



**STRATEGY
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**SHOULD WE USE OUR "911" FORCES TO CONDUCT
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS
ON READINESS, OPERATIONAL TEMPO AND LEADERSHIP**

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Should We Use Our "911" Forces to Conduct Peacekeeping Operations; what are the implications on readiness, operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and leadership

by

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ABSTRACT

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The Army of the future faces the challenges of a decreased force that must respond to a Nation's calling whether in combat or Operations Other Than War (OOTW) such as peace operations. We can assume based on guidance provided by the National Security Strategy (NSS) and our senior leaders that peace operations will continue in the future. While this presents challenges to our basic warfighting mission it also has positive implications to the future Army. Until the 1st Cavalry Division deployed, the bulk of the forces assigned to peacekeeping came from Europe's two divisions and the 10th Mountain Division. By deciding to use "911" forces, those identified as first to deploy for contingency missions, to conduct peacekeeping operations the Army has taken steps to ease the impacts of OPTEMPO. Additionally, it has provided a training ground for future leaders while minimizing readiness impacts and still maintaining forces combat ready. Today and in the future the United States cannot afford to exclude a division and have it just focus on one particular spectrum of war. All forces must be able to operate within the full spectrum of future operations. This paper examines the implications of using "First to Fight" i.e. "911" Divisions for Operations Other Than War by specifically reviewing the impact on readiness, operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and leadership.

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SHOULD WE USE OUR "911" FORCES TO CONDUCT PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS; WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS ON READINESS, OPERATIONAL TEMPO (OPTEMPO) AND LEADERSHIP

Peace Operations have dramatically increased during the Post Cold War era. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the increase in intrastate conflicts has put an increased premium on U.S. troops participating in peace operations. In April 1998 the 1st Cavalry Division was alerted to conduct peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. This marked the first time a Continental United States (CONUS) - based division had been tasked for such a mission. The 1st Cavalry Division, one of our Nation's premier rapid deployable warfighting units, had a major challenge. This "911" force, units designed to react quickly to world military conflicts, had to drastically change its focus. The division had to now quickly transition from training for high intensity type operations to training and preparing for operations on the opposite end of the spectrum - peacekeeping. As one senior leader stated "this will turn this division on its head."¹ Nearly two years later the Division is still feeling the affects of Stabilization Force (SFOR) 4/5 activities. This paper will examine the question: should we use our "911" forces to conduct peacekeeping operations: what are the implications on readiness, operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and leadership.

BACKGROUND

For clarification, it is appropriate to establish a framework prior to analyzing the question. First, this paper's conclusions and implications are viewed mostly through the single lens of the current Bosnian peacekeeping operation. The paper is divided into six sections beginning with background, defining terms and three major sectors concerning implications to readiness, OPTEMPO and leadership, and a conclusion.

The President's October 1998, *National Security Strategy for a New Century*, defines the Nation's strategy and national interests. The strategy's central theme deals with our ability to enhance our security, bolster our economy, and promote democracy throughout the world. To achieve and protect these objectives the strategy requires the military to be prepared to fight and win two near simultaneous regional conflicts. The National Security Strategy (NSS) also uses other means to support these objectives. It alludes to peace operations giving it a broad-brush interpretation as one of the many tools necessary to carry out our National Strategy. The NSS specifically states, "these operations (*Peace Operations*) will likely pose the most frequent challenge for U.S. forces and cumulatively require significant commitments over time."² Additionally, General Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), stated in his CSA Vision that the Army must be able to conduct a variety of missions. "The spectrum of likely operations describes a need for land forces in joint, combined, and multinational formations for a variety of missions extending from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to peacekeeping and peacemaking to major theater wars..."³

