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NAVAL TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Training Progress on Outstanding Submarine

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Jun 78 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank M. Korenevskiy and G. Savichev, special KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents: "The Guarantee"]

[Text] The officers of the Black Sea Fleet I. Lavrom and L. Shpil'ko, in speaking at reader conferences, asked for news in the paper on how things are going with the crew of the atomic missile ship, the initiator of the competition in the Navy. We are fulfilling the request of the readers.

Out there, halfway to the horizon, after several painfully long minutes, the ocean exploded like an underwater volcano, and a gigantic needle burst forth from the water into daylight in clouds of grey and orange vapor. Somewhat lazily during the first instants, it then roared into the skies, it penetrated the low-lying heavy clouds, and somewhere above us described the set arc in order to point downward at the doomed target.

The admiral lowered his binoculars, he glanced at his watch and frowned. What could bother him? It was as if he was taking the exam and not giving it. But, let us assume that now, thousands of kilometers away in Moscow, officers of the Navy Chief Staff are also impatiently glancing at the hands of their watches. And possibly, the commander-in-chief himself went up to the map, glanced at this region of the ocean and impatiently waited for a report on the results.

Yes, it was a special moment. The exam launch was conducted by the atomic missile carrying ship under the command of Capt 1st Rank Aleksandr Kazakov. For 2 years now this ship had been the initiator of the socialist competition in the Navy. So here the excitement was natural and blameness. These were not lessons, crew, but rather the prestige of an entire service of the Armed Forces! But, a surprising thing was that the commander of the unit who should have been most excited was completely calm. It was as if he had

received a guarantee: Fear not, a five [the highest number of points] is ensured. But there is no guarantee on paper. There merely are pledges. In truth, here they say that the pledges of the crew are already a guarantee. The submariners stated that during the year of the 25th Party Congress the missile carrying submarine would become outstanding, and they achieved this. And in the year of the 60th anniversary of Great October and the approval of the new USSR Constitution, they shouldered a burden that would make others gasp. For example, was it a joke to have everyone become masters of military affairs if these persons had the right to take exams for this title! And over a score specialists have this right! And quite recently, if some cruiser had three or five warrant officers ["michman"] with a master qualification, they were proud of this, they wrote about this in newspapers, and portraits of those few masters filled out the color inserts of the military journals. And here, all at once there would be scores of them!

Honestly speaking, even among those who welcomed the bold initiative, some doubted the feasibility of the crew's plans, considering them boldly overstated. But really hasn't daring accompanied the competition from the very moment of its instigation? Incidentally, the competition of the sailors arose precisely here, in this fleet, on a large scale and as an inseparable part of all military training.

In a freezing January of 1936, with squalling northeasterlies and north-westerlies, the submarine Shch-117 set to sea on a special mission. It was under the command of N. Yegipko and the military commissar was S. Pastukhov. The crew of the sub was to reach a maximum stay at sea during the winter. The order for the crews did not set a definite date for returning to the base, and the communists and Komsomol members resolved to aim for two range periods of the sub. Was this a challenge to straight thinking or a "daring overstatement"? No, it was something else. The nation was living through a period of decisive attacks on the established production and technical norms. Not because these customary norms were understated but rather because they had been set on the basis of the "average man." But what if a man is not average but rather has an expert mastery of the equipment? What if there is an upsurge in the activity of the collective and a thirst for good deeds for the glory of the motherland? Then overwhelming announcements will travel across the nation, inspiring the people and instigating unforeseen energy in them. During the preparations of the Shch-117 for the special assignment, the world learned the name of the Donetsk miner Aleksey Stakhanov who with a norm of 7 tons brought the shift output up to 227 tons of coal! The submariners declared the hero miner to be an honorary participant of their cruise, his portrait was hung up in each compartment, and in all the departments the sailors met during difficult minutes "to seek advice from Stakhanov," to reckon and do what else they could to fulfill the mission in a Stakhanovite manner. And then the range was surpassed by 2.5 times, and all the ship equipment had maintained 100-percent readiness for further actions, while the crew was healthy, cheerful and full of strength. In April 1936, the USSR Central Executive Committee awarded orders to the entire crew!

It is a pity that we do not have a book giving the history of the competition in the fleets, a detailed book with an analysis of the remarkable feats and with a penetrating into their essence. Here, where the histories are not truly known, where rich experience is not used, and bicycles are invented after motorcycles.... But the commander, Capt 1st Rank A. Kazakov, the political worker Capt 2d Rank V. Morozov and the ship party bureau, judging from everything, do rely on history, they take the most valuable from the present practices in the competition, and they test it out and enrich it with new ideas.

In truth, sometimes the lagging rivals say that the initiator ship is surrounded with supposedly unusual attention. A member of the military council and the chief of the Navy Political Directorate pays a visit, or other very experienced political workers, and each has something important to advise on, and helps in analyzing some complicated thing. All of this is true, however for the sake of justice it must be remembered that after almost each such visit a number of the socialist pledges is revised by the crew, they are adjusted, of course upwards. Thus here the help is of a special sort, just look in the dictionary. According to them, the dictionaries, help is to make something easier. But here, on the contrary, the help involves a complicating of the missions in accord with a new higher level of military and political training than achieved in the competition.

There are also "smart alecks" who state in the pledges what has already basically been attained, and it is merely a question of keeping up to the set mark, to rise a little above it, and then you can report that it has been fulfilled or overfulfilled. For Kazakov and Morozov, the approach to this is diametrically opposite. When the crew's appeal to all the Navy personnel was drawn up, someone proposed and defended the following line: "We promise to successfully carry out the missile firings." And many at first were ready to agree that this was a guarantee of success although immediately a "tick" was put on what was fulfilled. But Kazakov argued decisively: That is no guarantee! There were no unsuccessful firings and there never had been. With such a wording of "successfully carry out," where was the progress? It is not interesting for people to compete if there is nothing ahead for which they must fight.

Thus appeared in the obligations of the crew the clear line that the missile firings would be carried out only with an evaluation of excellent....

The admiral again raised his binoculars and found the place where, by his reckoning, the underwater volcano should erupt at any minute. The longest minutes passed.

On that day, reports from the Red Banner Pacific Fleet were also impatiently awaited at the editorial offices of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. And this was understandable. At one time the Armed Forces had learned from our newspaper about the patriotic initiative of the sailors on the atomic missile submarine. Later KRASNAYA ZVEZDA repeatedly returned to the concerns and achievements of the pacesetters of the competition in the Navy, and told

of them with great confidence in the strength of the famous collective of submariners. And they during each stage of the competition reinforced this confidence, providing information from time to time to the editors, such as:

"Today one out of every four men in the crew is a master of military affairs...."

"During the training year, 49 rationalization proposals have been introduced (the obligations stated "at least 24"). PO 2d Class P. Zverev particularly distinguished himself...."

"The officers about whom KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has written, V. Perepechenov and V. Yeres'ko have again been among those who particularly distinguished themselves...."

"All the firing missions have been carried out excellently...."

In this information the word "all" still did not include the inspection missile firings which were now at hand, and without them the impressive "all" does not cover certainly one-half of the results in the combat training of the crew. For a missile sub, such firings are the crown of the general successes and the main result. And understanding this, all the "fans" of the initiator ship were experiencing a certain excitement. Each in his own way. We recalled a meeting with the "atomic" submariners on the distant shores, we leafed through their Pacific notepads, and on the pages of them searched for what substantiated the "guarantee certificate," that basis for the enviable calmness of the unit commander.

Here are notes of what was said by the ship commander, Capt 1st Rank A. Kazakov, in various situations, at meetings, in the wardroom, and during talks with subordinates:

"The competition is an uncompromising struggle against shortcomings. It is also a continuous search. The real foundation for fulfilling the pledges is a well organized training and indoctrinational process."

"It is very important to concretize the aims of the competition periodically. For example, the overall aim is to prepare in an exemplary manner for carrying out the firing problems, and in my opinion, this would provide more inspiration and add enthusiasm if at a certain moment the aim were clarified as follows: 'Let us work for the right to participate in the competitive firings for the prize of the commander-in-chief of the Navy.' Or, for example, a major cruise was successful. Usually the challenge follows: 'Reinforce the success!' But would it not be better: 'Turn the experience of the ocean to bettering the organization of service and the raising of vigilance!' Or further: 'From confident cruising to confident combat!' The customary acquires newness and it is always attractive."

"The complicating of the missions of the competition necessitates particular attention to its indoctrinational role and a constant strengthening of discipline. To know the real state of discipline!"

Or here is a note of the words of the deputy commander for political affairs, Capt 2d Rank V. Morozov:

"I feel that for ourselves we should rephrase the excellent motto 'effectiveness and quality--a work guarantee!' As yet this has not come about, but the very idea of guaranteeing the fulfillment of the pledges has already taken root among us, I can say certainly!"

"Would you not help in locating someone from the Shch-117, from the participants of that famous cruise?...there are two addresses?! We must write!"

"Collectivism is responsibility. This is a direct link. But responsibility has not been equally developed in everyone. But in a close-knit crew, each person brings his responsibility up to the collective one. And we have the strongest basis for the indoctrination of collectivism. With whomever you speak on the ship, there are clear lines from the man stretching to the heroes of the war, to the heroes of the five-year plans. To the unprecedented solidarity of the Soviet people in combat and labor."

And since the missile firings involve trouble, why not look at the notes of what was said by the main ship "Thunderer," the commander of the missile troops, officer V. Yeres'ko:

"High technical skills are a very significant reserve for the development of the socialist competition. A reserve not in the sense that we do not have such a level, but rather that there are no limits to raising it. And how can we not but use this reserve if on the sub all the officers, with the exception of the physician, have received an engineering education! Our movement for a high technical level is headed by a talented man, the commander of department 5, the master of the atomic power unit. And he heads this exactly. Technical contests are organized with questions on the level of training specialists first class. They are both general ship questions as well as for the specialties in the departments, and all for first class. And do you think that anyone is intimidated by the complexity of the questions? Certainly not, and already voices are heard that the questions should be taken from the program for masters. Hence the sailors have acquired a taste for high technical skills. And this is largely the guarantee for success."

Is it not true that little by little what comprises the basis of a guarantee is collected together? But still, until the ocean has erupted somewhere there like an underwater volcano, until a giant needle bursts forth from the water and heads to the clouds, and until it describes above us the programmed arc without the slightest error, not a single involved person breathes easily....

And then the long awaited announcement: "Excellent!" And now it can be said: "But who doubted that it would be otherwise? Their pledges state: 'To fulfill the tactical and firing problems with high results, and the missile firings only with an excellent evaluation'."

For Better Use of Training Cruises

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Jun 78 p 1

[Editorial: "To Study the Experience of Long Cruises"]

[Text] Like all the men of our Armed Forces, the sailors with great enthusiasm are carrying out the missions of the summer training period. During cruises they are improving their military skills and professional expertise, they are carrying out complex training missions, they are strengthening the solidarity of the crews and the combat readiness of the ships, and are undergoing a strict testing for political maturity and loyalty to the oath and military duty.

The crew of the submarine under the command of Capt 2d Rank V. Viktorov returns from each long cruise with new achievements in training. For the military collective the ocean has become a real school for combat improvement and professional growth. On the ship more than a score masters of military affairs has emerged, and here there is always a high percentage of specialists first and second class, and the submarine is outstanding and is fighting for the title of best in the unit. It has been awarded the Pennant of the USSR Minister of Defense for courage and military valor. Capt 2d Rank V. Viktorov who has a large number of long cruises to his score possesses rich practical experience in commanding the ship. The crew headed by him excels in teamwork and high naval skills.

The time is long passed when long cruises by our ships were a rarity. At present voyages of thousands of miles away from the bases are a common occurrence in the fleet. Rich and valuable experience has been acquired in conquering the world ocean. This experience is constantly being added to and enriched. The best, leading commanders and crews are making their contribution to developing the art of navigation, to developing new weapons and equipment under the conditions of long voyages, and to seeking out and improving new practical procedures and methods for conducting combat at sea. However, advanced, innovative experience only acquires true practical value when it finds rapid and broad dissemination, and when it turns from the achievements of individual men and ships into a standard of life, training and work for all the military collectives.

Indicative in this regard is the mastery of advanced combat experience by Soviet sailors during the years of the Great Patriotic War. A new tactical procedure, a method employed by one commander and making it possible to achieve an impressive victory over the enemy immediately became available to others.

At present in order to navigate successfully, to carry out the set missions, it is essential to profoundly master and learn how to apply in practice the experience of predecessors, colleagues and senior comrades. It is particularly important to master the experience in training sailors for the expert use of weapons and equipment, and for the vigilant standing of a duty watch. At present a young commander, in setting out on a long cruise, often receives a mission which quite recently could have been carried out by only a few. Here the senior chiefs with every reason have confidence in the success of the actions of the commander and the crew even in unusual circumstances and in a situation new to them.

Of course, such confidence can occur only when it is based upon the tested and tried out practice of the careful and thorough preparation of the commanders and the crews for voyages with the broad use of the acquired advanced experience of cruises. Thus, in the unit where Capt 3d Rank V. Moskalev serves, the ship crews are headed by young commanders along with experienced ones. The unit commander and the staff endeavor to bring out all the best that has been attained by the crews in the process of a cruise, and to make this common property.

The training and preparation of the young commanders of the ships are greatly aided by their involvement in thorough analyses of each extended cruise. It is important that the senior chiefs conduct the analyses in a profoundly reasoned manner, with detailed analysis and an objective evaluation of the actions of the commanders.

Such a form of commander training and the passing on of advanced experience has been well assimilated in the fleets. But, unfortunately, the question at times is limited to this, and this is fundamentally wrong. In indoctrination work, the senior chiefs along with the political bodies and the party organizations should give primary attention to developing in all the communist officers a constant need to broaden and deepen their knowledge, and a desire to make active use of all opportunities for studying and assimilating the experience of the advanced ships and units.

The flag officers and the officers of the political department and staff, in being on board the ships during the cruises, should create conditions under which the exchange of experience between the commanders and the crews could be carried out efficiently, concretely and as applied to the missions being carried out. Here particularly great opportunities are provided with the joint cruises of several ships and during anchoring in the open sea.

As practice indicates, the active forms of exchanging experience between the ship commanders and crews directly at sea bring very great benefit for mutually enriching their knowledge and skills, and they make it possible to avoid many errors and more successfully solve all the problems which arise during the cruises. Here the commanders, the political workers and the party and Komsomol organizations must be able to spot in the activities of the sailors the new and advanced features which have been developed in the course of the creative search, and the desire to carry out the set missions

better and more effectively. The disclosure and dissemination of advanced experience in training and indoctrination, in mastering equipment and in party political work during a voyage and the transmitting of this to others--this is a concern not only for the successes of one's own ship, but also for raising the combat readiness of the unit and the fleet.

The competition must play a major role in disseminating advanced experience. Publicity, comparison of results, competitiveness, mutual aid and the following of the examples of the leaders contribute to the very rapid professional growth of all participants in the competition. The struggle for the best ship, the leading formation, and competitive exercises for the Navy prizes actively mobilize the crews to new achievements. Here the best trained military collectives which possess outstanding skills and high military expertise emerge as the leaders. The generalizing of their experience and the propagandizing of achievements should be at the center of attention for the commanders, the staffs, the political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations.

During the summer training period the ship crews are confronted with new miles at sea, training engagements, firing, voyages with official visits and business calls to foreign ports, and other missions. To carry them out excellently, to raise one's expertise and to enrich one's experience are the most important duty and a matter of honor for each Soviet sailor.

Better Warrant Officer Selection for Training Units

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Jun 78 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank A. Ivanov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Warrant Officers of the Training Detachment"]

[Text] During the exercise the officer candidates of the training detachment did not waste a minute. Having divided the platoon into individual groups, WO ["michman"] V. Kurdyukov gave a specific assignment to each man. The young sailors worked with interest on the complex equipment, using the diverse equipment of the training lab. They trained in eliminating characteristic malfunctions in the equipment, and they studied the design of equipment which they would soon be operating on the ships.

WO Kurdyukov, along with the squad commanders (the petty officers of the shifts) and the chief of the training lab kept careful watch so that each officer candidate worked at full force. When the warrant officer saw that a problem had arisen for someone, he hurried to help. He gave advice, he explained and by leading questions suggested what to do. In a word, the exercises with the future gunnery electricians were conducted in a lively, interesting and procedurally correct manner by the senior instructor.

Not only WO Kurdyukov, a knowledgeable sailor, an expert specialist who at one time served as a gunnery electrician on a cruiser knows how to train the officer candidates well. In the training detachment a predominant

majority of the warrant officers is such. For example, WO A. Belich. He has been 18 years in the navy. For many years he has worked in a training detachment. He was a senior instructor for special disciplines. Now he is a platoon commander. Here they say that not every officer is able to get across the material so effectively as does Anatoliy Grigor'yevich Belich. His graduates not only thoroughly know their specialty, but also excel in particular smartness and industry in service. The guard headed by WO A. Belich last year in the navy competition won a prize place, although it consisted basically of officer candidates who just several months previously had gotten into uniform.

Among the leaders are WOs A. Kravtsov, P. Glushchenko and many others. They give the officer candidates not only professional knowledge and skills in a concrete naval specialty. Along with the officers and regular petty officers, the warrant officers develop military bearing in the young men, the habit of military discipline, and acquaint them with the specific features of ship duty.

The complexity of ship equipment, the diversity of combat training missions, and the increased level in the overall development and education of the youth coming into the Navy place increased demands upon the educational skills and pedagogical level of the warrant officers, and upon their ability to carry out political, military and moral indoctrination of the officer candidates in an organic unity. In the training detachment, a great deal is done to improve the knowledge and skills of the warrant officers. Twice a year, procedural courses are held for them, and command exercises weekly. There are regular instructor-procedural and demonstration exercises, the reciprocal attending of lessons with a subsequent analysis, the exchange of experience, and so forth. The activities of the instructors are constantly in the field of vision of the company commanders and their deputies for political affairs.

In the training detachment under discussion, a majority of the warrant officers successfully handles the duties entrusted to them. Here they train for the ships sufficiently qualified specialists as is seen, in particular, from the replies from the fleets. But can it be said that all the reserves for raising the role of the warrant officers in the training and indoctrinational process have been used and that all the questions have been solved? Of course not. Here along with WOs V. Kurdyukov and A. Belich in this training detachment, for example, WO P. Dubrovin also serves, and we must speak in somewhat greater detail about him.

