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CHANGES IN COMBAT TACTICS OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT DISCUSSED

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 5, May 78, and No 6, Jun 78 signed to press 31 Mar, 4 May 78

[Article by Col V. Dubrov, Candidate of Military Sciences: "How Has Air Combat Changed?" Published under the heading: "Tactics and Modeling." Note: Parts 1 and 2 published in JPRS 71452, 12 Jul 78 (No 1362 of this series) pp 56-67]

[No 5, May 78 pp 44-46]

[Text] 3. Attack

As is indicated by air combat experience in the Great Patriotic War, attack consisted in direct delivery of fire on the adversary and was the decisive stage of combat. It included rough aiming of the weapon on the target, precise aiming and delivery of fire for effect. Careful preparation was made for the attack at the preceding stage of the air engagement -- closing.

In the field manual which came out right after the war it stated: "Maneuver in the process of closing with an adversary spotted in the air should ensure precise movement to the firing position, the element of surprise, the possibility of downing the target on the first pass, advance into those sectors least vulnerable to fire from the hostile aircraft (group), taking into account the possibility of another attack pass."

The element of surprise and the endeavor to down the adversary on the first pass become fundamental principles of conduct of offensive air combat, and the main elements of attack. A brief excerpt from the book "Istrebitel'naya aviatsiya v Otechestvennoy voyne" [Fighter Aviation in the Great Patriotic War] relates how these principles were observed: "According to the figures of most air forces, the number of enemy aircraft downed on the first pass was approximately 75%, 15% on the second, and 10% on the third."

An analysis conducted by foreign experts on the causes of aircraft losses in air combat in Vietnam and the Near East indicates that these percentages have changed little. It is true that the percentage of aircraft downed on the first pass has increased, and a third pass has become little probable.

Evaluation of the tactics and combat results of supersonic aircraft suggests the following conclusion: it has become more difficult to gain the element of surprise, but the consequences of surprise are more severe to the adversary.

The difficulty of achieving an attack with the element of surprise was caused by the fact that air engagements involved several aircraft and were conducted for the most part at medium altitude, under surveillance by enemy radars. Chances for gaining the element of surprise became greater as the point of engagement moved to friendly territory, but fighters performed the principal combat missions (air cover for troops, achievement of air supremacy, bomber escort) in the forward zone and beyond the battle line.

In combat over Vietnam, three fourths of the total number of downed supersonic aircraft were downed on the first pass. Maneuver combat would begin only upon failure of the first pass or if timely protective measures were undertaken by the adversary.

Of considerable importance in DRV fighter tactics was the factor of friendly territory. American aircraft were flying raids on Hanoi and Haiphong, were operating beyond the range of friendly ground radars, while information from airborne command posts was incomplete and not entirely accurate. In addition, all airborne radars were little-effective in spotting low-flying targets. Under these conditions North Vietnamese pilots adopted the tactic of thoroughly-prepared surprise attacks. Only aggressiveness combined with mounting devastating attacks could produce success with the enemy possessing numerical superiority in the air.

The Swiss journal INTERAVIA stated: "The U.S. Air Force encountered massive countermeasures by North Vietnam's air defense system. DRV fighter squadrons did not employ massive repelling techniques but would periodically engage, strictly in conformity with the situation. There exists the opinion that employment of tactics of prepared and surprise attacks during a specified period of time was the main factor ensuring success to the side sustaining defense." The journal emphasized that those attacks against which the U.S. pilots were unable to undertake response countermeasures were successful. This would happen most frequently at that phase of a mission when the aggressor aircraft were still in close formation prior to opening out over the target.

The principal device employed by the Vietnamese MiGs was characterized by the fact that closing with the adversary began long before establishing visual contact, on ground command. Speed at the moment the aircraft reached the ordnance release point was the maximum possible, taking into account limitations in regard to aimed firing of missiles.

General (Mom'yer), former commanding general of the U.S. Seventh Air Force in Vietnam, wrote in the magazine AVIATION WEEK: "As soon as they received supersonic aircraft, the North Vietnamese shifted from tactics of fluid

combat at short range to swift attack passes at a speed of Mach 1.2. This tactic was highly effective, since it was based on employment of excellent guidance radar facilities and made it possible maximally to utilize the element of surprise. The speed of the American fighters matched the speed of the bomb-laden aircraft they were escorting, and did not exceed 900 km/h. Precisely for this reason MiG attacks from the rear hemisphere were effective and resulted in almost no downed interceptors. It was very difficult to provide warning of such attacks, since they were operating beyond the surveillance range of friendly ground radars."

The success of the device employed by the North Vietnamese MiGs is due in the first place to the fact that the missile attack was preceded by undetected, swift closing. Second, the tactic itself was unexpected by the adversary, who was unable to find effective defensive measures. Third, a determining role was played by the factor of utilization in combat of new equipment and weapons. Up to this time American pilots had encountered only the subsonic MiG-17, which determined the character of close-combat air engagements.

A qualitative leap forward in armament immediately produced quantitative changes, since the newly-elaborated tactic corresponded to the capabilities of the new equipment. At the beginning of 1966 11 U.S. and 9 North Vietnamese aircraft were down in air engagements (a loss ratio of 1.2:1), while from May through December air engagements involving MiG-21 aircraft produced a ratio of 4:1 (47 downed U.S. and 12 North Vietnamese aircraft). We should note that the MiG attacks were aimed chiefly at bomb-laden U.S. aircraft, with "penetration" of a fighter escort screen.

Under conditions of extensive employment of warning and surveillance devices, the principle of "avoiding lack of originality in tactics," left as a legacy by the fighters of past generations, made itself known with even greater persistence. The element of surprise and mystery to the adversary lay precisely in the novelty and originality of the technique or mode of attack.

The war in Southeast Asia demonstrated the decisive role of the element of surprise in combat with a numerically superior adversary. DRV pilots confirmed the conclusion: "The best defense for a fighter is offense," contained in the book "Taktika istrebitel'noy aviatsii" [Tactics of Fighter Aviation], which synthesizes the experience of World War II. It is now clear that selection of passive defense rather than swift, surprise attack would not have led to overall victory in air combat with the aggressor.

In the final analysis the tactics of air combat demand of the attack not only the element of surprise but effectiveness as well. The element of surprise cannot per se be the goal of an action; it is only a means, with the correct utilization of which combat success is achieved. The role of surprise is determined by the results of the attack, while it influences the outcome of combat through its principal elements -- maneuver and fire.

As is evident from the examples, selection of mode of attack depends on the capabilities of the fighter's weapons. A missile attack was effective only with observance of fairly rigid requirements on flight conditions. The magazine AIR FORCE stated: "Air-to-air missiles had limitations of a minimum firing range (approximately 1,000 meters) for ensuring safety, for otherwise the proximity fuze could detonate the warhead close to the firing aircraft. The G-load during firing, in order to avoid guidance failure, should not exceed 2.5." In practical combat this meant that a missile attack had to be mounted against an adversary who was still in a static position. His response to maneuver with a G-load in excess of 2.5 would put the attacking fighter out of the area of possible missile employment.

What methods could be used to lull the vigilance of an adversary who was receiving information on the air situation? This question was resolved during multiple-aircraft engagements in the Near East. While it was necessary to employ approach and combat formations to achieve concealment of approach and to keep from giving away the combat plan, a surprise attack was possible only by restructuring the combat formation proper. Change in the missions performed by groups of various tactical designation should be acknowledged as a new element in air combat tactics.

Previously the squadron formation had consisted of two groups: attack and escort cover, with as much as one third of the forces (flight) assigned to the latter. The squadron would close with the adversary in such a manner that the attack group was higher than the main enemy force and would be first to engage. The direction of the first attack (first pass) would be determined by the squadron commander on the basis of estimating the air situation and determining the most vulnerable point in the enemy's formation. The cover group would engage for pursuit, to cut off the enemy and to support the attack group if there were no enemy fighters at a higher altitude.

Judging from reports in the foreign press, in combat between supersonic fighters, a decoy group would often be the first to engage. Its mission was to secure conditions for the attack group to gain the element of offensive surprise. Experts distinguished three tactical devices employed more frequently than others in a feinting action: breaking up of the enemy's formation, drawing it toward the area where the attack group was positioned, and breaking the flight into pairs by course and altitude after simulating a frontal attack.

Breaking up the enemy's formation by driving into it on a head-on course and at high speed was done so that the attack group could attack individual aircraft separated from the formation. Usually pilots left without support would not undertake vigorous actions and would attempt to locate their aircraft as quickly as possible, forgetting about defense.

Enticement of the adversary into the area where the attack group was positioned was called "provoking pursuit." In the process of pursuit the adversary would follow only the maneuvers of the diversionary group, planning on

attacking it with superior forces. However, at a predetermined point the attack group would engage. Usually it would attack from below, from beyond the range of hostile radar surveillance.

Following the diversionary frontal closing, the feinting group would separate in order to break up the enemy's formation, compelling him to scatter his forces for combat in two areas. The attack group would build up efforts in one of them, establishing a numerical superiority and engaging at that moment which was most favorable for mounting a missile attack.


If offensive thrust was insufficient, a reserve group, positioned either in the general formation or in a patrol zone beyond the range of hostile air defense fire, would swing into action. Support was required most frequently when the surprise attack failed and maneuver combat was engaged, where the chances of the opposing sides would equalize.

We shall now summarize our review of the third stage of air combat between supersonic fighters, establish the principal changes in tactics and draw certain conclusions pertaining to the future development of tactics.

First of all, tactics were determined in large measure by attempts to adapt aircraft and weapons designed for interception missions to the conduct of multiple-aircraft maneuver combat. The restrictions imposed by air-to-air missiles as regards release distance and G-loads made it necessary carefully to prepare for an attack and to revise the ratio of auxiliary and attack forces in combat in favor of the former.

There appeared in the combat formation a diversionary group with its own strictly-specified missions, this group ensuring the element of surprise to the missile attack by the main forces. If a group engagement was fought by three fighter flights (maximum composition according to the experience of local wars), usually the diversionary group would contain four aircraft. The combat plan specified that after performing its principal functions this group could augment the efforts of the attacking fighters.

Second, the attack group no longer sought to take a higher altitude prior to engaging the main enemy fighter group, but on the contrary would occupy the lower echelon in the formation, staying below hostile radar observation. Frequently it would set up an ambush, organized in gaps in the enemy's radar coverage. In conformity with the requirements of surprise, in most cases the attack would be delivered not from above but from below, from that sector least observed by the enemy. The thrust-to-weight ratio of the fighters was sufficient not to lose speed in the process of attacking while climbing.



Zones of Most Advantageous Attack (figure taken from journal INTERAVIA REVIEW)

Key:

- | | |
|----------------|----------------------------------|
| 1. Altitude | 3. Transitional zone, combat |
| 2. Mach number | at low speed |
| | 4. Main zone (BMB) |
| | 5. Transitional zone, high speed |

Third, it was no longer mandatory to assign the greater part of the squadron's forces to the attack group. Weapon firepower had increased to such an extent that there was more thought being given to accuracy of attack than to concentration of fire (which was mandatory for fighters with cannon armament). Thus attack, back-up and support forces were divided approximately evenly.

Fourth, thorough preparation and briefing of aircrews on the ground was required for successful completion of the third, in most cases the decisive stage of air combat between supersonic fighters. Playing out of different group combat variants, determination of reasonable missions for groups of different tactical designation, procedure of coordinated action, and establishment of points of engagement and direction of attacks were considered almost mandatory. Thus any air engagement where fighters were to impose their own tactics on the adversary, seize the initiative and attack with the element of surprise would be modeled on the ground with one of the various possible methods.

How do experts see air combat involving fighters of the next generation designed to gain air supremacy? We previously noted that their tactics are presently at the modeling stage, but already foreign experts are reaching some conclusions in regard to the attack stage. They are assisted in this by an estimate of the combat capabilities of aircraft and weapons as well as comparison of the characteristics of fighters of the past and present generation.

The F-15 Eagle, just as the Phantom, which took part in the fighting in Vietnam and the Near East, is armed with Sparrow medium-range missiles, Sidewinder short-range missiles, and the Vulcan aircraft cannon. The missiles, however, have been considerably improved and are members of a new generation of air-to-air weapons. The range of their employment as regards release distance and G-load has been appreciably enlarged.

