NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California

THESIS

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND MALAYSIA

by

Rahmat B. Hj. Hassan

March 2000

Thesis co-Advisors: Thomas C. Bruneau
Harold A.Trinkunas

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188

1. AGENCY USE ONLY *(Leave blank)*	2. REPORT DATE	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
	March 2000	Master's Thesis

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Civil-Military Relations: A Comparative Study Between Pakistan and Malaysia

5. FUNDING NUMBERS

6. AUTHOR(S)
Rahmat B. Hj. Hassan

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

13. ABSTRACT *(maximum 200 words)*

The armed forces of Pakistan and Malaysia, after their independence, inherited many of the common characteristics of the British armed forces, including but not limited to the implicit acceptance of civilian supremacy. However, in the subsequent years, frequent coups in Pakistan (the latest being the military coup on October 12, 1999), and their absence in Malaysia has touched off a scholarly debate. This thesis examines the experiences of Pakistan and Malaysia respectively with regard to civil-military relations. Specifically, this study focuses on the causes of military intervention in the politics of Pakistan in contrast to that of Malaysia. This thesis argues that the re-current military interventions in Pakistan are mainly due to its weak political institutions, which led to its inability to govern effectively. Malaysia, on the other hand, has a bigger advantage over Pakistan in that it has relatively mature political institutions with strong leadership and political elites. In addition, civilian control of the military is fully entrenched in the Malaysian political system and culture.

14. SUBJECT TERMS	15. NUMBER OF PAGES
Civil-Military Relations, Military Intervention, Professionalism, Legitimacy, Political Institutions, Military Institutions, Socio-economic Conditions.	98
	16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE	19. SECURITY CLASSIFI- CATION OF ABSTRACT	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
Unclassified	Unclassified	Unclassified	UL

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND MALAYSIA

Rahmat B. Hj. Hassan
Lieutenant Colonel, Malaysian Army
Advance Diploma in Security and Strategic Studies,
National University of Malaysia, 1994/1995

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 2000

Author: _____
Rahmat B. Hj. Hassan

Approved by: _____
Thomas C. Bruneau, Thesis Advisor

_____
Harold Trinkunas, Co-Advisor

_____
F.C. Petho, Chairman
Department of National Security Affairs

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

The armed forces of Pakistan and Malaysia, after their independence, inherited many of the common characteristics of the British armed forces, including but not limited to the implicit acceptance of civilian supremacy. However, in the subsequent years, frequent coups in Pakistan (the latest being the military coup on October 12, 1999), and their absence in Malaysia has touched off a scholarly debate. This thesis examines the experiences of Pakistan and Malaysia respectively with regard to civil-military relations. Specifically, this study will focus on the causes of military intervention in the politics of Pakistan in contrast to that of Malaysia.

This thesis argues that the re-current military interventions in Pakistan are mainly due to its weak political institutions, which led to its inability to govern effectively. Malaysia, on the other hand, has a bigger advantage over Pakistan in that it has relatively mature political institutions with strong leadership and political elites. In addition, civilian control of the military is fully entrenched in the Malaysian political system and culture.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This thesis examines the experiences of Pakistan and Malaysia with regard to civil-military relations. Specifically, this thesis focuses on the causes of military interventions in the politics of Pakistan in contrast to that of Malaysia. The thesis argues that military intervention is more likely when civilian political institutions are weak, the military has internal motivations towards a political role, and socio-economic factors make effective governance difficult.

The armed forces of Pakistan and Malaysia, after independence, inherited many of the common characteristics of the British armed forces, including but not limited to the implicit acceptance of civilian supremacy. However, in the subsequent years, frequent coups in Pakistan and their absence in Malaysia touched off a scholarly debate. The recent military coup of 12 October 1999 is the manifestation of the poor state of civil-military relations in Pakistan.

This thesis employs the comparative method, specifically the method of structured focused comparison to establish a framework of analysis. It adapts the approaches and models of civil-military relations presented by Samuel Huntington in the *Soldier and the State: Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, developed later by Samuel

Finer, Eric Nordlinger, Felipe Agüero, and others. Extensive reviews of bibliographic material and press reports are used to assess the causes of military interventions in Pakistan and the absence in Malaysia. For this, three main variables were used as a model to analyze the situation on both Pakistan and Malaysia. The main variables are (1) civilian institutions, (2) military institutions, and (3) socio-economic conditions. This model proved suitable for analyzing the situation in both countries. This model is equally applicable to praetorian societies.

The results indicate that recurring military interventions in Pakistan are mainly due to its weak political institutions, which led to its inability to govern effectively. Malaysia, on the other hand, has an advantage over Pakistan in that it has relatively matured political institutions with strong political leadership and elites. In addition, civilian control on the military is fully entrenched in the Malaysian political system and culture.

The Pakistan case demonstrates that it was the continuing instability, the fragile legitimacy of government, the weak civilian institutions, and weak political leaders that pulled the army into politics. The recurring military intervention in Pakistan occurred when civilian authority was weak and continues to the present

time to face unsolvable problems. The Malaysian Armed Forces, on the other hand, have always accepted the principle of civilian supremacy, even before independence. This is made possible by the strength of the civilian institution and its ability to transform itself into a stable pattern of civilian control of its armed forces. While it is likely that the nature of civil-military relations in Malaysia will transform in tandem with its aim of becoming a conventional force, and keeping with the developments of the post Cold War era, the Malaysian Armed Forces's basic character is likely to continue for some time in the future.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to express my deepest gratitude and sincere thanks to my professors-cum-thesis advisors Dr. Thomas C. Bruneau and Dr. Harold A. Trinkunas of the United States Naval PostGraduate School, Monterey, for their invaluable assistance throughout this study. Their academic guidance, dedication, persistence, encouragement, comments, and reviewing of the manuscript has helped me greatly in the completion of this thesis. I would also like to thank Professor Jean Giraldo for her useful comments on the earlier drafts.

I am grateful to my brothers, Ali and Abdullah for their constant encouragement and support in my research and writing endeavors, despite the distance that keeps us apart. I am similarly grateful to my wife Rafeah, and sons Hafiz, Hazwan, and Hazmi for their unflinching support, sacrifice, sensitivity, and patience. They have been a source of joy, pleasure and strength. Finally, I dedicate this thesis to my mother Rahmah who has been the main source of strength, and whom I owe a debt for her love, care, relentless support, and sacrifice throughout the years we were together.

THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

On 12 October 1999, the Pakistan military staged a bloodless coup for the fourth time in its 52 years of existence. The Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Pervez Musharraf, in his first address to the nation noted that the military had intervened to prevent Pakistan from facing a further state of economic and political crisis. He stated that "not only have all the institutions of Pakistan been played around with, and systematically been destroyed, but the economy too is in a state of collapse. The self-serving policies being followed have rocked the very foundation of Pakistan".[1] The coup ended a string of democratically elected governments that have been in place in Pakistan since December 1988. Effectively, the 1999 coup enabled the Pakistan military to play an even more active and open role in Pakistan's politics.

Meanwhile, in the same general region, Malaysia continues to remain relatively stable under civilian rule, despite facing a serious economic crisis in 1997 and 1998. It is interesting to note that at the time of independence

---

[1] "Full Text of General Musharraf's Address," *The Dawn*. Available [On Line] http://www.dawn.com/daily/19991013/top.1.htm, accessed on 18 October 1999.

(Pakistan in 1947, and Malaysia in 1957) both nations inherited many of the British legacies. Their political systems were modeled on the parliamentary democracy of Great Britain, and their military institutions inherited many of the British characteristics including organization, training and military culture, and more importantly the acceptance of civilian supremacy.

However, in the subsequent years, civil-military relations in the two countries evolved along very different paths. While Malaysia manages to function as a normal democracy maintaining civilian control over its military, Pakistan witnessed at least four military interventions (1958, 1969, 1977, and 1999). The recent military coup of 12 October 1999 has certainly not surprised scholars and students of civil-military relations alike. The frequency of coups in Pakistan and their absence in Malaysia provide and interesting 'puzzle' whose explanation will have important inputs to the many new democracies, which have emerged in the last half of the Twentieth Century.[2]

---

[2] See for example Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, (Norman: University Oklahoma Press, 1991); Larry Diamond, Developing *Democracy: Towards Consolidation*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press), 1999.

B. OBJECTIVE OF STUDY

The purpose of this study is to examine the experiences of Pakistan and Malaysia respectively with regard to civil-military relations. Specifically, this thesis will focus on the causes of military intervention in the politics of Pakistan in contrast to those of Malaysia. What are the causes and associated conditions that favor military intervention in Pakistan and its absence in Malaysia?

This thesis argues that the re-current military interventions in Pakistan are mainly due to its weak political institutions, which led to its inability to govern effectively. Malaysia, on the other hand, has an advantage over Pakistan in that it has relatively mature political institutions with strong leadership and political elites. In addition, civilian control on the military is fully entrenched in the Malaysian political system.

C. IMPORTANCE OF STUDY

The significance of this study is two fold. Firstly, it seeks to understand the dynamics of civil-military relations in the region of Asia particularly in Malaysia and Pakistan. Secondly, the Malaysian experience might, perhaps with necessary modifications, provide lessons for emerging democracies, which have to cope with similar problems. In addition, the analysis will provide explanations that will

have important implications for policy makers in the emerging democracies.

D. METHOD OF ANALYSIS

This study employs the comparative method, specifically the method of structured focused comparison.[3] Through a comparative study of the civilian institutions, military institutions, and socio-economic factors in both countries, this study seeks to explain the causes of the military intervention in Pakistan, in contrast to the absence of military involvement in Malaysia.

E. STRUCTURE OF THESIS

This thesis consists of six chapters. This chapter is the introductory chapter. Chapter II reviews the literature on the concepts of civil-military relations with specific focus on military interventions. It then puts together a theoretical framework designed for analyzing military interventions in Pakistan and Malaysia. Chapter III analyses the extent of the civilian political structures and processes in institutionalization of both countries. Chapter IV compares and examines the degree of military institutionalization in the respective countries. Chapter V

---

[3] Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. LXV, No.3, September, 1971, 682-693; A.L George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured focused Comparison," in P.G. Lauren (ed.), *Diplomacy: New approaches in history, Theory, and Policy*, (New York: Free Press, 1979).

analyses the socio-economic conditions. The final chapter (Chapter VI) offers the summary and conclusions to the 'puzzle' as to what causes military interventions in Pakistan and their absence in Malaysia. In addition, this chapter assesses the future prospects of civil-military relations of both countries.

THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

II. REVIEW OF THEORETICAL LITERATURE

A. INTRODUCTION

This Chapter reviews the literature on the general concepts of military intervention, in order to establish a framework of analysis on the causes of military intervention in Pakistan in contrast to Malaysia. It argues that military intervention is more likely when civilian political institutions are weak, the military has internal motivations towards a political role, and socio-economic factors make effective governance difficult.

B. CONCEPTS OF INTERVENTION

The literature on intervention generally contains two concepts to explain the involvement of the military in politics of modern states. These concepts center on military professionalism and the socio-political causes of military coups.

1. Military Professionalism

The main proponent of the first theory is Samuel P. Huntington who presented what has become one of the most important contributions to theories of military intervention

in politics.[4] Huntington attempted to explain the nature of the modern military profession in terms of its loyalty to its master, the civilian dominated democratic state.

The major contribution of Huntington's general theory of civil-military relations lies in his argument that the rise of military professionalism is inversely related to military intervention. For him, the modern professional sense of expertise, social responsibility, and corporate loyalty incline the military against political intervention.[5]

Huntington argues that the military officer in western society possesses significant levels of skill in the management of violence and uses those skills to protect society. Their tasks - organizing and equipping a force, training it, planning its activities, let alone 'fighting it' in combat against the enemy - is a full time job. This calls for special skills and demands long training. The professional soldier is seen as neutral politically, with his loyalty pledged to both the state and the constitutionally elected government. This approach regards military intervention in politics as a result of failure in military professionalism.

---

[4] Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957).

[5] Ibid, 8-11.

2. Societal and Structural Weaknesses

Another theory that explains military intervention tends to stress the societal and structural weaknesses such as institutional fragility, systemic flaws, and low levels of political culture, which acts like a magnet that pull the armed forces into a power and legitimacy vacuum (the pull factors).

In this respect, Samuel E. Finer's work on societal weaknesses, despite several drawbacks, remains one of the most comprehensive treatments of a regime's vulnerability that may lead to military intervention.[6] Finer states that military intervention in any society is directly related to the society's political condition. According to Finer, where public attachment to civilian institutions is strong, military intervention in politics is rare. On the other hand, "where public attachments to civilian institutions are weak or non-existent, military intervention in politics will find wide scope - both in manner and in substance."[7]

Finer's four-fold division of countries according to the maturity of their political culture leads to the hypothesis that only countries with a "mature" political

---

[6] For details, see S.E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of Military in Politics* (London: Pall Mall Press Ltd., 1962), 25-30.

[7] Finer, *op. cit.*, 20-21.

culture - those in which consensus and mobilization are very high - are actually immune to military intervention. All other countries, where there is some unevenness between mobilization and consensus, are vulnerable.[8]

An alternative analysis of the same basic theme (i.e., the level of political development as a determinant of military intervention), made by Samuel Huntington, which also links military intervention with the general level of political institutionalization in any society. According to Huntington, the cause of military intervention in politics basically lies not in the nature of the military organization itself. Rather it is a specific manifestation of a broader phenomenon in underdeveloped politics, that is, "praetorianism". Praetorianism here as defined by Huntington, refers to the general politicization of social forces in the absence of "autonomy", "complexity", "coherence", and "adaptability" of political structures - in one word, 'political institutionalization'.[9]

In short, the prevalent theme in Huntington's observations about the praetorian society is that its civilian political institutions are always weak. A vacuum in institution and leadership demands that groups take

---

[8] Ibid, 87-89.

[9] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1968), 194-198.

control - for their own ends. In this respect, the armed forces count themselves among the many potential contenders for power. Even though Huntington provides reasonable valid generalizations, some of them are still plagued by theoretical vagueness. Nevertheless, Hungtington's contribution on the level of political institutionalization with military intervention remains highly valuable.

3. Military as an Institution and Causes of Intervention

There are other explanations for military intervention. Alfred Stepan, relying on an institutional change theory, argues that military intervention in politics stems from a change in the military's beliefs and training. Using Brazil as a case study, he argues that, prior to 1964, the military acted as a "regime changer" on several occasions, but never as a "regime ruler". While the military instituted numerous coups against civilian governments, it never installed military governments afterwards. In part, this was because, while civilians supported the coups, they did not support the idea of a military government.[10]

However, this role of "regime changer" was adopted because of "the widespread belief by the military officers that, in comparison to civilians, they had relatively low

---

[10] Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971), 173.

legitimacy to rule."[11] Stepan further argues that the military became a regime ruler in a large part because of the rise of a "new professionalism," whereby the military adapted its traditional professional training to include socio-economic and political skills. This new professionalism resulted from the military's fear of a communist revolution.

To counter such a revolutionary threat, the military began to widen its definition of its counter-insurgency tactics to include societal factors such as economic development and political leadership. In this way, the military's role became rooted more and more in political terms. This expansion of skills affected the military's beliefs and caused it to see itself as a potentially legitimate ruler, since its training was now similar to that of politicians and bureaucrats.

Eric A. Nordlinger argues that the inclination of the military to intervene in politics can be affected by its material needs. Nordlinger's arguments can be divided generally into 2 parts. First, the military has certain corporate interests that it desires to protect and enhance. This includes a share of adequate budgetary support, autonomy in managing their internal affairs, and the preservation of their responsibilities in the face of

---

[11] Ibid, 172.

encroachments from rival institutions.[12] When the government fails to cater to their corporate interests, the military officers will be inclined to intervene.[13]

Secondly, Nordlinger argues that military officers can, to some extent, be seen as representatives of the urban middle class. Although military officers do not always have their origins in the middle-class, their status as officers puts them in that class and they usually marry into middle-class families. As members of the middle-class, they share its general interests. A government that fails to satisfy middle-class interests can thus often be expected to face opposition not only from the middle-class in general but from the officer corps of the military in particular as well.[14]

Samuel Decalo, argues that idiosyncratic and personalist factors are major variables that explain coup d'etats in sub-Saharan Africa.[15] He further argues that armies cannot be viewed as a cohesive coup, a westernized hierarchy intervening in the political arena from altruistic

---

[12] Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldier in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1977), 65-71.

[13] Ibid, 65-71.

[14] Ibid, 32-37.

[15] See Samuel Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style*,(Virginia: Yale University Press, 1976).

motives, but instead are coteries of cliques composed of ambitious officers seeking self-advancement.

Other analysts such as Juan Linz, Guillermo O'Donnell, and Felipe Agüero have drawn attention to the relation between military intervention and the "breakdown" of the democratic political systems.[16] It is argued that the orderly succession of political authority from one group to another requires prior agreement to satisfy questions of legitimacy. Legitimacy is thus, an important factor that relates to military intervention. In the next few pages, I will discuss the issue of legitimacy crisis.

4. Crisis of Legitimacy

Legitimacy is an important aspect that has a profound effect on the survival of a government. Juan J. Linz posits that "the higher the commitment in numbers and intensity to the legitimacy of the regime, the greater its capacity to survive serious crises of efficacy and effectiveness when confronted with unsolvable problems. ... Democracies build their legitimacy on the basis of loyalty to the state or the nation. In fact, sectors of society, particularly army

---

[16] Juan Linz, "Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration", in Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1978); Felipe Agüero, "Crisis and Decay of Democracy in Venezuela: The Civil-Military Dimension," in Jenifer McCoy and Williams Smith, eds., *Venezuelan Democracy Under Stress* (Florida: University of Miami North-South Center, 1995), 215.

officers, civil servants, and sometimes, intellectual leaders, feel a stronger identification with the state than with particular regime and reject in principle the partisan identification of the state."[17]

It has been argued that legitimacy crises arise from development syndromes that produce a widening of perceptions on a larger number of people, which eventually increases the sensitivities and the possibilities of doing things with wider alternatives. Furthermore, since legitimacy is an attribute to the political system and its association with the performance of the government, it is therefore, fundamental to determine the capacity of the system.

It is important to note that political power and resources are dispersed among numerous groups in praetorian politics, and the political parties are usually identified with particular social forces rather than as aggregating the interests of a broad range of groups. Governments tend to be formed by a coalition of various interests groups. Each must be given its due, including how the military sees itself. If at any time the military perceives the regime as inconvenient, it can intervene to bring in a regime that is more amenable.

In the following chapters, I will analyze the situation in Pakistan and Malaysia using the concepts discussed above.

---

[17] Juan Linz, *Breakdown of Democratic Regimes:…* , 1978, 45.

Specifically, I will focus on military professionalism, societal and structural weaknesses, socio-economic conditions, and legitimacy.

C. APPROACH TO ANALYSIS

In the following chapters, the following variables will be used to analyze levels of institutionalization of both Pakistan and Malaysia. They are divided into three sections; (1) Civilian Political Institutions, (2) Military Institutions, and (3) Socio-economic Conditions.

1. Civilian Political Institutions

The factors pertaining to levels of development on civilian political institutions includes roles of political parties, levels of political institutionalization, legitimacy, levels of mass political mobilization and participation, and the role of bureaucracies.

Political systems with high ratios of mass participation and high degrees of legitimacy have strong civil institutions. Irrespective of variations in governmental forms - monarchy, republic, democracy, or dictatorship - these systems have the power to innovate and implement policy decisions for their societies. Such systems may be called civic societies.

Conversely, praetorianism exists in a state in which institutions are weak and the basis for legitimizing

political authority is uncertain. Praetorian polities are characterized by varying degrees or overt class and ethnic conflicts such as student riots, mob violence, unstable and erratic political leadership, bureaucratic inefficiency, and corruption, government infringement of civil liberties, and individual and/or group alienations, and military coups.

The strengths and weaknesses of political institutions can be measured by two key elements.[18] First, the scope of public support for the organization and the procedures, which political structures can aggregate. This in turn depends, as Huntington notes, "on the extent to which political organization and procedures encompass activity in the society. If only a small upper-class group belongs to political organization and behaves in terms of a set of procedures, the scope is limited. If, on the other hand, a large segment of the population is politically organized and follows the political procedures, the scope is broad".[19]

Secondly, the level of political institutionalization, and the extent of political communication and public awareness of the government and the political issues surrounding it are other determinants.[20] In addition, political institutional structures are more effective if

---

[18] Huntington, *Political Order…* , 12.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid.

they are legitimate and can command widespread and stable allegiance to their symbols and procedures.

