

**STRATEGY
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**LEADERSHIP: THE MISSING LINK IN
ARMY RESERVE RECRUITING**

BY

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL JUDY D. DOUGHERTY
United States Army Reserve**

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Leadership: The Missing Link in Army Reserve Recruiting

by

LTC Judy D. Dougherty
United States Army Reserve

COL Hans Mijocevic
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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ABSTRACT

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This paper will examine the Army organizational recruiting structures of the Army National Guard and the United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) to include a review of the decision criteria used to consolidate the USAR mission within USAREC. The United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) has missed the United States Army Reserve (USAR) recruiting objective for four years in a row. Based on this trend, Congress has directed the Secretary of the Army conduct a review of the manner, process, and organization used by the Army to recruit new members for the Army Reserve. This analysis used against the backdrop of today's recruiting environment and existing organizational structures will provide the basis for determining USAREC's inability to meet mission. The focus of comparing organizational structure and Command and Control (C2) efficiencies and inefficiencies are used in order to determine the organizational approach that might best suit the United States Army Reserve (USAR). Additionally, this paper will identify organizational options/measures, that the Secretary of the Army can use to eliminate this negative trend.

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PREFACE

This is a paper reflective of someone on the outside looking in. I have never been assigned to the United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) nor dealt with recruiting and retention in any role, other than as a commander, prior to writing this paper. Learning about recruiting from ground zero took a lot of research. However certain individuals have been outstanding in contributing to my understanding of the subject. Special acknowledgements to Ms Annette Obanion for her assistance in helping me to understand the Army Reserve perspective on recruiting through the provision of numerous documents and sharing of her years of experience. Special acknowledgements to LTC Melayne Arnold for her professionalism in guiding me through the USAREC maze and drawing on her years of recruiting experience to help me understand the Active Component perspective. Special acknowledgements to MAJ Brian Baca from the National Guard Bureau for the capsulation of the important aspects of Army National Guard recruiting and retention in order to make a complex process easily understood. In order to write a research paper of this magnitude many hours of work must be put into research in all its forms: outlines, writing, rewriting, formatting and, most importantly, understanding the subject. I thank all those not specifically named above who assisted me during this voyage of understanding. I would also like to thank my husband who was supportive of the travel requirements, weekend and late night writing rituals which I pursued in order to complete this paper in a timely manner. I volunteered to work on this project so that my work here at the United States Army War College could perhaps be of benefit to the United States Army Reserve and, by extension, the U.S. Army on an issue of prime importance to the nation. Leadership in the pursuit of manpower to fight our nations wars is key to our National Security Strategy.

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LEADERSHIP: THE MISSING LINK IN ARMY RESERVE RECRUITING

There is no United States Army Reserve (USAR) leadership in Army recruiting today. It is missing in the headquarters of the United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) down to the recruiting stations. This leadership gap exists down to the unit level. Until this missing link is corrected, the USAR recruiting goals will continue to be missed. Responsible leadership provides flexibility to change as it has the resources available and the impetus to prioritize them. Once leadership is in place, fixes supported by USAR leadership can be implemented effectively. These fixes may include a combination of pay increases, enlistment incentives, increased number of women recruits, and matching personnel in specific Military Occupational Specialties (MOSSs) with aptitude. Continuing to use the same leadership structure, which has served USAREC for the past twenty years, is a prescription for failure. It is necessary to have in the recruiting organization leadership that has a vested interest in the success of USAR recruiting --- leadership that sees USAR recruiting as a primary, not secondary, mission of the recruiting organization itself.

USAREC has missed the recruiting goals for both the Active Component (AC) and the USAR over the past four years. The Army National Guard (ARNG), by comparison, has met recruiting goals over the same period. However, the ARNG does not fall under USAREC for recruiting, as does the USAR. The House Armed Services Committee, concerned by this poor record of performance by USAREC, asked the Secretary of the Army to review the USAREC system of recruiting for the USAR. Figure 1 contains the exact language of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY00.¹ While the entire Army

SEC. 552. OPTIONS TO IMPROVE RECRUITING FOR THE ARMY RESERVE.

(A) REVIEW. ---The Secretary of the Army shall conduct a review of the manner, process, and organization used by the Army to recruit new members for the Army Reserve. The review shall seek to determine the reasons for the continuing inability of the Army to meet recruiting objectives for the Army Reserve and to identify measures the Secretary could take to correct that inability.

(b) REORGANIZATION TO BE CONSIDERED. ---Among the possible corrective measures to be examined by the Secretary of the Army as part of the review shall be a transfer of the recruiting function for the Army Reserve from the Army Recruiting Command to a new, fully resourced recruiting organization under the command and control of the Chief, Army Reserve.

(c) REPORT. ---Not later than July 1, 2000, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a report setting forth the results of the review under this section. The report shall include a description of any corrective measures the Secretary intends to implement.

FIGURE 1 - NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FY00

has recruiting problems, this paper will look at what the USAR can do to reverse the downward trend of failing to meet accession goals. Recently several recruiting functions, i.e. recruiting for Army Reserve recruiters, Technical Warrant Officers and outsourcing for medical support personnel, have transferred to the Army Reserve.² Whether transfer of all recruiting functions can be supported by the U.S. Army

Reserve and would it be in the best interest of the Army to do so is a question for study by a Blue Ribbon Panel established by the Chief of the Army Reserve (CAR).³

The comparison of the current Command and Control structure of USAREC to that of the Army National Guard may provide incite as to the merits of creating a separate USAR recruiting command. A review of the various Army recruiting structures is necessary in order to meet the House Armed Services Committee intent. USAREC performs recruiting functions for the active Army and the Army Reserve. It does not recruit for the Army National Guard. The Army National Guard has a separate system that falls under the control of the National Guard Bureau. A separate Army Reserve recruiting command, if formed, would fall under the control of the Chief, Army Reserve.

