



**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

**PEACETIME MILITARY ENGAGEMENT:
A RELEVANT ASPECT OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY**

BY

**COMMANDER DANIEL E. NAGEL
United States Navy**

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for Public Release.
Distribution is Unlimited.**

USAWC CLASS OF 2000



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

20000526 052

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

PEACETIME MILITARY ENGAGEMENT: A RELEVANT ASPECT OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

by

Commander Daniel E. Nagel
United States Navy

Captain Thomas Arminio, United States Navy
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Daniel E. Nagel

TITLE: PEACETIME MILITARY ENGAGEMENT: A RELEVANT ASPECT OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 10 April 2000

PAGES: 28

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

This paper provides review of the United States military engagement posture as it exists today and some conclusions and recommendations for consideration. First, it reviews the world at the close of the 20th century and some thoughts on how this occurred. The United States perspective on the world, and some world perceptions of the United States are explored prior to providing a thumbnail sketch of the major regions of the world and what United States' interests and involvement are currently, and potentially for the future. Finally, some conclusions and recommendations are offered from the author's perspective on concepts and ideas that may be considered for the future.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
PEACETIME MILITARY ENGAGEMENT: A RELEVANT ASPECT OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY.....	1
THE WORLD TODAY	2
WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE?	4
NEW WORLD ORDER/OLD WORLD ORDER.....	5
GLOBAL PERCEPTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES.....	6
UNITED NATIONS.....	6
WESTERN EUROPE/NATO	7
RUSSIA AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS).....	9
AFRICA.....	10
MIDDLE EAST/SOUTHWEST ASIA	11
SOUTH ASIA, ASIA-PACIFIC, AND THE FAR EAST	12
THE AMERICAS/CARIBBEAN	13
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	14
ENDNOTES	19
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	21

PEACETIME MILITARY ENGAGEMENT: A RELEVANT ASPECT OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

America hates war.

America hopes for peace.

Therefore, America engages in the search for peace.

--Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 5 October 1937¹

As the world moves into the 21st century it is fitting to evaluate the global peacetime engagement policies of the United States military. More specifically, what are the best courses to pursue, and what are the best alternatives to armed conflict in the emerging global environment? Even more important, what alliances and associated strategies will pay the greatest dividends in the event that these alternatives fail? Can the United States military afford to stay the course with current military engagement strategies and paradigms (e.g., NATO, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Korea, Japan, etc.) or is there a better way? Is it possible to separate these engagement strategies by Service? These are particularly relevant questions in light of diminished defense budgets, shrinking military force structure, and increased international and domestic commitments to military operations other than war.

The United States currently, and for the foreseeable future, boasts the world's most technologically advanced armed forces. There are currently no peer competitors to challenge this technological advantage nor the current overwhelming advantage the United States enjoys as an individual economic power. Indications are that this will continue to be the case in the near and mid-term future, barring significant changes to the current world order. Technology and limited resources can only be stretched so far however, and beyond that point, diplomacy and robust theater engagement plans must buttress influence and power.

Under the current national security strategy, United States military presence takes three basic forms: crisis response, deterrence, and peacetime engagement (includes forward presence). Of these, peacetime engagement promises to provide the greatest return on investment in achieving the critical balance that enables the United States to protect its national interests. These engagement opportunities have the potential for broad participation that goes beyond individual Service initiatives, and on a larger scale, United States' unilateral action. The payoff is strategic shaping that can effect meaningful and beneficial change to international scenes that have proven a major challenge to United States foreign policy.² While crisis response and deterrence will remain critical military missions, effective engagement will minimize the need to execute them.

While the individual Services within the Department of Defense will maintain distinct roles and functions, there will surely be continued migration toward greater 'jointness,' interdependency, and elimination of redundancies. The result will be more coherent unified engagement plans driven by the

geographic Commanders-in-Chief. To maximize the effects of strategic shaping, engagement plans must be inextricably and synergistically bound to United States foreign policy.

The most universally 'engaged' element of the United States military community, and coincidentally the most integrated and jointly functional arm, is without a doubt the special operations community. Operating under one unified commander since April 1987, the U.S. Special Operations Command has integrated the various Service forces into a virtually seamless team. To achieve a similar synergy, the Services will have to continue to look beyond traditional boundaries and broaden current efforts to realize a more comprehensive joint perspective.

THE WORLD TODAY

Many refer to George Washington as the Father of our nation. From any perspective, he was indeed a critical influence on shaping the fundamental principles of the United States as a nation. It is interesting to note that he was impressed by the six volumes of British historian Edward Gibbon's, The Rise and Fall of the Roman Empire. Washington was particularly struck by a passage that provided some insight into Roman military power:

The terror of the Roman arms added weight and dignity to the moderation of the emperors. They preserved peace by a constant preparation for war; and while justice regulated their conduct, they announced to the nations on their confines that they were as little disposed to endure as to offer injury.³

In his first annual message to Congress, Washington paraphrased this lesson noting that, "to be prepared for war, is one of the most effective means of preserving peace."⁴

Washington's observation has been validated repeatedly. As he knew over two hundred years ago, in the long run it costs far more to be unprepared for war than it does to anticipate, shape, prepare, deter, and respond. A continuous difficulty in executing this task is tailoring those preparations in a way that makes them viable, affordable, and executable. In other words, there must always be the classic balance between the ends, ways, and means of an engagement strategy.

The world today however, is vastly different from that which existed 200 years ago or even ten years ago, for that matter. In 1989, the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact marked the definitive end of the Cold War. As an international superpower, the United States did not have time to revel in this victory and contemplate what President George Bush coined as the "New World Order." The United States entered the last decade of the twentieth century by embarking on key military missions that focused on United States interests, often on a unilateral basis. Concurrent with increased military engagement, the nation struggled with adapting its national security strategy and military structure to fit the New World Order. While the Department of Defense struggled with post-Cold War downsizing and adapting the Services and National Military Strategy to the New World Order, operations were often conducted on an ad hoc basis without clearly defined planning. This is certainly not an indictment of all

post-Cold War operations, but operations such as those undertaken in Somalia and the Balkans were initiated without a clearly defined military end state.