In the following chapter (Chapter III), it is argued that deficiencies in either or both of the above aspects facilitate military intervention in politics. The circumstances of the intervention will differ, however, according to the main source of weaknesses of civilian institutions. Uncontrolled mobilization or violence, for example, is likely to pull the military more actively into the conflict.

2. Military Institutions

Under this variable, factors such as roles and missions of the armed forces, beliefs of military elites, professionalism, corporate interest, cohesiveness, autonomy, and resources - all which affect the relative strength or weakness of the military institution vis-à-vis the civilian institutions. Broadly speaking, an army's institutional strength may be roughly measured by references to those factors.

3. Socio-economic Conditions

Under this variable, the economic decline in vulnerable regimes, does not automatically lead to military intervention, but is likely to increase the grievances of the armed forces. The other socio-economic factors include

social mobilization, social and class structure, religion, economic development, colonial legacy, dimension of independence, people's attitudes, and history.

Following the above, this thesis will examine three main variables that relate to military intervention, namely; (1) civilian political institutions, (2) military institutions, and (3) socio-economic conditions. Specifically, under civilian political institutions, political systems, the roles of political parties and leadership, and legitimacy will be analyzed. Under military institutions, the role of the military in internal security, and the beliefs of military/civilian elites regarding the roles of the armed forces will be examined. Under socio-economic conditions, the level of social structure, and the level of socio-economic development will be examined.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

III. CIVILIAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN PAKISTAN AND MALAYSIA

A. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, two important aspects related to civilian political institutions will be discussed; namely, (1) Political Systems and the Roles of Political Leadership and Political Parties, and (2) Legitimacy. This chapter argues that weak political institutions in Pakistan, in contrast to those of Malaysia have been a major contributing factor to the cause of military intervention in Pakistan.

B. POLITICAL SYSTEM, ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES, AND ROLE OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF PAKISTAN

Since independence in 1947, Pakistan has undergone continuing political crises (four coups since independence - 1958, 1969, 1977, and 1999). The development of its political system has been characterized as turbulent and marked by the birth, development, and the demise of a number of political organizations. None of which took roots in the political system, and thus never became sufficiently broad-based and representative.[21]

---

[21] Louis D. Hayes, *Politics in Pakistan: The Struggle for Legitimacy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 1-18.

After gaining independence from British rule in 1947, Pakistan began developing its political system of parliamentary democracy based on the Westminster model, similar to Malaysia. However, under the circumstances in which Pakistan began its political development, the functioning of the parliamentary system faced difficult obstacles.

The internal political conditions of Pakistan were not satisfactory. The most difficult problem facing the leaders of the nation has been to develop a viable political system. At the time, the general attitude was that as long as there was a strong leader, the country seemed stable. However, after the death of such a leader, factionalism, regionalism, and opportunism characterized the politics of Pakistan.[22]

The Muslim League (ML), in contrast to the United Malay National Organization (UMNO), failed to transform itself from a nationalist movement to a national party in order to lead the nation on the road to democracy, stability and prosperity. The Muslim Leaque stood for the creation of Pakistan and directed all its efforts towards this objective. It did not, however, indicate the outlines of political and economic actions to be followed after independence. Thus, when the objective of the party was

---

[22] Hasan Askari Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan*, (Lahore, Pakistan: Progressive Publisher, 1976), 61.

achieved, and when Jinnah, the father of the nation, died in 1948, the Muslim League lost the momentum and vigor that characterized its movement prior 1947. With the death of Jinnah, the Muslim League had no leader of similar standing. Liaquat Ali, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, at the time of the death of Jinnah, tried hard to fill the vacuum of leadership, but was assassinated in 1951.

This was made worse when political parties were shifting alliances among political leaders. Their loyalties to a particular party were not based on principle, but rather on the political and ministerial gain. For example, in 1953, Governor General Gylum Mohammed dismissed Nazimuddin's ministry, who had in just a few days passed the budget in the National Assembly. For a successor, the governor-general turned to Mohammed Ali Bog, who was Pakistan's Ambassador to the United States. The Muslim League did not object to the dismissal of its leader, and some members of the outgoing cabinet joined the new government.[23]

Indeed, the new government, which held office by the support of these political parties and politicians, was liable to be overthrown with every change in the loyalties of the politicians. The party in power used various methods

---

[23] Mustaq Ahmed, *Government and Politics in Pakistan*, (Space Publisher, 1970), 129; Rizvi, 65.

to retain the support of its members or manipulate the members of the opposition parties. The methods used included (1) financial aid, and material gain was assured to gain support, and (2) ministries were unduly multiplied in order to gain support.[24] When martial law was imposed in October 1958, 26 out of 80 members of the National Assembly were ministers.[25] The offering of ministerial posts proved to be the most useful device to keep a majority in the National Assembly.

The weaknesses in political leadership and the continuing struggle for power shifted the real power of the National Assembly to the head of state (Governor-General, and since 1956, President) a strong tradition of violating the norms of parliamentary democracy was quickly established. The politicians were divided into so many camps that they could not adopt a united stand to restrict the greater concentration of power left in the hands of the head of state.[26]

The impact of political instability on Pakistan could well be imagined. The administration was paralyzed and the economy was crippled. By October 1958, Pakistan was in the grip of a severe economic crisis. Taking advantage of the

---

[24] Ahmed, 167.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Rizvi, 69.

political instability and the economic crisis created by the politicians, the commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Army, General Ayub, on 27 October 1958, overthrew the civilian government and established a military rule in Pakistan. The military intervention ended the 11-years of civilian government. The military regime of Ayub, however, failed to fulfill its pre-coup promises and was replaced by another military regime on 25 March 1969. Ayub was forced to resign by a massive public agitation against him. However, Ayub, instead of handing the power to the civilians, handed the power to the military commander-in-chief of Pakistan.

General Yahya, who came to power with the collapse of the Ayub regime, ruled until 1971. After the defeat in the war with India over East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in 1971, Yahya was forced to resign. However, unlike Ayub, Yahya handed the power over to the civilians. With the downfall of Yahya, the second era of civilian rule in Pakistan began.

In the second civilian government, the emergence of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as Pakistan's Prime Minister in December 1971, replacing General Yahya was a natural outcome of the defeat in the war with India and the loss of East Pakistan, which later became Bangladesh. Bhutto's People's Party swept the 1970 polls in the western wing of Pakistan. Once East Pakistan was lost, the military had no choice but to hand the power to Bhutto, the leader of the majority party in West Pakistan.

Bhutto became Prime Minister at a time when Pakistan was passing through the most difficult crisis in its history. The loss of East Pakistan deeply hurt the emotions and caused unprecedented anguish, the people were bewildered and confused by what had happened.

The civilian government of Bhutto took the responsibility of restoring a sense of national identity and purpose in the demoralized Pakistanis. After consolidating his party's rule during the five-year period from 1972 to 1977, general elections were held on 7 March 1977. The ruling party received a landslide victory, obtaining an absolute majority of 155 in the house of 200.[27]

After the elections, the Pakistan National Alliance mounted a nationwide movement against Bhutto and his party, charging that Bhutto had massively rigged the elections. They demanded the dismissal of Bhutto's government by alleging that it was illegal and they demanded holding of new elections under the supervision of the armed forces and the judiciary. Gradually, the movement picked up momentum in most of the urban centers of Pakistan. The army was called in, and major cities were brought under martial law. Large numbers of people were killed, wounded, or thrown into jail. All efforts to quell the mass upheaval failed, and

---

[27] Manzoor Ahmed, *Contemporary Pakistan: Politics, Economy, and Society*, (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1980), 25.

Bhutto had to yield to open negotiation with the Pakistan National Alliance. The protracted negotiation continued until 4 July 1977 with no sign of any political settlement. It appeared that the country was on the verge of a bloody civil war. Against this backdrop, General Zia, the chief of the Pakistan Army, took over the reins of government and dislodged Bhutto's government. This brought an end to the second era of civilian government in Pakistan.

In justifying his actions, General Zia asserted that the primary reason the army had to intervene was to save the country from deepening political turmoil and chaos and that political leaders had failed to rescue the country from crisis. The pretext used by General Zia for intervening in the political crisis was the same that was used by General Ayub in 1958 (i.e., the inability of politicians to rescue the country from political instability and economic chaos). Similarly, in justifying the military coup on October 12, 1999, General Musharraf stated similar reasons for the Pakistan's Army intervention.[28]

In short, the political parties in Pakistan were functioning contrary to their professed principles. Its weak political institutions that included poor political leadership coupled with political intrigues and opportunism,

---

[28] "Full Text of General Musharraf's Address," *Dawn*. Available [On Line] http://www.dawn.com/daily/19991013/top.1.htm, accessed on 18 October 1999.

and a lack of unity in political parties, led the country from crisis to crisis. The politics pursued has been "thoroughly inimical to social change and national consolidation."[29]

In terms of political institutionalization, as defined by "adaptability", "complexity", "autonomy", and "coherence", of its organization and procedures,[30] Pakistan could not be considered satisfactory. The democratic process under the parliamentary system had been problematic and continues to be unresolved. These unsolvable problems rapidly impaired the moral fiber of the nation even after the Zia period of 1988 and continue to resurface up to the present time. The recurring political crises including the October 12, 1999 coup, is the manifestation of the types of weak political institutions that have characterized Pakistan's politics throughout its 52 years of history.

C. POLITICAL SYSTEM, ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES, AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF MALAYSIA

Like Pakistan, Malaysia after gaining independence from British rule on 31 August 1957, developed its political system under a parliamentary democracy modeled on Westminster. However, while Pakistan failed to maintain a parliamentary system, Malaysia continues to be ruled by a

---

[29] Rizvi, 69.

[30] Huntington, *op cit.*, 12.

parliamentary government, and its political system has become highly institutionalized.

The high level of institutionalization in Malaysia, since its independence in 1957, has largely been possible due to the strong leadership and the strength of UMNO. The strong leadership of the first Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman for 14 years managed to instill in the political system a set of values, norms, behaviors and rules of the game, and gave incredible leadership to the parliamentary system. Tunku Abdul Rahman's ability to build a national consensus on political, economic and social structuring, a firm commitment to parliamentary democracy, and an advocacy of independent foreign policy, made Malaysia one of the most stable countries in the developing world. Although this has somewhat decreased since the sacking of the ex-Deputy Prime Minister, Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim in 1998.[31]

The most remarkable feature about the UMNO has been its highly institutionalized character, in terms of effective adaptation with changing times and contexts, its structural and functional complexity, and its autonomous and coherent performance.[32]

---

[31] As of this writing, Dato' Seri Anwar has been in prison for six years on counts of corruption. He is currently facing charges of sodomy.