The Chief of Staff of the Army made recruiting #1 on his Mission Essential Task List, emphasizing that "We will achieve our recruiting targets."⁴ This strategic goal should migrate to every army unit commander being responsible for ensuring the #1 METL task of The Army is on his or her unit METL and is met. Yet, a separate organization is responsible for active and reserve Army recruiting without the involvement of unit commanders. The lack of USAR leadership involvement in recruiting hails from the way USAREC was given the USAR recruiting mission back in 1979. Comparison of conditions that existed in 1979 to 1999 is useful in identifying current recruiting problems and in determining whether the current recruiting command and control structure is adequate to meet USAR manning requirements. This paper will examine command and control options available for recruiting the Army Reserve force that best serves the nation in support of our National Security Strategy. A look at the roots of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) policy and the conditions that existed when the Army Reserve-recruiting mission was transferred to USAREC follows.

USAREC AND USAR RECRUITING MISSION HISTORY

Before World War II, the United States had no need for a large standing army. The draft supported the manpower requirements a strong defense demanded. During the later part of World War II, volunteerism was replaced completely by conscription for the first time in the Army's 221-year history. In August 1945, recruiting was reestablished.⁵ Although the draft continued, on 1 October 1964, USAREC was created to recruit exclusively for the Active Component. Three separate recruiting structures existed for the Active, Guard and Reserve forces.

Vietnam changed the way American people viewed the draft. Deferments and exclusions from the draft caused questions about whether those fighting were representative of society as a whole. The draft became a symbol of the Vietnam War. On June 1973, opposition to the war and the draft gave birth to the AVF.⁶ Congress tasked the Defense Manpower Commission in 1974 to look at current problems and those that might occur within the next ten years in a force that consisted of volunteers rather than draftees. It concluded that the success of the AVF would depend on the Army's ability to attract and retain personnel required. The AVF significantly impacted the Army Reserve since so many males had sought refuge there from the draft. The Reserve Forces began receiving those in the lower mental and

educational levels after the AVF came into effect. The commission found that the Army National Guard and Army Reserve forces needed special attention in order to improve recruiting success.⁷

In 1975 the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army, established the One Army Recruiting Task Force. This committee was formed to consider ways to improve the recruiting success of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. The committee found that active recruiting was dedicated solely to recruiting and was centralized. USAREC offered recruiting options by professional recruiters and one day inprocessing at the Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Site. By contrast, ARNG and USAR unit commanders were responsible for both recruiting and retention. Few enlistment options were available and inprocessing took up to 60 days. The recommendation of the committee was that ARNG and USAR recruiting should be supported by USAREC. The ARNG director dissented so the ARNG was excluded from the support. In August 1978, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army made the decision to add recruiting for the USAR to USAREC's mission. The transition was completed in May 1979.⁸ This created two recruiting systems: one for the Active Army and Army Reserve under USAREC and a second recruiting system for the National Guard. Consequently, the National Guard was left in control of their success or failure in recruiting but the USAR recruiting future was put with another organization. Retention remained part of both Reserve and Guard unit's mission.

MEASURES FOR EVALUATING USAREC'S PERFORMANCE

Evaluating USAREC's performance will demonstrate why recruiting and retention should not be separate missions. It will show that by all measures significant changes have taken place over the past twenty years and that a change in business practices is necessary. There are several measures of comparison that can be used to provide metrics for evaluating USAREC's success in meeting the

accession mission level of the Army. These measures are youth population, youth unemployment, misery index, military/civilian pay gap, propensity to join, college enrollment rate, and educational funding. Figure 2 depicts the comparison.⁹ Below is a brief description and discussion of each metric.





FIGURE 2 - COMPARING THE RECRUITING CONDITIONS

Prime Market Update

17 -21 Year old Males



Projected Prime Market Population is 1.69 Million by 2010

Growth Does Not Keep Pace with RA Accession Mission Growth

- Mission Increase During FY99-00 is 7.4%
- Prime Market Growth During Same Period is 3.05%



FIGURE 3 - PRIME MARKET

PRIME MARKET

The piece of the youth population of interest to recruiting is known as the prime market. Prime market is a term used in Army recruiting to describe males, ages 17-21, in the general population, that do not possess some disqualifying factor. Figure 3 illustrates the exclusion of medical, mental or educational deficiencies from the prime market.¹⁰ The average age of the USAR recruit this year is 24.4. Yet that age is not on the defined prime market scale by USAREC. If USAR leaders were total partners in USAREC, this shortfall in prime market identification might be discovered and handled effectively.¹¹ The prime market was rising in 1979. That is not the case today. The Active Army must compete against all other services, components, and businesses in the civilian sector for this limited slice of the population. The contact ratio is currently 140:1 in order to meet mission. This means the recruiter must contact 140 potential recruits in order to sign one to a contract with the Army. This being the case then the contact pool must be enlarged tenfold since the current population of males ages 17-21 is 1.4 million.¹²




