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**THE UNITED NATIONS AND PEACE OPERATIONS  
IN EL SALVADOR**

**BY**

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## ABSTRACT

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This document presents an historical overview of the Salvadoran contra-insurgency war and the key role of the United Nations, which supported the legal framework to develop peace operations in order to keep the peace, security and the stability in this country.

The Salvadorian conflict, has been a special case in peacekeeping operations. The peace, stability and security in the Central American region was affected by many factors like differences of class, military regiment, polarization of the society, extreme poverty, etc, but especially by the cold war rivalry between the US and the USSR.

The role played by the UN during and after this conflict was exceptional. After many interventions and mediations between the parties in the conflict, and after a long period of deep reforms of the main state institutions, a democratic reality was created in Salvadorian society.

This case is important because the UN took an active role from the beginning to the end. In trying to solve the differences between the Salvadorian government and the contra insurgencies groups. Throughout the conflict, the Peace Process and the peacekeeping operation, the necessary conditions were created for a new democratic system, which reflected the changing roles of the major actors of Salvadorian society into the social, political, and military arenas.



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .....	III
LIST OF TABLES.....	VII
THE UNITED NATIONS AND PEACE OPERATIONS IN EL SALVADOR.....	1
UNITED NATIONS BACKGROUND.....	1
LEGAL AUTHORITY.....	2
PEACE OPERATIONS DOCTRINE.....	3
UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS DOCTRINE.....	4
UNITED STATES PEACE OPERATIONS DOCTRINE.....	5
THE MILITARY COUP D'ETAT IN EL SALVADOR.....	7
EL SALVADOR BEFORE 1979 .....	7
THE 1979 COUP D'ETAT .....	7
THE CONTRA-INSURGENCY WAR (1980-1992) .....	8
THE GOVERNMENT .....	9
THE FARABUNDO MARTI NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (FMLN).....	10
THE SALVADORIAN ARMED FORCES (AF) .....	12
THE RIGHT .....	13
THE CATHOLIC CHURCH .....	13
THE MEDIA.....	14
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY .....	14
THE SALVADORIAN PEACE PROCESS .....	16
THE PROCESS, OBJECTIVES, AND GOALS.....	16
THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE NEGOTIATIONS .....	17
EL SALVADOR UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION (ONUSAL).....	18
PEACE KEEPING OPERATION "WHITE DOVE" (UN - ONUSAL) .....	20
THE FIRST PHASE.....	21
THE SECOND PHASE .....	21
THE THIRD PHASE.....	22

THE FOURTH PHASE.....	22
FINAL PHASE "PHOENIX OPERATION".....	23
CONCLUSIONS.....	23
ENDNOTES.....	41
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	45

**LIST OF TABLES**

TABLE NO. 1 UNITED NATIONS MEMBER STATES..... 27

TABLE NO. 2 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS 35

TABLE NO. 3 SUMMARY AND CHRONOLOGY OF THE CONFLICT IN EL SALVADOR..... 36

TABLE NO. 4 SUMMARY OF THE SALVADORAN PEACE PROCESS..... 40



## **THE UNITED NATIONS AND PEACE OPERATIONS IN EL SALVADOR**

In this research, I'll try to establish the importance of the peace operations developed by the United Nation, as a multinational organization, which contribute to the establishment of peace, and stability in regions of conflicts. I will also describe how this organization, through a multinational military instrument, has developed different types of peace operations and helped to reestablish peace and democracy in El Salvador.

The UN concerned by the situation in El Salvador, was observing this country from the beginning of the conflict, taking an active role in every part of this, especially after the sign of peace accords by the Salvadorian Government and the Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional-FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front). The separation of the forces and other tasks, were controlled by military observers as a contingent commissioned to accomplish the peace accords through a successful peacekeeping operation. As a result of one of the most comprehensive efforts ever undertaken by the United Nations, El Salvador in 1995 could confidently be called a nation transformed.

This work includes the background of the UN and its peace operations' doctrine to understand more about this organization, a brief survey of the Coup d'etat in El Salvador as a turning point in the history of this country, general information about the contra-insurgency war in El Salvador, to understand the conflict between the FMLN and the governmental Armed forces, the peace process between the parties of the conflict and the active participation of the UN, and the phases of the "White Dove" peacekeeping operation as the last part in which the UN took part, consolidating after this a new style of life into a democratic system.

### **UNITED NATIONS BACKGROUND**

"The structure of the international community has developed from a sovereign state system established in 1648 by the Peace of Westphalia that ended the great Thirty Years War of Europe. This sovereign state system continued past practice and permitted the aggressive use of force as a lawful modality of diplomacy until the twentieth century. Two watershed legal precedents of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the creation of the UN, have outlawed the aggressive use of force and placed the primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security on the United Nations Security Council."<sup>1</sup>

The United Nations (UN), one of the most important international organizations in the world, has developed since it was created in 1945 into a very important international actor, helping many different countries and regions address different kinds of problems, such as conventional and unconventional warfare, natural disasters, and many other different types of problems. Special emphasis has been placed on helping people who have suffered the consequences of these situations, especially those where the order, stability, security, and peace have been affected. The UN is the only organization in the world that has outlawed the aggressive use of force and placed the primary responsibility for the

maintenance of international peace on the UN Charter. The UN Charter describes how the UN is organized and how it works, and its legal authority to restore order, and peace in regions or countries in conflict.

Currently, 188 states are member of the United Nations (see Table 1 "United Nations Member States"<sup>2</sup>) making the United Nations the international organization with the most universal membership. The UN has many responsibilities, among which is the use of the forces to resolve problems and to keep the order, peace and security in the world. Peace operations have been a main tool for reaching these objectives. The UN has developed different types of peace operations in many countries and regions around the world. "The El Salvador counterinsurgency war case has been one of the most successful peace keeping operations for the UN"<sup>3</sup>, because the UN exerted leadership in order to bring peace and stability after twelve years of war in this country.

## LEGAL AUTHORITY

The United Nations Charter tasks the United Nations with responsibility for

"Maintaining international peace and security and to that end, to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of the threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace and to bring about by peaceful means, and unconformity of the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to breach of the peace."<sup>4</sup>

Two key chapters of the Charter provide the legal authority for the Security Council to maintain international peace and security.<sup>5</sup> Chapter VI provides for the "Pacific Settlement of Disputes." This chapter requires the parties to any dispute that may endanger international peace and security to "seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, restore to international agencies or arrangement, or the other peaceful means of their own choice." Within this peaceful settlement mechanism, the Security Council has investigative powers and the authority to recommend "appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment." Charter VII peace operations rely upon the consent of the parties involved and are intended to be impartial.

The UN in order to reestablish order and peace, may take some economic, diplomatic, or military actions; and one of this often is the military action, commonly know as Peace Operations (PO). The use of this type of operation is based on international legal authority under the Charter of the United Nations, which provides an extensive and flexible international legal framework for the conduct of Peace Operations, under the responsibility of the Security Council of the UN. The UN member states are required by the UN Charter to carry out decisions of the Council.

Typically, military operations approved by the Security Council are approved and conducted by the forces of the UN Member States, which contribute to and organize on an ad hoc basis each operation. Operational control may be exercised by UN commanders, or may be exercised by one or more of the

states involved. Article 43 of the Charter provides for the possibility of special agreements with UN members to make units of the armed forces available to the Council.

In this sense, Chapter IV of the UN's Charter, in general terms authorizes the Security Council to investigate any situation that might endanger the maintenance of international peace and security and to make recommendations for the peaceful resolution of such disputes. Chapter VII of the Charter authorizes the Security Council to determine the existence of any threat or breach of the peace, or act of aggression and to make recommendations or decide on measures of a mandatory character to restore the peace. This may include economic and diplomatic sanctions or a broad range of military actions.

Article 41 of the charter states, "The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations."<sup>6</sup>

Article 42 states, " Should the Security Council consider that measures proven for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have provided to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstration, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land force of members of the United Nations."<sup>7</sup>

During peacetime, the presence of the United Nations or multinational forces in the territory of a sovereign state must occur with the consent of the receiving state or under the coercive authority of the Security Council. Under these two circumstances the United Nations, in accordance with its doctrine, can develop three types of Peace Operations: Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and Peace-enforcing.<sup>8</sup> (See Table No. 2 International Legal Authorities for United Nations Peace Operations).

## **PEACE OPERATIONS DOCTRINE**

For this research, I will emphasize two main approach to Peace Operations. The first one is the United Nations Peace Operations doctrine. The UN, when authorized by the Security Council, is the only international organization authorized by the international community to develop this type of operations. Second, the United States of America's armed forces as other powers can develop unilaterally peace operations according to their own interests. During the cold war the US acted against the communist threat and helped many countries to fight it. Central America (especially El Salvador) was a region where the US, applied its own doctrine of Peace Operations. The next section will more thoroughly explain these doctrines.

## **UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS DOCTRINE**

For the UN the peaceful mechanism established in chapter IV of the United Nations Charter provides for the "Pacific Settlement of Disputes." Within this peaceful settlement mechanism, the Security Council has investigative power and the authority to recommend "appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment". Chapter VI Peace Operations rely upon the consent of the parties involved and are intended to be impartial in nature. As defined by the United Nations Secretary-General in his *Agenda for Peace*, these consensual Peace Operations include preventive deployment, peacemaking, and peacekeeping operations, and are normally under the control of the Secretary-General. If diplomacy or chapter VI fails to maintain or restore international peace and security, chapter VII authorizes the Security Council to employ coercive force. Article 39 provides that the "Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security." Coercive measures not involving the use of armed force, such as economic sanctions or the severance of diplomatic relations are authorized in article 41. More forceful measures such as demonstrations, blockade, and other military operations involving the use of the force are authorized by article 42. The Secretary-General categorizes these article measures as peace-enforcement operations. To date, these operations have been authorized by the Security Council and conducted under the command and control of the Member States; however, the Charter does provide for the creation of a United Nations military force that would operate under the command and control of the United Nations.

Peace operations is a term used generally to include all United Nations authorized operations which involve the deployment of military forces or personnel into an area of tension or conflict in an effort to maintain or restore peace. The Secretary General in his *Agenda for Peace* described the following terms:

### **Preventive Diplomacy:**

"Is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur."

### **Peacemaking:**

"Is action to bring those parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in chapter VI of the United Nations charter."