What are the nation's challenges today? The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) completed in 1997 specified five "vital national interests" that are the basis for defining our national military requirements (the next QDR process is already underway):

- Protecting the American homeland, especially against attacks employing nuclear, chemical, or biological "weapons of mass destruction."
- Preventing the reemergence overseas of hostile regional powers or coalitions.
- Guarding the security of global lines of communication at sea, in the air, and in space.
- Ensuring unfettered access to key markets, energy supplies, and strategic resources.
- Deterring and/or defeating aggression against allies and friends.⁵

Additionally, the Secretary of Defense's 1999 Annual Report identified major near-term security challenges to United States interests:

- Large-scale, cross-border aggression by hostile regional powers such as Iraq and North Korea.
- Flow of potentially dangerous technologies to overseas adversaries, particularly technologies relevant to weapons of mass destruction, information warfare, or space access.
- Transnational dangers such as terrorists and drug cartels that operate with little regard for national borders.
- Threats to the United States homeland, including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, information warfare infrastructure attacks, organized crime and uncontrolled immigrations flows.
- Failed states such as Somalia and Zaire, where the collapse of effective government has allowed the spread of lawlessness and disorder.
- Adversary use of asymmetric means, in other words, enemies' exploitation of novel tools and tactics to circumvent superior United States conventional forces.⁶

The "Partnership for Peace" established in January 1994 was offered to all former Warsaw Pact nations, including Russia. This offer greatly concerned Russia. This offer was interpreted as Western encroachment on the government of the former Soviet Union, and a divisive influence to their newly formed Confederation of Independent States. Situations such as the ethnic disputes in the republics of the former Yugoslavia and Western efforts to resolve or diffuse them further alienated the Russian government by eliminating yet another former sphere of influence. In short, a former world superpower continues to see its ability to impact regional and global situations marginalized.

Discussion of the potentially volatile and important world issues and concerns could go on indefinitely. Some examples are:

- Drug smuggling, illegal immigration, corruption, etc. in the Americas and Caribbean nations.

- Civil wars, ethnic violence, border disputes, corruption, famine, economic instability, etc. on the African continent.
- The Middle East Peace Process, Iran, Iraq, proliferation of WMD, etc. in Southeast Asia.
- Proliferation of WMD, ethnic violence, civil wars, economic instability, narcotics trade, etc. in Central and South Asia.
- Regional tensions, proliferation of WMD, economic and trade issues, etc. in West Asia.

The preceding lists merely scratch the surface of the diverse issues that form the complex global environment that exists today. There are additional global issues that will continue to affect the world for years to come: environmental concerns and exploitation; population explosion; technological explosion; and exploitation of space. Again, this is far from an exhaustive list. If nothing were to change from this day forward, the complex challenges of the 21st century are already well beyond the scope and ability of the United States to address alone. In order to impart decisive impact on a global scale, the United States will have to become increasingly reliant on a comprehensive foreign policy and a peacetime military engagement strategy that includes strategic alliances and cooperative action.

WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE?

A safe assumption to be made about the future is that the United States, having been the leading world power during most of the 20th century and the major victor of the Cold War, will continue to be afforded a plethora of potential opportunities to use the creative talents of the nation and instruments of power to influence international growth and change. What are some of the trends and opportunities that can reasonably be expected for the 21st century?

The world population will continue to grow, particularly in underdeveloped and/or developing nations. This phenomenon will undoubtedly contribute to continued crises of the human condition. Indisputable outgrowths will be the threat of famine, unemployment (and resultant poverty), continuing environmental concerns, and political unrest (contributing to the continued threat of terrorism). These trends will persist and will be very slow to turn worldwide.

The triumph of the West over the former Soviet bloc has contributed greatly to the continued growth and spread of budding democratic states worldwide. In an idealistic United States' view of democracy, most of these states would be considered less than democratic. This is due to virtual one-party systems and other governmental restrictions on traditional democratic principles, as viewed by the United States. However, there is great potential to guide these states toward greater democratic growth. This is especially true in the republics of the former Soviet Union.

Trends in Western Europe and the continued development of the European Union indicate a tenor of mutual collaboration among nations responsive to the collective needs and aspirations of the people. This trend has the potential for significant impact on many of the republics of the former Soviet Union. However, concurrent with the collaborative trend is an equally growing trend of nationalism. People tend to be more disillusioned with strict party politics. Spiritual politics (e.g., Islamic, Christian, Judaic fundamentalism, etc.) continue to grow in influence. Reaching beyond the emerging

fundamentalist features, all these political trends lend themselves to, the more or less, holistic principles of the best ideals of 20th century democratic philosophy.⁷

Everything considered, the European Union created high expectations, both inside and outside the European community. These expectations have yet to be realized and indications are that the complex environment in which the European Union was spawned will ensure a slower realization of potential than initially anticipated. Despite future promise, the member states have proven reluctant to perform to the higher standard of a single cohesive actor to date. That is not to say that there is not continued enthusiastic interest, as evidenced by the ability of the European Union to draw its northern, eastern, and southern neighbors into an increasingly complex web of agreements.⁸

NEW WORLD ORDER/OLD WORLD ORDER

“If you reach for the push button, you reach for suicide.” Nikita Krushchev

What is the nature of the world in which we live today? What is meant by the so called “New World Order” and how does it differ from the “Old World Order”? The epitome of the “Old World Order” is characterized in the statement above by Nikita Krushchev; the threat of mutual assured destruction. The “New World Order” is more difficult to summarize so succinctly. How are engagements determined? Why Somalia and not neighboring Sudan; why Bosnia and Kosovo and not Tajikistan? The list goes on. Since the collapse of the former Soviet Union there have been at least 44 different conflicts which crossed the threshold of costing the lives of at least 1000 persons. Why is it that the United Nations has only demonstrated interest in less than half of those and made significant contribution to resolving even less?⁹ Has the New World Order really changed the world today?

