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**MEETING THE CHALLENGE – DEVELOPING LEADERS FOR
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD COMBAT UNITS**

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**Meeting the Challenge – Developing Leaders for Army National Guard
Combat Units**

by

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ABSTRACT

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With today's demands for worldwide support, it's an accepted fact that more missions will find their way to Guard units like the Enhanced Readiness Brigades (eSBs). Capable and qualified leaders are a necessity in complex organizations like the eSB. These leaders will insure that Guard combat units meet all readiness and deployment standards necessary for future combat. However, is the current Guard leader development system up to the task of ensuring that present and future leaders are trained and capable of filling this vital role? This paper will examine the leader development system in the Guard and assess its ability to meet current and future requirements. Recommendations will be made to improve or incorporate new programs into the leader development process, the goal being to provide a steady stream of qualified leaders for now and the future.

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MEETING THE CHALLENGE – DEVELOPING LEADERS FOR ARMY NATIONAL GUARD COMBAT UNITS

The 1990s will undoubtedly be remembered as a period of major change and adjustment for the Army and its Reserve Component (RC) forces. Today, the Army relies heavily on RC forces for the execution of a full array of operations in all types of scenarios. RC units have deployed to support small scale contingencies throughout the world, while many continue to train and prepare for employment as necessary. Now, more emphasis is being placed on RC integration than at any other time in the history of the U.S. Army.¹ The last ten years have given birth to many initiatives that will improve Army National Guard (referred to as Guard) readiness and bridge the sensitive and sometimes volatile gap between the Reserve and Active forces. These initiatives include rotations through combat training centers as blue forces and opposing forces, Bold Shift training strategies, AC/RC integration, and command exchange programs to name only a few. Guard units participate in these programs on a continuous basis and with many positive outcomes. These results now serve as an example of the potential that exists within the Guard and supports the concept of the part-time soldier as a valid member of the Army.² Yet in spite of this success, many challenges remain that must be addressed if the Guard intends to maintain this positive trend for the long term.

One of the greatest challenges facing the Active and Reserve forces is the execution of a strategy that will insure a continuous flow of qualified leaders. This is important to the Army and other services, but it is critically important to the Guard. Many of the significant improvements in Guard combat units like the Enhanced Readiness Brigades (eSB) are directly attributed to the tireless effort of competent and capable leaders.³ Still, as missions change and unit deployments increase, the demand for highly qualified leaders will grow in disproportionate amounts. Will the current leader development system insure the steady production of qualified leaders for the present and the future?

This paper will identify the skills and attributes that are desirable in Guard leaders now and in the future, assess the current system's effectiveness in developing these skills and qualities, then propose strategies and changes to improve the current system as needed.

The Significance of Leadership in Army National Guard Combat Units

The challenges of running complex organizations like the Guard's eSBs demand highly qualified and capable leaders. These leaders are expected to maintain the war fighting capability of their units, which in turn provides the justification for their existence. As Army National Guard senior leaders work diligently to provide missions to all Guard combat units, the importance of that capability increases significantly. The readiness and deployability of those forces is an issue that Guard leaders can and must influence. In today's Army, well-led combat capable units equate to readiness; and readiness equates to relevance.⁴ The readiness of Guard combat units is an issue of contention that dates back to the mobilization of three combat brigades during operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm.⁵ Subsequent

studies that also addressed this issue state that Guard combat brigades will take longer than expected to meet deployment standards.⁶ These findings sparked a series of events that were focused on correcting problems and enhancing the readiness of these organizations. Today, many ongoing initiatives are improving the war fighting capabilities of these combat brigades. Active component Training Support Brigades (TSBs) and affiliated Active Army organizations are part of these initiatives that provide assistance to training Guard forces. This effort is primarily focused on improving performance at the squad and platoon level.⁷ Additionally, battalion and brigade staffs participate in exercises that help to improve the planning and execution capabilities of commanders and key staff leaders. These initiatives have the indirect effect of training leaders "while under fire," but only on certain occasions do they specifically focus on training leaders and developing their skills. FM 100-5 identifies leadership as the most important dynamic of combat power.⁸ Leadership in the Guard is key to the readiness of its combat units. To improve and sustain a combat unit's performance requires leaders that possess the requisite skills for their appropriate position.