### **Peace-Keeping:**

"Is the deployment of a United Nation's presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned. The deployment normally involves United Nations military and /or police personnel and frequently civilians, as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both prevention of conflict and the making of the peace."

### **Peace-building:**

"(A concept post conflict) is an action to identify and support structures, which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict."<sup>9</sup>

Preventive Diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out. Peacemaking and peacekeeping are required to halt conflict and preserve peace once it is attained. If successful, they strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict peace building, which can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples.

It is important to understand all these concepts in order to know which type of Peace Operations the UN has to develop for the type of problems that the UN is trying to help and support.

### **UNITED STATES PEACE OPERATIONS DOCTRINE**

The United States after WW I I, tried to achieve its own interests around the world by supporting democracy around the world. The US was the main actor during the Cold War period determined to stop the communist threat. In the post Cold War era the US continues to promote democracy in different countries or regions around the world. In this context, the US developed its own doctrine of Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW) which includes many types of operations such as Peace Operations. The US can participate in UN peace operations or unilaterally execute MOOTW to achieve its interests.

US doctrine coincides with the doctrine of many nations in recognizing the important but limited role for military forces in the creation of peace in today's turbulent world. MOOTW encompass a broad range of military operations and support a variety of purposes, including supporting national objectives, deterring war, returning to a state of peace, promoting peace, keeping day to day tensions between nations below the threshold of armed conflict, maintaining US influence in foreign lands, and supporting US civil authorities consistent with the applicable law.<sup>10</sup> Supporting these objectives is achieved by providing military forces and resources to accomplish a wide range of missions other than warfighting. The Principles of War, though principally associated with large-scale combat operations, generally apply to MOOTW. MOOTW may involve elements of both combat and noncombat operations in peacetime, conflict, and war situations.

Joint Pub 3-07 "Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War," states that MOOTW encompass sixteen types of operations:<sup>11</sup> Arms Control, Combating Terrorism, Department of Defense Support to Counterdrug Operations, Enforcement of Sanctions/Maritime Intercept Operations, Enforcing Exclusion Zones, Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight, Humanitarian Assistance, Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA), Nation Assistance/Support to Counterinsurgency, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), Peace Operations (PO), Protection of Shipping, Recovery Operation, Show of Force Operations, Strike and Raids, and Supporting to Insurgency.<sup>12</sup>

For US Armed Forces doctrine, Peace Operations are military operations to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long term political settlement and categorized as Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and

Peace Enforcement Operations. PO are conducted in conjunction with the various diplomatic activities necessary to secure a negotiated truce or to resolve a conflict. Additional types of MOOTW may complement peace operations, like Humanitarian Assistance (HA), Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), etc. Military PO are tailored to each situation and may be conducted in support of diplomatic activities before, during, or after the conflict.

US Armed Forces doctrine has established the following concepts relative to PO:

**Peacemaking Operations:**

"Are military operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major parties and are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreements) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long term political settlement."

**Peace Enforcement Operations:**

"Are the applications of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolution or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. PEOs can include intervention operations, as well as operations to restore order, enforce sanctions, forcibly separate belligerents, and establish and supervise exclusive zones for the purpose of establishing an environment for a truce or cease of fire. Unlike PKO, such operations do not require the consent of the states involved or of other parties to the conflict."

**Preventive Diplomacy:**

"Consists of Diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence. Military support to diplomacy may, for example take the form of a preventive deployment."

**Peacemaking:**

"Is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation or other form of peaceful settlement that arranges an end to a dispute, and resolves issues that led to conflict. Military activities that support peacekeeping include military-to-military relations and security assistance."

**Peace Building:**

"Consists of post-conflict actions, predominantly diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. Military support to peace building may include, for example, units rebuilding roads, reestablishing or creating government entities, or the training of defense forces."<sup>13</sup>

US Peace Operations as a part of MOOTW during the planning must consider besides the Principles of War, the six MOOTW principals: Objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy.<sup>14</sup>

Based on comparing these two doctrines, we can see that both UN and US Peace Operation doctrines are almost the same. We can also determine what kind of PO the UN in El Salvador's case applied, and the benefit that this type of operation brought to this country after the war.

## **THE MILITARY COUP D'ETAT IN EL SALVADOR**

### **EL SALVADOR BEFORE 1979**

The military governments in the majority of Latin American countries were established in order to stop the communist threat. The US government supported these governments as a part of its containment strategy. El Salvador was not the exception, and had its period of military governments (mainly 1932-1979). In 1972 a great controversy surrounded the presidential elections. Christian Democrat Jose Napoleon Duarte, a nominal moderate, apparently outpolled Partido de Conciliacion Nacional-PCN (Party of National Conciliation) candidate Colonel Arturo Armando Molina. However, a subsequent "official" government count gave the ruling PCN party a 22,000-vote victory; Molina's "election" was confirmed by the Congress, where the PCN enjoyed a two-third's majority. The military used a similar tactic for the presidential elections of 1977 when the ruling PCN candidate, General Carlos Humberto Romero, was declared the winner by a two-to-one margin over his opponent, another right-wing officer. When riots broke out against the rigged election, the government imposed martial law. Before order was restored, an estimated 100 protesters were killed.<sup>15</sup> A staunch conservative, General Romero was immediately faced with urgent problems of land reform, human rights and the Catholic Church, which had become reformist. He equated change from the old order with communism. Most of the fertile farmland in the valleys and lowlands (about 60% of total) continued to be owned by a handful of families who were closely allied to the ruling armed forces. In contrast, more than 65% of the population lived in abject poverty. Backed by the military, the conservative aristocracy had traditionally blocked disorganized peasant demands for land and reform. Wealthy landowners (including some military officers who owned large estates) feared a repetition of the unsuccessful peasant uprisings against the landed elite of 1932.<sup>16</sup> The pace of fighting between rightists and leftists rose dramatically after General Romero became President.

### **THE 1979 COUP D'ETAT**

As the nation moved toward complete chaos, a group of liberal army officers led by Colonel Adolfo Arnoldo Majano ousted President Romero in a bloodless coup on October 15, 1979. Power then shifted to a progressive five-man "Junta Revolucionaria de Gobierno" (Revolutionary Junta of Government), that included Col. Majano and two members of the centrist "Partido Democrita Cristiano- PDC" (Christian Democratic Party). The new rulers promised sweeping economic and social reforms that provided:<sup>17</sup>

1. Nationalization of the keys parts of the foreign trade industries, including coffee marketing,
2. Nationalization of the many banks (which traditionally provided loans only to the upper class),  
and
3. Land reform.

On paper, the land reform proposal was comparable in scope to similar measures taken in Mexico, Bolivia and Peru. The first phase, affecting 400 estates containing more than 1,235 acres each, would have redistributed about 600,000 acres of land (about 25% of the nation's arable land) to peasants. A second phase, planned for 1981, was to involve all farms larger than 370 acres. A major catalyst for reform was the Carter administration in Washington, which supplied El Salvador with economic and military assistance. Washington feared that unless fundamental reforms were enacted, El Salvador would slide into a disastrous class war.<sup>18</sup>

Such a conflict might well be won by leftists, who could then be expected to combine with radicals in Nicaragua to force Marxist governments onto neighboring Honduras and Guatemala. Conservative opposition to the Junta's reforms proved overwhelming, however, and right wing violence rose dramatically. The assassination of Catholic Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero in 1980 shocked the nation, and in 1980 conservatives murdered the head of the country's Human Rights Commission (its report had embarrassed the government).<sup>19</sup>

Appalled by this violence, President Carter halted all aid to El Salvador in late 1980. The Salvadorian military responded by taking aim at the Junta, but the result was unexpected. Majano was replaced by a new Junta, under the leadership of Jose Napoleon Duarte, of the Christian Democratic Party. A graduate of Notre Dame University, the 55 year old civil engineer pledged to move forward social reform. He took steps to control right wing military leaders reassigning some to isolated posts.<sup>20</sup>

#### **THE CONTRA-INSURGENCY WAR (1980-1992)**

Meanwhile (See Table No. 3 Summary and Chronology of the Conflict in El Salvador), the leftist groups, (Salvadorian Communist Party -PCS, National Resistance-RN, Revolutionary Army of People-ERP, Popular Force of Liberation-FPL and Worker of Camp Revolutionary Party-PRTC), made many terrorist actions in order to press and defeat the government. At that time, all these groups worked separately from each other, because every group had it own way and ideology with respect to how defeat the government and take the power in the country. Many differences existed between every group, but Fidel Castro with the goal of expanding communism to Central America, generally and El Salvador, specifically, pressed all these groups to join together in order to receive support form Cuba and the other communist countries. This support would be in the form of weapons, military training, military equipment, explosives, economic and political support or anything that these groups could need. These incentives were influential in the creation in October 10, 1980 of a new organization called "Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional-FMLN."<sup>21</sup>

On January 10, 1981 the guerrillas associated with FMLN launched a full-scale attack called "The Final Offensive," against government forces because they thought that the conditions for victory existed. Although supplied with Nicaraguan and Cuban arms, the rebels found no popular support in the countryside, and the offensive soon floundered.

In Washington, the Reagan administration issued in February 1981 a hastily prepared report claiming to have "concrete" evidence that the Salvadorian guerrillas' front was a part of a "worldwide communist conspiracy" masterminded by the Soviet Union. Insisting that it was necessary to "draw the line" against communism, President Reagan ordered a resumption of large-scale military and economic assistance to El Salvador. He also fired the Carter-appointed ambassador.

This failed offensive of the guerrillas, marked the beginning of "La Guerra Popular Prolongada" (The Prolonged Popular War). With this escalation of communist aggression, El Salvador faced the most unfortunate and bloody conflict in its history, that directly influenced Salvadorian society.

When the conflict began there was a "Junta" ruling the country, trying to implement democratic reforms. With the popular election, two legal governments were established (one of the Christian Democratic Party of Jose Napoleon Duarte and one of Nationalist Republican Alliance-ARENA, Alfredo Critiani). Both continued with the democratic programs, but could not control the corruption. As the Duarte administration implemented ineffective economic measures, a well-organized communist-terrorist opposition gained influence in the political-military field.

The opposition forces under the FMLN umbrella developed a "revolutionary war" strategy to take over the country by destroying the country's economic infrastructure, attacking the country's Armed Forces (AF) to destroy it or defeat it, and implementing the class struggle. With the coup d'etat the AF committed to the people to make democratic reforms. At the same time the AF faced an irregular war, which they were not prepared to fight. The conflict provoked the massive displacement of the people from the countryside to the cities and emigration to other countries.