According to the magazine AVIATION ET MARINE a new version of the AIM-9L Sidewinder missile with a heat-seeking guidance system is approximately 2.9 meters in length, has a body diameter of 0.127 m, and a wingspan of approximately 0.6 m. It travels at a speed of Mach 3, weighs 90 kg, has a minimum release distance of 300 meters, and an effective range of 15 km. The missile can be fired at an aircraft G-load of 6. Thus the close release distance and high G-load toleration in comparison with the older version mean that this missile can be employed in close maneuver combat.

The AIM-7F Sparrow missile with a radar guidance system is 3.66 m in length, with a body diameter of 0.203 m, and wingspan of 1.02 m. The missile weighs 227 kg, and the warhead weighs 39 kg. Maximum speed is Mach-4, and effective range 45 km. Simulation and actual firings at a G-load of 5 at a high speed, little-maneuvering target indicated that the F-15 can engage at medium distances (5-50 km) and can fire missiles head-on at existing closing speeds from a minimum range of 22 km.

Simulation of air engagements with the participation of air superiority fighters indicates that the expanded weapon capabilities can change the tactical content of the attack stage. Foreign experts believe that, in the first place, it is now possible to eliminate diversionary groups or at least alter their missions. Attack will involve not only a straight approach but also a turning approach. There should be an increase in the number of aircraft directly delivering fire on the adversary and not performing only auxiliary functions. The latter condition is considered mandatory, since the new-generation fighters cost several times more than the Phantom, and there will be fewer of them.

Second, it will become possible to attack at a great distance, much exceeding target visual detection range. The probability of success of such an attack depends on how stabilized the situation is, that is, to what extent the adversary loses his vigilance, enabling himself to be downed in an attack without closing. This situation is presently considered possible but not typical.

Third, in connection with the improved maneuverability both of aircraft and weapons, combat is being simulated with transition from medium to close distances. In other words, when interception fails aircraft and weapons are prepared to continue close maneuver combat. The adversary can be hit both immediately after closing (if it was undetected and swift) and after an unsuccessful first pass, if the pilot has succeeded in reaching a convenient position for firing close-range missiles in the process of a vigorous


maneuver. Thus a fourth stage is considered realistic for today's engagement: maneuver for executing a second attack in close maneuver combat.

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[No 6, Jun 78 pp 46-47]

[Text] 4. Maneuver

In the normal interpretation the fourth stage of air combat is the engagement proper, that is, rapid changes in heading and altitude, a sequence of maneuvers at a rapid rate, maximum G-load, and devastating fire at close range. It would seem that a brief analysis of current experience should have begun with this.



Fighter Effectiveness in Air Combat

Figure 1. Probability of Scoring Kill on Enemy Aircraft (disregarding lift and drag-augmentation devices). Figure 2. Probability of Survival at Various Thrust-to-Weight Ratios and Wing Loading (disregarding effect of lift and drag-augmentation devices).

Key:

1. Probability of scoring kill on enemy aircraft
2. Thrust-to-weight ratio on takeoff
3. Specific wing loading

We were entirely justified, however, in devoting such great attention, for example, to the preceding stage -- the first attack pass: three fourths of all air engagements in World War II and in local wars ended precisely with this first pass. We should note that a swift series of maneuvers and point-blank fire at a vigorously-evading adversary is a picture characteristic only of one fourth of successful engagements. It is not surprising that the endeavor to destroy the adversary on the first attack pass was a principle of fighter combat in the Great Patriotic War.

Today foreign experts are examining the two most probable variants of initiation of maneuver air combat. The first is after a failed missile-release attack pass, when the pilot has decided to continue pursuit of a maneuvering adversary. The second is when the adversary has suddenly appeared so close that weapons cannot be immediately employed. In the process of preparing for maneuver combat, usually two engagement variants are rehearsed: fighter advance into a potential attack area when the target suddenly appears ahead on a pursuit course or evasion from fire from an adversary discovered closing from behind. There are too many standard initial configurations and most advantageous defensive and offensive maneuvers to enumerate. West German pilot Illauer, for example, in an article entitled "The Logic of Air Combat" (in the magazine TRUPPENPRAXIS) schematically presented the possible continuations of maneuver combat following four standard mutual positionings of fighters at the moment the adversary is discovered in a threatened position. In this diagram one's attention is drawn by squares labeled "End," where the defending pilot ends up when he makes a clearly wrong move. Few pilots adhered to many of the correct continuations, such as sharp deceleration in a turn (as the pursued) or execution of a slow roll with a slip ("HG roll"), in actual air engagements in Vietnam and the Near East. A higher level of aircraft energy in flight was considered to be the main principle ensuring the capability of attack or vigorous defense. Deliberate slowing (a forced turn in the general case) would be undertaken only in critical situations, when it was necessary to think not about defense but survival.

Loss of energy by deceleration in order to increase the angular velocity of a turn was also done by an attacking aircraft when it was necessary to get into firing position as quickly as possible. If after deceleration, however, he failed to score a kill, the thrust-to-weight ratio was no longer sufficient for further pursuit. Thus the principal factors which directly influenced the course and outcome of close maneuver combat were suitability of the equipment for the conditions of combat, the pilot's skill and experience. As the magazine ORDNANCE comments, "The principal features of a fighter designed for maneuver air combat are low specific wing loading, high thrust-to-weight ratio and weapons which can be employed at close range and at high G-loads.... The pilot's skill consists in correctly utilizing these features or employing an intelligent tactic if any of them is insufficient."

In the opinion of experts, possessing advantage in the "aircraft-weapon-control system-electronics-pilot" elements is extremely important in combat. Experience shows that in such case the adversary has succeeded in equalizing the situation or seizing the initiative only when employing a new device which took too much time to figure out. We should note that in close combat, which began at the moment visual contact was established between adversaries, such factors as early detection and identification, concealment and swiftness lost their importance. The element of surprise was manifested only in a decision which was counter to the normal logic of combat, or with the employment of a new weapon with which the adversary is unfamiliar.

The journal AIAA PAPER published graphs characterizing the effectiveness of a fighter in maneuver air combat. Figure 1 shows the kill probability on a fighter aircraft with a specific wing loading (G/S) of 340 kg/m^2 and a thrust-to-weight ratio (P/G) of 0.7 (these figures were considered close to those of a North Vietnamese aircraft participating in air combat).

Figure 2 shows the probability of fighter survival in relation to specific wing loading and thrust-to-weight ratio. The results are averaged for a large number of air engagements for various initial conditions. The graphs contain curves reflecting the capabilities of new air supremacy aircraft based on simulation results. The following conclusions are reached on the basis of analysis of these graphs.

Kill probability, determined by optimal capabilities of closing with an adversary, depends to a greater degree on thrust-to-weight ratio than survival probability. Both criteria are more sensitive to specific wing loading than to thrust-to-weight ratio (this applies only to close maneuver combat).

Let us determine with the aid of these graphs the effectiveness of the Phantom (specific wing loading 390 kg/m^2 , thrust-to-weight ratio 0.8) and the F-15 Eagle (specific wing loading 293 kg/m^2 , thrust-to-weight ratio 1.2), with the stipulation that in close combat they employ only the Vulcan cannon or equal short-range missiles. Kill probability (the adversary's characteristics were given above) is 0.5 for the F-15, and 0.1 for the Phantom. Survival probability is 0.95 for the F-15 and 0.8 for the Phantom. It is also easy to establish from the graphs that the adversary, with a thrust-to-weight ratio of 0.7 and specific wing loading of 340 kg/m^2 , had both a higher kill probability and survival probability in combat with the Phantom. Foreign experts use precisely this to explain the misfortunes of the latter and the demand for a new fighter with improved maneuverability characteristics.

Many experts are generally inclined to call close maneuver combat between supersonic aircraft defensive combat. This is because, in the first place, when the attack aircraft shifts to maneuver, the offensive capabilities of the attacking aircraft diminish sharply, the element of surprise is lost, and long (or more precisely, medium) range weapons cannot be employed.

Secondly, the defending pilot led close combat, that is, determined its character and selection of devices. The attacking pilot merely conformed his actions to the adversary's maneuvers and selected a mode of attack in relation to the target's position in space (range, relative altitude and angle of approach).

Third, as is evident from the graphs, a light specific wing loading as a principal indicator of maneuverability determined greater capability for survival, that is, defense than offense.

The feasibility of employing a given type of maneuver in air combat was also discussed in the book "Taktika instrebitel'noy aviatsii" [Fighter Tactics], which was published just after the Great Patriotic War. The author noted that fighters in air combat would employ vertical and horizontal maneuvers, depending on the situation. Vertical maneuver (dive, chandelle, etc) gives a temporary speed advantage and therefore provides greater capability to conduct offensive combat. Horizontal maneuver (banked turn, turn without altitude loss or gain) in combat with equal aircraft or aircraft with a greater thrust-to-weight ratio diminishes a fighter's offensive capabilities: in executing a banked turn the pilot does not possess the needed energy level, since a considerable portion of energy is expended on opposing centrifugal force. Horizontal maneuver is permissible in combat with slower aircraft.

Analysis of fighter tactics in local wars indicates that these points have remained valid. We should also mention the extensive employment of standard techniques (combat maneuvers), models of which were elaborated in advance. The program of practice drills in the period of preparation for combat included mastery of several such devices, divided into offensive and defensive. Each corresponded to a specific initial situation, bore a short and sonorous name, which was employed as a command given in the air by the flight leader.

In the opinion of experts, the method of employing standard devices makes it possible to regulate pilot actions and to elaborate automatic reflexes to familiar scenarios when time is extremely short. Due to fast response to an already-learned situation it becomes possible to think through subsequent moves in combat which cannot easily be modeled due to their great diversity. As for air combat in Vietnam and the Near East, horizontal maneuver predominated, since the aircraft were optimized for interception and had a relatively high specific wing loading. In general close maneuver engagements were characterized by predominant employment of cannon fire and diminished results (due to the impossibility of employing missiles). In the opinion of foreign experts, loss of skills in aerial gunnery and a lack of practice in firing missiles at maneuvering targets were a factor. Today these skills are acquired on training missions on ranges specially equipped for working on the elements of maneuver combat, employing recording devices.

Increasing the thrust-to-weight ratio of air supremacy fighters and arming them with missiles for close combat is considered to be an important factor, which should ensure freedom of maneuver in any plane, and should also equalize cannon and missile capabilities. In other words, the disrupted relationship between maneuver and fire should be reestablished. The light F-16 fighters, which have already been purchased from the United States by four NATO member nations -- Belgium, Holland, Norway, and Denmark -- should embody the concept of maneuver combat of the classic forms.

An important place in forming the tactics of the new fighters is occupied by determining the logic of maneuver combat with a concrete adversary. On the basis of results of comparing the energy capabilities of aircraft, which are established on the basis of capability for additional acceleration at every point in the flight path, the areas of win, loss and draw outcome are being delineated. The initial position of the adversaries is selected by the investigator. In the process of playing out each variant, each makes that move which is most logical for that contestant, leading into the win area. In this way the rough outline of a device or combat maneuver is born, corresponding to the capabilities of one's equipment and weapons. The realisticness of the elaborated logic is verified in the course of experiment in the air with the participation of a fighter simulating the adversary's tactics.

The person playing the adversary occupies practically a leading role in bringing recommendations to a level adequate for their adoption in line units. Taken into consideration is the pride of the experienced pilot, who has no desire to lose in free combat and who seeks through his participation to refute logic which has not yet been adopted as a formal guideline. As is noted abroad, the tendency to understate the adversary's capabilities in order to push through one's own technical ideas is rather widespread and has shown its faultiness in local wars.

What conclusions are drawn on the basis of analysis of the fourth stage -- close maneuver combat between supersonic fighters in local wars?

First of all, the engagements differed little in character from those of World War II, and therefore all recommendations developed by past generations of fighters were applied to them. American pilots recalled the value of such recommendations after they had been forced to conduct maneuver engagements of a defensive character and had sustained losses.