He did his regular service in the missile troops. He was discharged into the reserves and returned to his home town. At the military commissariat he was proposed to go and study in a warrant officer school, and later to teach in a training detachment. He thought a bit and agreed as he liked service in the army. He completed his training with rather good marks. But then the misfortune. In the school they studied more and more educational procedures and the organization of service. But for the profound mastery of a naval specialty and the particular features of ship life

virtually no time was left. It was felt that the future warrant officers would have learned all of this during regular service. Incidentally, this was the case for a majority, but only not for Dubrovin. As was said, he had served in the missile troops and in the training detachment he was to train naval gunnery electricians.

"It is difficult for me now," says Pavel Ivanovich [Dubrovin] frankly. "I am teaching officer candidates and I feel I don't have enough knowledge. The fact that I did not serve on ships also tells. They promised a training period but there was only an excursion. But is it possible to see much in one day, let alone learn? Certainly a ship is a complex system, and it takes more than a week to master it, particularly at sea, during a cruise."

It is hard not to agree with this opinion. Unfortunately, here there are warrant officers without sufficient experience in ship duty.

The political worker, Capt 2d Rank Yu. Mikhelyus, told about one instructive story which he witnessed. The subject of the final preparations of a mine for setting was being studied. On the ship the mine specialists perform all the operations in very close quarters. But in the training classroom the mine stood in the middle of the lab, and the officer candidates could get at it from all sides. However, the senior instructor did not pay any attention to this oversimplification, since he himself plainly did not know ship conditions. And this was not so much the fault of the warrant officer as his misfortune. Why are such, even isolated instances possible?

Let us draw an analogy, with a certain, of course, share of conditionality. If at a plant there is a production technical school training personnel for it, the enterprise director would endeavor to have the most skilled plant specialists become teachers there. The benefit would be immediate. The better the young workers are trained the more rapidly they would master the job at the machine and the sooner they would begin to fulfill the plan and not cause rejects. A training detachment, it can be said, is a unique production technical school training personnel for the navy. And who else but the workers of the corresponding departments and the naval personnel offices should show constant concern for manning their training subunit with the best instructors and teachers! But how are things in practice?

It happens that the senior instructors for a specialization and the chiefs of the training labs are trained in the training detachment from among its own officer candidates. The best of them after the course of instruction remain in the training detachment in the position of squad commanders and shift petty officers. Before discharge into the reserves, those so desiring are sent to warrant officer school. Having completed it, they return as warrant officers back to the training detachment.

We feel it would be much better to select candidates for warrant officer school from among the sailors and petty officers who have served 2-2.5 years on the ships. Obviously on the ships it would be possible to find

trained and highly skilled warrant officers, including those who completed technician schools. Precisely such specialists who have experience in ship duty, in coming as warrant officers to a training detachment, would bring the greatest benefit.

Who should select the warrant officers for a training detachment? The officer of the fleet personnel department, Capt 2d Rank V. Smirnov, is firmly convinced that this should be the leaders of the training detachments. Their officers and warrant officers, he says, along with the officer candidates are present on the ships and periodically do tours of duty there. They should know and let them search and choose. Nothing prevents even specially sending an officer on a mission to a ship formation for this purpose. Personnel from the Northern and Pacific fleets come to the Baltic Fleet for selecting candidate warrant officers. And they find the needed men.

In a training detachment, as we have shown, without repudiating the idea of the independent selection of warrant officers on the ships, still greater help is awaited from the corresponding fleet bodies. And when this is not received, the well trodden path is followed.

We feel that these questions must be settled through the joint efforts of the command of the training detachment, the staff officers and the fleet personnel department. This will make it possible to strengthen the role of the training detachment warrant officers in subsequently raising the quality of training for specialists on the ships.

Cruiser Gunnery Training Described

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Jun 78 p 1

[Article by Sr Lt V. Burtovoy of the Red Banner Northern Fleet: "The Sources of Teamwork"]

[Text] The competitions for the title of best in specialty in the universal caliber battalion on the cruiser "Murmansk" are held each month. The battery commanders as well as their subordinates know about this. And now Sr Lt V. Komarov conducts training using the program of the competitions with the battery personnel.

Training was underway in the turret where CPO S. Lysikov is the crew petty officer. Sn A. Voronyuk executed the loading flawlessly, and the petty officer nodded approvingly. The skill was obvious! If all the battalion loaders could perform on this level, one could be confident that the "hitch" which had occurred recently would not be repeated in the future. The "hitch" consisted in the fact that one of the turrets did not keep up with the firing pace. This occurred due to errors of the loader, but Sr Lt Komarov was also responsible for this. The planning of the amount of training for the loaders depended largely on him. However, until the guns did not roar the battery commander did not pay proper attention to the training of this category of specialist.

Why did this happen? Probably because as a whole the gun crews had met the standard. What the loader lost was made up by the layer, and a "cover-up" ensued. The lesson with the "misfire" was also useful in that it caused the battery commander not to be satisfied by the final time indicator which averaged and evened out the contribution of the individual men to the work of the entire crew. Now in the workbook of Sr Lt Komarov entries appeared on the seconds of each man. It was clearly apparent in what operations a reserve of reliability could and should be created.

Sr Lt Komarov saw to it that the loaders were given equipment for additional training so that the best loaders could share their experience with the youth. And although a little time has passed, improvements can be seen. The same Sn Voronyuk fulfills the standard of a loader on the level of a specialist first class. And the sailor has been serving just a year.

So the battery commander has reason now to be content with the actions of the crew of CPO Lysikov. All the men worked smoothly, and the overall time indicator was excellent.

Now the subordinates of PO 1st Class A. Tazhbayev took over the gun. Their time coincided to the second with the time of their rivals. If this had happened a month previously, Sr Lt Komarov would have been satisfied.... But now his eye was sharper and his evaluations were significantly stricter. Yes, the time was the same, but the crews worked quite differently. Tazhbayev's crew could have outpaced its rivals, but the loader Sn O. Anfilogov worked half-heartedly. And while for his young comrade Sn Voronyuk the goal of a first class norm was very honorable, for Anfilogov this goal should have been considered merely the starting one. Anfilogov had incomparably greater experience, his skills were honed to the point of being automatic, but there was no spark to his work. His self-esteem was not even piqued by the probability that Sn Voronyuk would soon outstrip his more experienced rival in the competition. What was the reason for the inertia, the traces of which could be spotted in the actions of other members of the second crew?

Sr Lt Komarov compared the training sessions and saw how they were conducted by the petty officers from the posing of the problem to the analysis. And he concluded that CPO Lysikov possessed the same understanding of the essence of the struggle to condense the standard which had been reached by him, the battery commander. The petty officer did not merely evaluate the final result, but showed each specialist where he lost fractions of a second and how this told on the work of the crew. Lysikov noticed that the vertical gunner, Sn A. Semenchenko, was aiming in jerks, and he took his seat and demonstrated how to achieve smooth aiming and how one must consider the action of the sea. The junior commander also took pains with the quality aspect of the norm, and was able in word and deed to interest the men. And although the crew of CPO Lysikov was made up of less experienced specialists than the crew of PO 1st Class Tazhbayev, this difference was obliterated literally before your eyes. And in certain regards, this crew already had the advantage.

Although it is an advantage that the developing of actions to the point of being automatic (this, of course, is perfectly essential), this should not lead to a similar automatic quality of thinking and response (this is completely undesirable). At one of the exercises they were working on a non-standard problem. As a rule, the crews were accustomed to the main thing of increasing the rate of fire, and the higher it was the better. This is correct in many but not all situations of combat. At times a slow rate of fire can be needed. And in the course of working on precisely such "slow" firing, there was the premature sounding of the siren caused by accidental factors.

Indicative was the difference in the actions of the crews. The crew of PO 1st Class Tazhbayev, as they say, responded under automatic conditions. The signal sounded and now there would be a salvo. The crew of CPO Lysikov naturally could not help but respond to the siren. However, the prematureness of the signal alerted Lysikov and he contacted the battery commander. The prompt report from the gun turret drew the attention of the group command post to the failure in the firing circuit and prevented an error in the actions of the crews.

Well, the example of the actions which were demonstrated today by the subordinates of PO 1st Class Tazhbayev does not provide reason to feel that the petty officer has been able to change himself and to shape a new approach to training the personnel. The training is over. After the corresponding analysis of the actions of each crew, the sailors were dismissed, but the battery commander asked PO 1st Class Tazhbayev to remain. He did not understand what criticisms there could be when the norm had been fulfilled with an excellent evaluation.

"But your vertical gunner has not achieved smooth actions. But Sn Anfilogov could but he does not feel it necessary to contribute to preciseness and speed in the work."

"How many times have I said that," said the petty officer in justification. "But it does no good!"

PO 1st Class Tazhbayev also left, but Sr Lt Komarov was not in the happiest spirit, although both crews had kept within the norm. The officer reflected why his words had not reached Tazhbayev and Tazhbayev's words had not reached Anfilogov. As yet there was no answer. But the officer was aware that it would be difficult to go farther in combat training and to struggle for fulfilling the obligations of the summer period without the active and able aid of the petty officers. Hence the answer should and would be found.

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FIRST AIRBORNE JUMP EXPERIENCE DESCRIBED

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Jun 78 p 1

[Article by Guards Sr Lt A. Oleynik: "The Testing"]

[Text] The weather was excellent. The jump leader looked assessingly at the sky and said into the microphone:

"Put on parachutes!"

And the airfield came to life. Commands were heard, brief orders from the commanders. The aircraft engines revved up. The officer of the airborne service Maj Ye. Maksimenko again and again inspected the reliability of the parachutes and looked carefully into the faces of the men. Because, as the paratroopers were preparing to encounter the blue heights, the officer endeavored to determine their mood. His pedagogical intuition was almost unflinching. And this is not surprising. Yevgeniy Yefimovich [Maksimenko] began service in the airborne troops as a soldier, and had passed through many levels of command maturity. The white canopy had opened over his head more than 500 times, and now, after 15 years, he still remembered how he approached the hatch for the first time. He felt queasy, his legs did not obey and everything was swimming before his eyes.... But he merely had to take three steps to reach the hatch and jump. And Maksimenko did this. He closed his eyes tight and stepped out. He thought that now something terrible would happen to him but nothing of the sort occurred. The wind struck him in the face and then he was hanging on the suspension lines. And all his fears remained back there in the aircraft....

Having put on their full packs, the soldiers awkwardly, like bears shuffling in their airborne garb went out to the starting lines for inspecting the parachutes. One could only guess what was occurring in the heart of each man if the instant was so close when he must step out into the blue.

Pvt Nikolay Vladyga shifted nervously back and forth on his feet. While a majority of the young soldiers had made jumps before induction in the DOSAAF clubs, for Nikolay this was his first time. He had confessed to Maj Maksimenko that he was most afraid of making a "web," what the paratroopers say

when the paratrooper holds on to the edge of the hatch with his hands and feet and no force is capable of forcing him out. The company commander, Sr Lt A. Abdulayev went up to the young soldier. Having inspected his gear and having straightened the hanging straps of the suspension system, he said to Vladyga:

"The main thing is to precisely execute the commands of the jump officer. Don't hurry, do everything just as you learned on ground."

The other paratroopers Aleksandr Orlov, Vyacheslav Chasov, and Aleksandr Vishnyakov listened to the words of the experienced commander.... Probably only Pvt Chasov did not experience such excitement as his comrades. He had made an airborne jump three times when he studied in the parachute section of DOSAAF.

In looking during these final minutes at those who were to leave the airplane for the first time, Maj Maksimenko thought of what he could not help but think of before in each time leading the way into the skies for the new men. It is always difficult for a person to undergo his first major testing in life. For the young soldiers the testing of height was to be such a trial.

Jokes and friendly comments by seasoned soldiers now had the effect of a vital force on the new men, and lifted the psychological tension. The preparations were over and the parachutes had been inspected. The command was given amplified by the megaphone:

"Board the aircraft!"

One after the other the paratroopers disappeared into the dark openings of the Antonovs. A short run and the aircraft rapidly took to the skies.

...It was quiet in the cabin of the aircraft on which we were flying. The soldiers were seated close to one another, and from time to time they glanced out through the windows.

The jump officer Maj Ye. Maksimenko went down the rows of the paratroopers fastening the hooks of the static lines to the cable. He endeavored to encourage each man in placing his hand on their shoulder or smiling as if to say cheer up, comrades!

The young soldiers passed down a combat leaflet telling of the feat of their fellow countrywoman Pvt Prokopiya Kalushina during the years of the Great Patriotic War. It ended with the appeal to add to the glory of the men of the airborne infantry. In another leaflet put out by the agitator Sgt A. Makarov, there was a drawing of a paratrooper who upon the command "Jump," confused the doors and threw himself into the cockpit. The humorous drawing caused an outburst of laughter.

The aircraft suddenly banked. In turning, it swung around over a mountain plateau. An unfurled flag, the center of the landing area, was coming

closer and closer. The jump officer looked at the light panel. The soldiers also glanced periodically there, at the panel. "Get ready!" flashed the yellow light.

Sgt A. Makarov, the squad commander, was the first to take his place at the hatch. He was calm, his lips were pressed together and he was looking down, at the ground.

"Jump!" commanded Maj Maksimenko.

Makarov was followed by Pvts V. Chasov, A. Vishnyakov and A. Orlov. And Pvt Nikolay Valdyga also stepped out into the blue.

A current of air seized him and carried him off, and Nikolay could no longer hear the roar of the engines or the pop of the canopy over his head. The soldier's heart was filled with joy as he had jumped and not flinched! In swaying slightly on the lines, as if on a swing, Pvt Vladyga looked around. What blueness in the sky, and how clearly the sun was shining! And down below was the red, sun-baked plateau. And now everything seemed unusual and intriguing. It was easy when you had conquered yourself and had passed the testing of courage.

And tomorrow the paratroopers again were to jump....

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POSTSERVICE SCHOOL ADMISSION PROBLEM EXAMINED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Jun 78 p 4

[Article by V. Shil'ko, head of the preparatory department of the Bryansk Institute for Transport Machine Building, candidate of technical sciences and docent: "Concern for This Must Be Shown Earlier"]

[Text] Each year strong fellows with military bearing are admitted to the Bryansk Institute for Transport Machine Building. These are the students of the preparatory division, former servicemen. In 8 months of study almost all of them receive their student cards.

It is pleasing to note that a majority of the former soldiers and sergeants study well and partake in social life. For example, Aleksandr Gorokhov has been elected secretary of the Komsomol bureau of the preparatory division. N. Volkov, V. Ivanov, A. Musiyenko, A. Khokhlov, Yu. Korovkin, V. Kisenko and many other former soldiers are studying successfully.

The military men who have been discharged into the reserves have undergone good schooling in the Army and Navy. And we willingly admit them to the preparatory division. Unfortunately, this is not always possible. According to the current regulations in order to be admitted to the preparatory division the servicemen who have been discharged into the reserves should submit an authorization of the approved form signed by the unit commander.

If a soldier is discharged into the reserves and intends to be admitted to the preparatory division of the institute, he should be concerned ahead of time with this authorization. But far from everyone does this, and possibly they simply may not know that such an authorization is required. And thus an unforeseen obstacle arises on the path to the institute. Of course it is possible to request an authorization by writing a letter to the unit commander, but this is already excess trouble, particularly for those who have served in remote garrisons. And moreover (unfortunately, this is the case) not all the commanders promptly respond to these requests. Wouldn't it be better to be concerned with the authorization earlier?

LAX PARTY, POLITICAL WORK IN SIBERIAN MILITARY DISTRICT VIEWED

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Jun 78 p 2

[Article by Lt Col I. Belolapotkin, senior instructor of the aviation political department in the Red Banner Siberian Military District: "Why Are the Decisions Not Carried Out?"]

[Text] Some time ago a group of officers from our political department was working in the unit where Capt N. Tsurkan heads the party bureau. Along with the other questions, we were also interested in how the decisions of the party meetings were being carried out. The problem was that recently the influence of the communists on the efficiency and quality of the training process in the unit, on the organization and state of military discipline among the personnel had markedly weakened. An inspection affirmed that there were substantial flaws in the style of work of the party bureau. In particular, it was learned that many important decisions of the party meetings had remained "suspended in air." Why were they unfulfilled?

Initially Capt N. Tsurkan endeavored to explain this by the stipulation that the comrades who had been entrusted with carrying out the approved decisions had not shown the proper tenacity for industry. But when we delved more deeply into the essence of the matter with the secretary, it turned out that the question was much more complicated....

The party meetings themselves here had been prepared for without the broad participation of the communists, basically by the members of the party bureau, and in this instance it would be difficult to count on an interesting and fundamental discussion of even the most urgent questions. The draft decisions in a majority of instances were drawn up by the secretary himself and understandably it would be difficult for just one person to provide for everything, to ensure the necessary soundness of the decision, to set optimum dates of execution and determine the most competent executors. And, finally, the secretary also had assumed the organizing and control over the fulfillment of the decisions of meetings. But he was unable to check everything. All of this gave rise to an incorrect, flippant attitude on the part of certain communists in the party organization to fulfilling the decisions of the party meetings. The officers of the political department

and the secretary of the party bureau Capt N. Tsurkan himself had to apply a good deal of effort to rectify the situation.

Unfortunately, similar omissions in work were detected in a number of other party organizations. This was explained by the absence of experience in the young secretaries. In the course of the elections and reports, many young comrades had come to leadership in the party committees and bureaus. In considering this, we held a seminar with the secretaries, and in the course of this great attention was paid to the practice of generalizing the critical comments and proposals of the communists and to working on the carrying out of decisions, and so forth.

The necessary help on the spot was given to all the young secretaries.

The officers of the political department have actively disseminated the experience of the party bureau headed by Capt V. Kovalev. Here each decision of a meeting is a specific program for the work of the communists for the current period. Intensive training flights are to start, and the main efforts of the party organization are shifted to the high quality support of flying during the day and at night. The training facilities are improved with the communists receiving the mission of increasing the work of the rationalizers. Their personal initiative is encouraged in equipping the classrooms and trainers. Specific assignments are given. The communists precisely on the stipulated dates report on the fulfillment of the assignment either to the secretary himself or to a session of the party committee, and for the most important questions to the party meeting. This concreteness and professionalism is largely explained by the work style of the secretary himself. Capt V. Kovalev constantly seeks advice not only from the communists but also from the nonparty officers, warrant officers ["praporshchik"], sergeants and soldiers. The constant professional contact with the commander and close ties with the personnel help him in profoundly knowing the true state of affairs. The opinion of the collective is reflected in determining the agenda of the meeting and in elaborating the decisions. And most importantly, if a decision has been approved then it becomes a compulsory standard for all the communists. Here there are many forms of control over the fulfillment of the decisions. There are reports by the communists at sessions of the party bureau. There is information given at the party meetings on the course of fulfilling the planned measures. Finally there is the studying of the state of affairs on the spot. Often the party bureau assigns the control over the fulfillment of a decision approved by a meeting to the same group of comrades who prepared the given specific question for the meeting.