With respect to fighting two major theater wars, most analysts agree that the United States now has no military peer and will not have a peer competitor for at least the next 15 years. Conversely, peace

operations have doubled since the end of the Cold War from 13 during the Cold War to 28 counting the recent missions in Kosovo and East Timor.⁴ U.S Armed Forces have deployed in recent years more than 35 times, or 3 to 4 times more frequently than during the Cold War.⁵ Examples of this trend include; Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq, Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti, and our current peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and most recently in Kosovo. Based on these facts the Army can assume this trend will continue for the next 10-15 years. Additionally, from our recent experiences and a lack of an end-state in Bosnia we can conclude that these types of missions will be longer versus shorter in duration. In October 1999 the Army announced its unit rotation plan for Bosnia. Table 1 provides the list of the most recent and the projected future units scheduled to conduct the Bosnia mission. This schedule provides further proof that peacekeeping operations will, at a minimum last until 2002 and probably longer.

<u>Rotation</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Units</u>
SFOR #4/5	Oct 98 - Oct 99	1st CAV DIV
SFOR #6	Oct 99 - Apr 00	10th MTN DIV
SFOR #7	Apr 00 - Oct 00	49th AD providing TF HQs, with over 12 companies of 3rd ACR
SFOR #8/9	Oct 00 - Oct 01	3rd ID (M) Div providing TF HQs, BN level, TFs drawn from 3d ID, 30th IN BDE, NC NG, 45 IN BDE, OK ARNG, & 25th ID (L), 48th IN BDE, GA ARNG
SFOR #10	Oct 01 - Apr 02	29th ID (L) VA ARNG providing TF HQs with units from 29ID, 10th Mtn and 155th AR BDE MS ARNG
SFOR #11	Apr 02 - Oct 02	101ST ABN Div providing TF HQs with units from that division, the 116th AR BDE of Idaho ARNG, and the 76th In BDE of the Indiana ARNG
SFOR #12	Oct 02 - ___	28th ID (M) PA ARNG as TF HQs, supported by units of the 3ID, 25ID, 218th IN BDE (M) SC ARNG

TABLE 1 - BOSNIA UNIT ROTATION SCHEDULE

One argument against sending 911 divisions to conduct peacekeeping concerns the deployability aspect. A major drawback to 911 divisions being tied up conducting peacekeeping is their ability to react to a major regional conflict. This is a key argument to not having 911 divisions participate in these type operations. The challenge of relieving the unit, re-deploying it to either home-station or into another theater makes it virtually impossible to immediately count on these units. The Department of Defense (DOD) in its 1996 Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress noted these same concerns. The bottom line to the report is DOD downgraded this concern "based on steps taken to mitigate the risk such as modifying deployment schedules for units engaged in peacekeeping operations and substituting other equally capable units." The report stated "most major combat and key support forces are ready to meet assigned missions, but the pace of contingency operations continues to place stress on the readiness of certain segments of the force." It also stated "U.S. forces remain capable of executing the two major war strategy, but cited several factors, including mobility and logistics, that add to risk."⁶ This debate continues and exceeds the scope of this paper but, certainly provides an opportunity for further research.

To examine this paper's central question the author uses the assumption that the Army will continue to support future peace operations and will remain capable of executing the two-war strategy.

DEFINING TERMS

What does the term "911" division refer to in the context of this paper? The term 911 divisions refer to those divisions, which traditionally have had the role of rapidly deployable units focused on being first to deploy from CONUS to contingency type scenarios. Specifically, the "light forces" of the 82nd Airborne and 101st Airborne (AA) Infantry Divisions and the "heavy forces" of the 1st Cavalry and 3rd Infantry Divisions fall into this category. Until the 1st Cavalry Division deployed to Bosnia in September of 1998 these rapidly deployable, or 911 divisions traditionally focused on warfighting-type, contingency operations while others; the 10th Mountain Division, and the 1st Armored and 1st Infantry Divisions out of Germany conducted the bulk of the peace operations. This is not to say that these units did not focus on warfighting but that they were temporarily given new missions focused on Operations Other Than War (OOTW).