It is important to mention the key role played by the Catholic Church, the economic elite, the United Nations, the media and the international community. If on the one hand their attitude, sometimes, complicated the conflict, on the other hand most of them contributed to a political solution of the crisis.

## **THE GOVERNMENT**

At the end of 1979 the violence continued. It became clear the measures of the Junta would be carried out. In January 1980 following the collapse of the first Junta the second Junta was formed. The Junta was criticized for its incapacity to control political assassinations,<sup>22</sup> but began structural reforms with the objective of changing the traditional economic power to calm down the excitement of the people. Land reform, the nationalization of the country's banks, and export trade were implemented under a deep polarization of the society. The land reform program was under the direction of the U.S. State Department, and the American Institute for Free Labor Development.<sup>23</sup> Most of the reforms met with incomplete success. Even the Junta allows the opposite parties to contest to elections; constituent assembly elections in 1982, drafting the 1983's Constitution; presidential elections in 1984, in which the opposition won. The Constitution of 1983 strengthened individual rights, established a republican, plural

form of government, strengthened the legislative branch, and enhanced judicial independence. It also codified the labor law.<sup>24</sup>

The center-left government in office from 1984-1989 (PDC) focused its policy on maintaining free elections, the effect of the Constitution, the respect of human rights, and legislation reforms. In that sense were realized elections for deputies to the Assembly, and mayors in 1985 and 1988, and elections for president in 1989.

The first talks with the FMLN were realized in 1984, but the series of negotiations led to no positive outcome. Meanwhile, the government completed the nationalization of the country's bank and export trade of coffee, cotton, and sugar; adopted a series of austerity measures, which proved unpopular to the left and right wings, and the population. Therefore, the land reforms continued with incomplete success. As a consequence the government was criticized for "official corruption, inefficiency and ineffective reforms."<sup>25</sup>

Alfredo Cristiani's Administration (1989-1993), continued with democratic reforms and improved on the effort to respect human rights. He implemented an audacious program to rebuild the country economically, socially, and politically in what was called the "National Rescue Plan." President Cristiani put into place a model for a market economy, based in enterprise freedom and non-intervention of the State in the production and exchange of properties and utilities.<sup>26</sup> He started the privatization of the country's banks and some autonomous state companies, to open up domestic and external trade. In others words the Cristiani Administration privatized what the last Administration nationalized.

One of the first things the Cristiani Administration did was to call for direct dialogue between the government and the FMLN in order to end the conflict by political means. The talks continued with no success until cease-fire agreement on midnight, December 31, 1991.

### **THE FARABUNDO MARTI NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (FMLN)**

In October 1980 five separate guerilla groups came together to form the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) named for a Salvadoran Communist Party (SCP), party found in 1929.

The FMLN with the support and leadership of Fidel Castro developed a series of strategies against the government, Armed Forces, and the society. In political, military and social fronts, it developed a complex and well-organized structure in and out of the country:<sup>27</sup>

1. The central committee: conformed by five "commanders" of the five-armed groups;
2. The social front: students, teachers, workers, and peasant organizations;
3. The military front: peasants, militia, guerrilla forces and, urban commands;
4. The political front: a two way national front with the progressive-popular church, Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs); and an international front with the U.S. Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES), and other "solidarity committees" throughout the U.S., Western Europe, Latin America, Australia, and New Zealand.

The FMLN received undercover support from Cuba, Nicaragua, the former Soviet Union, Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Libya, and others, in weaponry, military supplies, and personnel. Their finances had two origins: money from kidnappings in the 1970s, and money from, mostly, U.S. and European citizens and organizations such as CISPES through its 58 offices established mainly in the U.S.

In the beginning of the armed conflict the FMLN developed the strategy of "revolutionary war." Supported by the international communism movement the FMLN launched its first "final offensive" in 1981, which caused a big impact in Salvadoran society and the international community.

However, it represented a military failure. With the defeat, the FMLN adjusted its forces, improved its military capacity, and adopted a "movement war" strategy in 1983, which achieved the capacity to concentrate and attack battalion level units. Starting in 1984, the FMLN made tactical, and strategic changes and developed a new strategy called "Social-political war," with the purpose of organizing, and controlling the civilian population to force recruitment to its forces, and to disrupt the government by showing to the people that the government, and Armed Forces can not protect them. In addition, the FMLN implemented indiscriminate mine warfare in the country.

By 1986 the FMLN implemented the "strategic counter offensive," which meant the execution of plans established before: focusing on the destruction of agriculture and industry, utilities, public transport; incursions to villages and small cities, and, urban terrorism and bombing activities (car bombs, minefields, etc.). Politically the FMLN used political-diplomatic pressure to express a fictitious interest in solving the conflict. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the FMLN lost its main support and decided one more time to execute a final offensive called "Hasta el Tope" (to the end). This final offensive was launched on November 14, 1989, mainly in San Salvador the capital city, and in other important cities with a lot of support send from Nicaragua. The "Definitive Military Offensive" by concentrating effort toward a national insurrection, however, failed because of the lack of popular support. The FMLN was one of the most ideologically rigid leftist insurgencies groups in the Western Hemisphere.

Guerrillas penetrated the city from three different directions. It took the armed forces a week to dislodge them. The Salvadoran armed forces, before attacking the guerrillas, took civilians out of their homes in order to avoid noncombatant deaths. Although the FMLN's attempt to spark a general uprising failed, it did create pressure for a transition to a diplomatic phase and shifted many people's attitudes in favor of negotiations. These were the objectives the FMLN tried to achieve because it now realized that it could not overthrow the government.

The rebels' ability to take the battle right to the doorstep of San Salvador's economic and political elite persuaded many that the civil war had to be ended by political means as soon as possible. Once the United States and the Soviet Union went on record as favoring a negotiated settlement, it was only a matter of sorting out the procedural details of an armistice and a new system of "mutual security"

guarantees under which the FMLN's combatants could be assured that they would not be subjected to political violence.<sup>28</sup>

In light of the momentous changes then occurring in Central Europe and the Soviet Union, the other high-level commandants including Joaquin Villalobos, Salvador Sanchez Ceren, Eduardo Sancho, and Francisco Jovel, began to understand that a negotiated settlement was both necessary and possible. During the peace negotiations, the FMLN wisely rotated some of its more skeptical field commanders in and out of the negotiating round so that they could observe the proceedings up close without jeopardizing the process because of their inflexibility.<sup>29</sup>

It is important to note that throughout the war the FMLN assassinated rightist political figures, executed unarmed combatants, indiscriminately planted land mines, and abused human rights to achieve its ends. After the peace agreement in 1992, this guerrilla group was transformed into a political party.

### **THE SALVADORIAN ARMED FORCES (AF)**

With the coup d'etat and the proclamation of the AF, the AF promised that it would implement political, economic and social reforms, to assure a true democracy. The proclamation did not include structural reforms in the AF, which was neither well prepared to face the new political reality nor to face the irregular war.

On the other hand, the AF maintained great influence in political decision making regarding the conflict. When the coup led to the resignation of many senior officers from the AF, the officer class named "La Tandonia" reached the highest levels. This group held the key commands in the military, and controlled the military until 1992 when this group retired.

The AF augmented its manpower, reorganized units and created others to confront the FMLN, which, as would explained above, had changed its strategy and tactics. The first strategy implemented by the AF was to "push back the guerrillas to the North, toward the Honduras border."<sup>30</sup> With that strategy it did not defeat the guerrillas but secured the permanence of them at the border and their logistic support from Nicaragua through Honduras. The increased counterinsurgency training and equipment provided as part of U.S. military assistance allowed the AF success at the tactical, but not at the strategic level.

By 1986, due to the FMLN's indiscriminate campaign against the Salvadoran economy, the AF deployed 60% of its forces at permanent military bases, to secure economic strategic locations, such as security to electricity, transport, communication systems, crops, and cities over the country; and 40% in military operations. The AF initiated an active defense attitude rather than offensive strategy. Later on the AF developed the "United to Reconstruct" plan in response of the FMLN "social-political war" and "strategic counter offensive" strategy. As Martin C. Needler, in the *Armed Forces and Society* book, wrote: "United to Reconstruct was developed in conjunction with planners from U.S. Southern Command in Panama. The plan called for the integrated implementation of a program for civic action, development

psychological warfare, and the training of civil-defense forces."<sup>31</sup> The priority objective of the plan was to better protect the people who lived in conflict zones and who were displaced.

After the FMLN's 1989 offensive, the AF launched a military counter offensive. This weakened, in military terms, the FMLN, influencing them, along with other factors, to think seriously about solving the conflict by political means.

## **THE RIGHT**

The country's wealth was concentrated in the upper class, which held the country's economic power. After the 1979 coup the "Junta" initiated democratic reforms, including land reforms.

The upper class refused to contribute to the reforms and the majority left and took their wealth from El Salvador. This contributed to the increasing economic crisis and serious financial problems for the government.

The coffee growers and merchants, landowners, industrialists, and businessmen belonged to the National Association for Private Enterprise (Asociacion Nacional de la Empresa Privada - ANEP). "Its members are politically conservative and oppose any change in the current policies of the government toward regulation. They also control considerable amounts of capital of the country."<sup>32</sup> In that situation, the private sector, looked for a political fix to its imminent lack of economic power by taking the advantage of the image and charisma of Major (retired) Roberto D' Abuisson, who founded a political party in 1981 called Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA). In 1982 ARENA won the majority in the Legislative Assembly deputies election.

After 1982 some moderate conservatives participated more in actively solving the solution to the economic crisis. This created a division among conservatives and progressives that still exists. Some of them "lived in self-imposed exile in other countries, and were generally thought to support the right-wing terrorists."<sup>33</sup> As mentioned before the generation of violence under cover from the FMLN generated more violence from the right. Under Alfredo Cristiani's government, 1989-1994 the rightwing and the private sector recovered part of the prestige and economic power lost, under the center-right government that preceded it.