Strong officer leadership in today's Guard combat units is equally, if not critically important to their success and relevance. As the practice of war and war like operations become more complex, so does the task of developing competent and capable officers. The process of grooming officers in the Guard needs to be a deliberate and well thought out effort. Combat organizations have reached a point where they can no longer rely on acquiring leaders through chance. The ability to command and control complex organizations like the Guard's eSBs will require the utmost skill and expertise from all of its key officers. The question is whether or not the current system is capable of providing those leaders for the near and distant future.

Leader Capabilities for the Present and the Future

The skill requirements for Guard officers will continue to increase as the Guard assumes a greater role in national security. Additionally, the Guard may find an even greater demand for its combat brigades as the Army redesigns its basic combat organization around a brigade-sized "middle-weight" fighting force.⁹ One of the most critical tasks for leaders in these organizations is the synchronization of all of their resources. These brigades have organic combat, combat support, and combat service support units. Their combined arms capabilities demand leaders that can fully utilize these systems. The critical task of synchronizing all the operating systems within the brigade is essential to achieving combat power at the decisive time and place on the battlefield.¹⁰ To effectively coordinate every operating system such as maneuver forces, fire support, intelligence, and logistics requires leaders that are "experts" in their respective fields. They must be able to easily grasp the commanders mission intent and know how to apply the capabilities they bring to the fight. These are difficult skills to master in any organization, Active or Guard, and require frequent leader training to develop an experiential base amongst staff.¹¹

The leaders of the future will face unique challenges and circumstances that are very different than those of today. The Guard will probably be involved in many types of operations, both at home and abroad. It's likely that the differences between Active and Guard forces will become transparent and leader exchanges and cross assignments will become the norm. Asymmetry will dominate the battlefield. Near perfect situational awareness and capabilities for precision engagement will stress the leaders decision-making ability.¹² Greater precision and lethality of all weapon systems, combined with real-time target visibility and situational awareness, will push decision making to the lowest levels of combat structure. Unit operating systems become totally linked, their operation automatically synchronized as weapons are employed to develop combat power. Battlefield boundaries and coordinating measures are limited and non-linear, if they exist at all. Leaders must possess the ability to simultaneously see and understand the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war as they become a virtual single entity.¹³

Along with developing future war fighting skills, the leader must become a facilitator and manager of change. Change becomes the norm as technology enables ongoing actions within the blink of an eye. Leaders must establish an environment that facilitates change and allows rapid transitions while maintaining mission capabilities. They must acquire the ability to maintain a broad perspective, yet rapidly focus when necessary. They must recognize patterns where others cannot, then have the courage to decide and act quickly.¹⁴




FIGURE 1 – Speed & Knowledge¹⁵

Leaders must possess the cognitive and behavioral learning skills that allow rapid analysis and comprehensive assessment while simultaneously directing execution. Future wars will require shorter reaction times. This will place a greater demand on leaders to exercise mental agility and psychological resilience while responding to crisis situations. Future programs must develop leaders who master increased skill sets, have greater experience in both command and staff positions, exercise battlefield intuition, and are able to withstand higher levels of stress due to psychological maturity.¹⁶ Will the current system equip Guard officers with the necessary skills to perform this vast array of requirements?

Current Leader Development System

Leader development in the Guard follows the same principles that drive leader development throughout the Army (figure 2). The collective effect of institutional training, operational assignment experience, and self-development endeavors provides a logical framework for the creation of qualified and capable leaders. However, unique situations in the Guard generate problems that inhibit the implementation of this model, particularly in the combat brigades. This section will address each pillar of leader development and identify the problems in the current systems that inhibit the effective development of officers in Guard combat brigades.