Seemingly nothing should prevent this style of work from being established everywhere. However, much is still impeded by inertia. As an example, recently it was discovered that in a number of party organizations at the Barnaul Higher Air Force Pilots School up to now they still had not eliminated shortcomings in the work with the young communists, although these shortcomings had been pointed out repeatedly, including at the last report-election meeting. Recently here this was again discussed at the meetings

and again analogous decisions were approved to eliminate the shortcomings.... Such examples and facts lead one to certain reflections.

First of all I would like to recall the words of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev given at the 25th CPSU Congress: "At times, after a certain decision has been unfulfilled and a second decision or even a third one has been taken on the very questions.... And involuntarily the question arises is not the new decision on the old subject a sort of concession or a sort of manifestation of liberalism? And as a result is not the exactingness reduced? An end must be put to such practices!"

Frequently in our practice the following is encountered. A decision has not been carried out on a certain question, and another one is approved. There must be a constant fight against such liberalism, without waiting for the next report-election campaign, when the question will arise as to which secretary has justified the confidence of the collective. It is essential to help the party organization secretary in creating a situation in the party collective whereby all the communists would show complete responsibility to carrying out the party decisions.

Recently our political department analyzed the practical work done with the party organization secretaries in a number of units. It must be said that there still are many shortcomings. And it was pointed out that in some places the practical training of the secretaries still has a formal nature and the positive experience in essence is not brought out.

Here is a characteristic example. At a seminar for the secretaries of the party organizations, one of the secretaries was instructed to describe his experience. In brief his speech came down to the following. The secret is simple. The party bureau provides constant control over the fulfillment of the decisions. One can scarcely see any specific experience behind this. However it is strange that no one present at the seminar pointed this out. Possibly because the comrades to some degree were accustomed to making empty phrases where serious analysis was required. This concerns us. For this reason as before the political department has the important task of instructing the secretaries of the primary party organizations in using concrete vital examples and facts from everyday practice and to arm them with effective procedures, manners and methods of work aimed at carrying out the taken decisions.

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YOUNG OFFICER DESCRIBES PROBLEMS WITH NCO PERSONNEL

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Jun 78 p 2

[Article by Sr Lt S. Perin: "The Sergeants--My Support"]

[Text] I have been in command of a battery for almost 18 months. When I took it over it was excellent, and since then it lost this high title. Only by the end of the winter training period of the present year did I succeed in restoring the lost positions. And now, in analyzing my commander practices and the state of affairs in the subunit, I have concluded that the overall success in combat training and service has depended largely upon the mood in the collective, and upon to what degree competitiveness and mutual help have been developed in it. In a word, upon troop comradeship which, as I have found out, does not come spontaneously. This is developed and assumes an active purposeful force only in the instance that the commander, in relying on the party and Komsomol aktiv, is able to create a healthy moral attitude in the collective.

Was I able to do this? Now it can be admitted that I was not able to completely. To put it figuratively, I had a very simplified notion of my service relationships along the vertical. The commander ordered and the subordinates carried out. The main thing was to act precisely according to the regulations. Certainly, in my dealings with subordinates I did not allow any deviations from the standards of the regulations. And at first everything went all right. But after a month or two, I began to notice that in carrying out one or another order, each man acted for himself. In truth there were examples of mutual aid, but they did not have a mass nature. There was also a certain separateness and dividing of the men into individual groups.

I was particularly struck by this after one Komsomol meeting. Jr Sgt M. Kuritsyn, in speaking at it, criticized certain Komsomol members in the battery for their passivity. Generally speaking the criticism was valid. And only in his polemical ardor did he lay it on a bit. After him Jr Sgt V. Borodin requested the floor. He also spoke about initiative, and advised Kuritsyn to reinforce his activity in words more often by deeds. At first glance everything was all right. But while in the words of Kuritsyn you could feel sincerity and concern, in those of Borodin there was rather a

mistrust in the challenge of a comrade as well as dislike for him. Generally the activity of Kuritsyn in Borodin's estimate had assumed a negative tint. And this judgment, judging from everything, was shared by other Komsomol members.

Precisely this put me on the alert. The problem was that Jr Sgt Kuritsyn stood out in his development and level of education. Prior to the army he had been a sailor on a fishing boat. And, in working for an active and vital position on the part of each Komsomol member in the battery, he was urging this not for the sake of an eloquent word. I had no doubt as to his sincerity.

But it turned out that in the battery many of the men perceived his activeness as external and feigned, and as a desire to stand out and be noted. Why did this happen? A detailed analysis showed that to some degree I had fostered the negative attitude toward Kuritsyn. At that time he had just arrived from the training subunit and worked very hard at his training and service. But the crew under Kuritsyn and he himself as yet had very meager successes.

At that time the subordinates of Jr Sgt Borodin had attained higher results. An outstanding specialist and a good comrade, he had great respect in the collective. But I failed to appreciate this, and only because Borodin rarely spoke at the meetings and conferences, and did not come to me with his thoughts, ideas and proposals.

Literally bewitched by Kuritsyn's activity, I praised only him, forgetting the successes of the other crews.

And thus it happened that I myself without wishing it, as they say, poured oil on the fire. In setting as the example the junior commander who showed initiative and tenacity but who had not yet won professional authority among his fellow servicemen, I thereby caused dissatisfaction in the experienced sergeants who had already done a good deal for the subunit.

Now I can perfectly see that at first I did not have sufficient pedagogical ability and tact in indoctrinating the sergeants. How did I work with them? In summoning them to me, I gave them an order. In making certain that the sergeant understood everything, I set the date by which I would check on the execution. I commended those who carried out the mission precisely on time. I reprimanded those who had any failings. But psychological niceties and sincere talks with the sergeants were beyond me. And I considered that our relationships should be determined by one thing, by the conscientious fulfillment of functional duties by each man.

The battalion commander, Lt Col S. Barabanov, repeatedly drew my attention to the excessive dryness and officialness, if it can be so said, to the emotional poverty of my relations with subordinates. He advised me to get closer to the men, and to better study their characters and the conduct of the men in the collective. Here particular attention was to be given to the sergeants, my immediate assistants.

I also heard much useful advice from the secretary of the battalion party organization, Maj M. Patskevich. The experienced communist officer helped me understand where I had been right and where I had erred.

The battalion commander and the secretary of the party organization were often present in the battery, and taught me the art of individual work with the men, and particularly with the sergeants. I read books on military pedagogics and psychology, I critically analyzed my practical work, and adopted the experience of our best commanders.

The first with whom I established trusting relations was Jr Sgt A. Akunevich. Previously he had responded painfully to my comments, but I rarely heard him out or I did not go into what he was saying, considering everything to be mere justifications. Now I changed my attitude toward him, and spoke with him in a different tone. Together we analyzed the state of affairs in the crew. I was convinced that he was a very industrious and conscientious man. And while not everything went well for him, the blame for this was to be put not on his personal lack of discipline, as I had assumed, but rather on his inability to organize his work. It turned out that when I spoke about Jr Sgt Akunevich at meetings, I had judged him narrowly, one-sidedly and therefore not always correctly. And the junior commanders in their hearts did not agree with me, because they knew Akunevich and his strong points and shortcomings better.

Having come to know each of the sergeants more closely, I learned that all of them were working for the common cause and if not all of them succeeded well it was merely because they still did not have enough experience or the ability to correctly organize the training and indoctrination of their subordinates. Myself and the officers of the battery taught them this constantly.

Over time I have come to feel that the sergeants could be entrusted with evermore responsible missions. Their initiative has risen in all matters and concerns which beset the subunit. For example, Jr Sgt Borodin made the proposal of let each sergeant train one or two of his subordinates and these at any moment could take over for their commander. His initiative was widely supported.

Thus good comradely relationships began to be gradually established between the sergeants. And now I am certain what a great impact this has had on the solidarity of the entire battalion collective and upon strengthening a healthy moral atmosphere.

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STRICTER CONTROL OF FULFILLMENT OF SOCIALIST PLEDGES URGED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Jun 78 p 2

[Article by Col V. Nagornyy, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent with the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "Bitter Lessons"]

[Text] The socialist pledges which have been set by the personnel of motorized rifle regiment X for the winter training period were high, but realistic and feasible. They were based upon the level achieved in the unit for military and political training. One battalion and several companies intended to become outstanding. However, certain of the subunits and the regiment as a whole did not meet the pledges. Why did this occur? What is being done in the summer training period to rectify the situation?

Here is what our correspondent who was recently visiting the regiment has to tell.

This was at the finish of the winter training period. During a tactical exercise which in essence summed up the results of the winter training period, the motorized rifle battalion under the command of Capt A. Lyashenko acted without coordination and unskillfully. Particularly disappointing was the poor skills of the men in the company under the command of Sr Lt A. Aleynikov. This involuntarily caused surprise as according to the entries in the log for accounting for the combat training of the company, all the planned exercise subjects in tactics without exception had been worked out with at least a grade of good, and the coverage of the personnel was 96 percent. What can explain the flaws in the training of the subunit? Let us begin by analyzing the entries in the log and compare them with other documents, and here an unpleasant picture unfolds itself.

At one time the platoon commanded by Lt N. Astanin was on patrol. Astanin himself was the chief of the patrol. At the same time, the log for accounting for combat training stated that on precisely that day the platoon was to work in field exercises on the subject "A Platoon on the Offensive."

And the motorized rifle troops were to be "led" in the attack by no one other than Lt Astanin.

Moreover, on one of the winter days, the company went out for a tactical exercise. The exercise was under the leadership of the battalion commander, Capt A. Lyashenko. At the very peak of combat, he received from regimental headquarters the command to break off the exercise and "shift" the company to carrying out a mission which had no relationship to combat training.

Certainly, military service does not exclude definite changes in planning which are dictated by circumstances. Unfortunately such "shiftings" of the subunits during the winter period happened rather frequently. In such a situation, seemingly, there should be all the more scrupulous consideration of those who missed the exercises in order to have a true picture of the training level of each man. Alas, this was not done here. Sr Lt Aleynikov drew up the exercise schedules and for the sake of form entered notes on their complete fulfillment.

The list of facts similar to the ones given could be continued. Interruptions in exercises and delays caused by excesses in planning and violations of the procedure for using training facilities frequently beset the motorized rifle company under the command of Sr Lt O. Kozhanazarov.

The battalion under the command of Capt V. Doron'kin also showed poor results in the final inspection. The battalion commander with regret stated that he had been "let down" by the company under the command of Capt A. Leont'yev. "I was hoping strongly on it and it earned a three." Many gunners merited only satisfactory grades.

The second battalion under the command of Maj V. Puchinin had assumed the pledge of becoming outstanding. The battalion did not win outstanding evaluations for any one of the basic disciplines. We feel that the unit command did not give sufficient attention to it. Here nothing was done, for example, so that under the instructions of the regiment commander his deputies and the chiefs of the services conducted inspection exercises in the battalion and comprehensively tested the state of affairs. The regiment party committee also did not delve deeply into the state of affairs in the battalion.

And now summer training has started. How are the existing opportunities being used in order to rectify the previous mistakes and make up for lost time? I recently again traveled to the regiment to study these questions.

On that day, upon the schedule in all the subunits the first hour of exercises was to be drilling. The battalions were formed up on a sun-bathed drilling field. But when the time occurred to start the exercises, the officers from the regimental staff began...to inspect the outlines of all the leaders. This procedure lasted 50 minutes. How could there be any question of a desire of the personnel to struggle for an outstanding result of the exercise after this?

Along with the chief of the regimental staff after the actually interrupted drilling exercises I went to visit the subunits. In the company under the command of Sr Lt A. Aleynikov according to the schedule there was to be technical training. The subject of the exercise was "The Training of An Infantry Combat Vehicle in Crossing a Water Obstacle." As was stated in the schedule this should have been conducted by the company commander and Lts I. Seliverstov and N. Astanin and WO ["praporshchik"] V. Terekhov. However Sr Lt A. Aleynikov, Lt N. Astanin and WO V. Terekhov were on daily detail. Lt I. Seliverstov assembled the personnel in the Lenin room and proposed to prepare for the forthcoming political exercises. Capt I. Makarov who was standing in for the battalion commander had known the day before of the situation which was developing in the company. However, he approved the company schedule of exercises without making any changes in it.

The commander of the adjacent company, Sr Lt O. Kozhanazarov was on his regular leave. Sr Lt Ye. Yermolin who was standing in for the commander intended to conduct exercises in technical training without having prepared for this and without even having drawn up an outline. The sergeants were also completely unprepared to conduct the exercises. And all of this occurred in a company which recently was an outstanding one and set the example for others.

Unfortunately, instances of the irrational wasting of training time or to put it more precisely the squandering of it also occurred in the other subunits of the regiment.

The battalion under the command of Maj V. Puchinin, as already stated, during the winter training period assumed the pledge of becoming outstanding, but did not fulfill it. The bitter lesson, unfortunately, was not taken to heart. And here on the very day there was a lack of organization in the training process. As it turned out, in the subunit they had not even drawn up schedules of exercises for the current week.

It is difficult to estimate how many hours of training time which is rightly called precious were lost on that day in the regiment. This figure would grow significantly if one considers that many of the exercises were conducted with low efficiency. What sort of effectiveness and quality in training or what sort of competition in the firing compound can there be, for example, if there are malfunctioning trainers and the working ones constantly break down. As strange as it seems, all these instances in the regiment were not fundamentally judged.

One cannot help but be alarmed by the fact that without having fulfilled the pledges in the winter training period, the motorized rifle troops "revised" them in the direction of a clear reduction. Thus, in the first battalion not a single company or platoon is fighting for the right to be called outstanding! And the second battalion did not assume the pledge of becoming outstanding, yet several months ago it was intending to reach this. Thus, here they have followed the line of least resistance.

It is quite apparent that the command and the party organization of the regiment have not drawn the proper conclusions from the lamentable lessons of the winter training period.

MERITS, SHORTCOMINGS IN MARXIST-LENINIST SCHOOLING DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Jun 78 p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Morozov of the Red Banner Far Eastern Military District: "In Order to Work Better"]

[Text] Each concern has its workdays and holidays. The holidays are particularly memorable and having resolved to write on a Marxism-Leninism university I would like at first to tell of the event which crowns the workdays of the training year all the more as it is pleasant to speak of this. The examinations are over. They have shown that the instructors of the Marxism-Leninism university headed by Maj A. Moroz have worked well. The students have responded warmly about their university. Both the political worker Maj R. Mingazeyev, the deputy subunit commander Capt N. Sivunov and Capt Tech Serv V. Shalayev, as well as many others, have noted that during the period of instruction their knowledge has been significantly broadened and deepened, and this is of great help in their practical work. With rare exception the comrades studying in the university serve in an exemplary manner.

In summing up the results, it is pleasant to speak not only of the final result. Something else is important, namely what the path was to the positive result, what contributed to the successful course of affairs and, possibly, what impeded this, and to what degree the people were able to see and resolve the key questions. In a word, what was instructive here?

After the approval of the Decree "On the Tasks of Party Training in Light of the Decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress" by the party Central Committee, in the university headed by Maj A. Moroz a great deal was done to improve the ideological-theoretical, procedural and organizational level of the exercises.

First of all I would like to point out that here, as they say, the focus was on work in the area of recruiting the faculty. "In any school the most important thing is the ideological and political direction of the lectures," wrote V. I. Lenin. "How is this direction determined? Completely and exclusively by the composition of the lecturers." This Leninist thesis has become a starting point and the main element in the struggle for the quality

and effectiveness of the training process. Involved in the teaching are officers who love propaganda work, who have mastered the profound knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory and who have undergone schooling in party-political and propaganda activities in the troops.

Of course, we would like that everyone who takes the university speaker's rostrum would be interesting people, talented and who know how to capture an audience, to give a lecture clearly and effectively, or to hold a seminar in an interesting manner. I would not state that all the officers who come to the university immediately acquire such qualities. Also invited are those who as yet are merely showing promise for such qualities. It is important to help a person grow. For example, we were not deceived in Maj V. Bronza. Over a comparatively short period of time he became a good instructor. One of the indicators of the interest in his subject and the authority of the instructor himself is the activity of the students in the exercises. The lectures given by Maj V. Bronza always captivate the men. And here there is no secret as in selecting the material for the lecture he endeavors to thoroughly elaborate the subject and takes concern that it reaches the students in a popular manner. And in seminars Maj V. Bronza creates an atmosphere of a lively exchange of opinions and at times heated polemics. He knows how to win over an audience. He has good diction and intonation and is tactful and resourceful. And most importantly, he puts his whole heart into his job.

The political department also is doing a great deal to raise the procedural and pedagogical skills of the instructors and those involved in holding exercises in the university. Assemblies, conferences and colloquiums are held with them, and the experience of the best propagandists is generalized and disseminated. For example, when the young instructor Maj V. Movchan arrived, the officers of the political department V. Dushin and Ya. Rybak explained to him the particular features of work in the Marxism-Leninism university, they helped him work out the training plans, and attended his first exercises. Gradually Maj Movchan became a good instructor. The scientific-procedural council also played an important role in his pedagogical development.

The Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the State and Measures to Improve Lecture Propaganda" emphasizes the necessity of raising the responsibility of the scientific-procedural councils for the content and subject of lecture propaganda. No lecture in the university headed by Maj A. Moroz was given without a discussion of it by the scientific-procedural council. The members of it included the head of the university, one of the most experienced instructors, the secretary of the party commission, and the leaders of the political bodies sending the officers and warrant officers ["praporshchik"] for studies. Only after approval of the lecture did the instructor give it to the students.

Such a procedure makes it possible to ensure a high ideological and political level for the lectures. But still this procedure does not guarantee

high effectiveness of the exercises. Certainly the council members discuss only the content of the lectures and do not consider the skills of those who will give it. It is no secret that a lecture, even a good one, but read dully and boringly does not captivate the students. And obviously the fact that only the text of the lecture is discussed must be considered a shortcoming. Why, for example, not check the preparation of the propagandist for the exercises on the given subject at the same time? The council must work out a procedure for such an integrated evaluation of the lecture's quality. This is an important reserve for raising the effectiveness of labor by the instructors.

In the university the reciprocal visiting of exercises by the instructors has become the rule. From the outside, as is known, one can clearly see the shortcomings and successful features in the work of a colleague. A frank discussion of the quality of the exercises helps create an atmosphere of strict reciprocal exactingness. Having attended the lectures of Sr Lt V. Pronin, Maj V. Movchan noted that he was giving obsolete examples. It was felt that the senior lieutenant was getting by with old knowledge. The practices of the instructor became the subject of a fundamental conversation at a session of the scientific-procedural council. Sr Lt Pronin considered its advice and recommendations.