It was on the occasion of the Gulf War that President George Bush proclaimed the existence of a New World Order. Shortly following this proclamation came corollary theses, “the death of Communism” and “the end of History”¹⁰ (referring to the end of the history of ideological conflict). When President Bush coined the term, he was referring to the change in international politics that was brought about by the Commonwealth of Independent States and the change in global ideological clashes that saw the diminished political influence of the former Soviet Union. The death of communism was an overly optimistic hope of some. In Asia there is still the People’s Republic of China and North Korea, and Cuba is less than a hundred miles off the coast of the United States. China, the last real bastion of communism, shows no signs of going away in the foreseeable future. Like the wide range of what can be termed a democracy, how is communism defined? Is it Bolshevik, Marxist, Leninist, Stalinist, Maoist, etc., or perhaps a hybrid that may itself evolve? Although nominal democracies are the predominant (and increasing) forms of government, communism is not going to be erased from the international scene anytime soon. The governments of the world today are amalgams that are tailored to specific states and represent ideological and political blends suited to the party in power and the nation governed.

To look at the collapse of the Soviet Union as marking the end of a world history of ideological conflict was an unrealistic assumption. If anything, the break up of the Soviet Union into the

Commonwealth of Independent States has broadened the scope of international crises in Europe, as well as other areas of the globe.

GLOBAL PERCEPTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

How a people of a nation views the United States will generally have a significant impact on the engagement opportunities the United States has available. Research indicates the most consequential impact on a nation's perception of the United States is a result of cultivation through media influence (i.e., television, films, books, magazines, newspapers, etc.). Cultivation is a slow and continuous process that persists no matter what the government or political climate.¹¹ These images are a persistent manifestation in every culture and it is important to understand that general perceptions can have a major impact on the effectiveness of foreign policy.

Some perceptions around the world are more long lived. Civilization, as we recognize it in the West, is really just over two centuries old and is generally associated with emphasis on secular and progressive human self-development. As Western societies advanced, "civilization" was used as an excuse to justify imperialism and carry "civilization" to those areas of the world still fettered by savagery and barbarism. Despite the fact that certain countries (e.g., Greece, Iraq, Iran, China, and Egypt) had established advanced civilizations centuries before, the West viewed them as only half-civilized, at best. After all, a nation could not be truly 'developed' until it had the processes to support an industrial and trading economy.¹² This 'rule' persisted well into the middle of the 20th century, and is still applied by some. William Howard Taft stated regarding the governments of Central America that, "[We] have the right to knock their heads together until they should maintain peace between them."¹³ Toward the end of the 20th century another United States president spoke of the United States requirement to "kick butt" in the same region.¹⁴

The point is, perceptions of the people of the world are what ultimately shape the long-term engagement opportunities the United States will have. Far too often the United States has pursued foreign policy exclusively with governments and not with the nation. Regimes will change, the people will remain and the United States has discovered all too often that a change in government can drastically alter the relationship with a nation. A prime example is the United States-Iranian relations after 1979. It can be reasonably argued that continued United States support of the failed regime of Shah Reza Pahlavi after the Iranian revolution of 1978-1979 removed any possibility of formal diplomatic relations with a post-revolutionary Iran.

UNITED NATIONS

We the Peoples of the United Nations...United for a Better World -

- to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
- to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and

- to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and
- to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

And for these ends

- to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and
- to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and
- to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and
- to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,

Excerpt from the PREAMBLE TO CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 26 June 1945¹⁵

As established in 1945, the United Nations assumed the monumental task of saving the world from global cataclysm. During the first forty-five years it had a somewhat narrow focus. This ironically resulted from the unintended stabilizing effect that stemmed from the global competition for influence of the two world superpowers. The end of the Cold War left a partial vacuum of international engagement by competing superpowers. Accordingly, the United Nations has been assuming an increasingly prevalent role in international mediation. This ranges from conducting humanitarian efforts around the globe, oversight of the peaceful resolution of conflicts, to organizing and observing elections.

Peacekeeping and peace enforcement activities are a growth industry. This new found enthusiasm and a widespread appreciation for these activities portends continued interest and more ubiquitous operations of this nature in the future. It is significant to note that the distinction between the United Nations activities listed in Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the Charter are becoming blurred. These so-called "Chapter VI and a half" activities sometimes raise the question of the objectivity and non-partisan role of United Nations personnel. By all accounts however, the United Nations is being projected for even greater activity in this arena. Whether the United Nations can make any significant strides in the maintenance of international peace and security for the future is one of those predictions that is very difficult to make.¹⁶ Likewise, it will also be very dependent on how the principle member nations posture and empower the United Nations to carry out its tasks and responsibilities.

WESTERN EUROPE/NATO

Significant changes have taken place in NATO since the creation of this alliance in 1949. These changes address the challenges that emerged following the end of the Cold War:

- 1990 – The “London Declaration” resulted from the first post-Cold War meeting. It outlined proposals for the development of cooperation with former adversaries in central and Eastern Europe.
- 1991 – The Rome Summit followed in the wake of the liberation of Kuwait and produced two major initiatives: 1) A new strategic concept that reduced reliance on nuclear weapons and made substantial reductions in military force structure and readiness requirements. 2) A declaration of cooperation goals and methods.
- 1994 – The Brussels Summit confirmed the importance of United States participation as a fundamental element in European security (the Trans-Atlantic Link), launched Partnership for Peace, endorsed the concept of a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), and considered measures to promote security in the Mediterranean (to include North Africa).
- 1997 – The Madrid Summit yielded an “enlarged” NATO (Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic were invited to join) and the strategic concept was modified to account for alliance security in a “global concept” with no identified enemy.¹⁷

There are however, fundamental questions that remain which must be resolved. These will have great impact on the future effectiveness and relevance of NATO. How should the United States continue to play in European security? What is the fair-share contribution of member nations? How far can NATO expand before it outgrows its utility as a mutual defensive alliance and becomes something else?