FIGURE 2 – The Army’s pillars for leadership development¹⁷

Institutional Training Shortfalls

Officer development in the Guard relies heavily on acquiring skills through the military education system. Institutional training is focused on developing technical and tactical skills, yet even with a first

class military education system, there are many skills that leaders must acquire on their own. Budget constraints and personnel reductions have caused many institutions to revise programs of instruction and reduce the number of tasks taught through formal education. Completion of appropriate military courses does not guarantee an officer has all of the requisite skills needed to be an effective leader. Is it acceptable to have a system that provides a partial solution and relies heavily on the individual's ability to make-up the difference? This "task delta" must be fulfilled through some means other than formal schooling. The general assumption is that leaders will learn these tasks "on the job" at their next assignment. This may work well in an active unit that has more time to train its officers, but that is usually not the case in a Guard combat brigade.

The first and foremost challenge is dealing with the limitation on time. 39 days per year does not provide adequate time to accomplish all that is expected of an officer in a combat brigade.¹⁸ Current OPTEMPO is very high and includes an abundance of requirements that support the goal of meeting pre-mobilization readiness standards. There is really no effective way to incorporate officer training into the existing number of training days that are provided to the combat brigade. Assuming that the "task delta" can be accomplished through on the job training is unreasonable and is rarely carried out with much success.

An additional issue concerns the method that is used by the officer to accomplish military educational requirements. There are several options involving both resident and non-resident training options. The first and preferred method is to attend the active component resident course required for the officer's grade and position. For certain schools, such as the Officers Basic Course, this is the only option available. The obvious advantage of this method is that it trains the officer on the greatest number of tasks while also receiving the same level of training as their active counterparts. What prevents more officers from attending resident training is either a lack of state funding, availability of the individual to attend, quota availability, or any combination thereof.¹⁹ The second and most widely used option is attending a resident/non-resident course. These courses consist of short resident phases (2-4 weeks) combined with correspondence phases. Many Officer courses are available in this form, and some are very credible. This option allows an officer to meet education requirements while balancing employment and other demands on their time. Unfortunately, resident/non-resident courses do not provide the social interaction and schoolhouse environment that is available during resident training.

Some brigades supplement institutional training by conducting officer development programs during additional training periods. These are noble efforts that usually produce some positive results amongst the participants. But generally, they provide a short-term fix to the ongoing challenge of training leaders. A more common approach is to use the "learn under fire" technique where a leader continuously learns through trial and error. This default method of training does offer some training value, but often at the expense of the leader and soldier alike. This method can waste valuable training time, demoralize the leader, and undermine subordinate confidence in their leader's abilities. A more permanent solution is needed to improve the follow-on training for officers in Guard combat units.

Operational Assignment Challenges

Several factors impact on the Guard's ability to offer leadership experience through operational assignments. The first issue is the availability of key leader positions based on the force structure assigned to a State. The second involves the physical distance between the unit of assignment and the officer's place of residence. The last issue addresses priorities and command focus that impact on the leader's ability to perform essential mission tasks.

With the Active Army's ability to assign leaders throughout the world, more opportunities exist to acquire the experience that will prepare the officer for future positions. In the Guard, operational assignments are driven by the State's force structure mix. States with large force structures that are heavy in combat units offer many opportunities for gaining critical experience. The opposite is true of states with less force structure. Cooperative arrangements with adjacent states might expand assignment opportunities but will require an aggressive and concerted effort by all players to ensure that the right people are selected for the right jobs. This is no small undertaking, especially when considering the special interest every State has in taking care of their officers first. In addition to getting the right job is the challenge of holding the position long enough to gain the proper knowledge from that assignment. Fewer training opportunities throughout the year may require that guard leaders remain in the job longer in order to achieve that experience. Only time will give an officer the chance to acquire and fully internalize proper standards and procedures. This contributes to the process of learning "what right looks like."²⁰

The next issue involves the distances between positions of assignment and home of residence. It is not uncommon to find officers assigned to units that are hundreds of miles away from their homes of record. Considering the geographic dispersion of Guard units throughout the country, this is not an unusual thing. Unfortunately, these arrangements are not always conducive to developing a leader's experience or relationship with the unit or command. This issue is compounded by the fact that regulations prohibit the use of government resources to support travel to the unit for inactive duty training.²¹ The price of dedication and selfless service runs very high for those who take their job seriously and absorb this personal expense. Unfortunately, those less committed find this issue a fitting excuse to avoid valuable training. Officers accept this as the cost of doing business, yet many would agree it takes its toll.