## **THE CATHOLIC CHURCH**

The Roman Catholic Church played an important role in the Salvadoran conflict. It was one of the strongest critics of the Salvadoran Government and its AF and mediated in talks and negotiations between the government and FMLN. On the other hand the bishop Pedro Arnoldo Aparicio, used to attack the guerrilla members, as he did in his homily of 30 July 1982, when he said that the subversives who are in the mountains: "are not genuine Salvadoran people, but people who have been deceived. They are Salvadoran bad sons, managed by international communism, by Cubans and by Nicaraguans."<sup>34</sup>

The hierarchy became involved in politics, and controlled by the progressives, used the pulpit and religious sermons as a place for political meetings. That attitude increased the polarization of Salvadoran society and during the 1980's the Catholic Church lost many followers, opening the opportunity for the growth of emerging Protestant churches. The announcement in 1984 by Catholic Church that it would try to mediate in the armed conflict would help to increase its image and credibility in the country.

## **THE MEDIA**

The media played an important role in El Salvador. The domestic media, most of the time was neutral in the coverage of the events during the war. Most of the reports covered the events that were happening within the country and the suffering that resulted from the conflict. Sometimes the media were criticized by the FMLN for its accuracy in what was happening. In the other hand, the international media, mainly from the U.S., supported openly the FMLN. Daniel James in his 1986 book, *El Salvador*, wrote, "The Media have contributed much to the American public's ignorance and confusion over El Salvador.... The media ignorance of El Salvador history, culture, and language led them to make reports or judgement that were simplistic. For example, they repeatedly blanketed all Salvadoran history from 1932 to 1979 as a half century of repression."<sup>35</sup>

It is clear that the most important US newsgathering organizations most of the time forgot the "responsibility of the press." The majority of over 700 international reporters stationed in El Salvador during the conflict, worked without basis and background to collect their information. It seems that the most important thing was to get and send the information rather than to investigate first if was true or false. " Perhaps the first thing to be noted about U.S. media reporting on El Salvador is the absence of background or prior field work not to mention the lack of knowledge of Spanish."<sup>36</sup>

At the same time the CISPES, organized in U.S. by Salvadorian Party Communist (PCS), influenced ordinary Americans and the Congress gave them a distorted view of the reality of El Salvador. "CISPES not only spreads pro-FMLN and pro-Soviet propaganda in the U.S. but is also active, and sometimes a leader in coalitions that lobby on Capitol Hill to influence U.S. policy toward El Salvador and Central America."<sup>37</sup> In the U.S. CISPES had defined its objectives: to serve as propaganda organizer of solidarity meetings, demonstrate pro FMLN, gain credibility, and look for aid, collecting millions of dollars for FMLN and giving a different reality about El Salvador.<sup>38</sup>

## **UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY**

Relations between the U.S. and El Salvador improved during the last decade. U.S. foreign policy had a clear influence in political, economic, social and military arenas, including the effort to end the internal conflict, and in arriving at the Peace Accords between the Salvadoran government and the FMLN in 1992.

U.S. foreign policy toward El Salvador focused on economic and military aid. The "Economic aid was provided in the form of Economic Support Funds (ESF).... and development aid was administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).<sup>39</sup>" The military aid received under the Military Assistance Program (MAP) was oriented in six main areas: education, tactical training, psychological operations, civic action programs, special units training, and logistic support. The military aid included U.S. military advisers and enhancement, enlargement, modernization, reorganization and equipping the Salvadoran A. F.<sup>40</sup>

The economic and military aid was crucial to the survival of the government and the capacity of the A. F. to contain the increasing insurgency. Nevertheless, U.S. intervention changed during the conflict in the search of accurate, opportune, and adequate policy toward El Salvador in the context of the East-West confrontation in Central America.

In 1981 U.S. President Jimmy Carter at the end of his administration suspended economic aid to the Nicaraguan Sandinistas for supporting the FMLN in El Salvador, and restored the military aid to El Salvador cut off a year earlier.<sup>41</sup> Obviously the cold war between the two great powers in El Salvador was flourishing.

"President Ronald Reagan's first foreign policy initiative was a vow to stop the spread of revolutionary communism in Central America."<sup>42</sup> The Reagan Administration saw the conflict in Central America in terms of East-West confrontation. The consolidation of power by the Sandinistas, in Nicaragua, and the increasing strength and capability of the FMLN in El Salvador were the main concern of the Reagan Administration in Central America. During the eight years in the White House, a major preoccupation of President Reagan was the threat of communism insurgency in "the U.S. backyard of Central America."<sup>43</sup> As the violence continued to escalate, with the increase in FMLN terrorism activities, the Reagan Administration increased U.S. military aid to El Salvador. In exchange for the aid, in 1983, President Reagan "pushed the Salvadoran Government to continue implementing land reform, to improve its human rights record, and to hold elections."<sup>44</sup> In April 1983 President Reagan, in a joint session of Congress to explain his policy to Central America, addressed a four point program in his speech, "to promote democracy, elections and human rights; to support economic development; to shield democracy and development through security support; and to support dialogue and negotiations in search of a peaceful solution for Central America."<sup>45</sup> This policy had a great influence of the Salvadoran government, and was maintained into the Bush administration in order to stabilize and create conditions for modern democratic reforms in El Salvador and Central America. With the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union, the Bush Administration pressed the El Salvador government and its Armed Forces, and the FMLN to finish the conflict as soon as possible, since there was no longer any reason to continue fighting, in terms of the cold war rivalry.

## **THE SALVADORIAN PEACE PROCESS**

### **THE PROCESS, OBJECTIVES, AND GOALS**

From 1989 onward, the peace process (See Table No. 4) was conducted by the parties in the conflict, under the auspices and supervision of the United Nations Secretary General. The objective of the peace process was to negotiate a series of political agreements aimed at resolving the armed conflict by political means as speedily as possible. "The goals established were:

1. Stop the war through politics means.
2. Achieve a prolonged possible promoting democratization in the country.
3. Guaranteeing unrestricted respect of human rights.
4. The reunification of Salvadoran society."<sup>46</sup>

#### **The San Jose Agreement**

The first substantive agreement on human rights was achieved on July 26, 1990, when the parties agreed in San Jose, Costa Rica, to sanction the establishment of ONUSAL to monitor respect for and guarantee of human rights and fundamental freedoms in El Salvador. According to the accord, the mission was to take up its duties upon the cessation of the armed conflict. Shortly after signing the agreement, however, the two parties independently requested that the mission be set up even before a cease-fire.<sup>47</sup>

#### **The Mexico City Agreement**

Subsequently, on April 27, 1991, in Mexico City, the parties agreed to amend the 1983 Constitution, by altering the role of the military, and dissolving the Military Intelligence Directorate and three paramilitary bodies. The agreement further called for a new civilian police, a new nonpartisan electoral tribunal, and a more broadly elected Supreme Court, as well as a truth commission to be set up to assess violations of human rights by both sides.<sup>48</sup>

#### **The New York I Agreement**

On September 25, 1991, the FMLN rejected a phased cease-fire and demanded a place for its troops in the new police force. In addition, a National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ), comprised of parties with powers to implement accords, was established.<sup>49</sup>

#### **The New York II Agreement**

On December 31, 1991, following more than two weeks of negotiations at the United Nations, the parties signed the "Act of New York", which combined with the agreements previously signed in Costa Rica, Mexico, and New York completed the negotiations on all substantive issues of the peace process.

In New York, the parties also agreed that the final peace agreement would be signed in Mexico City on January 1992.<sup>50</sup>

#### **The Mexico City Agreement**

The formal signing at Chapultepec Castle of the final accord on January 16, 1992, consolidating all the agreements negotiated since April 1991, took place in the presence of the new UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and various heads of state.<sup>51</sup>

#### **THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE NEGOTIATIONS**

The United Nations (UN) played a key role following the conflict, participating in the negotiations as an intermediacy, and monitoring the participation in the Peace Accords of the El Salvador Government the AF and the FMLN (See Table No. 4 Summary of the Salvadorian Peace Process). The first presence of the UN in El Salvador was in December 1989 by the Organization of United Nations for Central America (ONUCA). The original mandate of ONUCA was "to verify the cessation of aid to irregular forces and insurrectional movements; verify the non utilization of any state's territory to commit aggression against another state."<sup>52</sup> The FMLN disagreed with ONUCA. It opposed demobilization in the absence of a concrete political agreement with the Salvadoran government in December 1989. The ONUCA main effort would be in Honduras and Nicaragua, where the demobilization of contras would take place and ONUCA would verify it.

The agreement of the Central American presidents to use the UN as mediator, and international pressure on both the El Salvador government and the FMLN to end the conflict led to the beginning of the UN to continue the mediated peace in 1990. The United Nations Organization for El Salvador (ONUSAL) was formally opened in San Salvador on 26 July 1991. The ONUSAL would work in two stages. "In the first two months, the observer team would study El Salvador's judicial and administrative system and meet representatives from all parties involved in the conflict... the second stage would begin, when ONUSAL would receive accusations of human rights violations and investigate them."<sup>53</sup>

The presence of ONUSAL in El Salvador was seen by some sectors as interventionist, and threatening to the country's sovereignty. Other sectors saw ONUSAL as a credible actor to begin the peace process. In any case, ONUSAL represented a positive step toward achieving the peace agreement. A series of meetings and talks followed in 1991 and the UN increased its negotiation role to bring both sides, the government and the FMLN, closer together.

As a result of the New York meeting, in September of 1991, some agreement was reached about the creation of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ).

COPAZ is made up of two government representatives including a member of the Armed Forces, two FMLN representatives, and a representative of coalitions represented in the Legislative Assembly,<sup>54</sup> and finally, observers from the Catholic Church and the UN. COPAZ was the main organization charged

with overseeing the implementation of the agreements. However, it proved to be ineffective, and the main effort for implementation and verification fell to ONUSAL.

After many meetings, discussions and negotiations, on December 31, 1991 under the auspices of the Secretary General of the FMLN, the Salvadoran government and the FMLN signed the agreement called "Acta de Nueva York," which included January 16, 1992 as the date to sign formally the cease-fire and end definitely the armed conflict.

The final accord was signed on January 16, 1992 in Chapultepec, Mexico City, after twelve years of war, which had cost blood, destruction of the economy, and more importantly the suffering of the people a tragic history and harsh experience that nobody in El Salvador wants to live again. The cease-fire took effect on February 1, 1992. The COPAZ and ONUSAL increased their activities to monitor the accomplishment of the Peace Accords.

The Peace Accords essentially are a series of tasks for the signers to accomplish to create a democratic process in the country.

The key provisions of the Peace Accord for the government were:

1. Military reforms
2. New Civilian Police
3. Human right provisions political and social reforms that include judicial, electoral and land reforms.