It is necessary to establish a common reference to the terms peacekeeping versus peace enforcement. Joint Pub. 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations* and FM 100-23, *Peace Operations* provide the following:

Peacekeeping (PK): Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, etc.) and support diplomatic efforts to reach long-term political settlement.

Peace Enforcement (PE): Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.⁷

The key element in both is the level of consent of the antagonists. Consent is required in the case of peacekeeping and is not in the case of peace enforcement. Other characteristics include the risk of danger and amount of preparatory time. The risk of danger increases from peacekeeping to enforcement as the operation moves closer to combat activities. The required preparation time traditionally increases from peace enforcement to peacekeeping operations. Units alerted for peacekeeping normally are given time to plan and train for the mission. Peace enforcement missions are usually more fluid and are executed as a contingency operation with very little notice.⁸ This paper will focus on peacekeeping versus peace enforcement operations because 911 divisions should inherently be qualified and trained to conduct peace enforcement, contingency-type operations.

The acronym OPTEMPO in this paper refers to the common military combination of the two words "operations" and "tempo." An operation as defined by the Department of Defense is "a military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. The dictionary defines "tempo" as "the rate of motion or activity." For the purpose of this paper OPTEMPO will refer to "the rate of military actions and missions."⁹ These military actions and missions refer to both unit, and more specifically, to the effect on individuals within units - a phenomenon sometimes referred to as

PERSTEMPO. These missions and actions not only include deployment operations (i.e. combat, peacekeeping and humanitarian) but home-station training exercises, and garrison activities.

IMPLICATIONS TO READINESS

One of 1st Cavalry Division's (1CD) greatest challenges during their recent Bosnia mission was maintaining combat readiness while conducting the peacekeeping mission. Though peacekeeping operations degrade collective warfighting skills such as collective gunnery, brigade/battalion maneuver, combined arms breaching techniques, and deep operations, there are many positive readiness implications that carry over to combat readiness. Aware of the problem, the 1CD leadership used lessons learned from previous operations to mitigate combat skills degradation. The division developed a strategy to minimize atrophy of critical warfighting skills by using a systematic approach, which included simulations and emphasis on individual and small unit leadership. The division reduced skill degradation by exploiting the use of simulations, distance learning, and training aids and devices to maintain the fundamental skills at crew, squad and team levels. Units habitually used these training devices to increase unit readiness - while deployed, or at home station.

Even with simulations the unit experienced degradation in many collective skills (see figure 1).¹⁰ The peacekeeping operation however did have positive effects on many fundamental skills. The operation had a positive impact on small unit training and leadership in many areas. Some are hard to define aspects of readiness. For small unit operations the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia provided a leadership laboratory every day. Troop leading procedures from squad through battalion level increased dramatically. These fundamental skills do not change significantly from high intensity to low intensity operations. The daily training laboratory included training ranging from mission analysis, preparation for combat, mission rehearsals, situational awareness training (reconnaissance and patrolling) through potential combat operations. Many collective tasks for a squad and platoon conducting peacekeeping can be linked to collective tasks for high intensity.¹¹ Other collateral benefits included; weapons maintenance, vehicle maintenance and operations, reporting and communication skills, patrol techniques, countermine, and mobility operations. These skills while not performed to the standards required in combat (i.e., camouflage, deception) assist infantry and armor units along with low density Military Occupational Skills (MOS) soldiers sustain warfighting skills.

Support units such as military intelligence and signal units extensively used many - but not all - of their wartime skills while performing their Bosnia mission.¹² Bosnia provided a complex intelligence environment, which require rigorous analysis and many non-traditional skills. Bosnia's ambiguous and complex environment provided staff and intelligence soldiers a challenging environment to train and develop skills. Staffs were required to constantly produce products ranging from decision-making briefs, to executing crisis action drills, to conducting current operations while simultaneously continuing to plan for future operations.