Unfortunately, this cannot be said of Maj A. Ivanov. He disregarded the requests and comments of his colleagues and the scientific-procedural council, and he continued to use material which did not meet the requirements of the times. The instructor was removed from the exercises.

In speaking of the experience of the university, I would like to point out the following aspect. The students long remembered the lecture given by Doctor of Legal Sciences A. Suvorov. It dealt with the legal aspects of the new USSR Constitution. It was very beneficial. In the first place, the lecture deepened the knowledge of the students concerning the new Basic Law. Secondly, it provided a profound legal basis for the rights and duties of the citizens of our nation. Finally, the lecture enriched the students with valuable procedural experience which later became irreplaceable in work in the area of explaining the new USSR Constitution among the men. The lecture was very memorable to everyone. It forced us to reflect again about the following. As is known, a specialist in one area is a scientist or an instructor who for years gives the same course and conducts an exercise on his "own" subject more effectively than, for example, a universal lecturer. Consequently, it is essential to organize more frequent meetings between scientists and specialists with the military audience. The university has opportunities to involve in the exercises scientific workers and experienced instructors from civilian VUZes, but uses these opportunities far from completely.

I would also like to say that definite difficulties have also been created in the work of the Marxism-Leninism university, often nullifying the efforts of the faculty. It is a question of the attendance of the exercises. I

would not err if I said that on this level the leaders of many universities can complain of their students. And the university which I am presently describing is no exception. And most frequently not the students are to blame but rather their commanders. They send the men on missions or on details, without considering the calendar plan of exercises in the university. More often than others the subordinates of officers V. Razenko and V. Sayenko missed the exercises for such reasons. Already an appeal has been made repeatedly to these officers to take measures to ensure the normal studies of the students. Unfortunately, these communist leaders still have not shown a proper understanding of all the importance of the question.

The training year is over. But it can be said that the training year is not completely behind us. We must still carefully analyze both the positive experience and the shortcomings of the past training period. It is essential to analyze and take everything valuable from the acquired experience in order to work even better.

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CSO: 1801

CASES OF UNAUTHORIZED USE OF EQUIPMENT, MANPOWER REVEALED

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Jun 78 p 4

[Article by Col A. Drovosekov: "The Tugging of Conscience"]

[Text] On a sunny Saturday, Sr Lt Petr Dmitriyevich Zharonin suddenly felt a great need to communicate with nature. In giving way to this urging, he got in a vehicle and drove out to his summer house. Having breathed the aroma of grass and having listened to the birds singing, Petr Dmitriyevich headed back. But then the theory of troubles began to work flawlessly. According to this theory of two equally possible events, the less favorable one will occur. In crossing a ford of a water obstacle, the vehicle was stuck in a pit, probably the only one along the entire length of the river. And precisely at that moment the locks were opened above. Water poured into the vehicle.

Petr Dmitriyevich set off to the nearest kolkhoz for a tractor. However the vehicle had become so stuck that the tractor was of no help. He had to make his way back to the regiment from where Zharonin returned with two truck cranes. After a little more than 30 minutes the vehicle had been pulled out of the stream, but the crane was not stuck. The second one was sent to its aid, but it also was stuck.

After having to spend the night, Zharonin again returned to the regiment from whence he arrived in a large-capacity vehicle. The cranes were pulled out. Zharonin drove through the gates of his home regiment heading a column of four vehicles.

The communing of Petr Dmitriyevich with nature had lasted almost 24 hours, although he had not received leave for this. While one can certainly sympathize with him, but instead of mild and tender words of sympathy there were harsh and prickly words of criticism needed. Because Petr Dmitriyevich had driven out to the summer house not in his own vehicle but rather in a unit truck. And he took it without authorization, and drove off without informing anyone. And he took the cranes from the motor pool equally without authorization.

Why was this possible? Because Sr Lt Zharonin at that time was carrying out the duties of the chief of the motor service. He told the motor pool duty officer Sr Lt A. Arutyunov to open the gate for the cranes, and the latter had done this. It must be assumed out of kindness. Because the duty of the motor pool officer obliged Arutyunov to say no to Zharonin.

Zharonin had shown an irresistible attraction for his beloved summer house before. As an example, he had been assigned as the duty inspector of the VAI [Military Motor Vehicle Inspectorate], and instead of being on the highways drove off to the summer house. And in the case when he had been issued a truck for service business, he had also turned it to the summer house. He had transported various building materials. At no time was he bothered by his conscience.

Incidentally, when a person's conscience is touched by corrosion, such thoughts do not come to him. He feels that no harm is done....

The chief of the construction-installation section, Engr-Capt Oleg Serafimovich Ivanov, was given an important assignment at one of the projects. However, Oleg Serafimovich for 2 months periodically moved to another project. In his view this was a more important one. He was concerned with building a garage. More precisely, six garages under a single roof and under the overall leadership of Engr Lt Col Valentin L'vovich Rabinovich. Why six? Because, in addition to Ivanov and Rabinovich, there were four other builders who reached an agreement with Oleg Serafimovich and Valentin L'vovich to assume the function of the general contractor.

Two brigades of military construction workers were assigned periodically for building the garages. Direct leadership over construction was provided by the work superintendents Engr-Capt N. Chernikov and Soviet Army employee A. Loginov. Materials were supplied from the construction section. Equipment was also taken from there. Engr-Capt Ivanov did not lack for anything.

"Correct, I sent men to build the garages," admitted Oleg Serafimovich. "And I did allocate materials. And why? I did not want the men to sit idle waiting until the concrete or mortar was delivered to the site...."

As you can see, a very convincing explanation. One would not argue but rather thank Comrade Ivanov for his touching concern for supplying the work front. It is merely a shame that one detail stands in the way. The work at the site was excessive. If anything was not lacking it was working hands.

And here we must say that the chief engineer of the military construction organization was constantly at the site and he had been entrusted with the duty of aiding Ivanov and supervising him. In order, hence, that everything go according to schedule and be in order and safe. However, the inspector for almost 2 months shifted his attention...to accelerating the construction of the mentioned garages because the inspector of this was no other than Engr Lt Col V. Rabinovich. And one must give due to his effort as the garages were of superior quality.

However now this is no pleasure for Rabinovich and Ivanov. They must now answer for all that they have done. Both have been expelled from the party. And they had to pay for the garages out of their own pocket.

And here also we should recall the work superintendents Chernikov and Loginov. They are both communists. They were well aware that Rabinovich and Ivanov were abusing their official position but both were silent. And this silence was nothing more than the corroding of conscience.

Of course, it is possible to drive out to a summer house and build garages. Only this must be done in a legal manner. But with those who in the drive for property follow the path of abuse of position and those who deviate from our moral standards and our laws, the conversation should be abrupt and principled.

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CRITICISM FOR LAX TRAINING OF LAGGING SOLDIERS VOICED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Jun 78 p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Seledkin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Laggards... Out of Sight"]

[Text] The radar operators of the subunit under the command of Capt V. Zimakov carried out a regular training session with a high evaluation. The specialists skillfully detected the air targets moving under the cover of various interference, and without delay gave precise data on the "enemy."

We began our talk with Capt V. Zimakov with an analysis of this training session. He noted with satisfaction the tenacity and industry of many specialists in carrying out the set mission. "The socialist pledges assumed for the summer period of combat training will be fulfilled," stated the subunit commander with confidence. And the pledges for the radar troops are weighty ones: to maintain the title of outstanding subunit, and to add to the ranks of the high-class specialists. Is the collective up to this task? Yes. The winter military training period was completed by the radar troops with outstanding indicators, and they held one of the first places in the socialist competition among the unit subunits. Capt Zimakov mentioned with pride the names of the best soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers ["praporshchik"], and officers.

But are there no laggards in the subunit? The commander was in no hurry to reply. Obviously he was mentally assessing the skills of each subordinate. Then he commented: "We do have laggards. For example, Pvt A. Voloshin."

"His discipline leaves much to be desired," continued the captain sadly. "Quite recently he received a strict reprimand...."

Shortcomings in conduct and in observing the regulations had prevented Pvt Voloshin from achieving high successes in training and in service as well as in the competition. But why were other men lagging behind? For example, the radar operator Pvt S. Meshcheryakov.

"He is lost when he works at the screen in a difficult situation," said the subunit commander. "He may confuse the targets, he is late with a report and gives inaccurate data."

Involuntarily we thought that in a leading subunit extensive work would be carried out with these men in order to help them escape from their shortcomings in training, service and conduct, and to bring them up to the level of the leaders in the competition. How could the outstanding men in training allow laggards next to them? However it turned out that Pvt Meshcheryakov was not receiving the necessary help from the more experienced specialists. And then we sought out Pvt Voloshin...in building housing. It turned out that for several weeks the soldier had been completely taken off military training. How did Capt Zimakov view such a situation?

"Let him work at the construction site," he commented calmly. "It will be better for our subunit."

Unfortunately, such instances are not isolated. Recently I became acquainted with the organization of the competition in the leading company under the command of Sr Lt I. Bobyr'. A predominant majority of the specialists from the first days of the summer military training set a firm pace in the struggle for achieving high indicators. But individual operators still lag behind their comrades in training. For example, Pvt V. Malafeyev has poor indicators in his specialty and in technical training. I was interested how he was overcoming his lag and which of the outstanding men were helping him in training.

"Pvt Malafeyev is not presently in exercises," said the senior lieutenant with embarrassment. "He is temporarily working in the mess. This is good both for the collective and for the soldier."

And what happens? The soldiers who need the greatest attention and concern both from the commanders and from their comrades end up in the role of assistants on a pig farm or at a construction site. Understandably they fall even further behind their fellow servicemen who during this time learn something new in the exercises, who constantly are honing their military skills and are learning to confidently operate the complex modern equipment.

No matter how strange it may seem, the commanders of the subunits endeavor to justify such a solution to the question of laggards by proving that this has been dictated by the interests of the collective. And no matter what face-saving phrases are thought up, the load in military work which should be carried by Voloshin and Malafeyev now falls on the shoulders of their fellow servicemen. Naturally their service occupations rise. Under such conditions the specialists have less time for independent work. And this tells in the overall indicators in training and the competition. During one of the last inspection exercises the radar operators of the subunit under the command of Capt Zimakov carried out the set mission below their capabilities. Let us add to this that during a crucial moment the operator Pvt Meshcheryakov became confused and mistook the targets.

Here is the great price which must be paid for the lack of attention to the laggards and for the poor concern for increasing their military skills!

IMPROPER CONDUCT, RELATIONS AMONG OFFICERS DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jun 78 p 2

[Article by Maj G. Miranovich, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "In Revenge for Exactingness"]

[Text] In the division political department, having learned that a correspondent was coming out on a letter, for some reason they immediately decided that this was because of Capt Sermak. A similar proposal was made in the regimental staff. But the letter had been written by another officer.

Our first meeting with him was 2 years before during the North Exercises. The battalion under the command of Capt I. Deryugin was in the vanguard and successfully was carrying out its missions. During all the stages of the exercise the battalion commander proved to be a decisive and strong-willed man as everyone described him who happened to talk with him during those days.

And then a letter from a new place of service where Capt Deryugin had gone shortly after the exercises: "I would be very grateful for help and assistance to me in analyzing...."

By the time of my arrival in the regiment, a decision on the personal file of communist Deryugin had already been taken. In conducting an investigation of the critical signals which had been received from the battalion which he commanded, the unit party bureau headed by Maj V. Naumov had established that during an inspection of gunnery training of one of the companies, Capt Deryugin had actually endeavored to mislead a representative of the superior staff. The drivers should have been firing. But the battalion commander, doubting their skills, had decided not to risk this and replaced them by squad commanders. Only at the last minute, due to the intervention by an officer from the superior staff, did they succeed in preventing an attempt at deceit. And Capt Deryugin also had failings in his personal conduct. Capt V. Sermak informed the party bureau of the instance in firing and of the "failing" on the personal level.

The minutes and other documents from the sessions of the various party levels where they had examined the personal file showed that Deryugin was profoundly

aware of his blame, and had made a clean breast of the case and gave his word to do everything to recover his good name. In the opinion of the command and the members of the party bureau, he was keeping his word. Here are the lines from the service recommendation: "Recently Capt Deryugin has followed a path of rectifying the designated shortcomings." At a meeting of the communists from the regimental headquarters he had been described as a person who knew his job well and who had dedicated a great deal of energy and strength to service; here they had discussed the questions related to summing up the results of the winter training period and the fulfillment of the socialist pledges.

And here also they spoke about Capt Sermak. They noted that he was not very industrious or self-critical. In essence this had become the main reason for the cooling in his relations with the battalion commander. Having arrived in the battalion in the position of commander of the first motorized rifle company, Capt Sermak did not establish himself by deeds and concern for the collective. Having felt the exactingness of the commander, Capt Sermak responded to this in his own way. Instead of eliminating shortcomings he began to compile his own dossier on him.

As one can imagine it was strange to hear this about a company commander. Initially I thought that here something was wrong. My doubts were dispersed by Capt Sermak himself.

"Yes, I in fact followed the battalion commander," he said. "Why? In order when necessary to report as one should...."

Of course, he knew that shortcomings should be combated by other methods. But it would be best to take to eliminating them himself. But he was guided by the "principal" that for the injured every means is good when it is a question of settling scores with the guilty party. Yes, Capt Sermak for some reason considered himself an injured party, although he had no grounds for this.

And as for shortcomings, as it turned out, he had more of them than any other officer in the battalion. First of all he lacked the main thing, a desire to work at full strength. And from this stemmed his poor educational and technical training. Incidentally, precisely in the first motorized rifle company had occurred that lamentable case in firing which in the documents of the personal file was classified as an "attempt at deceit" and for which Capt Deryugin had received a party reprimand.

After that much publicized instance, their relationships were even further complicated. Capt Sermak saw that his critical comment had brought a number of problems for the battalion commander. In living through what had happened, Capt Deryugin for some time even relaxed his exactingness. Having felt this, Capt Sermak completely ceased responding to comments from the battalion commander and completely let things go. Capt Deryugin was forced to disciplinary measures. But this did not eliminate the shortcomings in the work of the company commander.

It is rightly said that exactingness is a trait of a commander. And at times we give no thought to what a profound sense resides in these words or what stands behind them. And certainly this means a great deal when the requirement of being exacting upon oneself and others becomes a vital principal of the officer and a trait in his character. It is a matter of honor for each officer to instill this remarkable command quality in himself.

It is not easy to be exacting. Sometimes the commander is involved with subordinates who have not learned exactingness and in every manifestation of it see certain personal factors as if to be or not to be exacting was a personal question for a commander.

Capt Sermak viewed exactingness with difficulty. Inner resourcefulness, the readiness and ability to carry out the orders of a commander precisely and promptly, honesty and justice--all these were qualities which Capt Sermak had, as they say, a great deal to do in learning. In a recommendation drawn up at the officer's previous place of service, it was stated that in his conduct "there were instances of altercation with superiors and an incorrect response to criticism and comments." And he also had a strict party reprimand. Naturally it was important to the battalion commander and the other chiefs how the man behaved at a new post, and what conclusions he had drawn from previous errors. But Capt Sermak, as is already known, was in no way in a hurry to correct his shortcomings.

And here Capt Deryugin had to show all the exactingness and tenacity inherent to him and employ all his experience as a commander in order with the help of the battalion party organization to force the company commander to carry out his duties as stipulated. But suddenly his firmness betrayed him. The impression was created that he could not stand up, as one of the battalion officers said, to the impudence and brazenness of Sermak. In continuing to keep the "dossier" on Capt Deryugin, Sermak at the same time began to accuse him of suppressing criticism. As the battalion chief of staff Maj Ya. Mkhitaryan pointed out, the only thing he did was write reports.

Need one say how important it was to promptly provide a fundamental evaluation of Sermak's actions and to proclaim his unworthy stand. But here the regimental command and the party organization were slow in picking up on this. And perhaps because in his numerous reports actual shortcomings were also mentioned. But it was essential to figure out where was the truth and where was the slander. Incidentally, a majority of Sermak's "critical comments" was not affirmed. It was also essential to understand what motives had guided the author of the "comments." And these motives were in no way principled. Sermak merely carefully noted the shortcomings but principledness is inconceivable without active work to eliminate these.

Although with a delay, ultimately the actions of Capt Sermak were sharply condemned by the members of the party bureau and all the battalion officers. And he seemingly realized that he had been unjust to persons who wished him well.

The members of the party bureau also drew lessons from this story. One of them is that people must be studied better. Capt Sermak suddenly appeared before them in a new, unpleasant light. All of a sudden.... At the same time the party recommendation concerning communist Sermak written in the unit where he had served previously stated: "He lacks tact in dealings with superiors and subordinates." Of course, because of previous mistakes it would be wrong to be prejudiced against a person. But certainly it would not have harmed things to take a closer look.

And, of course, there was also something for Capt Deryugin to reflect on. Exactingness is his strong trait as was pointed out at a session of the party bureau. But exactingness for subordinates is inconceivable without the highest exactingness upon oneself always and in all matters, and without consistent principledness. Deryugin, in many regards being an example for fellow servicemen, at times had shown instability and permitted himself what he condemned in others. And this inevitably leaves a trace. We believe that he will draw the correct conclusions from this story. And we will still hear of his good deeds as was the case in the North Exercises.

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CSO: 1801

GENERAL YEPISHEV DISCUSSES PARTY-POLITICAL WORK

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 7, Jul 78 pp 2-5

[Article by A. Yepishev, General of the Army and Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy]

[Text]

Alexei Alexeyevich Yepishev has been a member of the CPSU since 1929 and has been serving in the Soviet Army since 1930. He graduated from the Military Academy of Mechanisation and Motorisation of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army [now the Armoured Troops Academy]. As a member of the Military Council of the 40th and 38th armies he took an active part in the battles against the nazi invaders. After the war he occupied important Party and government posts. Since May 1962 he has been the Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy.

The decisive source of the might of the Soviet Army and Navy consists in their development, training and education being directed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the leading force of Soviet society. The Party's organisational and ideological work ensures effective use of the country's material and spiritual potentialities for building up its defence capacity.

An important line in the multifaceted work of the Communist Party in effecting guidance of the Soviet Armed Forces is Party-political work in the forces. It comprises the ideologi-

cal and organisational Party work of the Military Councils, commanders, political bodies, Party organisations and Communists to implement the policy of the Leninist Party in the Army and Navy, to inculcate the ideas of Marxism-Leninism in the personnel and to mobilise the officers and men for raising the combat-readiness level of units and ships. Party-political work covers a wide range of questions bearing on combat training, execution of service duties, everyday life, the living conditions and leisure of the officers and men, their moral, political and psychological preparation for the conduct of modern warfare.