For the FMLN:

1. The dismantling of its forces, and
2. Legalization as a political party.

The ONUSAL would monitor the whole process.

For the government the Peace Accords meant institutional reforms, creation of new institutions dismantling others and, the deepest democratic reforms ever made by any Salvadorian government. The AF were required to make profound reforms in its doctrine, education and organization. In other words they initiated the transition from the AF in wartime to the AF in peacetime. This included the reduction of its forces to adapt to the new reality. For the FMLN, the process required it to incorporate a new political reality, and compete for the first time as a political party in elections for president, congressional deputies, and mayors in 1993. In addition they changed their strategy from the political, military and social front to the political-social arena.

#### **EL SALVADOR UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION (ONUSAL)**

The establishment of El Salvador United Nations Organization (ONUSAL) came about as a result of a complex negotiating process initiated by the government of El Salvador (during Cristiani's administration) and the FMLN in 1989. On May 20, 1991, following the Secretary General's recommendation, the Security Council decided to establish the United Nations observer mission in El

Salvador (ONUSAL) as an integrated Peacekeeping Operation to monitor all agreements concluded between the parties. The mission's initial mandate was to verify the compliance by all parties with the San Jose agreement on human rights. Subsequently, the mandate was enlarged to monitor all the agreements concluded between the parties. A small preparatory office was established in advance in January 1991, and on July 26th ONUSAL was launched.<sup>55</sup>

All ONUSAL operations were under the overall direction of the chief of mission, whose office was composed of a team of political affairs officers and was directly responsible for monitoring and promoting the implementation of all the political aspects of the peace agreement.

The first division, on human rights, was established on July 26, 1991, to verify compliance with the San Jose accords. It was established before the cessation of hostilities. The human rights task forces monitoring the situation investigated specific cases of alleged violations and made recommendations for the elimination of such abuses. The human rights division established its headquarters in San Salvador and its regional offices in selected cities. Subsequently, teams of civilian observers traveled throughout the country, making contact with political, military and judicial authorities, NGO's, and the FMLN, to gather evidence.<sup>56</sup>

The military division began operation on January 19, 1992 to verify the cease-fire, the withdrawal of the armed forces from certain zones, the concentration of FMLN combatants in designated areas, and their disarmament. The division verified and investigated relevant reports of violations. It consisted of mobile teams of unarmed military observers to verify the concentration of the Salvadoran armed forces. Verification teams were deployed at all 15 FMLN concentration zones, while mobile teams periodically visited and inspected the 62-army concentration areas. In terms of their mandate, the peacekeeping troops could not engage in combat or obstruct the activities of any force.

The police division also began operation on January 19, 1992. Its early tasks involved accompanying the national police during the transition period; later, it verified the deployment of the newly created national civil police. In general, it supported the institutional strengthening of the national civilian police and the newly created national public security academy.

In addition, an electoral division was established in September 1993 and disbanded on April 30, 1994. This division verified the electoral process surrounding the-March 1994 elections and the second round in April.

Sir Brian Urquhart, the father of peacekeeping, formulated and simplified rules for the success of such operations. In El Salvador, ONUSAL met all his criteria, and this was an important factor in the mission's triumph. These criteria were:

1. The consent of the parties involved.
2. The continuing and strong support of the operation by the Security Council.
3. A clear and practicable mandate.
4. The nonuse of force, except in self-defense.

5. The willingness of troop-contributing countries to support the Peacekeeping Operation.
6. The willingness of the Security Council to make available the necessary financial and logistical support.<sup>57</sup>

ONUSAL represented the first time the United Nations had been asked to help resolve an internal conflict in the Western Hemisphere. It was also the first mission ever to include human rights and police divisions with traditional military Peacekeeping functions.

#### **PEACE KEEPING OPERATION "WHITE DOVE" (UN - ONUSAL)**

On May 20, 1991, with the recommendation of the UN Secretary General, the Security Council adopted resolution 693 which established ONUSAL to verify all accords agreed to by El Salvador's Government and the FMLN.

ONUSAL was inaugurated on July 26 to verify respect for fundamental liberties on Salvadorian territory. At the beginning, ONUSAL had 15 military observers under the command of Spanish colonel who coordinated the work between the UN, the Armed Forces and the FMLN. On December 31 the Salvadorian government and the FMLN signed the Act of New York and in January 16 the peace agreement in Mexico.

The peace agreement had two fundamental aspects, which amplified the mandate of ONUSAL. The first aspect involved the agreement over a cease-fire. ONUSAL verified the finality of the military structure of the FMLN, and the accord over the Public Security Forces, which guided the transition between the National Police to the Civil National Police. On January 14, based on the Secretary General's recommendation, the Security Council approved by unanimity the resolution 729 (1992) which increased the mandate of ONUSAL and the capacity to accomplish the verification of the accords. With this situation, two divisions were created: the Military Division and the Political Division.

The Salvadorian Armed Forces focused on progressively returning to their peacetime position and the FMLN concentrated on fulfilling its assigned tasks.

The Military component of the cease began on February 1 with the goal to accomplish the mission by October 31, 1992. This effort included 367 military observers from different countries under the command of Spanish General Victor Suanzes, 119 military observers came from ONUCA- Central America United Nation Organizations. During the first period from February 1 to March 2 1992, were established the separation of the forces and after that ONUSAL had a reduction of the military observers contingents (72 military observers were sent back to their countries).

The UN and both parties in the conflict recognized the vital contribution these militaries from different countries made during the **"White Dove Operation."**<sup>58</sup> Their job was the total verification of all aspects of peace accord.

The preparation Phase, ONUCA developed the initial planning, coordination, recognition and redaction of the Operation Order. The deployment of the military observers from ONUCA, which was the base of the Military Division's general deployment, was accomplished in January 30.

### **THE FIRST PHASE**

In the First Phase (February 01,1992-"D-Day") according to the mandate of the UN, which was to verify the cease-fire and separation of the forces, the Military Division was organized in one headquarters and 4 military regions. Each region had one major staff and teams to verify and coordination. The main tasks to accomplish this mandate were:

1. Establish and verify the separation of forces,
2. Authorize and supervise displaced forces (Armed Forces and FMLN),
3. Verify inventories of men and weapons,
4. Investigate all violations the accord.<sup>59</sup>

The separation of the forces phase began with armed forces troops moving to the 100 peace time, strategic and national interest places (From "D day to D + 1" / 01 - 02 February), and the FMLN moving to 15 concentration points (From "D + 3 to D + 5 / 04 - 06 February). This separation phase was accomplished without incident.

### **THE SECOND PHASE**

The Second Phase of the operation (From "D + 6 to D + 30 /07 February- 02 March), began with the Armed Forced and FMLN already concentrated, at the places noted above. The Military Division then restructured the verification and coordination teams, to send to each position where the FMLN and armed forces were located.

During this phase of the operation the main tasks were:

1. Re-incorporation of the ex-combatants of the FMLN into civilian life,
2. Verification of the down-sizing of the Salvadorian Armed Forces,
3. Verification of the disarmament and demobilization of paramilitary units,
4. Verification of the disarmament and demobilization of Territorial Service units,
5. Implementation of the new Reserve Regiment.
6. Destruction of the FMLN's armament, and
7. Restoration of arms to the exclusive control and use of the Armed Forces.<sup>60</sup>

There was a logistical problem disarming the FMLN, but the UN and others collaborated to solve this problem. The inventories presented by the FMLN had many discrepancies especially in accounting for the quality and age of arms. Finding the exact location of the different points of concentration was also difficult. This led to new negotiations between the parties. The armed forces' inventories were verified on March 27. But the failure to complete all the tasks provoked the visit of the Secretary General Adjunct for

Peace Maintenance Operations, Mr. Marrack Goulding, who restarted the process. During this phase of the operation ONUSAL got 359 military observers (96% of the authorized forces by the UN Security Council)<sup>61</sup>.

### **THE THIRD PHASE**

The Third Phase was delayed due to violations of accords both side. The Armed Forces did not want to withdraw from some strategic and national interest points, that they thought were outside the bounds as the accord, until ONUSAL mediated these points. The FMLN complained that the incorporation national guard and police of hacienda was a clear violation of the accord. They refused to continue until these differences were negotiated.

At least 20 % of the FMLN forces were to have been inserted into civil life, but this deadline was missed by May 1, because the FMLN said that the government did not create the proper conditions for this. Specifically they pointed to the lack of land reforms, the creation of the Civil National Police and the political activity of the FMLN.

In this phase, the Legislative Assembly approved some Constitutional reforms with respect to the Armed Forces like: the creation of the commission for investigation of the Armed Forces members (ad-hoc commission), the new Recruiting System for the Armed Forces, revision of the project of the new Regimen of the Reserve of the Armed Forces (presented in April 07), dissolution of the Civil Defense Units, especially of the "Escoltas Militares, and Patrullas Cantonales" units, and their reincorporating to the civil life, the first reduction of the Armed Forces (Finished by 26 of June, 1992).<sup>62</sup> The first 20% of FMLN forces was demobilized by June 30,1992 two months later. The FMLN in this phase demobilized four additional contingents (20 % in each one). ONUSAL noted many discrepancies in the demobilization, especially accounting for people, and armaments. Because of the ONUSAL pressure over the FMLN, this situation improved. On December 02, 1992 under supervision of ONUSAL the destruction of the FMLN's arms was begun.

A group composed by UNICEF, ONUSAL, Salvadorian Armed Forces and the FMLN was established in order to study the complex problem of the minefields and to get from both parties all the information available about locations, types, sizes, etc.

### **THE FOURTH PHASE**

On December 15,1992, the Military Division of ONUSAL, continued to supervise the peace accord to:

1. Accomplish the cease-fire,
2. Reduce the Armed Forces,
3. Integrate the FMLN's ex-combatants to the civil life,
4. Implement the new system of the Armed Forces Reserve,

5. Restore weapons to control of the Armed Forces,
6. Legally incorporate the FMLN into the politic arena,
7. Investigate discrepancies on each side that could affect the consolidation of peace, and
8. Create a new institution for State intelligence.<sup>63</sup>

During this phase ONUSAL had 226 military observers. The following tasks were accomplished with some delay: the reduction of the Armed Forces, the new Law of Military Service and Reserve, (approved in July 30), the creation of a new State Intelligence Organism independent from the Armed Forces, and the dissolution of the National Intelligence Directorate controlled by the Armed Forces. The FMLN was dissatisfied, however, that the Armed Forces could continue to collect intelligence against them and citizens in the country.

