage and organized issuing of individual protective gear and various equipment to the units and work shift. Such a facility should have interesting shop civil defense displays and graphic materials on mass defense topics and military-patriotic indoctrination. An important addition is training stations for practice drills and meeting practical performance standards. Here one can also demonstrate the methods of training civil defense units and the civilian population. Documentation on planning civil defense measures is mandatory.

We utilize base facilities equipped in this way beginning with the second half of the training week. By that time the training group has already studied the basic topics and proceeds to practical exercises.

We inform the base enterprises in advance, before the beginning of the training year, as to what training groups will be arriving and on what schedule. Incidentally, each base facility takes no more than 5-6 groups during the training year. This is not burdensome. The enterprises endeavor to coincide their scheduled activities with the specified days. In such a case the classes become more interesting and acquire demonstrational value.

Instructors of republic training courses maintain continuous contacts with production training instructors of interrayon training courses and share with them experience in utilizing the training facilities of the base installations, hold consultations directly at the assigned facilities, and acquaint their colleagues with the training facilities of the republic courses.

Today's training facilities for our program constitute an entire complex of modern teaching devices. In addition to the base facilities, the program utilizes the republic training ground, where the requisite equipment is supplied for the training process, and joint actions between non-military units and military civil defense subunits are demonstrated. At the training ground students receive a complete picture of organization of rescue and emergency repair operations.

The program has now been given a fine building. It has been renovated in a major repairs program on a special schedule, in a short period of time, with the active assistance of party, Soviet, and economic entities. The projection-equipped lecture hall and offices have been completely renovated, while teaching equipment and various devices have been installed. Specialists from many ministries, agencies and facilities of the economy as well as artists were recruited to set up teaching facilities for the program. All this enabled us to employ more active forms and methods of teaching and thus to intensify student activities.

We have adopted so-called dynamic teaching devices: wired display stands, working equipment of protective structures, communications gear, have built a mobile training command post, special simulators, and have installed Ogonek, Evrika, and Ekzamenator programmed teaching and knowledge testing machines. A considerable contribution to this effort was made by instructors P. Chetvergov, A. Bubnov, curriculum department head V. Medov, and Senior Engineer for Training Equipment V. Orlov.

Matters of further improving the training program continuously occupy the attention focus of the party and trade union organizations of civil defense headquarters and the program. There has been extensive socialist competition among the staff.

Training program classes are regularly conducted by the republic civil defense headquarters chief, his deputies, division chiefs, as well as senior officials of ministries and agencies, party and Soviet bodies.

For example, representatives of the Ministry of Construction as well as specialists from Gosplan and Gosstroy worked with training groups of design and construction specialization.

One can state with confidence that following training in this program there is a substantial increase in responsibility on the part of those who have gone through the training for accomplishing civil defense tasks at their own enterprises. Following is a typical trainee statement in this regard, made by A. Feoktistov, general manager of the Riga Furniture Production Association, and F. Kornelius, party committee secretary at the VEF Plant: "We now can clearly see where we must step up our efforts, what concrete conditions must be taken into consideration, and how to achieve in practice everything we have been taught."

There are no trivial matters in the area of further improving training in our program. This comprehensive task can be successfully accomplished only through the joint efforts of headquarters, the program and associated facilities under the supervision of local party and Soviet agencies.

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Comments on Medical Aid Team Training

Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 78 signed to press 18 May 78
pp 22-23

[Reader response article, authors listed in text: "Cause for Serious Conclusions"]

[Text] The editors received many responses to an article by G. Tashchiyev entitled "Both Joys and Sorrows," published under the section heading "Headquarters Chief's Rostrum" (No 12, 1977). Several responses appear below.

Only the First Word Has Been Spoken

I totally share the views expressed by G. Tashchiyev. I envy the fact that he can put together medical aid teams on a volunteer basis. I am not always able to do so. Be that as it may, at the present time the rayon's civil defense medical service is unable to assign us an adequate number of qualified instructors. I emphasize the word qualified. The result is that experienced medical aid team members sometimes prove to be better trained for practical actions in stricken areas than some instructors. There is no doubt that the general medical training of the latter is at an incomparably higher level than that of the trainees.

I also fully share Comrade Tashchiyev's complaints about difficulties in stocking medical aid kits. Many empty medical aid bags, for example, have accumulated in our storeroom. It is almost impossible to refill them with the needed medical supplies through the pharmacies, for they would rather

sell new, fully-stocked kits. But it is costly to the enterprise to do so.

We also made expensive parade uniforms. The first year we looked right sharp, which was a very important plus in competitions. The second year these individually-tailored uniforms no longer fit everybody, and the third year they were too tight even for those women for whom they had been ordered. I am therefore in favor of uniform work clothing -- comfortable, practical, and inexpensive.

Then there is another matter, which is of concern not only to me alone. The program presently specifies five working days to train medical aid team members. But where is the time allocation to be obtained for sending them to competitions? The labor and wages division as well as the chief accountant accuse headquarters of unlawfully taking people away from their work. What is the solution?

Many questions arise in connection with this article. In my opinion Comrade Tashchiyev has spoken only the first word from the "Headquarters Chiefs rostrum."

N. Reshetnikov, Enterprise Civil Defense
Headquarters Chief, Odessa

I Agree, But Not With Everything

Some of the points raised by Comrade Tashchiyev are of a particular character, while others require not simply discussion, debate, but quite concrete solutions.

Civil defense medical services have been established in rayons, cities, and at some enterprises. In my opinion they are obliged to train medical aid teams, for medical aid teams are nonmilitary civil defense units just like the rest. Therefore they should be trained in accordance with the appropriate programs precisely at the enterprise. Training of medical aid teams is currently assigned to Red Cross and Red Crescent Society committees, while responsibility for this training is assigned to civil defense headquarters of enterprises, rayons, and cities. In my opinion there is some organizational vagueness here. Otherwise no questions would arise.

And on the subject of medical aid kits. They contain everything required to render first aid, and therefore it is not advisable to simulate, and particularly exclude even part of this gear. It is necessary to demand emphatically that these bags be stocked and that medical aid teams be equipped with all other supplies. However, supplies are consumed at training classes, exercises, and competitions. It is difficult to replace them, but it is essential, because the medical aid team should not diminish its preparedness to perform its direct missions. What is the answer? We suggest that there be maintained for each team five additional kits as

training first aid satchels (one per element). They would be utilized at competitions and at enterprise-level exercises. This would result in considerable savings.

The Torez (Donetskaya Oblast) Central Rayon Pharmacy No 4 (Ye. Sinichenko, manager) offers a fine example in providing supplies to civil defense medical units. Enterprise civil defense headquarters place orders with the pharmacy in advance. A single order is placed with the oblast pharmacy. As supplies are received, the pharmacy informs the civil defense headquarters that their orders have been filled. We believe that up to a certain degree this practice helps overcome difficulties and merits further dissemination.

And there is a real mess with medical aid team uniforms. Comrade Tashchiyev is right when he says that it does not make sense to spend for the sake of an hour-long parade more money on making parade uniforms. Medical aid team members are supposed to be issued protective filtering clothing (ZFO) for working in stricken areas. This clothing should be used as a basis for developing a uniform in which it is convenient to work and gives an attractive appearance in a parade.

And finally, the judging. Medical aid teams train on a uniform program, but the judges do not. Hence elements of that "amateurishness," which sometimes impede them from determining the actual winner.

In my opinion it would not be a bad idea for medical aid team members to be briefed before competition on the entire list of theory items as well as the possible scope of practical tasks. If this list covers the entire course of training, perhaps it will eliminate many conflicts between judges and contestants.

V. Vasilyuk, Donetskaya Mine Civil
Defense Headquarters Chief, the city of
Torez, Donetskaya Oblast

Not by Uniform Alone....

The questions raised in the article by G. Tashchiyev have long been of concern to me, as an enterprise civil defense headquarters chief. If we were to compare, we would be in approximately the same situation, except that there would be many more medical units at the enterprise.

First of all, about the uniform. Medical aid team members do not appear at competitions for the sake of displaying their garb but in order to demonstrate their preparedness to work in stricken areas. And the uniform should be in conformity with those conditions in which they will be operating: it should be comfortable and provide a good seal. A parade uniform merely pleases the eye. Frequently, however, it has a magical effect on judges. Beginning things with a marching drill review, they allow the "elegantly dressed" medical aid team to surge into the lead, and subsequently they "do not notice," as it were, serious deficiencies in its professional performance capabilities.

The author correctly insists that uniform work clothing is needed.

I should like to focus attention on one other point -- competition judging. The situation in our town is approximately the same as in Stavropol'. I shall not begin citing examples of unfair treatment of medical aid teams. When you come to their defense (and sometimes vigorous intervention helps correct errors made by judges), they threaten: "Don't interfere, or your team will be assessed additional penalty points!"

Incidentally, I fail to understand why an enterprise civil defense headquarters chief is prohibited from going up to the stricken area and observing the performance of the medical aid team members. Their mistakes must subsequently be analyzed, and mistakes are always more evident when viewed by a third party. I also suggest that when competition performances are being totaled up that headquarters chiefs be permitted to attend the judge's meeting.

A. Bayev, Enterprise Civil Defense
Headquarters Chief, Sovetskaya Gavan'

Not to Be Disappointed....

The very fact of presenting a forum for discussion of matters pertaining to the training and preparation of medical aid teams at enterprises is a positive indication. Much in Comrade Tashchiyev's experience merits attention. First and foremost, the practice of having the best-trained medical aid team members hold classes for workers and employees on the 20-hour general compulsory minimum program, and then his experience in medical aid team member independent study of program material and, finally, their duty at medical institutions. Also interesting is the suggestion that medical aid team members be chosen for vehicle driver training or that drivers go through the medical training program. It is true that this suggestion must be seriously weighed and thoroughly studied, but without any question it is a valuable one.