READINESS...FUNCTIONAL AREA VIEW

Warfighting vs. Peace Support Operations




FIGURE 1

One of the most positive aspects of conducting peacekeeping as well as combat operations is the intangible measure of building cohesiveness. Units deployed for actual missions tend to be very cohesive units able to conduct operations at a higher degree of effectiveness. Cohesive units seem to adapt quicker to the full spectrum of possible operations. Analysts and military leaders agree, units are more likely to be at high levels of morale, cohesion, and discipline when they are doing something real than when they are in garrison.¹³

On the down side is a unit's inability to train on perishable collective tasks. Infantry, armor, and artillery units, the bulk of the force in Bosnia, are not able to conduct maneuver training above squad level. Very seldom do they get to operate their tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFV). Additionally, there were no artillery pieces in theater. Previous peacekeeping operations in Haiti and Somalia also provide evidence of the lack of ability to train above the squad and platoon level. To offset increased degradation of warfighting skills, the Army implemented a rotation plan devised to optimize both peacekeeping and retaining critical warfighting skills. Though the 1st Cavalry Division's headquarters remained in Bosnia for a year, the brigade size elements rotated after six months. Rotating combat forces reduced complacency and allowed non-deployed brigades to focus on high intensity-type operations. Using lessons learned the Division developed a training plan (see figure 2)¹⁴ to systematically have the division capable of performing traditional 911 missions within 6 months of redeployment. This closely resembles recommended timelines from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) study on peacekeeping impacts on training.

DIVISION TRAINING PROFICIENCY




FIGURE 2

During March 1999 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Military Readiness, the commanding general of the 1st Armored Division also said that the Bosnia deployment had both a significant impact on combat readiness and at the same time positive impacts, primarily at the smaller unit level.

"Understandably, the Balkans peacekeeping mission has had a significant impact on combat readiness: however, contrary to popular belief, the impact on combat readiness at squad, platoon, and company levels, and even to a degree at the battalion level, is overwhelmingly positive. Unit cohesion, concentration on soldier common skill tasks, emphasis on small unit operations, a clear mission focus and enforcement of training standards result in confident, competent, and mission capable units."¹⁵

Leaders within 1st Cavalry also echoed these feelings. A battalion commander stated that as a whole his unit was better off having gone to Bosnia. His battalion's collective skills did decrease but are about back to normal some 4 months after redeployment. The unit had just completed gunnery, platoon through battalion level Situational Training Exercises (STX), and would soon validate training with a National Training Center (NTC) rotation in May 2000.¹⁶

The 1st Cavalry Division used a simple model structured around maintaining disciplined, confident, and competent soldiers. The Division's approach to sustaining warfighting skills was to deploy with the basics established, train in theater to sustain the basics, then improve on them as units transitioned back to a 911 status. This basic approach allowed units to continue to emphasize individual and soldier professional development while minimizing degradation of individual, crew and squad skills during the deployment. Though the Division sustained some degradation in collective warfighting skills, it was able to transition after several months back to 911 status. The benefits of teambuilding and

cohesiveness were added benefits, which cannot be trained, and which will make units deployed for peacekeeping operations better organizations.

IMPLICATIONS TO LEADERSHIP

Leadership as defined in Field Manual (FM) 22-100 is "influencing people - by providing purpose, direction, and motivation - while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization."¹⁷ The FM provides the Army a leadership framework. The framework is anchored by the Army's core values - loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage (LDRSHIP). It also describes the principles of *BE*, *KNOW*, and *DO*. Succinctly put, a leader must *BE* - a person with inner-strength, a person who understands right from wrong. A leader must *KNOW* - maintain a "level of knowledge to be competent." A leader must *DO* - be able to "influence two ends: operating - mission completion and improving - continuing to learn in all assigned areas."¹⁸ Peace operations pose special challenges in all of these principles - *BE*, *KNOW* and *DO*.