#### **FINAL PHASE "PHOENIX OPERATION"**

On January 1, 1993, ONUSAL launched the final Phase called "Operation Phoenix." This phase was executed in order to give continuity to the previous actions. Special emphasis was given to creating the necessary conditions for the peace after the cease-fire. For this phase, the Military Division was reduced to 103 military observers and was reorganized into one headquarters and two regional offices (Military Regional Observers - MRO/ Central and Oriental Office). In April 30, 1995 the mandate of ONUSAL was terminated.<sup>64</sup>

#### **CONCLUSIONS**

The UN as the main organization to provide peace, security and stability in the world, is the only international institution that has the main tools necessary to create these conditions for conflict resolution in any region or country around the world. UN Peace Operations are based on an international legal framework, and supported by the decision of their state members. The UN paid attention to the El Salvador counterinsurgency warfare case from the beginning of this problem.

The UN was chosen to mediate the conflict because it was able to "neutralize" outside parties and build on the new US and Soviet interest in defusing regional conflict. The Secretary-General involved interested, but neutral states, and dealt separately with governments that had taken sides in El Salvador's civil war. He tried to obtain a commitment very early on from the United States, the Soviet Union, and Cuba that they would support the negotiations and avoid taking positions that would jeopardize them. He also tried to invest the negotiations with such prestige that it would be seen as bad form to undermine them. Among the warring parties in El Salvador, however, many thought it was impossible for the UN to be an effective interlocutor. The FMLN wanted the UN to be just a mediator, and, initially, the government did not want a mediator other than, the Organization of American States (OAS).<sup>65</sup> The UN's participation gave both superpowers an indirect seat at the table and made it more likely that they would support the

initiative. As a mediator, "The UN helped energize the negotiations by being a source of proposals, by reframing the meaning of concessions, and by creating a sense of urgency, imposing deadlines, and offering side -payments, assurances, and the threat of sanctions if progress was not forthcoming."<sup>66</sup> In undertaking these tasks the UN enjoyed the support of four friends of the Secretary-General (Venezuela, Colombia, Spain and Mexico), who lent their encouragement when negotiations appeared to be floundering. Once a settlement was reached, The UN's role in the peace process became even more important. The UN-monitored cease-fire was crucial to consolidate the peace process. Participants have called the cease-fire "the most successful part of the whole peace process." There was not one violation, and ONUSAL's verification of the cease-fire and the subsequent demobilization of the forces on both sides contributed to this result. However, the linking of the cease-fire with other political factors created its own problems and demobilization was slow because of this linkage. Nonetheless, the cease-fire brought about a level of maturity; parties saw that without armed conflict they could advance in different areas. The cease-fire thus helped to contain the conflict.

Although the cease-fire was a crucial confidence-building measure, ONUSAL played a key role in addressing other problems as well. Its interventions ensured that these problems did not become serious enough to derail the peace process.

The peacekeeping operation (White Dove) established by the United Nations Security Council to monitor and verify implementation of the Salvadorian peace accords through the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), was unprecedented in several respects. ONUSAL was the first in the "second generation" of peace keeping operations to emphasize post conflict peace building, which are efforts to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse in to the conflict. Further, at a time when UN peacekeepers had rarely been involved in internal conflicts, ONUSAL was granted extensive oversight to monitor and report on the human rights situation within a sovereigns state member of the UN. In yet another step whitout parallel in UN history, these human rights monitors were sent to El Salvador before the cease-fire had been agreed upon by the belligerent parties in the hope that their presence would defuse tensions and provide a visible deterrent to violence and the abuse of humanrights. This was indeed how events unfolded. ONUSAL was also one of the first examples of the multi-disciplinary peacekeeping operation, as compared to earlier, more traditional UN operations charged whit truce observation and supervision.

Like most other peacekeeping operations, ONUSAL faced difficulties and challenges nearly every step of the way. Implementation of the accords fell behind schedule in several critical areas, including demobilization of troops, the purification of the Armed Forces and the transfers of land intended to facilitate the reintegration into the civilian society of both side's former combatants. Confidence in the peace process was jolted by the discovery of illegal arms caches being maintained by the FMLN and by a spate of summary executions carried out by armed illegal groups, killings which called to mind the "death-squad" assassinations of the civil war years. But the peace process had powerful supporters in all sectors

of the society. The Salvadorian people, by their scrupulous respect for the cease-fire and strong participation in the electoral process, made manifest their overwhelming desire to embrace a peaceful, democratic future. ONUSAL was thus able to report, not long into its tenure, that the peace process was irreversible, and indeed it has proved so in large measure.

At a time when the international community is looking increasingly to the UN to undertake a variety of major endeavors, the experience of ONUSAL, combined elements of peacemaking, peacekeeping and post conflict peace building and placed an extraordinary focus on human rights issues. This has important implications for the conduct of other peace keeping operations and for the future of the organization itself. The high degree of success achieved by ONUSAL in fulfilling its major objectives serves to highlight the close interrelationship between the goals of the peace: freedom, democracy, and development. It also points toward the need for an integrated approach to human security. Under such approach, military, political, economic, social and environmental problems should be addressed jointly and coherently rather than separately, as has traditionally been the case.

The signing of the Peace Accords as a negotiated political solution was a victory for all Salvadorans and for each side. The civil war in El Salvador has ended with an agreement not simply to stop shooting but with deep changes in the structure of Salvadoran society. Now El Salvador after twelve year of war and with the intervention of the UN, the history has changed and the Salvadorian people are living a new reality, "democracy".

Word Count = 11,178



TABLE NO. 1 UNITED NATIONS MEMBER STATES

Source: UN Press Release ORG/1289 (15 September 1999)

Updated 15 September 1999

With the admission of Kiribati, Nauru and Tonga, there are now 188 Member States of the United Nations. The Member States and the dates on which they joined the Organization are listed below:

**Member -- (Date of Admission)**

**Afghanistan -- (19 Nov. 1946)**

**Albania -- (14 Dec. 1955)**

**Algeria -- (8 Oct. 1962)**

**Andorra -- (28 July 1993)**

**Angola -- (1 Dec. 1976)**

**Antigua and Barbuda -- (11 Nov. 1981)**

**Argentina -- (24 Oct. 1945)**

**Armenia -- (2 Mar. 1992)**

**Australia -- (1 Nov. 1945)**

**Austria -- (14 Dec. 1955)**

**Azerbaijan -- (9 Mar. 1992)**

**Bahamas -- (18 Sep. 1973)**

**Bahrain -- (21 Sep. 1971)**

**Bangladesh -- (17 Sep. 1974)**

**Barbados -- (9 Dec. 1966)**

**Belarus -- (24 Oct. 1945)**

--On 19 September 1991, Byelorussia informed the United Nations that it had changed its name to Belarus.

**Belgium -- (27 Dec. 1945)**

**Belize -- (25 Sep. 1981)**

**Benin -- (20 Sep. 1960)**

**Bhutan -- (21 Sep. 1971)**

**Bolivia -- (14 Nov. 1945)**

**Bosnia and Herzegovina -- (22 May 1992)**

**Botswana -- (17 Oct. 1966)**

**Brazil -- (24 Oct. 1945)**

**Brunei Darussalam -- (21 Sep. 1984)**

**Bulgaria -- (14 Dec. 1955)**

**Burkina Faso -- (20 Sep. 1960)**  
**Burundi -- (18 Sep. 1962)**  
**Cambodia -- (14 Dec. 1955)**  
**Cameroon -- (20 Sep. 1960)**  
**Canada -- (9 Nov. 1945)**  
**Cape Verde -- (16 Sep. 1975)**  
**Central African Republic -- (20 Sep. 1960)**  
**Chad -- (20 Sep. 1960)**  
**Chile -- (24 Oct. 1945)**  
**China -- (24 Oct. 1945)**  
**Colombia -- (5 Nov. 1945)**  
**Comoros -- (12 Nov. 1975)**  
**Congo -- (20 Sep. 1960)**  
**Costa Rica -- (2 Nov. 1945)**  
**Côte d'Ivoire -- (20 Sep. 1960)**  
**Croatia -- (22 May 1992)**  
**Cuba -- (24 Oct. 1945)**  
**Cyprus -- (20 Sep. 1960)**  
**Czech Republic -- (19 Jan. 1993)**

--Czechoslovakia was an original Member of the United Nations from 24 October 1945. In a letter dated 10 December 1992, its Permanent Representative informed the Secretary-General that the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic would cease to exist on 31 December 1992 and that the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, as successor States, would apply for membership in the United Nations. Following the receipt of its application, the Security Council, on 8 January, recommended to the General Assembly that the Czech Republic be admitted to United Nations membership. The Czech Republic was thus admitted on 19 January as a Member State.

**Democratic People's Republic of Korea -- (17 Sep. 1991)**  
**Democratic Republic of the Congo -- (20 Sep. 1960)**  
**Denmark -- (24 Oct. 1945)**  
**Djibouti -- (20 Sep. 1977)**  
**Dominica -- (18 Dec. 1978)**  
**Dominican Republic -- (24 Oct. 1945)**  
**Ecuador -- (21 Dec. 1945)**  
**Egypt -- (24 Oct. 1945)**

--Egypt and Syria were original Members of the United Nations from 24 October 1945.

Following a plebiscite on 21 February 1958, the United Arab Republic was established by a union of Egypt and Syria and continued as a single Member. On 13 October 1961, Syria, having resumed its status as an independent State, resumed its separate membership in the United Nations. On 2 September 1971, the United Arab Republic changed its name to the Arab Republic of Egypt.

**El Salvador** -- (24 Oct. 1945)

**Equatorial Guinea** -- (12 Nov. 1968)

**Eritrea** -- (28 May 1993)

**Estonia** -- (17 Sep. 1991)

**Ethiopia** -- (13 Nov. 1945)

**Fiji** -- (13 Oct. 1970)

**Finland** -- (14 Dec. 1955)

**France** -- (24 Oct. 1945)

**Gabon** -- (20 Sep. 1960)

**Gambia** -- (21 Sep. 1965)

**Georgia** -- (31 July 1992)

**Germany** -- (18 Sep. 1973)

-- The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic were admitted to membership in the United Nations on 18 September 1973. Through the accession of the German Democratic Republic to the Federal Republic of Germany, effective from 3 October 1990, the two German States have united to form one sovereign State.