I cannot, however, agree with some of his statements. For example, Comrade Tashchiyev believes that medical aid teams have two "masters." This is not so. Full responsibility for organization of their training, as is stated in Paragraph 3 of the organizational-methods instructions entitled "Training Program for Medical Aid Teams and Medical Aid Posts" (1975), is born by the enterprise civil defense chief, and consequently by his headquarters staff as well. There is no other possible interpretation. Therefore, in stating his unhappiness over the lack of coordination in the operations of civil defense headquarters, public health entities and Red Cross organizations, G. Tashchiyev, whether or not he intended it, seeks to remove from civil defense headquarters the burden of organizational work. He should not do so, for everywhere it is precisely civil defense headquarters which are organizers of the training not only of medical but of all other enterprise units as well.

The article correctly states that the authorized gear of medical aid teams should not be crudely simulated. But at the same time there should not occur at the annually-held enterprise, city, and rayon competitions the discarding of many thousands of bandages, individual dressing and antichemical kits as well as other authorized equipment, which unfortunately is frequently observed. We see the following solution: establish training kits of equipment at enterprises and permit, within certain limits, simulation of some items, such as surgical dressing kits, bandages wrapped in paper and marked "sterile," syringe tubes filled with water, and other items, which can be used over and over. And there is no question about the fact that it is necessary to prohibit the consumption at competitions of basic authorized supplies, which are obtained not for training purposes.

I feel strongly that there should be a very strict calling to account for medical aid teams lacking their full authorized supplies, but the enterprise managers should be called to account, not the medical aid team members. If, as G. Tashchiyev writes, civil defense headquarters experience difficulties in obtaining bandaging materials, syringe-tubes, and gas casualty first aid kits, why should the medical aid team members be blamed? Why should they be assessed penalty points? It is not their job to provide themselves with authorized supplies. Let the enterprise managers receive the "penalty points." Medical aid team members should learn to store supplies properly, to utilize them correctly, and extensively to employ materials at hand. It is this for which they should be held responsible.

In my opinion the matter of parade uniforms is unnecessarily complicated in the article. Regulations specify uniform work clothing with insignia. One can agree with the statement that only those medical aid teams which have earned the right to compete in zone, republic, and national competitions or to take part in international events which, incidentally, does not happen too frequently, should have parade uniforms.

It is scarcely likely that the medical aid team members themselves will approve of the suggestion calling for elimination of the marching song and amateur talent activities. Of course competitions are not a festival or even a sports event -- they are a form of training. Political-indoctrination and mass cultural work is an inseparable part of this training, and the marching song and amateur talent activities are elements of this work. At what competitions and to what extent should these activities be conducted? That is another question, and specific regulations should cover this matter.

The author quite rightly raises the question of improving the level of competition judging. This indicates once more that it is necessary to train better and in a systematic manner the medical personnel recruited for judging, and a special training program should be elaborated as soon as possible. In connection with this I should like to mention the exemplary organization of training of judges by the Moscow City Red Cross Committee (L. Molchanova, chairman). They have a group of medical personnel activists who possess considerable judging experience, and they are constantly adding

to this experience. Each year one-day seminars are held for judges, and immediately on the eve of competitions -- reconnoitering of stages, detailed instructions and study by each judge of his duties. The judges are recertified on a regular basis and are assigned appropriate categories. Much attention is focused on selection and placement of medical personnel on judging bodies. This is the task of the Moscow Civil Defense Medical Service and Civil Defense Headquarters.

Here they do not rest on their laurels. Each competition is viewed as a new and higher stage in the process of training medical aid teams. During competitions the performance of teams is demonstrated to civil defense headquarters chiefs and Red Cross committee chairmen, not spontaneously but under the supervision of the head judge or his deputy. But there should be nobody other than the judges and contestants directly in the competition areas. Judging bodies should be well trained and reliable.

The final stage is a detailed critique of mistakes and, of course, discussion of positive results as well. Such organization of competitions is a logical continuation of the training of the contestants. It is not surprising that Moscow's medical aid teams win national and RSFSR competitions and perform well at international events.

I cannot agree with the author of the article where he calls local "amateurishness" that punishment which was adopted in Stavropol': medical aid teams are assessed penalty points for arriving late to competitions. There was a need for it, and in my opinion the competition organizers were correct in punishing remiss individuals for their lack of discipline.

Wherever competitions run year after year without any new ideas, where the same thing is played over and over like a worn-out record, no progress is made and things fall clearly behind the demands of the present day. Of course newly-adopted changes should not distort the requirements of competition regulations or arbitrarily reduce the scope of competition. Any new addition must be specified in advance in the given competition program and be communicated to the contestants not later than one month prior to the competition.

Finally, in my opinion G. Tashchiyev should not have such a slighting attitude toward "auxiliary" pamphlets. It is unfair to negate the importance of these pamphlets merely because they were unable to obtain them on time. As a rule these are training-methods literature produced by the Executive Committee of the Union of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies on training medical aid teams and holding competitions. It reflects and analyzes practical experience, is approved by competent agencies, and incorporates the most up-to-date requirements. And it is the obligation of a civil defense headquarters chief and unit personnel to keep up to date on all new developments.

We believe that any civil defense headquarters chief will have much fewer causes for grief if he organizes the training of his medical aid posts and teams in a businesslike manner, supported by the Red Cross and Red Crescent Committee, and if he displays activeness, initiative and innovativeness thereby. Conscientious performance of his job demands this.

Col Med Serv M. Gogolev, Judge,
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Role of Radio and Television

Moscow VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 78 signed to press 18 May 78
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[Article by K. Kotlukov, Senior Editor, Main Administration of Local Television and Radio Broadcasting, USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting: "At the Microphone and on the Screen"]

[Text] One can scarcely exaggerate the role of television and radio in the ideological-political, labor, and moral indoctrination of the multi-million viewing and listening public. An important place in their programs is occupied by military-patriotic topics, a component part of which is propaganda of civil defense. Republic, kray, and oblast television and radio broadcasting committees, rayon and city radio station staffs are doing much work in this area jointly with civil defense headquarters staffs, which help determine the direction and content of propaganda measures. It is gratifying that in recent months and years the working relations between civil defense headquarters and television and radio broadcasting committees have become appreciably strengthened. The main thing on which their efforts are concentrated at the present time is an improvement in the effectiveness and quality of programming. How can we ensure that every program on civil defense incorporates vivid political commentary, comprehensibility, and is long remembered by viewers or listeners, forming a deep part of their awareness?

There are many ways to achieve this. But obviously a well-conceived plan should constitute the beginning of each. Practical experience indicates that many civil defense headquarters, television and radio broadcasting committees are devoting serious attention to this. In addition to giving a name or title to a planned series of broadcasts, the plans specify the principal areas of coverage and titles of the individual programs, the frequency at which they will be broadcast, the audience for which they are intended, the forms and genres to be used. Some plans specify program personnel in advance -- author, editor, director, cameraman, and support personnel. Also more and more frequently plans contain an advance list of required program support items (live broadcast, filmed broadcast, display of equipment and protective gear, films or film segments, etc).

At first glance it might seem that such plan detailing is unnecessary. Practical experience indicates the opposite, however. For example, the 1977 plan of the Estonian Committee and republic civil defense headquarters clearly formulated the following basic points: civil defense television programs were to be broadcast twice a month, Mondays, from 1730 to 1900 hours, with the broadcasts running 15 minutes. Radio broadcasts were scheduled for every Friday.

The plan specifies in detail the principal task of the broadcasting effort -- persuasively to explain to the population the resolutions of the 25th CPSU Congress and decisions of subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums, and the provisions of the new USSR Constitution on further strengthening the defense capability of the Soviet State and on the obligation and duty of each and every citizen of the USSR to be prepared at all times to come to the defense of his homeland.

Proceeding from the plan, journalists and headquarters officials have subdivided civil defense television and radio propaganda into the following categories: educational programs on the topics of the general mandatory knowledge minimum; dissemination of the experience and know-how of enterprises at which civil defense measures are being carried out most successfully; demonstration of forms and methods of training nonmilitary units, exchange of information on mass political work and indoctrination of moral-political qualities in unit personnel, workers and employees.

But unfortunately one still encounters instances where topic plans are drawn up hastily, without adequate substantiation. They contain nothing other than the name of the program, the month in which it is to be broadcast, and producing entity (usually civil defense headquarters). Of course little benefit is obtained from such planning.

Of great importance in improving the effectiveness and quality of broadcasting is choice of program writers and participants. For example, on Moldavian television, appearing in addition to headquarters officials in a series entitled "To the Public on Civil Defense" are enterprise managerial personnel, secretaries of party organizations, and civil defense activists. A broadcast in which V. Ivan'kov, party committee secretary of the Vibropribor Production Association, took part, enjoyed great popularity. The television viewer learned from this program that the high degree of conscientiousness of the Kishinev instrument builders and their deep awareness of the tasks facing civil defense, as well as the patriotic spirit permeating the work force make it possible successfully to handle all the measures connected with preparing the enterprise, its workers and employees for protection against mass destruction weapons. Communists play a vanguard role in all areas.

Socialist competition is an effective factor in development and improvement of civil defense here. Moral and material incentives are extensively utilized in determining competition results.

The subject matter in Kalininskaya Oblast radio broadcasts is also diversified. In the series entitled "Strengthen Civil Defense," in the program entitled "Youth," and in the children's news program "Sputnik," the Kalininskaya Oblast people place main emphasis on publicizing means of protection against mass destruction weapons, explaining duties, rules of conduct and actions in response to civil defense alerts, and on revealing the best know-how in accomplishing civil defense tasks. Specialists from headquarters and services, activists from public organizations, and lecturer personnel -- this is a partial list of those persons who regularly appear on the oblast radio.

The number of script writers and participants in civil defense broadcasts has also increased appreciably in many other republics and oblasts. But not everything has been accomplished in this area. It still rarely occurs that a scientist speaks on a current civil defense problem, or a writer or journalist shares his thoughts. We see in these programs few workers and employees who are members of nonmilitary units, and yet their appearance on the TV screen would enrich these programs. The TV viewer could see, for example, how people rated excellent in civil defense master knowledge and the ability to apply it in practice.