Second, close maneuver combat is acknowledged in fighter tactics as defensive, enabling one to seize the initiative, equalize chances or restore lost tactical equilibrium. It is not recommended to engage in protracted maneuver combat over enemy territory. Following an unsuccessful offensive maneuver, pursuit of a maneuvering adversary in the draw-outcome zone can be conducted by a pilot who is confident of his own resources and ability.

Third, assimilated logic of combat provides room for reflex decisions when there is a time problem, but it does not fetter pilot innovativeness, which is defined as making substantiated decisions in nontypical situations. It is believed that air combat in which the capabilities of equipment and weapons as well as pilot skills are equal is won by the "illogical" maneuver, that is, maneuver which takes the adversary by surprise. Experts claim that there are situations in modern combat where movement should precede thought, but they are usually called critical.

Fourth, traditional elements in flight and fire training continued to be considered a guarantee of success in close combat: highly-refined flying ability, high tolerance to G-loads, spatial orientation, and aimed fire at close range. It was also necessary to recall a "comprehensive" criterion: the ability to aim while under a high G-load. We know from the experience of World War II that top pilots could deliver accurate fire while under 4 G's. It was precisely at this moment that the adversary believed that he had already left the loss zone.

In conclusion we should note that fairly extensive regions of draw outcome were always characteristic of aircraft of identical designation in the arsenals of leading countries. This fact also imposed greater demands on the tactical and fire training of the pilot who intended to win in air combat. Only a fighter pilot who has learned all the secrets of tactics was capable of forcing the adversary into the small loss region through skillful maneuver and utilization of his slight superiority. Thrice Hero of the Soviet Union A. I. Pokryshkin discusses this in his book "Nebo voyny" [Skies of War].

Disengagement is traditionally considered the final stage of air combat in the air forces of all countries. It is never given adequate attention, and the inexperienced pilot frequently believes that following an attack pass, particularly a successful one, the engagement is over and he can relax. The final stage, however, is no less complex in execution and no less important in significance. This is proven by the large number of aircraft downed during this stage. The main reasons for these aircraft losses are diminished vigilance and lack of cover for fighters which are forced to disengage (damage to the aircraft, wounding of the pilot, critically low fuel). Disengagement merits a more detailed analysis.

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COMMANDER NOTES 60TH ANNIVERSARY OF TURKESTAN MILITARY DISTRICT

Tashkent KOMMUNIST UZBEKISTANA in Russian No 6, Jun 78 signed to press
24 May 78 pp 52-54

[Article by Col Gen S. Belonozhko, commander of the Red Banner Turkestan Military District: "Guarding the Southern Borders of the Country of the Soviets"]

[Text] An atmosphere of great festiveness and political enthusiasm prevailed among all units and subunits of the Red Banner Turkestan Military District during May Day celebrations. On 4 May both district personnel and the people of Uzbekistan and Turkestan marked the 60th anniversary of the district, which has been witness to a long history of hard, military work, dedicated struggle and glorious victories. And it is very symbolic that the 60th anniversary of the district coincided with May Day and the day of our great victory over fascism, as well as with notable historical events in the social-political life of the country. This left an indelible mark on our holiday and gave it a special significance and solemnity.

Just three months ago the Soviet people and their socialist friends marked the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy. Celebration of this holiday of the Soviet armed forces was essentially a continuation of the October festivities, because their glorious history is closely tied to the October victory and to the history of the first nation in the world with a highly developed socialist system.

The Central Committee CPSU, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR and Council of Ministers USSR at that time saluted our valiant armed forces with these words: "The Soviet armed forces were created by the Communist Party, by V. I. Lenin for protecting the revolutionary gains of the October victory and safeguarding the first socialist state in the world. During the last 60 years they have followed a legendary path and honored their military banners with undying glory."

Turkestan servicemen received this esteemed description of the deeds of the Soviet armed forces with a great deal of joy and legitimate pride. They are proud that they are serving in a military district which is one of the oldest in the country. Born almost at the same time as the Soviet army, our district

wrote many impressive pages in our heroic military annals. In the struggle for Soviet power in Turkestan, in battles with interventionists, White Guards and local lawless bands during the civil war, and in engagements at the front during the Great Patriotic War, Turkestan servicemen demonstrated extreme courage, steadfastness, valor and gallantry, and brought neverending honor to the military banners of their units. An awareness of their work in the legendary Soviet army, of which the Red Banner Turkestan District is an integral part, inspires our servicemen and encourages them to perform their military duty with dedication.

The trip of Secretary General of the Central Committee CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR L. I. Brezhnev to areas of Siberia and the Far East was enthusiastically received by district personnel. Turkestan servicemen, as well as all Soviet people, carefully followed the trip by the leader of the party and head of the Soviet state.

The meetings of L. I. Brezhnev with military personnel of the Far Eastern Military District and sailors of the Pacific Ocean Fleet were of special interest to our people. In his speeches on these visits L. I. Brezhnev indicated in a convincing manner that the policy of "from a position of power" is alien to the Soviet Union. He did not threaten any of our neighbors, either near or far, and urged the development of friendly relations between nations. The actions of the Soviet Union in the area of defense are directed at protecting and maintaining the safety of ourselves and our socialist friends from possible aggressive moves, no matter where they originate.

For Turkestan servicemen the advice and instructions expressed by L. I. Brezhnev during his talks with servicemen in the Far East have become a military action program and served as guidance in routine military activities and in perfecting combat and political training.

It is significant that on the eve of the jubilee of the Turkestan Military District, new constitutions were adopted for the Uzbek SSR and Turkmen SSR. Our military district encompasses these two republics. Turkestan servicemen actively participated in the republic-wide discussions of these Basic Laws for our republics. This considerably enriched the ideological-political activity of units and subunits, led to a strengthening of real ties between servicemen and workers of cities and villages, and prompted a rise in the creative efforts of servicemen and an urging of them to achieve new successes in their military work.

It ought to be noted that Turkestan servicemen thoroughly understand their duty of defending the southern borders of our homeland. And this understanding gives rise to a real sense of patriotism, thus inducing soldiers to perform conscientiously and untiringly, as well as prompting them to strive towards a mastery of weapons and military equipment and a readiness to protect the national interests of our country with dedication.

It is gratifying that our district's military personnel marked the 60th anniversary of the Turkestan Military District with significant achievements in

fulfilling socialist obligations, in elevating combat and political training, and in strengthening military discipline and combat readiness. Many teams, crews and subunits completed the winter training period with excellent and good marks, and made significant strides forward in mastering military skills and in perfecting field and air training. The ranks of outstanding servicemen, masters of military skills and higher qualified specialists have increased.

But Turkestan servicemen are not satisfied with the successes they have achieved. They entered the summer training period with new achievements in mind. Personnel of units and subunits are competing for excellent results for each training hour. Night and day enlisted men, ncos, warrant officers and officers at rifle ranges, artillery ranges, and training grounds, and on flights are continually sharpening their combat skills, building up their morale and physical strength, and mastering the art of modern warfare. And while adding to their successes in combat and political training, district troops are vigilantly guarding the southern borders of our country.

Veteran of our district Lt Gen (Retired) Fayzulla Narkhodzhayev, officer and frontline soldier, people's author of Uzbekistan Ibragim Rakhim, and military journalist Col Vladislav Stulovskiy, whose statements are published in this issue of the magazine, discuss in detail the primary stages of military development in the Turkestan Military District, the heroic feats of district servicemen during the Great Patriotic War, and the military life of today's generation of Turkestan military personnel. I believe their stories will be of great interest to our readers.

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HISTORICAL DATA ON THE TURKESTAN MILITARY DISTRICT

Tashkent KOMMUNIST UZBEKISTANA in Russian No 6, Jun 78 signed to press
24 May 78 pp 54-59

[Article by Lt Gen (Ret) F. Narkhodzhayev: "Stages along the Great Road"]

[Text] The Red Banner Turkestan Military District is an integral part of the valiant USSR armed forces. Its history has evolved through the heroic military efforts of all generations of Turkestan servicemen: those who routed the interventionists and local lawless bandits in mountains and on arid deserts, and those who fearlessly battled the Fascist invaders during the terrible years of the Great Patriotic War. Its history has been enriched by those who vigilantly guarded the southern borders of the country during the postwar years, and the current generation of servicemen is adding to this.

I want to look back and reconstruct the main stages in the development of the Turkestan Military District, recall the past, give credit to those who established the glorious military traditions of the district, and properly describe those who today are continuing to add to these traditions.

V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party were the originators of our district. The Turkestan Military District, as well as other districts, was formed by a decree signed 4 May 1918 by V. I. Lenin. And soon after, the formation of Red Army units was begun.

The situation in Central Asia at that time was very complex. Anglo-American imperialism was actively promoting counter-revolutionary activity. Having brought together around themselves White Guards, bourgeois nationalists, Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries, local rich landowners and mullahs, imperialist agents plotted against the Turkestan republic. In June 1918 they carried out a counter-revolutionary revolt in Ashkhabad and set up the so-called "Temporary Caspian Government" there. In the north Dutov's White Cossacks seized Orenburg, cutting off the Turkestan republic from the central part of the country. In Semirech' White Cossacks in collusion with local nationalists and kulaks launched an attack against the Soviets. Thus, the Semirech' Front was born.

Feeling itself in a tight iron collar Soviet Turkestan took steps to strengthen its armed forces. Primary emphasis was placed on increasing the size of Red Army units and adding to their arms. On 15 July 1918 the Central Executive Committee of the Turkestan Republic called upon all workers to take up arms for the defense of the achievements of the revolution. Two new international regiments made up of Uzbeks, Turkmen, Kazakhs, Tadzhiks, Kirgiz, and Karakalpaks, plus other nationalities, were formed in June in Tashkent.

The Communist Party with V. I. Lenin at its head took measures to eliminate the primary danger threatening the revolution from the east. On 28 April 1919 the Southern Group of Forces of the Eastern Front carried out a powerful counter-move against Kolchak's western army. Units from the Turkestan Republic began to advance also. On 23 May troops of the Trans-Caspian Front liberated the city of Merv (Mary), on 24 May -- the fortress Kushka, on 7 June -- Tedzhen, and on 9 July -- Ashkhabad.

In the summer of 1919 Kolchak's army withdrew in two groups under attack from Soviet forces: one went to Siberia, the other to Orenburg and Turkestan. Analyzing the complex situation, M. V. Frunze proposed to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) that the Southern Group of the Eastern Front be made into an independent Turkestan Front. The party Central Committee approved his suggestion. M. V. Frunze was named commander of the Turkestan Front, and V. V. Kuybyshev a member of the Revolutionary Military Council.

The following assignments were given to the Turkestan Front, which at the time included all fighting forces in the Turkestan ASSR: eliminate Kolchak's southern army, as well as the armies of Orenburg and Ural White Cossacks, break through the blockade of the Turkestan Republic, and quash the internal counter-revolution within Turkestan. Troops from the front moved quickly to carry out their military assignments. On 13 September 1919 the historical meeting of troops of the Turkestan Republic with units of the 1st Army of the Turkestan Front occurred in the vicinity of Mugodzharakaya Station. Soviet Turkestan was now joined with Soviet Russia for good.

The party Central Committee and Soviet government issued new assignments to the troops: overcome the local lawless elements in Fergana and assist the workers of the Khiva Khanate and Bukhara Emirate in eliminating these despotic regimes. And these assignments were carried out successfully.

In January 1920 our forces began a decisive offensive on a broad front. During this period the independent brigade under the command of Yu. I. Ibragimov, the cavalry brigade commanded by E. F. Kuzhelo, and the 2d Turkestan Rifle Division headed by I. N. Verekin-Rakhal'skiy all did their job well. They delivered a series of crushing blows against the bands of local counter-revolutionaries. Local volunteer elements, plus party and Komsomol groups, provided a great deal of assistance to our troops. The detachment led by Yuldash Akhunbabayev, later on a prominent figure in our country, as well as detachments headed by B. Usmankhodzhayev, Yu. Baymanov, A. Mad'yarov, A. Rakhimbabayev, and others, especially distinguished themselves.

Seeing the futility of their resistance, some leaders of local lawless bands capitulated at the beginning of 1920. During the same year people's revolutions were victorious in Khiva and Bukhara due to the active support of troops of the Turkestan Front. As a result, the Khorezm and Bukhara People's Soviet Republics were formed and friendly relations established with the Turkestan ASSR and all peoples of the RSFSR.