FIGURE 4 - YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT

Youth unemployment is the percent of youth age 16-24 that are seeking yet unable to find employment.¹³ Unemployment was rising in 1979. Figure 4 depicts that rising unemployment rate in 1979 and to a declining rate in 1998 that continues today.¹⁴ President Clinton in the State of the Union Address on 27 January 2000 stated, "Tonight I stand before you to report that America has created the longest peacetime economic expansion in our history - with nearly 18 million new jobs, wages rising at more than twice the rate of inflation, the highest homeownership in history, the smallest welfare rolls in 30 years - and the lowest peacetime unemployment since 1957."¹⁵

MISERY INDEX

The misery index is a combination of the national unemployment and inflation rate that reflects public perception of the economy.¹⁶ Governor Bill Clinton became President of the United States with the battle cry "It's the economy stupid". Many would claim that the economy is the primary cause of the fall in enlistment today. There exists a direct correlation between the Misery Index (Inflation + Unemployment Rates) and the AC production (In Thousands). In 1974 the Defense Manpower Commission used slow, medium and rapid economic growth projections in order to project the population pool for potential recruits. It found that "The Reserve forces will have a more difficult challenge; under moderate growth, they will encounter stern resistance, and rapid growth will force significant changes."¹⁷ Rapid economic

growth with the smaller prime recruiting population is exactly what we are experiencing today yet significant changes have not been implemented.

MILITARY/CIVILIAN PAY GAP

The military/civilian pay gap is the percent difference between military pay and civilian pay.¹⁸ In 1972 the Congress provided support to the manning effort by passing a 61.2% pay raise for first-term soldiers in order to restore pay comparability.¹⁹ By way of contrast, the year 2000 pay raise for the Army is 4.8%. On July 1, 2000, another targeted raise, based on grade, of up to 5.5 percent will take effect.²⁰ This has been in response to the news reports and congressional concerns of soldiers turning to food stamps and other government programs in order to feed and support their families. Senator John McCain stated "I think it's an absolute disgrace that there's 15,000 - 12,000 proud, brave, young enlisted families that are on food stamps in the military..."²¹ The question is whether the nation will react as in 1973. Then the nation failed to continue to provide suitable raises, nor account for inflation. Between 1975 and 1979, military pay declined 10% as compared to civilian pay.²² As a result, recruiting objectives were missed in FY 77, 78, and 79.²³ Today soldiers pay lags behind that of civilian counterparts by 14 to 15 percent.²⁴ The recruiting objectives have been missed in FY 96, 97, 98, and 99.²⁵

PROPENSITY TO JOIN THE ARMED FORCES

Propensity is the percent of male youth age 16-21 who say they definitely will or probably will




FIGURE 5 - RESERVE COMPONENT PROPENSITY

serve in the Armed Forces.²⁶ In 1973, the propensity to serve in the Army was 32% of the 17 to 19 year old male high school graduates. There exists a steady decline of in the propensity of the prime market to enlist in the Army.²⁷ Figure 5 depicts the low propensity to join the Reserve component. It is lower than the propensity to join the Active component. Reasons for this range from less reserve advertising to less exposure to Guard/Reserve to increased deployments of Guard and Reserve units. All are beginning to take a toll on recruiting and retention. Major General Thomas J. Plewes, Chief of the Army Reserve, said that "active-duty soldiers, the biggest source of reserve recruits, have shown a declining propensity to join the Guard and Reserves (after they leave active duty), at least in part because of the increased deployments."²⁸ The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Mr. Charles L. Cragin, agreed when he warned the Defense Science Board that "It may well be that the increased use of Guard and Reserves in the post-Cold War world has made it harder to attract people."²⁹ According to Pentagon surveys, retention has also been affected by deployments. The leading reasons for soldiers to leave the reserves are deployments that cause conflicts over jobs and separation from families.³⁰

COLLEGE ENROLLMENT RATE

The college enrollment rate, also known as the college continuation rate, is the percent of youth that continue to college immediately after high school graduation.³¹ Figure 6 depicts college enrollment




FIGURE 6 - COLLEGE ENROLLMENT RATES

rates up from 50 percent in 1980 to 67 percent in 1997.³² However, the graduation rate has been going down over time while the drop out rate of 44 percent has remained flat. As more high school graduates opt for college over the army, a shift in historical military recruiting from high school graduate to college drop out or college break market appears prudent.³³

EDUCATION FUNDING

Education funding is the total amount of Pell Grant dollars awarded.³⁴ The loss of the GI Bill in 1976 weakened the Reserve Component's ability to attract the number of high quality soldiers needed. It also impaired the Active Components NCO Corps.³⁵ In 1982 the Army College Fund was introduced at \$25,000. The Army Research Institute found that for the upper mental category soldiers, money for college was the most important reason for enlisting.³⁶ In order to increase production this incentive was doubled in 1998 to \$50,000. The upturn in production did not increase in the same order of magnitude as




FIGURE 7 - EDUCATION FUNDING

in 1982, however; rather it increased only slightly. The reason for the failure to reap the same results as the past is twofold. First, in 1982 unemployment was significantly higher as compared to today. Second and more importantly, for quality recruiting, many businesses and states today offer similar education benefits without the added risk of deployment from home and family. The National Guard is also a competitor and has the advantage of being able to expand benefits on a state level over and above Regular Army and Army Reserve benefits.³⁷ Figure 7 depicts the education funding available through the Regular Army and the Army Reserve.³⁸ The college incentive has become a given if you want quality people regardless of your business. To attract that person over your competitor apparently takes something more in today's market.