Forms and genres have become more diversified in television and radio broadcasts. Today, in addition to the broadcast series "To the Public on Civil Defense" (Belorussian, Kaliningrad, Kamchatka, Primorskiy and other committees), "No Civil Defense" (Kuybyshev Committee), "Everybody Should Know This" (Volgograd Committee), one encounters other broadcasts as well. Meriting attention, for example, is the experience of the Bryansk TV and radio committee, which regularly conducts a "Civil Defense School." The form of broadcast selected by the Krasnodar Committee is quite interesting. They employ a TV lecture group entitled "Methods and Means of Protection Against Mass Destruction Weapons," which has put on many interesting broadcasts. "Civil Defense Radio Journals" are popular with listeners. Offering brief presentations on various subjects, they carry useful information.

Speeches, discussions, interviews, reports from the sites of news events (exercises, competitions, exhibits, training centers) are genres which are being extensively employed today in civil defense publicity activities.

It is appropriate at this point to mention the experience of Lithuanian television. Journalists, jointly with republic civil defense headquarters, organized and held a TV quiz show entitled "Do You Know Civil Defense?" It was a substantial, diversified program. Its principal goal was to draw the viewer's attention to problems of civil defense and to test their knowledge and ability to use protective gear, to observe rules of conduct, and to offer first aid to victims. The quiz show was successful, in the opinion of its organizers. Program editor E. Kosobudskiy comments as follows: "We have had eight rounds of the TV quiz show. In each round the viewer was asked to answer three questions proceeding from topics covered in a film sequence. The program would be run on specified days at specified times. First the

reader would be briefed on the content of the current round, and then the film sequence would begin. For example, on the topic of utilization of individual protective gear we demonstrated the most typical mistakes usually made by a person who is not thoroughly familiar with the gas mask. Observing the film sequence, the viewer is supposed to note these mistakes and inform the studio how one should proceed correctly in the specific situation.

"This same principle was applied in setting up questions on other film topics. One quiz round was for schoolchildren. They were asked to answer questions on the most vivid pages from the history of the civil war, on the courage of civil defense personnel and the civilian population during the Great Patriotic War and in peacetime. Maj Gen (Ret) Ch. Perkauskas took active part in preparing this program.

Lithuanian TV viewers responded enthusiastically to the quiz program. The studio received more than 5,000 letters. The panel of judges, headed by the chief of Lithuanian SSR Civil Defense Headquarters, carefully read the letters and determined the winners. Prizes were awarded to the top three finishers. Other contestants sending in the fullest and most correct answers also received commendations.

Of course it is no simple task to prepare an interesting program and to present it in an interesting manner. Poor quality of script or even a minor error on the part of the script writer, lecturer, director, editor, camera operator, set painter, lighting operator, sound track editor and other personnel involved in the program can nullify all efforts expended on its preparation. This is why there should always be a high degree of demandingness and responsibility on the part of everybody involved in preparing a program, participating in it and broadcasting it.

In practice, however, such is not always the case. Dull, repetitive patterns and boring presentation unfortunately still hallmark some programs. Obviously today we can no longer accept a situation where some script writers bring to television and radio scripts or broadcast texts which are literally copied from instructions and textbooks.

Rayon, city and enterprise radio studios do much to promote civil defense publicity. It will unquestionably be useful for higher civil defense headquarters, jointly with television and radio broadcasting committees, to offer concrete methodological assistance to these entities and local headquarters in improving the quality of programs, in synthesizing and disseminating advanced know-how.

One more item. In order to learn the opinion of viewers and listeners on past broadcasts it is advisable to hold regular get-togethers with them, conferences at enterprises, at schools, on kolkhozes, sovkhoses, and housing operation offices. Feedback is an important aspect of this work, and there

is sufficient experience in this area, which could well be extended to civil defense broadcasts.

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Fire-Fighting Equipment

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p 25

[Article by V. Cherednikov and N. Komarkov: "Fire Equipment Exhibit"]

[Text] The unprecedented scale of exploitation of Siberia's natural resources and the grandiose construction program in progress across its endless expanses dictate the necessity of devoting increasing attention to problems of fire protection. In view of this fact, the Novosibirskaya Oblast Civil Defense Fire-Fighting Service devotes considerable attention in its prevention activities to dissemination of information on fire fighting among the public.

An important role in this is also played by the exhibit of fire-fighting equipment established in Novosibirsk 5 years ago. Experts from the artistic design office, RSFSR art resources fund, institutes of the Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Novosibirsk Vostoksibspetsavtomatika Trust, and many other entities took part in preparing the exhibit materials.

Means and methods of fighting fire were extensively displayed at the exhibit. Particular emphasis was placed on problems of civil defense fire-fighting engineer-technical measures, technical standards activities, and observance of fire safety regulations at industrial and agricultural enterprises and in dwellings.

The exhibit contains a number of working automatic fire alarm systems and automatic fire-extinguishing systems. The exhibit contains 60 main displays with various mechanical and electrical devices.

A visit to the exhibit is accompanied by radio commentary and tape recordings. The automatic information program incorporates various topics, differing both in content and time, which makes it possible to serve many categories of visitors. At the moment we provide three information variants: detailed, 2 hours with an intermission; survey, 50 minutes; and a 30-minute presentation for schoolchildren.

Remote control with the aid of a portable vhf transceiver enables the exhibit guide to interrupt the operation of the automatic displays, to give additional explanations or to answer questions during the tour.

The exhibit directors plan their work in close coordination with the oblast civil defense training program. Students in training courses, in conformity with the program, visit the fire-fighting equipment exhibit. Acquainting themselves with the displays, they consolidate and broaden their technical knowledge on fire fighting.

Since opening day the exhibit has been visited by more than 60,000 persons, and hundreds of consultations have been given on fire prevention safety. People leave this exhibit fully convinced of the importance of fire prevention measures and the necessity of adequate training.

Photo Caption: Commanders of nonmilitary fire-fighting squads become acquainted with organization of forest fire fighting.

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In a Housing Area

Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 78 signed to press 18 May 78 pp 26-27

[Article by P. Gorbunov: "In the Housing Sector"]

[Text] Ramenskoye, Moskovskaya Oblast--ZhKO [Communal Housing Department] chief V. Yemelev and pensioner V. Nosova were asked to come to civil defense headquarters at the Krasnoye Znamya Combine. They are the main organizers of civil defense training in the enterprises housing area. Studying the organizational-methods instructions of the new 12-hour program, Viktor Ivanovich and Valentina Aleksandrovna enthusiastically exchanged views and thought about how best to plan classes, whom to appoint as group leaders, and how to improve training facilities.

Five building management offices are subordinate to the communal housing department. The best in civil defense are offices 4 and 5, managed by M. Zelenina and Ye. Tarasenkova. Analyzing past experience, Yemelev stated: "For our classes we use propaganda display corners, the facilities of the recreation center, as well as outdoor facilities and shelters. We show filmstrips and films on various topics. We are greatly assisted by the recreation center staff. The main difficulty is that many cannot attend training classes (some due to illness, while others have nobody they can leave their small children with). We did try to hold classes with them in their homes, but Valentina Aleksandrovna will tell you about that."

Prior to retirement Nosova worked for many years at the combine as deputy civil defense director. She is well known as an active local air defense worker from before the war. During the years of the Great Patriotic War she was in charge of headquarters. And now, when it was time to take a deserved rest, this woman, who had become accustomed to working with people, said to herself: "I cannot simply sit around idle. What kind of life is that -- doing nothing?"

She went to the ZhKO and to the building management offices. She jotted down information on all pensioners and housewives. Many of them had formerly been active in local air defense. Her idea was to involve all nonworking persons in civil defense training. And she set about this plan with enthusiasm. She selected training group leaders, obtained textbooks and saw that reading corners were set up for study. She and her activists had considerable success. But they were unable to get everybody training in the classes. Then she had an idea: why not move study right into the apartments?

"I started right at my own building entrance," stated Nosova. "A category I disabled person, Konstantin Ivanovich Bubnov, and his wife Ol'ga Vasil'yevna, also a pensioner, live next door. Due to his state of health, it was difficult for Bubnov to go out for training classes. And his wife had to take care of a small grandson. So I invited them, the retired Troshkin couple and several others to bring their grandchildren along to a first class at my apartment. They learned to prepare cotton-gauze bindings and to cut out cloth dust masks. But it took time for them to learn to sew."

The new program in large measure took such difficulties into account. And today it is easier to organize training in the housing area. Small study groups and classes running one hour. They study topics connected with protecting children. In Nosova's opinion this is precisely what is needed. And her experience in organizing classes in the apartments around one building entrance merits attention.

Training on the new program got under way in the housing development. First they revised the makeup of the study groups. Instruction-methods and demonstration classes were held for group leaders, and training equipment and facilities were renovated. People were recruited from the recreation center for showing films. Protective structures were specified where practical classes would be held on topic No 2, "Collective Means of Protection," with testing on performance standards.

Once again V. Nosova, a civil defense volunteer enthusiast, played a role in all this. She is dubbed: "Our chief-instructor."

A very apt title, for she not only conducts practical classes herself but also teaches methods skills to other training group leaders. We attended one of the classes. They were studying topic No 3, "Individual Protective Gear." The trainees included pensioners and housewives. The majority were women. Some had brought children with them. And how appropriate it was. The leader's training class outline contains the following training item: putting a gas mask, respirator, cloth dust mask and cotton gauze binding on a child. A fine opportunity for mothers and grandmothers to practice.

"The people in this group are fairly knowledgeable about civil defense," reported Nosova. "They studied the gas mask and respirator last year. And today, as you see, they have brought cloth dust masks. Varvara Vasil'yevna, how did it go this time?"

"Got it," replied an elderly woman. "I used your patterns. It fit my grandson Vitya just fine."

Valentina Aleksandrovna inspected this unique homework assignment and praised her students.

"Now let us proceed. Those of you who last time did not meet the performance standard in fashioning a cotton-gauze binding, take a seat at this table and practice.... The rest will work on performance standard 2 -- putting a gas mask or cotton-gauze binding on a child and 'casualty'."

Time passed unnoticed. Everybody worked industriously, following the leader's instructions.

The training groups are formed in a differentiated manner. Those who have received previous training are assigned to advanced training groups. They do not require special explanations. Most of the time is spent on practice drills. Those who have never trained before are put into separate beginning training groups.

"I believe that is the right approach," stated Nosova. "We also teach the group leaders separately. We have one method for those who are teaching the beginners, and another for those teaching persons with prior training."