In the Soviet Armed Forces Party-political work is often referred to as a special type of weapon. This comparison is valid, because it reflects the specifics of the work carried out by the commanders, political bodies, Party and Young Communist League organisations in building up the morale of the army as a vital factor in securing victory in war.

Sound military success rests on two pillars, the material and the moral. The wars forced on the Soviet state by imperialism have conclusively demonstrated that the high morale and communist convictions of the officers and men play a decisive role in routing the aggressor.

In forming the Red Army V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party attached tremendous importance to the education of class conscious personnel boundlessly devoted to the cause of the socialist revolution. This has been the cardinal task of all Party-political work in the units and ships ever since the Soviet Armed Forces were founded. During the Civil War and foreign military intervention (1918-1920) the political bodies, Party organisations and individual Communists brought to the masses of Red Army men and Red Navy men the Party's word of truth, explained to them the just character of the war in defence of the Revolution, for the freedom and independence of the world's first socialist state of workers and peasants.

In the stern period of the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945) which Nazi Germany forced on the Soviet people, the political bodies and Party organisations of the Army and Navy inspired the men to rout the invaders. They consolidated in the minds of the personnel the socialist ideals and ethics, the sense of responsibility for the destinies of the Homeland and confidence in the victory of the just cause of defending the Socialist Homeland, educated them in the spirit of patriotism, internationalism and hatred for the enemy, and exposed the ideology of imperialism and its extreme expression — fascism.

An urgent task of Party-political work during the last war was work to raise the combat efficiency of the forces. The Military Councils, commanders, political bodies and Party organisations of the Army and Navy constantly centred their attention on such tasks as improving the combat skill of the personnel, strengthening their military discipline, enhancing their fighting spirit and many other ques-

tions bearing on improvement of combat efficiency.

L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, who took an active part in the last war, precisely and graphically revealed the essence of Party-political work in wartime. In his memoirs, entitled "Malaya Zemlya" (The Small Land) he wrote:

"...A sniper picked off ten Hitlerites — all hail that man; a company beat back an attack and stood its ground — all hail the company commander and his troops; a division broke through the enemy's defences and liberated a settlement — the division commander's name is cited in the commander-in-chief's order. But the contribution the political worker makes is equally great; it was he who armed the men ideologically, who planted the seeds of love for their country, who built up their self-confidence and inspired them to heroism.

"...And if we remember that the troops' fighting spirit was always the key to ensuring their tenacity, then it was the political worker who was entrusted with the most effective weapon during the war. It was he who steeled the soldiers' hearts and souls, and without that, nothing — neither tanks, nor guns, nor planes would have brought victory."

In formulating the tasks in building up the country's defence capacity today the Communist Party also pays serious attention to fortifying the spiritual potential of the Army, developing political consciousness in the men and instilling in them the readiness to carry out their sacred duty in defending their Homeland. Though the Soviet Armed Forces are characterised by a tremendous military-technical potential, this does not lessen the role man plays. On the contrary, this emphasises its importance to an even greater degree. The progress of automation, and the introduction of modern weaponry have only altered the character of military labour. They have made it more tense, requiring that every man should possess knowledge, energy, will power, discipline and initiative, and a profound sense of personal responsibility for the defence of socialist achievements.

The role of Party-political work in the Soviet Armed Forces is mounting. This is determined by a number of reasons both political and military-technical.

In the postwar period the balance of world forces has radically changed in favour of socialism. The further strengthening of the positions of the socialist countries, including the Soviet Union, in the economic, political and military spheres has played a decisive part in this. The positions of imperialism have been

weakened as a result of the collapse of the colonial system and the emergence of young independent states, the further aggravation of the general crisis of the capitalist system and the unfolding of class battles waged by the proletariat.

However, the nature of imperialism remains unchanged. Its aggressive essence continues to be a reality. In a number of capitalist countries there are forces that are unwilling to abandon the policy of military gambles in solving international problems. This is evidenced by the mounting military spending of the imperialist states and the arms race which is intensifying year by year.

Faced with the threat of war from the aggressive circles of the imperialist states the Soviet Union is compelled to improve its defences. Raising the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces and the level of readiness to defend the revolutionary achievements of the people has been and continues to be an objective need, an important condition for ensuring reliable defence of our country which is engaged in communist upbuilding and is keen on preserving peace on the earth.

The combat readiness of the Army and Navy is an alloy of their technical equipment, the fighting skill of their personnel, high morale, political and psychological steeling, physical fitness, organisation and preparedness of every Soviet serviceman to perform a feat of valour in the name of the Homeland. The people's tremendous efforts and material expenditures for the equipment of the Armed Forces, class consciousness, fighting skill and discipline of all servicemen and the command personnel's skill in troop control are all focussed on combat readiness.

The Military Councils, commanders, political bodies, Party organisations constantly bear in mind that today the weapons and other equipment must be brought into standby condition in a matter of minutes or even seconds. They are doing their utmost to get all the servicemen to realise the political implications of constant combat readiness and to use their skill and effort to maintain it at the required level. All the means of ideological and organisational work are concentrated on moulding class consciousness and high morale in the fighting men. Careful study of the materials of the 25th CPSU Congress, the works, reports and speeches of L. I. Brezhnev, General Sec-

retary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and of the Constitution of the USSR offers great opportunities in this respect. Such studies are conducted within the framework of the personnel's political education. The political study group leaders and propagandists profoundly expound the urgent problems of theory and Party policy, pay special attention to establishing the connections between the materials studied and the life of the country and the Armed Forces.

Party and state workers, advanced production workers, scientists and workers of culture take an active part in educational work with army personnel. Every year the ties between military units and ships, on the one hand, and the local Party and government bodies, the collectives of factories, collective farms and establishments, on the other, grow stronger. They are a manifestation of the unity of the Army and the people and of the popular character of the Soviet Armed Forces. The moulding of political consciousness, high morale and high combat qualities in a man is a complicated process which develops on many planes. However, the education of class conscious and courageous servicemen is assisted by Soviet reality, the character of the social and state system, the just and noble aims of defending the Socialist Homeland. The fact that the Soviet citizen is an active and ideologically convinced builder of communism, an ardent patriot and consistent internationalist also contributes to this process. Today the young men who come to serve in the forces are ideologically mature, well-educated and physically fit. Servicemen with higher or secondary education account for 80 per cent of the total strength of the Armed Forces. The units and ships continue the educational process that was begun in the family, school and work collective, ensuring the development in the young men filling the ranks of the Armed Forces of the essential combat qualities, the ability to make effective use of the weaponry and other combat equipment, to display staunchness in any situation and to maintain an unbending will for victory.

Today as never before the main effort of Party-political work is concentrated on improving the quality of combat training and political education of the forces. It is thereby borne in mind that modern warfare makes special demands on a man's spiritual strength and

psychological steeling. Exercises lasting many days, flights in supersonic aircraft, prolonged cruises in ships put the men's will power and

endurance to a "structural test" even in peacetime. In their work the commanders, political bodies and Party organisations pay special attention to increasing the Party influence on the personnel in difficult, rapidly developing conditions of the situation in the field, in the air and at sea. They take into account all the changes in the organisation and equipment of the units and ships. The experience of political work in Rocket Forces units, in newly-built ships and in units of air combat masters is of great value.

The Party organisations and their combat assistant—the YCL in the army—form the cementing force in the military collectives. The Communists and members of the YCL are reliable assistants of the commanders in work for enhancing combat readiness of subunits, units, ships, strengthening discipline and organisation. They are always in the vanguard in training and service duties. Most of them are among the foremost in combat training and political education.

Life constantly confirms the organic dependence of the level of combat readiness of units and ships on the level of organisation of the personnel and on the observance of the regulations. As radical changes have occurred in warfare, the Soviet Armed Forces have developed new concepts, such as "time discipline," "discipline of combat alert duty," "discipline of exemplary and competent employment of combat equipment," and "discipline of cooperation." These terms show that at the present level of development of the Army and Navy all servicemen without exception must act not only quickly, but also very competently and responsibly.

The commanders, political bodies, Party and YCL organisations constantly explain to the personnel the essence of Soviet military discipline, which is based on political consciousness of officers and men and the need for strict organisation and firm order for reliable defence of the Socialist Homeland. Support is given to exacting commanders, the men are taught to respect them and to be prepared to carry out their orders at any cost, even at

the cost of self-sacrifice. The experience acquired in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces has shown that one-man command is the most effective method of troop control. It ensures quick, centralised and reliable control of combat operations and victory in battle, and contributes also to achieving the required level of combat readiness in peacetime.

In the Soviet Armed Forces the high quality of combat training and the effectiveness of military education are largely determined by the ability of the commanders, political bodies and Party organisations to use socialist emulation as a powerful lever for raising the activity of the men in line of duty. The Army and Navy have established a good tradition in organising emulation in honour of outstanding dates in the life of the Leninist Party and the Soviet state. Nineteen seventy-eight being the year of the sixtieth anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces, the socialist emulation movement is conducted under the motto "Ensuring reliable defence of the Socialist Homeland, maintaining constant combat readiness, persistently mastering weaponry and other combat equipment, improving combat skill." In organising the emulation movement in units and ships special attention is paid to improving the efficiency of combat training and political education, to rational utilisation of study time, and to meticulous fulfilment of the combat training and political education plans.

Socialist emulation is an important means of education. The spirit of competition, comparable results and fair appraisal of achievements promote the establishment of a healthy moral atmosphere in military collectives.

For six decades the Soviet Armed Forces have been standing on guard over the security of the Socialist Homeland. Their combat record is distinguished by heroic victories. Each of these victories has been secured as a result of the wise leadership of the Communist Party in the development of the Armed Forces, thanks to the constant concern of the Party for improving the effectiveness of Party-political work as a powerful means of building up the combat might of the Army and Navy.

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MARSHAL KUTAKHOV ON AIR FORCE DEVELOPMENT

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW No 7, Jul 78 pp 11-14

[Article by P. Kutakhov, Chief Marshal of the Air Force, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, and Hero of the Soviet Union]

[Text]

The third Sunday in August is known in the USSR as Aviation Day. This traditional festive occasion has become a review of achievements of the national aviation and successes scored by flyers, ground personnel, scientists, designers and aircraft industry workers.

This year Aviation Day is celebrated in an atmosphere of tremendous political and labour enthusiasm evoked by the 60th Anniversary of the USSR Armed Forces. Our correspondent requested Chief Marshal of the Air Force P. S. Kutakhov, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Hero of the Soviet Union, to tell our readers about the origins and development of the Soviet Air Force. This is what he said.

When creating the Army and the Navy to defend the gains of the socialist revolution, the Communist Party and V. I. Lenin gave much attention to the development of aviation and the Air Force. The archives of the Council of Labour and Defence for 1918-1920 contain over 200 documents bearing on the development of aviation signed by Lenin.

The leadership of the Air Force build-up was effected by the People's Commissariat for the Army and Navy. On December 20, 1917, it instituted the All-Russian Air Force Board. It was at that time too that the first aircraft detachments were formed. By the spring of 1919 the Soviet Air Force included 61 and by December 1920, 83 aircraft detachments. A total of 350 Soviet aircraft were engaged simultaneously at the fronts during the Civil War. Flying personnel were trained at several flying schools. Late in 1918 the Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute was established. It became the centre of the development of Soviet aviation science and technology.

In the hard years of the Civil War and foreign military intervention the Red Army and its Air Force rose to defend the socialist gains. Military pilots showed skill and bravery in fighting the enemies of the young Soviet Republic. For courage, valour and heroism 219 of them were awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

Shortly after the Civil War the Soviet Union rehabilitated and partially enlarged its aircraft enterprises and organised the production of Soviet-designed airplanes. Implementation of

Lenin's plan for the country's industrialisation allowed a radical change in the image of the Soviet Air Force both in respect of combat equipment and personnel. Air Force units received splendid combat aircraft created by talented Soviet designers, engineers, technicians and aircraft industry workers.

Sons of workers and peasants and of working intelligentsia boundlessly devoted to their people, the Communist Party and their Homeland came to serve in the Air Force. The Ninth YCL Congress held in January 1931 adopted the decision to exercise patronage over the Air Force and the YCL sent thousands of young men and girls to join this fighting service.

In those years Soviet airmen performed a number of outstanding flights on first-rate Soviet-made aircraft. In March-April, 1934, the Ant-4, R-5 and other aircraft rescued from the ice-floes 104 ship-wrecked crew members from the steamship "Chelyuskin" which had been crushed by the ice and sunk in the Bering Straits. The seven airmen who took part in the operation were the first in the country to be honoured with the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. They were: A. Lyapidevsky, M. Vodopyanov, I. Doronin, N. Kamanin, S. Levanevsky, V. Molokov and M. Slepnyov. On June 18-20, 1937, an Ant-25 plane manned by pilots V. Chkalov and G. Baidukov and navigator A. Belyakov carried out a non-stop flight from Moscow to Vancouver (USA) via the North Pole, a distance of 8,504 km as the crow flies, in 63 hours, 16 minutes. On July 12-14 of the same year pilots M. Gromov and A. Yufashev and navigator S. Danilin flew the same type of aircraft non-stop from Moscow to San Jacinto (USA) via the North Pole, 10,148 km as the crow flies, in 62 hours, 17 minutes. This was a world record distance for a non-stop flight. At the time Soviet flyers held over one third of all world aviation records.

The Soviet Air Force's might, its first-class combat equipment and armament as well as the airmen's high moral and combat qualities were demonstrated in the struggle for the freedom of the Spanish and Chinese peoples

and in fighting the Japanese invaders near Lake Khassan. In the fighting on the Khalkhin-Gol River Soviet flyers were the first in the world to use rocket projectiles—a new type of aircraft armament.

The experience of combat operations of those years showed that success is achieved primarily by individual skill in the combat use of equipment, by each pilot's aerobatic flying techniques as well as by the ability of the Air Force Command to concentrate manpower and equipment at the right time and the right place for a crushing blow at the enemy. At that time Soviet airmen checked in practice the Soviet theory on winning operational and strategic air supremacy.

The growing threat of an attack by the imperialist states, fascist Germany in particular, on the USSR demanded the further strengthening of the Air Force. The Party Central Committee and the Soviet Government took a number of concrete measures aimed at enhancing the Air Force's fighting efficiency and combat readiness. The number of aircraft and air regiments was considerably increased. In 1939-40 the Soviet Union developed new types of fighters (Yak-1, LaGG-3, MiG-3), bombers (Pe-2, Pe-8) and assault aircraft (Il-2).

The Great Patriotic War (1941-45) was a severe test for the Soviet Air Force. Fighting on the country's western borders, in the skies of Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad, the Kuban, in the Soviet Polar Region, at the Kursk battles and in the offensive operations of the final stage of the war the Soviet airmen displayed unprecedented courage and heroism, high combat skills and devotion to their Motherland. They successfully provided cover for the friendly forces' actions, dealt blows at enemy air, land and naval groupings and objectives deep in the rear, carried out reconnaissance and supported the partisans' combat operations.

The nazi invaders felt the full strength of the Soviet Air Force's striking power. Having broken the enemy's resistance the Soviet Air Force achieved air supremacy and held it firmly till nazi Germany's final defeat.

During the Great Patriotic War Soviet airmen made 3,125,000 sorties and inflicted heavy losses in manpower and equipment on the

enemy. In air encounters and on aerodromes alone they destroyed 57,000 nazi airplanes. Not infrequently air engagements developed into gigantic air battles involving large forces on both sides.

For successful execution of missions set by the Command and for courage and valour in action 200,000 airmen were awarded Orders and medals and 2,420 were honoured with the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Eight hundred and ninety-seven air formations and units were awarded USSR Orders, 708 were given honorary titles and 228 honoured with the title of Guards formations and units.

After the victorious end of the Great Patriotic War the Soviet people resumed peaceful socialist construction. Concentrating the main effort on rehabilitating the national economy, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government nevertheless showed constant concern for enhancing the country's defence capability, primarily for equipping the Armed Forces, including the Air Force.

The main trend in the development of the Soviet Air Force in the postwar period was the transition from piston-engined to jet-propelled aircraft. To ensure air navigation and accurate bombing and firing, aircraft were equipped with electronic instruments, and instrument landing systems were intensively introduced. The new weapons with which the Air Force has been supplied have significantly raised the Soviet Union's defence capability.

A distinguishing feature of the Air Force's contemporary development is a wide use of the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution, and, as a result, the constant improvement of aircraft design, the introduction of progressive methods of operation and effective means of combat use.

Missile-carrier aircraft make up the core of the Air Force today. They are equipped with modern armament, enemy detection and control facilities and the most up-to-date navigation instruments.

The principal weapon in the long-range aviation with its supersonic missile carriers and bombers are various air missiles which make it possible to hit enemy targets without entering his air defence area.

The front-line aviation, having in service supersonic all-weather fighters, fighter-bombers, reconnaissance planes, combat and transport helicopters, is capable of fighting enemy aircraft successfully both in the air and on land, providing support and air cover for land and naval forces, carrying out reconnaissance and other missions.

Military transport aviation is equipped with modern aircraft and is capable of airlifting troops and heavy combat equipment to long distances and in a short time, which allows large-scale manoeuvres within the limits of a front or theatre of operations and landing of troops with organic weapons and equipment, including tanks, guns and missiles, deep in the enemy rear.

Attaching great importance to the technical supply of the Army, Air Force and Navy, the Communist Party has always maintained that a weapon can be efficiently used only if the personnel can expertly handle it and are fully aware of their responsibility for the security of their Homeland. That is why the training and education of military personnel and enhancement of the Armed Forces' combat readiness are given unflagging attention.

Military pilots, like fighting men of other services, are bearers of Communist ethics and are the embodiment of courage, gallantry and military valour. They know that their strength lies not only in the new combat equipment but also in lofty moral, political and combat qualities and in preserving and multiplying the heroic traditions of front-line soldiers. Their experience is incorporated in the everyday life and training of the Air Force units.

In this connection I would like to mention the Red Banner Helicopter Regiment named after Lenin which is very well known in this country. This unit's glorious combat record shows distinctly the continuity of heroic traditions in the Soviet Air Force. The regiment was formed in the crucible of fighting for Soviet power on Lenin's personal instructions. Its men fought interventionists and White Guards, rescued the "Chelyuskin" crew, dealt heavy blows at the Japanese invaders near Lake Khassan, fought the Nazi invaders and took part in the rout of the Japanese Kwantung Army. The veterans are no longer on the unit's roll. But their traditions live on and are multiplied by

the selfless military labour of younger generation airmen. For over a decade now the regiment has retained the title of an excellent unit. It is distinguished for its firm military discipline and high proficiency.