The final issue impacts on the effective use of the officer's time while serving in key operational assignments. Commands that focus on mission oriented training and set priorities to support its execution offer the greatest learning experience from an operational assignment. Commands that focus more on numbers and administrative requirements provide less of a tactical mission experience to their leaders. The key is setting the proper focus, enforcing priorities, and assisting units with accomplishing administrative requirements. Unfortunately, if commands do not establish this expectation throughout the organization, it is unlikely to happen. Competing demands will always challenge the leader and that is

expected. However, there is no priority when everything is a priority. Current pet projects will occupy the leader's attention regardless of the benefits or pay-off to the unit. The ultimate downside to all of this is the degradation of the leader's tactical and technical proficiency and the creation of "administrative experts" instead of tactical war fighters.

Self-Development Challenges

The last pillar of the leader program is self-development. Leaders must be motivated to think and grow intellectually.²² The Active Army benefits from a highly competitive culture that encourages leaders to personally broaden their knowledge if only to keep up with their peers. There are also the ever present "coaches and mentors" who no doubt encourage their subordinates to learn more about their chosen profession. However, for Guard leaders, expectations of self-development are often viewed as an increased demand on their time. Many Guard leaders are highly dedicated individuals that present a model for selfless service. However, there are still limits on how much additional time they can give to the Guard. Motivating officers to pursue a personal self-development program outside of their normal duties is a challenge. It would probably be more acceptable to the leader if this initiative was supported through programs within the command. If the command shows a sincere interest in the individual development of its leaders, then the individuals are more likely to respond. Initiatives that directly support individual development would have the greatest impact. Resources, e.g. funding, must be committed and will provide credence to the program. The command must show its commitment to its officers by investing in their development. Additionally, Guard leaders need to inculcate the practice of personal professional development throughout all levels. It's a matter of discipline combined with a sincere desire to improve. Efforts to personally improve one's abilities tangibly demonstrate a leader's commitment to self-improvement.

As seen in the preceding sections, there is room for improvement over the current system. Institutional training programs are the primary vehicles for developing an officer's foundation of technical skills. But additional training is needed to insure that officers are fully capable of carrying out their responsibilities. Operational assignments are essential to providing that much-needed experience for leader development.²³ However, assignment opportunities are directly linked to the availability of positions in a State. Finally, self-development is undoubtedly an important part of an officer's development but will require the open support of viable programs to make it credible.

Most units learn to live with the problems and challenges as evident by current results in the field. However, it could be much more effective. Left to its own devices, will this system give Guard officers the ability to keep up in the rapidly changing environment of the future? As already mentioned, capable leadership is vital to readiness in Guard combat units. Can the Guard afford to wait and see what will happen, or could complacency eventually lead to a decline in readiness that could undermine the relevance of its combat units? The proposals in the following sections are aimed at improving the current system with the intent of better preparing Guard officers for the challenges to come.

Recommended Strategies for Developing Guard Leaders

The following sections propose strategies that can improve the current leader development system. These strategies or changes are addressed to each level of the organization, beginning with National Guard Bureau (NGB), then followed by State, unit , and individual actions.

National Guard Bureau Level

At the NGB level, an effective leader development strategy begins with the officer education process. Guard officers must continue to follow the Army standard for institutional education.²⁴ The first task is to increase the number of quotas available at active resident courses. Officers should be encouraged to attend resident training as much as possible. To support an increased demand for resident training, NGB must increase the number of resident quotas at officer advance courses, combined arms and services staff school, command and general staff college, and the school of advanced military studies. The second area of assistance focuses on improving the quality of non-resident education. Even with increased attendance at resident courses, many Guard leaders will continue to attend non-resident schools. The quality and value of education obtained through this medium can be increased through leveraging technology.²⁵ Interactive distance learning through computers or video teleconferencing can significantly enhance the learning process.²⁶ Today, the technology exists to replicate a host of settings, scenarios, and learning environments. NGB, in conjunction with TRADOC, must expedite the development and fielding of revised non-resident education programs that improve the learning experience through the use of technology. This strategy must include the procurement of computers, communications hardware, virtual equipment, and the revision of programs of instruction to incorporate these systems. To make it effective, materials and equipment must be available at the user level. The goal should be to provide the best learning experience possible using current and future technologies.

