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**SECURITY ASSISTANCE, A VIABLE INSTRUMENT
OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY**

BY

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SECURITY ASSISTANCE, A VIABLE INSTRUMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

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ABSTRACT

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Security assistance has long been a key instrument of United States foreign policy. During the Clinton Administration, the American public and Congress have scrutinized security assistance, which is the transfer of arms, defense items, services, and training, closely. Some critics have decried it as a concept that has outlived its intended purpose and Americans should no longer bear the cost of promoting regional conventional arms proliferation. This paper examines the evolution and development of security assistance and critically assesses its role as a viable instrument of the Clinton Administration's national security strategy and foreign policy.

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SECURITY ASSISTANCE, A VIABLE INSTRUMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

The current United States policy on the role of security assistance in the conduct of foreign policy is fairly clearly articulated by President Clinton, in his National Security Strategy (NSS) for a New Century.

In it he states:

“International Assistance is one of the key tools the United States has at its disposal with which to shape the international environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests and global security. The proper application of security assistance promotes regional security by adapting and strengthening alliances and friendships, maintaining U.S. influence in key regions, and encouraging adherence to international norms. When combined effectively with other bilateral and multilateral activities, such as through cooperative scientific and technological programs, U.S. initiatives reduce the need for costly military and humanitarian interventions.”¹

This paper will examine the role of security assistance from its evolution and development, into a key instrument of U.S. foreign policy. It will critically assess the effectiveness of security assistance as a means for the current administration to achieve its stated foreign policy objectives. The current National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and the U.S. Department of State, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, will serve as a framework to determine whether the objectives (ends), are justified by the concept of security assistance (ways), and security assistance resources (means).

The analysis will also consider other relevant issues such as: The impact of domestic politics and public support, on the use of security assistance; how well or how poorly the administration articulated its policies and demonstrated its actions to the American public, the Congress, and the rest of the world. It will also assess whether security assistance, the policy of transferring arms and defense items, contradicts the administration's objective of countering regional conventional arms proliferation. Finally, it will provide a cost-benefit analysis of security assistance as an effective foreign policy tool. Security assistance is not without its critics; nor, is it the “silver bullet” for the conduct of foreign policy. This paper will demonstrate that security assistance, when applied in concert with other elements of national power and in support of U.S. national interests, has proven indeed to be quite an effective foreign policy tool.

It is first necessary to define security assistance, in order to understand why it is considered a foreign policy tool. Defining security assistance is no simple matter. If you asked the average "man on the street" in America, what security assistance means, the answer would in all probability not even be close to what the term really comprises. Security assistance, in fact, is often freely interchanged with other ambiguous terms such as foreign aid, foreign assistance, military assistance, international assistance, arms transfers, international defense cooperation, defense security cooperation, and international logistics, among professionals who routinely conduct security assistance on a daily basis. The problem of a lack of a clear-cut definition is compounded by the fact that security assistance must be considered from several different perspectives, in order to understand how it fits into the overall U.S. National security strategy and foreign policy.

The first perspective is legislative. The statutory basis for security assistance is found in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA), and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended (AECA). The definition contained in the FAA, is expressed in general terms and thus the U.S. Government has broad leverage with which to execute security assistance as a foreign policy tool. Section 502b defines it as:

"(A) Assistance under chapter 2 (military assistance) or chapter 4 (economic support fund) or chapter 5 (military education and training) or chapter 6 (peacekeeping operations) or chapter 8 (anti-terrorism assistance) of this part;

(B) Sales of defense articles or services, extensions of credits (including participation in credits), and guarantees of loans under the Arms Export Control Act, or

(C) any license in effect with respect to the export of defense articles or defense services to or for the armed forces, police, intelligence, or other internal security forces of a foreign country under section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act."²

The second perspective is that of the program components. There are four key component programs identified in the President's Congressional Presentation (CP) for Foreign Operations, which require annual U.S. Government funding. They are listed below. Two others are not funded.