The peacekeeping *BE* factor deals with the training and leadership challenge of transforming or breaking the paradigm related to a warfighters ingrained mentality to shoot to kill. Peacekeeping operations dull and blur this trained process. A very real problem of maintaining a warfighters edge in this environment is the notion that during peace operations we train soldiers how not to fight. The problem of changing mindsets from combat operations to peacekeeping and vice versa is real. This ability to instinctively know right from wrong goes against the grain of the essential warfighting task of closing with and destroying the enemy. This problem provides evidence to those proponents that believe 911 units shouldn't be used for peacekeeping operations. COL Win Noyes points out in his *Peacekeepers and Warfighters: Same Force, Different Mindset*, that the different missions require a different set of preconditioned responses that are significantly different from each other. "Combat requires the set that matches the Army FM 100-5 tenets of initiative, agility, depth, synchronization and the propensity for violent offensive action. Peacekeeping requires the set that matches Army FM 100-23 and its dynamics of restraint, control of consent, control of the level of violence and maintenance of impartiality."¹⁹

Peace operations place enormous responsibility at junior levels of command. In peacekeeping as well as combat operations subordinates must have confidence that leaders know what they are doing, that they understand the environment, and have the flexibility to exploit the talents of their subordinates. They must inherently be adaptable and knowledgeable of the bigger picture. To operate effectively junior leaders will have to *BE* able to quickly know right from wrong. No longer will it be a simple case of bad versus good in and an environment where "shoot to kill" is the first response. These leaders will have to learn to adapt across the full spectrum of conflict. They will have to move easily - with minimum training - from one conflict to another.

The *KNOW* aspect deals with developing conceptual, technical and tactical skills. More importantly the Army must provide the proper blend of skills necessary for operating across the full spectrum of future battlefields. Junior leaders must be grown. They must be creative, intuitive and

dynamic, able to make proper decisions in a very ambiguous environment. Future leaders will require a deep understanding of strategic as well as tactical issues. To achieve this proficiency the Army must maintain a balance between military training, tactical experience, academic education, and military professional studies. Using the total force, rotating 911 units as well as others is the correct formula for success. It provides the environment or laboratory to develop the skills necessary to cope in tomorrow's operations. The military has begun, but still requires improvement in training future soldiers and leaders on skills associated with peace operations. The Army has slowly integrated peace operations training into its academic curriculum. This training to date is generally oriented at the senior leaders level. Minimizing warfighting degradation while accomplishing this is the challenge to training future soldiers.

Soldiers deployed on actual deployments such as Bosnia practice the *DO* principle everyday. Young soldiers routinely performed unsupervised those tasks that previously required greater supervision or had to be accomplished using an individual with a higher rank. Deployed soldiers continually stretch themselves beyond their standard military training level to meet the special demands of peacekeeping. Simply put, soldiers conducting peace operations make things happen – the *DO* principle – daily.

Drawbacks to readiness occur when individuals serve repeatedly in peace operations. Multiple peacekeeping rotations by individuals pose the greatest risk for future leaders. It could create an Army of peacekeepers. Serving in multiple peace operations could create a generation of young leaders who could be confused about what is the military's true mission – fight and win our nation's war. These young leaders could fall into a dangerous category of not knowing how to run large organizations. It is conceivable that a company commander during his normal 18 - month command tour, who is focused on peace operations, might never maneuver his unit. During normal garrison operations, leaders are only given a limited amount of time to train this task. Junior leaders receive this training during their first 6-7 years. Company commanders could find themselves focused on peace operations for their whole 18-month tour. They then serve in a nominative or staff job until they become a field grade officer. Sixteen to seventeen years down the road, these company commanders are liable to command a battalion with only limited skills on how to tactically maneuver a large organization. This degradation of technical and tactical skills related to employment of fire and maneuver tactics poses a risk. Leaders understand there is overlap between many skills required for peace and war but collective training suffers. Those assigned to peace operations will require re-training in fire and maneuver tactics to maximize their warfighting capability.