MEASURES FOR IMPROVING USAREC'S PERFORMANCE

Failure to meet accession goals equates to failure to achieve the National Military Strategy because of the inability to meet the manpower requirements. Failure of the current measures and in light of projected continued failure to meet the accession mission, it is difficult to understand why employment of changes by USAREC has been timid at best. A look at the Defense Manpower Commission in 1974 recommendations for significant changes in the way that the Army did recruiting relates directly on how we currently do business and warrants review. These significant changes include "increase pay or enlistment incentives, attract more women, utilize personnel somewhat less qualified or employ a combination of these."³⁹

INCREASE PAY OR ENLISTMENT INCENTIVES

Karl Von Clausewitz when redrafting his work On War, came up with the idea of war as a 'remarkable trinity', "in which the directing policy of the government, the professional qualities of the army, and the attitude of the population all played an equally significant part."⁴⁰ Congressional support is the resource for pay increases, funding of such things as enlistment bonuses, advertising, and college funding and reenlistment bonuses. It is of primary importance to garner congressional support and the way to gain that support is through community support of the military. In 1983, General Maxwell R. Thurman published the report Sustaining The All-Volunteer Force – 1983-1992: The Second Decade that stated, "13% of those who enter the Army will stay until retirement – 87% return to the communities of America".⁴¹ General Thurman believed that those who returned to society carried with them strong Army values and a support for the defense structure. That belief still persists today however that representation in the community and in our government leadership is dwindling.

General John M. Keane stated at the Annual Association of the United States Army meeting this past October, "what you see is a threat to the volunteer force...because every year we become just a little bit more disconnected from the American people."⁴² This disconnect is causing difficulties in recruiting and retention in all the armed forces. Charles Moskos, a Northwestern University sociology professor noted, "Recruitment problems are really due to the decline of the concept of the citizen-soldier. The citizen-soldier not only addresses manpower needs but also, even more importantly, addresses the way that America's present and future leaders have served their country. I think there's a growing civilian/military gap."⁴³

The percentage of members in the Senate and House of the U.S. Congress that have military experience today has significantly declined over the years. This is the first administration with the president of the United States, the secretary of defense and the secretary of state that have never worn the uniform of the armed services of the United States.⁴⁴ A steady decline of our government's representation is indicative of society as a whole. As the force structure of the military is taken down, fewer in the community and in leadership positions will have direct knowledge of the military. This makes for a more difficult recruiting market because the product, in this case, the Army, is an unknown quantity.

As a recent speaker at the Army War College put it, decline in military representation is not as much a factor as is the ability of the military to get the general population to identify with it. Once the populace identifies with the military, it will then support the military and show its support by contacting their Congressional representatives.

ATTRACT MORE WOMEN

One incentive, money for education, is the main inducement for women making the military an attractive career choice. Ironically, one of the major impediments to accessing women is the restraint on the number of training seats afforded them by Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). USAREC has asked TRADOC to increase training seats for specific Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) in which women can serve. USAREC specified that the "Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR) and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) should program the gender requirement for specific MOSs at 50 percent male and 50 percent female versus the current 60 percent male and 40 percent female split."⁴⁵

If the 17-21 year old female population is added to the male prime market, the size of the prime market doubles.⁴⁶ The military has lead the way as a mover of society on such issues as racial equality, equal pay, and sensitivity training. A push by the military to remove the combat restriction for women is a position whose time has come if the military is going to achieve its needed numbers. The Army National Guard would be at 100 percent of its FY00 mission today if it could recruit females against combat arms positions.⁴⁷ Currently, several National Guard combat arms battalions are being converted to combat support/combat service support units. This conversion is helping the National Guard recruiting effort in the female market and causing additional competition for the Army Reserve.

UTILIZE PERSONNEL SOMEWHAT LESS QUALIFIED

In drawing comparisons between today and the beginning of the all-volunteer force, it is only fair to note that some things really have not changed in all these years. "Industry seeks smart young men and women for the same reasons we do. They perform better."⁴⁸ However, industry makes Army recruiting tougher because it usually pays better. Learning and working with new technology continues to be a draw for recruitment. This too demands smarter soldiers. General Thurman asked the question in his 1983 report that is still being asked today, "Will we revert to the less expensive notion that all we need are numbers, not quality?"⁴⁹ It did not work in 1979 when nearly half of the new recruits were in the lowest mental category the military accepted.⁵⁰ Bright young recruits were lost after working for a NCO of this caliber and there is no reason to believe this dynamic has changed. "We are about leadership: it is our stock in trade, and it is what makes us different. We take soldiers who enter the force and grow them into leaders for the next generation of soldiers."⁵¹ However, there are certain MOSs that require less intelligence to be operationally successful than others. Individuals that score lower on the new recruit entrance examinations may still be an asset to the Army in fulfilling requirements that are less technically

demanding. The Army is currently setting standards above that required by the Department of Defense (DOD). Meeting rather than exceeding the DOD standard would allow those in lower mental categories who wish to serve in the Army to do so without affecting the quality of the force.

HOW TO CHANGE THE PARADIGM

One of the primary responsibilities of leadership is identifying when something is broken and then choosing the correct course of action to fix or replace it. That is what Congress has mandated. Recruiting is broken for The Army. The Army needs to look at the problem, focusing for the purposes of this paper on the USAR, and come up with courses of action to fix it. The problems of recruiting to a decreasing prime market with low propensity to serve in the army when a large military/civilian pay gap exists in a strong economy that has a small percentage of unemployed youth is outlined above. The bottom line is that The Army is continuing to use a system born in 1979 when the conditions twenty years later have changed dramatically.

