Waging War With Blinders On: Cognitive Bias and British Decision-Makers in the Gallipoli Campaign

Abstract

During World War I, British national policymakers often did not seek, accept, or use information in an apparently rational manner when they made decisions concerning their campaign at Gallipoli. Using a cognitive psychology approach, I conclude that the presence of systematic cognitive biases among British leaders may have had a dramatic adverse impact on the quality of their decisions in the Gallipoli campaign. A cognitive psychology explanation is consistent with the historical facts of this case, but such an approach has been overlooked in the past. therefore, this approach can contribute to the existing historiography of the Gallipoli campaign by providing a fresh, plausible explanation that is consistent with the campaign's events.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 01, 2000
Accession Number
ADA377120

Entities

People

  • Martha S. Vandriel

Organizations

  • United States Military Academy

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Biomedical
  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Ammunition
  • Amphibious Operations
  • Artillery
  • Artillery Ammunition
  • Commerce
  • Health Services
  • International Relations
  • Military History
  • Military Operations
  • Military Organizations
  • Military Science
  • Military Strategy
  • Naval Operations
  • Naval Warfare
  • Navy
  • Psychology
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Military History of the United States in the 20th Century.
  • Team-Based Human-Centered Cognitive Task Decision Making and Information Performance.