NGB needs to support a formal adjustment to the number of required training days for key Guard leaders. The present annual requirement of 39 days for training must be increased to 78 days for all key leaders. This includes staff and other key individuals designated by the commander. The additional days are specifically for leader training and will require training plans and schedules. It is imperative that leaders have dedicated time, away from the troops to focus on training themselves. These days can be used to improve technical and tactical skills, review war plans and conducting regional assessments, train essential leader tasks, or participate in opportunity training with an active unit. Commands can consolidate training days or spread them over the year to support unit objectives. Today, most Guard leaders perform well over 39 training days per year.²⁷ This change would standardize the additional days as part of an on going training program, making it a requirement for all leaders. Leaders will occupy their positions with the understanding that they are required to perform these additional days. This action will require a change to the US Code Title 32, chapter 5, and should be limited to Guard combat units such as

the eSBs. Changing the law will also make it easier for Guard leaders to negotiate training requirements with their employers.²⁸ In the interim, NGB and the States should allocate additional funding for specific leader training until a permanent solution is attained.

The final change at this level focuses on improving the leader's effectiveness by providing the necessary tools, resources, and support staff to perform the job. NGB should change the regulation that prevents the use of federal resources (e.g. aircraft, funding, etc.) to transport leaders to their inactive duty training sessions. States must have the flexibility to support travel requirements as necessary and not place that burden on the individual leader. There also needs to be an increase in the number of full-time officer and NCO positions on the battalion level manning documents. A minimum of one officer and NCO is required per staff section to support pre-mobilization training and management for the battalion. This will require changes to the full-time manning models for battalions in the eSBs. In addition increasing staffing requirements, NGB should move to change the requirement for the mandatory 20-year retirement of AGR officers. The current program may cause the forced retirement of key officers that are making a significant contribution to the organization. Changing this requirement will allow the continued service of experienced officers provided they maintain "best qualified" standards. Lastly, all field grade command positions should have the option of being three-year active duty tours that are open to all qualified officers in the Guard and Active Army. Full-time commanders are more responsive to dealing with critical command and readiness issues, especially in priority units like the Guard's eSBs.

State Level

States have the responsibility of managing leader assignments within their assigned force structure. Their goal should be to improve the benefit to the organization and the individual by assigning the right leader to the right job. States must begin by establishing career tracks for critical officer positions, primarily those in combat units. This provides a road map for career opportunities and assists in guiding the individual's efforts to prepare for future assignments. Individual leaders should be selected, then tracked for career assignments. This will require states and subordinate commands to screen future candidates and create a selection list for key leader positions. Candidates being considered for key leader positions must meet the command's qualifications for that position. This puts the responsibility on officers to meet schooling, experience, and self-development selection criteria if they want to remain competitive. When the time comes to fill the position, the command selects the best-qualified individual against the pre-established criteria. This process allows the leaders to plan in advance and helps the command manage resources that support schooling and other leader training. More importantly, this system gives the command the ability to develop leaders for positions where they can do the most good for the organization. Once officers are assigned, they should remain in position for a minimum of three years to maximum of five. This provides the optimum time for allowing a leader to benefit from the experience without over extending the tour.²⁹ It also gives the leader the opportunity to employ lessons

learned over a longer period of time, adding greater value to the unit. The Army has evaluated this concept and is considering the possibilities of incorporating it into OPMS XXI for Active officers as well.³⁰

In addition to managing careers, a State can establish programs that directly support the training and development of its officers. States can coordinate with local or affiliated active Army units to establish cooperative training programs for the development of officers. The first program should provide training experience for newly commissioned officers. Lieutenants should serve from 6-12 months in an active component unit upon completion of their officer basic course. This short tour will reinforce the training received in basic and increase the lieutenant's ability to apply technical skills in future assignments. During this tour, the officer should also attend follow-on courses (e.g. ranger, airborne, air assault, light fighters, etc.) that will further enhance or provide additional skills to the officer.