To succeed on the future battlefield whether in combat or peace operations the requirement of maintaining the critical task of closing with and killing the enemy must remain paramount. If soldiers and leaders understand warfighting then they can adjust to any subsequent task - like peacekeeping. Each of these mindsets is different and requires training to transition from one to the other. Soldiers trained for combat are trained instinctively to aggress an enemy and force him to acquiesce. Conversely, the soldier trained for peacekeeping requires restraint. He understands that some restrictions exist and he must

make a careful decision prior to exerting force. This *BE* dilemma places even more challenges on both soldiers and leaders.

In both operations it remains clear that professional, disciplined and versatile soldiers are crucial to conducting both peacekeeping operations and maintaining combat readiness. Leaders at all levels consistently agree that a unit that is well trained in warfighting tasks can rapidly transition from a warfighting to a peace operations focus.²⁰ Rotating all units through peacekeeping operations provides leaders the opportunity to train and use valuable leadership skills. By rotating all units the Army can alleviate the possibility of only a few units/individuals obtaining "real world" leadership experience. The Army's six-month rotation plan allows individuals to gain future leadership skills without fully jeopardizing future readiness. Soldiers and leaders who have experienced the *BE*, *KNOW*, and *DO* factors while deployed on peacekeeping operations enhance the forces warfighting capability.

IMPLICATIONS TO OPTEMPO

Recent studies indicate that the deployment tempo will be significantly increased in the future. After surveying over 2,000 soldiers stationed in Europe, the U.S. Army Medical Research Unit in Europe concluded deployment rates dramatically increased. "At the current deployment rate, soldiers entering the military today will experience an average of 14 deployments by the time they serve 21 years or more in the service. This projected rate means that a soldier can expect to deploy once every 18 months. Such a projection is in sharp contrast to the rates reported by soldiers with 21 years or more of service. These soldiers report a total of four deployments in their 21-year career or an average of one deployment about every six years."²¹ This holds true for personnel in the majority of the battalions within 1st Cavalry Division. Several units that deployed to Bosnia had also been to Kuwait, Korea, and the National Training Center (NTC) within the last 18 months. Increased deployments directly affect home station training requirements. Deployments require units to train for peacekeeping prior to deployment and transition back during post deployment. This training usually takes 3-4 months on the front end and at least 6 months to re-train on the other end.

Using only a portion of the force, the non-911 Divisions created a "do-loop" which had soldiers constantly training up or down. The first units to deploy to Bosnia came from European based divisions. The 1stst Armored and 1st Infantry Divisions took the bulk of these missions. The 1st Armored Division for example deployed twice in the 3 1/2-year period ending in March 1999. Couple this with train up periods for Bosnia, and the subsequent re-training for combat operations, the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia created a tremendous amount of OPTEMPO. The increased OPTEMPO created by the Bosnia mission greatly affected personnel turbulence, morale, and family well-being as well as combat readiness.

Most affected were low density MOSs. These individuals /units, usually combat support and combat service support specialties such as transportation and civil affairs provide unique skills critical for peace operations.

The effects of deployment also affect units and individuals that did not deploy. "At 17 of 44 Army units examined by United States General Accounting Office (GAO) the non-deploying portions of the units had to give up people or equipment to bring the deployment portion up to strength."²² Soldiers remaining back in garrison often have a more difficult time than those deployed. "As a result of deploying partial units, the non-deployed portions (1) lacked the officers and senior noncommissioned officers leadership required to train more junior soldiers, (2) could not conduct training above the small unit and individual soldier level, and (3) had to do their work and that of the deployed portion of the unit."²³ The challenge of maintaining equipment and combat proficiency with limited resources has a negative effect on morale and readiness. Couple this with having to provide assistance to families and the non-deployed soldiers were as busy as those deployed. 1st Cavalry Division also experienced these problems. This unit, manned at the Army's highest levels, deeply felt the impact of increased OPTEMPO associated with peacekeeping operations.