Particularly edifying are practical classes held by Mariya Yegorovna Zelenina at Building Management Office No 2. She is greatly assisted by numerous activists: building committee chairman A. Lyalin, building committee members N. Moryakova, trade union organizer D. Frolova, and others. Regular assistants include schoolchildren Lena Timoshina, Slava Popkov, Sveta Bredikhina, Lena Popova, and Sveta Bortnikova. They inform tenants of upcoming classes, make display stands, and teach to their grandfathers and grandmothers civil defense knowledge and skills they have learned in school.

The boys brought to a practical class on topic No 2, "Collective Means of Protection," packages in polyethylene wrapping with a selection of food products, thermos jugs containing tea and other personal effects which one should take along into the shelter when an air-raid alert sounds. They also included toys for the children.

It is important to note that practical training and civil defense publicity are closely coordinated here with other activities. They offer sports activities with testing on the Prepared for Labor and Defense standards, including on the Civil Defense section. In the cutting and sewing study group housewives also learn skills of making simple protective gear (cloth dust masks and cotton-gauze bindings). In the housing management office there is a library, manned by volunteers, offering literature on civil defense.

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Means of Collective Protection

Moscow VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 78 signed to press 18 May 78
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[Article by Lt Col V. Spirin: "Collective, Reliable"]

[Text] Topic 2. Collective Means of Protection

The training class on this topic with civilians not employed in production or in the service industry, contains a number of features. The makeup of trainees is quite specific: pensioners and housewives burdened with household chores. In connection with this the class, as specified by the program, does not exceed one hour.

Of course in the span of an hour it is difficult to present the entire rather voluminous material of this topic and at the same time to practice the procedures in order to meet performance standards. Therefore it is recommended as preparation for the class that each individual thoroughly study the appropriate sections of the instruction guide entitled "Everyone Should Know This" (pp 11-20), which discuss the various types of protective structures (bomb shelter, fallout shelter, covered slit trench, etc).

During preparation for or at the beginning of the class the trainees should be shown the filmstrips entitled "The Bomb Shelter as a Reliable Means of Protection" and "Fallout Shelters and How to Build Them." And where possible, one should show the films entitled "Rules of Utilization of Bomb Shelters by the Civilian Population" and "Danger From Which There Is Protection," as this will make the group leader's job much easier. Trainees will also be briefed in advance on the properties and function of protective structures and on their construction. Then as well most of the time should be spent on practical mastery of training items.

For this one should select the nearest fully-equipped protective structure, if possible where trainees can take shelter in a realistic situation. It is also recommended that during the training class the shelter servicing element be operating. This will facilitate practical study of such items as filling the protective structure, placement of people and rules of conduct in the shelter.

After announcing the topic and objectives of the exercise, the leader shall check to make sure that all have read the section of the instruction guide on collective means of production and shall see if anybody has any questions on the filmstrips and films they have viewed. When he is sure that the trainees have acquired the requisite knowledge, he will proceed by announcing approximately as follows: "And now we shall go to the shelter in an organized manner. We ourselves shall do everything necessary in occupying the shelter."

At this moment one can simulate an air-raid alert by voice or with a tape recording.

When proceeding to the bomb shelter it is important to assist women with children of preschool age as well as the elderly. They shall be the first to enter the protective structure and shall take comfortable places close to the air ducts.

With the aid of the service element, the group leader shall acquaint the trainees with the arrangement of the airlock, the airtight door, the filter and fan room, The emergency exit and other internal equipment. Explanations should be accompanied by demonstration, such as how to close the airtight door. The trainees must also practice operating the electric-manual blower.

He should inform them that the shelter contains a telephone, radio, first aid kit, and a store of food and water. The trainees should see for themselves that when in a protective shelter they will not be alone, and that if necessary rescuers will come after them. If necessary they could remain in the shelter for an extended period of time together with their children, aged and ill family members under more or less normal life-support conditions, without detriment to their health.

Readily-flammable or strong-smelling objects shall not be taken into a shelter. No domestic animals should be kept in the shelter. Smoking is prohibited, and there shall be no lighting of kerosene lamps, candles or other light sources without the authorization of the person in charge. Children shall not be allowed to run, shout or play noisy games, for the shelter may contain infants in baby carriages (children's protective chambers), as well as persons in poor health. It is important to create an atmosphere of genuine compatibility, collectivism and mutual aid.

After covering all these points, the group leader shall announce all clear and shall drill his trainees on the procedure of exiting from the shelter. Following is one variant: the shelter has not become buried under rubble, and the city has not been attacked. Thus the people in the shelter can simply leave. But other situations are also possible: an adjacent building has collapsed, and the shelter is buried in rubble. With this variant, after specifying the scenario, the instructor shall demonstrate how to exit through the emergency hatch (for which it is recommended that several trainees be trained in advance). He should explain that the elderly, sick persons and children will be assisted in exiting by healthy individuals as well as members of the shelter servicing element and members of rescue teams which have come to lend aid.

The class session can end with work on the performance standards specified by the program. Trainees who have reached retirement age as well as disabled persons shall meet the performance standards without any time limit.

Through practice they acquire skills which are essential for protection against modern weapons.

When holding this class with residents of small towns and rural areas, a fallout shelter (PRU) with a simple filtering and ventilation system should be prepared, capable of protecting people against radioactive contamination, penetrating radiation, luminous radiation, and diminishing the effect of a blast wave. Basements, underground spaces, cellars, root cellars, other spaces below ground level, and the first floors of masonry buildings can be adapted as fallout shelters. The simplest type of structures, in the form of covered trenches, shall also be built.

The procedure to follow in working on training items is approximately the same as in the bomb shelter, but the specific features of rural areas shall be taken into account. It is important to teach each rural inhabitant to build simple protective structures. They will be assisted by posters and folders containing standard designs.

The main goal is to convince trainees that collective means possess reliable protective properties and, together with individual gear (gas masks, respirators, cloth dust masks, and cotton-gauze bindings), will protect people from the casualty-producing effects of a nuclear blast. The group leader shall particularly emphasize this at the critique session following the training drill.

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NEED FOR GUARDING AGAINST LAX DISCIPLINE DISCUSSED

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 6, Jun 78 signed to press
4 May 78 pp 30-31

[Article by Guards Maj K. Chaynov, chief of staff of an aviation unit:
"Exactingness First of All"]

[Text] The subunits were drawn up in front of the training building. The daily schedule and the schedule of classes are being firmed up and auditoriums are being assigned. Finally the command rings out: "Disperse!" The aviators head for the building.

"Listen, Nikolay, in which classroom are we studying?" Having received an answer, the owner of this same voice turned to another comrade: "What is the subject of the first class?"

I involuntarily turned my head. It was so--all these questions were posed by Guards Sr Lt A. Ionov, the second in command of an aircraft. And all this because he, impatiently shifting from one foot to the other and nudging one then the other neighbor, tried to talk with them while the personnel who were standing in formation were carefully listening to the commander's instructions. The officer was clearly violating formation discipline. However, none of the senior comrades standing nearby stopped him. Even the aircraft commander did not make any comments. And it should have been. Ionov's jacket was undone almost to the belt and his cap was cocked to his ear. Only the detachment commander, who caught my glance, introduced order.

Life shows that such cases are, unfortunately, still encountered. And the question involuntarily arises: "What is this--the carelessness of commanders? Perhaps it is simply the reluctance to note these small details?"

It is no secret that such "small details" little by little weaken discipline--the foundation of a subunit's entire vital make-up and its combat readiness. Not a single troop subunit can count on steady successes in combat and political training if strong military discipline, firm regulation procedures, and the ability to get things done to the very end are absent in it. It is

not without purpose that the introduction to the Disciplinary Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces states: "High military discipline is the most important condition for the combat capability and constant combat readiness of the forces. Its role is especially great in achieving victory during a modern war."

Nevertheless, at times they begin to work seriously in subunits at strengthening military procedures specified in regulations only when commanders run into flagrant violations of discipline. It is then that activity begins: inquiries and discussions are conducted, the violator of discipline is heard during meetings of the party or Komsomol bureau, and conclusions are drawn. And how does it turn out? As a rule, the reason for what happened lies in those same "small details" which at one time commanders and the community of a subunit left without the necessary attention and influence.

Nothing acts on personnel so harmfully as the absence of continuous and daily exactingness on the part of commanders toward subordinates in combination with concern for them. Therefore, the unmade comment, the unheld discussion, the unannounced (if the situation required it) punishment, or worthy actions which remain unnoticed give birth in subordinates to passivity and complacency. These qualities prepare the soil for more serious derelictions of duty.

Probably, each commander knows from experience how insidious is the external well-being in a subunit especially when the state of affairs of its administration is rated superficially, when critical situations are smoothed over, when instances of violating discipline or order are hushed up but the smallest successes are overevaluated.

I will relate one bitter lesson whose causes are immediately rooted in these notorious "small details."

The squadron which Guards Maj M. Veselov, a military flier first class, headed began to retrain on new equipment. Drill, party and Komsomol meetings were held in the detachments. The collective assumed increased socialist obligations. The results of the socialist competition between the detachments and squadrons were systematically summed up. Reports, dispatches and accounts about the progress of studying the new equipment regularly arrived in the headquarters.

The results of inspections by senior chiefs strengthened the opinion that the subunit had a serious claim on first place in the unit. The commander's authority also grew in accordance with the successes. The program for the theoretical retraining was approaching an end. Outwardly, everything appeared in the best shape. However, even during this period there occurred in the squadron an unnoticed but serious breakdown in the worst sense.

The initial successes in mastering the new aircraft evoked a complacent attitude. The commanders of the detachments and aircraft gradually lowered

exactingness on their subordinates. Instances of uniform violations, being late for formation, and deviations from the daily schedule became more frequent.

Once the party committee secretary noted that personnel in Capt A. Ivanov's detachment were playing volley ball on the sports field instead of attending classes on aerodynamics as the schedule provided.

The captain calmly explained: "The weather is good. Everyone knows aerodynamics excellently. They recently passed examinations. The squadron commander decided to conduct physical training."

Major Veselov not only confirmed his decision to switch classes but also justified it using these same reasons. That same day a serious discussion was held with him about the inadmissability of violations in the daily schedule. He was advised to tighten up discipline in the squadron. The officer gave assurance there would be an end to violations of regulation procedures in his subunit.