A second recommendation is to establish a formal shadowing program with an affiliated active army unit. The concept is to have a Guard leader shadow his active counterpart in lieu of attending training with a Guard unit. The State would assign officers to the State headquarters, then attach them to an active unit for training purposes only. In this capacity, the Guard leader is released from troop leading responsibilities and can devote his attention to learning new tactics, techniques, and procedures. The Guard officer would match-up with an Active officer in a comparable position. The officer participates in training events with his active counterpart, focusing on tactical training and essential leader tasks. The program should run for a year to give the officer maximum exposure to a variety of methods and strategies. This program can strengthen the relationship between the Guard and the Active component units while providing lessons learned to both sides.

A final area that senior leaders within each State can influence is in the area of setting priorities and creating a mission focus within the command. Officers have always faced a continuum of tasks, requirements, and responsibilities that come with the job.³¹ This is not likely to change. However, the chain of command should work to minimize distractions and allow officers to focus on essential roles and tasks as much as possible. Non-essential tasks distract officers from their primary roles. State commands should make a concerted effort towards eliminating non-essential tasks and elevating the majority of remaining tasks to the State Area Command (STARC). Adjutant Generals and STARC Commanders can influence this disparity by directing their staffs to decrease the "leader to administrative task" workload. By "breaching the administrative minefield," leaders gain time and are allowed to focus. Senior leaders need to minimize these distracters within the command and then hold subordinate leaders accountable for meeting mission standards and requirements.

Unit Level

The first unit level recommendation is to establish a leader certification program. The idea of leader certification is a concept that's been with the Army for many years. The most familiar rendition was skill qualification test (SQT) that consisted of a written exam and a hands-on component.³² This was a successful program that developed and validated the technical proficiency of the individual leader. The

complexities of current and future battlefields will require skill sets that are difficult to acquire and highly perishable. An effective way of identifying essential skill sets and measuring a leader's ability to execute them is through a certification process. Successful certification programs have already proven their worth. The opposing force at the National Training Center uses a certification program for all of its key leaders.³³ This process insures that leaders are qualified before they are allowed to perform the tasks of their position. The success of the opposing force speaks for itself and is largely due to qualified and capable leaders. The certification process should consist of multiple events that include on-the-job training, written and oral problem solving, hands-on demonstrations, and terrain exercises. Additional training days allocated to leader training provide the time to conduct these events. Training support brigades, affiliated active units, and sister Guard units can assist with external support and testing requirements as needed. Certification also provides an objective measure of the ability of leaders to accomplish their war time mission. This directly relates to unit readiness and can be added to the list of functional measurements.

A second recommendation is to create a formal mentor program for all officers.³⁴ The value of a mentoring program cannot be overemphasized since leaders often learn from watching and emulating others. Officers must establish an active mentor relationship with successful leaders from either Guard and or Active units. The program must allow for periodic discussion and activities that improve officer skills and focus on preparing for future assignments. This is an effective way of developing strong leader character. The values, attributes, and skills passed on through role modeling and mentoring are immeasurable.

Individual Level

Individual officers are responsible for tracking and following their development throughout their careers. Officers must initiate a self-development program that takes advantage of resources and opportunities that will contribute towards developing their leader skills. Programs should include plans for education (military and civilian), participation in Guard or Active Army training events, assignment considerations, and future goals related to military service. This individual learning plan should be monitored by a supervisor or mentor.³⁵ This provides the experience of the mentor in assisting the officer with decisions or strategies. Individual plans can also assist supervisors with prioritizing resources managing career opportunities. The objective is for officers to take responsibility for developing themselves into effective leaders that will make a positive contribution to the organizations they serve.