[32] Huntington, *op. cit.*, 12.

This is particularly true in its success in institutionalizing a mass party organization nine years after it was formed, coupled with consensus building with other political parties in a single party framework, the Coalition Front (Barisan Nasional) led by UMNO. It is important to note that the Malaysian political institution since independence, has always been controlled by an unequal alliance between the Malay and the non-Malay political parties.

After racial riots in 1969, largely in response to an economic imbalance between the Malays and the non-Malays, the Malaysian government introduced its New Economic Policy (NEP) which was designed to bring the Malays into the modern sector of the economy. This contributed towards the relative success of the parliamentary democracy in Malaysia.[33] For instance, unlike the Muslim League in Pakistan, UMNO has not faced severe electoral erosion except for a brief period in 1987 and again in the November 1999 general elections. In the last general election (November 1999), the Barisan National not only won the election but continued to maintain its two-thirds majority in Parliament, despite losing the state of Kelantan to the opposition party, Party Islam SeMalaysia(PAS).

---

[33] Huntington, Political Order in … , 398.

It is important to note that, unlike Pakistan, Malaysia has consistently held elections since its independence (11 elections since its independence in 1957). And at the federal level, the UMNO-led Barisan National coalition party has been in power since its independence.

There are many reasons for such high levels of political institutionalization. First, is the consensual authority of UMNO and the effectiveness of the Barisan Nasional in performing the role of political accommodation and political integration. As Arend Lijphart points out, despite the extreme racial and socio-economic differences between ethnic groups, the "Malaysians have been power-sharers … they provide a hopeful model to other multi-ethnic societies."[34] In fact, the mass base support has acted as the backbone of the Barisan Nasional of multi-racial parties, which held the legitimacy of diverse groups in Malaysian society.

Secondly, in contrast to the Muslim League, the Barisan Nasional has been and continues to be committed program of social and economic changes.[35] This was implemented in the form of "affirmative action" strategy, which was translated

---

[34] Arend Lijphart, "The Power-sharing Approach," in *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies,* ed. Joseph V. Montville, (Lexington, Massachusetts: 1990), 498.

[35] See Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Sharifah Alattas, "Malaysia in an uncertain Mode," in *Driven by Growth,* ed., James W. Morally, M.E. Sharpie Inc., New York, 1999, 176-196.

into policies and programs such as, the New Education Policy and the New Economic Policy (NEP). Despite criticisms of the New Economic Policy(NEP), Malaysia had been considered one of the few multi-racial democracies in Asia that has worked.[36] The UMNO-led government's success in achieving its high economic performance of the country after the 1969 riots, and its ability in overcoming the July 1997 economic crisis in a relatively short period of time, has in part contributed to the increased support for the UMNO-led government from the non-Malays.

Thirdly, Malaysia has a highly developed administrative system led by the Malaysian Civil Service (MCS) that was prepared to assume the primary responsibilities for input and output functions.[37] Despite the relatively high pace of modernization, and social mobilization in Malaysia, it did not create excessively disrupting demands and strains, and the UMNO-led government and the bureaucracy were able to handle and maintain their institutional capabilities, unlike that of Pakistan.

In short, the UMNO-led Barisan Nasional coalition party has played a prominent role not only in providing political stability, but also has provided a commendable level of

---

[36] Arend Lijphart, *op. cit.*, 498.

[37] After independence, Malaysia (Malaya as it was known at the time), was left with working administration, and even with administrators and advisors. See Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on the Horseback* … 1988, 208.

economic well being, which has enhanced the mass support and the legitimacy of the government. Given these conditions, and provided that the current structure is maintained, it is assessed that the UMNO-led Barisan Nasional government of Malaysia will continue to remain in power for quite some time in the future.

The survival and sustenance of the relatively stable and effective parliamentary democracy in Malaysia rests largely on the dominant political party, the United Malay National Organization (UMNO), the strong political leadership and the Malaysian Civil Service (MCS). As William Case observes, Malaysia's success accounts for the political stability and legitimacy that has generally prevailed in Malaysia "a record that has not been matched elsewhere in the region."[38]

D. CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY

As discussed in Chapter II, legitimacy is an important aspect to the survivability of a regime, and its relationship with military intervention. As Juan Linz argues "the higher the commitment in numbers and intensity to the legitimacy of the regime, the greater its capacity to

---

[38] William Case, "Malaysia: Aspects and Audiences of Legitimacy," in *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority*, ed. Muthiah Alagappa, (California: Stanford University Press, 1995), 70.

survive serious efficacy and effectiveness when confronted with unsolvable problems."[39]

1. Pakistan

In Pakistan, there has been little inclination to accept the legitimacy of political institutions. There are mainly two reasons for this. First, the ruling parties have been mainly preoccupied with their own survival and inclined to restrict access to the political process such as placing limitations on public meetings, party activities, and interactions.

Secondly, the unconstitutional action on the part of the bureaucrats turned politicians, can be considered to be one of the major sources of the loss of legitimacy. For example, Governor General Gulam Mohammed was among the first to act unconstitutionally in April 1953, when he terminated Nazimuddin as Prime Minister.[40] This was not challenged in the Assembly thus demonstrating the political supremacy of the bureaucracy. Subsequently, the Governor-general, and later under the 1956 constitution the President, arbitrarily

---

[39] Juan J. Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown & Reequilibrium*, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1978), 45.

[40] The Governor General, in justification of his decision, pointed that the Cabinet of Khawja Nazimuddin had proved itself incapable of maintaining law and order and of arresting the deteriorating food situation. Cited in Khalid B Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan*, (Boston:Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), 71.

made and unmade ministries and easily obtained the necessary parliamentary majority for the new incumbents without much difficulty.

The changes in political alignments could be explained in terms of the dominating and decisive role of the Governor-General and later the President, and the office led by bureaucrats. Essentially, the source of their power came from the backing won and their control over the bureaucracy and the army, rather than the changing coalitions of politicians, which they successfully manipulated from crisis to crisis.

It was in October 1954, when the military and bureaucracy assumed power directly for the first time, that East Pakistan took an independent stance by introducing the proposals for constitutional amendments designed to curb the powers of the Governor-General. In response, the Governor-General, on October 27, 1954, declared a 'state of emergency' and dissolved the Constituent Assembly.[41] The Governor General had not only relied on his supporters in the Punjabi group, the civil service and the army, but had also formed a new cabinet called a ministry of 'all talents' which included General Ayub Khan, the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) as Defense Minister, the Governor-General himself,

---

[41] Meena Kasshi Gopinath, *Pakistan in Transition: Political Development and Rise to Power of Pakistan's People's Party,* (New Delhi: Manohar Book Service, 1975), 11.

an ex-civil servant as the Minister of Interior. The induction of Ayub Khan in the new cabinet as defense minister and as C-in-C was not only unprecedented but also unprincipled and contradicted the principal civilian supremacy.

In addition, President Iskander Mirza, jockeying for power under a centralist presidency, survived by dividing his opponents and attempting to change the constitution in two years rather than the eight years it had taken to create the governor-general system.

Consequently, as the government could not satisfy the demands and aspirations of the people, the long awaited general elections to the National Assembly were postponed for one reason or another under the very constitution that had been designed to ensure free elections. For eleven years there were no elections, no national political parties, and no national cohesion. The disgruntled citizenry could only resort to write petitions against government decisions in courts of law. In the absence of national political structures, local political machines flourished and entrenched themselves.

The Muslim League, could not transform itself into a mass party, nor could it lead the nation towards stability and progress due to its weak political institutions, and lack of strong leadership. After the death of Jinnah in 1948, Pakistan was left without a strong leader that was

needed to hold the Muslim League together. On the other hand, the strong leadership of Tunku Abdul Rahman and the other ruling elites in UMNO enabled the political system to consolidate and institutionalize.

Consequently, in the absence of a stable party and strong leadership, the politicians in Pakistan began playing politics without following the basic principles of democratic governance. The weak political parties coupled with poor leadership played a major part in the failure of civilian government in Pakistan. The existing economic chaos exacerbated by the constant infighting among politicians in their struggle for power, was also an important reason for the failure of the civilian government in Pakistan.

It can be summarized that Pakistan's recurring crises fit Huntington's model of praetorian society where military interventions are a manifestation of the broader phenomenon of underdevelopment and general politicization state institutions.[42]

2. Malaysia

In Malaysia, on the other hand, legitimacy of the ruling government is more established than in Pakistan. The major reason for this is the wide acceptance of Malay

---

[42] Huntington, *Political Order …, op. cit.*, 194-198.

dominance over a wide strata of society, particularly among the Chinese and the Indians. In fact the concept of Malay dominance and the articulation of certain non-Malay interests, as well as the institutions associated with it, has generally being accepted by the majority of the Malaysian population. Indeed, the principle of Malay dominance is likely to endure for some time to come in light of Malaysia's demographic make-up.[43]

As discussed earlier, the success of UMNO is due to the contextual importance of the goals and their consequent appeal to the non-Malays. In Malaysia, the belief of their special rights as 'sons of the soil,' as well as an apprehension of being dominated by non-Malays, underscores the Malay appeal for ethnic protection and political dominance.[44] Developments following the racial riots in 1969 confirmed to the masses the importance of ethnic unity and protection.

After the May 1969 racial riots, the parliamentary system since Malaya's independence in 1957, was suspended. The Malays believed that the results of the election challenged the principle of Malay dominance - the core element, of the bargain struck among the three major ethnic

---

[43] See K. S. Nathan, "Malaysia: Reinventing the Nation," in *Asian Security Practice*, ed. Muthiah Alagappa, (California: Stanford University Press, 1998), 516-517.

[44] William Case, *op. Cit.*, 70-107.

communities in 1957. Many in UMNO - including the current Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohammed, then an UMNO back-bencher - advocated the permanent closing of the Parliament and continuation of emergency rule.[45] Since then the goal of Malay dominance has been its overriding concern. A majority of the Malays, rural and urban, confers a moral authority on UMNO.