However, it was difficult for him to keep this promise. The fact of the matter was that his relationships with subordinates exceeded the limits of regulation requirements. He frequently substituted patronizing and exhortatory conversations for exactingness and, when he heard about uniform violations or about subordinates spending a lot of time in the smoker or not hurrying very much when the "assembly" signal sounded, he ardently came to their defense--evidently thinking that he was defending the honor of the collective he headed by doing this.

The fact that even when solving purely service tasks his subordinates addressed him not by rank but by his first name and patronymic extremely impressed the officer. He thought "They respect me."

The weakening in exactingness was not long in having an effect on the work of the squadron's technical engineer complement. The preliminary and pre-flight preparation regimen began to be violated more often as did procedures for working on the aviation equipment. Having listened to a scheduled report on digressions in the preparation of the equipment, the squadron commander summoned the guilty party and, gently rebuking him, let him off. The case was left without the necessary appraisal. In return, the subordinates praised their commander everywhere, calling him humane, kind and good.

All this turned Veselov's head. The first solo flights in the new equipment were successfully performed by him. He not only lessened exactingness on his subordinates but also on himself. Having come to believe in the depth and perfection of his knowledge, he at first decreased and then halted entirely the work of improving himself.

Soon Guards Capt A. Kucherov, an aircraft commander and military flier first class, returned from leave. The squadron commander congratulated him on his return to work and said in conclusion: "Get ready, I will give you a ride in the new machine this week."

At the designated time on the hard stand Guards Capt A. Kuchеров, having received the report of the aircraft technician, began the preliminary check of the combat vehicle. A GAZ drove up to the hard stand and the squadron commander got out of it. Kuchеров went up to him to report on the readiness for the flight but the latter stopped him with a wave of his hand.

"I know. My aircraft is always in order."

Having successfully completed the flight mission, the crew started to land. At the moment of touchdown a cone of sparks escaped from under the aircraft's stabilizer....

The flight director wrote in the log: "Contact of the VPP [landing strip] with the tail of the fuselage."

Once again there was a serious discussion--but now it was about the flight training of the commander himself. Major Veselov was able to convince the unit's command element that this was an annoying circumstance and that he would engage in earnest in self-study. However, as it turned out later, he did not draw the appropriate conclusions for himself even this time.

Several months passed. The personnel continued to master the new equipment. Everything seemed to be in order. However, the day arrived when the long ripening events reached their logical conclusion.

The crew of Guards Major Veselov performed the scheduled flight mission. The climb on maximum afterburners went normally. The aircraft commander brought the craft to horizontal flight and set the most suitable mode of operation for the engines. However, through an oversight of the pilot the aircraft was higher than the practical ceiling. The speed began to fall off noticeably. Veselov momentarily used maximum afterburners but this did not insure the maintenance of the assigned speed. The aircraft commander began to fret. He searched his memory in vain for the necessary information. It wasn't there. He tried to maintain speed by changing the angle of attack. He brought the aircraft lower. Fearing excessive acceleration, he adjusted the revolutions of the engines. However, the speed did not increase. His first thought was a breakdown in the engines. The flier without checking this supposition mechanically pulled the cut-off valve. The engines stopped.

One of them was soon started up. The flier completed the landing on it. The data in the objective control systems corroborated that the engines and all equipment were in good working order. However, after several seconds it would have already been difficult to correct the error.

A detailed investigation of the preconditions for this flight incident showed that the incorrect actions in the air were the result of a poor knowledge of the equipment and aerodynamics.

The squadron commander also understood this. However, it was too late. Connivance in work, the weakening of exactingness toward oneself and one's subordinates which began by disregarding "insignificant" violations of military discipline, and the desire "not to wash one's dirty laundry in public" inflicted serious damage on combat training in the subunit and undermined the authority of the leader. He had to leave the collective. Although this is a justifiable result of lack of principles, such a finale is not fatal. It is only necessary to remember that the price of "small details" -- the more so in aviation--can be too high.

At the present time the squadron has earned and is firmly holding on to the title of "excellent". The personnel have achieved great successes in combat and political training. However, questions about strengthening in every way possible the regulation relationships between servicemen, order, and discipline are always timely in all subunits. Considering this bitter lesson of the past, subunit commanders, their deputies, and party and Komsomol activists pay a lot of attention to instilling in personnel a high sense of awareness and a sense of party responsibility for the thorough strengthening of military discipline and the conscientious performance of their service responsibilities and are developing a critical attitude to their achievements. This is the guarantee for a steady growth in combat training.

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IMPORTANCE OF PREPLANNING OF FLIGHT SERVICING WORK EMPHASIZED

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 6, Jun 78 signed to press
4 May 78 p 32

[Article by Engr-Capt P. Druzhinskiy: "Don't Plan Randomly"]

[Text] Once the deputy unit commander for IAS [aviation engineer service] asked us, the IAS leaders of the squadrons:

"What will you be busy at tomorrow?"

Knowing the task for the next day, we reported our understanding in general terms.

The chief asked: "And more specifically? How many aviation specialists will go to the hard stand? Who will be busy doing what? What is the procedure for preparing the aircraft?"

We were not completely ready to answer these questions. Therefore, a serious discussion was held about the ability to organize correctly preliminary, preflight, and other types of preparation for aviation equipment; and about how it is necessary to plan the coming work and, what is especially important, how to perform it. It was decided that each technician in a flight and that each maintenance group chief should have these plans.

We began to implement these requirements. Individual officers at first asked: Why, as they say, an unnecessary scribble, a waste of time. Some of them regarded the drawing up of the plan with coolness. They introduce a few points at random for the sake of form so that they would not be criticized during the critique or when the results were summed up. Sometimes they got away with this. However, formalism has never led to good. Thus, M. Aktabayev, a technician in a flight, changed an assembly on an aircraft together with his subordinates. The aviation specialists were late in finishing the work and filling out the documents. The officer decided to postpone till the next day the mothballing and turning in of the removed assembly to the depot.

The next day Lieutenant of Technical Services Aktabayev drew up a plan in general terms. In particular, the turning in of the assembly to the depot was not mentioned in the plan. Having arrived at the hard stand in the morning, he was busy with other work and did not see the affair of the removed assembly through to the end. More days passed. Something else again prevented the officer. Finally, he completely forgot about turning in the assembly. For this he received a talking to from the senior chief. If the flight technician had introduced this point into his plan he would not have forgotten about the unfinished work.

The careful planning of all types of preparation gradually became a law for the deputy squadron commander for IAS and the flight technician. I will relate how this is done in our squadron. Once, having returned from a mission a flier made a comment about the working of the sight. Immediately after finishing the flying shift, I and the maintenance group chief, Engr-Lt V. Babkin, estimated how many mechanics and what kind of specialties were required to eliminate the deficiency. Having coordinated this question with the other group chiefs, we drew up a work plan for the next day--and not in general terms but a specific one--right up to which of the specialists from what service would work on which aircraft.

I knew from the request of the deputy unit commander for IAS that two airfield starter assemblies (APA) would be allotted to the squadron for the preliminary preparation. In accordance with this the maintenance group's mechanics were divided into two teams--each of them included specialists from all services. The maintenance group chiefs were designated to be in charge of the teams.

The sequence of work in the cockpit was established in accordance with the schematic diagram developed in the squadron. While some checked the equipment with current, others performed an external inspection. The specialists changed places. At the same time the documents were filled out.

When the specialists had finished the preliminary preparation on the aircraft, they moved to another machine on order of the senior man in the APA team and brought the checking and measuring apparatus to it. Such an organization of preliminary preparation, as we have proved more than once, permits it to be completed an hour and a half before the end of the working day. The planes, on which some trouble or other had been detected, were checked last.

Having read these lines, some engineer can say: Under such ideal conditions when there is an APA and all the equipment available, it is possible to prepare aircraft exactly according to plan. But what should be done when the supporting subunit has not fully carried out the request and the equipment is late in arriving at the hardstand? Or it has happened this way. The specialists have begun to work on the aviation equipment and instructions have arrived from the unit headquarters: Detail several individuals for fatigue duties. Yes, all kinds of these additional commands must be

executed by the deputy squadron commander and the flight technicians during the course of a day. Nevertheless, a plan skilfully drawn up the night before always helps. The more detailed it is, the easier it is to find a way out of unforeseen situations.

When drawing up a plan, it is necessary to provide for various alternatives. For example, I take into consideration the fact that one APA can come to the hardstand instead of the planned two. When dividing the people between aircraft, I keep a reserve which I shunt about. In a word, no matter how difficult the conditions are under which the preliminary work must take place, it is always possible to find the optimum alternative by skilful planning.

The deputy squadron commander for IAS organizes the carrying out of the plan and implements it with the help of his subordinates. Therefore, it is very important that the flight technician, the maintenance group chief, the aircraft technician, and the mechanic know and strictly carry out what has been entrusted to them and that they display initiative and creativity in their work. The clear organization of preliminary preparation also presupposes a high level of getting things done on the part of all specialists. One has only to commit even an insignificant dereliction and immediately the plan is disrupted and the physical strain on others grows.

I still remember one case. V. Rusanov, a maintenance group technician, had not been included in the team for checking out the equipment on the airplanes so that he could be involved in supplementary assignments. Such a need soon arose: The squadron headquarters ordered that an officer be detailed to assume duties. I wanted to designate Rusanov; however, he wasn't at the work site. I had to send another specialist who was working on an aircraft. Naturally, the rhythm of the preliminary preparation was disrupted somewhat.

Or let us take the loading of aircraft with oxygen, air, etc. Once, a technician came to me at the end of the work day and reported that his aircraft was not filled with compressed air. I said to him:

"Why? The special vehicle came to the hardstand."

The officer answered: "I relied on the order getting to the driver to fill my aircraft."

No instructions, of course, are required in such a case. Only a technician's responsibility and ability to see things are done are necessary.

The timely and qualitative performance of all work on aircraft depends not only on the professional skill of the specialists but also on their level of discipline. A clear plan, constantly checked on by the deputy commander for IAS and the flight technicians is one of the indispensable conditions for further increasing combat readiness.