In later periods troops of the Turkestan Front, and beginning in 1926 of the Central Asian Military District, conducted a campaign against the vestiges of lingering lawless bands while simultaneously improving their combat training. Soldiers and commanders operated under the slogan: "While finishing off the lawless elements, step up training activities." The defeat of the Anna-Kuli band in 1932 put an end to local lawless warfare. Personnel of the composite detachment from the Military School imeni V. I. Lenin, the 8th Cavalry Brigade, the 1st Uzbek and 2d Turkestan cavalry regiments, the 7th Turkestan Rifle Regiment and other units displayed gallantry and heroism in battles with the local lawless bands. Machine-gun squadron commander Sabir Rakhimov, platoon commander Shukurov, squad leader N. G. Lyashchenko (now Arm Gen), and squadron commander A. A. Luchinskiy (now Arm Gen) performed skillfully and decisively.

Such notable military leaders as P. Ye. Dybenko, T. D. Velikanov, A. G. Petrovskiy, and I. R. Apanasenko, who at various times occupied the post of military district commander, were involved with developing the combat and political training of Turkestan servicemen during these years. Member of the district Military Council and communist since 1905 G. G. Yastrebov devoted considerable time and effort to increasing the fighting efficiency of the troops.

In 1939 the universal military training law was passed, which contained major social-economic reforms arising from the victory of socialism in our country. Thus, the new law removed the previously existing class restrictions in military service while consolidating the principle of building up the regular army and navy. Approval by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR of the new Military Oath in January 1939 had a significant effect on raising the morale and combat skills in servicemen.

Realizing the tenseness of the international situation, district personnel learned how to use their weapons and military equipment with real dedication, perfected their military skills, and made use of scientific advances to help defeat an enemy.

On 22 June 1941 the peaceful work of our people was interrupted. The war, forced upon us by German-Fascist invaders, was the largest conflict between socialism and the attacking forces of imperialism. It became the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people for freedom and the independence of our socialist homeland.

Even though the Central Asian Military District was located in a rear area, it played an indispensable role in helping to defeat the enemy. Outstanding

command and political personnel were developed in our district and numerous large units and units were formed and trained here which won fame in fierce battles with Hitler's troops. Military schools and institutions shifted to new accelerated combat training programs. Regular personnel from district units who were called up from the reserve spent 11-12 hours a day mastering military subjects.

A broad network of command personnel training sites covered the district. Many military academies and schools were evacuated here in 1941-1942. Their personnel worked within units of our district. Then tank and infantry schools again were opened in Samarkand, Chardzhou, Ashkhabad and other cities, and facilities were set up for training officers.

Many large units and units were formed in our district, which, after accelerated training, were sent to the front. They took part in the defense of Moscow, Leningrad, Novorossiysk and Sevastopol', in battles at the Volga, Dnepr, Visla and Oder, in the storming of Koenigsberg and Warsaw, and in other battles of the Great Patriotic War.

The 34th and 35th independent student brigades, formed basically of students and teachers from the Military School imeni V. I. Lenin, the 83rd Mountain Rifle and 69th Red Banner Rifle divisions, and many other large units and units were examples of the courage and heroism in combat against the enemies of our country.

Turkestan servicemen displayed great heroism in the battle for Moscow. The gallant 316th Rifle Division, formed by us and commanded by Maj Gen I. V. Panfilov, blocked the path of Fascist tanks on Volokamskoye Highway.

Turkestan soldiers also fought bravely in the battles for Sevastopol', the defense of which was led by a veteran of our district, former chief of the Military School imeni V. I. Lenin Maj Gen Ivan Yefimovich Petrov (later Arm Gen and Hero of the Soviet Union).

A division formed in Tashkent participated in the battles which liberated the Caucasus from Fascist rule. Its regiments were led into battle by a loyal son of the Uzbek people, Maj Gen Sabir Rakhimov. Soldiers of this division performed all their combat assignments with honor. In the course of three months of fighting in the Caucasus they annihilated 8,000 enemy troops.

Our military district carried out its assignments during the Great Patriotic War in an excellent fashion. During this time more than 20 large units and units from the district were awarded governmental citations. Over 820 Turkestan servicemen received the title Hero of the Soviet Union for heroism and gallantry during the defense of our country.

Soon after the end of the war the Central Asian Military District underwent reorganization, as did other military districts. In August 1945 two military districts were created out of it -- the Steppe and Turkestan. The Turkestan

Military District included the Uzbek, Kirgiz, Tadzhik and Turkmen SSRs. Subsequently its boundaries were expanded to encompass part of the Kazakh SSR. Improved living and working conditions were created with the reorganization of the district's forces in the postwar period.

During this time the following principle was established in accordance with the instructions of the party Central Committee concerning combat training and indoctrination: teach the troops what is needed in war. Primary emphasis was placed on the comprehensive and thorough mastering of what was learned in the Great Patriotic War. Front-line officers made a major contribution in this work.

The party and Soviet government have shown and continue to display every effort at outfitting the army and navy with adequate equipment. The reequipping of our troops, including the Turkestan Military District, was based on our growing economy and successes in scientific and technological developments.

In order to train troops to function in a nuclear-missile war, views on the logistical support of combat training had to be reexamined. Plans for equipping rifle ranges, artillery ranges, tank training areas, vehicle test areas, various sorts of training camps, training grounds, etc. were drawn up in the district. Construction was begun on these projects. Apparatus and devices were manufactured which made conditions in our training areas practically identical with those found under actual combat.

In the postwar period Arm Gen I. Ye. Petrov, Lt Gen A. I. Radziyevskiy, Arm Gen A. A. Luchinskiy, Arm Gen I. I. Fedyuninskiy, and Arm Gen N. G. Lyashchenko, who at various times were commanders of the Turkestan Military District, all made a major contribution toward the reorganization of the whole training system due to the changing needs of modern warfare, toward its improvement, and toward enhancement of the indoctrination of Turkestan servicemen and an increase in combat readiness. The current commander Col Gen S. Ye. Belonozhko is giving all his knowledge and extensive combat experience to this noble effort.

Political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations of large units and units have played and continue to play an important role in improving the military training of servicemen, enhancing their ideological indoctrination, and increasing the combat readiness of troops.

Commanders and political workers also are doing a great deal toward strengthening friendly relations between military units and local party and governmental organs, and rural and urban workers as well, and are continually indoctrinating servicemen in developing a sense of loyalty to our country, party, and government, as well as to be always ready to fulfill their duty to the people.

Turkestan servicemen have always quickly come to the aid of the people whenever a natural disaster has befallen them. Thus, in the fall of 1948, when

Ashkhabad was struck by a strong earthquake Turkistan servicemen were the first to help the residents of the capital of the Turkmen SSR. Also in April 1964 they fought the elements with determination and prevented a catastrophe in the vicinity of the town of Ayni. In April 1966, when the capital of Uzbekistan was hit by an earthquake, Turkistan servicemen were the first to extend a helping hand to Tashkent residents. Under incredibly difficult conditions they set up over 5,000 camping tents in the city in record time, and relocated 3,000 families there. And together with military construction workers from other districts they built the satellite city of Sergeli in seven months.

In 1968 our district was 50 years old. The party and Soviet government recognized its true value. The district was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for its contributions to strengthening the defensive might of the Soviet state and its defensive capabilities, as well as for its successes in combat and political training.

In August 1969 two districts were created out of the Turkistan Military District: the Turkistan (covering the Uzbek SSR and Turkmen SSR) and the Central Asian (covering the Kazakh, Tadzhik and Kirgiz SSRs). Col Gen S. Ye. Belonozhko was named commander of the Turkistan district.

New assignments given to the Red Banner Turkistan Military District foretold the nature of the combat-training work to come, as well as the service of its military personnel and the direction of party-political work with the men. The attention of the district command, commanders, staffs, political organs, party and Komsomol organizations, and all servicemen has been concentrated on ensuring the security of the southern boundaries of our country and to further increasing combat readiness. Turkistan servicemen have continued to improve their military skills, especially the ability to carry on operations in mountain-desert terrain, in different unrelated directions, and in situations involving hot weather, sharp temperature variations, limited water supplies and a lack of roads.

Everywhere from the gray Caspian to the Pamir peaks Turkistan servicemen are hard at work in their military activities. The high patriotic enthusiasm of personnel, which evolved from their training and celebration of important events in the life of the party and country, has enabled our men to carry out the assignments given them successfully. During these times the district Military Council has been ably steering the noble intentions of enlisted men and officers toward meeting these events with excellent and good marks in combat and political training.

The year 1975 was especially significant for us -- the 30th anniversary of our victory over Fascism. Stirring meetings with veterans of the Great Patriotic War took place in cities and towns, enterprises and kolkhozes, and military units. Together with republic workers our Turkistan military personnel participated in ceremonies at monuments and obelisks, and laid wreaths on friends' graves and at the eternal flame which burns at sacred places where our heroes who perished fighting for our country are buried.

Hundreds of new monuments to war heroes have been erected, and numerous museums, centers and rooms which reflect military victories have been opened, all on the initiative of local party and governmental organs and with the participation of district servicemen. A unique architectural structure of glass and marble -- the Red Banner Turkestan Military District Museum was built in Tashkent thanks to the ample assistance of the Central Committee of the Uzbekistan Communist Party and the government of the Uzbek SSR, as well as the enthusiasm of many of our officers, ncos and enlisted men.

The constant concern shown by the party and government for Soviet servicemen, and for improving their working conditions, training and everyday military life are clearly reflected in the services and amenities found at military posts. Improvement in the training aids equipment and the services and amenities at military posts has undoubtedly helped to increase the effectiveness of military training.

Turkestan servicemen greeted the 60th anniversary of the October revolution and the Soviet armed forces with a further increase in combat readiness and a rise in the number of outstanding military personnel and top-rated subunits. A tank regiment and a guards fighter regiment were the winners in socialist competitions. Many top officers and warrant officers were awarded governmental citations for their excellent marks in combat and political training.

Men of the Red Banner Turkestan Military District have been standing guard over the southern boundaries of our country for 60 years. While carrying out the historic decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, they are continually improving their skills, maintaining a constant and high level of combat readiness, and steadfastly protecting the national interests of our socialist homeland.

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INSTRUCTIONS FOR INDOCTRINATION ON SERVICEMEN'S SPIRITUAL LIFE

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 12, Jun 78
signed to press 6 Jun 78 pp 18-30

[Article by Col B. Sapunov, professor and doctor of philosophy:
"Our Spiritual Wealth"*]

[Excerpts] The social practice of mature socialism, the current stage of communist construction in the USSR, more and more convincingly demonstrates that communism is not possible without a high level of culture, political consciousness and people's inner maturity, just as it is not possible without the appropriate material and technical resource base. It is not by accident that the problems of our society's spiritual life occupied a prominent place in the proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress, in subsequent party documents and in the new USSR Constitution.

The realization of Lenin's plan for a cultural revolution, the enormous successes of Soviet science and education, literature and art, the gigantic growth in the political consciousness and creative activity of the masses and the blossoming of the entire spiritual life of society have put our country in the vanguard of mankind's cultural progress. As written in the USSR Constitution, developed socialism is a society "in which powerful productive forces, advanced science and culture have been created, a society in which the people's well-being is constantly growing and more and more favorable conditions for the individual's all-round development are being formed." At the same time, the future success of communist construction depends upon how these favorable, objective opportunities will be used to deepen the process of communist indoctrination of the Soviet people.

* This article is recommended for use in Marxist-Leninist training groups for officers when studying the topic "The Spiritual Life of the Developed Socialist Society: Current Problems on Communist Indoctrination of Workers and Army and Navy Servicemen in Light of the Decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress."

We must also take into account the fact that the sphere of spiritual life has now become the arena for a very sharp ideological struggle. By developing psychological warfare against the forces of socialism, humanism and peace and by conducting a shameless, reactionary campaign directed at discrediting advanced scientific thought and culture, the modern obscurantists from the imperialist camp are attempting to carry out antisoviet ideological diversions through the channels of the mass news media and through literature and art. The lofty mission of socialist culture is to not only protect universal human spiritual values from being profaned but also to carry the life confirming ideals of Marxism-Leninism throughout the world, while actively unmasking the corrupt bourgeois ideology.