The non-911 units experienced an even greater challenge. The effect of increased peacekeeping operations if only accomplished by a few will certainly affect the OPTEMPO rates of those limited forces. This could affect reenlistment rates of 1st term and mid term soldiers. 1st Armored and 1st Infantry were able to maintain high reenlistment rates but continued rotations to Bosnia would most probably have had a negative impact on future re-enlistment. Studies indicate although current reenlistment rates are not critically low, surveys from every service have shown evidence that officers and NCOs have a diminished propensity to stay until retirement.²⁴ Most soldiers like deployments and when asked, preferred to be deployed. For many young soldiers deploying was the major reason they enlisted in the first place. By rotating all units instead of utilizing only a few units the Army can deploy soldiers who remain focused on their mission. Frequent deployments also places strain on families. Soldiers surveyed stated that the number of deployments hurt their marriages and was the principle reason they would not reenlist. The current Army policy of rotating units in six months, while not perfect, provides the best solution to minimizing OPTEMPO affects and providing predictability.

The Army's new stabilization policy, stabilizing a soldier at their home station for one-month for every month they are deployed, will also assist to decrease turbulence. Additionally, the CSA's directive to fill all combat units at 100% will assist personnel OPTEMPO and will undoubtedly create less turbulence.

CONCLUSION

The Army of the future faces the challenges of a decreased force that must respond to a Nation's calling whether in combat or Operations Other than War such as peace operations. We can assume based on guidance provided by the NSS and our senior leaders that peace operations will continue in the future. While this presents challenges to our basic warfighting mission it also has positive implications to the future Army. Until the 1st Cavalry Division deployed, the bulk of the forces assigned to peacekeeping came from Europe's two divisions and the 10th Mountain Division. By deciding to use 911 forces, those

identified as first to deploy for contingency missions, to conduct peacekeeping operations the Army has taken steps to ease the impacts of OPTEMPO. Additionally, it has provided a training ground for future leaders while minimizing readiness impacts and still maintaining forces combat ready.

The greatest risk of using 911 units is the degradation of the technical and tactical skills related to employment of fire and maneuver tactics. Training prior to and after conducting a peacekeeping operation remains critical to success - both during the mission, and during the subsequent transition back to combat operations proficiency. The training model used effectively by the 1st Cavalry Division can provide well-trained and disciplined units that can deploy and excel across the spectrum of operations. Sustaining warfighting skills during peacekeeping remains critical to the successful return to mission readiness. Arriving with well-trained, disciplined soldiers, focusing on small leadership skills, and maximizing simulations to decrease skill degradation are key to minimizing readiness issues. Collective skills will decrease, but when able, the Army should provide access to simulation, and maneuver and gunnery ranges to sustain collective skills. The current policy of rotating combat forces in 6 months provides about the right amount of time away from high intensity type training. After 6 months, training in most units is back to acceptable levels of readiness to perform combat operations.

Soldiers and leaders who have experienced the *BE*, *KNOW*, and *DO* factors while deployed on peacekeeping enhance the Army's future warfighting capability. Positive effects can be derived from peacekeeping operations. Future leaders will be faced with complex environments where they will have to fully understand and implement the principles of *BE*, *KNOW* and *DO*. Developing junior leaders and unit cohesion are key outcomes. Rotating all units through peacekeeping operations provides the maximum number of leaders the opportunity to train and develop valuable leadership skills. The Army will take some risk, but by rotating all units into peace operations we can alleviate the possibility of only a few units/individuals obtaining "real world" leadership experience. Conversely, the Army can also ensure that no one unit becomes confused about the Army's essential task of fighting and winning our Nation's wars.