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INNOVATIONS FOR IMPROVING FLIGHT TRAINING DESCRIBED

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 6, Jun 78 signed to press
4 May 78 pp 40-41

[Article by Maj A. Lapshin: "Proposed and Introduced"]

[Text] The ventilators buzzed rhythmically forcing fresh cool air into the premises of the command and air traffic control point [KDP] Signal lights informing the flight director of the aircraft's readiness to take off flashed very often on the illuminated information display. There was no need to wait for reports by telephone. It was immediately evident from one glance at the board how things were in all detachments and squadrons.

Here, a red light began to blink on one section of the board and a stencil lit up in an instant. The flight director looked at his watch--the aircraft was loaded with fuel ahead of schedule. It is possible to hope that it would be ready to take off earlier than the prescribed time.

The illuminated display had been developed, put together and adjusted by regimental craftsmen under the direction of Guards Capt Tech Serv A. Fitsa . The innovators also improved the KDP heating system by fitting automated equipment for regulating the temperature and humidity of the air in the structure.

Comparatively recently much time was spent on telephone conversations, gathering information and transmitting commands when organizing aviation engineer support for flights. Communist A. Fitsa figured that replacing telephone communications with selective circuit communications from all points where aircraft are prepared for flight would significantly improve conditions for transmitting information to the KDP. To do this it was necessary to improve the existing selective circuit equipment. The innovator devoted much time and effort to studying various diagrams of transmitting equipment. Finally, a solution was found. The diagram promised high communications reliability and simplicity in operation. Guards Sr Lt Tech Serv M. Skobelev and Guards WO's V. Cherkasov and A. Lichman took an active part in building the transmission equipment.

As is known, fliers normally use posters, figures and diagrams to study airfield lighting equipment. The innovator thought: "But what if an operating model of an airfield with directional glide path equipment, illuminated approach lights, and searchlights was created in a training classroom? Thus it would be possible to land under night conditions holding an airplane model in one's hands...."

The regiment's command element approved the idea. The innovator again sat down to his calculations. WO Yu. Titov became his closest helper this time. Together they made an electrified model which suited the fliers.

More than 150 of Aleksey Kondrat'yevich Fitsa's suggestions have been incorporated in the creation of the regiment's training base, in improving information collection systems, in increasing the reliability of communications, in bettering the working conditions of personnel in the on-duty shifts.... All of them have been directed toward raising the combat readiness of the regiment.

The comrades say about their colleague: "Our innovator has an indefatigable nature."

And it is so. A. Fitsa is always engaged in creative research and in work. Now he is thinking about how to improve the notification system of the flight and technical engineer complement.

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INCIDENT INVOLVING GROUND COLLISION OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT DESCRIBED

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 6, Jun 78 signed to press
4 May 78 p 45

[Article by Lt Col A. Yena, military flier first class: "He Hurried To Take Off"]

[Text] The preliminary preparation was coming to an end. The fliers carefully listened to the last instructions of the commander. The commander said somewhat more loudly: "One more thing. I would remind you of the path for taxiing out to the take-off strip and for taxiing away after landing...."

In accordance with the planned schedule Capt S. Burinskiy was to be the first to perform the mission. The flier started up his engine exactly at the appointed time with the permission of the flight director. Having once again convinced himself of the correctness of the numerous instrument readings, he gave the order to the technician: "Remove the chocks from under the wheels!" Then having increased revolutions to average, he checked the reliability of the brakes.

While taxiing out Captain Burinskiy noticed at the last moment that a cockpit light located to his right was shut off. The officer remarked to himself: "It looks as if a pilot started his engine early." Actually, the latter aircraft was supposed to climb into the sky five minutes after the beginning of the flights.

This is an old case. The main one guilty of the preconditions for the flying accident drew the correct conclusion from what happened, as his subsequent service proved. Therefore, I do not want to mention his true name.

Having started his engine, the flier decided to take off before Captain Burinskiy. First, he was from the leading element. Moreover, he was in the cockpit of the senior chief's aircraft whose number every aviator at the airfield knew. Evidently, based on this the flier also concluded that nothing would happen if he disrupted the prescribed order for taxiing out somewhat. In return, he would take off first. At the same time the officer

perfectly understood that an airplane is not an automobile: If he should move right after Captain Burinskiy, he would not be able to pass him on the taxi strip. But if he took a shortcut, yes, and taxied somewhat faster than had been prescribed, then it would be possible to eliminate completely unnecessary minutes.

This thought, probably, appeared so real to him that he, immediately after moving the missile carrier from its position, turned it not to the left as Captain Burinskiy but to the right. He also taxied at a great speed. Thus, the seed for the preconditions of a flying accident began to germinate.

Being on the main taxi strip, the officer noticed Captain Burinskiy's plane to the right front. At that moment it was only beginning the turn onto it. Even in this situation, that is, after the first violation, it was possible to avert the precondition. It was necessary to halt and allow Burinskiy to get in front and then taxi oneself. However, instead of this the flier moved on without decreasing speed. He thought to rush onto the VPP [landing and take-off strip] first. Possibly, he thought, Burinskiy having caught sight of the taxiing aircraft would stop.

However, Burinskiy, strictly following the prescribed rules for taxiing, calmly began the turn to the right. Naturally, at that moment he also looked that way. In no way did he expect that someone could be taxiing otherwise. A single route had been prescribed for everyone. Moreover, the sequence of take-offs which was prescribed by a planned schedule was a law.

Of course, it is not possible to completely excuse Captain Burinskiy. To a known degree he also was negligent. However, the major share of the guilt for what happened falls nevertheless on the flier who decided to take off first.

The fighters drew near to each other. Afterwards the officer said even at the last second he had not lost hope there would be no collision. However, this did not happen. He hooked the left side of the fuselage of Burinskiy's missile carrier which had still not managed to completely turn with the right wing of his aircraft.

Both aircraft halted blocking the entire main taxi strip. Naturally, they received damage. And although the sun continued to shine and the air was so clear that the distant hills covered with thickets of half-grown trees appeared close by, it was impossible for the flights to begin. The way to the VPP was closed for a long time.

Why was such an annoying event possible in a very simple situation. Only one answer suggests itself: The flier who started his engine second did not carry out the instructions of the regimental commander and violated the order of movement of aircraft on the airfield. However, this answer, so it appears, will not be sufficiently complete if we do not analyze the reasons which caused the officer to commit a violation so thoughtlessly.

As was already pointed out, this flier was from the leading element. It would seem that his service position itself would compel the officer not only to suppress the lack of discipline in those junior to him in position and rank decisively, sternly and without delay but also to set an example first and foremost of the strict and accurate carrying out of the laws of the flying service. However, as it appears, he at that movement forgot about this for some reason.

Unfortunately, although it is extremely seldom, instances are still encountered where an individual who occupies a comparatively high position begins to think after some time that he is allowed to do something not in accordance with prescribed rules but in accordance with his own understanding. In our opinion, the harm from this is twofold. Carelessness leads to very undesirable consequences; moreover, the violator sets a bad instructional example for the other fliers. He, as is known, is infectious--the weed seeds germinate.

The collision of the two fighters could have been averted by the flight director. However, he was not on top of the situation. Having permitted the premature starting of the engine, he took the path of least resistance and displayed liberalism in his work relationships with an officer senior to him in position.

What has been said eloquently confirms the well known thought that the indoctrinators must be indoctrinated.

Undoubtedly, as has already been emphasized, in no way is it possible to excuse Captain Burinskiy. If this flier had been completely wary, the fighters would not have been damaged.

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PRINCIPLES OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 7, Jul 78 signed to press
22 Jun 78 pp 21-30

[Article by Col Gen (Ret) N. Lomov, professor, and Col S. Alferov: "On the Question of Soviet Military Doctrine" Passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface.]

[Text] Soviet military doctrine represents a system of scientifically grounded views accepted by the state for a given time period on the goals and nature of a possible war, on preparation of the country and the Armed Forces for it, as well as on methods of conducting it. Its content has two closely connected and interdependent aspects--a political and a military-technical aspect. The former includes provisions which reveal the sociopolitical essence of war which the imperialists might impose on the Soviet Union, the nature of political goals, and their influence on organizational development of the Army and Navy and on the country's preparations for war. The military-technical aspect comprises issues concerning military organizational development, methods of waging war, the technical outfitting, preparation and employment of the Armed Forces in a war, and requirements for their combat readiness.¹

Provisions on the sociopolitical nature of a possible war and on political goals of the sides occupy a most important place in the make-up of military doctrine. In defining the political goals of the sides, the Communist Party always proceeded from the assumption that "'the nature of the political goal' has a decisive influence on the conduct of war."² [Military doctrine] is not confined to this, however. V. I. Lenin stated that "war includes all forms of all areas of organizational development"³ and, consequently, it is a complex and many-sided phenomenon.

Great Patriotic War experience continues to remain a rich source for research of problems which even today are of theoretical interest and have practical significance for the development of Soviet military doctrine. Let us examine briefly how realistic certain provisions of the military-technical aspect were during this war, as well as the new elements which enriched these provisions.

/Principles of military organizational development represent one of the most important components of Soviet military doctrine./ They are the sum total of propositions and requirements as to the nature of activities aimed at solving problems of the country's defenses as a whole and of their different aspects. First of all, it includes the Leninist propositions elaborated by the Communist Party to the effect that our party's management of the Armed Forces is the primary foundation of Soviet military organizational development; secondly, providing armed protection of the socialist homeland requires the complete and comprehensive use not only of the state's military potential, but its economic and moral-political potentials as well; and thirdly, a possible war will be characterized by new features which place heightened demands on Soviet military organizational development.

Soviet military doctrine proceeded in these matters from the assumption that, in spite of new theories as to "small professional armies" and the dominant and decisive role of bomber aviation, tanks or other combat arms in winning victory ((Sekt), Fuller, (Due) and others), a future war might be a world war which will be waged by mass armies and over a lengthy period of time.

In conformity with this, principles of the organizational development and improvement of the Soviet Armed Forces were elaborated and were reflected in part in the build-up of large and well-trained manpower mobilization reserves and in the improvement of troop organizational structure and their system of mobilization deployment. Principles of training and indoctrination corresponding to the level of requirements of contemporary warfare also were elaborated.