The Soviet country is forced to use the wealth of its material and spiritual culture to strengthen its defense capability. The modern equipment, with which our army and navy are equipped, is, in itself, a personification of advanced scientific military thought and the high industrial culture of mature socialism. Only people who are highly educated, ideologically tempered and cultured in all respects can perfectly master this equipment.

Enormous spiritual values have accumulated in our Armed Forces, as in Soviet society as a whole. On a daily basis, servicemen have an opportunity to be exposed to books, listen to lectures, watch movies and television programs and attend plays, concerts, etc. on a regular basis. A lot is being done in the army and navy so that the society's spiritual values will become the wealth of each individual; a lot of work is being conducted for the servicemen's cultural indoctrination and self-indoctrination.

Recommendations for the Seminar Lesson

The topic "The Spiritual Life of the Developed Socialist Society: Current Problems on Communist Indoctrination of the Soviet People and Army and Navy Servicemen in Light of the Decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress" is of great theoretical and practical interest for officers who are studying the objective laws governing the formation and development of mature socialism in Marxist-Leninist training groups. During the seminar, it is especially important to understand the significance of spiritual culture and the formation of a congruently developed personality in strengthening the country's defense capability and increasing the combat power of the USSR Armed Forces.

In his introductory remarks, the lesson leader emphasizes that the developed socialism which has been built in our country is a new stage of maturity for all aspects of social life--economic, sociopolitical and spiritual. The conditions are being created during this stage for the practical accomplishment of the programmed tasks of the CPSU--the development of the new man. On the other hand, the success of communist construction is determined to a great extent by the effectiveness of the party's ideological and indoctrination work. "In the final analysis, the realization of all our plans depends on people, their knowledge, culture and political awareness," stated Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in his speech at the 18th Komsomol Congress. After pointing out the importance of a comprehensive approach to indoctrination, the 25th Party Congress provided a detailed program for using the achievements of socialist culture in the interests of molding a scientific world view, communist morality and an active life position in the Soviet people and army and navy servicemen.

It is recommended that the following issues be brought out during the seminar lesson: 1. The main features of developed socialism's culture. 2. The economic, sociopolitical and spiritual conditions for personality formation in a developed socialist society. 3. The 25th CPSU Congress on the need for indoctrinating Soviet people in a spirit of patriotism and socialist internationalism and the decisive struggle against bourgeois and revisionist ideology. 4. Current issues in ideological work in the army and navy under contemporary conditions and ways for improving its effectiveness.

It is advisable to begin the seminar by listening to the report "The Spiritual Culture of Developed Socialism and Its Role in Indoctrinating Workers and Soviet Servicemen."

When discussing the first issue, attention should be directed at an in-depth revelation of the substance of society's spiritual life in its Marxist-Leninist interpretation. At this point, it is important to understand that spiritual life is the totality of all forms of social consciousness as well as the nature of the spiritual values which have been accumulated and produced and which ensure the functioning of society and its progressive development. Spiritual life is not something that is fixed and set down once and for all. It is a process where some values are assimilated by people and transformed into their personal property, their spiritual world; other values are created by them in turn and they are transformed into new knowledge, ideas, standards of conduct, artistic forms, etc. This process occurs within a definite temporal and social framework and it is a manifestation of the society's spiritual life during a given stage of its development.

Marxism-Leninism teaches that the type of spiritual life and culture for each socio-economic structure is determined by the prevailing means of production, the nature of social and class relationships and the nature of the political and ideological superstructures which reflect them. It is precisely ideology that is the heart of the spiritual life of each society and it bears a class nature. The most important features of the spiritual life of the society of developed socialism--such elements as its world view, political, legal, moral and aesthetic consciousness--should be briefly reviewed during the seminar. While describing the main features of socialist culture, it is necessary to emphasize that it is profoundly populist in nature since it expresses the fundamental interests of the working people, friendly classes and social groups of all the country's generations, nations and nationalities. It is distinguished by true humanism and a life-confirming, historical optimism. This is a culture of a new type--socialist in content, diverse in national forms and internationalist in nature.

Under the conditions of mature socialism, culture has become an integral part of our entire Soviet way of life and it has become a necessary sign and condition of the perfection of all forms and types of human activity--physical production, social control, intercourse and people's everyday life, etc. Cultural progress promotes the accomplishment of such important tasks as erasing the essential difference between city and village and between mental and physical labor and equalizing the people's standard of living in different regions of the country.

One of the most important functions of socialist culture, and this must be revealed when discussing the second issue, is the formation of a spiritually rich, ideologically firm and intellectually and emotionally developed personality. The ideal of a congruent personality of the future was scientifically substantiated by the founders of scientific communism. While characterizing communism as a true humanism, K. Marx foresaw that a society based on joint ownership of the means of production and its products, on collective labor and without exploitation and social antagonisms would form an all-round person with profound feelings and perceptions.

The classic works of Marxism-Leninism, the CPSU Program and the proceedings of party congresses have revealed the true concept of "the congruently developed personality" and they have defined the paths to its formation. In its new Constitution, the Soviet state has clearly defined the conditions required for the successful indoctrination of the person of our communist future. Thus, the highest goal of

social production under socialism is the most complete satisfaction of the people's growing material and spiritual requirements. The social system of developed socialism is also oriented toward man's perfection and development. Article 20 of the USSR Constitution states: "In accordance with the communist ideal, Each person's free development is a condition for the free development of all people," the Soviet state sets itself the goal of expanding the actual opportunities for citizens to use their creative strength, abilities and talents and of expanding the actual opportunities for the individual's all-round development."

The social development of a society on the way to communism presupposes the obliteration of class differences, the essential differences between the city and village and between mental and physical labor and the comprehensive development and merger of all the USSR nations and nationalities. All of this promotes a growth in the degree of equality between people and an expansion in the opportunities for each individual's spiritual and physical perfection. The person's development is promoted by the constitutional guarantees of the citizens' right to work, relaxation, education, health care, provision of pensions, etc.

Any actual individual improvement is unthinkable without his active participation in political life. The Soviet people's citizenship and public activity are developing under the conditions of the widespread political freedoms granted to them: freedom of speech, press, assembly, meetings, street marches and demonstrations. Citizens of the USSR have the right to participate in the management of state and public affairs and in the discussion and adoption of laws and decisions of a state and local nature. Respect for the individual and protection of the citizens' rights and freedoms are the duties of all state agencies, public organizations and officials.

Our country's new Constitution demonstrates the very profound democracy and humanism of a developed socialist society to the entire world. It convincingly demonstrates the economic, sociopolitical and spiritual conditions within which Soviet man's personality--the builder and defender of communism--is formed.

The essence of bourgeois and revisionist distortions of the Marxist-Leninist propositions on the individual, his rights and duties and the paths of his development under the conditions of socialism should be critically analyzed during the seminar.

The third issue brought up for discussion by the seminar participants makes it possible to focus attention on an examination of the subjective side of personality formation, that is, the developmental process itself. At this point, it is necessary to uncover and understand the requirements of the party and its 25th Congress on the formation of the Soviet people's world view and their ideological, political and moral qualities.

There cannot even be any discussion about a congruently developed man without a correct, scientific view of the world, without an understanding of his place in it and without a clear-cut definition of his personal attitude toward events in his country and in the world. In the modern era, Marxism-Leninism is a truly scientific world view; it provides a true understanding of the laws of development for nature, society and man himself; it scientifically substantiates the historical inevitability of communism's victory. This is why the party looks upon the formation of a Marxist-Leninist world view in the Soviet people as the heart of all ideological work and as the basis for the personality's congruent development.

Patriotism and internationalism are the most important aspects of Soviet man's world view. In this respect, the proposition of the 25th CPSU Congress acquires special significance; it states that one of the party's most important tasks was and is firmly establishing in the workers' consciousness first and foremost the young generation, the ideas of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, pride in the land of the Soviets, pride in our motherland and a readiness to arise in defense of socialism's achievements (see "Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress," p. 75).

A man's world view determines his ideological conviction. Conviction in the soundness of communist ideals is born when they become part of a man's consciousness, part of his flesh and blood, when they define the purpose and meaning of his entire life and activity. Conviction--this is the individual's social construct, that "small bridge" across which the awareness, understanding and assimilation of ideas is converted into practice. Not simply knowledge from books, but its inherent combination with concrete deeds and actions determines people's inner maturity. To be highly principled and firm in your convictions means to always prove your worth everywhere as tireless and politically aware champions of communist ideals. This means to fervently love the socialist motherland and to work to the full extent for its happiness and prosperity. This means to demand from yourself

and others an honest, conscientious fulfillment of social duties and to be irreconcilable toward everybody who deviates from socialist standards of morality and who slows down society's forward movement.

An active life position is the most reliable criterion of moral fiber. "Nothing uplifts an individual," stated Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 25th Party Congress, "like an active life position, a politically aware attitude toward social duty, where the unity of words and deeds has become the daily standard of conduct. The task of moral indoctrination is to develop such a position." ("Proceedings of the 25th CC CPSU Congress," p. 77).

All aspects of the individual's spiritual world, his world view and morality are embodied in labor. Freed from exploitation, the labor of the Soviet people is a source of growth for social wealth, the people's well-being and the well-being of each Soviet person. The USSR Constitution points out that socially usefully labor and its results determine a person's position in society. By combining material and moral incentives and by rewarding innovation and a creative attitude toward work, our state promotes the transformation of labor into a primary, vital requirement for each Soviet person.

Ideological conviction presupposes a high level of conscientiousness and political vigilance. We cannot forget that modern bourgeois propaganda is becoming more and more subtle in its ideological diversions; it is attempting to undermine and weaken the Soviet people's convictions, first and foremost the young people's convictions; it is attempting to impose views and customs on us which are foreign to us and it is attempting to rekindle nationalist and religious prejudices. Under these conditions, the significance of a militant irreconcilability to the slightest manifestations of bourgeois ideology, political irresponsibility and complacency increases more and more. The new USSR Constitution, which is the embodiment of the truth about developed socialism, is a powerful spiritual weapon in the ideological struggle.

Proceeding from the task of communist construction and relying on the accumulated experience of ideological work, the 25th CPSU Congress pointed out the importance of a comprehensive approach to posing the entire issue of indoctrination, that is, ensuring the close unity of ideological, political, labor and moral indoctrination with due regard for the special features of different groups of workers. It is just such an approach that makes it possible to form an all-round, congruently developed personality most effectively.

Molding the personality of Soviet servicemen also requires a comprehensive approach. While studying the fourth issue, the listeners should uncover the system of ideological and indoctrinational work in the Armed Forces and they should show which of the most important and current problems it is solving. At this point, it is necessary to proceed from the decisions of the 25th Party Congress and the CPSU Central Committee plenums and the instructions of the USSR Minister of Defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

Our Armed Forces are rightfully considered the school of ideological tempering, the school of life and culture. The main content and purpose of ideological and indoctrination work in the army and navy is the indoctrination of personnel in a spirit of Marxism-Leninism, communist convictions and morality, Soviet patriotism and socialism internationalism and loyalty to military duty. This indoctrination is based upon an in-depth, creative study of revolutionary theory, current problems of scientific communism, the domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU and Soviet state, proceedings of the 25th Party Congress, the new USSR Constitution and the works of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. Propaganda of Lenin's teaching on defense of the socialist fatherland, revolutionary and combat traditions of the party, people and Armed Forces is extremely important, as is moral, legal, military and aesthetic indoctrination. Unmasking bourgeois Maoist and revisionist ideology and the aggressive nature of imperialism should occupy a large place with a military audience. It is important to conduct an active struggle against relapses of petty bourgeois and vulgar psychology and morals in the consciousness of a small part of the servicemen. Finally, in light of the requirements of a comprehensive approach to ideological activity, the inherent combination of all forms and means of mass agitation, propaganda, cultural and educational work and increasing the effectiveness of their influence on the consciousness of each serviceman are acquiring current significance.

It would be appropriate to remind the audience that, during his meeting with servicemen of the Southern Group of Forces, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, USSR Minister of Defense, directed attention to the need to make full use of the ideological wealth of L. I. Brezhnev's books "Malaya Zemlya" and "Rebirth" in all educational, indoctrinational and party political work and to learn how to love and defend the Soviet motherland based on these works.