Pilots and navigators with higher engineering education—flying school graduates—come to serve in air units today. High general educational and professional level are also characteristic of the personnel of the engineering service, communication and logistical subunits, carrying out the immediate support and servicing of air units. The servicemen's high professional level and ideological and political maturity are the fruits of those tremendous socio-economic and cultural transformations which have taken place in the country during the years of Soviet power.

Military airmen are proud to belong to the Air Force. The service there is full of romance. It opens up broad horizons for a man's initiative and creativity, moulds his character and helps reveal his abilities in full. It is not a fortuity that the Air Force produced the first spacemen who carry on with dignity the military pilots' relay of courage and skill.

The Air Force personnel regard their military labour as an organic part of communist construction and a contribution to the implementation of the 25th CPSU Congress decisions. Vested with their Motherland's trust, military airmen, like all Army and Navy personnel, are ready at the first call of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government to discharge to the end their patriotic and internationalist duty of defending their Homeland, the gains of the Great October, the cause of peace and socialism.

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SOVIET VIEWS ON DISARMAMENT DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, No 7, Jul 78 pp 50-52

[Article by N. Podolsky, M.Sc. (Philosophy)]

[Text]

FROM the day of its foundation the Soviet state has been a persistent fighter for the peace and security of nations. The first state act of Soviet power was Lenin's Decree on Peace, which proclaimed a clear-cut programme of struggle for ending wars between peoples, for a just, democratic and universal peace.

The Soviet Union's foreign policy being designed to ensure the conditions for the peaceful upbuilding of socialism, an important element of this policy is the struggle against militarism, for disarmament. "Disarmament," said Lenin, "is the ideal of socialism."

In the course of the past 60 years all important initiatives in the field of disarmament have come from the Soviet Union. At a conference in Genoa back in 1922 the Soviet Republic advanced a proposal providing for a universal radical reduction of armaments. Subsequently, in the 1920s and 1930s, the Soviet state repeatedly submitted concrete proposals intended to achieve the same end. But the imperialist powers rejected all the Soviet proposals.

After the Second World War new historical conditions took shape, the main feature of which was a radical change in the balance of world forces, the growth of the forces of peace, democracy and socialism. In this new context the Soviet Union launched a vigorous and persistent struggle for the abolition of the material basis of war and for an end to the arms

race. At the 14th Session of the UN General Assembly the Soviet Union put forward a programme for ending the arms race and establishing peace in the form of a plan for general and complete disarmament.

The Soviet drive for ending the arms race has been especially persistent in the 1970s. The Soviet Union submitted over seventy proposals for ensuring peace and disarmament. This invariable line in Soviet foreign policy was legislatively consolidated in the new Constitution of the USSR.

The Peace Programme and the Programme of Further Struggle for Peace and International Cooperation, for the Freedom and Independence of the Peoples put forward by the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses have become the concentrated expression of the new stage in the fight for a lasting peace.

In pursuit of these Programmes a whole system of bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements aimed at strengthening peace have been concluded and a set of fundamental standards and principles have been formulated, determining the character and content of the relations between states and reflecting in international law the process of relaxation of international tensions.

However, political détente has not yet been supplemented by military détente and has not become complete and irreversible.

Addressing the Joint Jubilee Session of the

CPSU Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, said:

"International relations are now at a crossroads, as it were, which could lead either to a growth of trust and cooperation, or else to a growth of mutual fears, suspicion, and arms stockpiles, a crossroads leading, ultimately, either to lasting peace or, at best, to balancing on the brink of war. Détente offers the opportunity of choosing the road of peace. To miss this opportunity would be a crime. The most important, the most pressing task now is to halt the arms race which has engulfed the world."

The Soviet Union proposed that the 32nd Session of the UN General Assembly should discuss as an important and urgent item the question of deepening and strengthening détente and warding off the danger of nuclear war. At the same time it submitted a draft declaration on the deepening and strengthening of détente and a draft resolution on the warding off the danger of nuclear war.

It is highly symbolic that the sixtieth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution was marked by new Soviet initiatives and proposals which are of decisive importance for the cause of world peace. At the Joint Jubilee Session held at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses Comrade L. I. Brezhnev proposed to take a radical step and to reach agreement on simultaneous cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons by all states. This meant all such weapons, whether atomic, hydrogen, or neutron bombs or missiles. At the same time the nuclear powers could undertake a commitment to proceed with the gradual reduction of the stockpiles of such weapons already accumulated till their complete liquidation.

Reducing the threat of nuclear war is directly connected with banning nuclear weapon tests in all media. In its desire to promote talks on this matter and bringing them to a successful conclusion the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to reach agreement on declaring a moratorium on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, in addition to banning for a definite period all nuclear weapon tests.

The Soviet disarmament proposals take into account the universal character of this problem. All peoples, the whole of mankind are interested in its positive solution. Desiring to

enlist the efforts of all states, regardless of their size and political weight, in solving the problem of disarmament, the Soviet Union proposed to convene an international forum to solve these problems with the participation of all the states of the world—a World Disarmament Conference. The special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament held in May-June 1978 marked an important step towards the implementation of this idea.

From the tribune of the Assembly the Soviet Union proposed to all the participants in the session and to all states in the world a concrete programme to stop the arms race, a programme of real disarmament. The USSR is of the opinion that the time has come to raise the question of complete cessation of further quantitative and qualitative increase of the armaments and armed forces of states possessing a big war potential. Considering that military arsenals consist of various armaments components, the Soviet Union proposes that the following measures be carried out in a definite limited period:

- cessation of production of nuclear weapons of all kinds;

- cessation of production and prohibition of all other weapons of mass destruction;

- cessation of creation of new kinds of conventional weapons of great destructive power;

- renunciation of expanding armies and increasing conventional armaments of the states which are permanent members of the Security Council and also of countries associated with them by military agreements.

The implementation of such measures would not disrupt the relationship of forces at present existing between states. Nobody will be the loser. On the other hand, the gain for the cause of world peace would be immense.

While working for general and complete disarmament the USSR is trying at the same time to ease and accelerate this process. To this end it has advanced concrete, though partial measures, each of which is intended to serve as another step in the advance to the ultimate aim.

Since the 25th CPSU Congress such documents have already been signed as the Soviet-American treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (May 1976), the agreement between the USSR and France on the prevention of accidental or unauthorised use of the nuclear weapon (July 1976), the convention on banning the military use of means affecting the environment (May 1976), the Soviet-French declaration on nuclear non-proliferation (June 1977), and the Soviet-British agreement on preventing the accidental outbreak of nuclear war (October 1977).

These agreements show that it is possible to take effective measures for curbing the arms race.

The opponents of détente and peaceful coexistence often try to prove that the improvement of the political climate on the earth and détente are due to the "balance of fear" and mutual "intimidation" which are regarded as a basis for political stability. In keeping with these views the arms race is characterised as a boon for the peoples, and the threat of war should constantly hang over mankind as a "stabilising factor" and should be consolidated as an inalienable element of "security."

Reliance on the force of arms cannot ensure a real and lasting détente. On the contrary, it inevitably leads to the arms race. In the context of the scientific and technological revolution it results in the introduction of increasingly "sophisticated" means of warfare. The CPSU and the Soviet Government constantly emphasise that peace based on a "balance of fear" would differ but little from the cold war. It would be a "cold peace" which might grow over into a tense confrontation fraught with the threat of outright hostilities.

The position of the US delegation and the delegations of the other NATO countries at the Belgrade meeting of representatives of the states which participated in the Conference on European Security and Cooperation has rightfully aroused the concern of the peace-lovers. The delegations of the NATO member countries prevented the inclusion in the final document of the constructive proposals submitted by the socialist and neutral countries, in particular the proposals on refraining from being the first to use the nuclear weapon

against one another, on the non-extension (by admission of new members) of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, on the reciprocal abstention from production of neutron warheads, on the freezing of military spending, etc. It is worth noting that the adoption of these proposals would have considerably promoted military détente and the curbing of the arms race.

The socialist countries believe that today there are real conditions for achieving a reduction of weapon stockpiles and for ensuring a switch-over to disarmament. These conditions consist above all in the fact that the struggle for peace and disarmament meets the interests of all peoples and all countries regardless of their social systems. In addition to ensuring a

stable peace, this struggle is paving the way for the solution of global problems in the socio-economic, technological and ecological spheres which confront mankind as civilisation progresses.

The solution of these problems depends directly on the maintenance of world peace. They cannot be solved if the arms race goes on. According to UN figures, the arms race consumes nearly 400,000 mil. dollars every year. At the same time about 500 million people in the world are living from hand to mouth. To satisfy the most urgent food needs 8,000 million dollars would be enough. A sum of 3,500 million dollars would allow a three-fold increase of the fund for the development of farming. An annual investment of 1,500 million dollars would be enough practically to abolish illiteracy in five years. (At present there are 700 million illiterate people in the world.) To double the annual outlays for public health in the developing countries a sum of about 7,000 million dollars is needed. The money needed to solve all these problems would easily be obtained if the Soviet proposal for a ten per cent reduction of military spending by the permanent members of the Security Council and for the use of a part of the funds thus saved to aid the developing countries were implemented.

The arms race exercises a direct negative effect on the economy of the developing countries. For instance, the annual military spending of the developing countries in Asia and North Africa alone amounts to 40,000 million dollars. The burden of military spending in these countries is increasing at twice the rate of growth of their economic potential. The switching over to peaceful purposes of the material resources

now being used in the military sphere would be most beneficial to the solution of the most urgent socio-economic problems facing these countries.

So far only the first few very limited steps have been made in the sphere of disarmament. A vigorous struggle is still going on in the world arena to supplement political détente with military détente and to make real progress towards disarmament.

The Soviet Union is prepared to proceed immediately with the implementation of measures in the sphere of disarmament, either large-scale and radical, or partial to begin with. But steps in this direction have to be taken on a really fair basis. The aim of the foreign policy pursued by the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community is a world without wars, without arms, a world of free constructive labour.

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REVIEW OF BOOK ON CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY

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[Article by Colonel Yu. Petrov]

[Text]

An analysis of China's foreign policy shows that it is above all subordinated to the realisation of the chauvinistic great power hegemonic intentions of the ruling group. This is the conclusion B. Koloskov makes in his book* devoted to China's foreign policy in the 1969-1976 period. He examines the main lines in Peking's efforts in the international arena during the above period. Proceeding from a wealth of factual material B. Koloskov exposes the anti-socialist character of these activities, which are spearheaded against the cause of peace and socialism.

The foreign policy the Chinese elaborated after the "cultural revolution" was legislatively consolidated in the PRC Constitution of 1975 and later in the Constitution adopted in March 1978. This policy is based on the general thesis that a world war is inevitable. The Peking leaders have therefore set the task of preparing for it. They have declared anti-Sovietism China's state policy.

The book pays serious attention to analysing the essence of the policy the Chinese leaders are pursuing in relation to the developing countries. The author reveals the aims and tasks they set in their relations with the young national states and the developing countries. They have not abandoned hope of securing the position of leader of these countries. The Chinese leaders are appraising their attitude to one Asian, African or Latin American country or another solely from the standpoint of using it for the realisation of their nationalistic great power hegemonic plans.

Regarding India as their chief rival in Asia the Peking leaders have intensified their effort on interfering in its internal affairs. They tried, with the help of various pro-Maoist groupings, to promote anti-government actions, they encouraged separatist movements, giving them direct aid and support, organising rebel detachments in India and providing them with Chinese weapons.

In order to exert pressure on India the Chinese leaders took active steps towards a rapprochement with Pakistan. They overtly sided with Pakistan on the Kashmir ques-

tion and at the time of the events which led to the formation of the People's Republic of Bangladesh. The author writes:

"At all the stages of these developments the Peking leaders invariably sided with the extreme reactionary forces. And this was not fortuitous. Since the Chinese leaders trampled underfoot the principles of socialist foreign policy, they strove to render aid and support to any regime in Pakistan, to any Pakistani rulers, provided Pakistan occupied anti-India positions."

Though Peking loudly declared its support for the peoples' struggle for independence, after the formation of the People's Republic of Bangladesh it did its utmost to prevent its admission to the UN. More than that, the PRC resorted to subversive activity and direct intervention in the internal affairs of the Republic.

In his book B. Koloskov reveals the causes of Peking's keen attention to the Arab world. Since the Second World War the Middle East has been one of the most explosive regions in the world, a potential source of international conflicts. The author writes that the Maoist leaders would

* B. Koloskov, "China's Foreign Policy, 1969-1976" Political Literature Publishers, Moscow, 1977 (in Russian).

like to turn the Middle East into an arena of contention between the two world systems, to use the Middle East crisis as a fuse for initiating another world war which, the Peking strategists believe, should lead to the realisation of China's hegemony.

In charting its policy with respect to the Arab countries it was from these ideas that Peking proceeded. Ties with Arab countries which sought to achieve a political settlement in the Middle East were severed. At the same time the PRC promoted the idea of settling the Middle East problem solely by military methods. Moreover, the Chinese Delegation to the UN did its utmost to thwart the elaboration of constructive measures for solving this issue.

There is still another aspect to the foreign policy of the Maoist leaders in the Arab world. The book points out that they have tried to represent the USSR as a force that is holding back the development of the national-liberation struggle waged by the Arab peoples. Peking has spared no pains to persuade the leaders and population of the Arab countries that the Soviet Union is operating in the Arab world in "collusion with the USA" and is pursuing "selfish interests" in that region. That these accusations are lies is obvious, the facts refute them.

The work under review devotes considerable space to analysing Peking's policy with respect to Africa. The Maoists regard that continent as a convenient base for launching the struggle for hegemony in the developing countries.

In this region they have chosen trade and economic relations as the main means for achieving their political aims. In the 1970s the African countries accounted for about 80 per cent of China's new loans to the developing countries. Africa holds the first place with respect to the number of projects Peking is building. The same is true of Peking's military aid. Over 90 per cent of the Chinese experts working outside their own country are in Africa.

However, many of the African states soon realised that the Maoists were not concerned about the fulfilment of the commitments they had undertaken and that as a result their development plans were being jeopardised. For instance, by

1976 China had fulfilled its promises only to the extent of 35-40 per cent. By the middle of 1976 it completed only nine industrial plants and power generating projects in Africa. China has mainly been building small and medium-sized factories in the light and food industries, and also farming, household service and sports projects, so that from the standpoint of achieving economic independence its aid to the African countries is of little effect.

It should also be mentioned that Peking has repeatedly interfered in the internal affairs of the African states, resorting to methods of dictat and inciting hostility between the peoples. The treacherous policy of China's Maoist leaders with respect to the national-liberation movement and the developing countries was most fully exposed in connection with the events in Angola. Peking took an active part in the armed intervention of the imperialists and racists against the people of Angola. China sent large quantities of weapons, and many military instructors to Angola. More than that, it trained military personnel for the splitting, pseudo-patriotic groups in Angola.

China's rabid anti-Sovietism, its hostility towards the communist, working class and national-liberation movements has resulted in its direct collaboration with the imperialists and racists. In the last few years China has been working actively to achieve a rapprochement with the racist regimes in the South of Africa. Defying UN sanctions Peking has been extending its economic ties with these regimes.

The book points out that these actions have seriously sapped China's positions among the developing countries and in the national-liberation movement.

Seeking to advance its influence in Latin America too the PRC leadership started to establish ties with the countries of the continent, totally ignoring the character of their political regimes. They have been pursuing this line since the time of the "cultural revolution." Peking's position with respect to the Latin American countries was particularly shown up on the occasion of the counter-revolutionary coup in Chile. While the Soviet Union and the

other socialist countries condemned the coup and broke off diplomatic relations with the junta, China sided with it and recognised the anti-popular regime it installed.

The book quotes numerous facts of the PRC's collaboration with Pinochet's fascist junta. According to the foreign press, China's loans to Chile totalled some 100 million dollars by 1976. Chile's Ambassador to the PRC said that Peking had demonstrated "friendship and understanding of Chile's reality." In Latin America too the Maoists have been acting in concert with the American monopolists.

In concluding his work on Chinese foreign policy the author writes:

"Despite all their tricks the PRC leaders have failed to force their leadership on the developing countries and to turn them into an instrument in the fight to implement their hegemonic plans. Peking's treacherous attitude to Bangladesh, when this state was formed, its direct aid to the fascist junta in Chile and the splitting pro-imperialist groups in Angola have gravely sapped the PRC's prestige and influence among the developing countries and in the national-liberation movement.

GENERAL KURKOTKIN ON LOGISTICAL CAPABILITIES

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW No 8, Aug 78 pp 1, 2, 6

[Article by S. K. Kurkotkin, General of the Army, Deputy Minister of Defence, Logistics Chief of the USSR Armed Forces]

[Text]

HISTORY has convincingly shown that all other conditions being equal victory in war is secured by the side which has been able to form a strong and well-organised rear, i.e. logistical service. V. I. Lenin regarded the rear and the logistical service as one of the cardinal factors determining the course and outcome of military operations, campaigns and a war as a whole. He wrote: "To wage the war in earnest we need a strong and organised rear. Even the best of armies, even people most sincerely devoted to the revolutionary cause will be immediately exterminated by the enemy, if they are not adequately armed, supplied with food and trained."

In a broad sense the rear is the whole of the country with its economic, social and political system, manpower and material resources, industry, agriculture, transport communications, science and culture.

The rear of the Armed Forces is its logistical service, with its special logistical units, subunits and establishments, with reserves of material means forming an organisational component of combat units and formations of all the fighting services, their purpose being to provide material, technical and medical support.

In executing its mission of support of the troops and naval forces the logistical service of the Armed Forces is a connecting link between the forces and the national economy of the country from which they receive their armament, combat equipment and other material supplies. The subdivisions of the logistical services make up complete sets of munitions and other war supplies, check them to see if they meet the established specifications, and then deliver them to the forces with the help of the means at their disposal.

The rear or logistical service of the Armed Forces of the USSR was created simultaneously with the Soviet Army. The structure of its agencies and the system of supply of the forces were worked out gradually, taking into account the economic and military situation.

The young Soviet Republic inherited from tsarist Russia a weak and badly ravaged economic basis. The country's economic condition deteriorated still more as a result of the Civil War and foreign military intervention (1918-20). Thus, as compared to 1914 the number of locomotives was reduced to half by the beginning of 1918 and that of rolling stock to less than one third. The inland waterway transport suffered to an even greater degree. The fleet of motor vehicles was small and badly worn. As

of June 1, 1919, the Army had only 919 trucks. As we see, during the Civil War the military transport service was very poorly equipped. The other services of the logistical system were not better provided for. The Army was experiencing a shortage of depots, garages, repair shops, sanitary and medical establishments.