For example, while there were 1.1 million persons in our Armed Forces in 1936, they already numbered over 2 million as of 31 August 1939 with the aggravation of the military-political situation and the threat of war on the part of the capitalist West.⁴ By 1 January 1941 their size reached 4,207,000 persons. The Ground Forces made up 80.6 percent, the Air Force 8.6 percent, the Navy 7.3 percent and the National Air Defense Forces 3.3 percent.⁵

It should be emphasized in particular that throughout almost all the Great Patriotic War the Soviet military leadership had an opportunity of maintaining the size of the Army in the field at a level of six million persons, preserving a growing superiority over the fascist German Army.

Table 1 - Correlation of Number of Personnel at the Soviet-German Front⁶

Number of Troops, Millions	Nov 1942	Jun 1943	Jan 1944	Jun 1944	Jan 1945
Soviet Army in the Field	6.1	6.4	6.2	6.4	6.5
Fascist German Army in the Field	6.1	5.2	4.9	4.0	3.1

Meanwhile, mobilization of human reserves in the Soviet Union did not exceed six percent of the country's population, while it equalled 16 percent in fascist Germany.⁷

/In the area of immediate organizational development of the Soviet Army and Navy,/which was the main element of statewide military organizational development, a number of doctrinal provisions underwent significant change. They primarily touched on troop organizational structure because of the effect of results of a study and generalization of combat experience gained during the war, an analysis of forms and methods of the enemy's conduct of combat operations, as well as a qualitative improvement in our forces' outfitting and an increase in their size.

The improvement in troop organizational structure was aimed at increasing the striking power and maneuverability of formations (ob'yedineniye) and units (soyedineniye and chast') in the attack, reinforcing their stability on the defense, and giving them greater independence in performing combat missions.

Inasmuch as the Ground Forces were the main branch of the Soviet Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War, primary emphasis was placed on increasing the proportion of all types of artillery, tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces within them, as well as on strengthening their air support.

The formation of breakthrough artillery divisions and corps, restoration of mechanized and tank corps, and creation of tank and air armies in particular, with the inclusion of air armies as part of fronts, must be placed among the most major organizational measures which had a profound effect on the nature of conducting an operation or battle.

The possibility of conducting such measures was directly related to the development of Soviet military economics--its capabilities of increasing military production on a quantitative and qualitative basis.

/In matters of technical outfitting/ of the country's Armed Forces, the Communist Party and Soviet government proceeded from Lenin's statements that "it is impossible to live in a modern society without machines and without discipline--we must either master the highest technology or be crushed."⁸ Vladimir Il'ich pointed out that "the best Army and the people most dedicated to the cause of revolution will be annihilated by the enemy immediately if they are not sufficiently armed, supplied with food and trained."⁹

This advice was made the basis of Soviet military doctrine and found complete confirmation in the Great Patriotic War.

As the 7th World Congress of the Communist International noted, the inevitability of the outbreak of a new world war became particularly apparent in the latter half of the thirties in connection with the rapid build-up of contradictions within the capitalist system and the striving by ruling reactionary circles of opposing imperialist groupings to resolve them at the expense of the USSR.

The chief threat to the Soviet Union here was fascist Germany's expansion of aggression aimed at conquering Europe, establishing world domination by German fascism, and, above all, at eliminating our state.

Under these conditions the Communist Party and Soviet government took the necessary steps to reinforce the combat might of the Armed Forces. A vast program for refitting them with the latest types of military equipment was developed in 1940 in an atmosphere of a growing immediate threat of war. It was not completely carried out, however, by the beginning of fascist Germany's treacherous attack on our country, and so technical advantages at the beginning of the war were on the side of the aggressor. These advantages were eliminated during the war thanks to the superiority of the socialist economy over the capitalist economy. According to economists' estimates, in 1942 Germany was producing 4.4 times fewer aircraft and 6.8 times fewer tanks than the Soviet Union per million tons of smelted steel; and 4.3 times fewer aircraft and 6.6 times fewer tanks than the Soviet Union per billion kilowatt-hours of electrical power produced.¹⁰

Our industry, which was converted to a military program in short periods of time, was able to provide a continuous increase in the amounts of weapons and military equipment it put out, which is shown by the data of Table 2.

Table 2 - Manufacture of Military Products (In Percent of 1940)¹¹

People's Commissariats	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
Armaments	145	191	200	206	156
Tank Industry	112	184	234	296	276
Aviation Industry	126	178	223	239	177
Munitions	152	218	264	310	171

Two essential circumstances should be emphasized in particular. First of all, the supply of necessary weapons and military equipment to the Army in the field at the beginning of the war took place under difficult conditions of the evacuation of the most important industrial installations from the country's western to the eastern regions with a simultaneous start-up of production of new types of weapons. Secondly, the intensity of armed struggle rose with each passing year, its scope broadened and the requirement for the means to conduct it grew.

If we take the number of personnel and weapons which took part in the Battle of Moscow as 100 percent, then the build-up in power of Soviet troop groupings in operations will be characterized by the indicators of Table 3.¹²

Table 3

Operations	Personnel	Guns and Mortars	Tanks	Aircraft
Stalingrad (winter of 1942/1943)	122	261	203	115
Belorussian (summer of 1944)	261	581	910	600
Berlin (spring of 1945)	272	640	954	684

As noted in the "Istorii Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], "the war went on with a steady rise in the might of the Soviet Armed Forces. By war's end they surpassed the enemy by more than double in personnel, by a little over three times in tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces, as well as guns and mortars, and by almost eight times in combat aircraft."¹³ This quantitative build-up in our Army and Navy's combat might, which occurred simultaneously with a qualitative improvement in weapons, caused a foreign author to state figuratively that the Ruhr was defeated by Magnitogorsk.

/The make-up of military doctrine includes provisions on the employment of Armed Forces in war and on principles for conducting armed warfare/ which depend on a number of factors of a political, economic and scientific-technical nature.

It was noted above that accumulated combat experience, knowledge not only of general principles but also details of the enemy's military art, as well as the level of military-technical outfitting of the Armed Forces of the sides (and this is merely a certain portion of the factors) exert a direct effect on formation of doctrinal views on the forms and methods of combat operations.

The general principles in this matter are requirements of Marxism-Leninism as to the absolutely historical examination of events and phenomena, a revelation of the dialectics of the development of forms and methods of armed warfare and, in connection with the mobility of these forms and methods, the need to apply those which favor the given conditions of a

situation. Lenin wrote that "one has to be able to change methods of warfare against the enemy when circumstances change."¹⁴

The attack and the defense are, as we know, types of military actions. They are characterized by a diversity of methods in employing personnel and weapons.

With all the diversity of methods of conducting combat actions, however, military doctrine identifies the chief ones among them which determine the essence of the viewpoint predominant in the state as to the employment of Armed Forces in warfare.

In its prewar views, Soviet military doctrine had a clearly expressed offensive character stemming from the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the Army. Lenin's thoughts on this matter were expressed in a large number of his articles and statements: "Lessons of the Moscow Uprising" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], Vol. 13), "Missions of Revolutionary Army Detachments" (Vol. 11), "Workers' and Bourgeois Democracy" (Vol. 9), "Advice from an Outsider" (Vol. 34) and so on. Their reality was confirmed in practice in the years of the Civil and Great Patriotic wars.

In giving the concluding remarks at the 8th All-Russian Congress of Soviets, Lenin emphasized: "To tell us that we must wage only a defensive war when the knife continues to be raised above us . . . is to repeat old phrases of petty-bourgeois pacifism which long ago lost their meaning.

"If, as has been suggested, we were to give our pledge to those forces which were constantly and actively hostile to us that we never would resort to certain actions which in the military-strategic sense might be offensive, then we would not only be fools, but criminals as well."¹⁵

Meanwhile, in directing attention to the mobility and development of types of warfare, V. I. Lenin recognized as rightful both the defense and the special variety of it--the withdrawal.¹⁶

The offensive nature of Soviet military doctrine was fully reflected in the "Vremennyy polevoy ustav" [Provisional Field Service Regulation of the RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army] of 1936 (PU-36). There it is written: "Any attack upon the socialist state of workers and peasants will be beaten back by the entire might of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union and military actions will be shifted to the territory of the attacking enemy. . . . Only /a decisive attack on the main axis,/ concluded by an unremitting pursuit, /will lead to complete destruction of enemy personnel and weapons./"¹⁷

It was proposed to employ the defense in those instances where it was necessary to create the conditions necessary for shifting into the attack or to support an attack on other axes, as well as to hold defended areas and lines.

Although draft regulations published in subsequent years did not make fundamental changes to the provisions of PU-36, they already considered to a certain extent the experience of the war in Spain, events at Khasan and the Khalkhin-Gol, the Soviet-Finnish armed conflict and World War II.

The Great Patriotic War persuasively confirmed the correctness of fundamental doctrinal views on types, forms and methods of conducting military actions. It enriched Soviet military science and doctrine with new provisions which were the result of a theoretical generalization of combat experience.

As had been intended, the attack was the primary type of combat actions by Soviet troops. Confirmation of this is the fact that out of nine campaigns conducted by the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War, seven were offensive and only two bore a defensive character.

The scope of the strategic offensive increased considerably and its content was enriched. It was conducted both on one strategic axis as well as on several, simultaneously and consecutively, laterally and in depth. The attack along the entire strategic Soviet-German Front in 1945 achieved greatest scope.

The operation by a group of fronts was a new form of strategic actions by the Ground Forces. Its characteristic features were an increase in the depth and width of the front of attack and the tempo of the operation.

We must emphasize in particular the principle of massing tank units and formations, which became a powerful strategic means in the hands of the Soviet military command. For example, in the battle of the Kursk Bulge the Central and the Voronezh fronts had one tank army and two tank corps each in their composition during the period of the defense. With the shift of all fronts deployed on this axis into the counteroffensive, they already had 5 tank armies and 25 separate tank and mechanized corps.¹⁸

Two tank armies and twelve tank and mechanized corps took part in the Belorussian Operation, while four tank armies each and several tank and mechanized corps took part in the Vistula-Oder and Berlin operations.