Currently, United States trade with Europe amounts to over \$250 billion annually and produces over three million domestic jobs. United States companies employ three million people in Europe. One in twelve factory workers in the United States is employed by a European Union firm operating in the United States (at this time there are over 4000). Europe buys 30 percent of United States exports. Fifty-six percent of United States investment occurs in Europe. Half of the world’s goods are produced in the United States and Europe.¹⁸ These staggering figures alone indicate the enormous economic interdependence between the United States and Europe and do not include the equally monumental political, cultural, and diplomatic ties.

Regarding fair share contributions, the United States currently provides the bulk of numerous aspects of the military security. There continue to be repeated attempts, particularly by the French, to establish a strictly Western European security pact. For reasons stated above, this is almost certainly not in the best interests of the United States.

When it comes to relevance, it is apparent from the numerous summits cited that NATO is striving to adapt to the changing global environment in order maintain its relevance. However, if NATO continues to expand to include most of Europe (Eastern and Western), what defines the threat? It is very conceivable that a burgeoning NATO could lead to international perceptions of a North American/European coalition to stifle East Asian, Central Asian, and/or South American economic and military potential.

The bottom line is the United States should maintain a solid focus on Western Europe. At the same time, unbridled expansion should be critically reviewed for first, second, and third order effects.

RUSSIA AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS)

There is no denying that the Yeltsin era in Russia is at an end. His chosen successor, Vladimir V. Putin, is by no means taking control of a well-oiled machine. How successful Putin is will be determined by a large amount of luck, political acumen, and outside assistance. The political and economic future of the nation remains uncertain. The Russian government in the 21st century may be vastly different than the present. There is a myriad of possibilities. Is there a way to hedge our bets to ensure manageable relations with the potential future in Russia? What happens to the CIS? Clear-cut solutions are not forthcoming.

Three plausible regimes (in relative order of likelihood) could emerge over the next few decades:

- A centrist government – Expect a continuation of reform and conservatism and continued migration toward a Western-style democracy that has characterized the government since 1993. While the major focus will be regaining the stability and prosperity of the Russian Federation and assert its destiny (someday) as a great power wherever possible, they will still try to assert greater influence in the CIS and abroad. Economic concerns and weak state control will likely see continued sale of nuclear power technology and advanced weapons sales abroad (often to countries not considered 'friendly' by United States standards), but the government will continue to pursue cordial relations with the West for economic reasons.¹⁹
- A communist revival – This is a likely outcome if a centrist government is unable to show continued progress over the nation's economic troubles. Expect a recentralized administrative and economic authority under a strong state apparatus. The nation would likely retreat into isolationism in order to consolidate its power base. Likewise, expect nationalized industry and financial institutions and restriction of the press and other civil liberties. A slow recapitalization of the military and inexpensive diplomatic and economic manipulation to encourage integration within the CIS. Exerting its interests outside would likely be pursued primarily diplomatically (e.g., formal protests and UN Security Council vetoes).²⁰
- Aggressive Nationalism – This type government might arise through several channels: 1) An incumbent administration adopts nationalist policies to shore up domestic support; 2) A military coup; 3) Russian voters may elect a nationalist president for a number of reasons (many prominent Russian leaders hold very nationalist views). The most prevalent theme of this type of government will be establishment of a strong Russian State at home and abroad (to include curtailing the autonomy of Russia's regions). A major priority would be given to recapitalizing the Russian military and its supporting military-industrial base through a significant increase in spending.²¹

Russia is by any estimation a nation with great potential, politically and economically. However, corruption and organized crime are so pervasive at all levels of government, that it is unlikely that there will be a governmental machine strong enough to create any widespread and rapid turnaround in the near term. Like so many other situations, Russia certainly bears close and continuous monitoring. With the world's largest arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons, she represents a potent force to be reckoned with, one which the United States can ill afford to allow to collapse. The challenge is in how to effectively foster change from within without getting in too deep and without alienating the government to the point of crisis. It is easy to discern that a former superpower government marginalized by its former satellites, being welcomed into the prosperous Western fold while facing financial crisis on the home front, could be pushed to the brink of despair. It is also very disconcerting when that government possesses a vast arsenal of nuclear weapons and is capable of delivering them almost anywhere in the world.

AFRICA

Virtually the entire continent is in turmoil or teetering on the edge of the abyss. In northern Africa there appear some tenuous vestiges of stability, or at least endurance (e.g., Libya, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia). On the West Coast, one of the long held bastions of stability, the Ivory Coast, is precariously perched on the edge of economic and political turmoil; this despite its outward modern appearance. The struggle to overcome the vestiges of apartheid notwithstanding, the economic and political picture in South Africa is surprisingly healthy. The continent of Africa is a wealth of natural resources likely to play an important role in the 21st century. Unfortunately, throughout the entire continent ethnic violence and conflict is the norm and political instability is rampant. The majority of the continent has suffered centuries of exploitation from imperialist colonial rule. Throughout most of the continent, the result is unbridled population growth, disease (primarily HIV and AIDS), poverty, starvation, and unstable borders.

In October 1999, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright visited six African nations. Her purpose was two-fold; reassuring Africans that the United States was still interested in the continent's affairs and to persuade Congress that Africa still mattered. Despite these efforts, the consistent message from the West is the promotion of African solutions to African problems. This posture is not without contradiction, however. A strongly worded report issued by an international panel of experts held the United Nations and leading member countries, particularly the United States, responsible for not ending the genocide in Rwanda in 1994.²² This report was issued concurrent with Secretary of State Albright's visit. These incongruous messages succinctly sum up the defining question regarding sub-Saharan Africa; does it matter, and if so, how much? No matter how this question is answered, Western attitudes regarding sub-Saharan Africa will not change quickly.

Since the end of the Cold War (1990-1998) there were 975 external interventions worldwide. About one quarter occurred in sub-Saharan Africa. The African continent will continue to be a hot bed of social and political unrest for decades to come.²³ At least for the near-term, the question of relevance will almost always arise when the question of sub-Saharan Africa is raised. Where does this region fit in a prioritized foreign policy constrained by resources? There are currently no vital United States interests in

the region. The relevance question will be answered in future assessments of Africa's importance, and if and when the United States wants to become engaged in order to maintain influence and access in the region.

One serious consideration in Africa is the use of local states as intervenors in regional ethnic conflicts. The idea is to provide a sub-Saharan Africa regional intervention group. In September 1996 the Clinton administration announced the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and allocated \$35 million to fund its start up costs and the European Command as the executive agent. The implementation of ACRI is being developed in consultation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations. ACRI's mission is straightforward: Train and equip peacekeeping troops from a number of African nations. These forces would maintain a specified readiness level and be stationed in their native country, but ready for rapid deployment to areas of crises in Africa. The basic goal is to develop the capacity to respond rapidly and effectively to emergency situations in Africa with a standardized force of 5,000-10,000 peacekeepers. United States Special Operations Forces are the principal actors in conducting the training. Initial training has been completed in Senegal, Uganda, Malawi, and Mali. Training is currently underway in Ghana, and planned in Ethiopia (indefinitely postponed due to conflict with Eritrea). The United States is also trying to involve other African nations (e.g., South Africa and Botswana). Other nations (e.g., France, United Kingdom, and Denmark) are trying to assist in fostering peacekeeping efforts in areas that were former colonies.²⁴

MIDDLE EAST/SOUTHWEST ASIA

This region has seen political unrest and aggression for centuries. Many United States presidents have futilely tried to foster peace in the region. Despite the tension, regime changes, and conflict that have been representative of the region for the past three decades (e.g., Algeria, Sudan, Qatar, Yemen, Israel, Syria, Iraq, Iran, etc.), it has remained a region of relatively stable political boundaries. Unlike Africa and Europe, the nation states have maintained their identities, despite regime changes. This is not to say that there is not potential for things to unravel at any one of a number of seams. Aged and ailing rulers, young and growing population masses, fractures along tribal boundaries, terrorism (state sponsored and otherwise), proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (and associated delivery systems), and a growing disparity in the distribution of wealth and accompanying political unrest are only a few of the critical problems that plague the region.

The United States will remain engaged in the region for a number of vital and important interests. First, until an alternate fuel source is discovered, the area of the Arabian Gulf will figure prominently as an area of vital interest to the United States. Closely related is the need to maintain a stable regional balance that is favorable to the United States. As long as the United States is a principal ally to Israel, the efforts to successfully conclude the peace process will continue. The United States will also continue to be involved in ensuring freedom of navigation along vital lines of communication.

Currently, the United States conducts a policy of dual containment of the Republic of Iraq and the Islamic Republic of Iran. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein has demonstrated his intransigence in pursuing a

policy of maintaining and recapitalizing his remaining WMD capability, maintaining his hold on power, and ultimately rearming the Iraqi military machine; all at the expense of the Iraqi people. However, it is difficult to say that this policy has been without benefit to Saddam Hussein. The broad support for United Nations economic sanctions is showing increasing signs of crumbling. Meanwhile, Iran is showing increasing signs of democratization. The recent victory (although not overwhelming) of Iran's reformers in parliamentary elections is the best indicator. President Mohammad Khatami has pledged that he will use this victory to remake Iran from an insular country of disjointed ruling elites into a truly democratic state ruled by a clear set of constitutional laws. Perhaps it is time to reevaluate United States policy in the region.²⁵

While the United States has strong and enduring ties in the Arabian Gulf with the nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), there are very few formal agreements. The United States is also a major supplier of military equipment to the region, but the GCC militaries are far from compatible in any kind of cooperative defense scenario. The United States will continue to provide the primary security umbrella for the region, at least for the near to mid-term future.

Israel is the single largest recipient of United States foreign military aid. With the end of the Cold War, is it time to reevaluate the unequivocal support posture that the United States has always provided? Instead, should foreign policy decisions be more focused on what best serves United States vice Israeli interests?

Right behind Israel in receipt of foreign military aid is the Arab Republic of Egypt. Military-to-military contacts and engagement have increased significantly since the end of the Cold War. Strategically located and a significant leader in the Arab world, Egypt will continue to be a principal player in the region.

From Egypt westward, the Maghreb Arab nations present no vital interests to the United States. With their significant ties to the Western European nations in trade and history, they could arguably be a significant focus of the NATO alliance as NATO begins to look south.

SOUTH ASIA, ASIA-PACIFIC, AND THE FAR EAST

Asia is an area of great interest and will, without doubt, be a major area of concern in the 21st century. It is a very diverse, as well as an economically and politically powerful region. Due to potential regional conflict, population growth, enormous economies, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international trade routes, nations such as Pakistan, India, the People's Republic of China (PRC), Australia, Taiwan, the Koreas, and Japan will all be critical players in the foreseeable future. How the United States manages its relationship with the PRC could very well be the foremost foreign policy challenge for the United States in the 21st century.²⁶ Some of the key issues affecting the posture that the United States will adopt in the region are:

- The unrivaled ascendant power in the region is the PRC.
- Most Asian nations view the chief threat in the region to be the PRC.

- The ten members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) are still not bound into a tight knit alliance that unites the region in achieving confederated goals.
- Most Asian nations do not have large legacy military industries.
- Vital United States maritime interests provide a natural basis for Asian alliance with the United States²⁷

While this region has great potential power, like all regions it has its trouble spots. India will probably become the most populous nation in the world within the next decade and a half while her economy continues on a downward spiral. India and Pakistan are fledgling nuclear powers and adversaries. Sri Lanka continues its long bloody and indecisive civil war. Indonesia shows signs it may be near collapse; an economy that declined 30 percent in 1998 and at the same time has an inflation rate near 100 percent. The PRC, the regional heavyweight, is going through serious growing pains. Privatization and reform of state owned enterprises are retreating from previous levels, despite the fact that most state owned enterprises are effectively bankrupt. Keeping them afloat with politically directed bank loans, plans to allocate \$1.2 trillion to infrastructure development, and a military shift to a more maritime focus all add to the PRC's economic woes. North Korea continues to wallow in economic despair.²⁸

The central focus of the region will continue to be the PRC. Great economic potential, a vast population, and government with expansionist motives will ensure this focus. Despite recent indicators of a warming of diplomatic relations and reestablishment of military-to-military contacts, there are equally ominous indicators of more sinister prospects in US-PRC relations. Some 600 translations of internal Chinese writings by 200 authors depict a PRC strategy to defeat a superior foe, using both military and nonmilitary means, such as propaganda, deception, and covert action. Details of these writings appear in the book, China Debates the Future Security Environment, published in January 2000 for the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment. The debate in the PRC is how rapidly the United States will decline in its current position as a world superpower. The PRC apparently now seeks to avoid head-on confrontation until around 2030, but still outlines various plans to confront carrier battle groups, conduct covert operations and pre-emptive attacks, and other means of asymmetric warfare.²⁹

Despite the economic, domestic, and political woes that plague the region, it will continue to be in the United States' best interest to foster and develop the economic and political potential of the region. Once again, this must be accomplished while infusing United States core economic and political values for the long term to ensure the environments are shaped in accordance with United States national interests.

THE AMERICAS/CARIBBEAN

Traditional assumptions the United States has maintained over the years regarding the Americas must achieve a more narrow focus. Historically, the United States generally handled its hemispheric concerns in well-meaning, but often clumsy and erratic ways (e.g., Nicaragua, Panama, Grenada, Colombia, etc.). The Americas (excluding the United States) is one of the least militarized regions of the

world, as well as one of the most democratized regions (only Cuba lacks any form of representative government). Despite democratization, a great percentage of the general population tends to be overwhelmingly disillusioned with the performance of their representative governments. Traditional political parties are often viewed as inflexible and corrupt, which at times has led to volatile results (e.g., the recent coup in Ecuador).

The most recent development is a United States \$1.3 billion antidrug aid package for Colombia to be spread over two years. Although White House drug czar Barry McCaffrey says that overall South American cocaine production has dropped 18 percent since 1995, Colombian production has skyrocketed. At the same time, Colombia has replaced Asia as the principal supplier of heroine to the United States. Colombian heroine production was nonexistent just a decade ago. This aid package certainly carries inherent risks.³⁰ The most acute risk lies with the American people. After spending \$600 million in aid for the war on drugs in Colombia, the nation is now poised to become the third largest recipient of United States' foreign military aid. The return on investment so far is perceived by many to have been a significant increase in quantity and diversity of the Colombian drug trade. Without a significant reduction in near term trafficking, this will almost assuredly be viewed by the United States' public as throwing good money after bad.

In the future, the United States policy in the Americas must support the region's stability and enhance hemispheric cooperation. As before, the Americas will continue to be an important showcase for United States intentions worldwide.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The world of the 21st century is certain to be one fraught with an overabundance of diplomatic and military challenges. When Gertrude Stein was on her deathbed, she asked her longtime companion, Alice Toklas, "Well, what are the answers?" Toklas replied, "There are none." "Then," Stein retorted, "what are the questions?"³¹ As Gertrude Stein was quick to recognize, if you do not have the answers, then you better be asking the right questions. Without posing penetrating questions to relevant scenarios you cannot expect to arrive at reasonably functional answers. In other words, the United States foreign policy must pose questions to which the potential answers are able to favorably and effectively shape a global environment to match United States interests. As the world superpower, this becomes a delicate balancing act in the form of power denial, power assertion and affirmation, and power sharing.³² All of these attributes must be specifically tailored to integrated global, regional, and national plans.

General Hugh Shelton, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff recently commented, "The fundamental purpose of our military forces is to fight and win the nation's wars. The military can do a lot of other things in support of our foreign policy and national interests, including maintaining America's presence around the globe, providing deterrence where appropriate and intervening if necessary." The lesson is, "we must bring all of our resources to bear -- our political, diplomatic, military, and economic -- if we expect to be successful solving nonmilitary problems, especially those that are rooted in religious, cultural or ethnic strife."³³

He clearly stated that the primary mission of the military is to fight and win the nation's wars, but he also clearly understands that the military will increasingly be used for other purposes. However, his most important message is that the employment of military power is no panacea, but that it is just one of the many tools that will be needed to effect a meaningful foreign policy.

As the world superpower, the United States must often (or chooses to) act unilaterally. Traditional allies are showing signs of being increasingly troubled by some United States unilateral actions. Additionally, traditional United States foreign policy has been one primarily of isolationism, which fosters unilateralism.³⁴ This behavior tends to be exacerbated by the dominant international position that the United States has held since the end of the Cold War. As the global economy and the information revolution continue to 'shrink' the world, isolationism and unilateralism are Siren's traps that should be avoided. An example of the rising hubris of the United States in the international scene is the following quote from former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski made only partly tongue in cheek, "...embrace an imperial geostrategy whose purpose is to prevent collusion and maintain security dependence among vassals, to keep tributaries pliant and protected, and to keep the barbarians from coming together."³⁵ The United States can ill afford the perception that such statements can foster. As the United States is intimately and inextricably involved in the affairs of the Americas, Western Europe, and Asia, so too must its foreign policy reflect such a connection. The alliances that the United States has developed over the years and the bilateral agreements it has fostered will continue to play an important role in integrating the United States into various regions. At the same time, the United States cannot rule out the prerogative of acting unilaterally. As a superpower this is always an option, but one which must be chosen very carefully.

To avoid marginalization, no matter what the foreign policy, the United States must remain engaged globally. This translates to maintaining the current policy of overseas military presence. In order to maximize cost effectiveness and ensure broad based support, new and old alliances must be constantly assessed for merit. The input and recommendations of the United States military (specifically the regional CINCs) must be an essential element to policy makers regarding these alliances. Moreover, theater engagement plans should be frequently reviewed to ensure maximum concurrence with foreign policy and enhancement of existing alliances.

The special operations forces are a powerful military engagement and shaping tool. They recognized early on the need for regional orientation, language proficiency, and knowledge of social, political, and economic factors around the globe. Familiarity with their focus regions and repetitive close work with foreign militaries and other institutions engender a unique cultural awareness. Additionally, their foreign internal defense and nation building activities will often render them (and consequently the United States military) a very significant influence in developing nations.