The situation began to change for the better after the Civil War ended, when the country switched over to rehabilitating and further developing the national economy. The Soviet state built up its defence capacity on the basis of industrialisation and collectivisation of farming. The Armed Forces were modernised and supplied with new weapons and other combat equipment. At the same time intensive efforts were undertaken to raise the level of the entire military system, to provide the logistical units and establishments with new technical equipment and facilities. The personnel were getting better food and clothing and the medical service was improved.

By the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War (1941-45) the fundamentals of the theory of the operational and immediate rear had been worked out. A series of measures was outlined to improve its organisational structure and principles of work. Unfortunately it was not possible to put them completely into effect before the war broke out. Work on further strengthening the logistical system was continued during the armed struggle.

The Great Patriotic War enriched Soviet military science with varied experience of great value, including experience in organising logistical support of the forces.

Before it launched its perfidious attack on the USSR Nazi Germany had a far more powerful military technical basis than the USSR. Yet three months after the beginning of the war the aggressor was already suffering a shortage of fuel, in a year interruptions in the supply of the troops with ammunition and in 1943 practically the whole of the Nazi army in the field was actually on "hunger rations."

Profiting by the advantages of the Soviet system and socialist economic structure, the USSR changed the balance of forces in its favour. Though Soviet industry was producing three or four times less steel and three or three and a half times less coal than Germany, the Soviet Union was manufacturing twice as much arma-

ments and other combat equipment as Germany was producing together with its satellites.

The Soviet state won the competition not only in the quantity of munitions produced, but also in their quality. While the war was raging the Soviet Army was re-equipped with new types of machine guns and artillery, mortars, aircraft, self-propelled guns, and also modernised tanks, artillery and other armament. During the war Soviet industry turned out 134,100 aircraft, 102,800 tanks and self-propelled guns, 825,200 artillery pieces and mortars. The logistical service units of the Armed Forces delivered to the firing positions, to the AFVs and fighting ships 10 million tons of ammunition, about 16.4 million tons of fuel and vast quantities of other war materials.

In addition to this, during the Great Patriotic War the Logistical Service of the Armed Forces carried out tremendous work for the national economy. For instance, in 1943 alone Soviet Army motor transport units carried 1.5 million tons of grain, one million tons of coal and large amounts of other goods for the national economy. By the end of 1943 nearly 11,000 army trucks were helping the national economy.

Providing for the needs of formations and units of Allied and friendly countries when they were formed in the USSR and when they were fighting the common enemy accounted for a sizable share of the work of the Logistical Service. For instance, it handed over to the armed forces of foreign states 900,000 rifles, carbines and submachine guns, 40,627 machine guns, 16,502 artillery pieces and mortars, 2,346 aircraft, 1,124 tanks and self-propelled guns, large quantities of other types of armament and equipment, ammunition and various supplies.

The Logistical Service of the Soviet Armed Forces helped the peoples liberated from Nazi occupation — the Poles, Czechs, Yugoslavs and Germans.

Thus during the war the Logistical Service of the Armed Forces coped with a number of big and responsible tasks.

In the thirty odd years that have passed since the Great Patriotic War the Soviet Army and Navy have changed beyond recognition. While being provided with qualitatively new weapons and other combat equipment, the forces having also become far more mobile and

manoeuvrable, it has become necessary further to improve the material and technical basis of the Logistical Service. To this end more rational methods have been devised for supplying the forces with ammunition, fuel, food, various equipment, for providing more efficient

medical support and for improving the everyday conveniences and services of the troops.

As a result of tremendous work along these lines, the Logistical Service of the Armed Forces has become qualitatively different. At present it is outfitted with modern transport, reconditioning and other engineering means. These new facilities enable the Service to restore communications in a very short time, to execute troop movements, repair combat equipment and weapons directly in the field, to render highly qualified medical aid to the wounded and to carry out a wide range of other tasks connected with the reception, storage, treatment and delivery to the forces of war production from the national economy under the most complicated conditions.

The Logistical Service today is a highly mobile and efficient machine. The logistical units and subunits carry out a vast volume of work. They supply combat units and subunits with missiles, artillery ammunition, fuel and material. They refuel in good time and very quickly tanks and motor vehicles, aircraft on airfields and in the air and ships at sea. They provide the personnel with high quality uniforms and a highly nutritive diet. In present day conditions the Armed Forces engaged in combat training consume as much fuel in a year as all the Armed Forces consumed in the four years of war. This means that the Logistical Service has to meet this demand in fuel supply.

To give a graphic idea of the new level of technical equipment of the Logistical Service and its potentialities I should like to quote a few concrete examples of some of logistic services.

The fuel and lubricant supply service has been equipped with new technical facilities which have helped increase its output capacity in the main elements by 50-100 per cent. At present practically the whole of the motor vehicle fleet for refuelling and transportation of fuel has been renewed. New field refuelling facilities are now in wide use.

Far reaching changes have occurred in the technical equipment of the food supply service. Modern methods of food preservation have helped develop and introduce into regular rations concentrated foods and preserves, sublimated dehydrated foods, etc.

The material and technical facilities of the medical service have been considerably improved and extended. The medical service has been successfully coping with tasks of medical support of the Land Forces and Navy and efficiently carrying out prophylactic measures. The new technical means it is now using include automatic repeat action syringes, apparatus for designating the wounded which ensures their identification under all circumstance, vacuum stretchers and portable electrocardiographers.

In addition to improving material and technical facilities, the Logistical Service pays special attention to the training of skilled personnel. To this end the higher educational establishments of the Service, such as the Military Logistics and Transport Academy, the S. M. Kirov Military Medical Academy, and the higher military Logistics Schools, are introducing advanced training methods and aids. In the last few years the professors and instructors of these educational establishments have made considerable progress in their teaching methods. They have revised the curricula, programmes and text-books to meet the latest requirements. Just like the military educational establishments, the Logistical Service agencies of the military districts, groups, and fleets are conducting military research work.

The decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress have exercised a major influence on the further development and improvement of the Logistical Service of the Armed Forces. In the Tenth Five-Year-Plan period (1976-80) the country's steadily rising economic potential will make it possible to build up further the material and technical basis of the Service. The qualitatively new level achieved will help increase the defence capacity of the country.

Late in 1977 an All-Army Conference was held on the improvement of the everyday conditions of the troops. This was an important event in the life of the Armed Forces.

The conference facilitated a broad exchange of views and advanced experience in work, the discovery of untapped reserves in the organisation of material and everyday supply and provision of cultural leisure for the personnel. This is beyond doubt an important step in improving the living conditions in the Army.

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BRIDGE BUILDING TRAINING OF ENGINEER TROOPS DESCRIBED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, No 8, Aug 78 pp 16-18

[Article by Colonel A. Soldatov]

[Text]

THE EXERCISE was just over. An important stage in combat training and political education for which combat engineer subunits had been preparing for a whole academic year had ended. At the critique of the exercise the senior commander pointed out that the assigned missions had been carried out successfully and that the personnel had demonstrated a high level of organisation, the ability to act confidently in a complicated tactical situation and to give reliable engineer support for an assault crossing.

Naturally the success has not come of itself. It was the result of painstaking, everyday and purposeful work by the entire subunit at the training preceding the tactical exercise,

and above all at the special training lessons. It is at such lessons the foundations of professional skill and coordinated actions are laid.

Let us examine some questions of special training, taking a pontoon subunit as an example.

This training includes the study of crossings, constructions of military bridges, demolition technique, engineer obstacles, fortifications, military and improvised roads, water supply, camouflage, etc. This variety of themes arises from the specific features of using engineer subunits in combat to ensure combat actions of other subunits. But the main object of special training of a pontoon subunit, however, is equipping and maintaining river crossings.

The special training begins with acquainting the pontoniers with general data on the character of water crossings, the ways and methods of forcing them, the types of crossings and modern crossings means. Military training films and diafilms are useful aids in assimilating the material.

The study of engineer equipment occupies an important part in special training, the more so as the technical equipment of the engineer troops is being constantly improved. Since the Great Patriotic War (1941-45) subunits' power available per man has increased considerably and this has favoured a sharp growth of their capabilities in supporting combat operations.

Today the commander of an engineer subunit must not only know how to organise performance of the assigned missions and use of the available combat equipment correctly; he must be perfectly familiar with the equipment in order to be able to teach his subordinates to handle it skilfully in the most complicated conditions. The commander who knows the equipment thoroughly can at any moment confidently demonstrate to his subordinates how to carry out this or that operation.

When organising exercises the commander pays special attention to accurate fulfilment of duties by each member of the crew, to interchangeability of crew members and ob-

servance of the safety rules, particularly at night time. When carrying out any kind of work on water, irrespective of distance from the shore and speed of the current, the commander must first of all thoroughly brief the men on safety measures and organise a rescue service. In work on water the wearing of life jackets is compulsory.

There is no doubt that launching a bridge in the appointed time depends on the efficient actions of each member of the crew but the skill of vehicle and boat drivers is of primary importance. If, for example, an inexperienced driver lacks precision in driving a vehicle up to the water, he is bound to cause delay, sometimes considerable. The same happens when a boat driver displays lack of assurance in making fast to a bridge unit (ferry). Therefore the commander must pay special attention to training his drivers, to working up making fast of boats and movement of ferries.

The final stage in special training on crossings is the equipment and maintenance of a floating bridge. At this stage no tactical background is usually created. But in planning exercises many commanders provide for it because of the impending special-tactical exercises.

The launching of a floating bridge is preceded by an engineer reconnaissance to define the character of the water barrier, the places for unloading units on the water and launching boats. It would also be a good thing for the reconnaissance men at such an exercise to establish practically a departure area for

concentration, approach for the bridge train from the departure area to the crossing site and the route of motor vehicles to the concentration area after unloading. The engineer reconnaissance data on the depth and bed of a water barrier, speed of current and conditions of the banks allow the lesson to be made more comprehensible and graphical.

It is not necessary to enumerate all the questions to be worked up when building a floating bridge, since the order of their study is determined in the corresponding manuals and instructions. Therefore we shall dwell on the most important

key questions. Thus, if a bridge is being built by the method of booming out the most important moments are: the coupling of separate sections into a continuous treadway and its alignment on the bridge's axis, and in case of successive pontoons (by bridge elements, or sections) — alignment of the sections, joining and locking. In every case the commander must check the working up of the anchoring of the bridge, the equipping of the drive-on and drive-off, and must personally check readiness for traffic.

By the way, the check of readiness of a floating bridge for traffic is a very important moment. The joining of bridge members must be reliable because the reliability of the entire crossing depends on the firmness of the coupling links. Not the slightest simplification is allowed here.

After the check the pontoniers work up the questions of maintenance of the bridge crossing, including organisation of the commandant's service and communication, methods of swinging out separate sections of the bridge to let boats pass, substitution of damaged bridge sections and others. Pontoniers also train to pass from bridge to ferry crossing, to transfer pontoon equipment to a new site. The training ends with the building of a bridge.

As a rule, critique takes place in the field. The commander commends the actions of crews and individual soldiers and sergeants, their initiative and resourcefulness, and points out the mistakes made.

Special training of an engineer subunit also includes exercises in building combined bridges consisting of two parts: a pontoon train and a mechanised bridge (or trestles of a low-level bridge). At such exercises priority is given to working up the speed and reliability of joints of different types of crossing means.

It is of particular importance to train a pontoon subunit to operate in special conditions, i.e. in the case of a limited number of approaches to the water's edge, swampy and soft ground on the banks, a steep or precipitous bank, great depth and width of a water barrier, heavy roughness and wind, swift current, varying water horizon, etc.

In conclusion it must be pointed out that competition for the over-fulfilment of normatives plays a positive role in enhancing the mastery of pontoniers. Many engineer subunits exceed the established normatives and this makes it possible to reduce the time for the troops to cross water barriers. Those commanders are right who encourage the spirit of sound rivalry and competition at exercises.

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AIR DEFENSE RADAR OPERATOR TRAINING DESCRIBED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, No 8, Aug 78 pp 21-22

[Article by Colonel V. Garnov]

[Text]

THE EXPERIENCE accumulated in the Air Defence Forces confirms that the training period for radar operators can be reduced. However, a shorter training period must in no way affect the operators' training standards.

To achieve this goal, different methods are used.

It has become a rule in many sub-units to make a careful selection of candidates for operators. The young men are checked for eyesight, hearing, attentiveness, reaction to light signals, articulation, and so on. Their general educational level, knowledge of the fundamentals of electrical and radio engineering in particular, is also taken into account.

The study of the main disciplines begins before the trainees have covered the complete course of preparatory subjects. For example, future operators begin studying radio engineering and radar design before they have finished the course of electrical engineering.

From the very first days of training the soldiers are acquainted with the functioning of radar. They are taught what to do in front of the

radar screen, to do the tuning, e.g. to adjust focussing and brightness, to augment signals and to change over from one operating condition to another. Already at this stage the trainees acquire a certain automatism in performing such operations as switching the radar on and off, getting their workplaces ready, etc.

The advantage of this method is self-evident. Experience has proved that it takes much longer to learn to handle the equipment in a complicated and fluid air or tactical situation than to learn the design or operating principles of the same equipment. That is why operators' special training can be started earlier than it used to be. This enhances the effectiveness of each lesson and consequently the trainees' professional level.

To acquire the necessary knowledge and skills before independent training young soldiers are systematically made to act as stand-by operators in order to strengthen their confidence in their abilities. When in the radar control room, young servicemen watch attentively their elder comrades' actions and get

acquainted with the air situation. Whenever there is a pause of any length in the training, experienced operators make the utmost use of the training time by explaining to the novices how the indicator works and how to tune it, show them different methods of timely detecting air targets, etc.

After a period of such familiarisation with the equipment, the young specialists are allowed to manipulate the radar indicators. This is done in accordance with the schedule drawn up by the crew commander for each operator. The schedule takes into account the trainees' individual qualities and personal abilities and provides for each operator to track a definite number of actual and simulated targets. The crew commander keeps a daily account of these targets. At the end of the week the results are summed up, each man's performance is analysed in details, and assignments for the next week are specified.

Practical experience has shown that maximum effect in speeding up operators' training at this stage is obtained from so-called mixed

lessons. Pairs of specialists are selected according to the principle: young operator — experienced plotter, experienced operator — young plotter. Such lessons improve the crews' team-work, and this in turn increases both operators' and plotters' proficiency.

Radar operators' accelerated training presupposes a complex and purposeful use of different forms and methods of instruction. However, no considerable reduction of the training period is conceivable unless these forms and methods are combined with a differentiated approach to each trainee. One man, for example, needs one or two lessons to acquire a certain skill, while another needs to spend more time on the training simulators. But there is one method equally applicable to all young specialists — the method of repetition.

This method consists in that while working on a new technique the trainees continue to improve their skills in carrying out preceding operations. This allows them to attain a minimum required degree of proficiency in the beginning and to perfect the acquired skills during subsequent training.

The instructors constantly seek to develop the trainees' attention making it more stable and purposeful from lesson to lesson. This is achieved by special training with the use of simulators which allow target blips to be fed onto the screen. The operator's task is to detect the targets in time and to give their coordinates. At each subsequent lesson the air situation is made more complicated: targets fly at different altitudes, perform course, speed and altitude manoeuvres, employ intensive jamming, etc.

Experienced instructors do not confine themselves to the use of simulators. When the situation permits and there are real aircraft in

the air the instructor repeatedly feeds target blips onto the indicator screens. The trainees learn to detect a new target each time, resorting to different modes of operation.

Detecting and tracking targets flying at minimum distances is also a useful means of developing operators' attention and reaction. The operator must then be extremely attentive and precise in his actions. Such training not only intensifies the process of instruction but also approximates it most closely to the conditions of real battle. The air situation is complicated by means of target simulators and jammers. Each flight route for actual or simulated targets worked out by the instructor is supplemented by a jamming schedule with time, intensity and sector duly indicated. In other words the jammer's functioning is planned for the entire flight route. When a slide projector is used in operators' training the instructor projects the slides showing the maximum density of an "air raid." Such organisation of training will enable the operators to take far less time to get ready for quick and competent actions in a complicated situation.

Wide use of concise training guides to create a complicated tactical background is also highly conducive to making the training more effective. These guides generally include flights of aircraft within a wide range of altitudes and speeds, of manoeuvring targets, closing-in and dispersion of multiple targets, flights of large groups of aircraft under cover of jamming, etc.

Photo checks too give positive results in improving operators' proficiency. The instructor uses photographs of various situations for special lessons at which young operators read out the data on targets flying against the background of

jamming, determine the jammer's coordinates and analyse the "enemy's" tactical concept.

Operators' accelerated training is a complicated and purposeful process. Alongside specialised and practical training the trainees develop psychological stability. It is most important, therefore, for the operator to feel confidence in himself.

In one of the subunits, for example, the air situation was simple at first, and then the number of targets increased sharply. The young operator became nervous and started making mistakes. At that moment he needed psychological support. The instructor took the right decision: he posted before the indicator screen a first-class operator who acted confidently and competently. Naturally, the young specialist, watching his actions, became confident that he too would be able to work equally well.

We have touched upon only a few questions of radar operations' accelerated training methods. The experience accumulated through the use of these methods proves their efficiency. The operators' professional level is improved, while the training period is reduced.

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PERSUASION AS THE PRINCIPAL METHOD OF TRAINING DISCUSSED

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[Article by Colonel N. Fedenko, D.Sc. (Psychology)]

[Text]

THE METHODS of training in the Armed Forces consist of the aggregate of pedagogical ways and means by which the instructor influences the servicemen for the purpose of developing in them the necessary qualities.

In the course of training the soldiers, Soviet commanders and political workers use various methods, such as persuasion, personal example, exercises, encouragement and compulsion. Moreover, they hold that educational work brooks no stereotyped or commonplace methods. Nor is there any single recipe that can be used in all cases. A method that proved effective in one case will not always produce the same results in another, even similar case. That is why, in the military training process, the whole aggregate of methods is used. In the army of socialist society they are aimed at all-round development of the personality and are based on humanism, profound respect for the personal dignity of the soldiers and their civil rights.

The principal method of training in the Soviet Army is persuasion. Its essence consists in purposeful development of the Marxist-Leninist world outlook and communist convictions in the servicemen. To persuade a soldier is to make communist convictions, the policy of the CPSU, the norms of communist morals, the requirements of the Oath of Allegiance and the military regulations, the guide of his activity and the chief motives of his behaviour and actions.

A convinced soldier embodies unity of ideas, feelings and will. He is characterised by stable principles, skills and habits. He always acts in accordance with his knowledge and world outlook, and his words and deeds are never at variance.

What underlies the leading role of persuasion in the

system of methods used by Soviet commanders and political workers in training their subordinates?