Air operations by long-range aviation as well as actions by the National Air Defense Forces, which acquired the form of antiair operations, found their place within the framework of the strategic offensive. Meanwhile, operations by airborne troops did not receive proper development due to a lack of transport facilities.

The counteroffensives in the battles at Moscow, Stalingrad and the Kursk Bulge introduced a number of new provisions to Soviet military doctrine and significantly expanded the prewar idea as to the place of the counteroffensive in different situations and as to the requirements for its preparation and conduct depending on the nature of strategic missions assigned to the troops.

The main efforts of the warring sides in the Great Patriotic War were concentrated in continental theaters both in Europe and in the Far East. By virtue of this, actions by the Soviet Navy primarily were of the nature of support to operations by the Ground Forces, which required the Navy to perform a number of major missions. Meanwhile, independent fleet operations on sea lanes also were provided for. However, "a viewpoint predominated in naval art as to the employment of naval forces in defensive operations, and the Navy itself was viewed as a defensive factor, although its operational and tactical missions were accomplished by offensive methods. . . . This is why the employment even of such long-range forces as submarines, including cruiser submarines, was limited to a narrow framework of primarily tactical use, mainly in close-in areas."¹⁹

Generalization of Soviet troop experience in the organization and conduct of the strategic defensive must be recognized as a substantial contribution to the content of Soviet military doctrine. The problem of the strategic defensive did not receive sufficient elaboration in prewar times, and so the most important provisions relating to it were the result of theoretical conclusions from an analysis of the Soviet troop practice of conducting defensive operations in the Great Patriotic War.

The strategic defensive was characterized by different conditions and methods of its conduct. In connection with the situation at hand, our troops were forced to conduct a strategic defensive in 1941 on the central Moscow axis, and in 1942 on the southern wing of the Soviet-German Front. It was accompanied, on the one hand, by a withdrawal into the depth of the country across a broad front, and on the other, by the active delivery of counterblows (17 frontal counterblows were conducted from July through November 1942), which disrupted the enemy's plans, exhausted his forces and were concluded by the Soviet Army's shift into the counteroffensive at Moscow in December 1941 and at Stalingrad in November 1942.

The strategic defensive in the Kursk Bulge was organized under different conditions and with different objectives. Here the shift into the strategic defensive was done deliberately.

In the operational-tactical area, the Great Patriotic War confirmed the advanced nature of the primary doctrinal views included in the theory of the battle in depth and the operation as developed in the thirties. The experience of combat operations permitted broader revelation of the principles and requirements for organization of coordination by different combat arms and forces in such a battle or operation. The artillery and air offensive was something new. The draft "Polevoy ustav" (Field Service Regulation) of 1943 reflected new elements in matters of organizing pursuit of the enemy, the withdrawal and disengagement, actions in encirclement and in moving out of encirclement, encirclement of the enemy and elimination of surrounded groupings; as well as in matters of joint actions by the Ground Forces with the Air Force, the Navy and naval river flotillas.

Generalization of practical experience of employing various methods of combat actions by partisan formations in the interests of mission accomplishment by fronts and armies was a new contribution to the theory of the operation in depth.

The far-flung partisan movement was enriched by new and effective techniques and methods of combat actions in the enemy rear thanks to the imagination of the popular masses. In the past war partisan warfare acquired broad and nationwide scope. In 1944 alone a 250,000-man army of partisans actively participated in the liberation of Karelia, Leningradskaya and Kalininskaya oblasts, the Baltic Republics, Belorussia, the Ukraine, the Crimea and Soviet Moldavia.²⁰

We should stress once again in conclusion the importance of propositions of Marxism-Leninism as to the dependence of forms and methods of waging combat actions on economic conditions. F. Engel's noted on this issue that "the entire organization of armies and the method they use of conducting warfare, and victories and defeats along with this, are dependent on material, i.e., economic, conditions: on human material and on weapons, and consequently, on the quality and size of the populace and on equipment." He said that the "successes of equipment" in turn "caused changes and even revolutions in the method of warfare almost forcibly, and often, moreover, against the will of the military command."²¹

The past war's experience confirmed that choice of the forms and methods of conducting combat actions was determined by the planned use of economic and technical capacities of our state to provide troops with weapons and combat equipment and to improve their organizational structure. As these capacities grew, as troop combat might increased and as they gained combat experience, the Soviet Army shifted from defensive actions in the fall of 1941 to an offensive on individual axes, and subsequently along the entire Soviet-German Front.

World War II and the Great Patriotic War confirmed the correctness of views of Soviet military doctrine according to which a new world war might arise both as an imperialistic war within the capitalist system and as aggression by imperialism against the USSR.

From the thirties on, German fascism was a real and most dangerous threat to peace. The participation of capitalist states capable of defending the independence of their countries against fascist enslavement together with the Soviet Union on the basis of principles of collective security was considered possible in the struggle against German fascism. This was carried out in the creation of an anti-Hitler coalition headed by the Soviet Union, United States and Great Britain.

Our state's war against German fascism and Japanese militarism was the greatest armed clash of two opposing socio-economic systems and a just Patriotic War of the Soviet people in defense of the Socialist Motherland.

The Soviet Union, with fundamental advantages internally inherent only to its social system, rightfully won victory in this war.

At the same time, the victory over Germany and Japan was vivid and convincing evidence of the indisputable advantage of Soviet military doctrine and Soviet military art over the doctrine and art of the enemies.

An important condition for the vitality of our doctrine was the careful accounting and rational use of the primary sources of the country's military might--the economic, moral-political and strictly military capabilities which led to victory in the war.

The realization of provisions of military doctrine in the practice of combat actions and, in the final account, achievement of combat successes at various stages of the war were organically tied in with the high level of combat and moral-political qualities of the Soviet soldiers, indoctrinated and led by the Communist Party, as well as with the steady increase in combat capability of the Soviet Armed Forces.

It is generally known that fascist Germany's treacherous attack on the Soviet Union was made at a time when the Soviet troops had not yet been placed in a state of full combat readiness. "The circumstance that there was no successful completion of the creation of groupings in western border districts to repulse attacks by fascist German armies placed Soviet troops in an extremely unfavorable position at the very beginning of the war."²²

This situation took shape not because the views of Soviet military doctrine on matters of the initial period of a war were erroneous, but because, by virtue of certain circumstances, the previously elaborated plans for strategic deployment of the Armed Forces in case of war, as well as measures of the western military border districts to screen this deployment, were not carried out in a timely manner.

"Mistakes made in estimating the possible time of attack by Hitler Germany against us, and, connected with this, the mistakes in preparing to repulse the first attacks played their role."²³

Thanks to efforts by the Communist Party, by all the Soviet people, and by commanders and political officers of the Army and Navy, this temporary advantage of the enemy in level of combat readiness was overcome in short periods of time, but the provisions of our doctrine for shifting military actions to the enemy's territory with the beginning of war were not borne out.

In all subsequent phases of the Great Patriotic War there was no instance where the enemy succeeded in catching our troops unawares and taking advantage of operational, let alone strategic surprise in his favor. To the contrary, history preserves many examples where all types of reconnaissance of fronts and armies revealed ahead of time the plans of the Hitler

leadership, and the command element successfully took advantage of weak places in the combat readiness and combat effectiveness of the enemy's groupings to deliver surprise attacks and defeat his troops.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War and subsequent local wars of imperialism convincingly confirms the very important significance of the level of troop combat readiness and of surprise in delivering an attack in winning success in a battle or operation. Demands placed in this regard grew immeasurably under present-day conditions in connection with the Armed Forces' outfitting with the latest types of military equipment: nuclear missile weaponry, nuclear power plants, rocket weaponry and radio-electronic means of control and support (communications, navigation, meteorological information).

Inasmuch as the danger of the outbreak of a world nuclear missile war still has not been removed, the task of maintaining armed forces in a readiness which would ensure a rebuff to any aggressor continues to be a current and primary task. "Troop combat readiness focusses the people's enormous efforts and material expenditures for outfitting of the Army, the awareness, combat training and discipline of all service personnel, the art of commanders in controlling troops and much more. In the final account, it is the crown of troop combat expertise in peacetime and the key to victory in war."²⁴

War experience provided much that was instructive for the theory and practice of training the Armed Forces. In particular, the importance and role of a comprehensive and thorough estimate and accounting of all factors influencing the beginning, progress and course of a war has grown immeasurably. The Hitlerite leadership's mistake in assessing all capabilities of the Soviet Union was one of the causes for the failure of fascist Germany in the past war. Meanwhile, its timely, secret preparation of aggression and powerful initial surprise attacks led to success at the beginning of the war. As the experience of past events showed in this regard, even now the timely revelation of the aggressive plans of probable enemies and adoption of necessary steps remains a vital necessity.

The provisions of Soviet military doctrine are not hardened dogmas, but scientific views developing under specific historical conditions. They preserve the experience confirmed by the Great Patriotic War. Even today, use of this experience makes a substantial contribution to increasing the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces and strengthening the country's defenses.

Outfitting our Armed Forces with the latest weapons and military equipment elevates even further the importance of man in deciding the fate of war. A particularly important role belongs to the training of officer personnel as the creators and carriers of military art and indoctrinators of Soviet soldiers.

Soviet military doctrine stems from two basic provisions in this matter. First of all, from the fact that the qualities of a Soviet officer are determined primarily by his Marxist-Leninist outlook. This is what creates the fundamental ideologic and scientific basis for a correct understanding of the nature of the modern era, principles of armed warfare and trends in the development of military affairs. Secondly, under present-day conditions heightened demands are placed on the Soviet officer with regard to overall competency and in the field of his military-technical training and pedagogic and organizational abilities.

The guarantee that the Soviet Armed Forces will successfully accomplish the very important state function of defending the socialist homeland lies in resolving the task of training just such officer personnel.

CPSU CC General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev points out that "everything created by the people must be reliably defended. To strengthen the Soviet state means to strengthen its /Armed Forces/ as well and increase in every possible way the defenses of our Motherland. And so long as we live in a troubled world, this mission remains one of the most important!"²⁵ This statement, in our view, provides the main direction for the work of commanders, political officers and party and Komsomol organizations in further developing the theory and practice of Soviet military doctrine and increasing the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces.

FOOTNOTES

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