Finally OPTEMPO, especially personnel tempo creates the biggest challenge associated with peace operations. The Army cannot continually use the same forces over and over to conduct peace operations. The CSA directive to increase the manning levels of all divisions will ease the problem somewhat but, the Army will still face the challenge of responding to our Nation's desires while maintaining combat readiness. The military cannot afford to exclude a division and have it just focus on one particular spectrum of war. All forces must be able to operate within the full spectrum of future operations. The first step for all soldiers and leaders to succeed on the future battlefield whether in combat or peace operations is the requirement of maintaining proficiency in the critical task of closing with and killing the enemy.

Word Count = 5,159

ENDNOTES

¹ 1st Cavalry Division senior leader interview by author, March 1998.

² William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, (Washington, DC.: The White House October 1998).

³ Eric K Shinseki, General, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, and Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army, *Army Vision: On the Point for the Nation... Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War.* <http://www.army.mil/CSAVision/default.html> (1 November 1999), 2.

⁴ Michael J. Hardesty, LTC (P), *Training for Peace: The U.S. Army's Post-Cold War Strategy.* (Army War College Fellow United States Institute of Peace, 4 April 1996), ii.

⁵ *American Military Culture in the 21st Century.* A CSIS Report, January 2000, 5.

⁶ United States General Accounting Office, *Military Operations, Impacts of Operations Other than War on the Services Varies.* Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Readiness and Management Support, Committee on Armed Services U.S. Senate, May 1999, 25.

⁷ Joint Pub. 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*, Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Task Force Commanders Handbook for Peace Operations (Virginia Fort Monroe, February 1995), GL 5-8, U.S. Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 100-23, *Peace Operations* (December 1994) 2-12 and Hardesty 4.

⁸ Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) *The Effects of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness.* (Fort Leavenworth, KS): U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Special Study, February 1996, 3.

⁹ Carla Castro, and Amy B Adler, "OPTEMPO: Effects on Soldier and Unit Readiness", *Parameters* (Autumn 1999): 87.

¹⁰ 1st Cavalry Division Command Brief on maintaining readiness while conducting peace support operations, November 1999.

¹¹ David Bongji, *Preparing for Peacekeeping Operations through Battle Focused Training.* (Fort Leavenworth, Kan) School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1993. David Bongji in his study on battle-focused training concluded that up to 70% of the supporting tasks to peacekeeping mission essential tasks (METL) were also warfighting collective tasks, 37.

¹² United States General Accounting Office, *Military Operations, Impacts of Operations Other than War on the Services Varies.* Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Readiness and Management Support, Committee on Armed Services U.S. Senate (May 1999), 27.

¹³ Antonia Chayes, and George Raach, *Peace Operations: Developing an American Strategy*, National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C., October 1995, 48.

¹⁴ 1st Cavalry Division Command Brief on maintaining readiness while conducting peace support operations, November 1999.

¹⁵ United States General Accounting Office, *Military Operations, Impacts of Operations Other than War on the Services Varies.* Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Readiness and Management Support, Committee on Armed Services U.S. Senate (May 1999), 9.

¹⁶ 1st Cavalry Division leaders, authors interview 1 February 2000.

¹⁷ Department of the Army, Peace Operations. Field Manual 100-23 (December 1994), 1-4.

¹⁸ Ibid, 1-6 – 1-7.

¹⁹ Winn Noyes, LTC (P), Peace Keepers and War Fighters Same Force Different Mindset. U. S. Department of Defense (Defense Technical Information Center, 8725 John J. Kingman Road, FT Belvoir), 2.

²⁰ Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) The Effects of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness, (Fort Leavenworth, KS): U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Special Study, February 1996, 3 & 9.

²¹ Castro, 6.

²² United States General Accounting Office, Military Operations, Impacts of Operations Other than War on the Services Varies. Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Readiness and Management Support, Committee on Armed Services U.S. Senate (May 1999), 11.

²³ Ibid, 11

²⁴ American Military Culture in the 21st Century. A CSIS Report, January 2000.

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