MISCONCEPTION THAT MORE RECRUITERS = MORE RECRUITS

Rather than addressing changes needed, USAREC is continuing to count contract numbers and




FIGURE 8 - ACCESSION MISSION PROCESS

forecasting failure. There is an inherent problem — USAREC continues to hold its recruiters responsible for one thing — writing contracts, while USAREC's mission is for something else — accessing people into units. Figure 8 depicts the mission process.⁵² The Army Reserve-recruiting mission declined slightly. However, previous failures combined with a shortage of recruiters leads to a projected shortfall in

FY00.⁵³ The number of people signing contracts to join the Army in a given month is called the write rate. This is the means used in recruiting to measure the ability to achieve the accession mission. For instance, in FY00 the accession mission for the Active Army is 80,000 new recruits. The Active Army has on average 6117 recruiters producing contracts. In order to meet its FY00 mission, USAREC requires 6185 recruiters each of whom are required to write 1.09 contracts per month to meet mission. This is the

active recruiter write rate. USAREC has added more recruiters to increase the number of recruits rather than requiring an increase in the number of contracts being written by the current recruiters.

The Active Army write rates have steadily declined from 1.54 in 1993 to 0.90 in 1999.⁵⁴ The USAR write rates have declined over the past ten years from 3.24 in 1990 to 2.38 contracts per month in FY00. Figure 9 depicts the historical write rates of the USAR.⁵⁵ The Army National Guard has an




FIGURE 9 - USAR HISTORICAL WRITE RATES

accession mission of 54,139 which requires a monthly net write rate of 1.69 for each the 2718 recruiters required to achieve the FY00 mission.⁵⁶ Recruiting USAR recruiters will transfer from USAREC to the USAR in FY00. The primary sources for recruiters are Full Time Support Manning Division, USAREC, Regional Support Commands (RSCs), and contract civilian

recruiters. Figure 10 depicts the comparison of AC; USAR and ARNG Accession Mission and recruiter numbers based on Table 1.⁵⁷




FIGURE 10 – ACCESSIONS VS RECRUITERS

	AC	USAR	ARNG
FY00 ACCESSION MISSION	80,000	41,961	54,139
FY00 ON-PRODUCTION RECRUITER AVERAGE	6117	1212	2665
REQ MONTHLY NET WR TO MEET MISSION	1.09	2.89	1.69
FY00 NET MONTHLY WR AVERAGE ACHIEVED	1.08	2.58	1.66
RECRUITERS REQ TO ACHIEVE FY00 MISSION	6185	1355	2718

TABLE 1 – FY00 ACCESSION MISSION

WRITE RATE IS WRONG MISSION


A decade of force structure reduction began in 1987 when the Army shrank from 780,000 troops to 480,000 troops. During this period, the lack of production by recruiters was masked. MG Mark Hamilton probably stated it best, "In effect, PERSCOM wrote us a 'blank check' for 30,000 {soldiers} per year for the last 10 years as we have drawn down. Now we are out of checks."⁵⁸ USAREC has failed in the performance of the USAR Mission.⁵⁹ So if missioning recruiters to write contracts does not work, what does? Why not mission recruiters the number of recruits needed to be accessed? This would be a system similar to that adopted by the City of New York when crime was running rapid through the city. Instead of counting the number of tickets or arrests as previous administrations had done, Mayor Giuliani only tracked the crime rate that he wanted decreased. The result was policemen being held responsible for the results required. USAREC missions recruiters to write contracts not to access soldiers. This is a prescription for failure that continues to occur.

THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD GETS IT

The ARNG faces the same challenges as the Active Army and the USAR however they have made mission. Evidence is clear that it is harder to attract and hold on to soldiers today. The question is how is the ARNG achieving success? The answer is threefold: command and control; recruiting and retention working hand-in-hand; and hometown recruiting.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The key is found in the organizational structure of the ARNG. The ARNG is organized for the recruiting mission much more austere than USAREC. It has 38 slots assigned for soldiers to work strength maintenance operations at the NGB. Each state heads its recruiting mission with one Lieutenant Colonel Recruiting/Retention Manager (RRM). Under the RRM are the Major or Captain Operations and



*** Numbers vary according to state size**

FIGURE 11 - ARNG RECRUITING AND RETENTION STRUCTURE

Training Officer. The state is divided into approximately four areas; each headed by a Master Sergeant. Each area has approximately eight to ten Sergeant, Staff Sergeant or Sergeant First Class Retention and Recruiting (R&R) NCOs. Figure 11 depicts the Recruiting and Retention organizational structure for the ARNG.⁶⁰

RECRUITING AND RETENTION WORKING HAND-IN-HAND

Recruiting and Retention working hand-in-hand means the soldier will see his recruiter again as the retention NCO for his unit. The ARNG has recognized that in order to meet its end strength goal of 350,000 in FY00, it must stop attrition. The number of R&R NCOs is determined on a 1:120 unit personnel ratio. The guard has experienced a 7 out of 10 conversion rate on unit referrals. The goal for the Army National Guard is 18 percent attrition rate. The Army National Guard has achieved between 18 and 18.2 percent for the last three years.⁶¹ The guard has fallen short of the DA quality goal of 67 percent for category I-III A, but is addressing quality now under the leadership of MG Roger Schultz. But it is important to recognize that the Guard leadership has the flexibility to change their priorities in order to impact mission success. NGB manages the process through the restriction of funding and monthly videoconferences.