Conclusion

Implementing all or any number of these strategies will have a notable effect on improving leader development in the near term, but the true value of these programs will be seen over the long haul. Many of these strategies will encourage positive culture changes in both Active and Guard organizations that will enhance working relationships and contribute to building a "seamless" Army. This culture change is

the fundamental underpinning that will enable both entities to benefit from collective experiences. What the Active Army learns in developing future leaders it shares with the Guard. What the Guard learns from developing leaders for part-time organizations it shares with the Active. This mutual exchange is necessary if both organizations expect to capitalize on developing effective leaders for the future. As the Army moves forward in the 21st century, Active, Guard, and Reserve forces must move in unison by leveraging technology and human developments that support "The Army." Leader development is a critical ingredient to making that happen.

At present, combat force structure is likely to remain with the Guard in one form or another. Providing the best-qualified leaders to run those organizations is reason enough for an effective leadership development program. But, the realities of combat provide the strongest justification of all. Combat is unforgiving, and leaders should never learn at the expense of their soldiers. The Army and the Guard owe it to their soldiers to provide them with the most qualified and capable leaders possible. Anything short of this would be a crime.

These strategies, if fully implemented, will provide a major improvement to the process of developing leaders in the Guard. Creating leaders with desirable values, attributes, and skills will benefit the Guard, the Army, and the community. Improved and sustained development programs will provide a steady flow of qualified individuals that are able to run the highly complex combat organizations within the Guard's force structure. Additionally, good leaders tend to foster command climates that enhance retention as well³⁶. The Army benefits through the increased readiness and relevance of its fighting forces. Finally, society gains from the contributions of citizen soldiers that are members of communities across the country. These individuals can bridge the gap between the Army and the public by displaying a favorable image of the service through their actions and behaviors.

Leader development is an investment in the organization. Institutionalizing a leader development system will imbed a process that will generate effective leaders for now and the future. As the Army moves forward it will surely invest in programs to develop future leaders. Guard leaders will be right there, riding that wave of development and retaining the ability to perform on present and future battlefields. Competent and capable leaders will enable that vision while insuring the Guard's relevance in years to come.

WORD COUNT = 6547

ENDNOTES

¹ News Release, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Washington D.C., 4 Dec 1997. Secretary Cohen Praises Army's Integration of Active/National Guard Divisions.

² Success stories include the guard involvement in the Sinai mission, Bosnia rotation schedule including guard units beginning with the 49th Armor Division HQ, successful OPFOR and unit rotations at JRTC and NTC, AC/RC Command exchange programs, and many more examples that demonstrate the guards combat capabilities as a relevant force.

³ Comments taken by the author from observers at the JRTC and during 25th ID (L) Warfighter and 29th eSB BCBST. CPXs highlight the contributions made by select individuals that contributed disproportionately to the effectiveness of the unit/staff.

⁴ David T. Fautua, "How the Guard and Reserve Will Fight in 2025," Parameters (Spring 1999), 128.

⁵ US General Accounting Office, National Guard: Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for Gulf War. Report to the Secretary of the Army. (Washington D.C.: US General Accounting Office, September 1991).

⁶ US General Accounting Office, Army National Guard: Combat Brigades' Capability to be Ready for War in 90 Days Is Uncertain. Report to Congressional Committees (Washington: US General Accounting Office, 1995), 2-6, and John R. Binkerhoff, "The Army National Guard and Conservation of Combat Power" Parameters (Autumn 1996), 1

⁷ The peacetime goal for ARNG combat units is to train to platoon and battery level proficiency. Staffs train independently through CPXs and BCBST.

⁸ US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations (Washington DC: GPO, June 1993), 2-11.

⁹ John R. Binkerhoff, "The Brigade-Based New Army," Parameters (Autumn 1997), 1. Article discusses the brigade-sized force as the right size for the 21st century.

¹⁰ US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, 2-8.

¹¹ Robert N. Townsend, "Generating the Force," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Command and General Staff College, Advanced Military Schools Program, 1992), p8. Comments made by General Burba during his testimony to Congress.

¹² MG Robert H. Scales Jr., "Cycles of War," Armed Forces Journal International (July 1997), 42.

¹³ Richard A. Chilcoat, "The Forth Army War College: Preparing Strategic Leaders for the Next Century," Parameters (Winter 1995-96), 7-9. Some of the ideas presented were encouraged by this article.