Further, UMNO's success in achieving high economic performance, particularly after the 1969 riots, coupled with its success in weathering the financial crisis in July 1997, without assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), has lent a legitimacy to the government, not only from the Malays but more importantly from the non-Malays. This is clearly evident in the last general election on November 1999, when the UMNO-led government won convincingly, retaining two-thirds majority in Parliament, a record it has held since Malaysia's independence.[46]

Malaysia's success has been attributed to the strength of its civilian political institutions led by UMNO, coupled with strong leadership, and stable bureaucracy. The flexibility and the ability of UMNO to respond effectively to social change, and the growing commitment to democratic

---

[45] Ibid, 102.

[46] "Triumph for Mahathirian Economics." Available [On Line] http://www.stratfor.com/asia/countries/malaysia/news/malaysianewsnov.htm . Accessed on November 30, 1999.

process, has lent legitimacy to the government. The civilian political institutions of Pakistan, on the other hand, have been weak, coupled with the inability of the ruling elites to acquire legitimacy, as proposed by Juan Linz in Chapters II. In addition the lack of consensus over the fundamental organization and purposes of a state has led Pakistan to continuing crisis up to the present time.

E. SUMMARY

This chapter has argued that weak political institutions in Pakistan have been the major contributing factor to the cause of military intervention in Pakistan. These can be summarized as follows.

As discussed earlier, both Pakistan and Malaysia started building their political institutions with the British parliamentary system of democracy. But, it is only Malaysia that continues to be ruled by a parliamentary government, while Pakistan has failed as demonstrated by the recurring crises. The coup of October 12, 1999 is the latest manifestation of such crises.

During their struggle for independence, both Pakistan and Malaysia had one dominant party; Pakistan with its Muslim League and Malaysia with its UMNO. But, UMNO, after the independence was able to transform itself from a nationalist movement to a dominant party, and more

importantly was able to adapt itself with the changing needs of other races by forming coalition parties in the following years; the Alliance Party and Barisan Nasional. The ability of UMNO to adapt and transform itself to the changing needs of its people proves its strength and maturity as a ruling party in contrast to the Muslim League.

In short, the weak political institutions such as lack of well-organized political parties and weak political leadership as referred to in Chapter II, has greatly contributed to the failure of the civilian government in Pakistan in contrast to Malaysia. The political bargaining and open defiance of the norms of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan has produced an instability, which in turn reduces the efficacy and legitimacy of its political institutions.

Indeed the propensity of a political system to resist military intervention relies much on the strength of its political parties and political leadership. As Huntington observes, "the decline in party strength, the fragmentation of the leadership, the evaporation of mass support, the decay of organizational structure, the shift of political leaders from party to bureaucracy and rise of personalism, all herald the moment when colonels occupy the capital." [47]

---

[47] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order …*, 409.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

IV. MILITARY INSTITUTIONS IN PAKISTAN AND MALAYSIA

A. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, the following variables of military institutions will be analyzed, namely; (1) the role of the military in internal security, and (2) the views of military/civilian elites regarding the roles of their armed forces are examined.

It argues that the Pakistani's military involvement and experience in internal security has influenced the professional thinking of the Pakistan Armed Forces. On the other hand, while Malaysia was involved in such internal security missions it did not influence its thinking and remained under civilian control.

B. ROLE OF THE PAKISTAN ARMED FORCES IN NATIONAL SECURITY

1. Role in Internal Security

This part argues that the military intervention in Pakistan occurred after it grew weary of rescuing the allegedly incompetent and ineffective civilian leadership. The military elites of the Pakistan Armed Forces particularly the Army viewed national security including internal security and development as falling within its exclusive jurisdiction. This is despite the stated role of

Pakistan's military in the constitution that civilian control over the armed forces is absolute in accordance to the norms of democratic principles.

Pakistan's Constitution stipulates that "the Armed Forces are primarily the defenders of Pakistan's frontiers, but can also be called upon to enforce the authority of the civilian government, or be endowed with such internal security duties that the civilian government may deem fit."[48] Article 245 of the 1973 Constitution prescribes the mission of the armed forces as defense of the nation against external aggression or threat of war and, subject to law, aid-to-the-civil power when called upon.[49] It therefore, does not provide for the military to play a role in politics.

From the very inception, the Pakistan Army was confronted with a horror of communal riots, and later it dealt with natural disasters such as floods, cyclones, or famine relief, and developed a strong record of such activities.[50] Out of all the episodes, three of the most important ones occurred in the former East Pakistan, where

---

[48] Babar Sattar, *A Journey Back to the Barrack? Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan*. Paper prepared for the State and Soldier in Asia Conference, East-West Center, Honolulu, 1999, 9.

[49] Article 245 (1) The Constitution of Pakistan, 1973.

[50] Najam Rafique, "Pakistan Army: Towards a New Professionalism", in *Strategic Studies*, vol. XVI Autumn, Winter 1993, 108.

the Army was obliged to participate in anti-smuggling and anti-famine operations.[51] They are (1) Operation Jute (1952-1953), "Operation Service First" (1956), and "Operation Close-Door."[52]

The army was called to restore law and order on numerous occasions when the situation went beyond the control of police, for instance, the riots in Karachi (1949), Dhaka (1949), Dhaka (1950), the language riot in East Pakistan (1952), the anti-Ahmadiya riots in Punjab (1953), and the labor troubles in East Pakistan (1954). The disturbance in Punjab in 1953 culminated in the imposition of martial law in Lahore, and gave the army its first experience in running a civil administration directly.[53]

Between the years 1972-1977, there were not less than six occasions when the army was called in to aid civil authorities. This include the language riots in Sindh (1972), labor disputes (1972), counter-insurgency operations in Baluchistan (1973-1977), civil conflicts in Dir, NWFP, and the mass anti-Bhutto movement(1977).[54] The inability of

---

[51] Fazal Muqeem Khan, "*The Story of the Pakistan Army*," (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1963), 161. Cited in Najam Rafique, "Pakistan Army: Towards a New Professionalism," in *Strategic Studies*, vol. XVI Autumn, Winter 1993, 108.

[52] Ibid, 109.

[53] Ibid, 110.

[54] Ibid, 111.

the political elite to manage the political crisis during this period, and the gradual erosion of the civilian political institutions, once again, brought the political initiative back to the Army.

The end of the 1980s, and under a duly elected civilian government, the military was once again called upon to check a growing civil war situation in Sindh. The provincial government in Sindh was paralyzed due to rising political disorder that led to total chaos in the rural and urban areas where political violence, ethnic tensions, sectarian differences, growing narcotic menace, bomb blasts, killings of innocent citizens, kidnappings of both local and foreign nationals were common.[55]

In addition, the anti-terrorist offensive in Punjab, conducted by the Pakistan Army in 1977, was the largest operation to aid the civil authorities since independence. This support not only affected the organizational integrity, but also had a profound effect in its relation to civil authorities, in terms of the government's ineffectiveness to tackle terrorism. The army continues to conduct internal security operations to the present day.

In short, the Pakistan army has frequently been engaged in internal security affairs and in the aid-to-civil authorities including dealing with mass nationalist movement

---

[55] Ibid, 112-113.

since its independence.[56] More importantly, many of these activities are more "political" in nature. This led the Pakistani military to develop various professional responsibilities in order to deal with civilian matters and internal security affairs. As Finer observes, "the decline of confidence in the politicians and civil processes is liable to enhance the popularity of the military," and the social status and power of the Pakistan army also rises in the eyes of the citizens.[57]

2. Military Elites' Views on National Security

Despite the constitutionally prescribed missions of defending the country and continuing the traditional role of aid-to-the civil power, the Pakistan Armed Forces have an unstated mission of internal security, development and international security. The military elites seem to believe that the mission of internal security, development and international security rests in their domains.[58] Arguably, it is these interests and beliefs that have led the military to assume power on four separate occasions since Pakistan's

---

[56] Stephen P. Cohen, "Civilian Control of the Military in India," Claude E. Jr. Welch (ed.), *Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases From Developing Countries* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976), 53.

[57] Samuel E. Finer, 73.

[58] Hasan-Askari Rizvi, 99-100.

independence in 1947 (1958, 1969, 1977, and the coup of October 12, 1999).

In fact their involvement and experiences in internal security affairs has led them to believe that internal security and development are their concern. The military engages in a broad range of missions in public service including economic activities, and natural disaster operations, where the armed forces play a leading role. In addition, the military has engaged actively in sensitive areas that are strategic to Pakistan particularly Balochistan.[59]

It is this belief that they expect the civilian government to ensure "socio-political stability" in the country.[60] This is evident on the part of the senior military commanders, who, in their annual conference "constantly review the government's political and economic management, especially its interaction with the political adversaries, the handling of law and order, and such issues as corruption, use of state machinery and patronage."[61]

In addition, the military elites "have not hesitated to comment publicly on the political situation, advising

---

59 *Pakistan: A Country Study,* (Washington: Library of Congress, US Government Printing Office, 1995), 286.

60 Ibid, 100.

61 Ibid.

political leaders to put their house in order, not to crush their opposition, to settle contentious issues through political means and negotiations, and the need to establish a corruption-free, transparent, and effective administration."[62]

The military elites have, on a number of occasions, used their influence to moderate a conflict among the politicians and/or forced them into a settlement when they felt that a confrontation would cause a major constitutional breakdown. For example, "they supported the President in removing civilian governments in August 1990, April 1993 and November 1996, having concluded that these governments could no longer ensure domestic peace, stability and order. Similarly, in the confrontation between the President and the judiciary in December 1997, "the military supported the Prime Minister."[63]

In addition to the internal security and development mission, the Pakistan Armed Forces maintains a deep interest in international security and foreign policy issues, particularly those that impinge on its security. It is widely believed that Pakistan's foreign policy is largely guided by its military, and in areas that overlap with

---

[62] Ibid.

[63] Ibid.

Pakistan's security policy, the military's forces "inputs are taken very seriously."[64]

Pakistan's foreign policy towards India, including Kashmir, is a case in point. The military views India as having a hegemonic ambition, and believes that building a strong and credible conventional force with nuclear weapons capabilities is vital to its security, and will enable Pakistan conduct independent foreign and domestic policies. Hasan-Askari Rizvi sums this up well when he observes that "unless the military is satisfied that there are credible guarantees against India's efforts to interfere, it will resist surrendering its nuclear-weapon option and advise caution on normalizing relations."[65]

On the nuclear issue, the military manages and dominates policy-making in the nuclear field. During the Zia era, the military directly controlled nuclear policy and the conduct of the Afghan War. In the post-Zia period of 1988 until the present day (February 2000), the "Army remains the *de facto* watchdog of Pakistan's nuclear establishment comprising of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and the Khan Research Laboratories, both of which are autonomous bodies."[66] The Arms Control Cell, which has

---

[64] Babar Sattar, 21.