THE HOMETOWN RECRUITER

The ARNG as compared to that of USAREC depicts a recruiting force approximately one-third the size of USAREC while approaching twice the production rate. The fact that recruiters in the National Guard are usually located in or near their hometowns helps to explain this dynamic. Tip O'Neal once said that all politics is local. The same appears to be true of recruiting. The ARNG has become an integral part of the local communities. Rather than a stranger making a "cold call", a neighbor is asking the prospect to join his or her organization. This type of rapport facilitates recruiting in any organization. To avoid burnout, the Title 32 Program for recruiters was not intended to hire a recruiter at the Sergeant level and keep them there until retirement. Most states rotate the AGR soldier to different jobs. The unit connection becomes key in that the soldier can move into the Operations Sergeant, First Sergeant, or Readiness NCO positions bringing with them that important recruiting and retention experience.⁶²

USAREC IN CONTRAST

COMMAND AND CONTROL

In contrast to the relatively small command and control structure of the National Guard,




FIGURE 12 - USAREC ORGANIZATION FY00

USAREC's current command structure consists of 41 Battalions, 243 Companies, 1614 Recruiting Stations, 6124 Regular Recruiters and 1195 Reserve Recruiters. Figure 12 depicts the USAREC organizational structure for FY00 and Figure 13 depicts the command structure.⁶³ USAREC was one of the first organizations in the Army to incorporate another component, the Army Reserve, into its structure.

It is a multi-component command with a mix of AGR officers and soldiers through out. However, the USAR is considered a competitor, partner or customer depending on the recruiting climate. USAR and USAREC could be considered co-dependent in that USAREC needs the USAR resources while the USAR needs the USAREC manpower in the form of active recruiters writing USAR contracts.⁶⁴

Despite the large number of AGRs assigned to USAREC, the Army Reserve feels they are not being included in the decision making process yet resources in the form of people and dollars are going directly to USAREC.⁶⁵ This is a classic case of taxation without representation. The only way to correct this deficit is to fill key leadership positions at USAREC and in the field with AGRs that represent the Army




FIGURE 13 - U.S. ARMY RECRUITING COMMAND - FY00

Reserve perspective during the decision making process. The alternative is to break with the current system and create a separate and autonomous organization for recruiting which falls under the control of the CAR.

RECRUITING BUT NOT RETENTION

There are inherent risks to Army Reserve in either remaining a part of USAREC or creating a separate recruiting organization. One of the risks in creating a new organization is the loss of synergy created in the recruiting station between the AC and AGR recruiters. Each receives leads for recruits for the other component. Currently the AGR recruiter cannot write contracts for the Active recruiter but does refer prospects. The Active recruiter can and does write contracts for recruits to join the Army Reserve.

The trade off of recruits between the active and reserve recruiters will be lost should a separate recruiting organization be established. However, the Regular Army recruiters only recruited about 7 percent of the Army Reserve contracts in FY98. Historically the Regular Army recruiters recruit 10 percent of the Army Reserve contracts. This drop in mission output contributed to the Army Reserve not making its mission.⁶⁶ This is a risk that exists today in being dependent on another component to help make mission. Of course, the question exists as to whether the Army Reserve can make up this 7-10 percent hedge if it becomes a separate recruiting entity. This requires expanded research if a separate USAR recruiting command is considered the viable option to the current system.

A smaller force structure could be put in place for the USAR similar to the NGB recruiting model. The overhead could be easily adapted into the USAR force structure through either the OCAR staff or OCAR Retention and Transition Division. The RSCs could be utilized in much the same manner as the state TAGS. There are enough recruiters in the system to adequately represent the USAR recruiting needs.⁶⁷ The location of the recruiters may need adjustment however. One of the key contributors to the Army National Guard success is the ability to leverage both recruiting and retention at the unit level. Recruiting and Retention (R&R) NCO are assigned to a unit and perform drills with that unit. The USAR that could reap the benefits of referrals should use the same concept. The USAR leadership would be involved at all levels and the unit commander would have his manning resource in order to meet his manning METL task. A multi-component aspect could continue to be retained by utilizing current stations throughout the workweek with the AC recruiters. The most senior recruiter, regardless of component, should be in charge of the station. Production synergy could therefore be maintained.

BG Billy Cooper, USAREC Deputy Commanding General (East) stated "...our efforts will not favor either Regular Army or Army Reserve - we'll have equal emphasis for both. If the volunteer Army is going to survive, we have to recruit high quality soldiers for both. We have to do it equally well and do it together."⁶⁸ The concept of multi-component organizations successfully working out difficulties due to component differences would be questioned should USAREC fail to give equal emphasis to both the Regular Army and Army Reserve. Failing equally, however, is not a sign of unity but a question lack of recognition that an institution is not functioning properly. With the Regular Army also missing mission for the last four years, one must ask why other systems are working while this one is failing. The Army vision seems to appreciate the current system that integrates the active and reserve recruiting effort. The success of the Army NG suggests that a local rather than a national approach to recruiting is the more successful model. If a mix of the two could be formed, risk could be minimized for all concerned.

Recruiting and retention should go hand in hand. Manning is a component of both and should not be worked as though separate issues following the Guard model. A smaller attrition rate equates to a smaller recruiting mission. The bottom line number can be achieved by coming at the problem from two fronts rather than one. It is also a resource saver in terms of training dollars for new recruits and experienced soldiers versus new recruits. USAREC leadership is responsible for ensuring both the Army

reserve and Active Component mission numbers are met. With restructuring and leadership involvement, success is maximized and risk of failure to meet the manning mission is minimized.