¹⁴ Gordon R. Sullivan and Michael V. Harper, Hope is Not a Method (Broadway Books: Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group Inc., 1996), 219-222.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ The Annual Report on The Army After Next Project to the Chief of Staff of the Army, (Washington DC: GPO, July 1997), 2.

¹⁷ Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-58, Leader Development for America's Army (Washington DC: GPO, 13 October 1994), 5.

¹⁸ 39 days per year is mandated by law. Many Guard leaders in combat brigades typically spend a total of 70-90 days per year in planning, preparation, and training.

¹⁹ Individual States receive funding from the National Guard Bureau to support sending soldiers/leaders to schools. States have flexibility on determining what schools to fund based on local needs and priorities. Officer attending basic courses receive top priority (must complete within 18 months of commissioning). The individual's availability to attend a resident course often rests with the quality of the relationship they have with their employer. This is usually the "long pole in the tent," although the author's experience is that a greater number of guard officers are making the effort to attend resident courses. The next step is to encourage and develop a similar pattern amongst the NCO corps.

²⁰ Comment made by Chief of Staff of the Army during news interview.

²¹ Regulations prohibit the support of travel to attend inactive duty training (IDT) periods that are the unit's normal weekend training sessions. This also includes additional training assemblies (ATA) or readiness management assemblies (RMA) which are in addition to normal weekend drills. Officers performing active duty for special work (ADSW) can be authorized government travel expense, but only while serving on that status. Leaders usually perform more IDT, ATA, and RMA periods than ADSW.

²² FORSCOM/ARNG/USAR Regulation 350-2, p8.

²³ Stephen M. Duncan, Citizen Warriors, America's National Guard and Reserve Forces & the Politics of National Security (Presidio Press, 1997) 83.

²⁴ FORSCOM/ARNG/USAR Regulation 350-2, p9-11.

²⁵ David Blymire, "Technology Narrows 3000 Miles." The Sentinel, 30 January 2000, sec D1, p.1.

²⁶ Interview with Director of Information Management at NGB indicated that distant learning programs are receiving utmost attention and are seen as the "wave of the future" for training citizen soldiers.

²⁷ Steven Lee Meyers, "Reservist New Role Transforms Military," New York Times, January 24, 2000 p1. Article comments on train-up of 49th AR Division, TXARNG, for Bosnia rotation. Additional survey of key leaders from the 41st, 29th, and 76th eSBs indicated they averaged over 90 days a year during the 2-3 year train-up for their JRTC rotations.

²⁸ The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 protects the employment rights of reservists. Guard members performing federally mandated training requirements are covered by this act.

²⁹ United States Military History Institute, United States Army War College, Experiences in Division Command, (Carlisle Barracks, 1998), 31

³⁰ This concept was covered by a speaker during an OPMS XXI briefing to Army War College Students.

³¹ Dandridge M. Malone, *Small Unit Leadership – A Commonsense Approach* (Presidio Press, 1983) 54. The list of “things to do” has changed little over the years and is likely to increase disproportionately in relation to new missions and tasks.

³² In the early 1980s, the individual training and evaluation program (ITEP) replaced the skill qualification tests (SQT) of the 1970s. These were NCO test programs that measured individual proficiency in their specialty. In mid 1980, the army started a complementary officer program called military qualification skills (MQS). This program was cumbersome and never really caught on. Neither program is in use today.

³³ John D. Rosenberger, “Reaching Our Army’s Full Combat Potential in the 21st Century: Insights from the National Training Center’s Opposing Force,” Land Power Essay Series, Association of the United States Army, No. 99-2 (February 1999): 4.

³⁴ United States Military History Institute, United States Army War College, Experiences in Division Command, (Carlisle Barracks, 1998), 31

³⁵ Individual learning plan is taken from a concept used by the Army War College. Students develop an individual learning plan and are advised by a faculty instructor. Instructors (or supervisors in the field) offer insight and personal experience to enhance the individual’s learning experience.

³⁶ ARNG conducts quarterly strength maintenance VTCs that focus on personnel end strengths of each State. Retention is a major topic of discussion. The Director of the ARNG attends the VTC, and many Adjutant Generals and other senior leaders participate to represent their States.

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