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SOME ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE ARMS RACE

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pp 3-17

[Article by V. P. Konobeyev and A. A. Poduzov]

[Text] The 25th CPSU Congress, in adopting a program for further struggle for peace and international cooperation and for the freedom and independence of peoples, set one of its major objectives as the need "to put an end to the growing, peace-endangering arms race and to make the transition to disarmament and the reduction of weapon stockpiles."¹ Proceeding from this general task facing all the people of the world, the USSR has repeatedly made, and continues to make, specific proposals aimed at the elaboration and implementation of an entire series of international treaties and agreements in conjunction with other nations. Soviet proposals have occupied a central position in the group of resolutions adopted at the 32d Session of the UN General Assembly (September-December 1977), which are aimed at curbing the arms race and reducing the threat of nuclear war, and at the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament which was called to order in May 1978.

As the appeal of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers "To the People, Parliaments and Governments of all Nations in The World" notes, however, "serious obstacles are being set up on the way to detente. There has been rash escalation of the arms race, which is becoming extremely dangerous."² Extremely influential forces striving to return the world to the time of the cold war, to stop or slow down the further development of the process of detente and to prevent cuts in defense programs and allocations still exist in the United States and in several other capitalist states.

Meanwhile, the arms race carries the threat of a new world war and is being accompanied by the senseless waste of huge amounts of material resources, which is harming the economy and placing a heavy burden on the shoulders of the working public. In the United States, for example, defense expenditures for the 1948-1977 fiscal years totaled 1,664,000,000,000 dollars,³ and almost 50 percent of these expenditures were made during the last 10 years. In the 1977 fiscal year these expenditures reached a record 97.5 billion dollars.

Representatives of the Pentagon and the defense industry and some American economists often speak out in support of the high level of military expenditures, asserting that military consumption, as an important element of the mechanism of state economic regulation, has a favorable effect on the development of the economy. Many American studies in this field and analyses of data on the state of the U.S. economy confirm the fact, however, that military expenditures have a serious negative effect on the civilian sector of the national economy, since they are made at the expense of this sector. The maintenance of U.S. armed forces and their provision with modern military equipment require huge expenditures of various resources which are diverted from the creation of socially useful products, and this can ultimately slow down the economic growth of the nation, escalate inflation and the rise in prices and reduce public purchasing power.

The authors of this article intend to examine the scales and consequences of the militarization of the U.S. economy, particularly the amounts of financial, material, scientific, technical and human resources absorbed in this process, and, with the use of these data, to quantitatively assess the negative effects of the arms race on economic growth rates. It must be borne in mind that the successful transfer of resources from the military sector to the civilian will only be possible after measures have been planned to ensure a significant increase in public purchasing power and levels of employment.

Lost Resources

The financial resources which are taken away from the civilian economy and are absorbed by defense programs can be calculated as the total funds allocated in the federal budget for military expenditures (according to American terminology, these are "national defense expenditures"). As we can see from Table 1, U.S. military expenditures in current prices have steadily increased in the last 3 decades. The only exceptions have been brief periods--for example, the periods after the United States' aggressive wars in Korea and Vietnam, when Pentagon expenditures were lower than the maximum level reached at the height of these ventures. Even in these cases, however, expenditures were cut to a level that was still higher than the pre-war level, and they again rose immediately thereafter. A new round of increases in military expenditures began with the 1974 fiscal year; the rise was 4.7 percent that same year. During the next 3 years, these expenditures rose by an average of 8 percent a year (2 percent in constant prices), and the annual rate of increase during the next 5 years, according to preliminary data, might be 10-12 percent--that is, it will considerably exceed the expected rate of rise in prices.

Naturally, the real purchasing power of defense budget funds and their dynamics are affected by the inflationary rise in prices which "consumes" part of the increase in budget funds. The actual effect of rising prices in this case, however, is not as great as depicted in official published statistics, since the Department of Defense uses its own, overstated price

index (deflator), which generally exceeds the average index for the gross national product as a whole, for calculating these funds in constant prices. In addition to this, most of the Defense Department's purchases are items with a long service life, for which the price index is significantly lower than the average. This has been admitted, for example, by the director of the Defense Contract Audit Agency and by the Joint Economic Committee of Congress in one of its reports.⁴ As a result, published data on U.S. defense expenditures in constant prices are frequently understated and their dynamics are distorted. According to our approximate estimates, the price index of the Department of Defense exceeded the average for the GNP by 5.1 index points in 1976 and by around 8 points in 1977.

The funds spent by the Pentagon are huge even by the standards of the U.S. economy. For example, they accounted for 13.4 percent of the GNP in 1953--the last year of the United States' war in Korea--and 9.4 percent in 1968, when American aggression reached its height in Vietnam. In recent years, military expenditures have constituted a small part of the GNP--5.5 percent in 1976. This has not been due to cuts in the defense budget, however, but primarily to the more rapid growth of the GNP than of military expenditures. To provide a better idea of the scales of U.S. military expenditures, we will note that the total sum in the 1976 fiscal year (90 billion dollars) was equal to 40 percent of the value of all new capital investments in the American economy.

Military expenditures play their negative role twice: both directly--as huge amounts of financial resources lost by the national economy--and in the capacity of means stimulating large-scale defense production, in which various resources are wasted on the creation of products not used for peaceful purposes.

In addition to direct military expenditures (Table 1), large sums for the financing of various types of U.S. activity for military purposes (the construction of strategic transport routes, scientific research conducted for NASA, the accumulation of strategic stocks),⁵ as well as for the payment of pensions to invalids and war veterans and so forth, actually come from the budgets of other departments.

The material resources (raw materials, energy sources, production capacities, land and so forth) absorbed by military preparations are actually taken out of circulation, since they are not involved in the creation of a socially useful product. The U.S. Department of Defense has accumulated colossal sums by taking them away from society and withdrawing them from the production process. Its land holdings (in 22 states) constitute a total area of 6.6 million hectares. The total value of its real estate holdings already exceeds 50 billion dollars, while the value of accumulated weapons and stocks of various military equipment is estimated at 172 billion dollars.⁶

Table 1

Structure and Dynamics of Military Expenditures (by Fiscal Years,
Billions of Dollars Current Prices)
% of Total

	1947	1951	1953	1960	1965	1969	1970	1973	1976	1977	1978	1982 Projected figures
1. Maintenance of personnel	3,0 20,8	7,1 31,6	11,6 23,0	12,0 26,1	14,8 29,8	23,8 29,7	25,9 32,7	27,6 36,7	32,4 36,0	33,9 34,8	36,0 33,5	40,3 26,8
2. Maintenance and operation of equipment	5,0 34,7	6,4 28,4	10,3 20,4	10,4 22,7	12,3 24,8	22,2 27,7	21,6 27,2	21,1 28,1	27,9 31,0	30,6 31,4	33,5 31,1	41,6 27,6
3. Purchases of equipment	4,0 27,8	4,0 17,8	17,1 33,9	13,0 28,3	11,8 23,8	24,0 29,9	21,6 27,2	15,6 20,8	16,0 17,8	18,2 18,7	21,6 20,1	35,0 23,2
4. Research and engineering	0,5 3,5	0,8 3,6	1,4 2,8	4,5 9,8	6,2 12,5	7,5 9,3	7,2 9,1	8,2 10,9	8,9 9,9	9,8 10,0	10,7 9,9	...
5. Military construction (Military facilities and housing for servicemen)	0,4 2,8	0,4 1,8	1,9 3,8	1,7 3,7	1,6 3,2	0,5 0,6	1,8 2,3	0,9 1,2	3,2 3,6	3,3 3,4	3,4 3,2	...
6. Civil defense	...	0,1 0,4	0,1 0,2	0,1 0,2	0,1 0,2	0,1 0,1	0,1 0,1	0,1 0,1	0,1 0,1	0,1 0,1	0,1 0,1	...
7. Military aid to foreign states	...	1,0 4,4	4,0 7,9	1,5 3,3	1,1 2,2	0,8 1,0	0,7 0,9	0,5 0,7	0,5 0,6	0,5 0,5	0,5 0,5	...
8. Work on atomic weapons (production and development)	0,6 4,2	0,9 4,0	1,8 3,6	2,5 5,4	2,6 5,2	1,4 1,6	1,4 1,8	1,4 1,9	1,6 1,8	1,9 1,9	2,3 2,1	...
9. Other expenditures and returned funds (-)	...	1,8 8,0	2,2 4,4	0,2 0,5	-0,9 1,7	0,1 0,1	-1,0 1,3	-0,3 0,4	-0,6 0,8	-0,8 0,8	-0,5 0,5	...
Total	14,4 100,0	22,5 100,0	50,4 100,0	45,9 100,0	49,6 100,0	80,2 100,0	79,3 100,0	75,1 100,0	90,0 100,0	97,5 100,0	107,6 100,0	150,6 100,0

The table presents data for the years that are most characteristic for assessing the dynamics of military expenditures.

Calculated on the basis of: "The Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 1979," pp 44, 478; "Statistical Abstract of the United States" for the appropriate years.

Table 2

Volume and Structure of Main Defense Department Primary Orders,
Millions of Dollars
% of Total

	Fiscal Year				
	1965	1968	1970	1972	1974
Airborne rockets and space equipment	10 207 43,9	14 589 39,2	12 015 40,3	13 836 43,0	12 233 34,3
Armored equipment, artillery rifles and ammunition	1 930 8,2	6 647 17,8	4 392 14,8	3 703 11,5	3 553 9,9
Radio electronic equipment	2 983 12,8	3 980 10,7	3 519 11,8	4 104 12,8	4 298 12,0
Ships	1 785 7,7	2 055 5,5	1 758 5,9	2 392 7,5	3 874 10,8
Total in military branches	16 905 72,7	27 271 73,2	21 684 72,8	24 035 74,8	23 958 67,0
Petroleum and other oil and lubricants	805 3,4	1 127 3,1	998 3,4	886 2,8	2 396 6,7
Construction	1 273 5,5	1 217 3,3	999 3,4	1 612 5,0	1 893 5,3
Food	653 2,8	1 069 2,9	943 3,1	773 2,4	1 059 3,0
Medical equipment, materials and services	113 0,5	185 0,5	122 0,4	174 0,5	565 1,6
Uniforms and other personnel equipment	368 1,6	727 1,9	409 1,4	397 1,2	547 1,5
Other materials and equipment	1 054 4,6	2 059 5,5	1 236 4,1	1 178 3,7	1 350 3,7
Services (transportation, leased means of communication, public utilities and so forth)	2 097 9,0	3 593 9,6	3 387 11,4	3 081 9,6	4 001 11,2
Total in civilian branches	6 363 27,3	9 977 26,8	8 093 27,2	8 101 26,0	11 811 33,0
Total	23 268 100,0	37 248 100,0	29 777 100,0	32 136 100,0	35 769 100,0

Calculated according to data in B. Udis, "The Economic Consequences of Reduced Military Spending," Lexington, 1973, pp 34-37; "Annual Report of the Joint Committee on Defense Production, U.S. Congress, 1975," p 15.

The scales of the material resources used only for defense production can be judged from data on the volume of defense purchases. As we can see from Table 1, the maintenance, operation and purchase of equipment, scientific research and engineering and military construction are the largest items in the defense budget--almost 56 billion dollars in the 1976 fiscal year, or more than 60 percent of all direct military expenditures. These funds determine the size of Defense Department purchase orders.

The Pentagon contracts distributed in many branches of the economy lead to its militarization, the level of which is characterized by two chief indicators--the output of defense products in these branches (see Table 2) and the percentage accounted for by these products in the gross product of each particular branch. In the case of some branches, this percentage is quite high, which means that they are greatly dependent on defense orders. Naturally, the lion's share of defense contracts (67-73 percent) is given to large monopolies, which are the Pentagon's main contractors. At the same time, the complexity of modern weapon systems has led to extensively ramified intrasectorial and intersectorial cooperation in their production and, for this reason, the main contracts are redistributed among many subcontractors. This involves tens of thousands of large and small companies in defense production and gives them an interest in acquiring military orders which guarantee them competition-free product sales and high profits.

The largest holder of defense contracts, both in terms of their number and in terms of their proportional significance, is the aerospace industry, which produces the most complex weapon systems with a constantly rising cost; in the 1974 fiscal year, the aerospace industry held 34.3 percent of all defense contracts in terms of their total cost. The second place was occupied by the radio electronics industry, which annually receives around 11-13 percent of all defense contracts. Large Pentagon orders are also placed in the civilian sector of the economy (11.8 billion dollars in the 1974 fiscal year). In recent years there has been a sharp rise in expenditures on oil and lubricants (6.7 percent) due to rising world petroleum prices. Large sums are also spent on construction and related measures, food, medical supplies and uniforms.

A clearer idea of the significance of defense contracts for individual branches of production and their interest in the defense business can be gained from a comparison of their military product to their total product. Our calculations, based on a number of American reference works, which we have presented in Table 3, indicate that the processing industry was dependent on defense orders on an average of 3.7 percent during 1972-1974, while the production of durable goods was 5.9-percent dependent on these orders. These indicators, however, are the average figures for consolidated groups of branches, and for some of these individual branches the indicators are many times higher. For example, in the subbranches producing conventional weapons (armored equipment, artillery rifles and ammunition), the proportion accounted for by defense production in their total production volume ranges from 90 to 100 percent, and the respective figures are

48-50 percent for the aerospace industry, 43-45 percent for shipbuilding and 28-32 percent for the radio electronics industry.

Table 3

Goods Produced to Fill Defense Orders and their Proportional
Share in Industrial Production

	Calendar Year		
	1972	1973	1974
I. Product of defense industry, in billions of dollars	27.9	28.9	30.0
Its share in production of processing industry, %	3.3	2.8	2.8
Its share in durable goods, %	6.4	5.5	5.7
II. Product of civilian sector to fill defense orders (I + II), in billions of dollars	6.9	6.7	7.7
Its share in product of processing industry, %	0.8	0.7	0.7
III. All goods produced to fill defense orders (I + II), in billions of dollars	34.8	35.6	37.7
Their share in product of processing industry, %	4.1	3.5	3.5

Several thousand large industrial enterprises in the United States work on contracts with the Pentagon and fill orders for military exports. Although they are quite underloaded in peacetime (in shipbuilding, for example, the workload is 60 percent), it would be virtually impossible to use these enterprises for the production of goods for civilian use due to the narrowly specialized nature of the majority of defense plans. This means that large production facilities with modern equipment, the establishment and maintenance of which are financed by the civilian sector, are excluded from the process of reproduction, and this has a negative effect on the development of the economy as a whole.

In 1973 the value of industrial enterprises (including production equipment) in the aerospace industry alone was 4.4 billion dollars, or more than 2 percent of the value of all American enterprises. New capital investments in this branch alone equaled 920 million dollars in 1975, or around 2 percent of all investments in the processing industry.⁷

The defense industry uses large quantities of construction and other materials, including a number of scarce materials purchased abroad (some alloys and rare metals), as well as energy resources, particularly high-quality petroleum products. For example, during the 1960's, defense production and research absorbed around 90 percent of all the beryllium used in the United States, 85 percent of the titanium, 70 percent of the niobium, around 60 percent of the tantalum concentrates and 45 percent of the semiconductive materials.⁸ At the beginning of the 1970's, the defense industry used

11-14 percent of all the aluminum, copper, lead and zinc used in the nation and around 10 percent of all other metals.⁹

The priority given to defense firms in the distribution of scarce materials and the high demand for these materials on the part of the defense industry are contributing to a constant and intensive rise in the prices of many types of raw materials and, as a chain reaction, the prices of food and consumer goods.

All of these resources, along with the large and constantly augmented strategic stocks, are withdrawn from the sphere of civilian production.

The scientific and technical resources used in the implementation of defense programs reflect the huge dimensions and the constantly new fields of the qualitative race for arms, which became particularly intense at the end of the 1950's and the beginning of the 1960's. While U.S. expenditures on defense research and engineering during the first postwar years were measured in quite modest figures (0.5-0.8 billion dollars) and constituted 3-4 percent of the budget of the Defense Department, by the end of the 1950's they accounted for 6.3 percent of the budget (almost 3 billion) and by the 1960's they already represented 9-11 percent of the budget. They have remained on this level with slight fluctuations even during those brief periods when expenditures on weapon purchases have been reduced. This means that defense research and engineering projects in the United States are conducted in accordance with long-range programs and are not subject to changes in "market conditions" under the influence of such events, for example, as the U.S. aggression in Vietnam and the Arab-Israeli wars.

The total amount spent on research and engineering in the nation in the 1976 fiscal year was 38.1 billion dollars, almost 53 percent of which went for federal programs, including almost 36 percent on defense and space programs; purely military research and engineering projects absorbed more than 27 percent of this sum.¹⁰

According to approximate estimates, the militarization of science takes around half of all scientific and technical personnel away from the civilian sector. We can gain an idea of its absolute scales if we consider that there were already 531,000 scientists and engineers working in the United States in 1975, 357,000 of whom were working on research and engineering projects. Various defense and other government agencies employed 65,000 of them and around 67,000 were working in the aerospace industry.¹¹

The withdrawal of such sizable resources from the civilian sector of the economy slows down scientific and technical progress in this sector. The frequent assertions made by representatives of the military-industrial complex about the stimulating effect of defense research and engineering on scientific and technical progress as a whole and about the possibility of extensive utilization of military discoveries and inventions in civilian production have not been borne out in practice. The percentage of such

inventions used for peaceful purposes is quite small. In particular, in addition to considerations of secrecy, the very purpose of military research and engineering (increasing the accuracy, reliability, range of action and destructive force of weapons) limits the possibilities for using their results in the civilian branches to a minimum. Military research and engineering projects which have developed under the conditions of the arms race are farther and farther away from meeting the needs of the civilian sector with each year.

The human resources withdrawn from the economy for the maintenance and provision of the U.S. armed forces are made up of several million individuals who are either directly or indirectly paid for their work through the defense budget. Some of them are directly within the armed forces and do not create anything of value for society: they numbered 3,127,000 in 1976 (including around 1 million civilian employees). Besides this, 1,845,000 were employed in the defense industry, producing goods of no use in peacetime in accordance with Defense Department contracts. According to American forecasts, the respective figures denoting the size of these population groups in 1978 will be 3,121,000 and 2,062,000. During the American aggressive wars in Korea and Vietnam, however, the size of the labor force withdrawn from production activity in the civilian branches exceeded 8 million.¹²

More than one-third of the defense budget has been spent in recent years on the maintenance of armed services personnel. The amount spent on this in the 1976 fiscal year was 32.4 billion dollars (36 percent of all military expenditures), or around 4 percent of the total wages and salaries paid to all categories of employees. In other words, out of every 100 dollars paid to working Americans, 4 dollars were paid to persons who created nothing of value for the nation.

Moreover, the armed forces and the defense industry in the United States take the personnel with the best general educational and technical background out of the civilian sector of the national economy. In 1970, almost 48 percent of all working aviation engineers, 40 percent of all aircraft mechanics, 23 percent of all physicists and 21 percent of all electrical engineers were employed in the defense industry. Around 39.4 percent of the total labor force had a secondary education, but the figure rose to more than 85 percent among privates and sergeants. Around 77 percent of the officers had a higher education while the figure was only 13.6 percent in the total labor force.¹³ These circumstances have an additional decelerating effect on scientific and technical progress in the civilian branches.

This effect has already become apparent in the reduction of the competitive potential of some American goods in the world market (for example, products of the steel industry, shipbuilding, radio electronics and even the automotive industry).

Exports of weapons are constantly growing and represent another factor contributing to the arms race and the militarization of the economy in the United States as well as in the nations acquiring these weapons. The sale of military equipment abroad heightens the interest of American industrialists in the defense business and, besides this, results in increased defense expenditures in the purchasing states.

For example, while total exports of weapons amounted to 1.1 billion dollars in 1964, this figure was ten times higher by 1977--rising to 11.3 billion dollars,¹⁴ which is equivalent to 60 percent of all budget funds allocated to the Pentagon for the purchase of weapons and military equipment in the 1977 fiscal year.

By stimulating military production, exports of weapons increase the amounts of resources withdrawn from civilian production for the maintenance of the arms race and, in the final analysis, for the augmentation of the profits of military-industrial companies.

Restriction of Economic Growth

The large-scale defense programs which led to the militarization of the nation's economy are diverting considerable resources from the production of socially useful goods and are thereby inflicting perceptible damages on the national economy. Nonetheless, the military-industrial complex, guided by self-seeking goals, is constantly demanding an increase in defense allocations and in the volume of defense orders, which bring them huge profits. Several American studies frankly state that the mainspring of the mechanism governing the activity of defense corporations is profit, "which is higher than in the production of civilian commodities, no matter how loudly the corporations deny this."¹⁵

Representatives of the military-industrial complex and some figures in government have tried to convince the public that large defense expenditures stimulate business activity, counteract economic recessions and guarantee fuller employment. In truth, however, this kind of costly "doping" will ultimately restrain economic growth, since it is accomplished at the expense of this growth or through the reduction of possibilities for growth. In this connection, V. Perlo writes that the slight stimulating effect of military expenditures is nullified by the reduction of individual purchasing power due to higher taxes and crises and, for this reason, they constitute a negative factor for the economy.¹⁶

We know that more rapid rates of economic development have usually been seen in the capitalist countries where the level of militarization is relatively low. For example, the highest rates of economic growth were noted during the 1953-1969 period in Japan, where the percentage accounted for by military expenditures in the GNP was smaller than in any other large capitalist country; conversely, Great Britain occupied the second place (after the United States) in terms of proportional military expenditures and the last

place in terms of rates of economic development; the United States occupied the first and next-to-last place, respectively, among these states.

Military expenditures are one of the least effective ways of guaranteeing employment. For example, according to the data of a special Pentagon division, the number of persons who lost their jobs due to cuts--for various reasons--in individual defense programs in 61 regions of the United States during the 1961-1973 period was 82,000, while measures taken to promote the civilian use of the funds that were thereby made available created 162,000 new jobs.¹⁷ In other words, the "productivity" of 1 dollar from the standpoint of the creation of jobs in the civilian sector was twice as high as in the defense sector. According to later calculations, 1 billion dollars in military expenditures created 45,800 jobs in the 1977 fiscal year. The use of these funds in the sphere of municipal services, however, could have given work to 98,000 persons.¹⁸

Huge military expenditures result in higher taxes, a larger national debt, escalated inflation and a lower standard of living for the population. One of the main causes of inflation and rising prices in the United States is the constant deficit in the federal budget, which is primarily connected with colossal military expenses. Moreover, while some federal programs (highway construction, agricultural development assistance, etc.) guarantee additional possibilities for the production of civilian goods, military expenditures do not create goods and services necessary to the society and do not aid in their creation and, for this reason, they engender "their own" share of inflation.

We have seen that the effects of the arms race on the American economy are extremely diverse and deep. For this reason, a quantitative assessment of the entire spectrum of various economic consequences of militarization would be an extremely difficult task. In connection with this, we will examine them in a more general form, namely from the standpoint of an assessment of the restricting effect of military expenditures on rates of economic growth in the nation.

The fundamental possibility of accelerating economic growth in the absence of militarization is connected with the fact that the funds actually withheld for military consumption could be used not only for the expansion of day-to-day civilian consumption, but also for the establishment of the necessary conditions for the further expansion of production in the future--that is, for national economic accumulation in the broad sense of the term. The scales of the influence which can be exerted by the civilian use of defense budget funds on rates of economic growth in the nation depend on the proportions in which these funds are distributed for the attainment of specified goals. A rise in the percentage of defense budget funds used for the augmentation of fixed capital and for the development of other non-material forms of wealth, such as scientific and technical knowledge and public education and health, would be accompanied by a corresponding rise in the hypothetical rates of economic growth in the nation. Several other factors could

also promote accelerated economic growth. For example, the productive utilization of persons of working age who are now in the armed forces would have increased its civilian labor force over the postwar period, improved its sex and age structure and increased its horizontal mobility. If military production had been converted to meet civilian needs, this would also have alleviated some of the structural and other disproportions in the capitalist economy, as well as lowering the barriers for the intersectorial movement of capital.¹⁹

The concept of the economic damages incurred as a result of militarization is therefore based not only on actual economic development under the conditions of militarization, but also on hypothetical economic development in the absence of militarization. The simplest and most convenient general indicators of these damages are the difference between average annual rates of economic growth in the hypothetical and actual cases and the difference between the absolute levels of the final social product in any particular year, resulting from differences in growth rates. The major practical difficulty in the quantitative assessment of the economic damages caused by militarization in the United States is connected with the fact that, while we know a great deal about the actual development of the U.S. economy (under the conditions of militarization), we know virtually nothing about its hypothetical development.

We can only make assumptions about the way in which the U.S. economy would have developed in the absence of militarization. In principle, two approaches are possible. One approach interprets the absence of militarization literally: It is assumed that during the period of, for instance, all of the postwar years in the United States, there were no factors stimulating an arms race and military expenditures did not exist.²⁰ The second approach is based on actual economic development, but with the assumption that all of the economic resources which were actually used for military purposes each year were returned to the civilian sector and were part of the reproduction process. Obviously, both approaches are conditional to a considerable extent, but the second approach has an important advantage: It is more definitive and, therefore, makes it relatively simple to gain an idea of hypothetical economic growth and to quantitatively assess the economic losses resulting from militarization. Within the framework of the second approach, however, there can be great discrepancies between assessments of damage--that is, significant differences in amounts. This depends on the specific hypotheses concerning different ways of effecting the civilian use of funds allocated for the arms race.

All subsequent calculations are based on three alternate ways of transferring these funds to the civilian sector. These variants, in the first place, assume that all military funds in their entirety are transferred to the civilian sector;²¹ in the second place, they presume the possibility of four areas for the civilian use of military funds: These are additional expenditures on capital investments in fixed productive assets; increased expenditures on civil research and engineering; increased consumer expenditures on goods and services, increased production expenditures of an

intermediary nature (raw materials, semimanufactured products and so forth). The differences between the three variants are due to the specific hypotheses concerning the distribution of funds among these four areas.

As we can see from Table 4, variant A presupposes that all of the funds used annually by the U.S. Department of Defense during the postwar period for the purchase of weapons and military equipment (3), their maintenance (2), military construction (5), foreign military aid (7) and work on atomic weapons (8) become a source of additional increased investments in fixed productive assets in the private business sector of the economy and thereby guarantee the accelerated growth of fixed capital in the nation. Furthermore, it presupposes that expenditures on military research and engineering projects (4) are used in their entirety for the development of civilian science and technology, and that the largest defense budget item in recent years-- personnel maintenance (1)--is used to expand consumer demand. Here, a certain expansion of consumer demand is regarded as an essential condition for increasing employment in the civilian sector by the number of servicemen and civilian employees of the U.S. Department of Defense.²²

Table 4

Alternate Ways of Transferring Defense Funds for Use
for Civil Needs

Sphere of Civilian Use of Funds	Variants		
	A	B	C
1. Capital investments in fixed productive assets	(2) + (3) + + (5) + (7) + + (8)	(3) + (5) + + (7) + (8)	$K((3) + (4) +$ $+ (5) + (7) +$ $+ (8))$
2. Expenditures on civil research and engineering	(4)	(4)	$(1 - K)((3) +$ $+ (4) + (5) +$ $+ (7) + (8))$
3. Consumer expenditures	(1)	(1) + 0,3 (2)	(1) + 0,3 (2)
4. Production expenditures of an intermediary nature	—	0,7 (2)	0,7 (2)

The figures in parentheses correspond to the numbers used in Table 1 to list defense budget items.

Variant B differs from variant A in the means by which funds allocated for the maintenance and operation of equipment (weapons, technical military equipment and so forth) are put to use in the civilian sector. This item in the defense budget consists of many diverse elements: expenditures on spare parts, fuel and lubricants, electric power, wages for equipment repair brigade personnel and so forth. If, when we consider the possible consequences of the transfer of funds from the military centers to the civilian, we take into account the existing analogy, no matter how remote, between military and civilian construction, military and civilian research and engineering and military and production equipment, expenditures on the

maintenance of military equipment will correspond in civilian production to analogous expenditures necessary for the normal functioning of additional capacities established in this sector. For this reason, in this variant the expenditures on the maintenance of equipment are not regarded as a source of increased investments. It is assumed that part of these expenditures (around 30 percent) will be used for the further expansion of consumer demand, while the rest (70 percent) will be used to finance production expenditures of an intermediary nature in the civilian economy.

In contrast to variants A and B, variant C proceeds from the fact that stable proportions in the distribution of funds between investments in fixed productive assets and expenditures on research and engineering have come into being in recent decades in the U.S. civilian economy. This fact allows us to assume that if new, additional funds (for example, those which might be transferred from the military sphere) enter the economy, their distribution between these expenditure items will be governed by the same proportions. In Table 4, the letter K signifies the share of total funds allocated for capital investments. Calculations show that this share has ranged from 0.87 to 0.93 during the postwar period in the development of the American economy.

If we are to quantitatively assess the possible effects of each of the variants on economic growth in the nation, we must first establish their connection with the structure of the final social product of the United States, the dynamics of which can be used as a basis for judging economic growth. The major indicator of the final product in the United States is the gross national product (GNP), one of the important (from the standpoint of the matters being discussed here) characteristics of which consists in the fact that all defense budget expenditures are part of this product, regardless of whether a particular budget item represents expenditures of a final or intermediary nature. In view of the fact that the major portion of the GNP represents a standard for measuring the total sum of final goods and services produced in the nation, the transfer of the defense budget into civilian channels must involve the exclusion of some of its components from the GNP in each variant.

Expenditures on research and engineering are a characteristic example of this. When the GNP is calculated in the private business sector, these expenditures are considered to be intermediary, since they are included in the value of the final product but do not constitute a separate component of the GNP. In contrast to this, expenditures on defense research and engineering projects represent a budget item and, consequently, a separate component of the GNP. This clearly indicates that the part of the defense budget which is transferred for the development of civilian science and technology must be excluded from the GNP in each of the variants. This also applies to the 70 percent of military expenditures on the maintenance of equipment which, according to variants B and C, are to be used to ensure the functioning of new elements of fixed capital.²³ As for such areas of the civilian use of military funds as capital investments in fixed assets

and the expansion of consumer demand, these are varieties of final use and are not excluded from the GNP.

Table 5 presents the preliminary results of calculations of the hypothetical rates of economic growth in the United States in the absence of militarization. The calculations are based on correlations known from American literature. One of these is used to calculate the average impact of production accumulation in the nation during the entire postwar period and consists in the fact that an increase in total investments by an amount equal to 1 percent of the final social product leads to a rise of 0.12 percentage points in the economic growth rate.²⁴ On the basis of these calculations, our variants presuppose that the transfer of financial resources from the military sphere to the civilian will signify an increase in capital investments in comparison to the actual figures of 5.1 percent, 3.3 percent and 3.1 percent of the GNP respectively. This means that the contribution of this factor to the acceleration of economic growth is 0.6 percentage points for variant A and 0.4 points each for variants B and C.

Table 5

Assessment of the Possible Effect of the Civilian Use of the
Defense Budget on the Growth Rate of the GNP in 1947-1977, %

	Variant		
	A	B	C
I. Actual growth rate of GNP	3.4	3.4	3.4
II. Increase in growth rate of GNP as a result of transfer of military funds for civil needs	1.1	0.8	0.5
Including:			
Accelerated growth of fixed capital	0.6	0.4	0.4
Accelerated scientific and technical progress	0.3	0.3	0.1
Structural changes	0.2	0.1	0.0
Increased employment	0.0	0.0	0.0
III. Hypothetical growth rate of GNP (I + II)	4.5	4.2	3.9

The equal increase in the growth rates of the GNP in variants B and C by means of the accelerated growth of fixed capital (0.4 percentage points) is due to the fact that the numbers have been rounded off. More precise assessments would be 0.37 and 0.42 percentage points respectively.

There is also an extremely rough correlation for calculating the economic impact of expenditures on civilian research and engineering in the United States. According to available estimates, all postwar expenditures on the development of civilian science and technology made a contribution equal to 0.3 percentage points to the acceleration of economic growth.²⁵ If we consider the fact that expenditures on civilian research and engineering

were, on the average, only approximately half as high as total U.S. expenditures on research and engineering,²⁶ we can assume that the transfer of the other half--the funds used for military purposes--to the civilian sector in variants A and B will lead to an additional rise in the rate of economic growth by another 0.3 points, and in variant C by 0.1 point.

Sound calculation of the contribution of various structural factors does not seem possible as yet. It is obvious that their significance as a whole is extremely great in ensuring economic growth. For example, according to the estimates of famous American economist E. Denison, the proportion accounted for by structural factors (unconnected with our hypothetical situation) in the postwar economic growth of the United States was 16 percent.²⁷ For this reason, it is not likely that we would be guilty of a serious error if we assumed that the share of these factors in the acceleration of the GNP growth rate due to disarmament ranges from 0.0 to 0.2 percentage points.

Finally, the last of the factors examined here--the increase in total employment figures by the number of armed forces personnel and civilian employees of the U.S. Department of Defense--does not affect the rate of economic growth in general, although it does contribute to an increase in the total GNP in each particular year. Actual employment in 1976 (88 million persons) was 1.54 times higher than the 1947 level (57 million). The inclusion of armed forces personnel in these figures increases absolute employment figures (to 59.2 million in 1947 and 91.1 million in 1976), but does not change the correlation between them and, consequently, is not reflected in the growth rate of employment.

Therefore, if all defense budget funds had been used to fill civilian needs, the average annual economic growth rate in the United States could have been much higher. Table 5 shows that it could have been 4.5 percent according to variant A, 4.2 percent according to variant B and 3.9 percent according to variant C. These rates are 1.32, 1.23 and 1.15 times higher respectively than the actual average rate during the 1947-1977 period--3.4 percent. The difference between hypothetical and actual rates, ranging from 0.5 (C) to 1.1 (A) percentage points, indicates the extent of the decelerating effect of militarization on economic growth in the nation over the long range. The estimates of absolute damage presented in Table 6 provide a clear picture of what these figures signify.

From the table we can see that militarization leads to a constant increase in the underproduction of the final product, which reached gigantic proportions in the 1970's. While the possible volume of underproduction ranged from 6 billion to 16 billion dollars in 1950 and from 50 billion to 110 billion in 1960, it ranged from 200 billion to 490 billion dollars in 1977. For the sake of illustration, we can say that 490 billion dollars is around 40 percent of the entire GNP in 1977 or the total GNP in 1949.

The total economic loss for the entire postwar period can be used as the most general estimate of the negative effects of militarization on the U.S. national economy. If the total underproduced final product over this entire

period is taken as a quantitative measurement of this loss, calculations indicate that this loss can be estimated at somewhere between 1.9 trillion and 4.5 trillion dollars (in 1972 prices). In other words, in all, the U.S. economy underproduced from 1.4 to 3.3 1977 GNP's as a result of militarization during the 30 postwar years alone.

Table 6

Absolute Amounts of Economic Damage Caused by Militarization,
in Millions of Dollars, 1972 Prices

Year	Variant		
	A	B	C
1950	16	11	6
1955	55	40	23
1960	108	78	48
1965	194	134	84
1970	295	205	125
1977	490	340	200

In addition to purely economic consequences, militarization has also had equally serious socioeconomic after-effects. Although our calculations do not make it possible to judge their proportions in full, one of the major aspects can be quantitatively assessed. This aspect is the effect of militarization on the standard of living of the U.S. population. One of its basic indicators is total real (that is, in constant prices) national income per capita. Since the average annual rate of population growth in the United States during the postwar period was 1.3 percent and the growth rate of real national income, just as that of the GNP, was 3.4 percent (see Table 5), the average statistical standard of living (under the conditions of militarization) rose at an average annual rate of 2.1 percent (3.4 percent minus 1.3 percent). As we mentioned above, depending on the particular variant for the transfer of defense budget funds to the civilian sector, hypothetical GNP growth rates range from 3.9 percent to 4.5 percent, which is significantly higher than actual growth rates. This directly leads to the conclusion that the average standard of living could have risen at a rate ranging from 2.6 percent (3.9 percent minus 1.3 percent) to 3.2 percent (4.5 percent minus 1.3 percent) in the absence of military expenditures. And this, in turn, signifies that the average standard of living of the American population in, for instance, 1977 could have been 13-35 percent higher than the actual level.

The estimates presented above, despite the fact that they are conditional to a certain extent, indicate that irretrievable economic losses in the American society due to militarization can now be measured in trillions of dollars. In the final analysis, these losses will seriously slow down the rise in the standard of living of the nation's working public.

The process of international detente has established definite objective preconditions for the relaxation of the militarization of the U.S. economy. These preconditions, however, are not being used as yet and have not been reflected in the policy of the American Government. In spite of great economic difficulties, it continues to increase defense expenditures, giving way to the pressure exerted by the military-industrial complex. This, however, is contrary to the long-range interests of the U.S. national economy and will interfere in the development of the process of detente.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, p 25.
2. PRAVDA, 4 November 1977.
3. Here and further on, if no mention is made to the contrary, all figures are given in current prices.
4. "The Economics of Defense Spending. Department of Defense," Wash., July 1972, p 140; "1976 Joint Economic Report. Joint Economic Committee. U.S. Senate Report," No 94-690, p 81.
5. See the report by A. A. Danilova in No 2 of our journal for 1977--Ed's note.
6. M. L. Weidenbaum, "The Economics of Peacetime Defense," N.Y., 1974, p 26.
7. Calculated according to: "Aerospace Facts and Figures, 1976/77," N.Y., 1976, pp 129-130; "Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1976," p 761.
8. M. I. Burlakov, "Voyennoye potrebleniye i kapitalisticheskoye proizvodstvo" [Military Consumption and Capitalist Production], Moscow, 1969, p 91.
9. "UN General Assembly. 32d Session. Report of the Secretary-General," 12 August 1977, p 33.
10. "Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1976," pp 566-568.
11. Ibid., p 572; "Aerospace Facts and Figures, 1976/77," p 120.
12. "The Economics of Defense Spending," p 9; "News Release, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense," 17 January 1977.
13. B. Udis, Op. cit., pp 33, 38, 39.