Security assistance organizations are resident in many nations and are an excellent means of assessing and reporting on situations and cultural climates in many regions. Likewise, defense attachés and other defense human intelligence sources are an excellent source of information. The Army has

been cultivating foreign area officers for over two decades. The Air Force and the Marine Corps have an almost equal history. The Navy inaugurated their foreign area officer program three years ago. These are important programs which currently are viewed as not being in the mainstream military and are generally not very career enhancing. This viewpoint should change.

As already noted, the NATO alliance has demonstrated its flexibility during several post-Cold War summits and has modified its strategic focus over the course of the previous decade. The United States is inextricably tied to Western Europe for the foreseeable future. It must be continuously vigilant to ensure the needs and desires of the European Union and their disparate views do not usurp its interests. The United States is legitimately involved in the affairs of Western Europe. The United States' social and economic well-being are undeniably linked to that of Western Europe; now, and for the foreseeable future. NATO must continue to evolve or it will wither on the vine.

Political alliances are going to continue to play a critical role in United States foreign policy. The Department of Defense needs to ensure that it is utilizing these alliances to the maximum extent possible through peacetime engagement. At the same time, it must look forward to potential opportunities to forge additional economy of force bilateral agreements that serve the interests of the United States. Crisis response and deterrence actions are the military activities that will surely make the news. For that reason the American public knows them as the most prevalent engagement tool of the United States military. By contrast, shaping through peacetime engagement can be the most effective means of effecting United States national values world-wide, but will almost assuredly make little in the way of noteworthy news. General Shalikashvili stated in his Joint Vision 2010, "...it [peacetime engagement] confirms our commitments, strengthens our capabilities, and enhances coalitions and multinational operations." According to the United States National Military Strategy, "...it reinforces regional stability, relieves human suffering, and promotes democratic ideals."³⁶ The focus on peacetime engagement needs to be pursued with an eye toward continuous engagement rather than large-scale exercises at widely spaced intervals. In other words, the centerpiece of engagement should be long term maintenance of meaningful communications and dialogue.

The most difficult aspect of engagement is focus. How does the United States maintain a robust and effective global engagement? Economy of force can only be stretched so far. As with virtually every endeavor, a classic balance of ends, ways, and means must be achieved. The solution would be easy if there were unlimited means to provide funding and personnel to support global unilateral engagement. The real challenge resides in tailoring and implementing a robust engagement posture (means) within the constraints of limited resources. The United States must choose engagement opportunities wisely and use economy of force to its best advantage. The key again resides in asking the right questions. What is the ultimate goal in the nation/region, is it supportable, and does it even make sense? Where are the best opportunities to effect favorable shaping strategies? While hope is not a method, it must be hoped that the choosing will be done wisely. What this really boils down to is synergizing Theater Engagement Plans to the National Military Strategy which ideally matches the National Security Strategy.

This may sound easy, but there are many peripherals, not the least of which is integrating national intelligence assets and summaries to ensure strategies (ends) are practical.

In what will surely continue to be a period of global commitments, a shrinking overseas presence, and (at best) static force levels, the United States must posture itself for future operations with allies, friends, and coalition partners. These operations will cover the entire spectrum of involvement, from observer/minor actor to unilateral actor. This necessitates the maintenance of traditional alliances, evaluation of their effectiveness, and forging new alliances to ensure effective shaping, relevance, and influence for the future. The United States foreign policy must be vibrantly alive and flexible, capable of continuous evaluation and reassessment. Military engagement will continue to be a relevant and integral tool in implementing a competent and comprehensive United States foreign policy.

Word Count: 8,129.

ENDNOTES

¹President Franklin Delano Roosevelt delivered these lines in a speech in Chicago, 5 October 1941, on the occasion of the Japanese invasion of China. Anthony Potter, producer, *Japan Invades China*, 51 min., Public Broadcasting Service, 1989, videocassette. (*Japan Invades China* is part 1 of 2 on the 51 min. videocassette. It is also part 1 of 16 in a PBS series entitled *Between the Wars*.)

²Robbin F. Laird and Holger H. Mey, *The Revolution in Military Affairs: Allied Perspectives*, McNair Paper 60, April 1999, (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University), p.7.

³Loren B. Thompson, *Military Supremacy and How We Keep It*, Reserve Officers Association National Security Report, November 1999, p. 29.

⁴Thompson, pp. 30-31.

⁵Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997, p. 8.

⁶William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, 1999 Annual Report, p.9.

⁷Mackubin Thomas Owens, *Gaps, Real and Imagined, American Society vs. Military Culture*, *Washington Times*, 1 November 1999.

⁸Carolyn Rhodes ed., *The European Union in the World Community*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998), p. 20.

⁹C. G. Jacobsen, *The New World Order's Defining Crises, The Clash of Promise and Essence*, (Aldershot, England: Dartmouth Publishing Company, Ltd., 1996).

¹⁰Jacobsen, p. 7.

¹¹Yahya R. Kamalipour ed., *Images of the United States Around the World*, (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999), pp. 10-13.

¹²Mike Mason, *Development and Disorder, A History of the Third World Since 1945*, (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1997), p. 5.

¹³Mason, p. 9.

¹⁴Mason, p. 10.

¹⁵Department of Public Information, *Yearbook of the United Nations 1946-1947*, (Lake Success, NY: United Nations, 1947), pp. 17-18.

¹⁶K.P. Saksena, *Reforming the United Nations; The Challenge of Relevance*, (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 1993), pp. 187-189.

¹⁷Richard L. Jaehne, NATO Alliance: Crisis in Transition, Swords and Ploughshares, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Volume II, Numbers 1-2, 1999, pp. 11-12.

¹⁸Wesley K. Clark, The United States and NATO: The Way Ahead, Parameters, Vol. XXIX, No. 4, Winter 1999-2000, pp. 4-5.

¹⁹Richard Weitz, Managing an Unpredictable Moscow, Parameters, Vol. XXIX, No. 4, Winter 1999-2000, pp. 72-74.

²⁰Weitz, pp. 74-75.

²¹Weitz, pp. 75-76.

²²United States and Africa: Unfulfilled Promises and Skepticism, New York Times, 25 October 1999.