THE HOMETOWN RECRUITER-ASSISTANT PROGRAM

The Hometown Recruiter-Assistant Program (HRAP) was established by USAREC years ago. It has received increased press of late in an attempt to address the Army National Guard's success in hometown recruiting. The ARNG has had great success in the recruiting technique of having high school students return to school to talk their friends into joining the Guard too. The HRAP gives the soldier up to 16 days of permissive temporary duty at no cost to the government. The soldier must volunteer and meet the program qualifications.⁶⁹ Recruiters could be stationed in their hometown areas if the propensity numbers support the station and unit location. Shared stations could continue to be possible if Active and Reserve could recruit for either force based on the customer's preference. Recruiters would become part of a local active or reserve unit and fall under that unit commander's chain of command. That commander would become responsible for the manning of his unit and his success or failure to maintain his manning levels would be reflected on his OER. The HRAP is a poor competitor for the ARNG hometown recruiting effort.

OPTIONS:

The Defense Manpower Commission in 1974 found that leadership was a key function of unit performance.⁷⁰ The same holds true in The Army today. Leadership is and always has been key to military success. Soldiers respond to good leadership. Recruiting is leader dependent and should be viewed as such. The current United States Army Recruiting Command is a multi-component entity. Multi-componency is consistent with The Army vision. Leadership in any multi-component unit must be representative of the components within that organization. Today, USAREC has failed to provide that balance.

There are several options available to The Army to answer the Congressional mandate on addressing Army Reserve recruiting.

STATUS QUO

Since this option has not worked for the past four years and the forecast for FY00 is another failed recruiting year, this does not appear to be a prudent option. Hope is not a method as General Gordon R. Sullivan stated so eloquently in his book, "If you are the leader, your people expect you to create their future. They look into your eyes, and they expect to see strength and vision."⁷¹

USAREC must see the Army Reserve as a partner at all times. Today the Army Reserve is at times viewed as a competitor. That view is counter-productive to both the AC and USAR. It is at other times viewed as a customer. In any partnership, each entity brings to the whole unique capabilities that make the whole better than if the two were to remain separate. For one partner to think of the other as a customer leads to the misconception of a lesser contributor to the whole. The history of the Army

Reserve recruiting being added to the USAREC mission sheds some light on how this perception developed. It has continued due to the USAR recruiters being unable to recruit for the AC in the past. It should be remembered, however, that the customer is the soldier that is being recruited or retained. In order to serve this customer and to meet the nation's manpower requirements, one must consider whether the vision that created the current USARC command and control structure is still valid today.

All the measures for evaluating USAREC's performance, i.e. prime market, youth unemployment, misery index, military/civilian pay gap, propensity to join the armed forces, college enrollment rate, and education funding show that recruiting is taking place in a more difficult environment today. Although numerous studies are being worked at USAREC that confirm this fact, significant changes in the way USAREC is doing business have not been adopted. Significant changes should include a combination of the following: pushing for legislation that would provide significant pay increases competitive with the civilian market; increasing enlistment incentives competitive with the National Guard, attracting more women by pushing for legislation to open up all MOSs to them, and recruiting personnel somewhat less qualified in certain MOSs for which their aptitude is adequate to perform the task.

USAREC must halt the misconception that more recruiters equate to more recruits. The answer is in refocusing the recruiter on his mission to access and retain not just write contracts. All recruiters can be trained to do both. This approach would make the recruiter accountable and would stop the numbers game that we are currently losing by maintaining the status quo.

INTEGRATED LEADERSHIP

The second option is to integrate the USAR AGRs into all levels of leadership in the USAREC structure so that a truly representative multi-component organization exists. This would include the General Officer who is the point of contact for USAR recruiting down to the recruiting station leader. This option minimizes risks for both the USAR and AC by allowing integration down to the unit level. OCAR and USAREC should review current AGR positions and realign those in USAREC headquarters in order to place USAR AGRs in positions of influence. The USAR should be an integral part of all decisions made at USAREC headquarters. Station leadership positions are being addressed and to USAREC's credit were pushed into legislation by them.⁷² However, the legislation is ambiguous and the plan to integrate USAREC AGR soldiers pursuant to 10 USC 12310 does not go far enough.⁷³

True change in the business practices will be realized only through the integration of the unit Commanders into the recruiting and retention process. Change can be achieved by assigning Recruiting and Retention NCOs to units. Adoption of force structure changes to cut overhead and increase direct contact to the customer at the local level is the structural prescription for success. Recruiting is a hometown enterprise built on relationships established at the community level. It serves the strategic leader well to remember the Clausewitz 'remarkable trinity' "the first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government..."⁷⁴ The Army National Guard gets it. The Active Army and the Army Reserve must get involved in the communities of

this nation in order to build rapport. The unit commander is key to this involvement which he can influence most directly through having Recruiting and Retention NCOs assigned to his unit. He must be involved again in the manning of his unit for the trinity to work. The government responds to the priorities of the people. If the communities identify with the units in their area they will demand from their congressional representatives support for the army.