14. "The International Transfer of Conventional Arms," Wash., 1974, p A-3; THE NEW YORK TIMES, 16 November 1977.
15. "Super State. Readings in the Military-Industrial Complex," Ed by H. I. Shiller and J. D. Phillips, Chicago, 1970, p 18.
16. V. Perlo, "The Unstable Economy," Moscow, 1975, pp 216, 225.
17. "Stop the B-1 Bomber, National Peace Conversion Campaign," N.Y., 1976, p 3.
18. THE DEFENSE MONITOR, September-October 1977, p 3.
19. It must always be borne in mind that the actual acceleration of economic growth under these conditions will only be possible in the event of simultaneous expansion of public purchasing power by means of the appropriate tax cuts.
20. Naturally, it is difficult to even imagine this. Militarism is characteristic of the very nature of capitalism. V. I. Lenin called it a "vital sign" of this order. Some approximation of this, however, can be found in the situation in postwar Japan, where the level of military expenditures remained quite low until recently for a number of specific reasons.
21. Although variants of partial transfer are not examined in this article, their possible economic effect can be judged indirectly in accordance with the estimates presented below in connection with total transfer. Further calculations also do not reflect variants of the gradual transfer of the military economy into civilian channels, even though these are of great practical interest. Calculations of this kind involve great difficulties and require the use of detailed econometric models.
22. See footnote 19.
23. The exclusion of these components from the GNP is not necessarily connected with a decrease in its absolute size, as the transfer of defense funds to the civilian sector must be accompanied by an increase in other components of the GNP due to the expected rise in employment, the more rapid increase in fixed capital and other factors.
24. E. F. Denison, "The Contribution of Capital to the Postwar Growth of Industrial Countries," in "U.S. Economic Growth from 1976 to 1986: Prospects, Problems and Patterns," vol 3--Capital, Wash., 15 November 1976, p 49.
25. Z. Grilliches, "Productivity and Research," in "Conference on an Agenda for Economic Research on Productivity," Wash., 1974, p 29. The relatively small size of this share is due to the fact that the

results of research and engineering are not always completely reflected in the dynamics of the real GNP. For more detail, see: A. A. Poduzov, V. G. Klinov and A. V. Morozov, "SShA: Izmereniye ekonomicheskogo rosta. Analiz iskhodnykh statisticheskikh pokazateley" [The United States: Measurement of Economic Growth. An Analysis of Initial Statistical Indicators], Moscow, 1976, pp 81-105.

26. More precisely, 52.4 percent. See "National Patterns of Research and Development Resources. Funds and Manpower in the United States, 1953-1977," Wash., 1977, pp 30, 34.
27. The average annual rate of economic growth is taken as 100 percent. See E. F. Denison, "Accounting for U.S. Economic Growth, 1929-69," The Brookings Institution, Wash., 1974, p 127.

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AMERICAN APPROACH TO PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE WITH THE SOVIET UNION (HISTORY AND PERSPECTIVES)

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 78
pp 18-31

[First installment of article by G. A. Trofimenko]

[Text] "Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State," a book by Daniel Yergin, young American scholar and research associate at the Harvard University Center for International Relations, was published last year in the United States.¹ Yergin's original study is based on abundant and largely heretofore unpublished documented materials: the diaries and memoirs of statesmen from the United States and other Western countries, Pentagon and State Department archives, and interviews granted to the author by many top-level officials who were directly involved in the making of decisions during the time when the United States was unleashing the cold war.

The general theory behind Yergin's work is within the channel of the so-called revisionist school of American historical science--an increasingly large group of scholars who are critically reassessing the official American version of how the cold war came into being (in accordance with which the Soviet Union is the one and only guilty party); this monograph represents a continuation and development of works by such American historians of post-war international relations as W. Williams, D. Fleming, D. Horowitz, F. Cook, G. Alperowitz, G. Kolko, B. Cochran, R. Walton, T. Patterson, R. Tugwell, J. Gaddis and L. Fitzsimmons. On the basis of an in-depth study of documented historical material, these "revisionist" historians use different approaches to arrive at approximately the same conclusion: It was the United States that took the initiative in unleashing the cold war which led to a quarter-century of American-Soviet confrontation. Washington, they assert, was largely incorrect in assessing the motives and aims of the USSR, overestimated the strength of the United States and, for this reason, decided to put an end to the Soviet-American cooperation which had come into being during World War II and to nullify all existing bilateral and multilateral conventions and agreements. It was this that gave rise to the situation known as the cold war. Some of the historians of this critical current--

G. Kolko--explained the aggressive behavior of the United States as a response to the need for the economic expansion of capitalist America; others, like W. Williams, blame it on the traditional American Messianism; while still others, like J. Murray and G. Alperowitz, say that the motive was the feeling of impunity and omnipotence engendered by the temporary American monopoly on the atomic bomb. All of them, however, make a complete shambles out of the official version concerning the "bad" Soviet Union and the completely "good and unselfish" United States, which "was forced" to resort to threats and nuclear blackmail for the sake of "saving the world from enslavement by international communism."²

The very emergence of the critical current in American historical science at the beginning of the 1960's was extremely symptomatic: These bourgeois scholars were among the first in the United States to recognize the adventurous and essentially antinational nature of Washington's foreign policy course at that time. Declining to make a "frontal attack" on this course, they began to criticize it by degrees, demonstrating the unsound nature of the main theories combined to make up its basis in the 1940's. In this way, they raised doubts about the correspondence of U.S. foreign policy to post-war international reality, which later led to direct criticism of American foreign policy in scientific and public circles and ultimately to a certain degree of official reassessment of this policy in the 1970's from a more or less realistic standpoint.

This reassessment primarily took the form of the official recognition of the theory of the peaceful coexistence of the two social systems by U.S. ruling circles, the normalization of relations with the Soviet Union, the "withdrawal" from Indochina and several other realistic steps taken by the American Government in the world arena. All of this, naturally, was more a result of objective circumstances than of the scientific and public criticism of Washington's policy; these objective factors were the fundamental change in the balance of world power and the military defeat in Vietnam. In spite of all this, however, credit must also be given to the American bourgeois critics of Washington's foreign policy course, who conclusively showed the ruling class the objective weak points in the American foreign policy position and the futility of pursuing the previous course and, thereby, made a substantial contribution to the process by which the American leaders realized that Washington's global ambitions were inconsistent with changing international conditions and the limited potential of the United States itself to manipulate the international situation.

After U.S. policy concerning the Soviet Union had been revised and both countries embarked upon the course of detente, it seemed at one point that most of the issues connected with the cold war would become a thing of the past and that they would be replaced by problems in constructive cooperation and the construction of an "edifice of peace" under the conditions of the new international scene, which differed radically from the one that had existed immediately after the end of World War II.

The events of the last 3 years, however, have proved that this, unfortunately, did not occur in the United States. The problems of interrelations with the USSR, the "expediency" of detente and the very possibility of the peaceful coexistence of the two systems are the central issues in the increasingly intense internal struggle in the United States. The events of the recent past serve both the advocates and opponents of detente as their main arguments, used for the reinforcement and substantiation of their own views. Works of history in which the causes of the cold war and the corresponding theories lying at its basis are analyzed are acquiring a great deal of topical significance and are attracting the constant attention of the public.

The fierce criticism of the process of detente by various right-wing groups cannot be called anything other than recurrences of the cold war. The certain degree of popularity enjoyed by this criticism in fairly large segments of the American public is due, in our opinion, not so much to a conscious desire to revive the cold war as to the fact that "anti-detente" propaganda falls on fertile soil in the United States--soil that has been abundantly manured with cold war stereotypes.

Well, the average American would say (and there are tens of millions of them), I do not want war, my government does not want war and what you do in your country is your business. But, he would ask, why are you striving for military supremacy, why are you threatening our nation with the "first strike," why are you trying to turn Western Europe into one of your holdings and why, in violation of treaties, are you intervening in the affairs of other countries? If you are going to behave in this way, we must be vigilant and we must arm ourselves. And just try, in the space of a short conversation, to destroy his logic by telling him that we are for peace, when each day, each hour and each minute he is being given gigantic doses of purposeful information intended to reinforce his anti-Soviet convictions. As V. I. Lenin said, the force of the habits of millions is the most awesome force. Conservative thinking is probably one of the main habits of this kind.

This is cogently corroborated in D. Yergin's book. He shows that it was not simply the average American, who had only heard rumors about the USSR, but the leading and most prominent American experts on the "Russian question," the men who were responsible for "making" all U.S. policy concerning Soviet Russia until the end of the 1960's, who were influenced by the tenacious group of ideas constituting anti-Soviet stereotypes. Blinded by their own "professionalism" and their own "perceptions," they never took the trouble to reanalyze the situation at any particular stage or to take a look at the world with their eyes wide open so that they could engineer U.S. policy not in accordance with biased a priori ideas, but in accordance with the requirements of reality and the American "national interests"--this is one of Yergin's main theses, a thesis that cannot be disputed.

D. Yergin calls this group of stereotypes the "Riga axioms," since the United States' main observation point for keeping an eye on the Soviet Union prior to 1933 was in the U.S. Embassy in bourgeois Latvia, which was where the main group of future leading American experts on the USSR gained, so to

speak, its organizational and psychological framework--these were personnel of the diplomatic service, figures like R. Kelly, L. Henderson, C. Bohlen and G. Kennan. This group of diplomats was also associated with American specialists who did not serve in Riga but nonetheless unconditionally accepted the entire anti-Soviet bouquet of axioms of the "Riga school," such as J. Grew, former secretary of the American embassy in St. Petersburg; D. Poole, U.S. consul general in Moscow; W. Bullitt, first American ambassador to the USSR (whose views underwent a complex metamorphosis from attempts to conduct affairs with the USSR on the basis of a recognition of reality to rabid anti-Sovietism); E. Durbrow, U.S. vice-consul in Moscow after the establishment of diplomatic relations and, later, director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs of the U.S. State Department; and others. D. Yergin shows that their views were not only influenced by their intuitive class dislike for the new order in Soviet Russia, but also by the fact that the only Russian people they knew in their youth were Russian bourgeois emigrants, who passed on many of their own--naturally, anti-Soviet--views about the nature and purpose of the new order in Russia to these future experts on the USSR.

"A new 'Soviet service' took shape in the State Department during the 1920's. It was anti-Bolshevik and opposed diplomatic recognition of the USSR. Closely united by their clearly expressed sense of solidarity, the members of this group defended the policy of subtle anticommunism in its axiomatic form. The views of these individuals were based on their personal experience, judgments, analysis and pessimism. When the leaders of the United States were trying to analyze Soviet policy and choose the proper American course after World War II, the position occupied by this group represented one of the extremes of the entire range of views. Its axioms ultimately triumphed. Actually, it would be more accurate to say they triumphed again, since it was precisely these views that were dominant during most of the period between wars, when few people argued against views of this kind; and they triumphed again even before the problem of the Soviet Union became a primary concern."³

The politicians who preached the "Riga axioms" in the American Government were opposed, according to D. Yergin, by a group of statesmen who examined American-Soviet relations from the standpoint of the "Yalta axioms," which postulated the possibility of, and necessity for, cooperation between the United States and the USSR.⁴ The main spokesman of this view was U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt, and this belief, in one form or another, was also shared by C. Hull, secretary of state in 1933-1943; H. Stimson, secretary of war in 1940-1945; H. Wallace, former vice-president and, in the Truman Administration, secretary of commerce (1945-1946); and a number of senators and congressmen.

II

The "Yalta axioms," just as the "Riga axioms," represented not merely a view for or against cooperation with the Soviet Union, but a complex set of the corresponding judgments and arguments constituting the basis of the particular position. The American experts on the USSR who subscribed to the "Riga

axioms" were particularly boastful about the "scientific basis" of their position, which was allegedly founded on their knowledge of Soviet history, politics and ideology.

The main premises making up the set of "Riga axioms" were the following: The foreign policy of the USSR is "a continuation of the expansionism of tsarist Russia"; Soviet foreign policy represents a detailed plan for "the communization of the world" and this general plan lies at the basis of all Soviet actions in the world arena; Soviet foreign policy is engineered under the influence of a "spirit of innate aggressiveness"--the nations located along the perimeter of the USSR and the United States itself "are under siege and must constantly maintain vigilance"; the strictly centralized ("authoritarian") internal system cannot allow for flexibility in foreign policy: It is also striving to gain control over the entire international arena, just as the socialist economic system has established an absolute dictatorship for itself within the nation.

It is not really necessary to continue this list of allegations of the "Riga school," since all the rest of its statements represent essentially a repetition of the above.⁵

The fundamental postulates of the "Riga theory" led to the corresponding conclusions: The only effective "argument" to be used in interrelations with the USSR was brute strength, primarily military. As G. Kennan, U.S. diplomatic charge d'affaires in Moscow, stated in 1946 in a dispatch sent to the State Department, "although it is impervious to the logic of reason... it (the Soviet Union) is quite sensitive to the logic of force";⁶ this meant that diplomacy was unnecessary in dealing with the USSR. Conferences and negotiations with the Soviet Union were only to be used for the formal recording of the latter's retreats in the international arena and were to serve no other purpose.

These postulates and conclusions of the "Riga school" were opposed by the group of arguments and conclusions of the "Yalta school," which constituted the basis of F. Roosevelt's approach to American-Soviet relations: The Soviet Union is a major world factor, and without its active participation it would be impossible to construct an international system of security, not to mention peace in Europe; the Soviet Union is striving to establish a stable world system based on a balance of the interests of the states party to the system; the internal activity of the Soviet State in transforming society on the basis of socialist principles does not in any sense signify the automatic export of revolution; the Soviet Union, which has suffered two extremely devastating wars on its territory during the lifetime of a single generation, cannot risk having anything but friendly states along its borders. This approach is dictated not only by ideological considerations, but also by the direct interests of Soviet security; the Soviet Union scrupulously fulfills its formal international obligations and even its informal promises in the area of international politics. The conclusions derived from this set of axioms were self-evident: Fruitful cooperation

with the Soviet Union is possible and necessary; the approach to interrelations with the USSR must be based not on ideological anticommunist beliefs but on consideration for the national interests of the United States (which was the case during World War II, when the United States discarded its ideological prejudices and entered into an alliance with the USSR); diplomatic negotiations, mutually acceptable compromises and the recording of these in the proper agreements should be the major means of solving problems; it is necessary to consider the fact that many Soviet actions essentially represent nothing more than reactions to U.S. actions, and they are dictated by the natural suspicions of the Soviet Union and by its many years of experience in being surrounded exclusively by hostile states.

When these alternative sets of "axioms" and the conclusions derived from them are examined with greater care, it is immediately apparent that these two approaches represent a concentrated form of the essentially "eternal" arguments of the debate over aspects of policy in regard to the Soviet Union which has been going on in the United States for more than 60 years now--since the time of the October Revolution. This debate began in 1917, and not in 1945. It was precisely at the time when the first prophets of the approaches which later combined to make up the anti-Soviet "school" were demanding "no dealings whatsoever with the USSR" that Americans with a more realistic frame of mind--John Reed, Albert Rhys Williams, Louise Bryant, Colonel R. Robins, Senator W. Borah and many others--were advocating a policy of recognition of the USSR and cooperation with young Soviet Russia. In taking this stand, they met with the complete mutual understanding and support of the Soviet Government and the founder of the Soviet State, V. I. Lenin. In answer to a question asked by an American news correspondent about the "basis of peace with America," he said: "If the American capitalists do not bother us, we will not bother them. We are even prepared to pay them in gold for machinery, tools and other items of use in transportation and production. And not only in gold, but also in raw materials." In response to a question about the "obstacles to this kind of peace," V. I. Lenin said: "There are none on our side, but there is imperialism on the side of the American (and all other) capitalists."⁷

V. I. Lenin's view was completely confirmed by later events, including the Entente leaders' rejection of their own peace initiative. As we know, American representative W. Bullitt, who then shared the views corresponding to the "Yalta axiom," brought the draft of a peace treaty between the Entente countries and the Government of the RSFSR with him to Moscow in March 1919. After the finishing touches had been put on this document with V. I. Lenin's participation, the draft included such fundamental principles of peaceful coexistence as the refusal to forcibly overthrow existing governments, the freedom of trade relations, freedom of movement for citizens, the withdrawal of foreign troops from occupied territories and the reduction of armies under international control.⁸ After the Government of the RSFSR had expressed its willingness to sign this agreement, however, it was rejected by the leaders of the United States and Great Britain, and W. Bullitt himself was actually repudiated by U.S. President Wilson, even though he had been

acting on the instructions of the President. The fact was that the leaders of the Entente countries, after playing the game--as a blind--of a "peaceful initiative," counted on, as W. Churchill put it, "smothering the infant (Soviet Russia--G. T.) in the cradle."⁹

While the "Yalta axioms" and the conclusions derived from them were based on a sense of realism and were corroborated by the practical experience of U.S. relations with the Soviet Union, the "Riga axioms" were a group of stereotypes which were not in any sense based on a "scientific knowledge of Soviet politics" (as the authors of these axioms asserted), but on biased views which were rooted in the ideology of American great-power chauvinism. In 1917, when the United States made its first attempt to force "American democracy" on the entire world, the American ruling class simply could not resign itself to the fact that another country had dared to challenge the "great American experience" and the "incomparable American system" and had offered the world its own model of a social structure, and, what is more, as a model superior to the American one. It was precisely this social challenge that made the Soviet order basically unacceptable to the United States and the other bourgeois states, which were not only taking practical steps to liquidate the Soviet regime by military means, but were also trying to theoretically "exclude" the Soviet State from the "international system" as a state "which would not and could not play by its rules."

F. Roosevelt, who entered the White House in January 1933, did not agree with this approach. He did not accept the petrified stereotypes of the "Riga school"; he was too much of a political realist to cling to a set of bombastic slogans to the detriment of state interests. F. Roosevelt was one of the first in the United States to realize that the very fate of American democracy and the American way of life would be called into question without cooperation with the Soviet Union in the struggle against German fascism and Japanese militarism. For this reason, he went against tradition and challenged the "Riga school" of diplomats by deciding on diplomatic recognition of the USSR in 1933.

By doing this, he was the first to implement the set of beliefs which we will call (to avoid the introduction of new terms) the "Yalta ideas," giving them the status of official principles of U.S. policy toward the USSR. In other words, F. Roosevelt embarked upon a course of peaceful coexistence with the USSR. Although the term "peaceful coexistence" was not used in the American-Soviet documents of that time, the notes and messages exchanged by F. Roosevelt on one side and M. I. Kalinin, chairman of the USSR Central Executive Committee, and M. M. Litvinov, people's commissar of foreign affairs, on the other not only laid the legal bases for relations, but also reinforced the chief principles of peaceful coexistence between states with different social structures. As a result of these documents, the USSR and the United States promised to observe the following principles in their long-term relations:

To respect the inalienable right of the people of the other country to build their own life at their own discretion and to refrain from intervention of any kind in the internal affairs of the other side;

To restrain all individuals and organizations under the control of the given government from taking actions capable of injuring the peace, welfare, order or security of the other side (including actions aimed at the encouragement of armed intervention or any kind of agitation or propaganda for the purpose of violating territorial integrity, or the forcible modification of the political and social order of the other side);

To prohibit the establishment, existence and activity on its territory of any organization or group with the aim of governing the other country, encroaching upon its territorial integrity or forcibly changing the political or social order of the other side;

To eradicate the difficulties existing in the relations between the two states by means of frank and friendly talks.¹⁰

These principles, which have never been abolished by anyone, are of interest at present, now that the U.S. Government is officially subsidizing the subversive activity of Radio Liberty, which is broadcasting propaganda that is obviously aimed at undermining the socialist order in the USSR, now that emigrant governments and organizations are being supported on U.S. territory even though they are encroaching upon the territorial integrity of the USSR, and now that Congress is passing laws (like the notorious Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the trade act) which represent intervention in the internal affairs of the USSR, not to mention other types of activity that are inconsistent with the principles listed above.

Even a strong and independent statesman like F. Roosevelt, however, had to recognize the strong current of great-power chauvinism (which American bourgeois historians love to call "American idealism" or "The American Dream"). The psychology and ideology of American uniqueness and American superiority flourished magnificently at the end of World War II, when the idea of the "Pax Americana" regained widespread popularity in the United States. For this reason, in conducting a completely realistic policy toward the USSR, based on a sober assessment of the balance of power and the "balance of interests," F. Roosevelt tried to depict it in a Wilsonian-Messianic spirit within the nation, as a policy aimed at the realization of "The American Dream," which regards the United States as nothing less than the "center of the universe." The dual nature of F. Roosevelt's policy was part of the reason for its collapse after his death.

III

F. Roosevelt's death in April 1945 not only led to the return of representatives of the "Riga school" to influential posts in the State Department, but also gave anti-Soviet figures in U.S. ruling circles an opportunity to use "Roosevelt's weak spot" (reflected in the concessions he made to the Messianic

globalists within the nation) to imply that it was Roosevelt himself who proved the necessity for their reversion to a rabidly anti-Soviet policy, to the cold war.

"President Franklin Roosevelt died and the new administration which occupied the White House immediately forgot all previous 'firm' promises and 'strong' agreements,"¹¹ L. I. Brezhnev notes in his memoirs, stressing the abruptness of the transition made by the new American leaders to the anti-Soviet course.

The "Riga axioms" again served as a theoretical platform, on the basis of which the so-called strategy of "containment" of the Soviet Union and "containment of socialism" was formulated in 1947.

G. Kennan, who was then the director of the Policy Planning Staff of the U.S. State Department, is considered to be the ideological father of this strategy. In an article printed in the influential foreign policy quarterly FOREIGN AFFAIRS in July 1947 and signed with the pseudonym "X," he formulated the strategy of the "containment" of the USSR by means of the "expert and vigilant use of counterforce in a number of constantly changing geographic and political points corresponding to changes and maneuvers in Soviet policy."¹²

Literally hundreds of studies have been written on the strategy of "containment" in the United States and in other countries. The last debate over the part played by this strategy in the unleashing of the cold war took place in 1977-1978 on the pages of the same FOREIGN AFFAIRS, marking the 30th anniversary of the publication of Kennan's article. It proved that there is still no unanimous opinion in the United States in regard to the significance of this strategy. Moreover, the debate itself became one of the facets of the ongoing internal struggle in the United States over questions of policy toward the Soviet Union, past and present.

It must be pointed out that G. Kennan, whose views underwent a transformation in the direction of realism with the passage of time, has long been asserting that he himself was referring more to political than military means in this article. In the first part of his memoirs, published 10 years ago, Kennan discussed this article and admitted that its most serious flaw was that "it was not clear that in speaking of the containment of Soviet power, I was not referring to the containment of a military threat by military means but to the political containment of a political threat."¹³ At the same time, however, he himself admits that the strategy he formulated was aimed at changing political and territorial realities in postwar Europe. "The purpose of 'containment,' as it was then conceived," he writes, "was not to perpetuate the status quo to which the military operations and political settlements of World War II had led."¹⁴

On the basis of this interpretation of the "containment" strategy by its author, Professor J. Gaddis, American historian of the critical current, expressed the view in the current debate on the pages of FOREIGN AFFAIRS that Kennan's essentially political strategy of the "struggle and coexistence" of the two systems was interpreted in a onesided militaristic way by

the American leaders of that time, who did not appreciate the extent of the lack of correspondence between their global aspirations and the limited material potential of the United States. The implementation of this strategy by the Truman Administration led to a series of "incorrect actions," combining to make up the cold war, which ultimately diminished America's strength. Kennan, however, Gaddis states, was planning a policy which was more like the policy conducted by R. Nixon and H. Kissinger (with its emphasis on "polycentrism" in the world, on a "balance of power" and on the "national interest" of the United States) than the policy of burdening the United States with the role of a "world policeman" called upon to single-handedly establish "world order." The latter approach resulted, he writes, in "the systematic overestimation of Soviet strength and the equally systematic lack of enthusiasm for negotiations until such time as the imaginary strategic inadequacy could be corrected."¹⁵

In answer to J. Gaddis, young American specialist Edward Mark stressed in the January 1978 issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS that, no matter what Kennan's current views were, it was precisely his so-called "long telegram" sent from the American embassy in Moscow on 22 February 1946, which acquired such fame in the American diplomatic service, and his article in the July 1947 issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS that formed the basis of the anti-Soviet strategy of the cold war, since they depicted the Soviet Union as a state which did not even give a thought to the possibility of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist countries and which was striving to achieve "security only through a stubborn and deadly struggle for the total destruction of its rival power, and never through agreements or compromises with it."¹⁶ Reference was made here, as Mark correctly underscores, not only to military confrontation with the USSR, but also to a policy aimed at the "destruction of the Soviet regime." He points out the fact that the term "rolling back the international communist movement" (a term which was later widely used by J. F. Dulles) was also coined by Kennan.¹⁷

No matter what kind of theoretical disputes are now being waged in the United States over the doctrine of "containment," however, one thing is completely obvious: In the practical policy of the Washington Administration, it took the form of a strategy of active anti-Soviet activity in all fields--military, political, economic and ideological, with emphasis on the use of military pressure.

M. Shulman, who is now the secretary of state's assistant for Soviet affairs, stressed the following in one of his articles: "The military aspects of containment became more and more dominant. Political considerations drowned in the all-consuming obsession with military strength as the major tool of policy."¹⁸

If this requires any kind of corroboration, there is probably none better than NSC-68, a document adopted in 1950 by the National Security Council which remained the main governmental document setting forth the long-term military and political strategy of the United States for many years.

Until recently, this document was only known to the Soviet reader interested in American policy (just as, incidentally, to the foreign reader) only in statements by American authors and statesmen whose memoirs contained obscure hints at its content. On 27 February 1975 it was declassified by H. Kissinger, who was then secretary of state, and was made accessible to researchers.¹⁹ In view of the fact that it has never been analyzed in Soviet scientific literature, it would obviously be wise to describe it in greater detail, particularly since the elucidation of the statements it contained is important to the further exposition of our theme.

NSC-68 was prepared under the general supervision of D. Acheson, who was then U.S. secretary of state, by a group of researchers on the foreign policy planning staff, headed at that time by P. Nitze, now a prominent American "hawk" and critic of the policy of detente. Written from the standpoint of the "Riga school," NSC-68 depicted the USSR as a total enemy of the United States and did not foresee any end to the crisis confrontation "until changes are made in the nature of the Soviet system."²⁰ The United States, for its part, was supposed to "accelerate the deterioration of the Soviet system" by its policy of exerting military and other pressure on the USSR from "a position of strength." "The day the Soviet Union becomes the owner of 200 atom bombs," the authors of the report stated, frightening American leaders, "will be a crucial day for the United States, since the launching of 100 atomic bombs at targets in the United States (the authors assumed that only 50 percent of the bombs would reach their targets--G. T.) will severely injure the nation."²¹

Therefore, P. Nitze's present alarmist statements to the effect that as soon as the striking power and accuracy of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles reach a certain level, this will signify the "end" of American "means of containment,"²² essentially represent the latest reiteration of intimidating phrases about the "Soviet threat" with which NSC-68 abounded.

The document recommended an intensive program of rearmament to ensure America's ability to exert pressure on the Soviet Union from a position of superior strength: "Military strength is one of the most important ingredients of power. According to the 'containment' theory, the maintenance of a strong military position is considered to be absolutely essential.... Without superior armed forces in a combat-ready state and capable of being mobilized quickly, /the policy of 'containment,' which is actually a policy of planned and gradual coercion,/ will be no more than a bluff"²³ (here and further, the emphasis [passages enclosed in slantlines] in quotes from the document is mine--G. T.). The document went on to set specific objectives in the area of the construction of the U.S. armed forces and outlined the specific tactics of their utilization. In a spirit quite strongly resembling the current debates in the NATO camp, the document discussed the possibility of delivering the first nuclear strike on the USSR and underscored the fact that "initiative and surprise will be of extremely great advantage during the initial stage of an atomic war."²⁴

In connection with this, the U.S. military complex was faced with the task of achieving "overwhelming atomic superiority" to the USSR and commanding the air. "In the event /that we use the atomic weapon/ in response to its initial use by the Soviet Union or /because we have no other alternative method of attaining our goals/ (!), it is essential that the strategic and tactical targets, against which the atomic weapon will be used, be the right ones..."²⁵--this was the statement made in this document, which, therefore, frankly foresaw the possibility that the United States would deliver an unprovoked nuclear strike on the USSR simply for the "reason" that the United States would have "no other method of attaining its goals."

As for negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, "for some time after the decision has been made to augment military strength, any offer of negotiation or attempt at general regulation by means of a treaty.../can only be a tactic/ (!). Nonetheless, when the decision is made and the forces of the free world begin to be built up, it might be desirable /to employ this tactic/ both /for the purpose of winning public support for the program of military construction/ and for the purpose of reducing the immediate risk of war" (that is, until the time when the military superiority of the United States and its allies has become so "overwhelming" that there will no longer be any kind of risk for the United States in a war and there will no longer be any need to deceive the public with conversations about the United States' "interest" in negotiations). "The objectives of the United States and the other nations of the free world in negotiations with the Soviet Union...will be the formal recording of the process by which the USSR adapts to the new political, psychological and economic conditions in the world, which will aid in the further consolidation and advancement of our position.... In other words, /our goal must be the formal recording,/ wherever necessary, /of the gradual retreat of the Soviet Union/...."²⁶

It is amazing that, although they are fully aware of this incomparably and frankly cynical document, which became the theoretical basis for the long-range American strategy with its major emphasis on military strength, American scholars are still naively wondering whether the "containment" strategy was "purely political" or whether "a military element was also present" in it.

NSC-68 also envisaged other methods of exerting pressure on the USSR and the states friendly to it which had embarked upon the course of socialism: a trade blockade, the "economic exhaustion" of the Soviet Union by "forcing the excessive expenditure of Soviet resources in contrast" (to American programs), the "intensification of positive and timely clandestine undertakings and operations in the spheres of economic, political and psychological warfare" and so forth.²⁷

All of these methods were tested on the Soviet Union by the United States in the 1950's and 1960's, and not one of them produced the desired results: By the beginning of the 1970's it became obvious to American leaders that American policy required cardinal reassessment, revision and adaptation to

the new international realities. The major reality of this kind was the change in the international balance of power in favor of socialism, in favor of the USSR, which, in its most graphic and tangible form, was reflected in the Soviet Union's achievement of parity with the United States in the area of strategic arms.

Summing up the "lessons of the 1960's," Professor H. Kissinger, who now has enough free time to give some thought to the theoretical aspects of U.S. foreign policy, said the following in his lecture at New York University in September 1977: "The end of the 1960's, which coincided with Vietnam, signified the end of the period when America was superior in strength to any other country and when we could undertake to solve problems single-handedly, exclusively with the aid of our own resources.... The end of the 1960's primarily signified the end of the era when we could think that any problem could be solved once and for all and that we would one day find solutions which would allow us to put an end to our efforts on the external front."²⁸

IV

The practical reassessment of foreign policy by Washington meant that, in addition to the traditional principles of U.S. foreign policy after World War II--/partnership/ (the bloc policy) and /force/ as the major political principle--the principle of /negotiation/ with "potential enemies" was proposed--negotiation based on equality with no preliminary conditions of any kind. In accordance with the new approach, negotiations were regarded as a means of reaching mutually acceptable compromises with a state of equal strength and status--the Soviet Union--and not as a way of forcing U.S. views on the Soviet Union (which was the message of NSC-68).

Naturally, this approach opened the door to a constructive Soviet-American dialog, since the Soviet Union had always advocated egalitarian negotiations and cooperation on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence. As a result, several productive Soviet-U.S. summit conferences took place during the first half of the 1970's and more than 60 agreements were concluded, which laid a solid legal and contractual foundation for the policy of international detente, representing a direct result of the normalization of Soviet-American relations.

In the Accountability Report presented at the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, L. I. Brezhnev stressed the fact that the turn for the better in the Soviet Union's relations with the largest power of the capitalist world--the United States of America--was of "decisive significance in alleviating the threat of a new world war and consolidating peace."²⁹

On the American side, Washington's course toward detente signified that the American leaders realized the importance of normalizing American-Soviet relations under the new historical conditions. In the "big strategy" of Nixon and Kissinger, write American journalists B. Woodward and C. Bernstein,

the authors of two books about President R. Nixon and his associates which created quite a stir in the United States, "American-Soviet relations were the key to international peace.... Since so much emphasis was placed on the maintenance of a balance of nuclear power, no treaty was regarded by Nixon and Kissinger as more important than the temporary agreement on strategic arms limitation (in the two countries). The President frequently told Kissinger in confidence what he regarded as the most sound motive for the deescalation of the nuclear arms race. He was afraid that the United States would lose this race. Prolonged military rivalry would be too costly. The nation might not be capable of financing a lengthy cold war in the future. The probability that America could not withstand this kind of pressure was too great."³⁰

The new U.S. leadership, which has succeeded the Nixon and Ford administrations, also believes, in President J. Carter's words, that American-Soviet relations are a "vitally important aspect" of U.S. foreign policy "which might be the most immediate factor determining the prospect of peace for us and our children."³¹

What did detente represent from the standpoint of the respective American and Soviet theories of foreign policy?

From the standpoint of the American bourgeois theory of foreign policy, detente represented (if we employ the definition we used in the beginning of the article) a transition from a policy based on the "Riga axioms" to a policy based on the "Yalta axioms"--that is, a return to Rooseveltian realism in the area of American-Soviet relations. When they gathered in 1975 at a seminar in the current scientific citadel of the "Riga school"--the Center for Advanced International Studies at the University of Miami--headed by F. Kohler, zealous guardian of the anti-Soviet "purity" of the postulates of this "school" and former U.S. ambassador to the USSR, 12 leading American experts on the USSR (E. Durbrow, R. Kelly, L. Henderson, P. Barghoorn, M. Harvey, G. Beam, E. Packer, T. Whitney and others) had to admit, with great displeasure, Washington's departure from the "axioms" they had preached. "It was called noteworthy that the United States had agreed for the first time at various summit meetings taking place since May 1972 to the inclusion of the Soviet term 'peaceful coexistence' in official agreements with the United States," the resume of the seminar stated.³²

In the Soviet theory (and practice) of foreign policy, however, there has not been and cannot be any kind of radical transition; the Soviet Union has followed, in a principled manner, the foreign policy course which was mapped out by the founder of the Soviet State, V. I. Lenin, and which has always constituted the general basis of Soviet foreign policy. This is a course toward peaceful coexistence (including fruitful cooperation in the economic area) with the preservation and continuation of competition by the two systems; it calls for the practical demonstration of the potential of each side to improve public well-being. Those who attended F. Kohler's

seminar could not ignore this obvious fact either, acknowledging that "the Soviet doctrine of peaceful coexistence...is not new; it can be traced back all the way to Lenin, even though he used another term ('communal living')." This doctrine, they noted, has been "a clearly defined characteristic of the foreign policy of the USSR" even after Lenin's death.³³

Therefore, as American theoreticians and practitioners of foreign policy from Kelly to Kissinger have admitted, it was precisely the United States that had to make a change in its foreign policy under the influence of objective circumstances and, on the strength of this fact, to take most of the steps involved in coming to an agreement with the Soviet Union, which has invariably proposed to the United States that the relations between the two countries be based on the principles of peaceful coexistence. The United States, however, accepted the Soviet proposal only after it had spent the 25 years since World War II testing all of the means of compelling the USSR to accept coexistence on American terms (subordination to American demands and American interests) and was unable to achieve this.

Only a precise understanding of the fact that it was precisely the United States that had to radically revise its policy makes it possible to thoroughly and objectively estimate the advantages detente has given to each side. The advantages of detente have been equal for the USSR and the United States, since the Soviet and American populations are equally benefited by the alleviation of tension, the diminishing of the danger of nuclear catastrophe, a certain deceleration of the rates and scales of the arms race as a result of the signing of the first strategic arms limitation agreements (which, incidentally, also produced a definite savings in material resources) and the expansion of economic, scientific, technical and other types of cooperation and cultural ties. The prospect of peace has become more tangible under the conditions of detente, since the major power opposing the USSR has finally expressed its intention to give up confrontation and embark upon a course of peaceful relations with the Soviet Union. Moreover, the improvement of relations between the two strongest states, each representing a particular social system, has led to a general relaxation of tension in the world, and this has directly benefited the people of all nations.