[65] Hasan-Askari Rizvi, 99.

[66] Babar Sattar, 20.

been operational in the Army GHQ since 1992, is another example of such domination. This cell, which has been performing the role of a think tank for Pakistan's policy vis-à-vis the non-proliferation regime, has now been separated from the Combat Division and placed under the Strategic Planning Division of the GHQ.[67]

In short, the Pakistan Armed Forces seems to no longer subscribe to the classical role and mission of external defenses. The role and mission of the military continues to be defined broadly to include political and military functions. It can be said that the theoretical concept of the military's subservience to civilian authorities does not apply in Pakistan. In addition to its autonomy in defense and institutional and organizational matters, the Pakistan Armed Forces is also independent on sources of intelligence. Furthermore, it possesses the capability of revenue generation with innumerable commercial organizations, educational and technical institutions, and even a separate legal code.

The above cases illustrate the various incidents of army intrusions into civilian realms of concern, including restoration of order in Lahore to General Ayub's formulation of a constitutional plan. This serves to illustrate how the political situation became more conducive to military

---

[67] Babar Sattar, 21.

control rather than civilian control. Similarly, one of the most important motivations behind the first coup in Pakistan was the military's judgement that civilian leaders were so incompetent that they would periodically plunge all or part of Pakistan into domestic chaos. Interestingly, these arguments are similar to the reasons given by General Pervez Musharraf immediately after he seized power from Nawaz Sharif on October 12, 1999.

C. ROLES OF THE MALAYSIAN ARMED FORCES IN NATIONAL SECURITY

1. Role in Internal Security

In the case of Malaysia, there has been no military intervention in politics even when the military has been involved in internal security roles, particularly during the insurgency periods, (1948-1960) and (1969 to 1989). In his study of the "The Military in Malaysia", Harold Crouch outlines three main reasons why the internal security experience has apparently not politicized the Malaysian Armed forces (MAF).[68]

First, during the height of the communist insurgency in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Malaya was still under

---

[68] Harold Crouch, "The Military in Malaysia", in *The Military, the State, and Development in Asia and the Pacific*, ed., Veberto Selochan (Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), 132.

colonial rule and the armed forces were under British control. The role of MAF, mainly the Army, then was very limited as the main responsibility was borne by the Commonwealth forces and the Malaysian Police. Although the insurgency continued after independence, it declined in intensity with the result that military officers were less affected by the experience and in any case, the primary role of the Police Force was to deal with internal security matters.

Secondly, the civilian authorities provided formal channels for military officers to participate in policy-making on security issues through the National Security Council(NSC) and the various State and District Security Committees that were set up following the return to normalcy in 1971, after the racial riots in May 1969.[69] At the national level the Chief of Defense Forces (CDF) and the Inspector General of Police (IGP) sit on the council which includes the Prime Minister, the Minister of Home Affairs, and various other cabinet members.

Similarly, the army and police are represented on the state and district councils, which often discuss security-related social and economic issues such as illegal squatters and development projects.[70] Through these councils the

---

[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid.

military has been active in promoting its concept of "Security and Development" with emphasis on the provision of basic amenities to rural communities.[71] In this area there does not appear to be any major differences in approach between civilian and military leaders.

Thirdly, the role of the police in internal security. Unlike the police in Pakistan, the Malaysian police have an important role in the internal security of the state. In fact the Police is one of the most important instruments of the state to deal with internal problems.[72] Apart from routine police duties, the police force also maintains its paramilitary police Field Force (PFF) later known as General Operations Police Force.[73] The PFF receives training in jungle warfare and have armored vehicles to deal with internal security issues, such as conducting search and destroy operations against communist terrorists.

In addition, the police has the Federal Reserve Unit (FRU) trained to meet emergencies such as demonstrations,

---

[71] Zakaria Haji Ahmad, "The Military and Development in Malaysia and Brunei", in J. Soedjati Djiwandono & Yong Mun Cheong eds., *Soldiers and Stability in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1988) cited in Harold Crouch, "The Military in Malaysia", 1991, 132.

[72] For a good account on the role of the Malaysian Police, see Zakaria Haji Ahmad, •The Bayonet and the Truncheon: Army/Police Relations in Malaysia," in Dewitt Ellinwood and Cynthia Enloe, eds., *Ethnicity and the Military in Asia*, New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction Books, 1981), 93-241

[73] Harold Crouch, *op. cit.*, 133.

strikes or riots. Another important branch under jurisdiction of the police is the Malaysian Special Branch of the Intelligence Department. The Malaysian Police Special Branch has played an important role in providing intelligence in the internal affairs of the state. More importantly, the Special Branch has been very effective in dealing with internal security matters particularly in political intelligence.[74]

2. Military Elites' Views on National Security

The Malaysian military elites' view on security is in contrast to that of Pakistan. Since independence, the Malaysian elites were determined to put the military under firm civilian control by limiting its role to a servant of the state and shaping the civil-military relations in accordance with the democratic system.[75]

This achievement of civilian supremacy is due, in part, to the constitutional arrangements, in that the command of the armed forces is vested in the supreme head of the federation, the Yang DiPertuan Agong.[76] All activities of

---

[74] Ibid, 133.

[75] See Zakaria Haji Ahmad, "Malaysia," in Military-Civilian Relations in Southeast Asia, eds., Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 119.

[76] *Malaysia: A Country Study,* (Washington: US Government Printing Office 1984), 192.

the defense establishment are carried out under his authority, as official supreme commander of the Malaysian Armed Forces.

The Constitution further stipulates that all officers hold the ruler's commission and that he has the prerogative of granting mercy in military offenses triable by court-martial. The power to declare war, however, rests with parliament. Thus, the armed forces are servants of both the Yang DiPertuan Agong and the civilians, the later exercising control through elected representatives in the parliament, which determines the size and composition of the three armed services and the necessary support required of them.

To further highlight civilian control of the Malaysian Armed Forces, it is pertinent to examine its role since independence. The role of the Malaysian Armed Forces, since independence, has been defined in terms of internal and external defense missions, with clear civilian control. This is achieved mainly through the establishment of the defense control mechanism in line with the need of the Constitution, which establishes clear civilian control over the armed forces.

Under Article 132, the Malaysian Constitution establishes that the Malaysian Armed Forces is an integral body with its own service chief who is appointed by the ruling government. Under this arrangement, the chain of command is clearly defined where the service chiefs are

responsible to the civilian Minister of Defense. The three Services Chiefs are the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Chief of Defense Forces (CDF) retains the overall command of the armed forces.[77]

In addition to the three services, there is a parallel civilian set-up, which runs the Ministry of Defense (MINDEF) headed by a secretary-general, whose position is equivalent to that of the CDF. According to Zakaria, there are 3 main reasons why the MAF have not intervened in politics. First, the status and role of the MAF is legally stipulated by statute, namely the Constitution, the Armed Forces Act (1962) and several other pieces of legislation, statutes and enactment.

Secondly, all service and policy matters are discussed by the Armed Forces Council(AFC), which is made up of civilians and military men.[78] Third, and perhaps most important of all, the Defense portfolio in Malaysia has by and large been entrusted to the most senior or esteemed of the ruling political elites.[79] Such ministerial control has probably resulted in there being a tight supervision of the military. Therefore, the political, legal and formalistic

---

[77] Zakaria, *op. cit.*, 1985, 119.

[78] Under Article 137 of the Malaysia Constitution, the Armed Forces Council is charged with the command, discipline and administration of the MAF, cited in Zakaria Haji Ahmad, *op. cit.*, 1985, 119.

[79] See Zakaria Haji Ahmad, 1981, 193-241.

criteria has established the nature of the civil-military relations in Malaysia.

It is clear that Malaysia has crystallized civil-military relations within a definite pattern. The functioning of democracy, since independence has established the norms of civilian supremacy over the MAF. Democratic consolidation and the concept of civilian control have been represented by the strength of the civilian institutions.

One might argue that the apolitical stance of the military could be attributed to the lack of opportunity and to its preoccupation with its tasks and responsibilities. The fact remains that its propensity to act as a political force and intervene in the political affairs of the state is not there.[80] For example, in the May 13, 1969 racial riots, the Army had to be called in to restore order, but they remained loyal and continue to support the civilian government. During that critical period it could have seized political power easily, but remained on the sidelines instead.[81]

This non-interference stance of the Malaysian Armed Forces illustrates that in spite of the severe internal problems, the MAF did not transform nor deviate from its established role and mission. In short, the MAF, since

---

[80] Zakaria Haji Ahmad, 1985, 119.

[81] Ibid.

independence, has always accepted the principle of civilian supremacy and there seems to be little reason to believe that this orientation is likely to change in the future decades.

D. SUMMARY

This chapter has examined the military institution focusing on the role of the armed forces of both Pakistan and Malaysia. It has argued that the experiences in internal security role do not necessarily cause military intervention, as demonstrated in the Malaysian case. The Pakistan case demonstrates that the instability, the fragile legitimacy of government, and the weak civilian leaders pulled the army into politics. The recurring military intervention in Pakistan occurs when civilian authority is weak and continues to be unresolved.

On the other hand, the Malaysian Armed Forces, since independence, have always accepted the principle of civilian supremacy. This is made possible by the strength of the civilian institution and its ability to transformed itself into a stable pattern of civilian control of its armed forces. While it is likely that the nature of civil-military relations will transform in tandem with its aim of becoming a conventional force, and keeping with the developments of the post Cold War era, the MAF's basic character is likely to continue for some time in the future.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

V. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN PAKISTAN AND MALAYSIA

A. INTRODUCTION

In this Chapter, two important aspects related to socio-economic conditions will be discussed namely; (1) the social structure, and (2) economic development. This chapter argues that the weak socio-economic conditions in Pakistan are in contrast to those of Malaysia and contribute to the recurring military intervention in Pakistan.

B. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN PAKISTAN

1. Social Structure

The prominent role of the military in the politics of Pakistan could be explained in the light of a weak social structure. Hamza Alavi, in his study on post-colonial societies, observes that the "relative autonomy", which the bureaucratic-military apparatus enjoyed was due mainly to the weaknesses of Pakistan's social structure that interacts between the three separate classes; the metropolitan bourgeoisie, the indigenous bourgeoisie, and the local semi-feudal landlords.[82] According to Alavi, the inherited over-

---

[82] Hamza Alavi, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies ..., in Kathleen Gough and Hari P. Sharma eds., Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia, (New York, London: Monthly Review Press, 1973), 145-73. Cited in Veena Kukreja, *Civil-Military Relations in South Asia*, (New Delhi, California, London: Sage Publications, 1991), 51.

developed apparatus of the state and its practices, produced a weak indigenous bourgeoisie that could not influence the relatively high-developed state apparatus.[83] "The bureaucratic-military state apparatus was able to maintain and even extend its dominant power in society. This gives it a certain autonomy which culminated in an overt seizure of power by the military ..."[84], as demonstrated in the four coups that have taken place including the October 12, 1999, intervention by the Pakistan Army.

2. Economic Development

In addition of the weak social structure, Pakistan is one of the most low-income countries in the world with low levels of economic development. At the time of independence, there was no industry in existence , and the level of urbanization was low.[85] Pakistan was, and basically continues to be, an agrarian economy. The economy was deficient in crucial areas such as natural resources and an industrial infrastructure. Pakistan, in the first few years, was grappling with immediate problems rather planning

---

[83] Ibid.

[84] Ibid.

[85] B.M. Bhatia, Pakistan's Economic Development 1948-1978: The failure of Strategy (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1979), (New York, Columbia University Press, 1967), cited in Saeed Shafqat, *Civil Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto*, (Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), 2.

strategy and long-term program of economic growth.[86] In contrast, Malaysia, since independence, has put much emphasis on political stability and economic growth.[87]

Even now, after more than 52 years of independence, Pakistan continues to face severe economic problems. The poor economic situation is a result of long-term and more recent factors.[88] The long-term factor is the issue of tax collection. This is mainly due to the resistance and unwillingness on the part of the majority of feudal landlords to pay any taxes on agriculture, which is the country's main economic base. Revenues are largely generated through imposition of customs duties, sales taxes, and income tax on salaried people. This causes the middle class to bear the burden of taxation.[89]

Because tax revenues are far below government expenditures, Pakistan borrows heavily from international financial institutions. With a total foreign debt of $30 billion, fully 40 percent of public expenditures goes towards debt servicing. The military consumes another 26

---

[86] Veena Kukreja, *op. Cit.*, 50.

[87] Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Sharifah Munirah Alatas, "Malaysia in an Uncertain Mode," in *Driven by Growth: Political Change in the Asia-Pacific Region*, ed., James W. Morley, (New York: An East Gate Book, 1999), 182.

[88] Ameen Jan, "Pakistan on a Precipe", *Asian Survey*, Vol XXXIX, No 5, September/October 1999, 708.

[89] Ibid.

percent of the expenditure.[90] Little, therefore, remains for development, especially given the high degree of corruption at all levels of the public sector.

Events before the October 12, 1999 coup, further contributed to the worsening situation of the already poor economic condition. First, the Sharif government suspended the operations of many foreign investors who had set up an independent power plants (IPP) to generate electric power supply - much needed in the country. The government's action has scared potential foreign investors.[91] Secondly, the freezing of all foreign exchange accounts, further undermined the domestic and foreign investor confidence. As a result, all major credit-rating agencies lowered Pakistan's sovereign debt rating to their lowest grade. Pakistan is now considered the riskiest country in the region for foreign investment.[92]

In the latest move to overcome the problem, the current regime has announced a "Tax Amnesty Scheme" under which undisclosed and untaxed income and assets can be declared and regularized by paying tax at the rate of ten percent. This scheme is in line with the Economic Reform Package

---

90 Ibid.

91 Ibid.

92 Ibid.

announced by General Pervez Musharraf on December 16, 1999.[93]

C. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN MALAYSIA

1. Social Structure

In terms of social structure, Malaysia inherited a sufficiently small middle class at the time of independence, which provided the bulwark for the functioning, and preservation of its economy. The struggle for independence led by UMNO, coupled with strategies of "affirmative action" that focuses on economic growth, and policies undertaken by the government has led to the emergence of a politicized and effective middle class.[94] This is in contrast to Pakistan, where such cases were almost absent in its early years, and in subsequent years has contributed to the prolonged instability in Pakistan.

The economic growth in Malaysia, which will be discussed below, has broaden the middle class that has an impact on the nature of Malaysian politics. In fact, this class-consciousness has been an important political force in

---

[93] "Tax Amnesty Scheme 2000 Announced," *The Dawn*, http://Dawn.com Available [On Line] cited on Mar 1, 2000.

[94] See Zakaria and Munirah, *op. Cit.*, 1999, 194.

the development of bourgeoisie democracy in Malaysia.[95] In his recent study, Crouch observes that the growing middle class, continues to support the UMNO party since the New Economic Policy was first introduced in 1972,[96] although this has somewhat reduced since the sacking of the Ex-Deputy Prime Minister Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim in August 1998.

2. Economic Development

In applying Finer's assumption that military intervention is more probable in countries in the early stages of industrialization when per capita income is low and there are few social classes capable of countervailing against military power, this is not the case of Malaysia. At US$2270 in 1989, Malaysia's per capita income was much higher than in any Asia Pacific state where the military has played a role in politics except South Korea.[97]

In contrast to Pakistan, economic growth has been rapid in Malaysia. Harold Crouch, in his study on "Malaysia: Neither Authoritarian Nor Democratic",[98] observes that in

---

[95] Ibid.

[96] Ibid.

[97] Compare for example, Indonesia ($520), and Pakistan ($365).

[98] Harold Crouch, "Malaysia: Neither Authoritarian Nor Democratic", in *Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism*, eds., Kevin Hawson, Richard Robinson and Garry Rodan, (New South Wales: Allen and Unwin, 1993), 140.

the early phase of independence from 1957 to 1970, the Malaysian economy expanded at an average annual rate of 6 percent, rising to 7.8 percent during the 1970s, before slowing down to 6 percent in the 1980s.[99] This happened when the impact of the world recession caused two years of stagnation in 1985 and 1986.[100] Overall, he observes, the economy doubled in size during the 1960s and tripled between 1970 and 1990.[101]

Crouch further observes that the rapid growth of the economy was accompanied by rising living standards. By 1988, Malaysia's per capita income had reached $US1940, far above neighboring countries in Southeast Asia.[102] In fact, Malaysia's economic growth was among "the highest in the world during the Mahathir's term in office ... With a gross domestic product (GDP) of almost $3000 per capita, Malaysia surpassed the European nations of Portugal and Hungary in world rankings".[103]

As discussed earlier, this rapid economic growth brought about a transformation of Malaysian class structure

---

[99] Ibid.

[100] Ibid.

[101] Ibid.

[102] Ibid.

[103] Seymour Martin Lipset, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Democracy*, (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1995). 795.

particularly the growth of the middle class. Crouch further observes that when Malaya became independent in 1957, the upper middle class made-up only four percent of the workforce, while another 11.5 percent were employed in the lower middle-class.[104] The economic growth of the 1960s resulted in the steady expansion of the upper middle-class category to 5.9 percent and the lower middle class to 14.1 percent by 1970, making a total of 20 percent of the workforce.[105]

During the next twenty years the middle class continued to expand rapidly and by 1990 the middle class as a whole constituted 32.6 percent or almost one of the Malaysian workforce.[106] Nonetheless, while Malaysia's socio-economic conditions provides no absolute barrier to military intervention, it seems, if other countries are taken into account, the probability of military intervention is less likely.

D. SUMMARY

Finer has suggested that military intervention is likely to occur in lower income countries. Pakistan and Malaysia both inherited weak economies but their post-

---

[104] Crouch, 1993, *op. Cit.*, 142.

[105] Ibid.

[106] Ibid.

independence economic policies were different. Malaysia's emphasis was, and continues to be on economic development and a commitment towards peace and stability. In this context, weak social structure, coupled with poor economic conditions contributed to the military intervention in Pakistan.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This thesis has adapted the theoretical literature of civil-military relations focusing on military intervention in Pakistan vis-à-vis the civilian control of the military in Malaysia. This model proved to be well suited for Pakistan and Malaysia. It is equally applicable to other praetorian societies.

The recurring military intervention in Pakistan (the latest being the 12 October, 1999 coup) has been marked by the birth, development and demise, of a number of political institutions, none of which took roots, as they never became sufficiently broad-based and representative. Jinnah, who has been publicized a brilliant founder of a state, failed as an institution-builder, having died early in 1948.

After the assassination of Liaquat Ali-Khan in 1951, Pakistan's politics have been characterized by a dearth of competent leadership and mass-based political parties, which led to the politics of non-consensus. First, political parties did not have roots in the masses and were essentially regional in character. The Muslim League, which took credit for the creation of Pakistan, in the formative years, witnessed the erosion of its "mass base" and soon became corrupt.

Secondly, the political leadership which came to power in West Pakistan headed by Ghulam Muhammad, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, and Iskander Mirza had absolutely no faith in the people or in the democratic institutions. In absence of accepted procedures, bribing and violence entered the political process. The political power was fragmented. It is noted that during the period of 1947-58 Pakistan had nine changes of government and seven Prime Ministers.

In short, political instability has marked Pakistan's history during its 58 years of independence. The period was characterized by the steady institutional development of the civilian and military bureaucracies, and the political power that went out from political parties into the hands of the civil service and the armed forces.

On the other hand, Malaysia provides a fine example of orderly development and stable democracy. In the formative phase of nationhood the survival and sustenance of the stable and effective parliamentary democracy in Malaysia rested largely on the United Malay National Organization (UMNO), and the leadership of Malay political elites led by Tunku Abdul Rahman. Malaysia had a bigger advantage than Pakistan in terms of the strong leadership of the political elites for 14 years in the nation's formative phase, which gave the support for the parliamentary political system.

The high level of political institutionalization in Malaysia has largely been possible because of the strength

of the Alliance party and later the National Front led by UMNO. The UMNO-led government enjoyed a monopoly of power, except for a brief period in 1969. The aggregate character of the UMNO coupled with the strong leadership of the four Prime Ministers, Tunku Abdul Rahman, Tun Abdul Razak, Tun Hussein Onn, and Dr Seri Mahathir Mohammad based on a consensus politics was a source of great strength for Malaysia.