**Ghana** -- (8 Mar. 1957)

**Greece** -- (25 Oct. 1945)

**Grenada** -- (17 Sep. 1974)

**Guatemala** -- (21 Nov. 1945)

**Guinea** -- (12 Dec. 1958)

**Guinea-Bissau** -- (17 Sep. 1974)

**Guyana** -- (20 Sep. 1966)

**Haiti** -- (24 Oct. 1945)

**Honduras** -- (17 Dec. 1945)

**Hungary** -- (14 Dec. 1955)

**Iceland** -- (19 Nov. 1946)

**India** -- (30 Oct. 1945)

**Indonesia** -- (28 Sep. 1950)

--By letter of 20 January 1965, Indonesia announced its decision to withdraw from the

United Nations "at this stage and under the present circumstances". By telegram of 19 September 1966, it announced its decision "to resume full cooperation with the United Nations and to resume participation in its activities". On 28 September 1966, the General Assembly took note of this decision and the President invited representatives of Indonesia to take seats in the Assembly.

Iran (Islamic Republic of)-- (24 Oct. 1945)

Iraq -- (21 Dec. 1945)

Ireland -- (14 Dec. 1955)

Israel -- (11 May 1949)

Italy -- (14 Dec. 1955)

Jamaica -- (18 Sep. 1962)

Japan -- (18 Dec. 1956)

Jordan -- (14 Dec. 1955)

Kazakhstan -- (2 Mar. 1992)

Kenya -- (16 Dec. 1963)

Kiribati -- (14 Sept. 1999)

Kuwait -- (14 May 1963)

Kyrgyzstan -- (2 Mar. 1992)

Lao People's Democratic Republic -- (14 Dec. 1955)

Latvia -- (17 Sep. 1991)

Lebanon -- (24 Oct. 1945)

Lesotho -- (17 Oct. 1966)

Liberia -- (2 Nov. 1945)

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya -- (14 Dec. 1955)

Liechtenstein -- (18 Sep. 1990)

Lithuania -- (17 Sep. 1991)

Luxembourg -- (24 Oct. 1945)

Madagascar -- (20 Sep. 1960)

Malawi -- (1 Dec. 1964)

Malaysia -- (17 Sep. 1957)

--The Federation of Malaya joined the United Nations on 17 September 1957. On 16 September 1963, its name was changed to Malaysia, following the admission to the new federation of Singapore, Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak. Singapore became an independent State on 9 August 1965 and a Member of the United Nations on 21 September 1965.

Maldives -- (21 Sep. 1965)  
Mali -- (28 Sep. 1960)  
Malta -- (1 Dec. 1964)  
Marshall Islands -- (17 Sep. 1991)  
Mauritania -- (7 Oct. 1961)  
Mauritius -- (24 Apr. 1968)  
Mexico -- (7 Nov. 1945)  
Micronesia (Federated States of)-- (17 Sep. 1991)  
Monaco -- (28 May 1993)  
Mongolia -- (27 Oct. 1961)  
Morocco -- (12 Nov. 1956)  
Mozambique -- (16 Sep. 1975)  
Myanmar -- (19 Apr. 1948)  
Namibia -- (23 Apr. 1990)  
Nauru -- (14 Sept. 1999)  
Nepal -- (14 Dec. 1955)  
Netherlands -- (10 Dec. 1945)  
New Zealand -- (24 Oct. 1945)  
Nicaragua -- (24 Oct. 1945)  
Niger -- (20 Sep. 1960)  
Nigeria -- (7 Oct. 1960)  
Norway -- (27 Nov. 1945)  
Oman -- (7 Oct. 1971)  
Pakistan -- (30 Sep. 1947)  
Palau -- (15 Dec. 1994)  
Panama -- (13 Nov. 1945)  
Papua New Guinea -- (10 Oct. 1975)  
Paraguay -- (24 Oct. 1945)  
Peru -- (31 Oct. 1945)  
Philippines -- (24 Oct. 1945)  
Poland -- (24 Oct. 1945)  
Portugal -- (14 Dec. 1955)  
Qatar -- (21 Sep. 1971)  
Republic of Korea -- (17 Sep. 1991)  
Republic of Moldova -- (2 Mar. 1992)  
Romania -- (14 Dec. 1955)

**Russian Federation -- (24 Oct. 1945)**

--The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was an original Member of the United Nations from 24 October 1945. In a letter dated 24 December 1991, Boris Yeltsin, the President of the Russian Federation, informed the Secretary-General that the membership of the Soviet Union in the Security Council and all other United Nations organs was being continued by the Russian Federation with the support of the 11 member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

**Rwanda -- (18 Sep. 1962)**

**Saint Kitts and Nevis -- (23 Sep. 1983)**

**Saint Lucia -- (18 Sep. 1979)**

**Saint Vincent and the Grenadines -- (16 Sep. 1980)**

**Samoa -- (15 Dec. 1976)**

**San Marino -- (2 Mar. 1992)**

**Sao Tome and Principe -- (16 Sep. 1975)**

**Saudi Arabia -- (24 Oct. 1945)**

**Senegal -- (28 Sep. 1960)**

**Seychelles -- (21 Sep. 1976)**

**Sierra Leone -- (27 Sep. 1961)**

**Singapore -- (21 Sep. 1965)**

**Slovakia -- (19 Jan. 1993)**

--Czechoslovakia was an original Member of the United Nations from 24 October 1945. In a letter dated 10 December 1992, its Permanent Representative informed the Secretary-General that the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic would cease to exist on 31 December 1992 and that the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, as successor States, would apply for membership in the United Nations. Following the receipt of its application, the Security Council, on 8 January, recommended to the General Assembly that the Slovak Republic be admitted to United Nations membership. The Slovak Republic was thus admitted on 19 January as a Member State.

**Slovenia -- (22 May 1992)**

**Solomon Islands -- (19 Sep. 1978)**

**Somalia -- (20 Sep. 1960)**

**South Africa -- (7 Nov. 1945)**

**Spain -- (14 Dec. 1955)**

**Sri Lanka -- (14 Dec. 1955)**

**Sudan -- (12 Nov. 1956)**

**Suriname -- (4 Dec. 1975)**

**Swaziland -- (24 Sep. 1968)**

**Sweden -- (19 Nov. 1946)**

**Syrian Arab Republic -- (24 Oct. 1945)**

--Egypt and Syria were original Members of the United Nations from 24 October 1945. Following a plebiscite on 21 February 1958, the United Arab Republic was established by a union of Egypt and Syria and continued as a single Member. On 13 October 1961, Syria, having resumed its status as an independent State, resumed its separate membership in the United Nations.

**Tajikistan -- (2 Mar. 1992)**

**Thailand -- (16 Dec. 1946)**

**The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia -- (8 Apr. 1993)**

--The General Assembly decided on 8 April 1993 to admit to United Nations membership the State being provisionally referred to for all purposes within the United Nations as "The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" pending settlement of the difference that had arisen over its name.

**Togo -- (20 Sep. 1960)**

**Tonga -- (14 Sept. 1999)**

**Trinidad and Tobago -- (18 Sep. 1962)**

**Tunisia -- (12 Nov. 1956)**

**Turkey -- (24 Oct. 1945)**

**Turkmenistan -- (2 Mar. 1992)**

**Uganda -- (25 Oct. 1962)**

**Ukraine -- (24 Oct. 1945)**

**United Arab Emirates -- (9 Dec. 1971)**

**United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland -- (24 Oct. 1945)**

**United Republic of Tanzania -- (14 Dec. 1961)**

--Tanganyika was a Member of the United Nations from 14 December 1961 and Zanzibar was a Member from 16 December 1963. Following the ratification on 26 April 1964 of Articles of Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar, the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar continued as a single Member, changing its name to the United Republic of Tanzania on 1 November 1964.

**United States of America -- (24 Oct. 1945)**

**Uruguay -- (18 Dec. 1945)**

**Uzbekistan -- (2 Mar. 1992)**

**Vanuatu -- (15 Sep. 1981)**

**Venezuela -- (15 Nov. 1945)**

**Viet Nam -- (20 Sep. 1977)**

**Yemen -- (30 Sep. 1947)**

--Yemen was admitted to membership in the United Nations on 30 September 1947 and Democratic Yemen on 14 December 1967. On 22 May 1990, the two countries merged and have since been represented as one Member with the name "Yemen".

**Yugoslavia -- (24 Oct. 1945)**

**Zambia -- (1 Dec. 1964)**

**Zimbabwe -- (25 Aug. 1980)**

TABLE NO. 2 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS

Source: (UN Peace Operations, A collection of Primary Documents and Readings Governing the Conduct of Multilateral Peace Operations), American Heritage, Custom Publishing Group, 1995.

TYPE OF PEACE OPERATIONS		AUTHORITY	AUTHORITY MEASURES/ARTICLES	
Consensual Peace Operations	Peacemaking	Chap VI	UNSC may call upon the parties to settle their dispute by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, regional agencies or arrangement, other peaceful means.	33 (2)
			UNSC may investigate any dispute	34
			Any dispute may be referred to UNSC or UNGA	35
			UNSC may recommended, on it own initiative, procedures or methods of adjustment	36 (1)
			Referral of legal issues to ICJ	36 (3)
			UNSC may recommended, on its own initiative, terms of settlement	37 (2)
			UNSC may recommended, at request of parties, actions whit a view toward pacific settlement	38
Peacekeeping	Chap IV	UNSG may recommended measures to include use of forces, for the peaceful adjustment of disputes	14	
		Chap VI	UNSC may recommended, on its own initiative, use of military forces as a method of adjustment	36 (1)
			UNSC may recommended, on its own initiative, use of the military force as a term of settlement	37 (2)
			UNSC may recommended, upon request use of the military force as either a method or term of settlement	38
		Coercive Peace Operations	Chap VII	UNSC may recommended, to include use of the military force, to maintain or restore peace and security
UNSC may impose provisional measures, to include use of military forces, to prevent aggravation of the situation	40			
UNSC may call upon its Members to apply measures, which may involved military forces but no the use of armed forces, to give a effect to its decisions. These measures include complete or partial interruption of the economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations	41			
UNSC may authorize its Members to take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security	42			
UNSC may direct a combined international enforcement action whit national contingents made available to it	42-45			
Peace Enforcing				

TABLE NO. 3 SUMMARY AND CHRONOLOGY OF THE CONFLICT IN EL SALVADOR

Source: The Peace Process in El Salvador (1984-1992), Strategy Research Project, LTC. Simon A. Molina, El Salvador Army, USAWC class of 1996

1979

DATE	EVENT
October 15	A group of young military officers overthrows the government of General Carlos Humberto Romero and forms a ruling junta with prominent civilian politicians.