²³Deepa Khosla, Third World States as Interveners in Ethnic Conflicts: Implications for Regional and International Security, Third World Quarterly, Volume 20, Number 6, 1999, pp. 1143-1145.

²⁴Project on Peacekeeping and the United Nations, A Project of the Council for a Livable World Education Fund, African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI): A Peacekeeping Alliance in Africa, pp. 2-3.

²⁵Susan Sachs, As Iran Counts the Vote, Some Fear Backlash, New York Times, 22 February 2000.

²⁶Ian James Storey, Living With the Colossus: How Southeast Asian Countries Cope with China, Parameters, Vol. XXIX, No. 4, Winter 1999-2000, p. 111.

²⁷Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive Defense, A New Security Strategy for America, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1999), p. 19.

²⁸Ronald N. Montaperto, Strategic Assessment 1999: Priorities for a Turbulent World, "Asia Pacific: Murky Future?," (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1999), pp. 124-125.

²⁹Bill Gertz, Pentagon Study Finds China Preparing for War With United States, Washington Times, 2 February 2000, p. 4.

³⁰Linda Robinson, Trainers, guns, and money for Colombia, U.S. News and World Report, 13 March 2000, p. 34.

³¹Jaehne, p. 6.

³²Laird and Mey, p. 13.

³³Henry Cuninghame, Shelton Says "Dover Test" Necessary, Death Potential Considered Factor, Fayetteville, N.C. Observer, 27 January 2000.

³⁴Charles William Maynes, United States Unilateralism and its Dangers, Review of International Studies, Volume 25, Number 3, July 1999, p. 515.

³⁵Maynes, p. 517.

³⁶General John Shalikashvili, Joint Vision 2010.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bryan, Ian, Capt., USAF. Military Success and Political Direction, Strategic Review, United States Strategic Institute, Volume XXVII, No. 4, Fall 1999.
- Carter, Ashton B. and William J. Perry, Preventive Defense, A New Security Strategy for America, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1999.
- Clark, Wesley K. The United States and NATO: The Way Ahead, Parameters, Vol. XXIX, No. 4, Winter 1999-2000.
- Cohen, William S., Secretary of Defense. 1999 Annual Report.
- Cuningham, Henry. Shelton Says "Dover Test" Necessary, Death Potential Considered Factor, Fayetteville, N.C. Observer, 27 January 2000.
- Gertz, Bill. Pentagon Study Finds China Preparing for War With United States, Washington Times, 2 February 2000.
- Jacobsen, C. G. The New World Order's Defining Crises, The Clash of Promise and Essence, Aldershot, England: Dartmouth Publishing Company, Ltd., 1996.
- Jaehne, Richard L. NATO Alliance: Crisis in Transition, Swords and Ploughshares, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Volume II, Numbers 1-2, 1999.
- Kamalipour, Yahya R., ed. Images of the United States Around the World, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999.
- Kegley, Charles K., Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond, A Multipolar Peace? Great Power Politics in the Twenty-first Century, New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1994.
- Khosla, Deepa. Third World States as Interveners in Ethnic Conflicts: Implications for Regional and International Security, Third World Quarterly, Volume 20, Number 6, 1999.
- Laird, Robbin F. and Holger H. Mey. The Revolution in Military Affairs: Allied Perspectives, McNair Paper 60, April 1999. Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.
- Mason, Mike. Development and Disorder, A History of the Third World Since 1945, Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1997.
- Mayne, Alan J. From Politics Past to Politics Future, An Integrated Analysis of Current and Emergent Paradigms, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1999.
- Maynes, Charles William. United States Unilateralism and its Dangers, Review of International Studies, Volume 25, Number 3, July 1999.
- Montaperto, Ronald N. Strategic Assessment 1999: Priorities for a Turbulent World, "Asia Pacific: Murky Future?," Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1999.
- Owens, Mackubin Thomas. Gaps, Real and Imagined, American Society vs. Military Culture, Washington Times, 1 November 1999.

- Rhodes, Carolyn, ed. The European Union in the World Community, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998.
- Robinson, Linda. Trainers, guns, and money for Colombia, U.S. News and World Report, 13 March 2000.
- Roosevelt, Franklin D. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt delivered these lines in a speech in Chicago, 5 October 1937, on the occasion of the Japanese invasion of China. Anthony Potter, producer, Japan Invades China, 51 min., Public Broadcasting Service, 1989, videocassette. (Japan Invades China is part 1 of 2 on the 51 min. videocassette. It is also part 1 of 16 in a PBS series entitled Between the Wars).
- Roskin, Michael G. The Emerging Europe: Power Configurations for the Next Century, Parameters, Vol. XXIX, No. 4, Winter 1999-2000.
- Sachs, Susan. As Iran Counts the Vote, Some Fear Backlash, New York Times, 22 February 2000.
- Saksena, K.P. Reforming the United Nations: The Challenge of Relevance, (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 1993).
- Shalikhavilli, John. Joint Vision 2010.
- Singh, Shri Jaswant. What Constitutes National Security in a Changing World Order? India's Strategic Thought, Columbia International Affairs Online Occasional Paper No. 6, June 1998.
- Storey, Ian James. Living With the Colossus: How Southeast Asian Countries Cope with China, Parameters, Vol. XXIX, No. 4, Winter 1999-2000.
- Thompson, Loren B. Military Supremacy and How We Keep It, Reserve Officers Association National Security Report, November 1999.
- Weitz, Richard. Managing an Unpredictable Moscow, Parameters, Vol. XXIX, No. 4, Winter 1999-2000.
- Whitney, Craig R. United States and NATO Allies Divided Over Defense Needs, The New York Times International, 3 December 1999.
- Project on Peacekeeping and the United Nations, A Project of the Council for a Livable World Education Fund, African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI): A Peacekeeping Alliance in Africa.
- Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997.
- United States and Africa: Unfulfilled Promises and Skepticism, New York Times, 25 October 1999.
- Yearbook of the United Nations 1946-1947. Department of Public Information, Lake Success, NY: United Nations, 1947.