During the seminar, attention should be directed to the CPSU Central Committee decrees on oral political agitation, propaganda through lectures, visual propaganda, library work, amateur artistic work and their significance for army conditions

should be analyzed. Since the seminar topic is connected with the problem of developing the spiritual life of Soviet society, it should be shown precisely how particular components of spiritual culture (literature, art, mass news media, etc.) influence the consciousness of servicemen and the development of their positive qualities. It is desirable to connect all this with a concrete situation and discuss what needs to be done to accomplish the tasks of ideological, political, moral, military, legal and aesthetic indoctrination more effectively in units and subunits in the interests of the spiritual enrichment of the Soviet serviceman's personality and of strengthening discipline and combat readiness.

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GUIDE FOR INDOCTRINATION ON NEED FOR STRONG DEFENSE

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 12, Jun 78
signed to press 6 Jun 78, pp 72-80

[Article by Maj Gen Avn A. Zaytsev, lecturer and candidate
of historical science: "V. I. Lenin On the Socialist
Fatherland and the Need for its Defense"]

[Excerpts] This topic begins a new section in the curriculum
for political lessons "V. I. Lenin On Defense of the Socialist
Fatherland." Its content approximates to the maximum the
tasks which are being accomplished by army and navy personnel.
Ten hours are allocated for the study of this topic within
the political lesson system for soldiers and sailors, sergeants
and petty officers. It is advisable to distribute this time
in the following manner: allocate two hours for the lecture
(account), four hours for independent work and four hours for
the seminar (discussion).

It is suggested that the following basic issues be examined
during the lecture: 1. Marxism-Leninism on the socialist
fatherland as the true fatherland of the workers. 2. Lenin's
reasons for the need to defend the socialist fatherland.
The Communist Party is the moving spirit and organizer of the
Soviet Armed Forces victories. 3. The 25th CPSU Congress and
subsequent party decisions on defending socialism's accomplish-
ments under modern conditions.

In a short introduction, it is important to remind the listeners
that the Communist Party and the Soviet People have evaluated
the results of the 60 years in the life and struggle of the
Soviet state and its Armed Forces. During all these years,
the Soviet people lived and fought according to Vladimir
Il'ich Lenin's behests. "Lenin's ideas, Lenin's political
tempering and Lenin's science will win," pointed out Comrade

L. I. Brezhnev, "this is the inexhaustible source from which we derive our confidence and our strength, courage and optimism and will for victory" ("Lenin's Policy," vol. 2, p 580).

While being guided by V. I. Lenin's instructions and behests, our party is demonstrating unabated concern for the defense of the socialist fatherland. From the first days of the Soviet state's existence, the imperialists have tried to destroy it and deprive the workers of their revolutionary accomplishments. The Soviet Armed Forces, which were created by V. I. Lenin and led by the Communist Party, won universal historical victories over our enemies during the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War. Under modern conditions--while fulfilling the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress--they are keenly protecting the peaceful labor of the Soviet people who are building communism.

3. The 25th CPSU Congress and Subsequent Party Decisions on Defending Socialism's Accomplishments under Modern Conditions

While being guided by Lenin's teaching on defense of the socialist fatherland and while conducting a peaceloving foreign policy, the Communist Party is displaying constant concern for strengthening and improving the Soviet Armed Forces. It is doing everything necessary so the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the security of the country will be reliably defended. The CPSU recorded in its program: "The party proceeds on the basis that as long as imperialism exists there will be a danger of aggressive wars. The CPSU considers the defense of the socialist fatherland and strengthening the defense of the USSR and the power of the Soviet Armed Forces as the sacred duty of the party and all the Soviet people and as the most important function of the socialist state."

The Communist Party's concern about strengthening the Soviet Armed Forces and increasing their combat readiness was vividly expressed in the proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress. While speaking at the Central Committee Keynote Address, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev specifically stated: "During all these years, the party has devoted the necessary attention to strengthening our country's defense capability and improving the Armed Forces. We are able to report to the congress that we have done a lot in this area. The equipping of the Armed Forces with up-to-date weapons and combat equipment has improved; the quality of combat training and personnel ideological tempering have increased... The Soviet People can rest assured that the fruits of their constructive labor are being reliably defended" ("Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress," p 83).

The party's close attention to the issues of further strengthening the country's defense and increasing the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces is caused by the complexity and contradictions in the international situation and by imperialism's immutable aggressive nature. The few positive shifts taking place in international relations do not at all mean that imperialism has been penetrated by peacefulness. As the 25th Party Congress emphasized, the nature of imperialism remains the same although the opportunities for its aggressive operations have been significantly curtailed. The imperialist powers, and first and foremost the US, are not ceasing their preparations for a new war; from year to year, their military budgets are increasing and the arms race is growing. As pointed out in the report of Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, USSR Minister of Defense, "Guarding Great October's Accomplishments for Sixty Years," during the past ten years alone, the countries in the aggressive NATO bloc have expended 1.3 trillion dollars on military preparations; moreover, almost half this colossal amount of money has been spent during the past four years. The military expenditures of NATO countries were 165 billion dollars during last year alone. Even higher allocations are planned for subsequent years.

The Chinese leadership is active in concert with imperialist reaction. In his speech at the 25th CPSU Congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev pointed out: "Of course, the issue on relationships with China is a separate and special issue. The policy of its current leaders is openly directed against the majority of the socialist states. Furthermore, it is directly linked with the most extreme, reactionary position throughout the world--from the militarists and enemies of detente in the western countries to the racists of South Africa and the fascist rulers of Chile. This policy is not only completely alien to socialist principles and ideals but it has essentially become an important reserve for imperialism in its struggle against socialism" ("Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress," p 10).

Considering the complexity of the international situation and proceeding from V. I. Lenin's behest that "We must always accompany our steps toward peace with the pressure of all our military readiness" ("Complete Collected Works," vol. 40, p 248), the Communist Party is doing everything necessary so the Soviet Armed Forces will be equipped with first class equipment and weapons, so they will be a precise and coordinated body, so they will have a high level of organization and discipline and so their combat capability and combat readiness will always be at a level, which will reliably protect

the state interests of our homeland and all the countries of the socialist commonwealth.

Lenin's behests and the CPSU instructions on defending the socialist fatherland were reflected in the USSR Constitution.

The USSR Constitution defines the defense of the socialist fatherland as the sacred duty of Soviet citizens and it defines military service in the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces as their honorable duty. The chapter "Defense of the Socialist Fatherland," which was included in our country's Basic Law for the first time, testifies to the concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet State for the security of the socialist motherland and it testifies to their indestructible loyalty to the behests of the great Lenin.

The constitution of the state of developed socialism is extremely clear in its expression of Lenin's ideas and the party's policy in the area of the socialist fatherland's defense and military organizational development. In accordance with Lenin's teaching, the Basic Law proclaims: the defense of the socialist fatherland is one of the most important functions of the state and it is the affair of all the people. The Constitution allocates the decisive role in accomplishing this mission to our glorious Armed Forces. The Basic Law points out that they were created for the purpose of defending socialist accomplishments, the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state and they must always be prepared to immediately repel any aggressor.

Soviet servicemen are filled with determination to honorably fulfill the responsible mission assigned to the Armed Forces by the 25th CPSU Congress--to guard the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and to serve as a stronghold of world peace. With a feeling of profound satisfaction, the defenders of the motherland found out that, during his trip to cities in Siberia and the Far East, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and chairman of the USSR Defense Council, visited a number of military units, became acquainted with the military equipment, showed an interest in the status of personnel combat and political training and attended exercises. The fact that the servicemen demonstrated a high level of combat readiness, coordination and the ability to perfectly handle the modern weapons and combat equipment entrusted to them during the exercises is especially gratifying. "During my trip to the East," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stated at the 18th Komsomol Congress, "I became acquainted both with the manner in which the defense of our borders is organized and with the people who are standing their difficult

service there--the fine servicemen of our Army, our Navy and our Border Forces. I will tell you this comrades: The borders of the motherland are reliably protected against any surprise; the motherland's defense is in experienced, reliable hands. And I can assure you that the young people who are protecting the Soviet country's peace and tranquility have everything they need to honorably fulfill their lofty mission."

Daily life in the army and navy abounds with examples of courage, self-sacrifice and, frequently, heroism, heroism like that which was displayed by Komsomol leader and WO Aleksandr Zharkov who walked into a raging fire to save his comrades, by Pvt Refkat Mirgazizov who covered a live grenade with his body and protected his comrades from the explosion and by many others.

Profoundly aware of their duty to the people and to the socialist fatherland, Soviet servicemen are steadily improving their combat expertise; they are learning to destroy targets at maximum range with the first shot, launch, pass and they are learning to make full use of the high speed, high altitude, maneuvering, protective and other characteristics of new equipment.

Socialist competition in the army and navy is directed at decreasing the period of time for mastering equipment and weapons, molding the servicemen's ability to extract the maximum from their equipment and weapons, improving the land, sea and air training level of personnel and fulfilling each assigned mission in an exemplary fashion. In this jubilee year for the Soviet Armed Forces, socialist competition is being conducted under the slogan: "Reliably defend the socialist fatherland, maintain constant combat readiness, persistently master weapons and equipment, improve combat expertise." Its main goal is the high qualitative accomplishment of the missions facing the army and navy. The initiative of the leading units and the nuclear-powered submarine--who addressed an appeal to the personnel of their services of the Armed Forces to raise the banner of socialist competition even higher and make the 60th anniversary of the USSR Armed Forces the year of outstanding military labor--was greeted with enthusiastic approval and unanimously supported in all units, subunits and ships.

The greeting of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the USSR Council of Ministers to the servicemen of the valiant Armed Forces of the Soviet Union

on the occasion of their 60th anniversary states: "In the interests of further strengthening the might of the army and navy, Soviet servicemen are called upon to continue to improve their combat expertise, persistently master modern equipment, constantly increase the level of organization and strictly fulfill their military oath. The most important task of commanders, political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations is to indoctrinate the personnel of units and ships in a spirit of superior moral fiber and political vigilance, internationalism and combat brotherhood with the servicemen of fraternal armies, loyalty to the revolutionary and combat traditions of the older generations and endless devotion to the Soviet fatherland."

The 18th Komsomol Congress took place in Moscow at the end of April. The Komsomol members of the Armed Forces marked this event with glorious deeds. With a restless soul, they are moving steadily ahead, striving for new frontiers in combat improvement; they are stepping forward as the initiators of good undertakings for the young people of the army and navy. On the fields of training battles, at firing ranges, tank training areas, airfields and remote points, on ocean and sea voyages, the Komsomol members of the army and navy are demonstrating superior morale and fighting efficiency, an outstanding level of training and courage and the ability to successfully accomplish any mission under the difficult conditions of modern combat. They are the true leading spirits in the difficult journey to heights of military expertise.

The everyday life of army and navy Komsomol members also sees them participating in the accomplishment of diverse national economic tasks. The servicemen are demonstrating their labor valor in the construction of the Baykal-Amur Railway and in the fields of the Non-Blackearth Area, of Kazakhstan, the Volga Region and the Far East. They transported tens of millions of tons of agricultural products during the past year alone. On an annual basis--after their transfer to the reserve--thousands of military Komsomol members become the guardsmen of Komsomol shock construction sites for the five-year plan.

Servicemen are relying on the glorious combat traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces in the struggle for high marks in combat and political training and for strengthening the combat readiness of subunits, units and ships. Born in battles with the enemies of the socialist fatherland, our combat traditions have become the moral law of life for Soviet servicemen and a good means for instilling superior morale and political and combat efficiency in the current generation of the motherland's defenders. Commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations make active use of them in daily political and indoctrination work with personnel. They are trying to organize things so that, after his arrival in the regiment or onboard ship, each young serviceman will recognize its

combat path, its heroes and combat decorations, its victories during the war and successes in combat training and so that each soldier and sailor will be proud of his regiment, ship, formation and will defend its honor through his actions and his conduct.