In the first place, the class nature of Soviet society and its Armed Forces. Every soldier is a representative of the working classes (in socialist society there are no others). This class unity engenders relations of mutual aid, friendship and trust among the various categories of servicemen. This manifests itself in all spheres of association, i. e. service, training and personal contacts. In other words, the officer and soldier remain class and labour brothers under all circumstances — during the process of command and subordination, as well as during training and instruction. It stands to reason that in this situation the greatest effect of training is produced by persuasion.

The accent on the method of persuasion is also conditioned by ideological prerequisites. Persuasion is possible only in a system of education based on so true a science as Marxism-Leninism. A conscious attitude of the soldiers to the service comes together with the understanding of their role in the struggle for man's historical progress.

From the pedagogical point of view the method of persuasion is the most expedient because it ensures the closest relations between the commander and his subordinate. The instructor is interested in the success of the trainee, believes in his abilities, takes into account his individual features, and the trainee assumes a position of active, creative endeavour and displays initiative.

The necessity of persuasion in the Army and Navy is also due to the peculiarities of military labour. Service in the Armed Forces of the USSR is, as the Constitution says, an honourable duty of Soviet citizens. At the same

time it imposes a great responsibility on the servicemen. They stand guard over the peaceful creative work of the Soviet people. The decisive factor in the activities of the servicemen is their awareness of the importance of military service to the people and the building of communism.

Under army conditions the personnel are required strictly to observe military discipline and the established rules. Without a profound conviction of the necessity of precise and absolute observance of the military regulations and execution of the commanders' orders and instructions no successful performance of the missions facing the troops is conceivable.

The use of the method of persuasion in the Army has its own specifics. Here persuasion is combined with an order, which in the Armed Forces of the USSR is the basic means of organising the activities of the personnel and exercising troop control. The orders and instructions of the commander — the representative of the Soviet state — are received by the soldier as commands of the people and are implicitly obeyed.

Commanders and political workers take into consideration the conditions on which the effectiveness of the method of persuasion depends. They comprise the personal example of the trainer, his profound conviction of what he tries to persuade others, the scientific substantiation of the material he communicates and its connection with life, reliance on trustworthy facts, etc. To persuade the people, to make them follow you, emphasises Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, the USSR Minister of Defence, knowledge alone is not enough. The decisive role is played by the personal example of the commander and political worker, their Party ardour, their adherence to principles, intolerance of shortcomings, their tactfulness and sympathy for the subordinates, their ability to understand them and render them the necessary assistance.

Persuasion comprises two principal trends — persuasion by word and persuasion by deed. The word is a potent educational instrument. Explanation, proof and refutation help to reveal the meaning, significance and internal connections of the phenomenon in question, the subject being studied, the event under examination. For example, during the study of the Regulations the commander not only retells the content of a particular article, he also explains its essence, its purport.

The officer resorts to proofs, as a rule, only when the subject in question or the event under consideration is complicated and the soldier fails to understand thoroughly the correctness of the principle explained. The instructor bases his explanations on a wide range of knowledge, information from various branches of science, and adduces convincing examples and facts.

Sometimes a soldier may form erroneous opinions. In such cases the instructor adduces convincing arguments and scientifically substantiated facts.

V. I. Lenin emphasised that it is necessary to teach "not only by words, but also by action, by work." Persuasion of the soldiers by action, practice, implies such organisation of the educational process under which they arrive at correct judgements by personal working experience and evaluation of the activities of others. Commanders and political workers continuously

strive to draw the soldiers into working out practical problems and into social and political life. They make every effort for the soldiers to gain a deeper insight into the information they receive and to verify their knowledge in actual life.

However, the training of the personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces does not exclude compulsion, which is an auxiliary method and is used with respect to servicemen whose behaviour is at variance with the requirements of the military regulations. In the socialist army compulsion neither suppresses the will of the trainees nor humiliates them. It impels the wrongdoer to analyse his deed psychologically and alter his behaviour.

The manuals of the Soviet Armed Forces contain well-formulated articles which make it possible to employ methods of persuasion and compulsion correctly in training the personnel of the Army and Navy. The manuals make it the duty of commanders and chiefs not to overlook the wrongdoings of their subordinates and to impose penalties on those who violate discipline.

But Soviet commanders employ compulsive measures only after exhausting all measures of persuasion. Before imposing a penalty they make a thorough analysis of all the work that has been done with the particular wrongdoer, the seriousness of the violation and the circumstances under which it took place.

Military instructors endeavour to use disciplinary measures with discrimination, with due regard for the individual features of each soldier. Knowing well his subordinate, his attitude to military duty, his character, general development, etc., the commander chooses in each concrete case the penalty that will produce the best educational effect on the culprit.

The Disciplinary Regulations of the Soviet Armed Forces forbid imposition of several penalties for one violation and punishment of a whole unit for the deed of one man, humiliation of the offender and rudeness towards subordinates.

An important role in training soldiers is played by the military collectives themselves. Commanders and political workers strive to make the most effective use of this factor. They rally these collectives on the basis of friendship and military comradeship, high principles and mutual responsibility, which favours the formation of a congenial atmosphere.

The work of the Party and Komsomol organisations with the personnel is based on the method of persuasion. Passionate words and personal example helped the Communists and members of the Komsomol to inspire the soldiers to selfless struggle against the enemies in the Civil and Great Patriotic wars. Today, too, the principal method used by Communists and members of the Komsomol to influence the rest of the soldiers is persuasion by word and deed. They show the example of industry, efficiency, and discipline.

Reliance on the method of persuasion combined with other training methods helps commanders and political workers to solve the problems of all-round training of the defenders of the Motherland and to instil in them high moral and combat qualities.

NEW SCIENCE ON WAR 'POLEMOMOLOGY' CRITICIZED

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[Article by Colonel I. Chelyshev]

[Text]

During recent years a so-called "new science" on war — polemology (from the Greek word *polemos*, war) has become widespread in the capitalist countries. G. Bouthoul, a French sociologist, is considered its originator. France, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium have institutes of polemology supported by state bodies.

The basic propositions of polemology show that while talking profusely of the necessity to "cure" mankind of wars, bourgeois sociologists actually profess their old reactionary theories that there will always be wars, that they are inevitable. It is clear that the purpose behind all this is to absolve the ruling classes in the imperialist states of the responsibility for preparing and unleashing wars.

Contrary to all bourgeois theories of this kind, Marxism-Leninism regards war as a socio-historical phenomenon whose origin and nature are subject to definite laws of social development. Lenin said: "All wars are inseparable from the political systems that engender them. The policy which a given state, a given class within that state, pursued for a long time before the war is inevitably continued by that same class during the war, the form of action alone being changed."

To retain their economic and political domination the exploiter classes resorted and continue to resort to wars. Therefore, wars do not break out spontaneously; they are purposefully prepared and unleashed by the ruling classes and governments of imperialist states.

Unlike Marxists, polemologists deny the economic and political causes of wars. They even maintain that in the

majority of cases the ruling circles are not interested in wars economically, that "businesslike people" are always prepared to compromise in the field of economics. These assertions actually deny the dependence of wars on politics and political aims. "War is an aim in itself," says Bouthoul.

What are the aims of war? In whose and what classes' interests is war waged? This cardinal question remains unanswered. But the above-mentioned sociologist says explicitly that "a striving for power and bellicose impulses are manifest in man irrespective of the economic system and social hierarchy, the organisation of labour and appropriation of the means of production and consumption."

In defiance of historical facts polemologists qualify war as a general law of the development of human society common to all socio-economic formations, and see the root-cause of wars in the biological features of man. Everybody, the polemologists maintain, is by his very essence made for war and everybody has bellicose designs at the bottom of his heart. Proceeding from such "findings" they hold that in studying wars one should pay attention primarily to human "bellicose impulses" and "vague emotions" which engender wars, and not to socio-political conditions.

Not daring to deny completely the dependence of wars on socio-political factors, the polemologists attach secondary importance to them. They distort the actual interrelation between war and man's social conditions. In their opinion war regulates the "demographic equilibrium" of society. Distorting the social aspect of war,

E. Murez asserts that "it is the biological and social function of war to dispose of surplus psychological and demographic potential."

Thus, the polemologists really revive the old Malthusian theory of war. It follows from their "teaching" that if a country shows a rapid growth of population and cannot ensure full employment for young people, this is direct evidence of a demographic situation called "explosive structure" or "bellicose demographic structure." This demographic situation is alleged to favour the germination in society of "bellicose impulses" which, in turn, give rise to "collective aggressiveness." When ripe, this "collective aggressiveness" is transformed into an "explosive condition." In that case, say the polemologists, society displays all the prerequisites for social upheavals and wars whose aim is to liquidate the most active part of the population.

Quite unashamed of their cynicism, the polemologists assert that there have always been two ways of reducing the number of the young population: mass emigration and military expeditions. "War," they say, "is also armed emigration to enemy territory or to heaven."

These "scientists" juggle with the terms "explosive demographic structure," "collective aggressiveness" and "aggressive potential" to justify the policy of aggressive states and to explain the causes, nature, course and outcome of war. So if we accept their arguments it will turn out, for example, that fascist Germany and militarist Japan unleashed the Second World War because an "explosive demographic structure" had taken shape in those countries, strong "bellicose impulses" were operating and "aggressive potential" had accumulated. This pseudoscientific nonsense is used by bourgeois sociologists to construe historical facts at random, to falsify history, to justify the expansionist policy then pursued by the ruling circles in Germany, Italy and Japan and the policy of connivance with the aggressors on the part of imperialist forces in the USA, Great Britain and France.

The polemologists use the false, defamatory of the people, thesis of "explosive demographic structure" and "aggressive potential" to explain different degrees of intensity of combat operations in different theatres of the Second World War. They affirm, for example, that fierce clashes between the Soviet Army and German forces during the whole of the last war were determined by a great "aggressive potential" and rapid growth of population in both belligerent countries. On the other hand, Britain's and France's sit-on-the-fence policy and the defeat of the Anglo-French coalition in 1940, the polemologists say, are to be explained not by the policy pursued by the ruling classes in those countries but by "national complacency" and lack of "tension in demographic structure."

More than that, they link up the termination of war with demographic factors too. In their opinion, the destruction of a great number of young population leads to a decrease in "collective aggressiveness" and restoration of the disturbed demographic equilibrium. So the war, Bouthoul writes, fulfils its functions and the people loose the desire to fight, peace is established and lasts until a new "explosive demographic structure" matures and "bellicose impulses" plunge the world into the abyss of another war.

Proceeding from such assertions, bourgeois polemologists are sceptical of world-wide popular movement to stop the arms race and prevent a new war. They practically justify the arms race, presenting it as a deliverance from economic slump and unemployment. Like Malthus they consider war inevitable owing to the growth of population which tends to disrupt world equilibrium and gives rise to "collective aggressiveness." "Peaceful restoration of economic and demographic equilibrium is impossible from the material point of view," G. Bouthoul writes.

This conclusion in itself belies the polemologists' words that their "science" is capable of finding ways to save mankind from war. The propositions of polemology, reactionary through and through, have nothing in common with real science. The bourgeois sociologists' high phraseology covers up a cunning attempt to conceal the real causes of war from the people, to white-wash imperialism, camouflage its unchangeable aggressive nature and put the aims of capitalist and socialist countries' foreign policy on the same footing.

The polemologists' arguments fall to pieces when confronted with historical facts and the experience accumulated by the masses during the Second World War. This war was in no way caused by any demographic factors; it stemmed directly from imperialism's aggressive, antipopular and antisocial policy and the hegemonic designs of the ruling classes in the imperialist countries.

Today, owing to the Soviet Union's insistent and consistent policy and as a result of joint efforts by the countries of the socialist community and all people of good will, the world has turned from the cold war to détente. However, the ideological struggle between capitalism and socialism, far from abating, is intensifying daily. In his report to the 25th CPSU Congress L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stressed that ideological contention between the two systems becomes more and more active, and imperialist propaganda more and more sophisticated.

Bourgeois philosophers, sociologists and historians come out in a united front against Marxist-Leninist ideology, sparing no pains to muddle up and distort the

most vital problems of our epoch — the problems of war and peace. Denying the class essence of wars and masking their real intentions by grandiloquent phrases about "new approach" to studying wars, the polemologists are not squeamish in the choice of means to implant in the people's minds the idea that there will always be wars, that they are inevitable. They do all they can to discredit the broad popular movement for peace, thereby defending imperialism, justifying militarism and the arms race and bringing grist to the mill of the enemies of détente.

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NEED TO INCORPORATE PSYCHOLOGY INTO PHYSICAL TRAINING DISCUSSED

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[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel A. Yulin]

[Text]

IT WAS DURING a physical training check-up. On mats placed on the gym floor motorised infantrymen were demonstrating methods of attack and self-defence. They performed so well that most of them earned high marks. Then one of the officers, a member of the commission, suggested a little experiment. Choosing two of the best first-category sambo-wrestlers he asked them to repeat one of the throws they had just demonstrated, this time not on the mats, but on the wooden floor. It seemed those well-trained athletes should have had no difficulty doing it. What happened, however, was something nobody had expected. The soldiers seemed to have lost all their skills and determination. One of them looked as though he did not know how to attack and the other as if he had never learned how to defend himself. And when the first finally executed a throw and downed his opponent, the other nursed his hurts long afterwards.

"It was no mere accident that I asked you to demonstrate your skills on the hard floor," said Colonel Yu. Naklonov to the soldiers. "You

have learned the necessary skills very well on mats, but in real combat, when you come face to face with a well-trained enemy, you will have no mats, so you must learn to fight on ordinary soil, sand and asphalt."

There is a good deal of common sense in what the colonel, a specialist and participant in the Great Patriotic War, said. The skills firmly mastered in the course of day-to-day training help the soldier to act in real combat with a maximum of efficiency and to vanquish the enemy.

Colonel Naklonov had been through all that himself. In 1943 Junior Lieutenant Naklonov, while defending the regimental colour together with a handful of scouts, had to engage a large group of Hitlerites in hand-to-hand fighting. The front-line leaflet issued after the combat said that in the unequal engagement the scouts had annihilated the entire Nazi group and that Naklonov alone had accounted for more than a dozen of the enemy soldiers. For this exploit the 19-year-old officer was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

That's what it means to master the sambo skills and use them effectively in battle. Competent officers always remember this. In organising and carrying out physical training they strive to overcome in the mind of every soldier the psychological barrier caused by fear of the unknown and unusual. And this can be achieved only by regular training and practice under conditions most closely approximating those of actual combat.

Imagine a soldier who, for the first time, has to break into a house on fire and fight on its different floors. Every officer knows that the soldier may at first be rather lost, because it is very hard to make oneself rush into flames. But the soldier musters up all his courage and enters the house, where he finds the staircases and ceilings on fire and clouds of smoke choking him and hindering his orientation. But the soldier keeps advancing, acquires greater confidence with each step and thereby lays, figuratively speaking, a new brick in the foundation

of his experience. With each successive exercise this foundation grows stronger and after several such training periods the soldier frees himself of hesitation and constraint.

It is no mere accident that in many units, next to the usual apparatus and facilities for physical training special grounds have of late been set up for training in the most important psychological qualities required for success in combat. Exercises in so-called "fire" obstacle courses equipped with means that imitate explosions, shots and other battle noises are carried out more and more often. The soldiers are trained in fields with artificial obstacles, such as stone house fronts deformed by explosions, demolished bridges, slashings, as well as naturally difficult terrain — hilly, marshy and broken. Such training produces good effects, as is attested, for example, by the experience of the Guards Port Arthur Motorised Infantry Regiment.

The whole regiment does tactical morning exercises. What do they consist in? Upon the "reveille" signal the soldiers, wearing helmets and with submachine guns, protective means and entrenching tools line up on the drill ground and after a few preparatory exercises march rapidly or run to the nearby hills. Then they deploy for combat, attack one of the hills, negotiating on their way crevices, slashings and fallen wood, and climbing cliffs. This special exercise ends at the top of the hill. Experience shows that such training not only develops endurance, strength and agility, and helps to perfect combat skills in mountainous country, but also instils in the men courage, determination and an ability to take conscious risks. To say the least, the men have to attack

mountains at false dawn, under conditions of poor visibility when every stone, ravine or fallen tree constitutes a serious obstacle. It must be added that the tactical exercise routes are regularly changed, and this creates additional difficulties.

Extensive experience in training courageous and resolute soldiers capable of effective combat under the most complicated conditions has been accumulated by the units of the Cis-Carpathian Military District. Everybody there is convinced that the necessary combat qualities and

skills are best developed by physical exercises which form an organic part of the system of field training. Mass competitions are organised in this district, in which the participants have to climb cliffs with the aid of ropes, cross deep precipices and run on a beam across a ravine. As a result of repeated practice of these skills, the soldiers act courageously and daringly, with no fear of the unknown.

A few years ago Lieutenant-Colonel V. Plakhtiyenko, M. Sc. (Pedagogy), performed the following experiment in one of the units. Excel-

lently trained sergeants were asked to run at top speed on a beam raised one metre above the ground. The results were superb. Then the beam was raised one more metre, and the picture changed, the examinees walking rather than running, stepping carefully on the rounded beam surface and balancing themselves with their hands. The dispassionate stop watch recorded a performance hardly half as fast as on the previous beam. However, this was not the end of the experiment; the soldiers repeated the run time and again and, when the same beam was placed across a deep ditch full of water, every one of them ran across fast

and nimbly. That's what repetition means — widening the psychological "safety margin."

A methodologically competent and imaginative commander can find innumerable ways and means of enhancing the psychological stability of his subordinates. One of the units of the Guards Rogachev Motorised Infantry Division named after the Byelorussian SSR Supreme Soviet has interesting grounds and facilities for the physical and moral training of its personnel. The grounds are well provided with all sorts of apparatus. For example, the equipment for developing attack and defence skills comprises a curious and effective contrivance, namely two freely rotating boxer's "hands" fastened on a vertical pipe. After hitting one of them with his fist the soldier must immediately dodge to avoid a return blow. To train the soldiers in the spirit of courage and determination, another unit has gymnastic apparatus which appears ordinary only at first sight. The high and parallel bars can be extended upward by special devices. You will agree that it is one thing to perform at the usual height and quite another to do so at twice or three times that height. That takes courage and self-control.

In a word, physical training contains quite a few methods that also affect the soldiers' psychology. It is important to use them in practice skilfully and methodologically correctly by ensuring the performance

of exercises "on the verge of risk" but always with reliable insurance against possible injury. Regrettably it is sometimes precisely this factor that makes some commanders too cautious in special psychological training. "Something might happen," they argue, thereby justifying their unwillingness to make their subordinates run even the slightest risk.

But there are not many who argue that way today. For most officers there is no alternative, and if they want to see their soldiers courageous, resolute and daring in combat, they must train them under conditions closely resembling real combat.

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