On military institution, in Pakistan, the experiences in internal security role did not necessarily cause military intervention, as demonstrated in the Malaysian case. The Pakistan case demonstrates the instability, the fragile legitimacy of the government, and the weak civilian leaders that pulled the army into politics. This recurring military intervention in Pakistan occurred when civilian authority was weak and continues to face unsolvable problems.

On the other hand, the Malaysian Armed Forces, since the independence, have always accepted the principles of civilian supremacy. This is possible by the strength of the civilian institution and its ability to transform itself into a stable pattern of civilian control of its armed forces. While it is likely that the nature of civil-military relations will transform in tandem with its aim of becoming a conventional force, and in keeping with the developments of the post Cold War era, the Malaysian Armed

Forces basic character is likely to continue for some time in the future.

On socio-economic conditions, in terms of Finer's four-fold classification, Pakistan fits in the category that is low political culture. An important factor that contributed to the military intervention in Pakistan is the low social structure coupled with deteriorating economic conditions. The economy was weak and its development tardy, the weight of defense, was more than it could bear. The rapid decline in foreign assets, poor administration, the rise in prices of essential commodities, hoarding and black-marketing led to a frustration and political alienation among the people at large which reduced the effectiveness and efficacy of the civilian administration. This conforms to Finer's hypothesis that economic development, especially industrialization, diminishes the probability of military intervention.

For Malaysia, in terms of Finer's classification of political culture, Malaysia can be considered to be in the category of a mature political culture. This is based on its well-established political formula and strong civilian government organizations, recognized and authoritative civil procedures and organs of political systems, and widespread public involvement and attachment to civilian institutions.

On the other hand, politics in Pakistan has been characterized by low political mobilization, low scope of

political activity, and not able to respond to increasing demands of its institutions. The cases of Malaysia and Pakistan confirm Finer's hypothesis that military intervention is likely to decrease with the increased social mobilization and economic development.

THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Agüero, Felipe., *Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1997.

Ahmad, Borhanuddin., *The Generals of Pakistan and Bangladesh*. Academic Publishers, 1993.

Ahmad Manzoor., *Contemporary Pakistan: Politics, Economy, and Society*. Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1980.

Alagappa, Muthiah., ed., *Asian Security Practice*. California: Stanford University Press, 1998.

Alagapa, Muthiah., ed., *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority*. California: Standard University Press, 1995.

Ahmed, Mustaq., *Government and Politics in Pakistan*. Space Publisher, 1970.

Azar, Edward E. and Moon Chung-in, eds., *National Security in the third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats*. Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1988.

Blood, R., ed. *Pakistan: A Country Study – Library of Congress*. 6th edition, US Government Printing Office, 1995.

Cohen, Stephan P., *The Pakistan Army*, Berkeley: University of California, 1984.

Decalo, Samuel., *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style*. Virginia: Yale University Press, 1976.

Desch, Michael C., *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment*. Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1999.

Diamond, Larry and Plattner, Marc F., eds., *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*. Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996.

Diamond, Larry., *Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation,* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999.

Finer, Samuel E., *The Man on Horseback, The Role of the Military in Politics.* Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988.

Goodpaster, Andrew J., and Samuel P. Huntington, *Civil-Military Relations.* Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1977.

Gopinath, Meena Kasshi., *Pakistan in Transition: Political Development and Rise to Power of Pakistan's People's Party.* New Delhi: Manohar Book Service, 1975.

Harold,Crouch., *Government and Society in Malaysia.* Boulder: Colorado, Westview Press, 1985.

Harold Crouch., "Malaysia: Neither Authoritarian Nor Democratic", in *Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism,* eds., Kevin Hawson, Richard Robinson and Garry Rodan, New South Wales: Allen and Unwin, 1993.

Harold,Crouch., "The Military in Malaysia," in Verberto Selochan, *The Military, the State and Development in Asia and the Pacific.* Bolder: Westview, 1991.

Harowitz, David., *Ethnic Groups in Conflict.* California: University of California Press, 1985.

Hasan Askari Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan, Lahore, Pakistan*: Progressive Publisher, 1976.

Hayes, Louis D., *Politics in Pakistan: The Struggle for Legitimacy.* Boulder: Westview Press, 1984.

Higley, John, and Richard Gunther, eds., *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe.* Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Hoadley, J. Stephan., *Soldiers and Politics in Southeast Asia: Civil-Military Relations in Comparative Perspective.* Cambridge, Massachusetts, Schenkman Publishing Company, 1975.

Horowitz, Donald L., *Coup Theories and Officers' Motives: Sri Lanka in Comparative Perspective.* Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1980.

Huntington, Samuel P., *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.* Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

Huntington, Samuel P., *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.* Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1957.

Huntington, Samuel P., *Political Order in Changing Societies.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1968.

Janowitz, Morris., *Military Institutions and Coercion in Developing Nations.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.

Kukreja, Veena. *Civil-Military Relations in South Asia.* California: Sage Publications, 1991.

Leifer, Michael, *Dictionary of the Modern Politics of Southeast Asia.* London and New York: Routelouge, 1996.

Lichback, Mark and Alan Zuckerman, eds., *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure.* Cambridge. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

Linz, Juan. *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Re-equilibration.* Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1978.

Linz, Juan and Alfred Stepan. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation.* Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996.

Lijphart, Arend, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in thirty-six Countries.* New Haven and London, 1999.

Lipset, Seymour Martin, *The Encyclopedia of Democracy.* Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1995.

Lovell, John P., and Albright, Davie E., *To Sheathe the Sword: Civil-Military Relations in the Quest for Democracy.* Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1997.

Malaysia: A Country Study, Washington: US Government Printing Office 1984.

Mares, David R. ed., *Civil-Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, Southern Asia and Central Europe*. Colorado: Westview Press, 1988.

Midgal Joel S., *Strong Societies and Weak States: State Civil-Military Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988.

Nordlinger, Eric A., *Soldier in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1977.

Osborn, Milton., *Region of Revolt: Focus on Southeast Asia*. New South Wales: Pergamon Press, 1970.

Pakistan: A Country Study - Library of Congress, ed. R. Blood, 6th edition, US Government Printing Office, 1995.

Perlmutter, Amos., The *Military and Politics in Modern Times*. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1978.

Pion-Berlin, David., *Through the Corridors of Power: Institutions and Civil-Military Relations in Argentina*. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997.

Shaeed Shafqat., *Civil Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir, Bhutto*. Westview Press, Lahore, Pakistan, 1997.

Schmitter, Philippe., "The Consolidation of Political Democracies: Processes, Rhythms, Sequences, and Types." In *Transitions to Democracy*, ed. Geoffrey Pridham. Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995.

Schwarz, Adam., *A Nation in Waiting*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994.

Selochan, Veberto, ed., *The Military, the State, and Development in Asia and the Pacific*. Colorado: Westview Press, 1991.

Stepan, Alfred., *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988.

Welch. Claude E. Jr, ed., *Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases From Developing Countries.* Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976.

Zakaria Haji Ahmad., "The Bayonet and Truncheon: Army/Police Relations in Malaysia," in Enloe, ed., *Ethnicity and the Military in Asia.* London: Transaction Books, 1981.

Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch, Eds., *Military-Civilian Relations in South-East Asia* New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.

Journals

Charles Hirscham., "The Meaning and Measurement of Ethnicity in Malaysia: An Analysis of Census Classifications," *Journal of Asian Studies,* August 1987.

Diamond, Larry., "Beyond Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism: Strategies for Democratization." *The Washington Quarterly* (Winter 1989).

Doh Chull Shin., "On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory and Research." *World Politics*, vol. 47, no.1 (October 1994).

George A.L., Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured focused Comparison, in P.G. Lauren ed., *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy*, Free Press, New York, 1979.

Jan, Ameen., "Pakistan on a Precipe", *Asian Survey*, Vol XXXIX, No 5, September/October 1999.

Lijphart, Arend., "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. LXV, No 3, September 1971.

Rafique, Najam., "Pakistan Army: Towards a New Professionalism", in *Strategic Studies*, vol. XVI Autumn, Winter 1993.

Rizvi, Hasan-Askari., Civil-Military Relations in Contemporary Pakistan, in *Survival,* Vol. 40, No 2, Summer 1998.

Sengupta, Prasun K. "The Defense of Pakistan." *Asian Defense Journal July 1999*.

Papers and Manuscripts

Pion-Berlin, David, *An Analysis of Missions and Decisions: Military Roles and Civilian controls in South America*.

Sattar, Babar *A Journey Back To The Barrack? Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan*. Paper prepared for the State and Soldier in Asia Conference, East-West Center, Honolulu, 1999.

Internet

"Triumph for Mahathirian Economic." Available [On Line] http://www.stratfor.com/asia/countries/malaysia/news/malaysianewsnov.htm. Accessed on November 30, 1999.

Khoo Boo Teik, "Leave Malaysia's Politics to Malaysia," The *Australian Financial Review*, available at [http://wwwhum.murdoch.edu.au/arc/newspaper/khoo23nov.html]

"Tax Amnesty Scheme 2000 Announced," *The Dawn*, http://Dawn.com, Available [On Line] cited on Mar 1, 2000.

"Full Text of General Musharraf's Address," available [On Line]http://www.dawn.com/daily/19991013/top.1.htm, accessed on October 10, 1999.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center.....2
   8725 John J. Kingman Rd., STE 0944
   Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

2. Dudley Knox Library.....2
   Naval Postgraduate School
   411 Dyer Rd.
   Monterey, CA 93943-5101

3. Professor Thomas Bruneau, Code NS/BN 689.....2
   National Security Affairs Department
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, CA 93943-5101

4. Professor Harold Trinkunas, Code NS/TH 689.....1
   National Security Affairs Department
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, CA 93943-5101

5. Professor Jeanne Giraldo Code NS/GJ 689.....1
   National Security Affairs Department
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, CA 93943-5101

6. Assistant to Chief of Staff.....1
   Operation and Training Branch
   Army Headquarters
   Ministry of Defense
   Wisma Pertahanan
   Jalan Semarak
   50634 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

7. John Yung Rhee.....1
   Fellow, Center for East Asian Studies
   Monterey Institute of International Studies
   425 Van Burren Street,
   Monterey CA 93940

8. Lt Col Rahmat Hj Hassan.....1
   Signals Branch
   Army Headquarters
   Ministry of Defense
   Wisma Pertahanan
   Jalan Semarak
   50634 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia