Engagement Force: A Solution to Our Readiness Dilemma
Abstract
Since 1989, the number of small-scale conflicts, humanitarian emergencies and other similar contingencies has increased at a phenomenal rate from 16 (1947-1989, the Cold War period) to 45 (1989-1997). The Army's increased participation in and long duration of these small-scale contingencies (SSCs), with resultant high OPTEMPO was not foreseen, nor was its impact on Army readiness. While combat arms unit's train for and execute SSCs, their warfighting skills atrophy and combat proficiency declines. This phenomenon threatens the Army's ability to successfully accomplish its primary mission - fighting and winning two near simultaneous MTWs. Because of increased participation in SSCs, the Army's readiness problems have become progressively worse over the past few years. At the center of the Army's readiness dilemma is the mismatch between current mission requirements and forces available. This paper examines the effect of engagement activities and SSCs on conventional warfighting unit readiness through analysis of recent operational deployments. The paper then describes the advantages of using specialized rather than general-purpose forces for engagement activities and SSCs. Finally, the paper outlines the force structure for a proposed corps-sized organization called "Engagement Force", which is designed to conduct theater engagement activities and 550 operations while allowing the preponderance of the Army to train and focus on MTW readiness.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 10, 2000
- Accession Number
- ADA377643
Entities
People
- Timothy D. Cherry
Organizations
- United States Army War College