The purpose of this paper is to look at what the USAR can do today to reverse the downward trend of failing to meet accession goals. One must always keep in mind that The Army of the new millennium will be affected by the decisions made to resolve today's problems. The Army Recruiting Command of the new millennium should also include the Army National Guard in this integrated leadership model. A good analysis of the subject can be found in the strategy research project "Seamless Total Army Recruiting: A Concept for Army After Next."⁷⁵ USAREC also recognizes this inevitable change for the future and has documented it in its campaign plan for 2000-2010.⁷⁶ However, both documents miss the mark by each vying for prominence in this futuristic organization. The ARNG should not take over recruiting yet adoption of many of the ARNG system successes seems at once the prudent choice. USAREC lacks the record of success for the ARNG to turn over successful operations to the current organization. Shared and integrated leadership is the only way for the ARNG, USAR and AC to realize seamless recruiting in the Army After Next. This would need to work from the top down with a rotation of the top general officer positions between components. The Commander, USAREC could be AC, USAR or ARNG with his East and West Deputies each representing one of the other components. The next commander would be of another component, as would the deputies. This total integration of leadership negates risk and objections of separate components forming to provide impetus to all component-manning requirements. Taking the first steps toward this futuristic model would be through integrating the USAR into all leadership positions that exist today in USAREC.

SEPARATE USAR RECRUITING COMMAND

In the words of Abraham Lincoln, "A house divided against itself cannot stand." If the AC, ARNG and USAR cannot work together to solve this common problem rather than against each other competing for a select number of recruits, a split is necessary. The USAR is responsible for its manning levels. The leadership must therefore have the ability to determine how this business is being conducted. It appears that the current USAR force structure could adopt a recruiting and retention structure similar to the either OCAR in a manner similar to the Strength Management Division at the NGB. RSCs could be utilized similar to state TAGs. Recruiting and retention would be pushed down to the unit level where Recruiting and Retention NCOs would be assigned. Lesson learned this past year was that increased emphasis on retention allowed the USAR to obtain its mission goals. This demonstrates that the Command and Control structure should change in order for the USAR to meet its mission goals. The question exists as to whether the risk of losing the synergy that exists with the USAR and AC recruiters today will be outweighed by the ability to control the recruiting and retention environment through direct USAR

leadership involvement. Further study is necessary in order to determine the level of funding necessary to support a separate recruiting organization for the Army Reserve and a phased approach to minimize risk during transition.

CONCLUSION

MANPOWER KEY TO THE ARMY VISION

A review of the decision criteria used to consolidate the USAR mission within USAREC was discussed in this paper. It is important to review the historical context of such a decision in order to determine if the decision remains valid today. It is important to reflect on the fact that in 1975 the One Army Recruiting Task Force was established in order to consider ways to improve recruiting success in the Reserve Components. The decision was to add USAR recruiting to the USAREC mission. USAREC has missed the USAR recruiting objective for four years in a row. Now Congress has asked that a study is conducted and that consideration is given as to the merits of establishing a separate Army Reserve recruiting command.

USAREC has set measures for evaluating its performance. A comparison of the conditions over the past twenty years reveals that significant changes have taken place and that a change in business practices is necessary. It is evident that the recruiting problem exists, acting upon it, rather than studying it, through initiation of measures identified in this paper for improving USAREC's performance via increasing pay or enlistment incentives, attracting more women and utilizing personnel somewhat less qualified is warranted.

The existing organizational structure used against the backdrop of today's recruiting environment demonstrates the problems with identifying and therefore changing the paradigm. It is a case of not being able to see the forest for the trees. The misconception that more recruiters equate to more recruits is a case in point. Soldiers must be tasked with the mission not with a function of that mission. If the mission is to access soldiers then that should be the assigned mission of that recruiter. If the mission is also to retain soldiers then that should also be the assigned mission. Making Recruiting and Retention NCOs similar to the ARNG makes logical sense. It gets directly at the manning problem.

The focus of comparing organizational structure and Command and Control efficiencies and inefficiencies of ARNG to USAREC are used in order to determine the organizational approach that might best suit the USAR. It is clear from the analysis that recruiting and retention should work hand-in-hand. It is inefficient and wasteful to keep these two functions separate. The ARNG system enhances manpower capabilities by enabling the unit commander to meet end strength goals by attacking the problem from both ends. The NGB leadership has the flexibility to change priorities in order to impact mission success.

The organizational options identified in this paper are status quo, integrated leadership, or a separate USAR recruiting command. Any of these options could be used by the Secretary of the Army to eliminate the negative trend of USAREC missing the USAR recruiting objective. However, the best option if embraced by both USAREC and the USAR is the integrated leadership option. The reasons for this are

clear. The future of The Army lies neither in separation nor in status quo but in integration. 'The Army' means all components working together towards creation of a seamless organization. The integrated leadership option is the first step towards the futuristic model of having all three components working together in a truly multi-component unit with no one component's recruiting and retention missions taking precedence over the others.

There is a risk for the USAR in recommending this option. The risk that the Active Army will not work towards true integration of leadership at all levels and will continue to treat the USAR as a secondary mission due to this lack of vested interest. The slow response of the Secretary of the Army to elevate the Chief Army Reserve to Lieutenant General in order to provide the USAR with an increased voice in Service related decisions is demonstrative of this point. A protection under the law in the form of a bill would be recommended to insure compliance with the integration of leadership.

The Army Vision states "The Army will be a professionally rewarding and personally enriching environment within which people take pride in being part of the Nation's most highly esteemed institution. Our physical, moral, and mental competence will give us the strength, the confidence, and the will to fight and win anywhere, anytime."⁷⁷ The Defense Manpower Commission concluded their report by saying, "The overwhelming lesson of this report is that human considerations now have become primary in planning of the nation's defense. It is for that reason that we believe without hesitation that defense manpower is the keystone of our national defense."⁷⁸ Manpower is key to The Army vision today making it critical to our National Security Strategy in the new millennium.

Word Count: 8210

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