"Detente today," stressed General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev, "is not a theory, not a slogan and not a fond hope. It has many good deeds, completely concrete and tangible, to its credit. In Europe it has become the basis of interrelations between states and has encompassed various aspects of their life. Soviet-American relations, despite all changes in conditions, have also taken on a new appearance, one that is more favorable for the cause of peace. The cause of detente is recognized and supported by people as the only reasonable course in our difficult time."³⁴

(To be continued)

FOOTNOTES

1. D. Yergin, "Shattered Peace. The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State," Boston, 1977.
2. For a more detailed discussion of the "revisionist" current in American historical science, see "SShA: politicheskaya mysl' i istoriya" [The United States: Political Thought and History], Ed. by N. N. Yakovlev, Moscow, 1976.
3. D. Yergin, Op. cit., p 18.
4. The basic principles of this kind of cooperation were set forth at the 1945 Yalta Conference by the leaders of the USSR, the United States and Great Britain. This is the origin of the term "Yalta axioms."
5. It is probably of some interest to note that the school of foreign policy practitioners formulating these "axioms" also included most of the American experts from the academic community who dominated American Sovietology until recently. While the anti-Soviet "Riga school" in the United States was opposed by the "Yalta school" in the sphere of practical policy, the anti-Soviet "school" in Sovietology virtually had a monopoly on academic theory until recently. This was the reason for the sharp decline in interest in the representatives of "classic" Sovietology in the United States in the 1970's: They could not give convincing answers to the real questions raised by practice. In essence, it is only now that a new current of researchers of Soviet foreign policy is beginning to take shape in the United States, raising doubts about many of these "axioms."
6. "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946," vol VI, Wash., 1969, p 707.
7. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 40, pp 145, 146.
8. "Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR" [Foreign Policy Documents of the USSR], vol II, Moscow, 1958, pp 91-95.
9. L. Broad, "Winston Churchill: A Biography," N.Y., 1958, p 186.
10. "Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR," vol XVI, Moscow, 1970, pp 564, 641-642.
11. NOVYY MIR, No 5, 1978, p 5.
12. "X" (G. Kennan), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1947, p 575.

13. G. Kennan, "Memoirs, 1925-1950," Boston, 1967, p 358.
14. Ibid., p 365.
15. J. Gaddis, "Containment: A Reassessment," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1977, p 883.
16. G. Kennan, Op. cit., p 550 (quotation from the "long telegram").
17. E. Mark, "The Question of Containment: A Reply to John Lewis Gaddis," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1978, p 438.
18. M. Shulman, "Relations with the Soviet Union," "Agenda for the Nation," Ed. by K. Gordon, Wash., 1968, p 376.
19. The very declassifying of this document is quite indicative. In 1975 Henry Kissinger was sharply criticized by influential members of the right wing of the American Democratic Party for his activity as secretary of state. Some critics accused him of coming close to "forgetting American ideals." By declassifying NSC-68, Kissinger was obviously trying to prove that, although his method of action in the international arena had to be based on consideration for new world realities and the change in the balance of power, his fundamental goals did not differ in principle from those formulated in this document.
20. "NSC-68. A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security. April 14, 1950," NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, May-June 1975, p 58.
21. Ibid., p 67.
22. P. Nitze, "Consequences of an Agreement: Such as That Foreshadowed by the Current SALT II Negotiatory Posture," Wash., 1 November 1977.
23. "NSC-68," p 68.
24. Ibid., p 82.
25. Ibid., p 84.
26. Ibid., pp 89, 90.
27. Ibid., pp 100-101. (This statements from NSC-68 would seem to warrant a separate examination in view of the assertions frequently made by American journalists and specialists to the effect that the "ascription" of the desire to conduct "psychological warfare" against the USSR to the United States allegedly has no basis and is an invention of Soviet propagandists.)

28. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 7 October 1977.
29. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, p 20.
30. B. Woodward and C. Bernstein, "The Final Days," N.Y., 1977, p 240.
31. WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, 1 August 1977, p 1063.
32. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 4 June 1975, p S9569.
33. Ibid.
34. PRAVDA, 26 April 1978.

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PLOT AGAINST DETENTE

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[Article by Ernst Henry]

[Text] Since November 1976 a private organization has been operating in the United States, all of the efforts of which have been aimed at a single goal: To impede the improvement of Soviet-American relations and to prevent the further progress of international detente.

Since the organization's members include extremely influential "liberal" politicians and military figures and is backed up by strong business groups, it cannot be regarded as one of the usual anti-Soviet and anti-communist groups which spring up with such frequency in the United States. This is an organization of the so-called "elite," the members of which have for decades had direct access to the State Department, the Pentagon and the National Security Council--that is, to the chief institutions making U.S. foreign policy. As a rule, all of these persons occupy responsible posts in these agencies at one time or another, particularly during the years of the cold war in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. At the same time, almost all of them have been either directly or indirectly connected for several years with the heads of the overseas military-industrial complex. The organization obviously has sizable financial resources at its disposal and has recently been waging an uninterrupted anti-Soviet campaign in America.

We are referring to the "Committee on the Present Danger" (CPD), established in Washington on 10 November 1976.

At that time, the press reported that the CPD united "former top-level officials" and that their goal was "to alert the American public to the dangerous Soviet policy." The press added that the committee would oppose "anyone attempting to cut the U.S. defense budget." One of the founders of the organization announced that its objective was "to give the public a clear understanding of what is happening in the world" as a result of "Soviet expansionism."

Since that time, CPD activities have created such a stir that its real plans are no mystery. This is a real plot against the policy of peaceful coexistence.

We must consider the time and circumstances of this organization's birth. This was a week after the presidential election had been held in the United States and a change of government was coming in Washington. Power would be assumed by new people, some of whom were regarded in anti-Soviet circles as insufficiently militant and, possibly, even supporters of detente. Right-wing groups grew alarmed. The creation of the CPD was something like a warning to the White House on their part. The new masters in Washington were unequivocally informed that the opponents of detente were not dozing and would come into sight if necessary.

This happened almost immediately. Although, as we know, there was no real change in the course of American diplomacy, the CPD began to carry out feverish activity. By 12 January 1977 the committee had already issued a dramatic--we could say, hysterical--announcement which stated: "Our nation has entered a time of danger, and this danger is constantly growing.... The very survival of our nation might be threatened." Once again the Soviet Union, which favors detente and disarmament, was accused of attempts to "establish world domination from a single center in Moscow" and even of the intention to deliver the "first nuclear strike." The announcement also contained a categorical demand that Washington "change the course of policy," reject the "illusory detente" and increase military expenditures, primarily on "research and experimental design"--that is, on the manufacture of the latest types of weapons of mass destruction.

This was the first volley. Later, during all of 1976 and the beginning of this year, the Committee on the Present Danger continued to take advantage of every opportunity and any excuse to interfere in Soviet-American relations and to prevent the convergence of the views of the two great powers on debatable issues. This was done--and is being done--in various ways. The CPD only addresses the general public after everything possible has been done behind the scenes to poison public opinion and throw ruling circles into a panic.

For example, allegedly "documented" data on Soviet weapons are periodically published; these invariably suggest a single conclusion: The United States is becoming weaker than the Soviet Union, a catastrophe lies ahead and the only solution is a substantial increase in Pentagon funds. Some of these "documents" would be the envy of Baron Munchausen.

The logic of the authors of one of these, which was compiled by some kind of secret "Group B," was, for example, so implausible that the Carter Administration rejected its conclusions after a "detailed study" of the material. Nonetheless, the stir caused by the "Group B" report has not died down. In reference to the initiators of these campaigns, George B. Kistiakowsky, famous American scholar, Harvard University professor and

former assistant to President Eisenhower for scientific and technical affairs, recently wrote: "Sometimes their efforts take the form of the dissemination of exaggerated data with no technical basis. One example of this genre can be found in the science-fiction essays on radiation weapons, which are sowing anxiety."¹ There is no question that science fiction is an interesting literary genre, but not when it is practiced in international relations.

Brochures containing the same kind of allegations are also distributed, stating that the purpose of the CPD is to "alert Americans" and "open their eyes" to the Soviet threat. Just as in the 1920's and 1930's, the American citizens are systematically being frightened. Since this time, however, the propaganda is coming directly from former high-level officials, its sting is even more poisonous in some cases.

Another method used by the CPD consists in attempting to torpedo Soviet-American relations by exerting pressure directly on members of Congress. At a specific time, secret information about negotiations is suddenly "leaked." Soon afterward, some press organs begin printing reports alleging that the American Government is making impermissible concessions to the Soviet Union and is even preparing to "surrender" to it. "Information evenings" are immediately organized, at which right-wing figures, "experts on disarmament" and "Sovietology," try to prove the unacceptability of an agreement with the USSR and the need to "talk to the Russians only from a position of strength." Later it is learned that the "secret information" came from top-level officials closely associated with the CPD.

In June 1977, for example, Nitze, Colby and Zumwalt, members of this organization, spoke in Washington at a conference organized by the ruling Democratic Party to discuss relations between the United States and the USSR. They poured forth phrases about the "dramatic buildup of Soviet weapons," the need for a further increase in U.S. military expenditures and the "futility" of the policy of relaxing international tension. In July, a CPD report was published which recommended that the production of a winged missile and the strategic M-X missile be commenced. "The deployment of a system of M-X missiles," the report states, "will provide us with a good trump card in bargaining" (in negotiations with the USSR). In other words, an attempt at blackmailing the Soviet Union is unequivocally proposed. Leading journalists and television commentators are being brainwashed in the same way.

The matter has reached a point at which even some American public figures who have never been distinguished by benevolence toward the USSR, are expressing misgivings about the CPD's behind-the-scene maneuvers. It is becoming too obvious that the goal of this organization is actually to revive the cold war and to return to the policy of John Foster Dulles 2 decades after his death.

Who are the members of the Committee on the Present Danger?

The Americans are being assured that all of its members, 141 persons (most of whom are retired statesmen and still active businessmen), are people with many years of experience and scrupulously honest individuals who only want to warn their nation of the imminent danger. They allegedly know more about the state of affairs than others: Each member once occupied a top-level, key post and each--it goes without saying--spent many years studying Soviet policy at first hand. Motivated, they say, by purely patriotic feelings, these individuals wish to acquaint America and the entire world with the information at their disposal and with the conclusions they have drawn from it. What could be more reasonable or natural?

This is how the rightist press in the United States depicts the founders of the CPD. But do these people represent only themselves? Are they merely retired American officials and nothing more? Or are there definite keys that fit this entire group and its intentions? It would certainly be easy to find the keys that fit.

In reference to the groups which paved the way for the formation of the CPD, the New York liberal magazine NEW REPUBLIC reported soon after the committee was founded: "Behind that campaign of saber rattling was a network of right-wing organizations ranging from doctrinaire anticommunists to weapons manufacturers who stood to gain from stepped-up military spending."² This is true. It was precisely these two interrelated groups that were concerned.

The head of the CPD executive committee is Eugene Rostow, who was assistant secretary of state in the 1960's. He is not a very well-known man. It is possible, however, that he is the front for an incomparably more influential figure, his brother Walter Rostow. In the Johnson Administration, W. Rostow was the actual head ("executive secretary") of the National Security Council, before this he was the head of the State Department planning staff, and before this he worked for the OSS, the American intelligence service succeeded by the CIA. This is a completely well-defined figure.

For a long time, W. Rostow has been regarded as an ardent supporter of the continuation of the arms race. As early as the 1950's, when he was the leading figure at the CIA-funded Center of International Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, he published a book called "The Dynamics of Soviet Society," in which he stated that the USSR was a power striving to conquer the world and that the United States had to eliminate the "communist threat." It was later learned that Rostow's book, which was published in two versions (a classified version for politicians and another for the general public), was also published with CIA funds.³

According to reports in the American press, Eugene Rostow worked on the creation of the CPD for 5 months and he was encouraged to do this by none other than former U.S. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger,⁴ whose own name, however, was missing from the committee roster (evidently in the expectation

of a place in the Carter Administration, which subsequently was offered to him). There is no doubt in Washington that it was precisely Schlesinger who was the "moving spirit" behind the CPD. According to E. Rostow himself, the creation of the committee grew out of conversations with Schlesinger when he was still head of the Pentagon.⁵ Schlesinger's extremely anti-Soviet views are no secret to anyone. When he headed the Department of Defense, he did everything to escalate the arms race and subvert the Soviet-American talks.

E. Rostow is following in the footsteps of the former Pentagon chief. In a letter to zealous anticommunist F. Barnett, who had created a stir with his escapades during the years of the cold war, he wrote: "We are living in a pre-war, and not a postwar world,"⁶ adding that "being on good terms" with the Soviet Union did not appear possible. He also joined the board of the National Strategy Information Center, Inc., an anti-Soviet organization founded by the same Barnett. Through this organization, the CPD is tied to extreme right-wing groups.

The formal leadership of the committee is in the hands of three men, its chairmen. One of them is former Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard. A talented director could easily make his life the subject of a film which could clearly depict some of the aspects of contemporary American reality. A brief account of his career would not be out of place here as it is quite typical.

On the eve of World War II, the 27-year-old Packard assumed the post of the director of Hewlett-Packard, Inc., a California company producing electronic equipment and controlled by his family. Some time later, he became the head of the company. The electronic industry, which grew rapidly in connection with defense industry orders, elevated the young businessman's status. But this was only the beginning of his career.

A few years later, Packard took a seat on the board of Standard Oil of California, the richest oil corporation. In this case, however, oil was not the main consideration. California is the chief center of the American aerospace industry and a citadel of the right-wing of the Republican Party. It is the leader in arms production in the United States. When he joined the board of the California oil monopoly, Packard sat at the same table with two influential men. One of them was W. Allen, president of the gigantic aircraft concern, Boeing, which produced bombers of the same name for the Pentagon. The other was multimillionaire J. McCone, former director of the CIA, former head of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and renowned expert on the organization of government negotiations in foreign countries.

This was enough. Packard began to come into contact with the highest levels of politics. He knew the right people. The door to the charmed circle of the American military-industrial complex and, thereby, to the government was opened for him. In 1969 he was appointed deputy secretary

of defense and the distribution of Pentagon defense orders came under his control. Billions of dollars in federal funds passed through his hands, and from his hands into the tills of the nation's major military concerns. But this was not all. Part--and a very great part--of this money was deposited in the safe of a certain concern with which Packard was also personally connected by that time and which had occupied one of the first places in the list of the American Government's defense contractors in recent years. Even before he was appointed deputy secretary of defense, Packard was on the board of the General Dynamics Corporation, which could also be included in the script of the nonexistent film: Its business activities are full of drama.

This corporation's turnover in 1976 exceeded 2.5 billion dollars.⁷ Quite recently, it was contracted to build the latest American atomic submarines, carrying 24 ballistic missiles of the Trident type with a range twice as great as previous models. In the strictly monetary sense, this was, until recently, probably one of the most gigantic businesses in American history. Each ship carrying Trident missiles costs 1.6 billion dollars. This is one of the reasons why the U.S. defense budget is growing with such feverish speed.

Naturally, Packard was no longer on the board of General Dynamics when he became deputy secretary of defense. This is not done: It is not good to irritate the public. Packard only passed orders on and paid out Treasury funds, explaining to journalists that all of this was being done because of the Soviet Union's threat to America. It can be said, however, that Packard and other American politicians from the Pentagon milieu saved General Dynamics. After the end of World War II, its entire portfolio of orders totaled no more than 4.5 million dollars. This threatened the company with bankruptcy. Anti-Sovietism "put everything in order." There was a great deal of noise in the press and in Congress, but the main things were being done--and are being done--behind the scenes. The concern recently became one of the Pentagon's contractors for the production of winged missiles.

Since 1972 David Packard has been retired. But he has not left the scene of the defense business. And he is not the only one.

Another CPD co-chairman is Henry H. Fowler, former American secretary of the Treasury. He is also far from a mere statesman.

At the beginning of the 1950's, during the Truman Administration, although Fowler did not occupy a post in the government or in Congress, he was nonetheless one of the members of the National Security Council--the highest-level confidential federal organization whose 13 members (including the President, vice-president, secretary of state, secretary of defense, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CIA director) actually set the guidelines for the nation's foreign policy.

History has recorded the foreign policy conducted by the United States under the Truman Administration. Almost undisguised preparations were made for "reprisals" against the Soviet Union: The United States still regarded itself as the atomic dictator of the world. As a member of the National Security Council, Fowler was involved in the elaboration and implementation of the Truman Policy. But this, just as in Packard's case, was only one aspect of his personality.

Fowler is still a senior partner in the renowned New York banking firm Goldman, Sachs & Co., one of the leading firms of this kind in the nation. The head of the firm, S. J. Weinberg, was on the board of two of the leading industrial and military-industrial concerns in the United States for a long time: Ford and General Electric. The annual turnover of the second exceeds 15 billion dollars. General Electric is the main supplier of electronic equipment for Pentagon armaments. Fowler is now also retired, but only as a government official. As a banker, with an interest in the arms race—or, in other words, in military superprofits—he is at his post. The fact that Fowler shares the chairmanship of the Committee on the Present Danger with Packard is therefore no coincidence. In one way or another, in one form or another, money, and not merely political views or personal ability, has explained much in the careers of all of these individuals. We can examine the facts from any standpoint but this conclusion is inescapable.

Who is Paul Nitze, the leading member of the Committee on the Present Danger and chairman of "policy studies" of the committee? This is a figure from the same circles as the Rostow brothers.

Nitze is renowned as a diplomat of the "highest class," specializing in questions of military strategy: He is the former director of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, a former secretary of the Navy and a former assistant secretary of defense. We are dealing here with the same group. Nitze oversaw the "foreign policy aspects of military policy." In other words, he was one of the Pentagon's leading lights, who had control over the major issues. Here again, however, we are not referring only to a top-level government official in retirement.

At one time, before the war, Nitze was the vice president of a New York bank, Dillon, Read & Co., which was financing Hitler's Germany (incidentally, the former head of this bank, C. Douglas Dillon, who was U.S. undersecretary of state in the 1950's, is also a member of the CPD). German heavy industry, which evolved so "suddenly" into a powerful defense industry under Hitler, was substantially build up prior to this time with the use of funds received from the American bankers, the Dillons and Schroeders. The particular role played in this matter by Nitze personally remains unknown. There is no doubt, however, that he is still closely connected with Wall Street.

Throughout the postwar period, Nitze has invariably taken the stand of the "hawks," continuing, as it were, his line of the 1930's. In January 1950, when Truman ordered the immediate acceleration of work on the development of an American hydrogen bomb and, in connection with this, the "sharpening" of U.S. foreign policy, Nitze, at the President's request, headed the group responsible for drawing up the notorious NSC-68 document. This document, based on fantastic "assessments" of USSR policy, demanded the immediate buildup of American bomber aviation,⁸ planes that were supposed to drop hydrogen bombs on Soviet cities.

On the eve of his appointment as assistant secretary of defense in 1961, Nitze publicly warned the Americans against "negotiations with the communists" (with the USSR).⁹ Fifteen years later, in November 1976, immediately after the creation of the CPD Nitze again made sharp objections to the Soviet-American strategic arms limitation talks, declaring that a new Soviet-American agreement on this issue would allegedly guarantee the Soviet Union "overwhelming nuclear superiority." In July 1977, he made a new report in the same vein at the request of the CPD. When President Carter later, at a meeting of the leaders of the Committee on the Present Danger with the President, expressed doubts about the need for a further increase in U.S. spending, Nitze loudly uttered: "No, no, no."¹⁰ Just recently, he again spoke out publicly against the SALT talks, calling them a trap for the United States.

It must be said that this retired American official from the Washington elite has also remained true to himself. At the end of the 1970's he is still thinking in terms of categories of the 1940's and 1950's and evidently cannot and will not change. Detente is apparently more frightening to individuals like these than a third world war.

The fourth leading member of the Committee on the Present Danger--Dean Rusk, U.S. secretary of state under Kennedy and Johnson--also belongs to the political fringe of the same financial group with which Nitze is associated. Prior to his appointment as State Department secretary, Rusk was for 8 years the president of an organization founded by billionaires, which had half a billion dollars in capital ostensibly for "philanthropic" purposes, but actually and primarily for political purposes. Rusk, a more polished diplomat than Nitze, does not make aggressive anti-Soviet statements like the latter, but his policy essentially differs in no way from Nitze's views. A dependence on big business magnates with their tremendous military-industrial capital investments actually determines his actions as well.

Many readers will remember the name of Willian E. Colby, another prominent member of the CPD. This name is quite important in some American circles. Until November 1975, Colby was the director of the CIA. It is therefore quite naturally that he is a member of the Committee on the Present Danger. Colby is not merely an ace of American intelligence, but also one of the pioneers of its terrorist school and a recognized expert on the reactionary coup d'etat.

At one time, working in various nations of the world he was always engaged in the same kind of operations. "Since the end of the war," he himself stated a few years ago, "we in the CIA have done nothing but assist various... forces against the communist threat." Speaking before a Senate subcommittee, Colby admitted that his agency "sends out its secret agents to join organizations of war resisters and dissident political organizations in the United States."¹¹ He also confirmed that his agency had done everything possible to "destabilize" the Allende Government in Chile.¹²

"Operation Phoenix," which he personally led at the end of the 1960's in South Vietnam and during the course of which thousands of Vietnamese patriots were tortured, was equally characteristic.¹³

Later, in answer to Senator Fulbright's question about the fate of these Vietnamese, Colby said: "Officially, they were not annihilated. I cannot say this. But I also cannot say at this time that none of them were killed."¹⁴

This is the personality of the CIA expert on "special matters." We can assume that he has not changed his profession by retiring. It is most probably for this reason that he is a member of the CPD. Intelligence agents do not necessarily work for federal agencies. Apparently, Colby is much more interested in taking his old place behind the scenes than in sitting on the board of a corporation.

Some mention should also be made of another influential member of the Committee on the Present Danger--L. Kirkland, the third co-chairman of the organization. His name is also missing from the roster of the military-industrial monopolies; he has another sphere of activity. Kirkland is neither a businessman nor a top-level official; he is the secretary and--even more important--the treasurer of the American labor organization, the AFL-CIO, regarded there as second in command to Meany. It is also known that these two people have been backed up for a long time by an anticommunist of long standing, J. Lovestone, who was once expelled from the Communist Party of the United States for his treacherous behavior and who then became director of the AFL-CIO's International Department. A right-wing labor boss like Kirkland is apparently needed by figures in the military-industrial complex as a front. In this respect, he is probably just as valuable as Colby to the champions of a new cold war.

Newswoman Clare Luce, who caused quite a sensation during the cold war, is the widow of the man who controlled the largest publishing monopoly, publishing TIME and FORTUNE, and also a member of the CPD. She is necessary to this organization in a different capacity: as an expert on certain propaganda methods.

We have listed some of the civilian representatives of the American military-industrial complex here. We cannot, however, ignore the military figures in this same circle; the former cannot get along without the latter, just as the latter need the former.

American generals (naturally, not all of them) have invariably been drawn toward big business during this century, particularly after World War II. This tradition was conclusively established after General Douglas MacArthur, who commanded the American intervention in Korea and who was the favorite of the American military leaders, destined by them to the presidency or--if circumstances permitted--even to a military dictatorship, chose instead in 1951 to head the military concern Remington Arms, Incorporated, now the Sperry Rand Corporation. Even earlier, the vice president of the same concern was another famous general--Leslie Groves: the same military man who headed the secret government agency working on the atomic bomb (the so-called "Manhattan Project") during the war. A few years later it became known that Sperry Rand's average annual profits from supplying the government with artillery shells totaled 1,700 percent of expended capital (this is not a typographical error: 1,700 percent!).¹⁵ The percentage of this profit collected by Groves and MacArthur was not reported. This is considered to be their personal affair. Both generals are no longer among the living. But their colleagues at Sperry Rand, the turnover of which reached 3.2 billion dollars in 1976, are still living.

Four generals were named as CPD members in the American press. Three of them--M. Ridgway, L. Lemnitzer and A. Goodpaster--are alike in one respect. Each was at one time the supreme allied commander of NATO forces in Europe and each persistently demanded a maximum buildup or armaments in this post. Now all of them are retired, but General Ridgway, for example, has become a director of Colt Industries, a company which manufactures costly equipment for missiles in addition to conventional weapons. He also heads the Institute of Industrial Studies founded by the billionaire Mellons.

Another military man in the CPD active membership is General M. Taylor, former U.S. Army chief of staff. He also took part in the intervention in Korea, later served in an intervention mission in Vietnam and, in 1965, was appointed the head of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. His views are apparently identical to the views of Ex-Director Colby of the CIA. At the end of the 1950's, General Taylor said at a session of the NATO Council that he "could wipe the Soviet Union from the face of the earth" and a short time later advocated the transmission of atomic weapons to the West German Bundeswehr. From the commercial standpoint, General Taylor's biography is rounded out by his acceptance of the post of chairman of the board of an American company operating in Mexico after his retirement.

The last of the military men named as members of the CPD, Admiral E. Zumwalt, occupied a post in the Pentagon's division for international "security" affairs. He also took part in the intervention in Vietnam in a commanding post, demanded the continuation of this war "to a victorious end" and favored stepped-up bombing of Laos and Cambodia. In the 1970's, he was U.S. naval chief of operations. As yet, he has not received his share of the profits of the military-industrial complex in the form of an official seat on the board of a particular concern, although Wall Street is already discussing his unofficial ties with this circle. In any case, he is not wasting his

time. In June 1977 Admiral Zumwalt went to Peking for some unknown reason: Was he following Schlesinger's example and trying to establish direct contact between the millionaires on the Committee on the Present Danger and the Maoists?

Finally, two of the oldest and most influential leaders of the rightist group, of both bourgeois parties are coordinating their own activities with those of the CPD. Senators Barry Goldwater and Henry Jackson. Neither one nor the other has spared any effort in deteriorating Soviet-American relations. Goldwater, department store owner and Republican candidate for president in 1964, is renowned for his famous phrase: "The only important thing is to fight against communism! The means used in this fight are of no importance."¹⁶ His good relations with the American semifascist John Birch Society and with Straus, the leader of the West German revanchiste, are also no secret.

Senator Jackson is a no less remarkable figure. In recent months, he has displayed particular energy in his attempts to undermine the SALT talks. In November 1977 it became known that Jackson, in the capacity of chairman of the Senate arms control subcommittee, had sent secret information on these talks to newsmen he knew for the purpose of disclosure and attacks. The WASHINGTON POST reported: "Senator Jackson's staff long ago demonstrated its efficiency in influencing the news printed in the press." The same newspaper had noted even earlier that Jackson was the chief opponent of the policy of "quiet diplomacy" in relations with the USSR.¹⁷

At one time, Jackson was the chairman of the national committee of the now ruling Democratic Party and was a close friend of President Johnson for many years. One of the underlying reasons for his influence, however, is something quite different: For a long time, Jackson has been regarded as an unofficial legislative representative of the gigantic Boeing military concern, which produces the Minuteman III missile for the Pentagon and has recently made preparations for the production of winged missiles. In 1976 the turnover of the Boeing concern was almost 4 billion dollars.¹⁸ It is absolutely clear that the conclusion of a Soviet-American agreement on strategic arms limitation would be a severe blow for this concern.

In other words, one of the important determining factors in policy for Senator Jackson, just as for the dignitary-businessmen Nitze and Fowler, General Ridgway, Admiral Zumwalt and other leading members of the Committee on the Present Danger, is the superprofits that can be derived from the production of weapons of mass destruction.

Another important fact should also be mentioned. The members of the CPD are not only influential in themselves or because of their influence in the top levels of the bourgeois parties and their contacts with the military-industrial complex; their relations with key political and military agencies in the American Government, particularly the most important of these--the President's National Security Council (NSC)--are of equal importance. All decisions on U.S. domestic and foreign policy are first made by this council and are only later and to some extent submitted to Congress for its approval.

There is every reason to believe that the Committee on the Present Danger has much in common with the staff of the National Security Council. As we mentioned above, banker Fowler was one of its full members in the 1950's, even though he did not occupy any kind of government post at that time. Walt Rostow was the executive secretary of the council and its actual head; Nitze and Generals Taylor, Ridgway, Lemnitzer and Goodpaster were directly associated with it; and Colby, director of the CIA under Nixon and Ford, was also a member. These old contacts are obviously the reason for the ease with which the CPD now learns Washington's state secrets.

Reports in the American press have indicated that CPD associates and supporters also include some of the members of the Senate and House committees and subcommittees concerned with questions of military policy. Therefore, its ties extend to the executive and legislative branches.

Naturally, not all persons connected with military-industrial corporations should be considered unconditional supporters of a revival of the cold war. They also include stockholders in these corporations who simultaneously have no objection to trade in civilian industrial commodities with the socialist countries and, for this reason, talk about peaceful coexistence. This contradiction is now characteristic of the position occupied by several representatives of monopolistic capital, including some overseas. But the main, driving nucleus of the military-industrial complex still favors continuation of the arms race and, consequently, the preservation of tension in international relations. The interests of precisely this group are reflected in the Committee on the Present Danger. This is why any kind of secret coordination of positions by the CPD and the NSC staff on any particular issue might have a genuinely serious effect on U.S. policy.

This is intensified by the fact that the Committee on the Present Danger has influential allies outside the United States. These are not limited to the staff of the State Department, CIA and NATO in Western Europe. The close ties of several members of the CPD to the semisecret international organization, operating under the name of the "Bilderberg Club" and numbering prominent Western European bourgeois politicians and big business magnates among its members, are quite obvious.

The "club" does not conceal the fact that joint policy is discussed at its annual meetings and is then proposed to the governments of the nations concerned. In recent years, the United States has been represented at meetings of the club by such "stars" of the CPD as Nitze, Rusk, Lemnitzer, Goodpaster, Zumwalt and Senator Jackson. The familiarity of these names could hardly be a coincidence. Many say that the Committee on the Present Danger in the United States and the Bilderberg Club in Western Europe are partners working toward the same goal.

There is also no doubt that the international military-industrial complex is actively aided in these affairs by right-wing circles in international finance. While CPD founders Nitze and Douglas Dillon are associated with

the New York bank Dillon, Read & Company, CPD Chairman Fowler is within the orbit of another influential international finance group with rightist leanings--the Lazards.

The Western powers are divided by deep-seated economic and political conflicts. Experience has already shown, however, that this does not prevent forces on the extreme right in these countries from working together against detente. While an entire galaxy of overseas military-industrial corporations can be found behind the screen of the CPD, the outlines of military concerns in the FRG, England, France and other states can be seen just as clearly behind the facade of the Bilderberg Club. Despite existing conflicts, all these groups are united by two motives: anticommunism and the desire to continue the arms race at any cost. This is why accomplices of the American Committee on the Present Danger can now be found in all of the major countries of the capitalist world.

Another fact is also interesting. The announcement of the Committee on the Present Danger of 12 January 1977 contained the following phrase: "If we continue to flow with the current (in the direction of detente--E. G.)... the possibility of our convergence with China will disappear."¹⁹ This is quite unequivocal. The same right-wing American circles which categorically object to the improvement of Soviet-American relations are shamelessly advocating a bargain with Maoist China. Apparently, the inspirers of the CPD are not traveling to Peking to no purpose. The close ties between these two forces are repeatedly corroborated.

We cannot deny that the American reactionaries' plot against detente has been organized on a broad scale. The conspirators have extensive contacts and tremendous resources at their disposal. Apparently, they themselves are firmly convinced of the success of their maneuvers. We can be confident that they will not miss a single opportunity to undermine detente in the future. The Committee on the Present Danger and the circles backing it up indisputably represent a serious threat to the cause of peace.

This has also been recognized by realistic-minded circles in the United States. For example, on 15 January 1977, the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, the influential but far from leftist Boston newspaper, printed an article by C. Yost, former U.S. representative to the United Nations, in which he described the CPD's announcement about the "intentions" of the Soviet Union as a "biased assessment of information" and an "inclination to extremes."

"A more probable interpretation," Yost wrote, "is that the Soviet Union, having lost 20 million people in the last war, is trying to limit human sacrifices in a new war if this kind of tragedy should break out.... We can confidently say that our inveterate diehards, after blowing up the thesis of the Soviet threat to absurd proportions, will oppose any agreements on arms control or any mutual limitations with the exception of those which will give America such great advantages that this will make them absolutely unattainable.... The fact that the Soviet Union is fully willing and able to prevent this kind of American superiority has clearly been attested to by the history of the last 15 years."

This is the voice of common sense, one of the many now heard quite frequently in bourgeois circles abroad. Naturally, statements of this kind will not put an end to the CPD's maneuvers.

In recent months, this organization has waged an even more intense campaign against detente. This has apparently been caused by the fear that new practical possibilities for the improvement of Soviet-American relations exist. For example, CPD leaders said at a meeting of the American Foreign Policy Association in March of this year that there was no possibility of military detente between the USSR and the United States. At the same meeting, they demanded that the U.S. Government immediately begin the production of the neutron bomb.

The people backing up the Committee on the Present Danger believe that they are quite strong. As we have already said, they do have resources and contacts, and both of these can even be called abundant. Nonetheless, if we look at the international situation as a whole, the forces supporting detente are still incomparably stronger than its enemies. Hundreds of millions of people throughout the world now have a clearer understanding than ever before that the desperate game with weapons of mass destruction can lead to the most horrible catastrophe in the history of mankind.

No secret or public organization of opponents of detente, no matter who its members are and no matter who is backing it up, can paralyze the people's desire for a lasting peace.

FOOTNOTES

1. THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, 27 November 1977, p 77.
2. NEW REPUBLIC, 27 November 1976.
3. V. Marchetti and J. Marks, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," N.Y., 1974, p 175.
4. THE WASHINGTON POST, 27 November 1977.
5. Ibid.
6. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 6 April 1977.
7. "Moody's Industrials," N.Y., 1977, p 1524.
8. THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, 27 November 1977, p 80.
9. J. Stormer, "None Dare Call It Treason," Florrisant, 1964, p 88.
10. THE WASHINGTON POST, 13 August 1977.

11. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 16 January 1975.
12. Ibid., 8 September 1974.
13. M. Copeland, "Beyond Cloak and Dagger: Inside the CIA," N.Y., 1975, p 223.
14. THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, 1 June 1973.
15. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 18 August 1972, p 1067.
16. J. Bell, "Mr. Conservative: Barry Goldwater," N.Y., 1963, p 76.
17. THE WASHINGTON POST, 30 July 1977.
18. "Moody's Industrials," p 243.
19. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 12 January 1977.

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'NEUTRON LOGIC'

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 78
pp 44-55

[Article by L. S. Semeyko]

[Text] President J. Carter's decision, announced at the beginning of April this year, to "defer production" of the neutron bomb does not signify U.S. rejection of this weapon. The White House announcement leaves no room for doubt on this score: "The ultimate decision concerning the use of enhanced radiation devices in our modernized tactical weaponry," it states, "will be made later." At the same time, J. Carter reported that he had instructed the Department of Defense to "begin modernizing nuclear warheads for the Lance missile and howitzer system of weapons," for the possible subsequent use of neutron charges in them. As the U.S. secretary of defense said, this will make it possible to "add enhanced radiation charges to them in a relatively short period of time if a decision should subsequently be made to do this." Noting that his department still regards the neutron weapon as "a useful addition to American nuclear potential," H. Brown laid particular stress on the fact that the President's decision reserves the United States' right to produce it in the future.

Therefore, the question of the neutron bomb is still on the agenda. After encountering a mass protest movement against the plans for its development and deployment in Western Europe, the United States preferred to resort to a maneuver which would leave this question open until a more propitious time. Instead of clearly and precisely saying "no" to the neutron bomb, the Carter Administration made a decision which is not consistent with the demands of the public and is not in the real interest of the security of the United States itself.

The White House statement indicates that people in Washington are still trying to imply that this is a "tactical" weapon to be used for "defensive" purposes. In actuality, however, as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev stressed in his speech aboard the cruiser "Admiral Senyavin" on 7 April 1978 in Vladivostok, "this is a new type of weapon for mass human

destruction. Statements about its alleged 'defensive' nature are inconsistent with the facts. This is a nuclear offensive weapon, and its primary aim is destruction. This weapon increases the danger that a nuclear war will break out."¹


Each new type of weapon is an equation with many unknown quantities, taking the form of political aftereffects as well as military-technical and strategic consequences. This is particularly true of the neutron bomb, which lowers the "nuclear threshold" and makes the transition to this kind of warfare externally, as it were, visible to people. The logic of the neutron bomb is the logic of the arms race, the logic of those who rush from one type of weapon to another in the naive hope of preserving a monopoly on them and gaining onesided advantages "at any cost."

What is the neutron weapon and how does it differ from the "conventional" nuclear weapon?

The neutron bomb² is a modified and miniaturized thermonuclear warhead (with up to 10 kilotons of explosive force), which explodes as a result of the explosion of a small plutonium igniter and the subsequent synthesis of deuterium and tritium. In contrast to existing thermonuclear weapons, this produces a relatively small shock wave and emits little thermal energy (its estimated radius of damage is 300-400 meters); most of the energy (up to 80 percent), however, is released in the form of the fatal radiation of high-speed neutrons, while these only constitute a small percentage of the energy released by the explosion of a "conventional" atomic charge.

Various indicators of the fatal effect of neutron radiation on the human organism have been cited in the American press (this matter has not been studied in depth as yet). It is estimated, for example, that the radiation dose around 800 meters from the epicenter of the explosion of a neutron warhead with a total force of 1 kiloton would be 5,000-8,000 rads (or roentgens). The effects of radiation on the human organism (radiation sickness) will be apparent within a few minutes, and death will follow within 1-2 days as a result of the disruption of the regulatory functions of the brain and the central nervous system. The individual exposed to 3,000 rads or slightly more will lose his ability to work (and to take part in combat) within 30-45 minutes and will die after 4-6 days. At a distance of around 1,200 meters, the radiation dose should be 600-800 rads, and 50-80 percent of the persons exposed will die within 4-8 weeks,³ while the rest will die within the year after months of horrible suffering. Even a dose of 30 rads can have negative genetic consequences for 10 generations. The biological effects of neutron radiation are approximately 10 times as great as the destructive effect of the gamma rays released by the explosion of existing nuclear warheads.⁴ In addition, protection against neutron radiation is much more difficult. This is because high-speed neutrons easily penetrate buildings, bunkers and even heavily armored tanks. For example, armor plating 100-120 mm thick will only stop 20-30 percent of the neutrons, while it reduces the effect of gamma

rays by 90 percent. For this reason, American military experts regard the neutron weapon as the most effective means of destroying the enemy's tank groups and manpower.⁵



Areas of damage caused by neutron and nuclear warheads
(NEWSWEEK, 4 July 1977)

1. Lance missile is fired from position 120 km away.
2. Warhead explodes above military target.
3. Area of blast-fire damage caused by Lance missile fitted with neutron warhead.
4. Area suffering radiation-kill by neutron warhead.
5. Blast-fire damage caused by Lance missile fitted with present nuclear warhead.