1980

DATE	EVENT
January 3	Two of three civilian members of the junta resign, along with all the civilian cabinet members, after the military rejects civilian control. The first junta dissolves. A new Christian Democratic Party-military junta is formed.
March 6	The junta promulgates an agrarian reform law; it plans to expropriate all properties over 500 acres and form cooperatives to be owned by the families working them.
March 24	Archbishop Oscar Romero is assassinated.
April	The Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR) is formed and begins to operate as the political arm of the revolutionary opposition.
October 11	The union of five insurgent groups forms the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN).
November 27	Six leaders of the FDR are kidnapped and killed as they prepare for a news conference.
December 2	Four U.S. churchwomen are abducted, raped, and killed by members of the National Guard.
December 5	U.S. economic and military aid is suspended in reaction to the churchwomen murders.
December 17	U.S. restores economic aid.

1981

DATE	EVENT
January 4	Two American labor leaders and the head of the Salvadoran Institute of Agrarian Reform were killed at the Sheraton Hotel in San Salvador
January 10	Insurgent forces launch "final offensive."
January 14	U.S. restores military aid and sends three advisory teams to El Salvador.
May	Major Roberto D'Aubuisson found the ARENA party.
December 11	Massacres occur in the Hamlet of El Mozote and nine surrounding villages.

**1982**

DATE	EVENT
January	The first 1500 Salvadoran soldiers arrive at Fort Bragg and Fort Benning to receive training.
March 28	Election held for Legislative Assembly.
April 22	D'Aubuisson elected president of Legislative Assembly.
April 29	Due to U.S. pressure, the presidency of El Salvador is denied to D'Aubuisson. Alvaro Magana is named instead.

**1983**

DATE	EVENT
January -June	The FMLN murders at least 43 civilians. In early May the FMLN summarily executes captured government soldiers.
March	The National Campaign Plan, a comprehensive pacification effort, is begun in San Vicente and Usulután.
December 11	Vice President George Bush visits El Salvador and makes specific threats to end U.S. aid unless death squad activities are curbed and certain officers strongly suspected of human rights violations are relieved of command. Officers are transferred and death squad activities diminish significantly.

**1984**

DATE	EVENT
May 6	Christian Democratic leader Jose Napoleon Duarte is elected president of El Salvador, defeating ARENA party leader D'Aubuisson.
December 31	Insurgent forces take over the Fourth Brigade Headquarters at El Paraiso, in Chalatenango Department.

**1985**

DATE	EVENT
Early 1985	The FMLN begins to change tactics from relatively large-scale, conventional attacks to smaller-unit action. Economic sabotage become a major component of insurgents, arsenal.
March 31	The Christian Democratic Party wins a majority of seats in the Legislative Assembly and a majority of municipal councils.
June 19	FMLN members attack several nightclubs in San Salvador's Zona Rosa, killing 13 unarmed people, including four off-duty U.S. Marines.
September 10	Ines Guadalupe Duarte, the president's daughter, is kidnapped by the FMLN. She and several majors, who had been kidnapped in previous months, are released on October 24 in exchange for political prisoners held by the government.
November	The United for Reconstruction civic action campaign is inaugurated.

1986

DATE	EVENT
January 8	Salvadoran armed forces initiate "Operation Phoenix," designed to drive out insurgents from Strongholds on the Guazapa Volcano. It lasts until mid-1987.
June 1	FMLN accepts Duarte's proposal for a resumption of peace talks.
October 12	Earthquake strikes San Salvador, killing over 1000 and causing extensive damage.

1987

DATE	EVENT
August 7	Duarte signs the Central American Peace Plan, obligating the government to negotiate with the FMLN, to allow FDR leaders to return to El Salvador, and to declare amnesty for political prisoners.
October 22	A broad amnesty for all crimes (except the Romero murder) connected with the civil war is passed by the Assembly. FMLN combatants must apply within 15 days for amnesty.
October 26	Herbert Anaya, head of the non-governmental Human Rights Commission, is murdered
November	Ruben Zamora and Guillermo Ungo, respectively vice president and president of the FDR return from exile and resume political activity.

1988

DATE	EVENT
March 16	ARENA supplants the Christian Democrats as majority party in municipal and legislative elections.
July 7	U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz visits El Salvador and presses Salvadoran military officials to curb human rights violations.
September 21	Soldiers of the Fifth Military Detachment murder ten villagers from San Sebastian. The Army first asserts that the villagers were subversives who were killed in a firefight; it then claims the FMLN killed the villagers.

1989

DATE	EVENT
February 3	Vice-President Dan Quayle visits El Salvador, issuing a tough warning on human rights violations and declaring the need to solve the San Sebastian case.
March 19	Alfredo Cristiani, of the ARENA party, is elected president.
April 19	The FMLN kills attorney General Jose Roberto Garcia Alvarado.
June 9	Jose Alejandro Antonio Rodriguez Porth, newly appointed minister of the presidency, is killed. Although it denies involvement, the FMLN is the prime suspect.
October 17	Ana Isabel Casanova, daughter of the commander of the military academy and cousin of a former defense minister, is assassinated.
October 19	Zamora's home is bombed.
October 31	Bombs explode at the office of COMADRES (the committee of the Mothers of the Disappeared) and the FENASTRAS labor federation, killing ten persons and wounding over 35 more.
November 2	FMLN breaks off peace talks.
November 11	FMLN launches biggest offensive in the history of the conflict.
November 16	Soldiers of the Atlacatl Battalion kill six Jesuit priests including the rector and vice-rector of the Central American University and the director of its Human Rights Institute.
November 29	The FMLN kills five journalists after capture at the headquarters of the government news agency.

990

DATE	EVENT
January 13	Cristiani identifies nine Army soldiers as those responsible for the Jesuit murders.
May 16	The government and the FMLN begin the first round of the most recent peace talks.
July 17	U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Bernard Aronson visits El Salvador to deliver a scathing lecture to the Salvadoran High Command regarding its suspected involvement in the Jesuit murders.

1991

DATE	EVENT
January 2	The FMLN shoots down an U.S. military helicopter carrying three U.S. servicemen. Two of the servicemen survive the crash but are murdered by the FMLN.
March 10	Legislative and municipal elections are held. ARENA emerges as dominant party but loses outright majority.
December 31	The Government and FMLN reach a Peace Agreement in New York City

1992

DATE	EVENT
January 16	The Government and FMLN sign the Peace Agreement in Mexico City.

TABLE NO. 4 SUMMARY OF THE SALVADORAN PEACE PROCESS

SOURCE: James Dunkerley, The Pacification of Central America, 1994.

DATES	PLACE	EVENT
23 JAN 1989	El Salvador	FMLN offers to contest and respect elections if the elections are delayed for six months with military confined to barracks.
23 MAR 1989	El Salvador	Cristiani offers talks; in response FMLN proposes new poll, withdrawal of U.S. military aid, radical reduction of military and trial of those responsible for repression.
01 JUN 1989	El Salvador	At his inauguration Cristiani offers talks without prior FMLN surrender.
04 APR 1990	Geneva	Joint declaration of desire to end war, promote democracy and guarantee human rights; commitment to secret negotiations under mediation of UN Secretary General or his representative.
21 MAY 1990	Caracas	Three-phase agenda established: Political accords sufficient for a cease-fire; integration of FMLN into legal sphere; consolidation of peace. UN to verify all Accords. Military represented this time.
26 JUL 1990	San Jose	Substantive agreement on human rights and establishment of ONUSAL, first UN verification body to oversee human rights at end of a civil war.
27 April 1991	Mexico	Major accord to amend 1983 constitution, including alteration of role of military, dissolution of military intelligence directorate and three paramilitary bodies, to be replaced by civilian police; new non-partisan electoral tribunal and more broadly elected Supreme Court; Truth Commission to be set up to assess violation of human rights by both sides.
26 JUL 1991	El Salvador	ONUSAL start human rights monitoring under broad powers that preclude need for referral to New York.
11 SEP 1991	El Salvador	New National Assembly ratifies constitutional reform required by Mexico accord of April.
25 SEP 1991	New York	Rejection of phased cease-fire; FMLN agrees in secret annex to drop all demands for inclusion of its troops in military in exchange for participation in new police force (PNC); establishment of National Commission for Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ), comprised of parties, with powers to implement accords.
23 OCT 1991	Washington	U.S. Congress withholds half of military aid pending improvement in human rights and advances in peace process.
31 DEC 1991	New York	Six-paragraph act (NEW YORK II) ending the civil war is signed; calendar for implementation discussed until 14 Jan.
16 Jan. 1992	Mexico city	Formal signing at Chapultepec Castle of accords consolidating all agreements since April 1991 in presence of new UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and various heads of state.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> UN Peace Operations, A Collection of Primary Documents and Readings Governing the Conduct of Multilateral Peace Operations (New York: American Heritage Custom Publishing Group, 1995), 1.

<sup>2</sup> "United Nations Member States," Available from <<http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html>>; Internet; accessed 16 March 2000.

<sup>3</sup> The United Nations, The United Nations and El Salvador 1990 - 1995, UN Department of Public Information, Blue Books Series, Volume IV (New York: UN Publication, 1995), 3.

<sup>4</sup> Charter of the United Nations, Charter Purpose and Principles Art. 1, UN Department of Public Information UN Department of Public Information (New York: UN Publication, 1997), 1.

<sup>5</sup> UN Peace Operations, 1.

<sup>6</sup> Charter of the United Nation, 86.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 106.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 27.

<sup>10</sup> Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, Types of MOOTW, Joint Pub 3-07, DOD Regulation 5200.1-R (Pentagon, Washington DC: 16Jun1995), II-1

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., III-1.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., ix.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., III-13.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., II-6.

<sup>15</sup> Robert T. Buckman, The Republic of El Salvador, Latin America 1999, The New World Today Series, 33<sup>rd</sup> Edition (West Virginia: Stryker-post publications Harpers Ferry, 1999), 113.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 114.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> El Conflicto en El Salvador, Dutriz Hermanos, S.A. de C.V., 2a. Edition (San Salvador, El Salvador C.A.: La Prensa Grafica, 1992), 8.

- <sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 20.
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