Old traditions are multiplied and new traditions are born in military labor. The desire to emulate front line soldiers and to learn courage and the art of victory from them leads to an increase in the ranks of experts in combat vocations, rated specialists and training experts. This desire finds vivid expression in the persistent struggle to fulfill and overfulfill the adopted socialist pledges for the Soviet Armed Forces jubilee year and in the movement for leading formation and for new achievements in training and on duty to mark the 60th anniversary of the Leninist Komsomol. For example, as initiators of the current competition among the services of the Armed Forces, many units and ships are achieving consistent outstanding marks from year to year. Supporting this tradition in every way possible and making his worthy personal contribution to the success of the military collective is a matter of honor for each soldier and sailor who is called upon to irreproachably fulfill his duty to the socialist fatherland.

The servicemen of the Soviet Armed Forces are endlessly devoted to their Leninist Party; they are vigilantly guarding our revolutionary accomplishments and the peaceful labor of the Soviet People. They are always prepared to honorably carry out any order from the motherland.

When completing the presentation of material on this topic, it can be emphasized again that our great motherland--the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics--is the true homeland of the workers of our country and a society with firm confidence in the future, a society of bright communist prospects. Strictly carrying out Lenin's mandate on defending the socialist fatherland is the sacred duty and honorable obligation of each citizen of the USSR and each Soviet serviceman.

During their independent work, it can be recommended that the students read: the works of V. I. Lenin "The Military Program of the Proletarian Revolution" ("Complete Collected Works, vol. 30, pp 133-138), "The Socialist Fatherland is in Danger!" ("Complete Collected Works," vol. 35, pp 357-358); Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's report "Report to the CPSU Central Committee and the Party's Immediate Tasks in the Fields of Domestic and Foreign Policy" ("Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress," Politizdat, 1976, pp 75-76, 83, 85-89); Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speech at the 18th Komsomol Congress (PRAVDA, 26 April 1978); the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics (Chapter 5); the report of Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, USSR Minister of Defense, "Guarding Great October's Accomplishments for 60 years" (PRAVDA, 23 February 1978); chapter one of the training aid for political lessons "V. I. Lenin on Defending the Socialist Fatherland" (Voyenizdat, 1977).

During the seminar lesson, it is advisable to discuss the following issues: 1. Marxism-Leninism on the socialist fatherland. 2. V. I. Lenin on the need for defending the socialist fatherland. 3. The leading role of the CPSU in defending the accomplishments of Great October. 4. The 25th Party Congress and the USSR Constitution on the mission of Soviet servicemen in defending the peaceful labor of the Soviet people.

During the evening, it is possible to organize a showing of the news reels and documentaries "From the Arrow to the Missile," "Always Alert" and "I Serve the Soviet Union" and the slide shows "V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on Defending the Socialist Fatherland" and "Always Maintain Combat Readiness."

When preparing for the lessons, it is desirable to make use of the album of visual aids "The 25th CPSU Congress on Strengthening the Defense of the USSR" (Voyenizdat, 1976).

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REVIEW OF BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGICAL TRAINING OF NAVAL PERSONNEL

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 12, Jun 78
signed to press 6 Jun 78 pp 86-89

[Article by Rear Adm V. Sabaneyev: "Sailors' Psychological Training"]

[Text] Commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol activists greeted the publication of the book "Principles of Naval Psychology" with a great deal of interest.* This is completely normal and understandable. First, the servicemen of the land of the Soviets are filled with determination to fulfill their constitutional duty--to reliably defend the socialist fatherland and maintain constant combat readiness, guaranteeing the immediate repulsion of any aggressor. The work cited will undoubtedly help in developing a conscious desire in personnel to irreproachably carry out their honorable mission, to vigilantly guard socialism's accomplishments. The role of moral, political and psychological training has sharply increased under the conditions of the revolution in military affairs, which has led to radical changes in the methods of armed combat, to a major complication in an individual's actions in combat and to enormous pressure on his psyche. Therefore, the study and consideration of the special features of man's psychological states during war and the conclusions for military pedagogy which are connected with this are of continuing importance for the activities of command and political personnel.

*G. A. Bronevitskiy, Yu. P. Zuyev, A. M. Stolyarenko, "Osnovy voyenno-morskoy psikhologii" (Principles of Naval Psychology), under the overall editorship of Adm V. M. Grishanov, Voenizdat, 1977, 339 p, price 1r 37k.

Second, like all sciences, psychology is based on objective laws; it studies the objective laws of the origin and development of psychological phenomena; it reveals the psychological mechanism for molding personality; and it points out the forms and methods for accomplishing this task. Depending upon the special features of the activity being studied by psychology, there are a number of branches, including military psychology (the psychology of military activity). Moreover, the special features of service and accomplishing combat missions in the Navy demand a special approach to psychological training for military sailors.

It must be stated that research in this area has been conducted throughout the entire history of the Soviet Navy, especially after the creation of the School of Military Pedagogy and Psychology at the Military Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin and after scholars from the Kiev Higher Naval Political Academy and teaching personnel from a number of other educational institutions became connected with this work. The book "War, Sea, Man" served as an important contribution to the theoretical understanding of morale and the psychological aspects of Soviet sailors' activity.

The publication under review is a logical extension of the versatile research work, study and synthesis of accumulated knowledge and experience. The principles of naval psychology are formulated in it in a thorough and integrated manner and this is its main value.

The structure of the book makes it possible to pick out the key issues of the subject in a clear-cut manner and to follow the main directions in training naval personnel--from an analysis of the special psychological features of naval service and their influence on molding the sailor's personality and the military collective during combat training to inculcating servicemen with the skills and ability to function in combat and wage a battle in accordance with the highest interests of the party, state and people.

The authors correctly point out that the spiritual qualities of Soviet sailors are dependent upon socialist society and the unabated concern of the CPSU in forming the new man. Firm, social motivators, and first and foremost Soviet patriotism--that great creative force upon whose soil the mass heroism of servicemen in the battles of the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War and the dedication in accomplishing the modern missions of reliably defending socialist accomplishments throughout the world became possible--are formed on the basis of a communist world view.

Concern about the ideological tempering of our servicemen always has been and is one of the most important tasks of party and political work. The brilliant works of V. I. Lenin, the decisions of the CPSU and the Party Central Committee plenums and the jubilee documents, reports, speeches and books of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev are our wealth, the firm foundation for indoctrinating champions of a bright future who are endlessly devoted to the cause of communism and politically strong and able. It is the noble duty of commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations to make full use of all of this. Along with this, the fact that a man's psychological tempering also develops during his everyday life and work should also be taken into account. On one hand the military sailor operates under conditions which are characteristic of all the services of the Soviet Armed Forces; on the other hand, he operates under conditions which are distinguished by special features which are vividly expressed; the first two chapters of the book are devoted to a thorough analysis of these special features.

The detailed presentation of specific factors of naval service is interesting, such as, the sea's elements and their dangers; the length of voyages and the large amount of physical and spiritual strain; the tiring monotony of a cruise; the limited mobility and limited group of people to associate with; many months of separation from family, relatives and friends; changes in climate, seasons and others. A consideration of the influence of these factors on people is required to carry out a system of measures which limits their negative influence and stimulates positive motivations.

The psychological aspects for accomplishing the main mission--increasing combat readiness, which is the concentrated result of the servicemen's training and education and the practical realization of the requirements levied upon the Armed Forces by the party, government and the country's Basic Law--are consistently and thoroughly reviewed in the book. The basic definition provided by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev serves as a point of departure for the authors in their presentation of this problem: "...the efforts and material expenditures of the people in equipping the army, political awareness, the combat training level and discipline of all the servicemen, the skill of command personnel in controlling forces and much more is concentrated in force combat readiness, as in a focal point. In the final analysis, this is the crown of combat expertise for the troops in peacetime and the key to victory in war" ("Lenin's Policy: Speeches and Articles," vol. 2, p 49).

The detailed revelation of the components of combat readiness, their relationships and dynamics and the methods for mobilizing the potential resources of each sailor in overcoming difficulties provide commanders and political workers with rich food for thought, creativity and application of their pedagogical expertise in work with personnel. The same purpose is served by the psychological description of combat expertise for a ship's specialist and the recommendations on forming his professional qualities, abilities and skills, which are contained in the book.

The pages of this publication devote special attention to a demonstration of ideological and military vocational guidance in forming the personality of a Soviet sailor. The remarkable traits of Soviet man's spiritual makeup are formed under the influence of the tireless activity of the party, state and public organizations in indoctrinating the workers in a spirit of a Marxist-Leninist world view and superior communist ideals. During the process of combat and political training, the armed defender of the motherland is also formed spiritually and professionally on this good foundation. Yesterday's student, worker or kolkhoz worker quickly masters military affairs and is penetrated by an awareness of the superior goal of military labor.

Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR Minister of Defense, emphasizes: "The just and noble nature of the goals and missions of the Armed Forces and all the people's love for them gives birth to enormous energy in the servicemen, a high sense of duty, a desire to steadily increase their combat expertise and a readiness to selflessly carry out their military obligations for the sake of a great cause--defense of the socialist fatherland. The young patriots who have entered the army and navy are studying with interest; they are quickly mastering combat equipment and methods for employing it and they are becoming brave, disciplined soldiers."

New officers will find useful, practical advice in the book on considering and using their subordinates' character traits, temperament and abilities in their work with them and on forms and methods for reinforcing positive traits and overcoming negative traits; this is very important for ensuring effective vocational and moral training for servicemen and military collectives.

The serviceman functions and carries out his patriotic duty in a collective; he passes through the school of indoctrination

here. Therefore, it is not by accident that the authors assign one of the main spots to the psychological problems of the naval collective, of managing its complex process of cohesion, of developing collective forms of consciousness, a unified understanding of goals and missions, unified discipline, common responsibility, warm relationships, mutual respect and insistence on high standards and subordination of personal interest to social interests.

The book correctly points out that the naval collective includes features of a universal (characteristic of all Soviet collectives), particular (typical for a military organization) and individual collective (specifically peculiar to the Navy). And, in accordance with the limits of the subject, the latter is examined in detail.

During a cruise, it is as though the ship's crew is locked up; in contrast to the customary conditions of service ashore, it does not have any direct contact with other collectives. Not a single step, not a single action extends beyond the setting of the collective and there is nowhere to go for advice, to find an answer to a disturbing question, except to a member of this collective and, in the majority of cases, to a member of the "microcollective"--the watch section, the department.

The need for special care in selecting people for watch sections and departments, attention to psychological compatibility and clear-cut and well thought out organization of party and political work stem from this. Under these conditions, the role of the personal example of commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol activists and their ability to approach each person on an individual basis increases. Measures directed at indoctrinating servicemen in a spirit of friendship, goodwill and a readiness to come to the aid of their comrade during difficult times also have a positive effect.

The analysis of the ship collective's sociopsychological structure and the description of its special features, the consistent description of ways of indoctrination based on heroism and traditions, the formation of public opinion and the responsibility of the collective for each of its members and the responsibility of each serviceman to the collective--which are contained in the work under review are armed with a knowledge of the objective laws for mobilizing personnel to accomplish the assigned missions.

At this point, procedural advice is provided on leading the ship's collective and, first and foremost, on the part of the sole commander; it demonstrates how to achieve mutual understanding among crew members, mutual agreement and psychological compatibility.

One of the chapters is devoted to the sociopsychological prerequisites for ensuring firm military discipline. It is impossible not to agree with the authors' assertion that the servicemen's high degree of political awareness and very strict procedures based on regulations are the main components which assure a high level of discipline. On this basis, it is especially important for officer personnel to not only strictly cultivate these procedures but also to have an in-depth knowledge of the traits of each subordinate and his possible reactions to changes in the situation in order to render concrete assistance in preparing for cruises and fulfilling cruise missions. That is, simultaneously combine an increased insistence on high standards with improved individual indoctrination work. This also includes a psychological analysis of the activities of specialists at battle stations and an operative reaction to undesirable changes in their conduct, the ability to prevent or relieve stressful situations, a systematic appeal to political awareness and patriotic feelings, timely rewards for those who distinguish themselves, etc. The authors have taken these and other recommendations from concrete practice and accumulated experience.

The book devotes a large place to an analysis of the psychological prerequisites for efficient combat training and ensuring a high level of combat readiness for the crew, to the principles of personnel leadership during the cruise with consideration for the special features of underway watch and navigation, as well as to the accomplishment of combat missions in modern naval warfare, etc. The last three chapters are devoted to these problems.

In our opinion, the authors are correct in focusing the reader's attention on those cases which have the most applied significance. The discussion is primarily about the efforts of command and political personnel which are directed at comprehensive stimulation of the servicemen's conscientious attitude toward military labor, developing an interest in them toward the military profession and combat training, strengthening their faith in their capabilities and developing the firm habit of overcoming difficulties. The detailed description of the stages, procedures and means for achieving a practical level of training is like a detailed action plan

for training and indoctrinating each sailor, petty officer, warrant officer and officer.

The changes in waging armed conflict which were brought about by the revolution in military affairs have led to the need for a detailed development of the corresponding system for moral, political and psychological training of servicemen and the work under review makes its contribution to solving this problem. It is noteworthy that psychological training means, its component parts, organization and methods are formulated here in broad perspective; the need for its continuing relationship to moral and political training is substantiated and the special importance of party and political work is emphasized. Revelation of the special features of psychological training for officers should be classified among the book's merits since they are precisely the ones who will make decisions and organize combat. The well-thoughtout and comprehensive organization of this training is called upon to ensure the purposefulness and effectiveness of the officers' work. It is completely warranted that the book presents this issue in relation to a ship's distant voyage, since long voyages have now become the standard of life, the standard for fulfilling the Navy's missions in defense of the fatherland's state interests.

Readers will undoubtedly derive a lot of useful information for themselves when they become acquainted with the advice on controlling the behavior of subordinates during an ocean cruise; this advice concerns evaluating the situation and making psychological predictions of people's actions, making the appropriate decisions and also organizing their implementation and monitoring them, especially in difficult situations. Moreover, the authors have set the party requirements for carrying out its personnel policy, which were enunciated by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 25th CPSU Congress, as the cornerstone for a solution to these problems; the qualities, which he formulated and which a leader must possess, are party spirit, in-depth competence, discipline, initiative, a creative approach to work, sensitivity to people, their needs and interests and exemplary conduct in work and everyday life.

The book conducts an objective discussion about ways of improving the effectiveness of party and political work during long voyages. It emphasizes the importance of a continual party influence on the consciousness and actions of sailors, a political approach to all their work and behavior, an open atmosphere with mutual understanding and comradely strictness and the efficiency and effectiveness of each measure.

One of the important, but not very easy, tasks of party political work is ensuring the efficiency of personnel, the intelligent expenditure of spiritual and physical strength and timely maintenance and restoration of this strength after hard work loads.

Daily and purposeful moral and political influence on servicemen, indoctrinating them in the heroic spirit of the past, propaganda on combat traditions and developing a sense of class hatred toward the enemy are reliable ways of accomplishing these tasks. The authors provide clear-cut advice to commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol activists on how to make more efficient use of them.

The material of the work under review serves as a confirmation of the profound topicality of the instructions from Army Gen A. A. Yepishev, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "Life shows that success in work is ensured where officers are indoctrinated in a spirit of Lenin's high principles and in a party spirit, where constant concern is displayed for the development of the qualities required of a leader, such as, firm ideological tempering, a practical nature, political consciousness, a state approach to the assigned work, close contact with the masses and exemplary personal conduct in fulfilling their military duty."

The book "Principles of Naval Psychology" will undoubtedly serve as a useful aid for our command and political personnel in mastering the art of training and indoctrinating capable and courageous defenders of the motherland.

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CSO: 1801

IMPORTANCE OF MARKSMANSHIP TRAINING STRESSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Aug 78 p 1 LD

[Editorial: "With the First Shot"]

[Text] Modern combat is making increasingly high demands on the field, air and naval training of personnel; particularly their firing skill. Victory in combat is impossible without reliably and effectively hitting the enemy with all kinds of fire. The ability of subunits to fulfill a combat task and their tactical training are determined primarily by their ability to use their weapons skillfully and to cause the enemy maximum harm at maximum ranges and with the least expenditure of ammunition. The increased combat potential of weapons and materiel, their provision with improved sighting systems and the increase in firing rates and ranges and in the power of ammunition pose with special acuteness the question of improving the art of hitting targets with the first burst, shot, launch or combat approach.

The demands of modern combat are concretely embodied in the plans, programs and other documents governing the organization of combat training. They permeate, in particular, firing courses aimed at raising the quality of personnel firing training and insuring further rapprochement between firing and tactical training. Current firing courses devote great attention to hitting targets with the first shots.

Considerable experience in fire training and in cultivating real masters of firing has been accumulated among the troops and in the navy. The firing and missile launches carried out in this training year have shown the growth in fire training in many subunits, units and ships. The ground forces air defense subunit commanded by Capt A. Nosovich, for example, hit a small, high-speed target with the first missile. The tank battalion commanded by Maj N. Zavatskiy achieved high results at a combat firing exercise. Most of the battalion's crews hit the targets with the first shot. Firing was carried out in a complex tactical situation in accordance with the demands of modern combat. The organizers of the exercise proceeded from the premise that accurate shots will bring victory only when combined with high tactical training and when the improvement of firing skill and tactical training represents a unified, organically indivisible process.

It is not an easy matter to hit targets with the first shot, launch or salvo. This demands skillful mastery of weapons and equipment, thorough theoretical training, sound knowledge of the firing regulations and their skillful application in practice. Persistent struggle to enhance the quality of every exercise--weapon and tank-firing training exercises, above all--is a reliable way to attain skill. As they are the main type of fire training exercises, training sessions help to increase the individual skill of gunners and operators and also to achieve firing harmony among subunits and to improve the commander's skills in fire control.

The quality of training sessions depends to a decisive degree on the state of the material training base. It is gratifying to note that classes of programed instruction in fire training and improved teaching aids, instruments and training and monitoring facilities are being introduced more and more widely.

However, the importance of weapon training is underestimated in some units and subunits. At times the frequent repetition of the exercise aptly named cartridge drill is used as a substitute for fire training. This drill results in considerable defects in the training of a marksman; he acquires firing skills that are of use only under certain stereotyped conditions. The drill renders him incapable of independently solving complex fire tasks including, in particular, hitting targets with the first shot.

There have been instances of low efficiency in weapons training in a number of subunits of the Kiev Military District and the Northern Group of Forces. A tank battalion commanded by Capt A. Markin (Central Asian Military District) achieved mediocre results in gunnery in recent test exercises--as a result of the poor organization of tank-gunnery practice. Only individual crews of this subunit hit their targets with the first shot. Such occurrences should receive a principled assessment from staffs, political organs and party organizations.

At the front the marksmen's authority was exceptionally high. Their names were known by regimental, divisional, army and front personnel. What about today? There are units and ships where snipers are trained with proper care, who are surrounded by honor and respect, and whose experience is persistently inculcated. This applies, in particular, to the G.I. Kotovskiy Proskurovsk-Berlin Guards tank regiment of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. The regiment holds regular firing conferences in which snipers share their experiences. Demonstration exercises and open classes are held, and there are firing clubs. But, unfortunately, there also are many units and ships in which people do not know who are their best gunners, where due concern is not shown for their training and authority and the dissemination of their experience.

Mastering the art of hitting targets accurately is one of the most important directions in socialist competition. It is important to insure that this part of combat training is everywhere placed on a shockwork level and that every fighting man considers learning this art to be a matter of honor. All of the wide arsenal of forms of moral incentive, including such an effective stimulus

as instituting pennants bearing the names of illustrious comrades-in-arms and marksmen, should be utilized for this purpose. The efficiency of subunit and unit competitions for the title of best gunner and operator must be raised, and the experience of subunits, ships and winners of competitions in tactical and firing training at the level of groups of forces, districts, fleets and branches of the armed forces must be inculcated more persistently.

Purposeful party political work plays an enormous part in mobilizing personnel to raise firing skills. A major task of commanding officers, political organs and party organizations is to explain the role and importance of marksmanship in modern combat, to propagate and inculcate the experience of the best gunners and to make the fullest possible use of the mobilizing force of socialist competition.

The persistent training of subunits, crews and squads to hit objectives and targets with the first shot is a vital requirement of our time. The more skilled marksmen there are, the greater the combat readiness of units and ships and of our glorious armed forces.

CSO: 1801

CHIEF OF MAIN STAFF ON DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET AIR FORCE

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Aug 78 Morning Edition pp 1, 2 LD

[Article by Col Gen Avn G. Skorikov, chief of the Air Force Main Staff:
"Combat Wings of the Motherland"]

[Excerpts] USSR Air Fleet Day, which was instituted in 1933, is a nationwide holiday. It has become part of our lives as a militant review of the achievements of domestic aviation and the successes of the pilots, navigators, aviation specialists, scientists, designers, aviation industry workers, DOSAAF members and all those who through their selfless labor have created and are strengthening the air shield of the socialist homeland.

Fundamental qualitative changes have taken place in the air force during the postwar period. As a result of the switch to fundamentally new aviation equipment, the air force's combat potential and ability to solve complex combat tasks under any conditions have risen sharply. Our aviation has become jet propelled, supersonic and missile carrying.

The air force is capable, independently and in cooperation with the other branches and categories of troops, of successfully solving tasks of a strategic operational scale and of influencing the course and outcome of operations in land and sea theaters of military operations. The air force's modern technical equipment makes it possible to strike the enemy's means of attack, to support troops, to struggle successfully for dominance in the air, to carry out aerial reconnaissance and to solve other complex tasks.

In the contemporary period the gaining and retention of dominance in the air remain the determining conditions for the successful implementation of operations and of the war as a whole. Thanks to the Communist Party's constant concern and to the persistent labor of workers, scientists and designers, our air forces along with the other branches of the armed forces constantly keep abreast of scientific and technical progress and are armed with the best possible combat equipment and weapons. The third generation of warplanes and helicopters in the postwar period is being successfully mastered. In the military theory sphere the most efficient forms and methods of using various categories of aviation in battle are being sought.

Our Soviet aviation is the cradle of cosmonautics. And this is no accident. The formation of cosmonautics and its successes and achievements are closely linked with and insured by the improvement of aviation and jet technology. The designs of spaceships and the mighty multistage launch rockets were created with consideration and extensive utilization of the experience of aviation science and technology.

The system of training flight personnel in air force [voyenno-aviatsionnyy] training establishments is organized with consideration for the leading achievements of science and technology. The establishments train pilot-engineers, navigator-engineers and other highly qualified specialists. The reinforcement of aviation with officers with higher training makes it possible to raise to a new, higher level the combat skill of air force subunits and units. Today's generation of people bearing the mighty wings of the motherland are ideologically and politically mature, bold and courageous pilot officers and navigators with higher education.

Military airmen are greeting USSR Air Fleet Day with new achievements in combat and political training and in raising combat readiness.

Political organizers and party organizations have an important role in solving the tasks facing air force units. They are rallying soldiers to solve the historic decisions of the 25th party congress. Party political work is filled with rich content, is marked by the diversity of forms and methods of ideological influence on personnel, and contributes to the formation in them of high moral, political and combat qualities. The discussions of L. I. Brezhnev's wonderful memoirs "Malaya Zemlya" and "Rebirth" in units and subunits proceeded with particular success. Our soldiers see them as an inspiring example of service to the motherland and Lenin's cause.

The Communist Party and the Soviet Government highly value airmen's work. Many airmen have been awarded the honorary titled of "Honored Military Pilot of the USSR" and "Honored Military Navigator of the USSR" for their excellent indicators in the mastery of aviation equipment and their masterful use of it. Many airmen have been awarded orders and medals of the Soviet Union. This high assessment and attention on the part of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government inspire air force personnel to new achievements.

The main aim of military airmen's martial labor is clearly defined in the words voiced by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev during his visit to the Pacific Fleet on 7 April 1978: "We are improving our defense with the sole aim of reliably defending the gains of Great October and firmly protecting the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and our friends and allies. The soldiers of the Soviet Army and Navy serve this noble goal."

This goal is also served by the air force servicemen. In a united formation with the soldiers of other branches of the armed forces and rallied closely around the beloved Communist Party and the Soviet Government, airmen are prepared at a moment's notice, at the first call from the party and at the order of the Soviet Government, to fulfill their patriotic and international duty.