Troops, however, will not be the only victims of "neutron death." Neutron radiation leads to the formation of zones of lasting radioactive pollution, as high-speed neutrons release the induced radioactivity of some chemical elements in the soil (particularly sodium, manganese and silicon). Induced radioactivity will be approximately 10 times as strong as that resulting from a nuclear explosion of the same force. Besides this, just as during explosions of conventional nuclear warheads, this will cause pillars of radioactive dust to rise in the air, and this dust will be carried by the wind for considerable distances; there is no question that populated points might be in these zones of radioactive contamination--a fact which the American supporters of the neutron bomb prefer to ignore. For this reason, the use of the neutron weapon would inflict harm not only on troops on the battlefield, but also on large segments of the population outside the combat

zone. "Although the radius of neutron radiation is limited," writes WASHINGTON POST correspondent W. Pincus, "it is impossible to precisely calculate the number of people outside the combat zone who will be exposed to some radiation. Scientists also have no reliable data on the minimum dose of radiation that will not have fatal consequences over a long period of time."⁶ It is also difficult to predict the long-range effects of neutron radiation on the life and health of future generations as a result of genetic aftereffects. These are the facts about the latest weapon for the mass annihilation of human beings which is being advertised as a "clean" and "humane" weapon in Washington.

The American press has shed some light on the history of the development of the neutron bomb, which dates back to the beginning of the cold war. The work on this bomb has been going on for more than 20 years in the United States. The first neutron warhead project was completed at the Livermore Lawrence Atomic Testing Laboratory in California (the Los Alamos Laboratory also took part in the work) in 1958, and experimental tests were conducted 5 years later.

At first the neutron weapon was only supposed to be used within the anti-missile defense system, but by the mid-1960's an attempt was made to develop a neutron warhead for the operational and tactical surface-to-surface Lance missile, which was being adopted at that time as a weapon for land forces. This project was unsuccessful and the warhead model (W-63) was, according to the WASHINGTON POST, rejected by the leadership of U.S. land forces on the grounds that it could not produce neutron radiation strong enough to destroy tank crews.⁷

Later, the question of the development of neutron charges was discussed in connection with the Pentagon's plans to equip rocket artillery units with more highly perfected nuclear ammunition. According to the American press, the heads of the Army interpreted the dismantling of some nuclear anti-aircraft systems at the beginning of the 1970's and the limitation of anti-missile systems in accordance with Soviet-American agreements as the "decline of the nuclear role" of land forces. They were not the slightest bit enthusiastic about the Vienna talks on the reduction of armed forces and arms in Central Europe either, since this was the location of the largest contingent of American land forces outside the United States.⁸ Therefore, the development of the neutron bomb was the Pentagon's immediate "response" to the steps taken to curb the arms race.

At the beginning of 1975 the Livermore Atomic Testing Laboratory began to develop a new type of neutron warhead (W-79) for the 203.2-mm howitzer and, employing the technology used in the development of a neutron warhead for the Sprint antimissile system, achieved "quick success." Significant advances were also made in the development of a new model of neutron warhead (W 70-3) for the Lance missile. The Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), which was financing these projects, was already requesting funds in 1976 for the production of a "limited quantity" of

neutron warheads for these systems of weapons. President Ford gave his consent to this on 24 November 1976--that is, after he lost the election--but his decision was kept secret.⁹

The appropriations for the production of neutron warheads for the Lance missile and the 203.2-mm howitzer, as well as for the development of warheads of this kind for the 155-mm howitzer,¹⁰ were included in the program of the ERDA's so-called "public works." Total funds allocated for this program in the 1978 fiscal year (it began on 1 October 1977) have been set at 10.3 billion dollars, including 2.6 billion on the military part of the program, but the "neutron" portion of this sum is classified information. Expenditures on the production of neutron warheads are also envisaged in the Pentagon budget for the 1979 fiscal year. According to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, expenditures on the production of neutron warheads just for the 203.2-mm howitzer will total 650 million dollars.¹¹ According to some experts, neutron warheads for the Lance missile and atomic artillery will cost at least 3 billion dollars.¹²

According to General A. Starbird, the final testing of the 203.2-mm neutron shell should be completed prior to October 1979; its series production is planned for the same time, in the presence of political approval. At the beginning of 1977, the neutron warhead for the Lance missile was tested; its final acceptance as a weapon and the commencement of its production will require at least one more series of tests.

Therefore, practical preparations for the series production of the neutron weapon are being completed or may have already been completed in the United States. Everything now depends on the ultimate political decision. But this decision has been delayed, as we know, by serious difficulties in the domestic and foreign political spheres.

The engineers of U.S. military policy foresaw these difficulties to some extent, which is attested to by the long period during which the development of the neutron bomb was classified as a secret project. Evidently, they planned to present not only the American public, but even Congress, with a fait accompli. The veil of secrecy was so all-encompassing and so thick that even former Secretary of State H. Kissinger, if we can believe newspaper reports, did not know about the abovementioned decision made by President G. Ford on 24 November 1976 concerning the production of neutron warheads for rocket artillery systems.

Fierce debates in Congress essentially did not begin until June 1977, after the bill on appropriations for ERDA "public works" entered the decisive stage of discussion. Paradoxical as it may seem, the legislators did not attach any special significance to the problem of the neutron bomb in February, when President J. Carter sent them this bill, or in March-May, when hearings were conducted in both congressional houses, at which the heads of the ERDA gave testimony concerning the programs for which they were requesting funds.

The division of the legislators into groups opposing and supporting the neutron weapon only became clear after this problem was being discussed in the world press and had attracted the attention of the world public. The results of the Senate votes on the amendments to the bill introduced by the opposition, headed by Senators M. Hatfield and E. Kennedy, are indicative. According to the Hatfield amendment, the Senate was not supposed to vote at all on appropriations for the neutron bomb until President Carter had made his final decision on its production. The vote in the Appropriations Committee was 10 for and 10 against, and in the Senate the respective figures were 38 and 58. E. Kennedy's amendment on the prohibition of all appropriations for the neutron bomb was rejected by a majority of only one vote--43:42 with 4 abstentions.¹³ Although the House of Representatives approved appropriations for the development and production of neutron warheads for the Lance missile and the 203.2-mm howitzer, it voted against their development for the 155-mm howitzer.

In an attempt to relax the emotional tension on Capitol Hill, President J. Carter sent a letter to Chairman J. Stennis of the Armed Services Committee on the eve of the deciding vote in the Senate on the bill as a whole. In this letter, he requested, "in the interests of national security," the approval of appropriations for the neutron bomb, promising to study the problem more thoroughly before making the "final decision." The letter was supposed to convince the legislators that the executive branch, while preserving its "freedom of choice," would be able to carefully weigh all of the "pros" and "cons" mentioned in connection with the neutron bomb by participants in congressional debates and by the nation's public. An "escape clause" introduced on the initiative of Majority Leader R. Byrd and Republican Floor Leader H. Baker (both resolutely supported the development of the neutron bomb), concerning Congress' right to veto the President's "final decision" in favor of the production of the neutron bomb within 45 days after the announcement of this decision, also caused a change of mind in some of the opposition in the Senate (the vote was 74 in favor and 19 against).¹⁴

Pressure was also exerted on Congress through other channels. For example, General A. Haig, supreme allied commander of the NATO forces in Europe, said at the height of the "neutron debates" that the United States' European allies "enthusiastically supported" the idea of the neutron bomb,¹⁵ although it was later learned that no such support existed.

The bill was finally dragged through Congress. Appropriations for the production of the neutron bomb were voted on in the Senate on 13 July (85 in favor, 3 against) and in the House on 29 September (297 in favor, 109 against). The bill was quickly approved by President Carter and went into effect. The way to a new round in the race for nuclear arms seemed to be clear.

The problem turned out to be much more complex and delicate, however, than Washington officials thought. They obviously did not expect the plans for the production and deployment of a neutron bomb in Western Europe to evoke

such a strong wave of protest. A statement approved by the bureau of the Presidium of the World Peace Council at its Washington session in January 1978 noted: "The demonstrations, mass-meetings and campaigns for the collection of petitions against the neutron bomb represent the /largest/ [in boldface] (emphasis ours--L.S.) mass movement ever organized for the purpose of mobilizing public opinion in support of a ban on a single type of weapon of mass destruction." In Washington they evidently decided it was too risky to begin a new round of the race for nuclear arms and plunge into this kind of dangerous venture alone at a time when the people of the world were quite resolutely supporting the policy of detente and at a time when important talks on disarmament were being conducted through many channels. The sad experience of the Vietnam venture, undertaken without direct participation by the United States' chief allies, has not been forgotten.

After the "neutron debates" on Capitol Hill last summer, Washington began to exert much more pressure on the Western European countries, demanding their consent to the deployment of a neutron weapon on their territory and, consequently, the willingness of the leaders of these nations to share the responsibility for this weapon to their own people and all the people of the world. The latter, however, were in no hurry to bind themselves with this kind of commitment. The plans for adopting the neutron bomb as a NATO weapon evoked a worldwide protest movement. Tens of millions of common people and the most diverse public organizations joined in this movement. International conferences were held under the motto: "Stop the neutron bomb, declare it illegal." Under these conditions, the Western European states belonging to NATO are trying to maneuver, preferring not to say yes or no: Let the decision be made in Washington, they say, since the neutron weapon is supposed to be produced in the United States. As reported in the Western press, the series of talks conducted within the NATO framework in Brussels on the eve of the new year of 1978 were unproductive.

The progress of the debates which have been going on for almost a year now on various levels indicates that the apologists of the neutron bomb are trying to justify themselves in the eyes of the public by alleging, in particular, that the adoption of the neutron bomb as a weapon is essential for the "containment" of the Soviet Union; the neutron weapon allegedly "will not lead" to a lowering of the so-called nuclear threshold, but will make this kind of warfare more "humane"; the deployment of neutron weapons "will not affect" the current talks on disarmament.

Any kind of careful examination, however, makes it quite obvious that all of these arguments have no real foundation.

The Neutron Bomb and Security. The supporters of the neutron bomb assert that the American tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Western Europe (around 7,000 units) have virtually ceased to perform the notorious function of "containing the Soviet threat." "The scenario requiring destruction of Allied territory to save it has become so clearly unattractive to Europeans,"

NEWSWEEK reports, "that...U.S. strategists have concluded that the nuclear deterrent lacks credibility."¹⁶ A paradox, they say, has arisen: The destructive force of the nuclear weapon is too great to use, and the United States and NATO "simply refuse" to brandish the "nuclear sword."

They see only one way out--namely, to create, as a supplement to nuclear potential, a powerful neutron potential, the use of which, as they assert, would present almost no danger to Western European territory. This, they allege, would safeguard the interests of the allies to the maximum and, mainly, would reinforce the security of the West as a whole. This is the cheap argument used by the apologists of the neutron bomb and associated by them with their "concern" for lasting peace.

We should immediately note the complete lack of a political basis for the thesis on the need to "deter" the USSR in general, and with the aid of the neutron bomb in particular, primarily because the "Soviet military threat" to the West is a malicious lie from start to finish and a slander on the foreign policy goals and aspirations of the Soviet Union (anyone who reads such fundamental documents on Soviet foreign policy as the Program of Peace and the Program for Further Struggle for Peace and International Cooperation, for Freedom and the Independence of Peoples, adopted at the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses respectively, will be convinced of this). The myth of the "Soviet threat" and of the need to "deter" the USSR, including deterrence with the aid of the nuclear neutron weapon, has been deliberately invented by bourgeois propaganda to justify the continuation of the arms race and the escalation of military preparations in the West.

It is true that it would be senseless to "save" Western Europe--if a conflict could not be averted--by means of its nuclear devastation. People in the United States are evidently becoming increasingly aware of the gaping contradiction between the political goal of starting a war and the methods of attaining this goal through nuclear suicide. The point is, however, that, in attempting to escape the nuclear impasse with the aid of the neutron palliative, the advocates of this approach are falling into another, equally acute contradiction. Surely it must be obvious that the delivery of the very first neutron strike will threaten rapid escalation of the same nuclear war they claim to be trying to prevent.

An increase in the "security of the West" is also made more than doubtful by another factor, which has been pointed out by some American experts. "Sooner or later--and, as a rule, sooner--the Russians can develop any weapon the United States is capable of developing. One wonders what will happen to the additional deterring factor which the neutron bomb is allegedly giving NATO if the Warsaw Pact acquires this bomb,"¹⁷ speculates P. Holt, former staff supervisor of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Therefore, even with the neutron bomb, which supposedly guarantees "maximum flexibility" in nuclear warfare, its supporters cannot escape a vicious circle. And this is only natural. Any ideas about the use of force, particularly with the aid of weapons based on the fission or fusion of atomic nuclei, are incapable of surmounting this contradiction. The formula

"atom + neutron" does not diminish the threat of nuclear war with its devastating consequences, but increases it--and this is the basic counterargument which is being advanced by many statesmen, public figures and experts on military policy in various nations, including Americans.

This argument has been used during the course of congressional debates and in the American press. The neutron weapon, Congressman R. Dellums stated, makes nuclear war "conceivable, acceptable, possible and, in the final analysis, inevitable."¹⁸ The same kinds of misgivings have been voiced by Senator E. Kennedy, M. Hatfield, J. Heinz and R. Clark. They believe that the reinforcement of the security of the West with the aid of the neutron bomb is an illusion. Even in the administration itself, judging by all appearances, there is no unanimous view on this issue. In particular, Director P. Warnke, of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency asserts that a weapon "with less explosive force and higher accuracy, which would supposedly guarantee little collateral damage" (and the neutron weapon is just such a weapon--L. S.) will undermine the "self-restraint" of states in using it.¹⁹ A. Frey, an associate of the influential Council on Foreign Relations (New York), has noted that the neutron weapon does not signify a departure from the accepted principles governing the defense of Europe with the aid of tactical nuclear weapons, and that the same objections raised against tactical nuclear weapons apply completely to the neutron bomb.

The opponents of the neutron bomb also doubt the thesis that its use will supposedly cause "completely permissible" destruction. Many Western experts are of the opinion that the territory of the FRG might become the main region of hostilities. "The industrial regions of this nation are urbanized, and large cities surrounded by smaller satellite cities cover a significantly greater area than in the past. Even in the West German regions considered to be primarily agricultural, there are many small towns and settlements, frequently no more than 3-8 kilometers apart,"²⁰ reports, for example, the journal ARMY, citing these data...in favor of the use of neutron weapons. The high density of the population and the buildings on West German territory, however, will inevitably cause mass human destruction in the event of hostilities with the use of this kind of weapon. Moreover, as critics of the neutron bomb have correctly pointed out, even if we assume that only neutron weapons will be used during the initial period of a military conflict and that "conventional" nuclear weapons will be held in reserve, the subsequent transition to their use will greatly increase the general scale of losses and destruction. The implementation of the "atom + neutron" formula in a war would have much more catastrophic consequences than the use of only the "atom." It is indicative that, although this fact is "cautiously" skirted by the supporters of the neutron bomb, many of them do not deny that the use of the neutron weapon would increase the danger of the escalation of the nuclear conflict with all of the resulting consequences.

According to the Pentagon, this "deterrent" will be more effective if the neutron bomb is not only developed but also deployed in major strategic areas in Western Europe. "We will not begin producing the neutron bomb

if we cannot send it to Europe," said a representative of the administration in July 1977, after the Senate had voted on this matter. "We certainly do not want it on U.S. territory."²¹ It would be difficult to say how much this statement actually corresponds to the United States' real intentions. The peculiar "logic" of the neutron bomb's supporters, however, should be noted: The "security of the West" should be increased precisely by the fact that the neutron bomb is intended for use far away from the United States' own territory.

Nonetheless, a clear purpose can be seen here as well. This kind of "logic" is supposed to alleviate the fears and anxieties of Americans: The American population has nothing to fear, they say, because someone else will be dying. The American people are being lulled; they are being forced, with the aid of a not particularly clever ruse, to reconcile themselves to the possibility of nuclear war. Scientists agree, however, that no one will be able to escape the consequences of this kind of war, even those who are on U.S. territory.

It is precisely this "logic" that has generated particular anger in the European public and has aroused the suspicions of a number of Western European governments: Why should the "security of the West" be safeguarded at the risk of the devastation of Western Europe? Patent disagreements in NATO have led to a situation in which the final communiques of NATO sessions ignore the issue of the neutron bomb, even though this is now one of the most crucial issues in world politics.²²

American military and political leaders are doing everything possible to eradicate these disagreements in NATO and to consolidate this bloc. Various steps have been taken in this direction, including some to "increase the confidence" of the allies in American nuclear "safeguards." At least two major stages in U.S. military policy in recent years can be discerned.

The first was the announcement of the theory of "limited strategic nuclear war," in accordance with which the United States would be prepared at a time of crisis, including crises necessitating the "saving" of Western Europe, to deliver "selective nuclear strikes" by strategic means at military targets--that is, it would be prepared for a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union on a limited scale. This was based, in particular, on the assumption that the allies would believe that the United States was willing to be the victim of the Soviet "limited nuclear strikes."

The second stage was the announcement of the idea of the neutron bomb, in accordance with which the allies were already supposed to be willing to accept "limited damage." This is how the American leaders are trying to substantiate statements about the need for stronger "mutual trust" between the United States and its allies and, thereby, to reinforce NATO.

These new ideas about the use of nuclear strength will ultimately benefit those who would like to somehow convince nations and governments of the "legitimacy" of using nuclear weapons as a means of settling international

conflicts and to make nuclear war--both in its "traditional" nuclear variant and in its new neutron form--acceptable. For this reason, it would appear that the neutron bomb is not simply an episode or an isolated event, but a link in the chain of Washington's consistent and dangerous steps in military policy that are not aimed in any way at "detering" nuclear war, but are, instead, directed toward practical preparations for this war.

Consequently, the security of the United States and its NATO allies can only be diminished by the adoption of the neutron bomb as a weapon, as this will increase the threat of worldwide nuclear conflict.

The Neutron Bomb and the "Nuclear Threshold." The last conclusion can also be corroborated by an examination of another aspect of the problem--the effect of the neutron bomb on the so-called "nuclear threshold"--that is, on the transition from conventional to nuclear war.

Washington maintains that the possibility of any effect here has been excluded or almost excluded, as the decision-making process will still be controlled by the President, and "the decision to cross the nuclear threshold would be most difficult for any President to make." It is possible that there are some people who truly believe in the weight or arguments of this kind. The neutron bomb's opponents, however, are of a different opinion. It is precisely the fact, they say, that the neutron weapon is relatively less destructive than the "conventional" nuclear weapon (and, consequently, more "acceptable") and, to a certain extent, even comparable to modern powerful conventional weapons, that will make it relatively easier for the President and, possibly, for military commanders on the local level, to make the fatal decision.

And this is not all. A few obvious contradictions in the official view should be pointed out. In the first place, the United States once tried to keep the "nuclear threshold" high--that is, to delay the use of nuclear weapons in terms of time and space to the maximum to protect U.S. territory as long as possible against the danger of a nuclear strike. Now, however, the lowering of this threshold is being discussed objectively in the illusory hope that escalation will not be immediate. In the second place, the projected methods of crossing the "nuclear threshold," crossing it "neutron-style," are also contradictory. "Lance neutron warheads," Pentagon representatives have announced in this connection, "just as neutron shells, will not be used in isolation, but in the form of group strikes with the use of around 30-50 warheads, some of which might not be enhanced radiation warheads."²³ In other words, the Pentagon in no way excludes the possibility of the simultaneous (!) delivery of neutron and nuclear strikes. Consequently, the "nuclear threshold" might not only be lowered, but might also clear a wider path toward rapid nuclear escalation due to the variety of means of mass destruction being employed.

Finally, the general stand taken by U.S. leaders is contradictory. There is no question that the issues of lowering the "nuclear threshold" and delivering the first nuclear strike are closely related: The prevention

of one would exclude the possibility of dangerous escalation in the direction of nuclear conflicts. Although the United States has expressed the sober opinion that "the initiation of the use of nuclear weapons could lead, within an extremely short period of time, to rapid and uncontrollable escalation and a possible world catastrophe"²⁴ and that nuclear weapons should be excluded from the political sphere for this reason, it is actually pursuing a quite different policy: It still has shown no desire to begin negotiations on the non-initiation of the use of nuclear weapons by all of the states which participated in the all-European conference, as proposed by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. Instead of renouncing reliance on nuclear weapons, it is planning to develop new varieties.

The Neutron Bomb and Arms Limitation. The American supporters of the neutron bomb are making every attempt to reassure the world public that its development will not affect the current arms limitation talks. They also maintain that this weapon is not strategic and that its deployment will therefore have no effect on Soviet-American talks on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons. A different opinion is held, however, not only by many prominent experts, but also by official institutions, such as the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which believes that neutron weapons will have a negative effect on these talks if they come into the picture.²⁵

It is true that an overall positive atmosphere is the most important condition for the success of any kind of negotiations, particularly those concerning arms limitation. The development and deployment of a neutron bomb, however, would certainly have a negative effect on the international situation, undermine detente and reinforce apprehensions about the motives of the United States and its NATO allies. It would be extremely difficult to combine efforts to reduce nuclear potential with steps to increase this potential.

The neutron bomb's American opponents have also pointed out its potential negative effect on the Vienna talks on the reduction of arms and armed forces in central Europe. They have noted that it would have the same kind of harmful effect on the talks on the universal and complete banning of nuclear tests, since additional tests of the neutron bomb will certainly be required.

Finally, the connection between the issue of the neutron bomb and the danger of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons has been pointed out. Around 100 states, the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR reports, have pledged to not possess nuclear weapons, but the United States is already making preparations for the production of third-generation nuclear weapons. Will the deployment of a weapon with a "limited radius of damage" motivate these states to create their own nuclear potential?²⁶

Therefore, an analysis of the main aspects of the "neutron debate" in the United States indicates that the opponents of the neutron bomb in the political and scientific communities base their objections on convincing and

valid arguments. They correctly believe that the neutron bomb will not only fail to resolve crucial military and political problems of the present day, but will, on the contrary, will give rise to new and probably stronger possibilities of nuclear conflicts.

The creation of the neutron bomb represents a new step in the arms race, coinciding with the development of other destabilizing weapon systems in the United States. These measures are totally inconsistent with Washington's officially declared policy of limiting and reducing arms and virtually renouncing nuclear weapons. They attest to the contradictory nature of the administration's official policy and to the continuous dangerous "zig-zags" in U.S. domestic and foreign policy, which will ultimately increase the danger of nuclear war.

The USSR resolutely opposes the creation of the neutron bomb and any attempts to raise the arms race to an even more dangerous level. "Our position on this issue," General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev said in his speech at the 18th Komsomol Congress, "is quite simple and radical: The states concerned must agree to mutually renounce the production of this weapon before it is too late. And may mankind be rid of it once and for all."²⁷

In this context it must be noted that, as early as 9 March 1978, eight socialist countries (the USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and the CSSR) submitted a draft of an international convention on a ban on nuclear neutron weapons to the Disarmament Commission for its examination. The main purpose of the convention was to declare these weapons illegal. Representatives of the United States and England then hastened to express their negative attitude toward this kind of convention.

Attempts have recently been made to turn the neutron bomb into a bargaining counter and to link this issue with other totally unrelated issues. In essence, this is an obvious attempt to confuse the public: The United States allegedly does not object to talks that would stabilize the nuclear balance in Europe. "There is only one motive underlying all of this--a desire to depart from the USSR's clear and concrete proposal of mutual renunciation of the production of neutron weapons," L. I. Brezhnev said in this connection. "This kind of maneuvering, naturally, does not attest in any way to serious intentions in favor of disarmament. It will not promote progress toward this goal."²⁸

On the eve of his official visit to the FRG, L. I. Brezhnev said the following in response to questions put by VORWAERTS, the weekly periodical of the Social Democratic Party of Germany: "The future of detente in Europe will depend largely on the progress made in the resolution of urgent and pressing problems connected with detente in the military field. It could also be said that we have reached a point at which the process of political detente should merge with the process of military detente. This is why the main

thing now is to take practical steps to curtail the arms race, to curb this race.... And when the Soviet Union now advances concrete, realistic and far-reaching proposals concerning disarmament and the curbing of the arms race, the response takes the form of the rattle of their neutron weapon."²⁹

The consolidation of peace and international security can come about primarily through the renunciation of new rounds in the arms race and through the limitation and reduction of arms. If Washington wants to actually work toward progress in this focal area of Soviet-American relations instead of just talking about it, a renunciation of the neutron bomb, which would then be supplemented by the same kind of renunciation on the part of the USSR, would now be one of the most essential steps.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 8 April 1978.
2. This term came into being in the 1950's when the idea was born of developing an aviation bomb with a neutron charge for strategic bombers, which were then the major means of delivering nuclear weapons; it is now used as a synonym for "neutron weapon." At the end of 1977 the Pentagon decided to call the neutron bomb an "enhanced-radiation, limited-blast warhead" in all future official documents.
3. ARMY, September 1977, p 33. Other correlations between the radiation dose and radius of damage are also cited and alleged to have been accepted as normatives in the U.S. Armed Forces: 18,000 radians--400 meters, 8,000 radians--500 meters, 3,000 radians--640 meters, 650 radians--760 meters (MILITARY REVIEW, May 1976, pp 3-10).
4. BULLETIN OF PEACE PROPOSALS, No 1, 1977, p 36.
5. In September 1977, the journal ARMY presented a hypothetical account of the unsuccessful battles of American divisions during the first 2 days of a conflict. Only the use of the neutron bomb, which made it possible, the account stated, to put 30,000 of the enemy's soldiers out of commission "in 2 seconds," brought about a radical change in the situation. The author of the article, naturally, is delighted with the neutron bomb (ARMY, September 1977, pp 31, 33).
6. THE WASHINGTON POST, 12 July 1977.
7. Ibid., 7 July 1977.
8. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 18 July 1977, p S12190.
9. THE WASHINGTON POST, 8 July 1977.

10. According to Pentagon data submitted to Congress in March 1977, U.S. and NATO troops in Europe have around 450 203.2-mm howitzers and 2,196 155-mm howitzers (THE WASHINGTON POST, 12 July 1977); 92 Lance launchers are also deployed there (THE FINANCIAL TIMES, 26 October 1977).
11. THE WASHINGTON POST, 6 July and 29 September 1977.
12. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 18 July 1977, p S12191.
13. THE WASHINGTON POST, 12, 13 July 1977; THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 15 July 1977.
14. THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 15 July 1977.
15. THE WASHINGTON POST, 19 July 1977.
16. NEWSWEEK, 4 July 1977, p 29.
17. THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 22 September 1977.
18. THE WASHINGTON POST, 29 September 1977.
19. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 18 July 1977, p H7325.
20. ARMY, September 1977, p 32.
21. THE WASHINGTON POST, 19 July 1977.
22. For more detail, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 3, 1978, pp 64-69--Editor's note.
23. THE WASHINGTON POST, 12 July 1977.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., 6 July 1977.
26. THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 15 July 1977.
27. PRAVDA, 26 April 1978.
28. Ibid., 8 April 1978.
29. Ibid., 4 May 1978.

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FROM THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION TO THE BEGINNING OF MILITARY INTERVENTION

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 78
pp 56-67

[First installment of article by L. A. Gvishiani]

[Text] Sixty years ago the United States of America joined an armed attack by the imperialist powers on the young Soviet nation. L. A. Gvishiani's article describes the educative pre-history of the intervention.

The birth of the world's first socialist state began a qualitatively new stage in the history of international relations and established a new type of interrelations between states differing fundamentally in terms of their socioeconomic nature. On the day after the October victory--that is, on 26 October (8 November) 1917--in accordance with a draft drawn up by V. I. Lenin, the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets adopted the Decree on Peace, in which the fundamental principles of Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy were set forth. The Decree on Peace, addressed to all of the governments and people of the warring nations with a proposal that the war be ended, did not receive any positive response from the governments of the Entente countries.

"The Soviet regime," L. I. Brezhnev stresses, "was born under the sign of Lenin's Decree on Peace, and since that time all of the foreign policy of our nation has been permeated with a love of peace. Objective historical conditions dictated its specific content: a course toward peaceful coexistence by states with differing social structures."¹

It was under the conditions of hostile capitalist surroundings, a struggle against internal and external counterrevolution and tremendous economic difficulties that Soviet diplomacy was forged and established itself, contributing more and more actively to the resolution of the major problems facing our nation. From the first days of the Soviet State's existence, its activity in the sphere of foreign policy was accomplished under the direct supervision of V. I. Lenin. It was precisely during these years, while they were performing the tremendous amount of practical work and solving the specific foreign policy problems on which the fate of the cause of

socialism depended, that V. I. Lenin and his associates worked out the strategy and tactics of Soviet foreign policy--a policy socialist in form and content, a policy determining the long-range course of our nation in international affairs.

In the face of an upheaval of the magnitude of the October Socialist Revolution in Russia, the imperialist world, torn apart by the deep-seated conflicts that were splitting it into two opposing groups of powers, insistently tried to consolidate all reactionary forces for a struggle against socialism. The position occupied by U.S. ruling circles was no exception to this rule: They acted in concert with all imperialist states--both tsarist Russia's allies in the war and the states that had been fighting against it.

Washington's official initial reaction to the events in Soviet Russia was expressed in President Wilson's speech at the annual congress of the American Federation of Labor on 12 November 1917. This speech was aimed at the reinforcement of U.S. military undertakings and at the condemnation of antiwar feelings among workers, whom Wilson called upon to "produce mountains of weapons and ammunition." He sharply criticized the "radicals," who, in his words, "saw discord among the workers," and stigmatized American pacifists (and critics of the war) by declaring that they were "just as frivolous as the Russian dreamers."²

The first appeal by the Soviet Government to the governments of the United States and the Entente countries through diplomatic channels was made on 21 November 1917. Identically worded notes were sent to the U.S. ambassador and the ambassadors of the Entente countries stationed in Petrograd. These notes officially informed them that a new government--the Council of People's Commissars--had been established in the Soviet Republic and that it regarded this note as a formal proposal for an immediate armistice on all fronts and the immediate commencement of peace talks. The fully empowered government of the Russian Republic addressed this proposal "simultaneously to all warring people and their governments." The note addressed to the American ambassador ended with the expression of the profound respect of the Soviet Government for the people of the United States "who must strive for peace just as all other people who have been exhausted and drained by this unparalleled war."³ The text of the Decree on Peace was appended to the note. The Soviet note was printed in the American press on 24 November.

American Ambassador Francis and the ambassadors of the Entente countries in Petrograd arranged for a meeting to coordinate their positions immediately after they received the Soviet note of 21 November. On 26 November, Francis, the doyen of the diplomatic corps, sent a telegram to the State Department on the main results of the meeting. He said in the telegram that a recommendation was adopted at the meeting that the governments of the allied powers "not reply to the Soviet message."⁴ Francis' telegram and the Soviet note were forwarded by the State Department to the White House for President Wilson's consideration.⁵

As Professor J. Thompson, contemporary American historian, points out, "Wilson knew little about Russian history and had been little informed of the state of affairs there, as a result of which he was not prepared for the fall of the Provisional Government." The class sense of the President of the largest capitalist power, however, caused him to realize that Great October signified a challenge to international capitalism. "Among the leaders (of the Western nations--L. G.)...", Thompson stresses, "Wilson was almost the only one who realized the force and seriousness of Bolshevism's challenge to the West." From the very beginning he was extremely hostile toward the Soviet regime. And, after all, "Wilson essentially defined the policy of the United States and, in turn, the position of the United States had the deciding influence" on the policy of the Entente powers toward Soviet Russia.⁶

The anti-Soviet course of the Entente governments and the United States was made quite clear even before the end of November 1917. The first step taken by the diplomatic corps of the Entente countries stationed in Russia at the time of the October Revolution attested to the anti-Soviet frame of mind of most of the representatives of the capitalist world in Soviet Russia and of the governments accrediting them.

The inevitability of a coming fierce struggle against the capitalist world to preserve the conquests of the October Revolution became apparent. The use of diplomatic means in the struggle for the recognition of socialist conquests was the primary objective of the Soviet regime. The desire to deliver the country from war and to implement the new principles of political and economic relations--these were the goals and objectives of Soviet foreign policy from the first days of its existence.

The most urgent problem was to make peace with Germany. As one of the first steps in this direction, the Soviet Government proposed on 28 November 1917 that all people and governments of the Entente countries and the United States begin negotiations along with Soviet Russia on a truce with Germany. "Now all governments, all classes and all parties in the warring nations must respond categorically to the question of whether they will join us in commencing talks on 19 November--1 December (19 November corresponds to 2 December in the new style calendar) on an immediate armistice and universal peace. Yes or no."⁷

This appeal stressed the need for joint negotiations, but it noted that if the Entente countries refused to negotiate, the Soviet side would have to conclude a separate peace. In this case, as the appeal pointed out, these nations would have to assume total responsibility.

The Soviet Government approached the talks on a truce with Germany as the beginning of general negotiations on peace, which would have to be participated in by the countries of the Quadruple Alliance (Germany, Austro-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria) and the countries of the Entente, which had been joined by the United States by that time. As we know, the Entente powers and the

United States ignored the Soviet proposals on this matter, not replying to them in any way. Obviously, under these conditions the Soviet side could only make one decision--to begin peace talks with Germany without the participation of the Entente countries and the United States.

On their part, the Entente countries, after rejecting the Soviet peace initiatives, concentrated the efforts of their diplomatic corps on the assessment of the events taking place in the Nation of Soviets and on the development of a single foreign policy course for their states to follow in relations with Soviet Russia.

In response to Secretary of State Lansing's inquiry of 22 November 1917 regarding the views of Paris and London on the events in Russia, the U.S. President's advisor Colonel House, who was in France at that time, sent the following message to the State Department on 24 November 1917: "In Great Britain they feel that the situation in Russia is hopeless at the present time. To all appearances, there is no responsible government there. My advice is to take no further steps at the present time and to allow no further contacts in connection with purchases." On the same day, Colonel House reported that the French prime minister had been informed of the content of the telegram of 24 November 1917 and agreed completely with House.⁸

The Quadruple Alliance had a different reaction to the Soviet peace proposals. Due to a number of circumstances--economic difficulties, the growing revolutionary movement and antiwar feelings--the nations of the Quadruple Alliance agreed to an armistice and to the commencement of peace talks with Soviet Russia. In Berlin they hoped that a peace with Russia would make the Entente countries disposed to making peace with Germany on terms favoring Berlin. On 27 November 1917 the German commander-in-chief advised the Soviet Government of his consent to armistice negotiations.

The refusal of the Entente countries and the United States to take part in the talks with Germany could not change the foreign policy course of Soviet Russia, but the Soviet Government did not exclude the possibility that these countries would join in the negotiations for some time.

A few days before the beginning of the talks, on 30 November 1917, the RSFSR People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs published an announcement that military operations on the Russian front had been ceased and an agreement had been reached on the commencement of preliminary talks.⁹ The allied governments were requested to inform Soviet Russia if they wished to take part in the negotiations. There were no replies.

During the peace talks which began in Brest-Litovsk on 2 December 1917, the Soviet side repeatedly requested the allied governments to take part in the negotiations, stressing its desire to conduct these talks with consideration for the interests of the former allies in Russia, which was

specially mentioned in a statement by the Soviet delegation at the talks on 5 December 1917. This announcement proposed that the states not represented at the conference take part in drawing up the terms of the armistice on the battle fronts. The Soviet side's proposal also contained a clause prohibiting the transfer of the troops of the Quadruple Alliance nations from the eastern front to the western.¹⁰

The delegates representing Germany, Austro-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria at the negotiations rejected the Soviet proposals concerning the Entente powers and the United States, declaring that they were only authorized to negotiate with the Russian delegation, since "there were no delegations of Russia's allies at the conference." Even after this, the Soviet delegates reiterated that their objective was "to include the governments of all the warring countries in the negotiations for the purpose of ensuring universal peace."¹¹

The Soviet Government report of 5 December 1917 on the course of the negotiations, addressed to the people of the Entente countries and the United States, underscored the fact that the Russian delegation was standing up for the conditions of a universal democratic peace, since the matter concerned the fate of all peoples, including the warring nations whose diplomats were ignoring the talks.¹²

Therefore, the Soviet Government did everything within its power to ensure the participation of all warring countries in the negotiations. For this purpose, it even called for a break in the talks. On 6 December the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs sent a note to the British, French, American, Italian, Chinese, Japanese, Romanian, Belgian and Serbian ambassadors, informing them that, at the request of the Soviet Government, the talks on the armistice with representatives of the German-Austrian bloc had been adjourned for a week "to provide an opportunity during this period of time to inform the peoples and governments of the allied countries of the very fact of the talks and of their progress."

The note pointed out the fact that representatives of the Quadruple Alliance had declined to give a definite reply during the course of the negotiations to questions concerning the objectives of the war and of the general armistice, and also advised that a 1-week armistice had been declared on the fronts opposing the troops of the German-Austrian bloc. The note went on to say: "There will be an interval of more than a month between the first decree of the Soviet regime on peace (26 October) and the day when the peace talks will resume (29 November, old style). This period of time, even in view of the present disorder in means of international communication, seems quite sufficient for giving the governments of the allied countries an opportunity to define their views on the peace talks."¹³

In this way, the Soviet side again insistently proposed that the Entente powers join in the negotiations. Again, however, not one of the states appealed to by the Soviet Government, including the United States, replied.

On 13 December 1917, in a special report issued by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in regard to the Brest-Litovsk talks, the Soviet Government had to announce that the negotiations were acquiring a separate nature. It again stressed the fact that the responsibility for this would fall completely on the governments which "have refused up to now to assert their terms for the armistice and peace and which continue to conceal from their own and other people the objectives for which the war should be continued."¹⁴

It was only after all of these steps that the Soviet Government signed a treaty on an armistice between Soviet Russia and the nations of the Quadruple Alliance on 15 December 1917.

This was the first step and an extremely decisive one toward the peaceful regulation of relations between the warring powers, which was of exceptional significance at that time. Despite the fierce resistance of the major capitalist states and despite the serious obstacles set up by the opposition within the nation and even within the party, the implementation of Lenin's foreign policy line ensured the first, however modest, success of Soviet diplomacy. The most important consequences of this foreign policy action were, in the first place, the possibility of a perhaps temporary, but absolutely necessary respite for our nation, which had suffered great difficulties; in the second place, the conclusive exposure of the aggressive and militaristic essence of the policy of the imperialist states, which favored the continuation of war and impeded the establishment of peace between peoples; in the third place, evidence of the Soviet State's willingness, not in words but in deeds, to achieve the regulation of relations between states by peaceful means in spite of the existence of the most acute conflicts.

Soviet diplomacy showed the entire world its capacity for political realism and its ability to make compromises whenever necessary for the purpose of ensuring favorable conditions for the subsequent implementation and establishment in the international arena of the principles of interrelations between states set forth in the Decree on Peace.

As we already noted above, after Soviet Russia had concluded an armistice with the countries of the Quadruple Alliance, it did everything within its power to not only avoid setting it in opposition to the Entente countries, but also to preserve the possibility of their inclusion in subsequent peace talks. This proved the definite flexibility and farsightedness of Leninist diplomacy. The Entente countries, however, were not even thinking about peace at that time. Moreover, their intention to begin a struggle against Soviet Russia became increasingly obvious; at first, this intention took the form of intervention in the civil war on the side of counterrevolution and later evolved into overt military intervention. The imperialist powers united their efforts for an anti-Soviet struggle, guided by their desire to smother the young Soviet regime.

In addition to political and class factors, expansionist encroachment of an economic nature by the imperialist monopolies was also of great significance in the development of the anti-Soviet course of the Entente countries and the United States. Western European monopolies had already controlled a number of the industrial branches in the huge Russian market with its abundant resources for more than 1 decade. During the last few years before the revolution, American capital had begun to actively penetrate Russia.

During the last 5 years before the beginning of World War I, there was a significant increase in trade and economic relations between Russia and the United States. American monopolies became even more interested in the Russian market, as statistics show, during the war. While U.S. exports to Russia totaled 22.7 million dollars in 1912, the figure had risen to 658.9 million by 1917.¹⁵ American capital investments in Russia were also growing. According to American estimates, they totaled 117.75 million gold rubles by 1917, and these were concentrated in 14 or 15 companies.¹⁶

While the imperialist war brought suffering and destruction to people, especially the Russians, American imperialism used the war for profit. "During World War I and after this horrible slaughter, the American capitalist system grew and flourished, nurtured by human blood,"¹⁷ Chairman W. Foster of the Communist Party of the United States of America later wrote.

The plans of American ruling circles to expand their economic and political influence in Russia became particularly evident during the period after the February bourgeois-democratic revolution, when the United States quite resolutely embarked upon a course of extensive economic expansion in Russia.

The October Revolution totally shattered the hopes of U.S. ruling circles, which evoked an immediate anti-Soviet reaction.

American diplomatic representatives stationed in Soviet Russia first recommended that Washington ignore the existence of Soviet Russia and then advised overt struggle against it.¹⁸ M. Summers, U.S. consul-general in Moscow, set forth his thoughts about the October Revolution in Russia in a letter to Secretary of State Lansing on 26 November 1917, saying that he "strongly advised...protest against the present regime" in Russia.¹⁹

The actions of Francis, the American ambassador in Petrograd, were quite characteristic. After the fall of the Provisional Government, he flooded Washington with telegrams which contradicted one another and, in a number of cases, misinformed his government about the state of affairs in the Soviet nation. For example, in a telegram sent to Secretary of State Lansing on 28 November 1917, Francis asserted, contrary to facts, that the Soviet Government was trying to conclude a separate armistice with Germany.²⁰ On the same day, however, on 28 November, Francis sent a second telegram to Washington, reporting that the Soviet Government had officially announced Germany's agreement to negotiate and that the Soviet side had postponed the

talks for 5 days for the purpose of requesting the Entente powers once more to define their views on this matter.²¹ On the next day, 29 November 1917, Francis sent a telegram reporting the Soviet Government's proposal that the governments of the United States and the Entente countries take part in the peace talks with Germany planned for December 1917. The note of the Soviet Government on this matter was sent to the American Embassy on 29 November 1917.²²

On 1 December 1917, Secretary of State Lansing wired Francis a reply, asking him to wait and do nothing, as "the U.S. Government is awaiting the further development of events. The President has not made any kind of announcement."²³

Meanwhile, on 27 November 1917, a conference of the allied countries began in Paris, at which the question of Soviet Russia was discussed among other issues. Colonel House, who represented the United States at this conference, wired President Wilson on 2 December 1917 that "there was a long and frank discussion concerning Russia" during the course of the conference. It was not possible, however, for England, France, Italy and the United States to agree on a common stand on relations with Soviet Russia. "It was ultimately decided that each power should send its own reply to its ambassador in Petrograd. The essence of each reply should be that the allies are ready to discuss their military objectives with Russia once again as soon as it has a stable government with which they can act jointly."²⁴

This decision actually signified not recognition of Soviet Russia and expressed the hope that the power of the bourgeoisie would be restored and that military actions would be continued against Germany on behalf of the interests of world capital. The decision was made on 3 December 1917. The conference of the allies finished its work, essentially having rejected Soviet Russia's peace proposals.

The October Revolution was an unexpected turn of events for American ruling circles. Obviously, they could not have a prepared strategy concerning Soviet Russia at this time. The unparalleled speed with which American ruling circles reacted to the political changes in Russia, however, particularly since the reaction was so negative, is quite striking.

Only a month or so after the October Revolution, on 4 December 1917, Secretary of State Lansing prepared the draft of a memorandum containing a political evaluation of the situation in the Nation of Soviets. It clearly evinced fear of the possibility of the existence of a socialist state, a state without private ownership of land or the means of production, and worries about the fate of the capitalist world as a whole. In his draft of the memorandum, Lansing warned that the policy of Soviet Russia was allegedly based on "an openly expressed determination to overthrow all existing governments and establish the supremacy of the proletariat in all nations." The draft went on to stress: "For any government which believes in political institutions in the form in which they now exist and which bases its actions on a sense of national unity and also recognizes private

ownership, the correct policy is to leave these dangerous idealists in isolation and to not have any direct contact with them."²⁵

Lansing's class consciousness did not allow him to objectively assess the significance of the October Revolution. In his judgment he frequently passed his hopes off as reality. "The whole of Russia will never be headed by the Petrograd Bolsheviks.... It is more probable that it (Russia--L. G.) will break up into separate parts aspiring to independence." Imperialism, especially monopolistic capital in the United States, cherished the hope that the Russian State would disintegrate, and Lansing quite frankly wrote: "It would be lucky for us if several separate states with their own independent policy were created."²⁶

On 6 December 1917 Lansing informed Ambassador Francis and other American representatives abroad: "The President wants American representatives to cease all direct contacts with the Bolshevik government."²⁷ In his memoirs Lansing stated that a policy of "nonrecognition of the Bolsheviks" was undeviatingly adhered to from that time on.²⁸ The facts show, however, that later U.S. policy was not at all limited to the simple "nonrecognition" of the Bolsheviks. American politicians feverishly searched for any opportunity to intervene in the events occurring in Russia for the purpose of influencing their development in the direction desired by the United States.

On the same day--that is, 6 December 1917--Summers, American consul-general in Moscow, sent the following report to Washington: "General Alekseyev sent us a friend who could be trusted so that he could tell me confidentially about the movements of his troops. This man said that...Alekseyev has united his forces with the forces in the Ukraine and part of the army located along the southwestern front. He also stressed that Alekseyev himself strongly recommends that the Entente occupy the Siberian Railroad to guarantee supply."²⁹

A few days later, on 10 December, Lansing suggested a plan of practical action to Wilson, envisaging the liquidation of "Bolshevist rule" through the establishment of "a military dictatorship supported by loyal disciplined troops." On the advice of Summers, Lansing nominated Kaledin. "The only real nucleus of an organized movement," he wrote, "strong enough to remove the Bolsheviks and take power, is the group of officers at general headquarters headed by General Kaledin," who, "in all probability, will be supported by the cadets, the entire bourgeoisie and the landowners."³⁰

After discussing this proposal with Lansing on the evening of 11 December, W. Wilson gave it his total approval. The following notation was made in the secretary of state's diary: "Discussed the situation in Russia and, in particular, the strength of the Kaledin movement."³¹ As a result, Wilson and Lansing decided to give economic support to anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia. The next day, Lansing asked Secretary of the Treasury W. McAdoo about financial possibilities. The latter quickly found the necessary funds and reported: "There are no objections on my part." The

President hastily gave the operation his approval: "It has my total support."³² This marked the beginning of an openly anti-Soviet course aimed at direct intervention in the internal affairs of our country by American imperialism, followed later not only by its support of counter-revolutionary forces, but also by overt military intervention.

In a confidential document dated 12 December 1917, Lansing wrote that any opposition movement in Russia "should be supported even if there is little chance of its success."³³

This directive was sent out at the same time as a circular addressed to American diplomatic representatives in Europe and the Far East on 15 December 1917; in this circular, the secretary of state gave the following instructions: "Pending further instructions, you must not have any official relations with Russian diplomats who have been recognized or appointed by the Bolshevik Government."³⁴

These are the facts exposing the secrets of American diplomacy during the first months the young Soviet State was in existence. Although it took a hostile stand toward Soviet Russia and embarked on a path of struggle against it, the U.S. Government did not feel it was possible at that time to openly declare its policy, fearing negative reactions on the part of large segments of the population in the United States and in Russia. Washington was faced with the problem of how its position on the "Russian question" should be presented to U.S. public opinion.

Colonel House, who was in Paris in November 1917, said that American propaganda should temporarily refrain from openly qualifying Soviet Russia as an enemy. "The wire services here have picked up and published a statement," House wrote, "made in the American papers that Russia should be looked upon as an enemy. It is extremely important to stop this kind of criticism. It is pushing Russia into the arms of Germany."³⁵

American diplomacy tried to camouflage its already fully formed anti-Soviet policy by resorting to the most varied tricks: from the concealment of the Soviet proposals to purely demagogic actions. While it was actually following an extremely reactionary foreign policy course toward Soviet Russia, the U.S. Government tried in every way to disguise it with "democratic" phrases and pacifist slogans. Since he was incapable of refuting the concrete proposals made by the Soviet Government or countering them with anything substantial, President Wilson resorted to such tricks as their complete misrepresentation and tried to distort their real meaning and use them in the interests of American politics.

Since it was difficult for American politicians to directly oppose the idea of peace advanced in the Soviet Decree on Peace, President Wilson tried to prove that the policy of peace was the natural position of the imperialist states. His message to Congress on this matter stated: "But the fact that this just idea (the idea of peace between peoples--L. G.)

has been incorrectly interpreted should not give any cause to fail to use this idea in the proper way. It must be given back to its true friends."³⁶

U.S. ruling circles had to at least verbally formulate a definite positive program in counterbalance to the peaceful foreign policy actions of Soviet Russia. The actual policy of the United States, however, pursued the goal of a continuation of the war.

American diplomacy was quite active in consolidating Entente forces for the continuation of military actions against Germany. On 8 January 1918 President Wilson sent Congress a message which was called a "program of peace," a message widely known in historical literature as the "Fourteen Points." In setting forth the American program in regard to the major international problems, Wilson devoted special attention to the "Russian question" in an attempt to set up his program as a counterbalance to the Decree on Peace, which had met with a widespread response in many countries, particularly those at war.

As noted in House's memoirs, the President was pursuing the following goals in his message to Congress on 8 January 1918: In the first place, to reply to the Bolsheviks' demand for an explanation of the objectives of war which could convince Russia (W. Wilson wrote this without specifying which Russia he meant) "to join the allies in their defense of the democratic and liberal principles on the basis of which the edifice of peace must be built" and which could be "crushed in the event of a German victory." In the second place, the speech was supposed to sound "an appeal to the German socialists who have become suspicious that their government is actually waging an aggressive war and not a defensive one." In the third place, it was to "warn the Entente that military objectives, as expressed in secret agreements, must be revised in the liberal spirit."³⁷

The entire message was permeated with a desire to represent the policy of American imperialism as the policy of an "unselfish champion of peace." Beginning with a discussion of the events occurring in Europe and the talks in Brest-Litovsk, Wilson made an obviously demagogic statement about the goals being pursued by the United States in the war against Germany: "We believe that the world should be constructed in such a way as to guarantee a secure life in it, particularly the security of each peaceful nation, which, like ours, wishes to have its own way of life, establish its own institutions and be confident of the fairness and honesty of the actions of other people in the world against force and against unjustified aggression.... The program of the world's peace, therefore, is our program."³⁸

This brief introduction was followed by the "Fourteen Points." The first point concerned international relations and diplomacy. It was an obvious attempt to seize the initiative from the Soviet Government, which had advanced a popular demand for the cessation of secret diplomacy. This point stated: "Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understanding of any kind but

diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view." The second through fifth points spoke of the freedom of navigation upon the seas, the development of international trade, the reduction of armaments and the adjustment of colonial claims.

The sixth point pertained directly to Russia.³⁹ It mentioned the "evacuation of all Russian territory"⁴⁰ and the settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and not only a welcome, but also support in everything, which she needs and which she herself desires. The treatment of Russia in coming months by her sister nations will serve as the best test of their goodwill and their understanding of her needs, which differ from these nations' own interests--a test of their judicious and unselfish sympathy."

The rest of the points spoke of Belgium, France, Italy, Austro-Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, Turkey, Poland and the formation of "a general association of nations."⁴¹

The dominant view now, even in Western historical works, is that Wilson's Fourteen Points were the direct result of the reaction to Lenin's program of peace. One of the recognized authorities on this question, American Professor J. Thompson, states: "From the very moment when the 'Bolshevist movement' began to attract attention, its peace program competed with the program of the West for the support of all people, and this challenge and the advancement of a six-point program by the new Soviet Government at the beginning of the talks in Brest-Litovsk were an important factor which led to the new formulation of the military objectives of the allied powers by Wilson and by Lloyd George in the beginning of 1918."⁴²

In making his statement, Wilson was attempting to paralyze the growing international influence of Great October. "Wilsonism" became an ideological weapon in the struggle against the revolutionary ideas coming out of Soviet Russia. In an analysis of the significance of Wilson's message of 8 January 1918 from this standpoint, American bourgeois historian A. Mayer notes that "Woodrow Wilson's appealing picture of the world to come...strategically reinforced by American financial assistance and economic opportunities, could keep...many socialists and radicals from immediately joining the forces of revolution."⁴³ Similar goals were pursued by "Wilsonism" in regard to the people of Russia, essentially in an attempt to stop the triumphal progress of Soviet ideals.

The U.S. Government's declarations of its "love of peace" and of its "sympathy" for the Russian people were accompanied by a more and more overtly hostile policy toward the Soviet State.

For example, the reaction of the State Department to Ambassador Francis' telegram of 5 February 1918 was characteristic. In this wire, he informed the secretary of state that he was "trying to gradually set up a working relationship" with the Bolsheviks. State Department expert Miles qualified this report as "setting up contacts with the Bolshevik Government," which, in his opinion, was a symptom of a dangerous turn of events. "I conclude," Miles wrote, "that the ambassador has been strongly influenced by Robins and might slip up unless we are on the alert."⁴⁴

By the beginning of 1918 the anti-Soviet foreign policy course of the U.S. Government had been defined more distinctly and precisely. The form in which President Wilson tried to represent it, however, is still creating some illusions in that part of the American bourgeoisie which accepted Wilson's statement as a sincere appeal for the development of economic cooperation with Soviet Russia. It was precisely at that time, in the beginning of 1918, that the "American League for Assisting Russia and Working with It" was founded by a large group of representatives of American capital. The league was organizationally formed at a conference in Washington on 10 January 1918. On 3 May 1918, the EVENING POST reported that the league was founded for the purpose of implementing the sixth point in Wilson's program.⁴⁵ Through the development of trade and economic ties, the league tried to keep Russia as an ally in the war against Germany.

On 4 April 1918 the executive committee of the league announced its plan of action. The basic premise of this plan, as the announcement pointed out, was a belief that "the freedom and democracy of the Russian people are extremely important to the future of universal peace and the shattering of the militaristic and autocratic aspirations to power of Germany, Austria and their allies." The league felt that the main purpose of its activity consisted in the development of economic relations between the United States and Soviet Russia. The executive committee of the league insisted that the U.S. President and other government officials give the Russian people every kind of assistance and cooperate with them. In addition to official measures, the members of the committee felt it was necessary to establish a national citizens' organization to attract the public's attention and to use all possible resources for the purpose of expanding this work of such great importance to Russia and to the United States.⁴⁶

The administrative committee of the league was made up of 73 members--people with the most diverse convictions. These included scientists, representatives of the Red Cross and representatives of industrial and trade circles, including Senator Borah; the league was headed by Herbert Carpenter. The members of the committee included, the EVENING POST reported on 3 May 1918, the most influential people in the United States, people acquainted with the problems of Russia and international affairs, people of radical and conservative views, people with friends among the Russian leaders and people with influence on the Russians in the United States.⁴⁷

The league was not able, however, to expand its work on a broad scale, since its creation was inconsistent with the plans of the U.S. Government and, what is more, the plans of big American capital as a whole.

(To be continued)

FOOTNOTES

1. L. I. Brezhnev, "Great October and the Progress of Mankind," KOMMUNIST, No 16, 1977, p 16.
2. W. A. Williams, "American Intervention in Russia in 1917-1920," ISTORIYA SSSR, No 4, 1964, p 173.
3. "Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR" [Foreign Policy Documents of the USSR], vol I, Moscow, 1959, pp 16-17.
4. G. Kennan, "Russia Leaves the War," Princeton, 1956, p 152.
5. Ibid.
6. J. Thompson, "Russia, Bolsheviks and the Versailles Peace," Princeton, 1967, pp 39, 40, 42; see also A. R. Williams, "Journey Into Revolution. Petrograd, 1917-1918," Chicago, 1969.
7. "Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR," pp 28-29.
8. "Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia," Publications of the Department of State, vol III, Wash., 1932, p 28.
9. "Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR," p 31.
10. Ibid., pp 39, 58.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., p 40.
13. Ibid., pp 41-42.
14. Ibid., p 45.
15. W. A. Williams, "American-Russians, 1781-1947," N.Y., 1952, p 85.
16. L. J. Lewery, "Foreign Capital Investments in Russian Industries and Commerce," Wash., 1923, p 27. In terms of the amounts of capital invested in the Russian economy, the United States lagged behind France (731.7 million rubles) and England (507.5 million rubles).

17. W. Z. Foster, "The Decline of World Capitalism," Moscow, 1959, p 37.
18. See "KPSS v resolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s"yezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK" [The CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions of Central Committee Congresses, Conferences and Plenums], vol I (1898-1925), Moscow, 1953, p 372.
19. W. A. Williams, "Op. cit., p 173.
20. "Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia," vol I, Wash., 1931, pp 251-252.
21. Ibid., pp 252-253.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., p 254.
24. "Intimate Paper of Colonel House," vol III, translated from the English, Moscow, 1939, p 201.
25. "War Memoirs of Robert Lansing," N.Y., 1935, pp 340-343.
26. Ibid., p 344.
27. Quoted in: W. A. Williams, Op. cit., p 175.
28. "War Memoirs of Robert Lansing," p 345.
29. "Istoriko-diplomaticheskiy arkhiv MID SSSR" [Diplomatic History Archives of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs] (hereafter called the IDA), microfilm collection.
30. Quoted in: W. A. Williams, Op. cit., p 176.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., p 177.
33. Ibid.
34. "Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia," vol I, p 317.
35. Ibid., p 271.
36. "Russian-American Relations," March 1917-March 1920. Documents and Papers, N.Y., 1920, pp 57-58.

37. "Intimate Paper of Colonel House," vol III, p 226.
38. "Russian-American Relations," pp 70-71.
39. Neither Soviet Russia nor the Soviet Government was mentioned in Wilson's message. He spoke of "Russia," "the Russian people" and so forth.
40. This was in reference to the withdrawal of the troops of the Quadruple Alliance from "Russian territory."
41. "Russian-American Relations," pp 71-74. For a translation and discussion of the Fourteen Points, see "Intimate Paper of Colonel House," vol V, Moscow, 1944, pp 148-157.
42. J. M. Thompson, Op. cit., p 17.
43. A. Mayer, "Political Origins of the New Diplomacy," New Haven, 1959, p 392.
44. Quoted in: W. A. Williams, Op. cit., p 181.
45. "Arkhib vneshney politiki MID SSSR" [Foreign Policy Archives of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs] (hereafter called AVP SSSR), collection 129, file 2, drawer 2, case 15, line 11 (newspaper excerpts).
46. Ibid., lines 8-9.
47. Ibid., line 11 (newspaper excerpts).

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CSO: 1803

UNITED STATES PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO LATIN AMERICA AND SOUTH AFRICA

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 78
pp 68-73

[Article by V. Yu. Vasil'kov and P. G. Litavrin]

[Text] On the eve of the U.S. President's official visit to Black Africa and South America (he traveled to Venezuela, Brazil, Nigeria and Liberia), which took place in March and April of this year, NEW YORK TIMES correspondent T. Smith wrote that each nation included in the itinerary is of special significance to the United States and plays a definite role in the politics of the developing states.

Venezuela, with which the American President began this trip, is the largest producer and exporter of oil in Latin America and its position as a member of OPEC on oil prices is extremely important for the United States. In addition to this, Venezuela is an active participant in the movement of the Latin American countries for the establishment of egalitarian and mutually beneficial trade and economic relations between the United States and its southern neighbors and for the consolidation of national sovereignty. During Carter's stay in Caracas, the Venezuelan public resolutely criticized Washington for its failure to make any cardinal advances in Latin American policy. For example, 1,300 people, including Chairman Gustavo Machado of the Communist Party of Venezuela, famous writer Miguel Otero Silva and presidential candidates Hector Mujica and Jose Vicente Rangemo, sent the U.S. President a petition demanding that the economic blockade of Cuba be lifted. Several Venezuelan student and youth organizations condemned Washington's hypocritical campaign "in defense of human rights," underscoring the inconsistency of the U.S. declarations with this country's support of the reactionary regimes in Chile, Paraguay, Nicaragua and other countries which are harshly suppressing all of the freedoms and rights of the individual.

Although both sides expressed their common views on such matters as "the observance of human rights" and "stronger mutual cooperation" in an official communique marking the conclusion of the talks in Caracas, noted the importance of deliveries of Venezuelan oil to the United States and spoke in

support of Latin American integration, the visit to Venezuela did not produce the results Washington expected. First of all, Venezuela refused to make any kind of commitments concerning the maintenance of stable oil prices. President Perez reminded Carter that Venezuela had nationalized the petroleum industry and a number of other branches of its economy primarily in its own interest, to put an end to the merciless exploitation of Venezuelan natural resources by foreign monopolies.

J. Carter could not offer any real program of U.S. economic cooperation with Venezuela in particular and with all of the Latin American countries in general on the basis of complete equality. This is understandable. Any step taken by Washington in this direction would inevitably encroach upon the interests of multinational corporations operating in Latin America, in which the leading role is played by American capital. It is indicative, for example, that J. Carter did not even touch upon existing U.S. trade legislation that is frankly aimed at frustrating the interests of many Latin American countries, including Venezuela. Speaking before the Venezuelan Congress, the U.S. President limited himself to general statements about the need for "concerted effort," coordinated action and so forth.

The circumstances of J. Carter's visit to Brazil were even more complex. This nation has long been represented by American politicians and writers as some kind of "new model of dynamic national capitalism." At the same time, it is still totally dependent on foreign capital, primarily American. For example, the deficit in Brazil's trade with the United States annually reaches 2.2 billion dollars, and it owes more than 30 billion dollars to the largest industrial banks.

Nonetheless, the military regime in power in this largest nation of the Latin American continent pretends that Brazil is the "leader" of Latin America, "pointing the way to stable and independent development." This is completely consistent with the interests of international capital, which is striving to use the "Brazilian model" to consolidate its own positions, not just in Latin America but in all of the developing countries. For example, the American, West German and other foreign corporations operating in Brazil have been granted an opportunity to expand into other nations under the guise of "national Brazilian capital."

There is tension, however, in the relations between Brazil and the United States. To a large extent, it has resulted from the policy of harsh political repression within the nation conducted by the Brazilian military government. This has compromised the "Brazilian course of development" in the eyes of other nations, is contributing to constant tension in Brazil itself and, to a great extent, is slowing down its economic development. It was precisely for these reasons that Washington felt it necessary to criticize this policy, and this evoked a sharp reaction on the part of the Brazilian Government.

The purpose of J. Carter's trip to this country was primarily to eliminate the "misunderstanding" and to "explain" Washington's critical demarches. This again pointed up the inconsistency and hypocrisy of the U.S. Administration in the issue of human rights. J. Carter's visit to Brazil showed that it was not at all the persecution of democrats and progressive forces that gave Washington cause for "concern," since it has closed its eyes to this persecution for the last 13 years. The actual reason was that the "Brazilian model," this showcase of the capitalist course of development, has begun to quickly crack in full view of all Latin America and all of the developing countries. Evidently, the current American Administration intends to mend this "model" through joint effort with Brazilian ruling circles.

Great significance was attached in Washington to J. Carter's trip to Nigeria, the African country with the largest population. During the first half of the 1970's, relations between the United States and this nation evolved from coldness to overt hostility and were in an extremely pitiful state by the time the Carter Administration took office. There were many direct causes. The aggravation of these relations began as a result of the more than two-faced stand taken by the United States during the civil war in Nigeria in 1967-1970, which actually signified Washington's support for the Biafran separatists. Relations became even worse in 1975, when President G. Ford sent a confidential "directive" letter to a number of African countries, including Nigeria, on the eve of an OAU session where the issue of the recognition of Angola was to be discussed. This letter "recommended" that the withdrawal of Cuban military personnel and Soviet specialists from Angola be demanded "in exchange" for the departure of South African troops. A mission headed by W. Shaufele, assistant secretary of state for African affairs, was sent to Africa at the same time for the same purpose. Enraged by this outright dictating, Lagos made the American "directive" public and categorically rejected it, calling upon the other African countries to also resist U.S. pressure. In January 1976, Nigeria closed the CIA radio station in Kaduna and refused to receive then Secretary of State H. Kissinger, who was making "all-night" trips in an attempt to force the African countries to accept the American terms of regulation in the south of Africa.

When the new administration came to the White House, the United States began to conduct a more active policy toward Nigeria. Washington was lavish with its assurances of friendly feelings and of its desire for "constructive dialog." In 1977 Lagos was visited twice by A. Young, U.S. representative to the United Nations, who organized (in October 1977) an official visit to Washington by General O. Obasanjo, head of the Nigerian Government. In recent months, there have been repeated consultations between representatives of the two nations on various issues connected with the situation in African "hot spots," which attests to Washington's desire to "attach" Nigeria to its African policy. As U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT noted, "there are two important reasons, economic and political, for America's obvious respect for Nigeria. The first reason is that deposits of oil and gas make this country the richest in Black Africa and one of the main suppliers of energy resources to the United States. The second reason is that Nigeria looks like a brilliant rising star on the African horizon, with the potential ability to play the deciding peace-making role on this restless continent."

It is true that Nigeria is the largest producer of oil in Africa. By 1977, 25 percent of American oil imports were already coming from precisely this nation. In addition, the nation has large gas reserves. The volume of U.S. trade with Nigeria is now twice as great as that of trade with South Africa, and the United States has a deficit of 5 billion dollars or so in this trade. In recognition of Nigeria's growing economic significance, J. Carter said the following at the time of O. Obasanjo's visit to the United States last year: "Nigeria is the most important country in Africa in the economic sense."

As for the political role of Nigeria, the U.S. President's advisers on African affairs, particularly A. Young, have concluded that "it would be difficult to conduct the policy of the West in Africa without mediation by Nigeria," since its voice "is listened to at African forums," and that the United States "could influence African affairs indirectly, without resorting to direct intervention, if a close working relationship were to be established with the military leaders of Nigeria."

The U.S. President's visit to Lagos was also intended, as the NEW YORK TIMES noted, "to build political bridges on the basis of common economic interests" and "to turn commercial ties into political partnership." The United States also hoped, remembering the unique stand taken by Nigeria in 1973 when it refused to support the oil embargo of the Arab nations, to convince the present Nigerian leadership to use its influence in OPEC to prevent a new rise in the price of oil or to at least limit it.

Despite the generally favorable welcome the U.S. President received in Lagos, his attempts to change Nigeria's views on a number of cardinal issues were not successful. For example, Nigeria regarded the American "request" that it occupy a "special position" in OPEC as an attempt to use Nigeria as a means of splitting up this organization and refused the request. Washington was also unable to improve opportunities for American corporations in Nigeria, which reaffirmed its determination to make the accessibility of their economy to foreign companies dependent on their refusal to have any kind of trade and economic ties with South Africa.

When the situation in southern Africa was discussed, the two sides essentially remained in their previous positions. The significance attached by the United States to this issue is attested to by the parallel negotiations of American, English and Nigerian delegations with the foreign ministers of Zambia and Botswana and a representative from Tanzania. These negotiations were organized by A. Young, who accompanied the President. The United States did not wish to depart from the Anglo-American plan of "reconciliation" in southern Africa by a single iota. This plan, as we know, is intended to save the regimes of Smith and Vorster. For its part, Nigeria, although it did agree to the desirability of peaceful regulation in southern Africa in principle, firmly stated that no one would waive the interests of the black majority in this region.

In his speech in Lagos, which was advertised in the American press as "the strongest possible warning" to racists, J. Carter only repeated the thesis about the United States' "condemnation" of racism and apartheid. He called upon Nigeria--and Africa as a whole--to aid in "evolutionary changes" in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa, but did not propose any kind of effective measures for compelling the Smith and Vorster regimes to take the demands of the African majority in southern Africa into account.

In his rebuttal, O. Obasanjo noted that "taking efforts to eradicate racism on the continent" would be a real "test of the sincerity" of Washington, particularly in its campaign "in defense of human rights."

In the final communique the Nigerian side recorded its disillusionment with the refusal of "some nations" to support economic sanctions against South Africa and to censure the "internal regulation" in Rhodesia. The United States had to admit that the agreement of 3 March on "internal regulation" in Rhodesia concluded by Smith and the puppets Sithole, Chirau and Muzorewa, has not changed the illegal nature of the present regime and is unacceptable. After the close of the negotiations, J. Carter admitted that O. Obasanjo had called for more decisive steps in southern Africa and had opposed any kind of compromise in the question of turning the government over to the majority.

One of the strongest disappointments for the United States was the failure of the attempts to involve Nigeria in the anti-Soviet and anti-Cuban campaigns unleashed by the West when the socialist countries assisted Ethiopia in repulsing Somali aggression. When the situation on the Cape of Africa was being discussed, U.S. representatives tried to frighten the Nigerian leaders with the notorious threat of "military intervention by foreign states," which would allegedly "clear a path for new forms of dominion and colonialism." The African public, the influential Nigerian newspaper PUNCH wrote in this connection, has long understood that "the anti-Ethiopian and antisocialist campaign unleashed in the West is nothing other than an energetic attempt by imperialism to camouflage its mercenary goals in Africa." Nigeria made it clear that the African countries are sovereign states with the complete and inalienable right to establish any kind of relations they feel to be necessary with any other nations, including the USSR and Cuba. As a result, American diplomacy was not able to include any attacks against the policy of the USSR and Cuba in Africa in the joint American-Nigerian communique. In addition, after Carter had already left Lagos, L. Harriman, Nigerian permanent representative to the United Nations, publicly informed Washington that the position of his government "differs sharply" from the position of the United States, "not only on the issue of southern Africa, but also in regard to the Cuban military presence in Africa."

In describing the results of this trip as a whole,¹ we can say that for the United States, it was, to some degree, the summation of the first results of the "new" approach to the developing countries announced by the Democratic administration.

1. President Carter's brief stay (of only a few hours) in Liberia was of a symbolic nature and was dictated by the wish to "not offend" an ally of long standing.

The growing significance of the developing states and the changes in the international situation--particularly after the United States' defeat in Vietnam and the failure of its gamble on the schismatics in Angola--are forcing Washington to search for different, primarily non-military forms and methods of policy-making in regard to countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Naturally, this does not imply a total rejection of the use of military strength, but only a shift of emphasis from military to political, diplomatic and economic methods. The United States is trying to attain its goals by relying on local pro-Western nationalism and on social polarization, as a result of which various types of "moderate" regimes are uniting for a joint struggle against their common "threat"--the rapid spread of the ideas and practice of socialism. In this way, Washington hopes to diminish the influence of national patriotic forces in these countries and use the Africans (or Latin Americans) themselves as a means of breaking up their alliance with the socialist states.

The United States is also taking the process of the economic differentiation of states developing in accordance with the capitalist course, a process which has gone quite far, into account. As a result of the uneven development characteristic of capitalism, the nations which have been able to achieve some success in economic development have become "leaders" in their regions. The growth of the economic and military potential of the "leaders" is expanding their political role on the regional scale, even though they themselves are dependent on the developed capitalist states. The "new" element of imperialist policy, which was so clearly demonstrated during the U.S. President's trip, consists precisely in the utilization of more covert forms of dependence on international imperialism by these "leaders" to counteract the struggle of the people in the developing countries for genuine independence and the right to choose their own course of development.

The United States is relying on some of these nations, where an average level of capitalist development has been reached or is being reached in combination with a reactionary political course (for example, South Africa and Brazil) or where the regimes are "purely" reactionary but are also closely connected with the international capitalist system (for example, Saudi Arabia), not only as the transmitters of imperialism's economic influence but also as its regional policemen. By means of "African" or "Latin American" efforts, the United States is trying to establish the order it desires in the corresponding regions (let us recall, for example, the role played by South Africa, working with schismatic forces, in the attempts to defeat the forces of the MPLA in Angola).

In Washington, however, they apparently feel that, over the long range, reliance on Venezuela or Nigeria and other states of this kind (states which have abundant reserves of natural resources and, in addition, a good deal of authority in their regions as a result of their independent political course) is more promising from the standpoint of the consolidation of American interests in the developing countries than the support of pro-American dictatorial regimes. It is assumed that deeper capitalist development in these countries will sooner or later lead them into the channel of American policy, despite

the simultaneous growth of conflicts with these nations--which already include inter-capitalist conflicts. Besides this, nationalist slogans, the policy of "attaching" economic programs of development to the system of international capitalism and the course of bourgeois parliamentarism objectively contribute to the growth of the strength and influence of the local bourgeoisie, which guarantees a more solid base for the development of these countries in accordance with the capitalist course.

Therefore, a "combination course" is quite apparent in the current American approach to the developing countries: The continued support of "old friends"--the reactionary "subimperialist" regimes which are being given more "democratic" hues--and the simultaneous playing of games with all countries acquiring great economic significance in their regions in the expectation of their political evolution in the direction of an alliance with imperialism in the future.

The itinerary chosen by the U.S. President should be assessed in the context of this "new" approach.

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'PEACE CORPS'--NEW MYTHS AND REALITY

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pp 73-78

[Article by A. V. Verein]

[Text] After consigning it to a long period of oblivion, the United States has suddenly remembered the Peace Corps. Articles with titles like "The Peace Corps Is Ready to Go Back" or "We Want 2,700 Volunteers" have begun to appear in the American press with increasing frequency. These articles are intended for more than a specific propaganda effect. They are also the result of concrete steps taken by the White House and Congress, which have displayed a direct interest in reviving this "ridiculed and bemoaned organization," as U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT recently called the Peace Corps. According to the magazine, this would fit in best with President J. Carter's "Messianic-moralistic" ideas.

The first step in this direction was the appointment of new administrators to head ACTION--a centralized federal agency created in 1971 to unite eight volunteer organizations," including the Peace Corps.

In February and March 1977, Congress approved the appointments of new ACTION Director Sam Brown and his assistant Mary King.

In 1968 S. Brown was one of the men managing the election campaign of E. McCarthy, Democratic candidate for the U.S. Presidency. After the election defeat, he worked in the Peace Corps, particularly in India and Nepal. Mary King, in addition to holding the position of deputy director of ACTION, is the U.S. President's special assistant on "women's affairs"; when J. Carter was the governor of Georgia, she worked on his staff as an adviser on these same issues.

The final step in the reorganization and rearrangement was the decision to restore the position of Peace Corps director to give the Corps "more independence"; this position was liquidated in 1971--that is, after the Corps became part of ACTION. Carolyn Payton, psychology instructor at Harvard University, was appointed to this position.¹ She joined the Peace Corps in 1964 and was later the Peace Corps director's special assistant on the Latin American region.

Therefore, a complete "changing of the guard" took place on the administrative level of the "apostles of peace." Replacements of this kind had taken place earlier as well, as each new administration came to Washington. The most distinctive feature of the latest appointments is that they reaffirm the previously noted tendency to promote persons with greater practical experience in a particular field to administrative positions. Whereas administrative appointments in the Peace Corps were previously given to diplomats, other state officials and representatives of the university elite and the business community, now almost half of the administrative personnel on the central staff of the Corps and the overseas staffs are former "model volunteers." At one time, the press described them as people who combined "the qualities of a missionary, a Boy Scout leader, a social worker, an army officer and an executive."

For a fuller description, we must add that all of them are highly paid officials. The salary of the chief director, approved at last year's congressional session, is now 47,000 a year,² while total budget allocations for the Peace Corps for the 1979 fiscal year have been set at 95.1 million dollars, or several million more than last year. In all, between 1961 and 1980 Corps appropriations totaled 1.5 billion dollars, allocated from funds envisaged in the act on "the mutual safeguarding of security." Since President Truman's time, these funds have been used for anticommunist espionage and diversionary actions.

Another important step in the campaign to revive the Peace Corps was the resumption of Senate hearings on the state of affairs in this "philanthropic organization" last year, after an interval of 6 years. They were previously held in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, but were organized this time in its foreign aid subcommittee. The basis for the discussion was a report on the future of the Peace Corps, which was compiled by the Aspen Institute of Humanistic Studies.³

This report and subsequent statements stressed the need to reinstate the goals and objectives of the Peace Corps in their original form, as defined under President Kennedy.

As we know, the imperialist, neocolonialist nature of this agency has always been concealed by its disguise as a cultural, educational and missionary volunteer alliance. This also applies to the new program, which is based on the premise that the Peace Corps, in accordance with the original plans of its organizers, will be guided by the slogan of "face-to-face" or "man-to-man" communication, which will be "more appealing and comprehensible" to the people of the developing countries than "government-to-government" communication. Consequently, its personnel are required to penetrate the most remote areas and perform their work on the lowest level, "on the community level," to which American diplomats and representatives of cultural centers do not have access.

This is not a new idea. It has been repeatedly set forth in the past, particularly in connection with the general goal of keeping the people of these countries within the capitalist system. As early as 1962, C. Bowles, the U.S. President's special assistant, spoke of the importance of the Peace Corps' penetration of the very "heart" of the developing countries and backed this statement up by the reasoning that "the 75 percent of the population now living in rural areas will essentially determine the political and economic future of Latin America, Asia and Africa."

Furthermore, the Peace Corps is supposed to be aimed at filling the "most immediate needs" of the people in the developing countries in the areas of public health, agriculture, afforestation, irrigation and education. "We need programs," S. Brown said, "which will not require resources, equipment and personnel from the United States but will leave a perceptible trace even after the volunteers leave." For this reason, the hiring structure is to be changed. Since the Peace Corps will not be involved in the construction of complex engineering structures, there will be no need for specialists in these particular fields. Instead, Americans with a "broad background in the humanities," capable of "maximum flexible adaptation to local conditions," are to be recruited.

Volunteers of this kind will also be the best possible executors of another important task the Peace Corps plans to resume: the collection and analysis of "sociological" information. It has already accumulated a certain amount of experience in this field. For example, there was the so-called sociological programs of "community development," the purpose of which was stated in the following way in the sixth annual report of the Peace Corps, dated 30 June 1967: "The organizers of 'community development' programs must observe the kind of people they are dealing with, what they want and which of them has authority.... The volunteer must be educated and well trained for the collection of detailed information. He must be bold enough to knock on doors and begin conversations, and must not be squeamish. He must be able to sit in a bar with everyone else and eat and drink what the locals eat and drink and, after he goes home, he must write down everything, without leaving out a single detail."

The actual nature of this kind of "sociological" research is quite obvious, although S. Brown says that the Peace Corps should be unrelated to any kind of investigative agencies and that its personnel should not be asked to perform "intelligence functions." In saying this, the director of ACTION actually acknowledged the ties between the Corps and the CIA. Incidentally, this was already known even before his frank statement. The many disclosures of these ties severely damaged the authority of the "apostles of peace" from the United States and gave them the reputation of missionaries of imperialism and neocolonialism.

The new Peace Corps program envisages its active involvement in UN international programs. The idea of giving it international status, which was particularly supported during the hearings before the Senate subcommittee

by H. Cleveland, director of the Aspen Institute, and expert T. Scanlon, is also not original in any way, as American diplomacy was persistently working toward the adoption of this project by the United Nations as early as the end of the 1960's. The Peace Corps is now involved to an insignificant degree in a number of multilateral UN projects; in particular, it is working with the FAO in Colombia. But the objective of doing this on a massive scale and on a regular basis has now been set. "The volunteers will not be treated like spies or cultural imperialists if they work with international organizations.... This would be the best strategy under the conditions of peace after guardianship," T. Scanlon feels. Appeals for Peace Corps involvement in approximately 50 percent of these programs in 1978 were heard during the hearings in the House of Representatives last September.

Finally, the National Advisory Council of the Peace Corps, headed by the U.S. vice-president,⁴ is to resume its activity and enlist the aid of prominent political and public figures, including figures from the Asian, African and Latin American countries, in this work. According to the heads of the Peace Corps, this should guarantee their organization broader support and constant attention on the highest level.

The new leadership feels that one of its primary tasks should be to contact all former Peace Corps employees and enlist their active assistance in its restoration. A special lobby made up of many former Corps activists has been formed in Washington. Some of these people occupy high-level positions in the Carter Administration. For example, Tim Kraft is the President's special assistant for appointments, Russell Baker is associate deputy attorney general, Lionel Castillo is the director of the Federal Immigration and Naturalization Service and Paul Tsongas and Christopher Dodd are congressmen. Around 90 people who served in the Peace Corps at different times now work on the congressional staff and actively assist their former agency.

Special significance is being attached to the expansion of Peace Corps activity on the African continent. In June 1977 a conference of the heads of ACTION branches from 20 states in Black Africa was convened in Dakar. A report on the new policy of the Peace Corps was read by Deputy Director M. King. The reaction of the developing countries to Washington's attempts to revive the Peace Corps was tested at the meeting in Dakar.

In the summer of 1977, a record 2,700 volunteers were hired by Peace Corps headquarters and sent to 64 countries. According to the 25 December 1977 issue of the NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, the activities of this organization are to extend to all of the developing countries within the next few years.

The Peace Corps was born in 1961, at a time when Washington was entertaining the idea of "intercepting revolution" in the young states of Asia, Africa and Latin America which had thrown off the colonial yoke. This idea was based on a desire to prevent progressive change in the liberated countries, keep them in capitalism's orbit and subordinate their economic and political development to the interests of American imperialism, either through armed

aggression, as was the case in Vietnam, or through giving them "aid" in the struggle against indigence and poverty "on the basis of the principles of an American, and not communist, revolution." The role of the Peace Corps consists in propaganda of the American way of life and the capitalist course of development, and it is regarded as one of the means of U.S. social expansion and as an effective channel of U.S. influence in the developing countries.

In the beginning, the Peace Corps managed to introduce itself into approximately half of the developing countries, and by 1966 it had 15,500 active members. In such countries as India, Colombia, Brazil, Malaysia, Ethiopia, Peru and a few others, the number of Peace Corps employees reached 1,000 or more some years.

There were a number of reasons for its "rapid success." The widely advertised Peace Corps programs were externally deceiving: education in schools and in universities, medical assistance and the improvement of agricultural methods--and all of this without any kind of direct financial expenditures by the "host country."

An important role was played by official Washington's active support of Corps activities, as American ruling circles never doubted that this activity was completely in the interest of the United States.

The experience of the missionaries of the past was taken into account and utilized. The efforts of these missionaries prepared the way for the seizure of many territories in Asia, Africa and Latin America. At the same time, we cannot discount the significance of the fact that the first people sent out by the Corps included many idealistic young men and women who believed in their "philanthropic mission."⁵ Their desire to assist the local population in their struggle against the poverty and ignorance they had inherited from the colonial era met with a positive response, particularly in the regions where they were the only foreigners.

The penetration and consolidation of the Peace Corps in the developing countries contributed to the dependence of many of them on monopolistic capital and their participation in military and political blocs under the aegis of the United States. The Corps operated in most of the countries which were receiving American military aid. There was also some blackmail involved: "Accept our volunteers and your next loan will be granted." For example, in exchange for economic "aid," the United States was able to resume Corps activities in Guinea, which had evicted the Corps in 1966.

But the "honeymoon" did not last long. The people of Asia, Africa and Latin America quickly recognized the neocolonial essence of the Peace Corps. Many developing countries made sharp cuts in the number of "corpsmen" on their territory, while others, like India, Ethiopia, Libya, Sri Lanka, Peru, Pakistan, Panama and others, completely refused their services. As a result, the size of the Peace Corps dropped from 15,500 members in 1966 to 6,000 in 1977; half of them, however, are working in such important spheres as education and culture.

Tactics and forms of operation were changed and programs were given "new directions." Black Americans began to be chosen for volunteer work in the African countries. Attempts were even made to recruit local inhabitants for the Corps. But all of these attempts to breath new life into the Peace Corps suffered failure after failure.

At the beginning of the 1970's broad-scale reorganization was begun, as a result of which the Peace Corps was made part of the ACTION agency. This plan, however, was also unsuccessful. Although Corps employees were operating under a new title, they continued to be evicted from the nations to which they were sent.

Frequent attempts have been made in the United States to place the blame for the Corps' decline on President R. Nixon. The "sudden decline" in Peace Corps activity, a U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT editorial of 17 October 1977 stated, for example, began after 1968 because "Republican Nixon tried to denigrate or even totally bury the Peace Corps, which was closely associated with the name of Democrat Kennedy."

The matter, however, does not lie in the tactical errors or motives of individual leaders, but in the developing nations' nonacceptance of the American way of life, which was being, and is still being, forced upon them.

The campaign to revive the Peace Corps has coincided--naturally, not without good reason--with the Carter Administration's extensive measures to heighten the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy propaganda and adapt American ideological institutions to the changing situation in the world at a time of international detente.

In an attempt to preserve and consolidate their positions in the developing countries, U.S. ruling circles are trying to resurrect old ideological myths and stereotypes by giving them a more modern appearance. The modernization of the Peace Corps, which is aimed at its deeper penetration into all spheres of social life in the developing countries and at the guaranteed influence of bourgeois ideology on the consciousness of the masses on a broader scale, serves as a concrete reflection of this general tendency in imperialist policy.

FOOTNOTES

1. C. Payton is the fourth director of the Peace Corps. The first, for 5 years, was S. Shriver--President Kennedy's brother-in-law, millionaire, diplomat and renowned public figure in the United States. Later, this position was occupied by J. Vaughn, former U.S. ambassador to Panama, and J. Blatchford, head of the American volunteer firm "ACCION International" on the Latin American continent (it later became known that this firm was closely connected with the CIA).

2. In 1961 S. Shriver received 25,000 dollars a year. D. Blatchford's salary was 40,000 dollars. National and regional directors are paid from 10,000 to 30,000 dollars a year.
3. In 1976, in line with a contract with the federal ACTION agency, the Aspen Institute conducted a survey among representatives of the scientific and business communities, propaganda services and former Peace Corps personnel. The respondents included S. Shriver, J. Vaughn and J. Blatchford. Each was asked four questions:

"What kind of world will the Americans be faced by during the next 2 decades?" "What are the concerns and values of Americans, particularly youth, at the present time?" "Can the overseas activity of Peace Corps volunteers effectively influence the attitude of Americans toward world problems? If so, then why?" "Can the Peace Corps be of any use to the U.S. Government in the form in which it now exists in line with the question asked in the previous point?"

Two conferences were held to discuss the results of this survey, and reports and recommendations were drawn up.

4. The National Advisory Council of the Peace Corps was a consultative agency whose members were appointed by the U.S. Government. During the 1961-1969 period it was headed by Vice-Presidents L. Johnson, H. Humphrey and S. Agnew. In December 1969 astronaut Neil Armstrong, the commander of the Apollo 11 spaceship and the first man on the moon, was appointed chairman of the council in an attempt to elevate the prestige of the Peace Corps. During the 1970's, under the Republican administration of R. Nixon, the council gradually ceased to exist.
5. These were mainly young people under the age of 24-26, but, naturally, middle-aged individuals were also accepted. For example, Lillian Carter, the mother of U.S. President J. Carter, worked for the Peace Corps in India in 1967-1969. In 1977 she headed the U.S. Government delegation at the funeral of Indian President F. Ahmed. During this visit, the American side examined the possibilities for the Corps' return to this nation.

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CSO: 1803

MOTOR TRUCK MANUFACTURE

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 78
pp 79-89

[Article by B. V. Skvortsov]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1803

CONGRESS: LABYRINTHS OF POWER AND FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 78
pp 90-99

[Article by Yu. A. Ivanov]

[Text] The interrelations between the executive branch, personified by the President and the federal bureaucracy under his jurisdiction on the one hand, and the legislative authority--Congress--on the other, play an exceedingly important role in the political life of the United States of America; in particular, this applies to foreign policy-making. For this reason, the more active interest taken by Congress in foreign policy issues in the 1970's has attracted particular attention to the factors influencing the position occupied in this sphere by the highest legislative authority.

According to the Constitution of the United States, Congress has fairly extensive prerogatives in relation to the foreign economic ties of the nation, including the regulation of foreign trade, the granting of loans, the establishment of customs duties and the regulation of the value of national currency. If we exclude these primarily economic constitutional premises, as well as some others which have obviously become obsolete (as, for example, the power to define and punish piracies), however, Congress has the following prerogatives in the area of foreign policy: It has the power to declare war and raise and support armed forces; the ratification of foreign policy treaties and appointments to major diplomatic and military positions require the "advice and consent" of the Senate; Congress has control over the allocation of financial resources for the execution of foreign policy acts, the fulfillment of international commitments and the conduct of military operations.

We should add that Congress can also use certain other constitutional powers to exert pressure on the President in connection with foreign policy issues. It can exert definite influence on the executive branch and public opinion by adopting resolutions, publishing statements by congressmen, conducting investigations and hearings in its committees and publishing documents on foreign policy issues.¹

Constitutional premises, however, are no more than the legal framework of the federal foreign policy machinery that has been taking shape up to the last quarter of the 20th century in the United States. The machinery itself and the methods by which it functions have departed quite a distance from the letter of the Constitution and, for this reason, it would be wrong to try to define Congress' place in foreign policy-making.

The executive and legislative branches of the United States are two pillars of the machinery of state of the ruling class. The resulting community of basic class and political goals represents the basis on which cooperation between the Congress and the President is built. This kind of unity, however, does not exclude the possibility of fights between them, as these reflect the rivalry between various groups of monopolies, their different views on specific political goals and the methods of their attainment, and the desire of various influential groups to make use of public administration levers for their own purposes.

Bourgeois researchers and the mass media have tried to prove that Congress is the most representative body in the machinery of national administration. The extent to which these statements contradict the facts is attested to, if by nothing else, by the fact that Congress is an assembly of professional politicians; during the 20th century, particularly the postwar period, there has been a tendency toward the retention of all legislators with seats in previous sessions in the new sessions of Congress. Between 1940 and 1971, the number of persons replaced in the Capitol as a result of each election has decreased from approximately one-fourth to one-sixth of the total number of congressmen, and in 1968 it was even less than 10 percent. The relatively high percentage of newly elected congressmen in 1974 (21 percent) was apparently the result of the unique "post-Watergate" atmosphere in the nation, and after the next elections, in 1976, the figure again dropped to 15 percent.

In a recently published work on the role of Congress, American scholar M. Fiorina writes: "Congress today has been seized by professional politicians.... Since World War II, almost 90 percent of all those occupying congressional seats have run for re-election at the end of each term, and approximately 90 percent who have run have been successful."²

A common feature of the political career in both congressional houses is the need to constantly strive for re-election, and for members of the House of Representatives, which is totally re-elected every 2 years, the struggle to retain their seats in elections simply becomes a way of life. We must also remember that, according to the Constitution, only a resident of a particular electoral district can be elected to the House of Representatives, and only a resident of a particular state can be elected to the Senate. This rule makes the congressman or senator completely dependent on the demands, moods and interests of his electoral district or state. Naturally, this means local interests as they are interpreted primarily by monopolies based in the particular district or state, as the legislator's re-election depends largely on their support, both financial and organizational.

Not one member of Congress would be bold enough to vote against the interests of the business community in his district or state, as this would be political suicide. Even such an influential senator as W. Fulbright, the former chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, always voted in favor of bills which benefited the oil and gas companies. Once he frankly told some friends that "he would not be re-elected in Arkansas if he tried to stand up to the powerful oil bloc."³

Congress' vulnerability to influences of this kind, particularly the pressure exerted by local businessmen, contributes, in particular, to a situation in which this link of the American political machinery can be used for their own purposes by opponents of international detente. All American statesmen experience the tangible pressure of the dominant ideology of anticommunism. However, while the President and the administration are forced by their position to take the realities of international life into consideration in the engineering of national foreign policy and to act in line with them, the members of Congress do not bear this kind of extensive responsibility and, besides this, are subjected to this kind of pressure to a greater extent. This is also due to their dependence on re-election in their own district or state, where the decisive role might be played by conservative businessmen or simply rich and influential adherents of anti-communism from the far right of the political spectrum.

Therefore, Congress always has the potential to become an instrument for counteracting realistic steps toward detente and the improvement of Soviet-American relations, as has been the case on numerous occasions in recent years.

Special studies and the general press have repeatedly pointed out that it is sometimes more difficult to gain congressional support for reasonable compromises and realistic steps toward detente than for the continuation of the "tough line." One of the reasons for this is evidently the fact that, although the majority of Americans, as public opinion polls testify, approve of the improvement of Soviet-American relations in principle, their views are not embodied in strong, organized action. At the same time, politically influential and well-organized groups--the military-industrial complex, the Zionist lobby and anticommunists of every stripe--come together and take action on the platform of struggle against detente. This alignment of forces on the level of local politics is reflected in the positions occupied by Congress, where the advocates of an arms buildup invariably constitute the majority, and the White House can always rely completely on the support of these groups when it is a "tough" foreign policy line that is being implemented.

One indication of the dependence of the members of Congress on local interests is their vulnerability to pressure on the part of the capital of certain ethnic groups, such as the Jewish community, the Irish, the Greeks and others. The degree of influence these groups have on members of Congress varies and depends on their economic position, political importance,

extent of organization and size, but their pressure is so perceptible that it affects U.S. policy on some international issues.

The most striking example of this, naturally, is the policy of the United States in the Middle East: According to American scholar F. Wilcox, the effect of domestic political considerations has been more decisive here than in any other foreign policy issue.⁴ Naturally, pro-Israeli positions are occupied by various political forces in the United States, but there is no question that the exceedingly influential Zionist lobby represents the center around which all active supporters of Israel have rallied.

In their struggle for re-election, members of Congress must take the influence of Zionists on the local level into account and, consequently, the majority in Congress invariably occupies pro-Israeli positions. This has resulted in a situation in which the Israeli Government actually conducts its policy on two levels in its relations with Washington, dealing with the executive branch and with an invariably friendly Congress. Through the years, a customary political tactic has even been worked out, and it is to this tactic that the Israeli leaders resort every time they want something from the White House: They appeal to Congress through the Zionist lobby and get what they want.

In terms of its influence, the pro-Israeli lobby represents an extraordinary phenomenon in American political practices. Other ethnic minorities, however, can also affect foreign policy by using Congress for their own purposes if they have enough economic and political influence. For example, the imposition of the embargo and the later restrictions on deliveries of weapons to Turkey after the Cyprus crisis of 1974 was largely a result of active pressure on Congress by representatives of the sizable and influential Greek community in the United States. It should also be noted, however, that the lobbies of ethnic minority groups are usually only able to win much more modest forms of support from members of Congress--public statements of sympathy for their position, presentation of the proper speeches, or, at the most, the adoption of non-binding and symbolic resolutions and the introduction of amendments with no chance of adoption. In resorting to this ruse, the member of Congress is paying a cheap price for election support from the emigrant organizations, as he himself is quite aware of the demagogic and unproductive nature of this kind of symbolic declaration.

The great extent of their dependence on "their own" groups of capital unavoidably causes members of Congress to take a utilitarian, regional and narrowminded approach to various problems, relegating the national interest, as it were, to a position of secondary importance, and this naturally has a negative effect on the engineering of foreign policy. Prominent American jurist B. Manning, chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations, has written that an essential element of international negotiations is "bargaining, which often might produce results that are extremely beneficial to the collective national interests of the United States but harm the interests of some American domestic subgroups." These subgroups, however, can work through Congress to prevent this kind of compromise from being

made.⁵ A vivid example of this can be seen in the negative position occupied by an influential segment of Congress in regard to international detente.

The peculiarities of the organizational structure of the legislative branch and, above all, the existence of a diversified system of standing committees in both houses, constitute one of the important factors determining the capabilities of Congress as a component of the foreign policy-making machinery.

It is precisely in the committees that most of the legislative work of Congress is concentrated. In addition, their functions include making contacts with related subdivisions of the federal machinery of state, overseeing their activities, investigating the actions of federal agencies as well as private individuals and organizations and conducting hearings on matters under the jurisdiction of the particular committee. In most cases, the committee has the deciding vote on the wording of legislative acts: Amendments are rare when bills submitted by the committees are examined in the houses. According to J. Robinson's calculations in his analysis of a 10-year period, the Senate approved 91 percent of the bills and resolutions submitted by the Committee on Foreign Relations; amendments were only adopted in 20 percent of the cases when the bills were examined in the Senate.⁶

The leading role in the work of each committee is played by its chairman. He calls meetings, decides which issues will be examined and when, determines the issues requiring hearings, etc. In recent years, however, there has been some decline in the influence of the committee chairmen in connection with the institution of a new procedure for their election by the party faction (in the past, these posts were filled automatically in accordance with the "rule of seniority").

The reduced authority of the committee chairmen is introducing a new element into the interrelations between the executive branch and Congress, particularly in the area of foreign policy-making. When the committee chairmen were omnipotent, it was precisely these men who constituted the link in the congressional structure to which the administration usually turned for advice on planned measures. After gaining their consent, the White House could expect support from the necessary committee and, consequently, from Congress. Consultations of this kind on questions of domestic policy and national security made it possible, incidentally, to avoid undesirable publicity. The new status of the chairmen threatens the existing system of communication, and although it is still in effect, it, on the one hand, is being criticized in the Congress and, on the other, is losing much of its value to the administration, as feelings of good will on the part of the chairmen are ceasing to signify automatic support for the particular action by the committee and Congress.

The system of standing committees represents, as it were, the first level in the specialization and division of authority within Congress. The second level is composed of subcommittees, which are created within each committee for the performance of the same functions but in connection with a more

limited group of issues. The norms of interrelations between each committee and its subcommittees are quite similar to those of relations between the committees and the houses--that is, the committee generally approves the proposals of its subcommittees and, reinforcing them with its own authority, turns them over for examination by the house. The role of the subcommittee in the legislative process is constantly growing because it is precisely on this level that bills are worded, and changes in this wording can only be made by means of amendments during subsequent stages of the bill's examination. Experience has shown that a decline in the influence of the committee chairmen results in a further increase in the weight of subcommittees and their chairmen.

Their primary role in the preparation of legislation, their narrow specialization and the extremely limited coverage of the activities of the congressional bodies by the mass media were the preconditions for the present situation in which it is precisely the subcommittees that have become the particular link in the congressional structure where three sides cooperate most effectively on each specific issue--the legislators, the related subdivisions of the federal bureaucracy and the representatives of capital's interest groups.

V. I. Lenin noted that in the bourgeois state "the real work of administration lies in the hands of a gigantic army of functionaries."⁷ This applies completely to the United States. The President himself appoints the heads of the departments and agencies responsible for implementing the political decisions of the White House. The actual administration of the enormous federal bureaucratic system is accomplished, however, one level below, where approximately 8,000 high-level officials of the civil and diplomatic services and military men of high rank function. This bureaucratic elite has an interest in close cooperation with the particular links of the legislative branch which make decisions on the authority, organizational structure, staffs and, finally, funding of their agencies. The members of Congress have an equal interest in this kind of close cooperation, however, since the expenditure of federal funds in their states or electoral districts, the placing of federal orders for construction or the distribution of profitable government contracts in these areas and many other considerations of this kind depend on these bureaucratic functionaries.

The lobbyists of those who have a direct interest in the content of future congressional acts display their greatest activity on this same level of the first and most decisive steps in the legislative process in the subcommittees. This primarily applies to the large corporations. As for questions of foreign policy and national security, in addition to the influence of "ethnic" lobbies, the strongest pressure on Congress is exerted in this sphere by representatives of the military-industrial complex. Prominent American journalists D. Pearson and J. Anderson regard the lobbyists of the military-industrial complex as "the most powerful pressure group" in Washington, which "annually inflates expenditures, burdening the federal budget with unnecessary billions, which inevitably pushes foreign policy in the direction of war."⁸

This means that trilateral centers of influence, triangles of cooperation by Congress, the bureaucracy and the monopolies, are formed on the level of the subcommittees. In this kind of triangle, each of the sides has an interest in cooperating with the other two, as the results of this cooperation will take the form of material benefits for some and the satisfaction of political and other ambitions for others. We must remember, however, that the most independent and strongest components of this triangle is the powerful corporation, and the legislation prepared as a result of this kind of cooperation therefore inevitably reflects this balance of power.

According to W. Olson, the former head of the foreign division of the congressional research service, in addition to the subcommittees functioning within the framework of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, around 50-60 various committees and subcommittees have been involved in recent years in making decisions concerning the relations between the United States and foreign countries.⁹ Nonetheless, when cardinal issues of foreign policy and national security are discussed in Congress, the chief role is played by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the armed services committees of both houses.

The Committee on Foreign Relations headed the list of the first ten standing committees created by the Senate in December 1816, and although there was no formal difference in their degree of importance, appointments to this committee were always considered to be an honor. Within the framework of Congress, it is the most influential body in the area of foreign policy, which is in line with the constitutional powers of the Senate in this sphere.

Just as other committees, it has its own system of subcommittees, but one of the distinctive features of its operations is that bills, treaties and appointments have traditionally been discussed by the full committee. The activities of its subcommittees have generally been limited to supervisory functions. One exception to this rule is the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance and Economic Policy. It is empowered to write legislation on such specific issues touching upon many different interests as programs of economic and military aid, the sale of weapons overseas and U.S. participation in multilateral programs of assistance and international financial institutions.

The committee chairman is now J. Sparkman,¹⁰ who said that he would not run for re-election this November. The American press has predicted that the committee will be headed by F. Church in the next Congress.

Traditionally, the House of Representatives' similar committee (which has been called the Committee on Foreign Affairs since March 1975) has had much less influence on foreign policy than the Senate committee. This is not only due to the fact that the House has less constitutional powers in this field, but also to the overall political position of the House of Representatives, which has always been more inclined than the Senate to make compromises and

to concede to the executive branch in foreign policy matters. Let us recall that many of the Senate's initiatives aimed at stopping the war in Vietnam did not achieve their purpose because the House of Representatives refused to support them.

Some steps have been taken during the last few years to make this legislative body more active. There was a structural reorganization of its subcommittees in 1975. Influential Congressman C. Zablocki became chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in January 1977. The first year of the committee's work in the present Congress has confirmed the tendency toward greater activity on its part.

Both of the armed services committees--in the Senate and the House--have a firmly established reputation as bodies which invariably support the Pentagon's demands for arms buildups. The chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee is J. Stennis, and the chairman of the House committee is M. Price. Major decisions on national security are made within the framework of the executive branch, but the allocation of the necessary funds depends on Congress and, in the final analysis, on the armed services committees. Conservatives, advocates of a "tough line" in the area of foreign policy, are predominant in both committees. According to L. Aspin, member of the House committee, each congressman elected from a district in which the main employer is a large manufacturer of weapons strives to become a member of the Armed Services Committee, and "as a result, the committee is filled with congressmen who are oriented toward defense interests by their constituency." Whereas amendments concerning cuts in the defense budget have generally won 25-30 percent of the votes in the House of Representatives as a whole, they have only won 10 percent in the committee.¹¹

The primary interest of the members of these congressional bodies does not consist in the examination of major problems in national security or the determination of the total size of the defense budget, but in learning exactly who will receive defense orders and exactly where funds for military construction will be spent and military bases will be situated. The Pentagon is not stingy in rendering every kind of service to the influential members of the committees when it needs their support. It is no wonder that a wry joke once made the rounds in Congress to the effect that, if one more military installation were to be established in the coastal electoral district in Charleston of L. M. Rivers, one of the former chairmen of the House committee, the entire district would sink under the weight of the military bases. The total sum paid out to military personnel stationed in Charleston was 200 million dollars a year.¹²

A special and extremely influential role in all areas of congressional activity, including its attempts to influence foreign policy and national security policy, is played by the appropriations committees of both houses. The enactment of any legislative measure requiring expenditures calls for the passage of two bills by Congress: The first is a sanctioning bill prepared by functional committees, and the second is a bill on appropriations, including the necessary expenditures, prepared by the appropriations

committees. This gives them one of the most powerful and prestigious positions among all committees. They are not bound by the decisions of other standing committees, and even in the event that sanctioning legislation specifies precise sums of expenditures (as, for example, legislation on foreign aid), the Appropriations Committee is at liberty to increase or decrease them. It can also make other, essentially political decisions by implementing them with the aid of bills on appropriations.

The subcommittees functioning within the framework of the two appropriations committees are more independent and influential than other congressional bodies on this same level. Their members, particularly the chairmen, prepare legislation on appropriations in specific areas year after year, acquiring experience and "weight." The decisions of these subcommittees are subject to change in the committees even less frequently than those of other congressional bodies, and they completely determine the content of a future bill, at least within the framework of the position occupied by the particular house to which the committee belongs. Conservative members of Congress are predominant in both appropriations committees.

The system of committees and subcommittees turns the passage of any bill, including those on foreign policy matters, into a lengthy and multileveled process. On each of 15 levels, it can either be completely buried or considerably amended. The supporters of the proposed bill must win its approval on each of these levels, while its opponents only need a negative decision (or even "no decision") on any of these levels. This makes it possible for a small group of opponents with strong positions in the proper subcommittee or committee to effectively slow down the examination of a bill in this body, and this is frequently tantamount to its rejection, as the principle of "discontinuance" is in effect in Congress: The bill is either approved during all stages within the term of a particular Congress or is considered to be dead and is not carried over to the next Congress. The document of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations marking the 160th anniversary of this body underscores the fact that it can submit positive and negative reports to the Senate on any legislative proposal, "as a rule, the measures not approved by the committee are either held up in the committee or their examination is postponed without any kind of written explanation."¹³

A major role in the formation of Congress' views is played by the subjective factor. A long career within the walls of the Capitol and advancement to key positions in the committee structure give congressional veterans access to means of political influence. In turn, the political ideas and subjective views of these veterans leave their mark on the activities of these bodies. At the beginning of the 1970's, under the guidance of Senator W. Fulbright, a politician with extensive knowledge and experience in the area of international relations who had always defended Congress' active role in foreign policy-making, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations was an important center of influence and made significant efforts to reinforce Congress' position in this sphere and to limit recurrences of the cold war in the administration's policy. The influence and activity of the committee in this sphere diminished considerably when W. Fulbright left the Senate.

By concentrating several of the important levers of influence in his own hands--even outside the framework of the committees directly involved in foreign policy issues--any senator can force the administration to constantly take his views into account. This is the position occupied in the present Congress by Senator H. Jackson, leader of the bloc opposing detente. He heads the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and two subcommittees--on arms control in the Armed Services Committee and on investigations (the latter functions within the framework of the Committee on Governmental Affairs). The first of these posts gives him extensive opportunities to influence foreign policy aspects of energy problems, and the administration is dependent on him to some degree for congressional approval of its programs in this field. The chairmanship of the first subcommittee gives Jackson the possibility of actively opposing any constructive steps in the direction of arms limitation. Finally, the Subcommittee on Investigations, in which Jackson has already been hanging on for more than 10 years and which has gone through several changes of name during this period of time, is invariably used by the senator for the investigations he needs on the ways in which American foreign policy is made and implemented. All of this guarantees the senator--the opponent of detente--considerable influence in Washington.

The existence of a diversified and specialized system of committees and subcommittees has given rise to what is considered to be the main characteristic and, according to most researchers, the main defect of the way in which foreign policy issues are discussed in Congress--the maximum fragmentation of this process. The method of examination used by Congress not only leads to a situation in which totally unrelated and even contradictory decisions can be made on individual components of an overall problem, but can also be used for the purpose of moving important political decisions through well-disposed committees with Congress as a whole totally ignorant of this move. A. Frye, former assistant to Senator E. Brooke, reports that when the multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) began to be tested, only the members of the armed services committees and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy knew about this program, the cost of which had been estimated at 10 billion dollars, even though Congress had actually already allocated significant sums for this program over a number of years.¹⁴

In its present form, the organizational structure of Congress aids in the exertion of pressure on the legislative process during the discussion of foreign policy issues by monopolies and other influential groups with an interest in the results of this process and gives rise to a tendency toward slowing down and obstructing any new foreign policy idea or initiative, regardless of whether it has originated in Congress or has come from the administration. The organizational structure of Congress is quite effective as an instrument of counteraction, but is difficult to use for positive influence on the nation's foreign policy.

An important characteristic of the U.S. Congress, which must be taken into account for a correct evaluation of the legislative process, is the limited role played by the party structure and the party affiliation of the members of this body. In contrast to the European bourgeois parliaments with their strong faction leaders and party discipline, the Democratic and Republican organizations in Congress are extremely amorphous and independent of the national committees of the two largest bourgeois parties, while the members of Congress are not bound by the norms of factional discipline in their actions.

The main reason for the party machinery's weak influence in Congress is the dependence of the congressmen on local forces in the struggle for his reelection. The party can only give him indirect, and not decisive, assistance in the attainment of this goal. The leaders of the party factions in the two houses consequently cannot have a decisive effect on the position occupied by a member of Congress on issues directly affecting the interests of his constituency. But the opposite is also true: The less the issue being discussed touches upon these interests, the more probable it is that the legislator will take the views of his party leaders into consideration. In order to build up the necessary majority, these leaders use their own personal influence in each house, perform various services for the members of Congress (this method is particularly effective when the party controls the White House) and assume the role of active mediators for the achievement of many compromises behind the scenes.

The President holds relatively frequent consultations with the leaders of his party in Congress (less frequently with the leaders of both parties) on matters of domestic and foreign policy. They inform the President of Congress' attitude toward particular acts of the administration and the chances of their approval and recommend the methods and times for introducing initiatives originating in the executive branch.

During his first year in the White House, J. Carter relied largely on the support of Speaker T. O'Neill of the House of Representatives in his relations with Congress; the latter did much to "teach" the new President and his assistants how to get along with the Capitol. According to reports in the press, O'Neill quite often insisted on correcting the President's proposals during the course of private consultations, but successfully moved all of the particular proposals, with which he agreed and which he had promised to support, through the House. Evidently, the President can continue to expect O'Neill's assistance in his relations with the House of Representatives, and O'Neill has a solid reputation as a liberal in anything concerning foreign policy issues.

J. Carter's relationship with Senate Majority Leader R. Byrd have taken a somewhat different form. According to TIME magazine, in 1977 Byrd "ruled the Senate with the kind of firm and confident hand it had not seen since the time when the leader of the majority was Lyndon Johnson."¹⁵ This

politician is distinguished by a profound knowledge of the Senate machinery and the ability to skillfully avoid taking sides in the complex intermingling of the interests of individual senators, the multitude of Senate bodies and the groups represented in the Senate. Until R. Byrd became the majority leader, however, he almost never came into direct contact with foreign policy issues and does not have the necessary experience in this field. He occupies an independent position in relation to J. Carter and likes to stress: "I am not the President's man, I am the Senate's man." It is probable that his position will continue to depend primarily on his own political views and the alignment of forces within the Senate.

Although spokesmen for almost the entire spectrum of the political moods of the bourgeois class can be found among the legislators, who represent the Democratic and Republican parties, it would be virtually impossible to determine the differences in their views on the basis of party affiliation. In actuality, different views are not held by different factions, but by three different blocs of like-minded members of Congress, who are not united by any kind of organizational structure; the boundaries between these blocs are frequently vague and indefinite. These are the conservatives, the liberals and the center; the latter group, as G. Reedy puts it, is generally considered to be made up of all members of Congress whose views do not lend themselves to precise definition.¹⁶

Even now, at the end of the 1970's, the conservatives of both factions still adhere to the foreign policy dogmas worked out during the years of the cold war. They do not wish to recognize the changes taking place in the world, advocate the continuation of the arms race and believe that assistance should be given to any racist or dictatorial regime as long as it takes an anticommunist position.

In contrast to the straightforward position of the conservatives, the behavior of the liberal bloc in Congress is more complex and sometimes contradictory. On the one hand, it constituted the nucleus of the coalition opposing the aggression in Indochina, initiated the struggle for a more active foreign policy role for Congress, and speaks out in favor of detente and in favor of the limitation and curtailment of the arms race. On the other hand, however, the liberals are inconsistent in their approach to the development of Soviet-American relations: While their statements as a whole advocate the improvement of these relations, they sometimes undertake actions that can only make them worse. For example, they frequently support various propagandistic anti-Soviet campaigns. Most of the representatives of the liberal bloc are "hawks" in their approach to the Middle Eastern problem and invariably support Israel, and this was their position on this matter even during the period when they actively opposed the war in Vietnam and were considered to be "doves."

Although the fact that a member of Congress belongs to a particular large political bloc can serve as definite reference point for predicting his views on foreign policy issues, in many cases the conclusions based on this will only be quite approximate. For example, it can be said with certainty that any positive steps toward the improvement of relations with the USSR will be opposed by extreme conservatives--B. Goldwater, S. Thurmond or J. Helms--but in some cases the centrists and even the liberals have voted with the conservatives on some crucial foreign policy issues.

Coalitions of the supporters and opponents of a particular position are formed in Congress in connection with the specific question of foreign policy and national security (and in connection with questions of domestic policy), and each member of Congress determines his own line of behavior, basing it primarily on the interests of his electoral district--in the form in which he interprets them--and on personal expectations and considerations--and only after all this, on his own political views.

The coalition which managed to include amendments discriminating against the socialist countries in the 1974 Trade Act can serve as an example of how mixed the composition of these temporary blocs can be. It included conservatives, for whom the adoption of anti-Soviet amendments was a matter of principle, and centrists, and liberals, most of whom were following the lead of the Zionist lobby and the reactionary labor bosses headed by G. Meany.

At the beginning of the current session of Congress, many representatives of the liberal bloc, particularly the Democrats, joined the new administration's demagogic "human rights" campaign without giving any thought to the far-reaching foreign policy consequences of this step. They also refrained from criticizing the American side's departure from the Vladivostok agreement in the talks in Moscow in spring 1977. This kind of inconsistency has naturally weakened the influence of this bloc. The liberals' first attempt to occupy an independent position on a problem of national security was also unsuccessful: In the summer of 1977 they failed to exclude appropriations for the production of the neutron bomb from the budget.

On the other hand, the conservative bloc became more active in the 95th Congress. During the very first days of the new administration's activity, the conservatives chose the approval of presidential appointments to high-level positions, which, by tradition, are rarely disputed by the Senate, as the area for a test of strength. Under the pressure of this bloc, T. Sorenson, who had been appointed CIA director by the President, had to decline the nomination. P. Warnke was only established in the position of director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (as well as head of the U.S. delegation at the Soviet-American talks) after a lengthy struggle, and the Senate ballot on his appointment indicated that the bloc advocating a "tough" line in the talks with the Soviet Union was capable of winning more than one-third of the Senate over to its own side. Conservative forces

in Congress have recently been waging a campaign, using, in particular, H. Jackson's subcommittee, attacking the second Soviet-American agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms that is being drawn up, in an attempt to undermine the principle of the equality and equivalent security of the two sides, and insisting on advantages for the United States to the detriment of the security of the Soviet Union.

On the whole, however, neither the liberal bloc nor the conservative bloc had an absolute majority in the 95th Congress, just as in all other congresses of the 1970's, and consequently, in order to push through their own legislative measures, each has required the support of at least part of the centrist bloc. This alignment of the forces in Congress explains why every legislative act on questions of foreign policy and national security necessarily bears the imprint of the views of the center. It objectively reinforces the administration's position and gives it a certain freedom of movement within the framework of agreement with the centrists. By winning the support of the center, the administration can attain the results it desires in connection with any issue on which the views of conservatives and liberals diverge considerably.

In his speech at the session of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 24 February 1978, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev said: "Soviet-American relations have now reached a stage which requires renewed effort to give these relations a more dynamic and constructive nature. There is no question that the USSR Supreme Soviet and the U.S. Congress could play a role in this matter."¹⁷ The immediate future will show whether the U.S. Congress is capable of overcoming the multitude of prejudices, obsolete traditions and organizational impediments in its structure for the purpose of taking on this important role.

FOOTNOTES

1. The constitutional prerogatives of Congress in the area of foreign policy have been repeatedly discussed in our journal. In particular, see: T. N. Yudina, "The 'Congress Factor' in U.S. Foreign Policy of the 1970's" (No 4, 1978); V. A. Savel'yev, "Foreign Policy and Congress" (No 12, 1976); D. N. Konovalov and V. A. Savel'yev, "The Act To Limit the President's Military Powers" (No 2, 1974); A. M. Belonogov, "The Executive Agreement as a Form of U.S. International Commitments" (No 6, 1973)--Editor's note.
2. M. Fiorina, "Congress. Keystone of the Washington Establishment," New Haven and London, 1977, pp 5, 7.
3. D. Pearson and J. Anderson, "The Case Against Congress," N.Y., 1969, pp 425-426.

4. F. Wilcox, "Congress, the Executive and Foreign Policy," N.Y., 1971, pp 137-138.
5. B. Manning, "The Congress, the Executive and Intermestic Affairs: Three Proposals," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1977, p 323.
6. J. Robinson, "Congress and Foreign Policy-Making," Homewood (Ill.), 1967, p 73.
7. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 34, p 202.
8. D. Pearson and J. Anderson, Op. cit., pp 339, 355.
9. W. Olson, "President, Congress and American Foreign Policy: Confrontation or Collaboration," INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, October 1976, p 580.
10. For more on Senator J. Sparkman, see the report in No 5 of the journal for 1975--Editor's note.
11. L. Aspin, "Games the Pentagon Plays," FOREIGN POLICY, Summer 1973, p 90.
12. L. Freedman, "Power and Politics in America," Belmont (Cal.), 1971, p 359.
13. "Committee on Foreign Relations U.S. Senate. 160th Anniversary," Wash., 1976, p 17.
14. A. Frye, "Responsible Congress: The Politics of National Security," N.Y., 1975, pp 51-52.
15. TIME, 23 January 1978.
16. G. Reedy, "The Twilight of the Presidency," N.Y., 1971, p 30. For an interesting analysis of the correlation of forces between these two blocs in regard to questions of arms limitation in the mid-1970's, see Ye. I. Popova's article "The Senate and Strategic Arms Limitation" (SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 4, 1975).
17. PRAVDA, 25 February 1978.

8588

CSO: 1803

POWER, INC.

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 78
pp 100-105

[First part of Russian translation of chapters from the book "Power, Inc."
by Morton Mintz and Jerry S. Cohen, 1976, Viking Press]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1803

MARKETING RESEARCH IN AMERICAN CORPORATION STRATEGY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 78
pp 106-114

[Article by E. V. Kirichenko]

[Text] During the present stage in the development of capitalism, the ties between the spheres of production and sales have become much broader and more complex. American companies are also striving for the closest possible coordination and integration of these two spheres. They are using increasingly subtle methods of competition to overcome the difficulties of the sales phase. The firms are trying to take marketing factors into consideration in all stages of the production process and are working out ways of studying the market and the formation of demand. This makes it possible for them to plan their activities and to react more flexibly and efficiently to all changes in demand.

The companies attach great significance to the thorough development of their marketing strategy and tactics. This process usually consists of several stages. First they try to determine the general problems requiring resolution; then the necessary information is gathered and analyzed. On this basis, strategy and tactics as a whole are formed--that is, long-range goals are set and the specific steps which must be taken for their attainment are outlined. This is followed by evaluation of the measures that have been taken, constant control over their execution and the introduction of the necessary corrections.

The choice of the correct strategic guidelines depends largely on the volume, accuracy and timeliness of the information on all marketing factors on which successful sales depend and on the skill with which this information is analyzed--that is, in the final analysis, it depends on so-called "marketing research."

The Essence of Marketing Research

It should be stressed that there is still no fixed definition of the term "marketing research."¹ The American Marketing Association once defined this kind of research as the systematic collection, recording and analysis of data on problems connected with the sale and transfer of goods and

services.² Since market and commodity studies presuppose an analysis of competitors' positions, comparison of the characteristics and quality of various commercial brands and so forth, however, it is clear that marketing research goes beyond the boundaries of the sphere of circulation. It is with good reason that some firms call their departments engaged in this kind of research commercial, business or economic research departments, and not marketing research departments. This is due to the fact that, if the work of this subdivision is on a high enough level, it will be responsible for studying not only pure sales figures, but also many production and economic indicators aiding in the resolution of sales problems.

The field of this kind of research is quite broad. American economists A. Blankenship and J. Doyle, for example, list 34 types of marketing studies.³ Most of them, however, can be classified by a few basic fields: the market, the commodity, the sales network, means of stimulating sales and problems in corporate growth. It is precisely these fields that were called the main ones in a survey conducted at the end of the 1960's by the American Marketing Association. Of the 202 companies in the processing industry surveyed which conducted regular marketing studies, virtually all of them were engaged in the constant study of the market, sales channels, the commodity, the growth and development of the company and means of stimulating sales.

A vast amount of literature on this problem has been written in the United States during the last 2 decades. This does not mean, however, that companies previously entered the market with no knowledge of it. They always made painstaking preparations for its conquest. In reference to the history of this matter, it should be noted that the nation's first so-called commercial research department was set up by the Curtis Publishing Company as early as 1911. By 1920, the U.S. Rubber Company and Swift had followed its example. In 1908 the first research firm was founded--Business Bourse; by 1940 there were already 69 such specialized companies, many of which are still operating today. By the 1940's, a course in "market research" had become part of the curriculum at many higher academic institutions in the United States. During the pre-war period, however, only a few firms understood that it was necessary to conduct marketing research on a scientific basis. It is interesting that when the nation's first "business research" department was set up at Harvard University, it was precisely the business community that opposed this move.

During the postwar period, employers have taken much more interest in the efficient use of marketing research in the practice of economic management. Expenditures in this field between 1940 and 1966 grew 18-fold (for the sake of comparison, the GNP grew 6-fold and retail sales grew 5-fold during this period). This research acquired particular significance in the 1960's and 1970's when American firms began to make extensive use of marketing theory in practice. It is precisely within the last 2 decades that marketing research has become comprehensive. The very concept of comprehensive marketing research has developed in close connection with the evolution of marketing theory.

Marketing Research--The Cornerstone of Marketing Practices

The term "marketing" is interpreted in different ways in American economic literature. At first this was a term which simply signified activities in the sales sphere (and even now it is frequently used in precisely this sense). In recent decades, marketing has come to mean a theory of management, but it is interpreted in two ways: Some economists associate it only with the sphere of circulation, while others feel that marketing is connected with all stages of reproduction.⁴ It is the second view that has taken on the appearance of a more complete theory, which began to be implemented by many American companies to one degree or another in the 1960's and 1970's.

Marketing is a system for the management of production and market-sales activity which has borrowed elements from various fields of knowledge--from economics, sociology and psychology to mathematics, physiology and ecology. It is based on the idea of orienting production toward output with consideration for peculiarities in demand, in contrast to the previously widespread principle of guaranteeing the sale of any commodity produced by the given company. In reality, however, these two variants of competitive policy do not oppose one another, but are even mutually supplementary. When companies fill the market with new, increasingly calculated products, they use every available means to stimulate their progression toward the consumer, frequently creating demand on their own. At the same time, the greater emphasis on the study of the present and future demands of various categories of consumers makes it possible for the firm to concentrate its efforts and means in the development and modification of the characteristics of those goods with a better chance of success in the market. It is necessary to stay ahead of the consumer, and not follow him,⁵ marketing theoretician Theodore Levitt says.

In recent years, the economists adhering to marketing theory have begun to replace this term with another--"consumer-oriented management"--and to use the term marketing in connection with its traditional sphere--sales. The firm's strategy based on this theory has been given the corresponding name "consumer-oriented strategy."

As we have already mentioned above, the elaboration of strategy primarily requires the determination of cardinal problems whose resolution might give the firm advantages over its competitors ("key factors of success"). After the company has singled these out, it sets the goal of gaining these advantages, at least in line with some factors, if not in line with all. Popular textbooks used in business schools stress that the search for success factors is usually conducted in the area of the four "p's": product, price, promotion and place. Here, product signifies the "commodity--market" entity. In his book "Products and Markets," Professor W. Reynolds writes: "Marketing strategy is a decision-making system in which all four 'p's' are taken into consideration."⁶

Theoretically, marketing presupposes the right of unlimited intervention by sales offices in all production processes. Not all companies, however, decide to take this step. Usually the firms bring marketing specialists into central administrative offices, broaden their functions (at present, one out of every three corporations is headed by a marketing expert)⁷ and dramatically increase the role of marketing research in their activity. The latter has become the cornerstone of the implementation of marketing theory, the sphere of which, consequently begins even prior to the production phase.

Some authors have tried to use marketing theory for apologetic purposes. It is represented as a new "business philosophy," the widespread application of which will allegedly transform modern capitalism into a new society, the driving force of which will not be profit, but the fuller and better satisfaction of public demand. There is no question that marketing orients firms toward the study of the possibilities for adapting to market demand, but the motives of the companies are purely commercial. V. I. Lenin once wrote: "It is a fact that consumption is not the purpose of capitalist production. The contradiction between this fact and the fact that, in the final analysis, production is linked with consumption and depends on the consumer even in the capitalist society, is not a contradiction in doctrine, but in real life."⁸ Marketing theory reveals the limited nature of the ideas of bourgeois theoreticians and their inclination to exclude the deep-seated socioeconomic contradictions in the capitalist economy from analysis.

The Development of the Theory and Practice of Market Segmentation

The evaluation of the entire complex of requirements made in the market and the determination of the most important of these require in-depth study of the specific market. When a company elaborates its strategy, it must know the answers to some questions of a specific nature: What are the dimensions of the market and the tendencies toward change in its size; what socioeconomic and psychological factors affect the size of the market; what is the elasticity of demand; are increased sales based on short-term or long-term tendencies; who is the main consumer of the given commodity; what are the requirements and desires of customers and what changes are possible in their habits and tastes; what are the motives for the purchase of a particular commodity. Besides this, answers must also be found for the following questions: To what degree is the market monopolized, what share of the market can the firm expect and what is the maximum level of outlays. Competition is taken into account in market research. The development of electronic computer equipment has made it possible to quickly and efficiently process huge amounts of information and, consequently, to use the processed data as a basis for not only the more accurate choice of a market but also the adaptation of the commodity to the demand in a particular part of the market.

Research on any market is based on its division into sectors. Each company must have a clear understanding of the "marketing segment"--that is, the group of consumers for whom it plans to produce a specific type of commodity; it must study the specific features of demand and all factors affecting the formation of demand in this segment. The need for market segmentation as an important element of the competitive policy of modern firms was first theoretically substantiated in 1956 by American economist W. Smith.⁹ In the 1960's and 1970's the principle of segmentation became one of the basic principles governing the elaboration of American corporate strategy.

As a rule, the market is divided into sectors in terms of types of commodities and groups of consumers, as well as in terms of the geographic principle.

In terms of the type of commodity, markets are divided into markets selling goods for industrial use--that is, the means of production (they are later classified according to branches)--and consumer goods. The latter, in turn, are classified according to the reasons for which the customer buys the commodity, namely:

Goods for daily use (food, haberdashery, tobacco items and so forth). The customer strives to acquire this with the minimum effort and, consequently, they must always be in supply in trade points catering to people working or living in a given region. Sometimes these goods are further subdivided into basic commodities, which the consumer will buy in any case, and impulse commodities--that is, those which are acquired as a result of impulse buying (for this, the commodity must be properly packaged and correctly displayed);

Goods which are chosen more carefully; these are usually also more costly (for example, clothing, furniture, fabrics, most appliances and so forth). The customer usually does not have exhaustive information on all of the characteristics of the commodity and, for this reason, the sales clerk must be highly qualified;

Special-assortment goods; these are usually goods of rare quality which are worth extra effort, time and funds to the customer (for example, radio and photography equipment of the highest quality, some gourmet foods, sports equipment of the highest class and so forth).¹⁰

In contrast to the traditional division of goods into those for short-term and long-term use, this system of classification assists the company in choosing the best locations for sales points and in using advertising more effectively.

One of the chief principles of marketing strategy has become a differentiated approach to the satisfaction of the demands of various groups of consumers. American economic literature speaks about the primary and secondary consumers, or, in other words, the purchaser and the consumer. For example,

electric razors are quite often purchased as gifts--that is, the purchaser does not use the commodity; in the same way, almost one-third of the wrist-watches sold are purchased as gifts. Besides this, it is important to know who makes decisions on purchases (particularly when the consumer is an industrial firm) and who influences these decisions (for example, medicines are usually purchased when they are prescribed by a doctor)--that is, it is important to know the target of sales promotion measures. For example, one company producing surgical instruments requested a firm specializing in marketing research to determine the effect of the advertisements it sent out to surgeons. Thorough investigation, particularly interviews of surgeons and operating room nurses immediately after operations, indicated that the surgeons frequently did not even know the brand of the instruments they had just used. And although it is precisely the surgeons who are responsible for choosing instruments in hospitals, they generally turn this matter over to senior nursing personnel; the choice of a particular brand depends on these nurses. After the company began to prepare and send out advertisements specially intended for operating room nurses, its sales volume rose considerably.

The classification of consumers of goods intended for industrial use is generally based on the following characteristics: the branch of activity, the size of the purchasing firm and the region in which it is located. In recent decades, the study of psychological factors has acquired increasing significance. For example, a study was conducted in New Jersey in the mid-1960's to learn how purchases were made by 11 large companies. The main conclusion drawn in this study indicates the need for motivation analysis in industrial marketing. Administrators do not leave their emotions at home and, just as they are influenced by many irrational factors when they purchase cars or whiskey, they are equally influenced by them when they purchase something for their office or firm. A second conclusion was also drawn--on the need for particularly thorough study of the psychological aspects of the behavior of middle-level administrators, and not those on the highest level as was assumed in the past, since it is precisely the middle level which compiles purchasing plans while the top level often simply signs them automatically.

The method for categorizing the purchasers of consumer goods has been worked out more comprehensively. It is based on demographic, socioeconomic and psychological principles: differences in education, social status, marital status and income; racial, sexual and age differences; differences in the motives of purchasers and so forth.

The degree of success a firm can achieve after it has found a particular market sector can be seen from the following example. Although the purpose of toilet soap is to cleanse the skin well, this seemingly self-evident truth was forgotten during the course of the fierce competitive struggle between its manufacturers. The modification and perfection of soap took the direction of improvements in its smell, appearance and packaging. The sector of consumers who looked at soap from the purely pragmatic standpoint

was ignored. This assisted outsiders to penetrate the market by directing their efforts toward attracting those customers who regarded soap's ability to cleanse the skin as its chief merit.

Demographic factors were widely recognized in the practice of market segmentation earlier than others, since they easily fit into the basis of the system of classification. They do not, however, take many aspects into account. For example, the consumption of such goods as clothing, furniture and automobiles depends largely on the income and social status of purchasers. In this respect, sociological criteria supplement demographic factors quite well, but the motives of purchasers remain unknown. For example, according to research conducted by American psychologist D. Yankelovich, people who buy wristwatches can be divided into three categories. The first are those who wish to buy a fairly good watch at the lowest possible price; then there are people who value watches for their durability, quality and good style and, finally, there are those whose decision to buy a watch is not based so much on the price and the utility characteristics of the commodity as on their emotional feelings about it; in the last case, the style and appearance of the container are important, as well as the reputation of the brand name and the recommendations of jewelers. Therefore, when companies elaborate strategy, they must consider the fact that expensive watches are not only purchased by people with a higher income; at the same time, some consumers with a high income do not buy the more expensive and prestigious watches, but use cheap ones, replacing them as soon as they stop working.

Psychological factors have become quite popular during the last 2 decades, but, as many marketing specialists have pointed out, they are unreliable, and the psychological scale of values is often difficult to use for practical purposes. Nonetheless, one of the fields of social psychology--so-called motivation analysis--now occupies an important place in the system of marketing research.

New methods of market segmentation founded on a comprehensive basis have recently been used more and more. One of these methods is segmentation on the basis of "life styles." This general idea was set forth in 1963 by W. Lazer, was subsequently worked out in detail by several other economists and, in 1974, Joseph Plummer, vice president of Chicago's Leo Barnett firm, wrote an article analyzing the possibilities for using this idea in practice.¹¹ The very process of segmentation on the basis of "life styles" consists of two stages. During the first stage the researcher must answer the following questions: What place does the particular commodity occupy among competing brands, how often is it purchased and what percentage is accounted for by the initial buyers of the product. It is important to find the segment with the highest concentration of consumers constantly buying the brand being analyzed in large quantities. During the second stage, this segment is studied in greater depth; further segmentation is based on the entire "life style," in which the following parameters are included: demography, geography, sociology (they are discussed above), the activities of the buyer (his job, hobbies, forms of amusement, purchases,

sports and so forth), his interests (family, work, society, forms of amusement, diet, means of communication and so forth), and the opinions of the consumer (on himself, politics, business, economics, products and so forth). During the second stage, subsegments are actually delineated. This permits two extremely similar commodities to find their own place in the market. Despite the merits of this kind of multifactor method, segmentation on this basis is difficult to accomplish.

The most thoroughly developed and widely used method of segmenting markets for consumer goods consists in their division according to the scheme: "age--income--marital status--geographic factor." This is followed by studies of the behavior of each group of consumers. In the case of goods for daily use, consumers are divided into those who buy large, average and small quantities of the given commodity. For example, it was learned that 17 percent of the Americans who like beer consumed around 84 percent of all beer sold. This group mainly consists of blue-collar workers and college students; it is for them that two basic "commercial models" are created. Besides this, it was noted that some of the purchasers within a particular segment were easily persuaded to switch brands. Even if a firm had stopped all means of sales promotion, with the exception, naturally, of the distribution network, it would not immediately lose its market: Some purchasers would remain loyal, some would leave the market and some new purchasers would enter the market. The two last groups constitute the segment called the "shifting market" in American literature. Each company strives to conquer this "unfixed" section of the market.

The Commodity in the System of 'Marketing Research'

The study of the commodity is one of the fields of marketing research. During this process, researchers look for answers to the following questions: What kind of commodities does the firm offer on the market and what are their characteristics; which consumer demands are the commodities supposed to satisfy and do they satisfy them; what features should the commodity have to appeal to a particular market segment (durability, quality, packaging, price); how flexible should prices be; does the commodity have a chance to compete with similar products; are there new areas for the application of an existing commodity; should changes be made in it. It is not necessary for research to be conducted in all these fields; sometimes the firm singles out a particular problem and attempts to work out its competition strategy and tactics on the basis of its analysis.

Due to the present intensive renewal of the product assortment in the modern market, the coordination of the process by which new commodities are created and developed with studies of market demand is becoming exceedingly important. According to estimates, only one product out of 40 has a chance of progressing all the way from the idea stage to the marketing stage. According to various estimates, 40-80 percent of all consumer goods and groceries and 20-40 percent of all goods for industrial use which are put on the market fail.¹² Approximately one-third of surveyed firms name insufficient market

analysis as the main reason for the failure of new commodities. For this reason, before the idea takes shape in a finished product, a company tries to determine whether there is a demand for it in the market and to choose the proper market segment toward which its production should be oriented. The second stage consists in marketing tests of the finished product, at which time its utility features, the impact of advertising and the sales network are conclusively tested.

When the product assortment is being planned, the theory of the life cycle of the commodity is employed. According to this theory, each commodity or service has its own life cycle, consisting of several distinct phases: the introduction of goods on the market, growth, maturity and decline. During the introduction stage, the product usually undergoes a phase of low production volume, followed by a rapid increase in sales, stabilization during the stage of maturity, and then a gradual decline in sales. The profit curve generally indicates reduction sooner than the sales volume curve. American economists feel that this theory makes "creative strategy" possible. In order to earn maximum profits, the firm must learn to change the life cycle of the commodity and control it. Besides this, it is necessary to plan the production of the commodity assortment in such a way that various types of products will be in various phases of the life cycle.

It is assumed that each stage in the life cycle requires a special strategy. During the first stage it is necessary to compel the buyer to accept the commodity, while during the stage of growth, he must be encouraged to prefer precisely this commodity, and the correct choice of a sales network is extremely important. Market saturation is the first sign of the onset of the phase of maturity. At this time, the firm concentrates on distinguishing the particular commodity from all other similar products. Differentiation of the commodity is combined with increasingly differentiated advertising, appealing to particular consumer groups. During the stage of decline, the company usually gives careful consideration to the question of whether it will be possible to prolong the life of the product or whether it should be withdrawn from production.

Therefore, this theory takes the accelerated obsolescence of products at a time of intensive scientific and technical competition into account and stimulates the renewal of the commodity assortment. In actuality, each commodity has its own life cycle and it would be difficult to predict it. The Dupont Company presents a good example of the way in which the correct strategy can greatly prolong the life cycle of a commodity. When sales of nylon stockings began to slow down, the firm conducted commodity and market research which showed that the reason was a tendency among women to not wear stockings. Dupont developed an appropriate campaign to transform stockings from a "neutral" accessory into a central element of fashion. In accordance with this, it began to manufacture stockings in various styles and all possible colors to go with the cut and color of women's outerwear. Annual changes in clothing fashions affect the vogue for types and colors of stockings, and this keeps sales volume on a high level. This is an

example of the way in which a company can create public demand in its own interest by influencing consumer taste. When a company has to decide whether it should produce and promote new products or withdraw particular commodities from production, it is guided by the objective of guaranteed profits; from the national economic standpoint, however, this means that fantastic sums are sometimes thrown to the winds as a result of huge expenditures on the useless "cosmetic" modernization of goods, on campaigns to force them on the consumer and on the replacement of goods which have artificially been made obsolete.

Therefore, the search for new market segments is always accompanied by the increasing differentiation of products; the search for possible ways of making new modifications in a commodity has become one of the major fields of commodity research.

Other Aspects of Marketing Research

One of the central fields of marketing research is the study of problems in sales organization and promotion.

The organization of sales takes in a number of operations connected with delivering goods to the buyer, taking and filling orders, transporting and warehousing goods and serving the buyer. The collection and analysis of information in this area should aid in answering a number of questions: What sales channels should be used for the sale of the particular commodity (direct contact with buyers, agents, brokers and so forth); how effective is the activity of middlemen in the organization of product sales; what types of promotion and advertising should be used for winning the market; are turnover outlays optimal; what should be done to satisfy transport and delivery requirements and to organize post-sales services.

By comparing the volume of goods sold through various sales channels with turnover costs, the company administrators can judge the effectiveness of these channels.

Various forms of sales promotion make up a large part of the expenditures involved in sales. These might include direct advertising with the aid of the mass media (radio and television commercials, ads in newspapers and magazines, billboards), as well as door-to-door sales, the organization of exhibits, the display of goods, the distribution of samples, and the rewarding of customers who have accumulated a certain number of labels or packages. American companies spent 20.5 billion dollars on regular mass advertising and more than 30 billion on other forms of promotion, excluding door-to-door sales, in 1976.¹³ The United States leads the capitalist countries in per capita expenditures for these purposes.

Research on the problems of company growth and development includes the search for ways of increasing the profits and prestige of the firm, determining the expediency of mergers and takeovers, studying the territorial distribution of enterprises and so forth. This type of research is particularly valued by international monopolies.

Organizational Forms of Marketing Research

The range of organizational forms of this kind of research is quite broad. The most frequently used surveys take the form of personal conversations, telephone interviews and postal inquiries. Specialized companies who have made up a consumer sample group on the basis of specific criteria regularly observe this group for years (so-called consumer panels or follow-up surveys). Qualified surveys make it possible to obtain virtually any kind of information about the market.

On-the-spot surveys in stores are being widely used; in these, the reaction of the buyer to advertising and to the way in which commodities are displayed and packaged is studied and purchasing patterns are analyzed.

The study of foreign markets and the adaptation of production to the demands of the foreign buyer are of a more complex nature and include several new elements (the collection of data on customs barriers, currency exchange rates, language and climatic peculiarities and the national characteristics and habits of buyers). The actual methods used to study domestic and foreign markets, however, are largely the same.

In some cases, information is gathered and analyzed by the industrial firms themselves, while other firms prefer specialized research companies to perform this work. Here we will only discuss the position of marketing research departments in the organizational structure of American companies. These departments might be directly accountable to the highest level of administration, marketing administrators, sales managers, advertising managers or other administrative links--this depends on the developmental history and specific features of the company. Many firms feel that research groups will perform work of better quality if they are directly accountable to the "central authority," to the president, vice president or chairman of the board, since it is only on this level that accumulated information can be totally assessed and used for the good of the entire company. In firms where the manager of marketing has the status of a vice president, the marketing research department is generally under his control. This is the case with the corresponding department in the Ford Motor Company.

Eastman Kodak is an example of the other trend. Here the marketing research department is accountable to administrators responsible for finances. This is due to the company's interest in broad-scale research and, consequently, its desire to make the department accountable to a person whose interests are not limited to any particular subdivision.

American economists A. Blankenship and J. Doyle indicate a tendency toward an increase in the role played by the highest administrative level in the management of this kind of activity.¹⁴ The funding of the department also depends on the position it occupies in the organizational structure of the company. American economists are debating the advantages and disadvantages

of centralized and decentralized funding in this area. In recent years, however, most of them have tended to favor a centralized budget.

Therefore, marketing research has become a necessary initial phase in the elaboration of the firm's strategy, and the corresponding departments have firmly established themselves in the corporate structure. Not all firms, however, can allow themselves to conduct regular research, since this is quite costly and requires many highly skilled specialists in different fields. Procter & Gamble, for example, spends 1 million dollars a year on consumer research; it has a permanent staff of 100 observers and interviewers who annually survey more than half a million housewives. Only the largest companies can maintain an entire staff of specialists in this area.

A vast amount of the painstakingly collected and extremely valuable information is frequently useless because of the absence of the necessary contact between the marketing research department and other administrative links.¹⁵ In this connection, the experience of the IBM concern is of interest. To broaden the outlook of its specialists, the firm sends candidates for managerial positions in almost any department in its sales organizations to work on outside assignments for periods of time ranging from 2 months to 2 years, while sales personnel are assigned to work in production and technical divisions.

Such large U.S. companies as General Electric, General Foods, Westinghouse, IBM, Coca-Cola, Chemstrand and others have attempted to combine various methods, means, organizational measures and technical media for the collection, processing and transmission of data used in making decisions in the area of marketing into unified information systems operating on the level of the firm. These systems, in turn, are to become elements of even larger company information systems. This calls for the creation of the corporation's own information center to store all data, both domestic and foreign, including data obtained as a result of marketing research. This is a qualitatively new stage in the use of information; it will make it possible to coordinate various informational flows concerning all phases of reproduction and to employ a comprehensive approach in the management of the firm.

V. I. Lenin pointed out the fact that, in contrast to the isolated manufacturers of the era of free competition who knew nothing about each other, the large monopolies can calculate the approximate dimensions of the market. The dramatic rise in the level of production concentration and technological progress not only permits, but also forces, modern monopolies to pursue a purposeful policy of taking market demand into account. Some American economists see extensive marketing research as a universal means of reducing risks and surviving crises. Capitalist reality, however, shatters these illusions. Attempts to coordinate flows of production, sales and global socioeconomic information are frequently made ineffective by the haphazard development of the capitalist economy. The attention and resources invested in market research by American companies represent a natural, but, in the final analysis, futile attempt to overcome the contradiction between the precise organization of intrafirm production and anarchy on the scale of the society.

Nonetheless, the use of marketing forecasts and the elaboration of long-range marketing strategy and tactics give companies a great advantage in the competitive struggle. This is why experts feel that firms will rely on marketing research on an even broader scale in the future and will continue to perfect research techniques.

FOOTNOTES

1. There is no fixed translation for this term either. In Soviet economic literature, marketing research is translated "kompleksnyye rynochnyye issledovaniya" [comprehensive market research], "kommercheskiye issledovaniya" [commercial research] or "marketingovyye issledovaniya" [marketing research].
2. R. Alexander, J. Cross and R. Hill, "Industrial Marketing," Homewood, 1967, p 136.
3. A. Blankenship and J. Doyle, "Marketing Research Management," N.Y., 1965, p 22.
4. "Marketing is the administrative task of strategic planning, management and control over enterprise activity to implement profit programs which guarantee the satisfaction of consumer demand, a task combining all types of business activity (including production, finance and sales) in a single unified system of operations" (A. Phatak, "Managing Multinational Corporations," N.Y., 1974, p 257).
5. HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, November-December 1977, p 108.
6. W. Reynolds, "Products and Markets," N.Y., 1969, p 4.
7. BUSINESS WEEK, 6 January 1973, p 47.
8. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 4, p 78.
9. JOURNAL OF MARKETING, July 1956, pp 3-8.
10. J. Stuteville and M. Roberts, "Marketing in a Consumer-Oriented Society," Belmont, 1975, pp 41-43.
11. JOURNAL OF MARKETING, No 1, 1974, pp 33-37.
12. R. Alexander et al, Op. cit., p 198; JOURNAL OF MARKETING, No 2, 1977, p 51.
13. HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, July-August 1976, pp 116, 120.
14. A. Blankenship and J. Doyle, Op. cit., p 70.
15. HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, September-October 1977, p 108.

BOOK REVIEWS

History of U.S. Human Rights Struggle

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 78
pp 115-117

[Review by V. A. Chukseyev of the book "Human Rights U.S. Style" by Claude M. Lightfoot, New York, International Publishers Company, Inc., 1977, 229 pages]

[Text] At the time of the Bicentennial festivities so splendidly organized by official Washington to commemorate the nation's 200th birthday, bourgeois propaganda made great efforts to represent America as some kind of "model" of freedom and democracy for the entire world. The new administration's obsessive wrangling over the so-called violations of human rights abroad was the logical continuation of this campaign. One of the underlying motives for the administration's move was the desire to divert the attention of the world public from the genuine violation of elementary civil and constitutional norms in the United States itself. The book by famous political figure and commentator Claude Lightfoot is one of the works on this subject recently published in the United States. It exposes the true essence of the notorious "democracy" of American society, the establishment of which was accompanied from the very beginning by the merciless annihilation and suppression of the Indians, the native population of the country, the enslavement and exploitation of negroes and other ethnic minorities and the inequality of women.

This is not the first time C. Lightfoot has turned to historical subject matter. His work "Ghetto Rebellion to Black Liberation" and his book "Racism and the Liberation of Mankind," an account of his impressions of the FRG and GDR, are well known in progressive circles in America.

Lightfoot's new book only covers part of American history, ending with the period of the Roosevelt Administration, but the value of the work consists in the fact that its in-depth analysis of the sources of American capitalism cogently explains the ugly situation in the sphere of human rights in America today.

Setting forth his own political views, the author writes in the foreword: "In my eyes the Statue of Liberty in New York was the screen behind which my black mothers and fathers, brothers and sisters were being burned alive in the city squares.... I asked 'What kind of democracy is this?' Later I joined the Communist Party and studied the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and William Foster, and they answered my questions. I understood that total and absolute democracy is impossible for whites or blacks in a class society. From the birth of the American nation up to the present time, the government has only acted in the interest of big business."

C. Lightfoot logically shows that the colonies and, later, the nation were born in an atmosphere of cruel class and racial oppression. In this respect, neither the revolution nor the constitution has changed the nature of the nation's development. Naturally, bourgeois researchers ignore or minimize this side of American history. In describing the period of the colonization of America, which most U.S. writers try to romanticize, the author notes that the program of the first settlers consisted simply in the seizure of land and the coercion and annihilation of the Indians for the sake of their own enrichment. Lightfoot stresses that it was precisely this that caused the barbarous war waged not long ago by the United States in Southeast Asia, where the crimes and cruelties that were committed can only be compared to fascist atrocities (p 50).

By manipulating historical facts and grossly distorting reality, the "great American nanny"--television--and the other mass media are still painting pictures of "bloodthirsty Indians" standing in the way of the civilization which the first American pioneers were supposedly bringing them. In this connection, it is interesting to cite an excerpt reprinted in the book from a documented account, included by Indian writer William Mayer in his book "The Native Americans," of an encounter between the native inhabitants and the settlers:

"On 28 November 1864, Sand Creek became the site of a mass slaughter of Cheyenne Indians by the 3d Colorado Volunteer Regiment commanded by Colonel Chivington. Chivington gave the order: 'Kill and scalp them all--adults and children.' Women who begged for mercy were shot and others were cut to pieces with sabers. The children who ran out holding little white flags were killed and pregnant women's stomachs were ripped open.

"There were almost a thousand people in the Indian camp. The DENVER NEWS reported: 'All of them (the soldiers) did their best, only three women and four children were taken prisoner and they were later displayed as beasts in a cage in Denver. The soldiers showing off their scalps during intermission in the Denver theaters were greeted with applause'" (p 55).

The barbarous treatment of the Indians displayed by the first "pilgrims" began a stage in American history which has lasted to the present day. When C. Lightfoot's book was being prepared for publication, more than 10 bills were introduced in the U.S. Congress with the goal of nullifying the

remaining treaties once concluded between the government and the Indian tribes. This kind of legislation, inspired by large corporations and land owners, could bring about the total destruction of the cultural and spiritual heritage of the native American population.

The sections of the book describing the status of negroes and other non-whites in the United States, who, just like the Indians, became the victims of racism, are of equal topical importance. With the emergence and development of capitalism, the oppression of black Americans achieved unprecedented proportions. Lightfoot stresses that "the Civil War put an end to slavery, but it was replaced by a new kind of slavery" (p 207). In this section, the author presents some little-known facts about the heroic role played by the blacks in the struggle for their own liberation--facts which are now being deliberately concealed in the American schools. Some 149 negro regiments, made up of more than 123,000 infantrymen, artillerymen and cavalrymen, fought in the Civil War (close to the end of the war). Around 60,000 black Americans gave their lives on the battlefield, largely determining the outcome of this struggle (p 112).

The author has sharp words to say about bourgeois historians who maintain that emancipation allegedly gave the blacks "equal opportunities," even though the ruling class was actually simply forced to make a number of concessions to black America, mainly in the social sphere. This had to be done because of the broad civil rights movement, particularly in the 1960's. But the United States never did become the "promised land" for its black citizens. "No concessions were made to the blacks in the economic sphere. Moreover, the economic conditions of most of the black population have recently become worse" (p 207).

The same racist strategy in the political and economic spheres, the author testifies, is also being applied to emigrants from Latin America and Asia, who are being used as cheap labor.

Lightfoot's study also covers another "forgotten" subject in American history--namely, the stubborn struggle waged for more than 200 years by American women for their own civil rights. The systematic oppression of women, who were not even given the right to vote until 1919, still exists, the author states. Despite certain positive changes in this area, American women have almost no access to political power, not to mention economic power. "President Carter babbles about human rights in the Soviet Union to the accompaniment of the applause of racist fanatics, but he is doing nothing to dispute the Supreme Court decision which will expand the scales of violations of the civil rights of ethnic minorities and women," C. Lightfoot writes (p 208).

Lightfoot's book is in no way a "purely historical" study, intended only to clarify the events of the past and objectively evaluate various stages and aspects of the American society's development. It is distinguished by its eye on the future. With consideration for the lessons of the past, the

author sets forth a constructive program in the spheres of domestic and foreign policy. Above all, he feels that America can only cope with coming crises if it completely renounces the cold war policy and takes a firm stand for peace. This, the author feels, could aid in gradually eliminating its now chronic economic ills and in carrying out its most vital social programs.

Lightfoot places special emphasis precisely on "a drastic shift in U.S. foreign policy in the direction of the establishment of strong and lasting peace." "With this approach," he writes, "significant cuts, of 50-60 billion dollars, could be made in appropriations for military purposes and the funds made available in this way could be used for creating jobs and a more accessible system of public health care, liquidating slums and ghettos and curing the ills of our ailing cities. If we renounce the cold war mentality, this will have a profound effect on the entire world" (p 210).

The "big" press in America has ignored C. Lightfoot's book. And this is not amazing, considering its mercilessly truthful analysis of the real state of affairs in the area of human rights in the United States. Its true value, however, can be judged simply by the fact that it sold out literally within a few days after it appeared in the bookstores. "C. Lightfoot's book," a reviewer wrote in the newspaper of the American workers, PEOPLES WORLD, "is not the fictional account of the origins of bourgeois democracy presented in the schools. The author takes the path of scientific analysis, describing the struggle for human rights in the historical context...and exposing the illusory nature of human rights under present conditions in the United States."

Foreign Economic Policy

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 78
pp 117-119

[Review by A. A. Smirnova of the book "America in the World Economy" by C. Kindleberger, New York, Foreign Policy Association, 1977, 128 pages]

[Text] In this new book, American economist Charles Kindleberger examines some of the aspects of U.S. foreign economic policy, as well as the place and role of this nation in the world capitalist economy.

The weakening of U.S. foreign economic positions, which became apparent in the mid-1970's, is worrying the American Government. As Secretary of State Vance stressed when he was being sworn in, U.S. foreign policy will depend increasingly on domestic economic policy.

The shift in the system of U.S. foreign policy priorities in the direction of foreign economic aspects is connected with the general increase in the role played by foreign economic ties in world economics and politics. It

was for this reason that the American Foreign Policy Association turned to famous economist C. Kindleberger (once an adviser on the Marshall Plan and now a professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology), requesting him to analyze basic problems in the area of international economic relations.

The author's intention is to determine the role of foreign economic ties in the U.S. economy. "No one is saying," he writes, "that problems in international economics are more important than problems in world politics, such as detente, the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons or the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, just as no one is saying that they are more important than domestic economic problems: unemployment, discrimination against ethnic minorities, environmental pollution or the nation's energy supply. International economic problems are important in their own way and, moreover, are frequently connected with international politics and domestic economics" (p 5). The degree of this connection, the author feels, ultimately depends on the degree to which the economy of a particular nation is "open." If the country is small and its resources are limited, its economy, as a rule, is wide "open"--that is, most of the goods it produces are exported and most of the goods it consumes are imported. It would seem that a large country with a variety of natural resources could exist without imports. It is not likely, however, Kindleberger goes on, that even a large country could get along without imports and completely "close" its economy. For example, regardless of its foreign policy course, the United States will still need imports of, for instance, coffee, tea, cocoa, manganese, chromium and so forth.

At the same time, according to the author, the United States is less dependent on foreign economic ties than many other nations due to the dimensions of its territory, the size of its population and the variety of its natural resources. To corroborate his thesis, he cites data indicating the percentage accounted for by exports in the gross national product--approximately 7 percent, while it reaches 40 percent in other nations (p 5).

It must be said that this approach has become outdated and does not reflect the actual state of affairs, even though it is fairly prevalent in bourgeois economic literature. As a typical representative of bourgeois political thought, C. Kindleberger deliberately denies the objective tendency toward the internationalization of production which was noted even by K. Marx and V. I. Lenin and which has become much stronger in the last decade, leading to the creation of an entire American "production empire" outside the United States. Changes have taken place in the interrelations between the American and world economies in the direction of the progressive dependence of U.S. economic life on foreign economic ties, which have become a major factor in economic growth. In this process, the internationalization of capital in the United States is far ahead of the internationalization of production, and the export of capital is becoming the main form of foreign economic ties.

All of these factors taken together, as well as the size of the profits earned by U.S. monopolies from operations in the foreign market, indicate that the United States is just as dependent on foreign economic ties as other nations.

One of the major aspects of foreign economic policy, as we know, is tariff policy. C. Kindleberger feels that, "theoretically," the complete cancellation of tariffs would benefit any nation as a whole: Consumers would benefit from the lower prices and exporters and their employees would benefit from increased sales abroad, which would also compensate for a firm's losses caused by competing imports (p 13).

But theory is only theory, and the matter is actually quite different. Despite the significant reduction in customs duties in international trade as a result of several rounds of talks on international trade problems within the GATT framework, they still represent one of the chief barriers in international capitalist trade and a tool with which each side strives to protect its own interest at the expense of its partners. The latest GATT talks (the "Tokyo round"), which are taking place in an atmosphere of the fiercest disagreement, can serve as an example of this.

In his discussion of the United States' trade and economic relations with the USSR and the other socialist countries, C. Kindleberger does not miss this opportunity to accuse the nations of the socialist community of their alleged inability to trade with the United States. He writes: "The United States is being blamed for the low level of the East-West trade volume, but even if this kind of trade were much freer, it is extremely doubtful that it could attain a significant level" (p 38). In the author's view, this is due to the shortage of "necessary" goods, the absence of convertible currency in the socialist countries and even their "general bad credit rating." In this way, the author adds grist to the mill of those U.S. circles which, primarily for political reasons, oppose the expansion of economic ties with the USSR and the other socialist countries.

Moving on to an analysis of the role and policy of the United States in the sphere of economic relations with the developing states, the author essentially agrees with the official thesis that assistance should primarily be given to those states which view general U.S. policy in this region "with understanding" (see, for example, p 62).

Reflecting the current worry in the United States over the new balance of power in the world economic system, the author proposes a number of measures which, in his opinion, would aid in preventing the further weakening of U.S. hegemony in the world capitalist economy. These measures include the cancellation of customs duties, the coordination of policy on the macroeconomic level and leadership in deliveries of food, the export of capital and the extension of credit (see pp 113-123).

In general and on the whole, C. Kindleberger's new work is permeated with a desire to find a way not only and not so much to a "new world economic

order" as to the safeguarding of the United States' onesided economic interests in today's world.

Western Radio Propaganda

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 78
pp 119-120

[Review by E. A. Ivanyan of the book "Antenny napravleny na Vostok" (Antennae Aimed at the East) by G. N. Vachnadze, Moscow, Politizdat, 1977, 2d edition, revised and supplemented, 238 pages]

[Text] A second, revised and supplemented edition of famous Soviet researcher of bourgeois radio propaganda G. N. Vachnadze's interesting work has been published. He discusses the distinctive features of the present stage in the continuing process of international detente and the forms, methods and subjects characteristic of this stage in the propaganda activity of bourgeois radio stations and centers.

G. N. Vachnadze uses specific examples from the history of the subversive activity of bourgeois radio propaganda to illustrate one of the basic premises of his book--that "bourgeois propaganda aimed at the socialist nations, regardless of its tone, is of an anticommunist and anti-Soviet nature" (p 5), even though the relaxation of international tension has made significant adjustments in the style of this propaganda. As the author correctly stresses, however, "it would be wrong to believe that the crude methods of pathological anticommunism are completely a thing of the past." They simply "coexist" at present with modernized--that is, better disguised--forms of hostile propaganda (p 220). Among the subjects which have recently become quite prominent in bourgeois propaganda aimed at the socialist countries, a primary place is occupied by "human rights" and "the quality of life." The author cogently demonstrates how bourgeois propaganda is using these "new slogans" in an attempt to divert the attention of the world public from the fact that it is precisely the capitalist society that is incapable of guaranteeing most of its citizens a suitable existence.

One of the sections in the new edition of the book is devoted to exposing the doctrine of the "free exchange of information" or the "free flow of information." The author notes that the problem of the international exchange of information, its nature and its essence has become so important in recent years that it is now the subject and theme of international meetings and talks on various levels. Citing facts attesting to the great concern of the progressive world public about the use of the mass media in the public interest, G. N. Vachnadze stresses the danger of the uncontrolled and onesided so-called "free flow of information" when it is used as a means of economic, cultural and ideological expansion--and it is precisely this purpose that "information" is supposed to serve in the imperialist states, especially the United States. It is precisely against this that R. Mayo, general director of UNESCO, warns the world public in the following

statement quoted by the author: "Each minute of radio and television broadcasting can have a positive or negative, constructive or destructive, enriching or polluting effect, but, in any case, the influence of programs on the cultural life of society is indisputable."

The author analyzes the specific features of the planning and coordinating of propaganda conducted by research centers in the capitalist countries, as well as their government institutions and departments. The author tells the reader about the activities of the Council of Britain and the CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY of Great Britain, the FEDERAL PRESS AND NEWS AGENCY of the FRG, the Internaziones propaganda agencies and so-called Goethe Institute functioning in this country, and American institutions and agencies, including the White House Staff, the State Department, the Pentagon, the CIA and the former U.S. Information Agency (USIA).

It is quite natural that an analysis of the content and peculiarities of the propaganda aimed at the socialist nations by the largest radio stations in the capitalist world--Voice of America, the BBC and Deutsche Welle--should take up a considerable part of a book entitled "Antennae Aimed at the East." The parts in which the author talks about the methods they have employed since the completion of the work of the All-European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Helsinki are of particular interest.

The book also contains a detailed analysis of the activities of Radio Freedom and Radio Free Europe, stations broadcasting from the territory of the FRG; these are overtly hostile to the ideals of peace and progress and their very existence, as L. I. Brezhnev stressed, represents a direct challenge to the letter and spirit of the agreements concluded in Helsinki.

Reconstruction-Era Ku Klux Klan

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 78
pp 120-121

[Review by V. V. Sogrin of the book "Klanistskoye dvizheniye v SShA v period rekonstruktsii Yuga (1865-1877)" (The Klan Movement in the United States During the Period of Reconstruction in the South [1865-1877]) by E. V. Lisnevskiy, Rostov-on-Don, Izdatel'stvo Rostovskogo universiteta, 1977, 192 pages]

[Text] One of the most inglorious anniversaries in American history took place in 1977--100 years since the end of the Reconstruction of the South, which marked the surrender of the northeastern bourgeoisie to the former plantation owners and slaveholders, the revision of many outstanding achievements of the second American revolution and the triumph of Thermidor. The end of Reconstruction resulted in a genuine tragedy for the American blacks, a victory for the Dixiecrats and the establishment of a racist political regime in the South. E. V. Lisnevskiy's monograph is the first special Soviet study of the counterrevolutionary role played in these events by the Ku Klux Klan, militant gangs of white racists.

An underlying motif of E. V. Lisnevskiy's work, which is based on the analysis of abundant factual material, is the premise that hostilities between the North and South did not cease at the end of the Civil War, but continued in unique forms even after 1865. The place of the defeated and disbanded army of the Southern Confederacy was taken over during the Reconstruction Era by terrorist bands of the "invisible empire" of the Ku Klux Klan, created illegally in 1865. The author clearly and vividly describes the scales, aims and consequences of the "white terror" for which the Ku Klux Klan was responsible. The author does not limit himself to a description of its organizational structure, program, racist ideology, political activity and numerous terrorist acts, the victims of which were thousands of leaders of negro organizations and white radicals who were trying, through the legislatures of the Southern States, to implement the 14th and 15th amendments to the federal Constitution, declaring the political and civil equality of white and black Americans. The author does not only analyze the ways in which the "white robes" attained their counterrevolutionary goals, but also tries to uncover the reasons for their tenacity.

The author shows that the founders and inspirers of the Ku Klux Klan, who expressed the interests of the plantation oligarchy, were able to gain quite solid support among the middle and lower strata of the white population in the South. E. V. Lisnevskiy presents a complete--although, we feel, far from exhaustive--description of the socioeconomic, historical and psychological roots of the racist attitudes prevalent among the white population of the South. It would seem that the analysis of this problem in relation to the era of Reconstruction would be of value in understanding the modern stereotypes of racist thinking in the Southern States. The lessons of the struggle between racist and antiracist forces in the Reconstruction Era are of unquestionable value to the present generation of fighters for the civil rights of black Americans.

The author's attempt to analyze the character and nature of bourgeois radicalism, under the ideological and political banners of which the policy of Reconstruction was implemented, has also been productive in revealing the reasons for the racists' success. The main flaw of the bourgeois defenders of the black Americans' rights was that these rights were of obviously auxiliary and secondary importance to them in comparison to their own socioeconomic and political interests. Uncompromising struggle for humanistic ideals and the willingness to make sacrifices for them were, quite simply, alien to most bourgeois radicals. On the contrary, they were quite prepared to renounce them as soon as they began to threaten the retention of the economic and political domination on the federal scale that had been gained as a result of the Civil War. The clearest proof of this can be seen in the bargain made in 1877, when the Republican Party agreed to put an end to the policy of Reconstruction, which was already barely flickering and actually had one foot in the grave, in exchange for the presidential seat.

E. V. Lisnevskiy's long work is also not devoid, in our opinion, of several inaccurate, debatable and insufficiently substantiated conclusions. Obvious

exceptions can be taken to his conclusion that contemporary bourgeois authors, in comparison to their predecessors, are guided in their explanation of the Klanist terror "by equally unscientific, but nonetheless more objective causes" (p 105). We could also dispute his contention that the Klanism of the 1920's "was a definite echo of the populist doctrines of the 19th century" (p 183). This statement could mar the reputation of one of the most brilliant stages in the American democratic tradition--the anti-monopoly movement of the farmers during the era of the transition to imperialism. Lisnevskiy's assertion that "the slave-owning South had only a purely external resemblance to capitalist society" (p 18) appears quite superficial against the background of the present level of research on the nature of plantation slavery in Soviet historical works.

Nonetheless, E. V. Lisnevskiy's study is original and promotes a deeper understanding of the historical roots of American racism.

Canadian-Asian Relations

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 78
p 121

[Review by A. B. Parkanskiy of the book "Kanada i strany Yuzhnoy, Yugo-vostochnoy Azii i Dal'nego Vostoka" (Canada and the Nations of South and Southeast Asia and the Far East) by V. V. Vakhrushev, Moscow, Nauka, 1977, 136 pages]

[Text] The Pacific basin is an arena of increasingly fierce inter-imperialist rivalry which is weakening the positions of the old colonial powers and increasing the influence of not only the United States, Japan and the FRG, but also such states as Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

The publication of this work on the present policy of Canada in the nations of South and Southeast Asia and the Far East and the development of Canada's trade, economic, scientific and technical ties with the Pacific Asian countries appears quite timely in this respect.

"The geographic position, history and present interests of Canada have made it a Pacific power," the author quotes from the White Book of Canada's State Department, published in 1970 (p 41). Setting its main political objective as the reinforcement of the nation's position as a Pacific power, the Canadian ruling class is simultaneously striving to conquer sales markets and spheres for the application of capital in this dynamically developing region of the world.

Canadian exports to these countries are constantly growing: They rose by 44 percent in 1974 alone and totaled 3,434,000,000 dollars with imports totaling 2,501,000,000 and a positive balance of almost a billion dollars. Canada sells mainly grain and other food products, raw materials and semi-manufactured goods, as well as machines and equipment (p 41).

In this book, V. V. Vakhrushev describes the basic forms and methods of Canadian expansion in the Pacific countries. Programs of "assistance" have become Canada's major instrument of foreign economic policy. The mechanism of the Community of Nations is being actively utilized; in particular, Canada's active participation in a major economic program of cooperation--the "Colombo Plan"--has played an important role in the economic penetration of the countries of South and Southeast Asia by Canadian capital and in the augmentation of Canadian influence.

The author quite realistically assesses the present scales of the Canadian "presence" in Pacific Asia: It is minimal in most of the countries of this region. "Canada is somewhat behind its stronger rivals and is only taking its first steps...in establishing a 'favorable climate' for itself in the future" (p 134). At the same time, the author's contention that Canada might become a serious rival of other capitalist countries in this region of the world also seems sound.

The success of Canada's policy in the Asian and Pacific countries lies, in the author's view, in the paths toward struggle for the establishment of stability here, a positive attitude toward the consolidation of peace and security in Asia, the dissociation of itself from any aggressive imperialist plans and the complete normalization of relations with all countries in this region.

The author has also made some regrettable errors. For example, his statement that the American economy depends on imported raw materials "almost as much" as the Japanese economy is an obvious exaggeration (p 28). There is no question that the United States is much more self-sufficient in this sphere. In another part of the book he writes that Canadian exports to Japan more than quadrupled during the 1970-1974 period, while data cited in the book a few lines earlier attest to a less than threefold increase (p 79). These errors, however, do not have any fundamental effect on the general scientific level of the author's analysis.

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CHINESE ETHNIC MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 78
pp 122-127

[Article by V. I. Biryukov]

[Text] Americans of Chinese origin occupy a prominent place among the ethnic minorities in the United States. According to reports in the American press, the number of Chinese living in the United States passed the half-million mark a few years ago.¹

Historically, the Chinese ethnic minority in the United States began to take shape in the middle of the 19th century. Its formation was partly a result of the mass-scale immigration of Chinese occasioned by the difficult socioeconomic conditions of the masses in feudal and underdeveloped China. During this same period in history, the rapid industrial development of the American West Coast gave rise to an acute need for cheap labor. It was precisely these two factors that played the deciding role in the recruitment of Chinese coolies by American employers for the most difficult work involved in the development of the western states.

The first wave of Chinese emigrants to the United States coincided with the famous "gold rush" that seized California in 1848 and stimulated the economic development of this part of America.²

Under these conditions, the racial, lingual and cultural isolation of the Chinese from most of the American workers provided favorable opportunities for the exploitation of the immigrants. The history of the Chinese immigration in the United States graphically demonstrates how American capitalism took advantage of the newly arrived Chinese workers. For example, there were 82,600 miners in California in 1860 and 24,000 of them were Chinese.³ Besides this, the taxes levied on the Chinese miners were several times higher than the taxes collected from workers of other nationalities.⁴ In all, Chinese miners had to pay 5 million dollars, or almost the total taxes collected from foreign gold prospectors.⁵

As old sources of gold were exhausted in California and new ones were discovered, the Chinese settled throughout the United States and Canada.

The Chinese coolies were also recruited for the broad-scale railroad construction that connected California with the eastern part of the United States in the 1870's. The intensive use of Chinese workers made it possible to complete many sections of this gigantic construction project within a short period of time. "We coped well with hiring difficulties," said one representative of the Central Pacific Railroad Company. "There were no workers in the nation, and they had to be imported. In any case, at the height of the construction work being done by Central Pacific, nine out of ten workers were Chinese."

Railroad construction in the United States also contributed to the resettlement of the Chinese throughout the nation and beyond its borders.⁶ They worked in Colorado, Nevada, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Washington and Utah. By 1882, 6,500 Chinese workers had moved from the United States to Canada, where railroad construction was also being done.⁷

Besides this, Chinese workers were predominant in California light industry. By the 1870's, the Chinese, representing 14 percent of the total labor force in this state, received 90 cents a day in contrast to the 2.25-5 dollars paid to whites.⁸

The Chinese were also employed in California agriculture. In 1880 around 70 percent of the seasonal agricultural workers in the state were Chinese.⁹

When the demand for large amounts of cheap labor disappeared at the end of the 19th century, at a time of increasingly frequent economic crises, American business began to reduce the flow of emigrants from China, just as from other countries in Asia. The utilitarian approach to the exploitation of Chinese in the United States and racial pressure on the part of American society (including the labor unions, which were infected with chauvinism) forced the Chinese to find specific spheres of employment in the economy. It was precisely at this time that the bases were laid for the stereotypical idea of the Chinese in the United States as people employed in the service sphere and in small-scale trade within the bounds of the Chinese neighborhoods, or "Chinatowns."

During this same period, anti-Chinese legislation began to be written with the intention of preventing the arrival of new Chinese immigrants and reinforcing the underprivileged status of the Chinese emigrants who had already arrived. For example, in 1854 a law was passed in California on the inclusion of "Mongols" in the category of Indians, which prohibited them from testifying against whites.¹⁰ The first American-Chinese treaties did not envisage the granting of American citizenship to Chinese immigrants. The attempts to reduce the Chinese immigration to the United States continued in the 1870's and were reflected in the passage of the "Fifteen Passenger Act," in accordance with which each ship entering a U.S. harbor was not

supposed to carry more than 15 Chinese. Laws were passed in California to prohibit the employment of Chinese by white employers for virtually every type of work; in addition, they could not be hired for civil service jobs. It was precisely the factor of the economic discrimination against the Chinese in the American society that caused their sphere of employment to become the service sphere--laundries and similar establishments. This, in turn, caused the concentration of Chinese in cities, where they could expect to find jobs. In 1882 a federal law was passed which prohibited Chinese workers from entering the United States for 20 years; formally, it remained in force until 1943, when an entry quota of only 105 persons a year was set in the United States for Chinese immigrants.¹¹ The anti-Chinese "excluding" laws, which stopped Chinese immigration to the United States at the end of the 19th century, reduced the size of the Chinese community.

Therefore, the Chinese community in the United States was doomed to isolation by the existence of an externally hostile American environment and by its own alienation. This was the reason for the concentration of Chinese immigrants in the American cities in separate neighborhoods called "Chinatowns." The external appearance of the Chinese neighborhoods still makes them stand out clearly against the general background of the American cities; the architecture, ethnography and style of life in them are unique. The immigrants had to use the traditional power structure characteristic of the southern Chinese rural areas of the 19th century based on a system of family clans and district associations. Power in the Chinatowns was seized by the merchants. The highest organ of the Chinese immigrants in the United States is still the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association. It has branches in San Francisco, Los Angeles, New York and other American cities where Chinese live. Secret societies, in some cases of a criminal nature, became widespread at the end of the 19th century, acting parallel and in counterbalance to this association. Other associations have also existed within the framework of the American Chinatowns: Chinese chambers of commerce regulating business activity in the Chinese neighborhoods, guilds of restaurant owners, merchants and tailors and so forth.

A reflection of events in China has always been seen in the political life of the Chinese community in the United States. As a result of a campaign begun in 1937 to appeal to the "Chinese overseas," the Kuomintang was able to win the support of most of the Chinese in the United States, although far from the entire community was on the side of this regime. This caused a split in the community. Immediately after the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the ties of Chinese in America with the regime in Taiwan became even stronger due to the United States' hostile attitude toward the young state during the years of the cold war.

The American Government's policy concerning the immigration from China began to be actively changed at the beginning of the 1960's when there were signs that the PRC leadership would withdraw from cooperation with the socialist community, especially the USSR.

This transition was a gradual one. In response to the wave of Chinese emigrants from the PRC to Hong Kong, President J. Kennedy issued a special directive in May 1962 on refugees from mainland China. In accordance with this directive, many refugees from the PRC were allowed to enter the United States.

A law proposed by the Johnson Administration was passed on 3 October 1965, in accordance with which all of the countries of the Eastern Hemisphere were granted entry quotas of up to 20,000 persons a year from each country. Between 1966 and 1971, 75,500 Chinese came to the United States.¹²

The flow of Chinese immigrants was uninterrupted during the 1970's as well. Between 1965 and 1975, 147,000 Chinese came to the United States, which represented 4 percent of the total immigration figure.¹³

The Chinese immigrants coming to the United States include a special category of political refugees. Between 1954 and 1974 there were 90,000 of these (including those who came from Taiwan), and there were 1,700 in 1973 alone.¹⁴ According to the U.S. population census, the number of Chinese there rose from 237,300 in 1960 to 435,000 in 1970--that is, by 83 percent--and constituted 0.2 percent of the total U.S. population.¹⁵ In 1973, however, a UPI report cited another figure--860,000 Chinese. We should note the unreliability of official American data on the number of Chinese in the United States. American historians Victor and Brett de Bary Nee believe that "the census figures on the inhabitants of the Chinese neighborhoods were always incorrect due to the absence of data on illegal aliens."¹⁶

According to official data, 96.6 percent of the Chinese now live in cities and only 3.4 percent live in rural areas.¹⁷ The distribution of Chinese immigrants over U.S. territory is uneven. The largest Chinese neighborhoods are the Chinatowns in San Francisco and New York. In addition, there are large Chinese communities in Chicago, Boston and Philadelphia. The highest proportional concentration of Chinese was noted in Hawaii in 1970: The 52,000 Chinese represented 6.8 percent of the total population of the state.¹⁸ At this time, around 65,000 Chinese were living in San Francisco, or approximately 10 percent of the city's total population.¹⁹ According to American experts, however, if 35,000-45,000 Chinese live directly in San Francisco's Chinatown and adjacent regions, the total Chinese population of the city might be 70,000-80,000--that is, up to 12 percent of the total population. More than 50 percent of the Chinese population is under the age of 21.²⁰

The relatives of American citizens of Chinese origin represent a significant factor contributing to the growth of the Chinese community in the United States. This category of new immigrants is distinguished by a lack of education and professional training, no knowledge of the English language and a low income level. When they come to the United States, they supplement the army of cheap labor in the Chinatowns and the ranks of the secret societies.²¹

Specialists and skilled workers who have received a higher and specialized education in Hong Kong and Taiwan make up another large group of Chinese immigrants. It is indicative that this immigrant group is growing. For this category, the Chinatowns are only a rest stop on the way to assimilation in the American society.

Students from Taiwan who go to the United States to study and then settle there are also increasing the size of the Chinese community. It is known that many political and military figures in Taiwan send their children to the United States expressly for the purpose of their acquisition of American citizenship. They anticipate that they will be able to emigrate with no trouble to the United States as the parents of American citizens in the event of instability in Taiwan.

Illegal immigration is another considerable factor contributing to the growth of the Chinese ethnic minority. Illegal Chinese aliens from Hong Kong and Taiwan were the fifth-largest group in 1971 after aliens from Mexico, Canada, the British West Indies and the Philippines. In 1971 the number of illegal Chinese aliens was estimated at 2,900,²² although the actual number is most probably much higher. One of the popular ways of entering the United States consists in jumping ship in Honolulu and Vancouver--trans-shipment points for subsequent illegal infiltration of the United States.²³

For example, it only costs 350 dollars on the black market to send a "mainland Chinese"--that is, a refugee from the PRC--from Canada to New York, where these people disappear without a trace in the Chinese neighborhoods.²⁴

Finally, the flow of Chinese from the PRC has increased since the beginning of the 1970's. These enter the United States through Hong Kong, legally, with Peking's permission; many of them have relatives in the United States and Canada.

The influx of new immigrants lowered the standard of living of the inhabitants of Chinatowns even more, although they were never high to begin with because of the racial discrimination that still exists in one form or another and because of double exploitation--by the American economic system and by the Chinese bourgeoisie. The situation in San Francisco's Chinatown is most indicative in this respect. In 1971 the rate of unemployment among Chinese was 14 percent, twice as high as the city average.²⁵ The density of the Chinese population in San Francisco's Chinese neighborhoods was 900 persons per acre, which was ten times as high as the average citywide population density.²⁶ Rents in Chinatown were 25 percent higher than the city average.²⁷ The rate of tuberculosis was the highest in the nation.²⁸

The pitiful situation of most of the inhabitants of the Chinese neighborhoods gives rise to acute social conflicts, which, incidentally, have been smoothed out in most cases by the local bourgeoisie through the use of traditional institutions of authority. All of this, however, inevitably

intensifies the conflicts between the top level of the Chinese community and the general public in this community and undermines trust in the once prestigious "district associations" which served to control the socio-political and economic life of the Chinatowns. In addition, more and more Chinese are being assimilated in American society. These are mainly third-generation Chinese who have been educated exclusively in American schools. The Chinese who have attended universities in Hong Kong, Taiwan and the PRC do not remain in the Chinatowns either.

Another reason for the diminished role and influence of the traditional authorities and organizations, which still occupy a pro-Taiwan position, is the PRC's more active struggle to win the Chinese living in the United States over to its own side. Intensive work in the Chinese community has made it possible for the Peking leaders to influence part of the Chinese population. The new immigration laws and, what is even more important, the reassessment of American policy concerning the PRC for the purpose of encouraging Peking's anti-Soviet course are also working in this direction.

The policy of the Peking leadership toward Americans of Chinese origin is aimed at a number of specific objectives. Peking is striving to broaden its political and ideological influence in the Chinese community, particularly for the purpose of influencing general public opinion in the United States and the position of the American Government. It is extremely important that the Chinese community represents a convenient instrument for the collection of political, economic, technical and military information.

For this reason, Peking is primarily striving, on the one hand, to undermine the existing ties between Americans of Chinese origin and Taiwan and, on the other, to use these ties as an additional channel for communication with the Taiwan regime.

The Chinese community in the United States is a major source of foreign currency as a result of donations, money sent to relatives in the PRC and commercial activity.

In a speech presented in Tientsin on 20 May 1975 (the text of this speech, when it appeared in Taiwan, did not raise any suspicions on the part of American experts as to its authenticity),²⁹ former PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ch'iao Kuang-hua said: "We hope that most of the Chinese overseas and their families sympathize with the revolution and support it. Some of them will take part in the revolution, will join the local population or will become revolutionary leaders."³⁰ In reference to the significance of Chinese in the United States for the PRC, Ch'iao also said: "Yang Chen-ning--naturalized citizen of the United States (winner of the Nobel Prize for physics)--loves China. American citizens like this one can be very useful in our propaganda work because they have all the rights of American citizens."³¹

Peking's interest in contacts with Chinese immigrants became even stronger after the victory of the so-called pragmatics in the PRC leadership. After embarking on a course toward the accelerated modernization and militarization of all spheres of economic life and politics, the nationalist leaders of China began to regard the "hua ch'iao" ("foreign Chinese") as a quite promising means of attaining their own great-power objectives. The significance now attached to contacts with them is attested to by the fact that several conferences of interested organizations and departments were held in Peking in 1977-1978 to clarify the methods of winning over the "foreign Chinese." Loud appeals for the creation of a "united front," connecting China with "overseas countrymen" on the basis of "common nationality," regardless of the political convictions and social status of the latter, appeared in the PRC press.

Hua Kuo-feng, new chairman of the CCP Central Committee devoted a large part of his speech at the last session of the National People's Congress to this matter. He stressed that the overseas community should serve as a "bridge" between the PRC and the countries in which they are located.

The official policy of the U.S. Administration toward the PRC in recent years and the "vogue for China" created by the American mass media have given Peking particularly favorable opportunities for infiltrating the milieu of the American Chinese. Peking's influence is growing as a result of the broadening of its propaganda channels with the aid of the press, radio, official dignitaries, broader cultural ties and trade relations and the establishment of pro-Peking political organizations capable of undermining and usurping the influence of the pro-Taiwan political associations. There are now dozens of Maoist organizations in the United States.

In terms of their social base, the new Chinese organizations can be divided into three main groups. The first are the organizations of young immigrants in the Chinatowns, who have begun to establish ultra-leftist groups under the influence of Peking propaganda. The second are the organizations of university students and the groups springing up on campuses under the influence of the civil rights movement begun by non-whites in the United States in the 1960's; they are now concentrating their efforts on extending their influence and expanding ties with the Chinatowns. The third are organizations of the members of the Chinese intelligentsia of liberal leanings who have already broken away from the Chinatowns; the well-to-do inhabitants of the Chinatowns are frequently also members of these.

A certain amount of influence in the Chinese community in the United States has also been acquired by such organizations as the Chinese Progressive Association, the Public Service Society and others. Various clubs and societies of Maoist leanings are now widespread in the university environment. Organizations sympathetic to Maoism have sprung up in the Chinese intelligentsia, such as the Asian American Political Union and Chinese for Affirmative Action.

An important channel for Peking's ideological infiltration is editing control over press organs in the Chinatowns and the distribution of literature and other propaganda materials prepared in the PRC. In this connection, we could name the newspapers published by the so-called Chinese Progressive Association (T'UAN-TSE PAO) and the Wei-ming Society (WEI-MING PAO) and new papers which came into existence in the 1970's: SHIH-TAI PAO, CHIU CHIN-SHAN PAO, JEN PAO and others. Besides this, Peking is striving to gain control over the bourgeois Chinese press: The Maoists have been able to gain control over one of the most popular newspapers of the West Coast Chinatowns--T'AI-P'ING-NIEN CHOU-PAO--as well as MEI-CHOU JIH-PAO, published in New York's Chinatown since 1940.

The distribution of Maoist literature and other propaganda materials is accomplished through the China Books and Periodicals firm, which essentially has a monopoly on the U.S. distribution of all Chinese literature printed in Chinese, English and Spanish. The firm has branches in San Francisco, New York and Chicago. There is an entire network of bookstores in San Francisco and New York for the distribution of Maoist publications: the New China Bookstore, the People's Bookstore, Everybody Bookstore, the China Mercantile Corporation, the Hsin-hsing Corporation, United Books, Books New China, the Modern Chinese Arts and Printing Corporation and others. For the same purpose, Peking has set up a special news agency, CHUNG-KUO HSIN-WEN, in Hong Kong to distribute news compiled in Peking to all countries with a Chinese population, including the United States. The distribution of Chinese films in the United States is accomplished by Peking through the film department of Grove Press.

The personal ideological processing of Chinese living in the United States occupies a special place in Peking's policy toward the Chinese community. There are now close to 11 million people in China with some degree of relationship to emigrants.³² Cases are known of the blackmailing of PRC residents with relatives in the United States so that the latter will display more energy in their pro-Peking activity. American citizens who travel to China to visit relatives are made especially welcome. A special hotel has been built in Peking for the Chinese who come from abroad, and their relatives in the PRC are given government assistance. Many prominent American citizens of Chinese origin who visit China are welcomed on the highest level. For example, Yang Chen-ning, American nuclear physicist and winner of the Nobel Prize for physics in 1957, has visited the PRC several times in the 1970's alone. On his last visit he stayed from 27 March through 18 April 1976.³³

The Chinese community in the United States is becoming increasingly important to the PRC both in the economic sense and from the standpoint of opportunities for the acquisition of information needed by Peking, including information of a military nature.

FOOTNOTES

1. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 8 November 1971, p 91.
2. K. Wright, "The Other Americans. Minorities in American History," N.Y., 1971, p 120.
3. H. Melendy, "The Oriental Americans," N.Y., 1972, p 44.
4. Ibid., p 29.
5. I-yao Shen, "A Century of American Immigration Policy Toward China," FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, July 1974, p 10.
6. V. and B. de Bary Nee, "Longtime Californ'. A Documentary Study of an American Chinatown," N.Y., 1972-1973, p 41.
7. D. and J. Dowdell, "The Chinese Helped To Build America," N.Y., 1972, p 61.
8. V. and B. de Bary Nee, Op. cit., p 43.
9. Ibid., p 42.
10. Ibid., p 32.
11. H. Melendy, Op. cit., p 66.
12. Ibid., p 67.
13. "U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. Annual Reports, 1965-1974."
14. "Statistical Abstract of the United States," 1974, p 101.
15. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 8 November 1971, p 91.
16. V. and B. de Bary Nee, Op. cit., p 22.
17. "U.S. Bureau of the Census," HC/7/-9, 1973.
18. THE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES, vol 29, No 2, 1973, p 2.
19. FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 9 September 1972, p 25a.
20. V. and B. de Bary Nee, Op. cit., p 22.
21. The model for American organizations of this kind was the secret societies in China in the 18th and 19th centuries.

22. "Illegal Aliens," Hearings..., Wash., 1972, p 1259.
23. Ibid.
24. THE AMERICAN FEDERATIONIST, August 1974, p 22.
25. Min S. Yee, "Cracks in the Great Wall of Chinatown," RAMPARTS, October 1972, p 36.
26. Ibid.
27. FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 9 September 1972, p 26.
28. Min S. Yee, Op. cit., p 36.
29. CHINA NEWS ANALYSIS, No 1036, 9 April 1976, p 3.
30. WHAT'S HAPPENING ON THE CHINESE MAINLAND, A BIWEEKLY NEWSLETTER OF FACTS AND ANALYSIS, Taipei, vol 2, No 16, 31 August 1975, p 2.
31. Ibid.
32. CHINA ACTUEL, 4 October 1975.
33. JEN-MIN JIH-PAO, 18 April 1976.

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