- 1) The Foreign Military Financing Program, furnishes Foreign Military Sales (FMS) grants or loans to enable eligible foreign governments to purchase U.S. defense articles and services (including training);

- 2) The Economic Support Fund (ESF), provides flexible economic assistance on a grant basis, to countries selected for their special political and security interests to the U.S.
- 3) International Military Education and Training (IMET), is military training provided on a grant basis to foreign military and related civilian defense personnel both in the U.S. and in overseas facilities;
- 4) Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), provides assistance to friendly countries and international organizations for peacekeeping programs which further U.S. National security interests.³

The third security assistance perspective is budgetary. Security assistance appears not only in the Congressional Presidential Document (CPD), mentioned above, but also in the Office of Management and Budget's annual "Budget of the United States Government", under the heading of "International Security Assistance", and also in the same document as part of the "International Affairs: Foreign Aid", budget category.⁴

Finally, the fourth perspective is that of the Department of Defense (DOD). This perspective is much more restrictive and specific. Security assistance is defined in both Joint Pub. 1-02, and The Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM), as follows:

"Groups of program authorized by the FAA of 1961, as amended, and AECA of 1976, as amended, and other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives."⁵

Definition notwithstanding, the use of security assistance as an instrument of foreign policy is not a new phenomenon, unique only to the Clinton Administration. Security assistance has been an important component of U.S. foreign policy from as early as World War I, whereby, despite our early declaration of neutrality, we exported more than \$2 billion worth of war materiel to Europe between August 1914 and March 1917.⁶

BACKGROUND: SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND FOREIGN POLICY -- AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Security Assistance had its origin in the post-WWII years, when the United States sought to thwart the expansion and potential domination of the Soviet Union's Communist influence in Europe and Asia. The U.S. undertook initiatives to provide assistance to economically devastated, key non-Communist regions of the world, in hopes of restoring economic and political stability.⁷

The Truman Administration followed a policy of active "Containment" of the Soviet Union. The policy, reflected in the stopgap Greece-Turkey Aid Act of 1947, was designed and initially applied in a way to inhibit Soviet efforts to expand militarily, economically, or politically in Europe.⁸ This policy resulted in the creation of military assistance programs as instruments to implement the U.S. collective security commitments undertaken during the formative years of the Cold War.

The U.S. embarked upon a more formal and comprehensive approach to containing Soviet expansion by 1949. Along with Canada and 10 European nations, the United States created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In that same year, the U.S. Congress passed the Mutual Defense Assistance Act (MDAA), to implement the mutual security concept, inherent in the NATO treaty, through a broad-based program of military assistance. The MDAA established the authority to provide military aid to members of NATO, as well as to Greece, Turkey, Iran, Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. It also formed the legal basis for the major military assistance programs of security assistance as they exist today.⁹

In the early 1950s the United States entered into a number of bilateral and multilateral mutual security pacts with various Asian nations. The aim was to attempt to replicate the NATO treaty model in Asia. These treaties were in partial response to the unsuccessful attempt of North Korea to overrun the government of South Korea in 1950, as well as the overall increasing instability in Southeast Asia. Among the treaties concluded were bilateral ones with Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, and South Korea. Multilateral treaties were completed with Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS); and with Thailand and Pakistan, through the Manila Pact.¹⁰ This increase in mutual security agreements resulted in a corresponding increase in U.S. security assistance to nations who were parties of those agreements.

From the late 1940s to the early 1960s the central foreign policy theme of U.S. Government thought was the need to strengthen anti-Communist forces. This focus, at times, seemed to override concerns of critics who questioned the value of supporting repressive regimes, some of which devoted more effort to dealing with internal or regional opposition than communism. South Korea was one such example. The United States sent substantial military assistance in order to enhance South Korea's defensive capabilities. Yet the U.S. had been critical of South Korea's human rights record.

By the early 1960s, U.S. security assistance programs experienced significant changes. Europe had recovered from the devastation of World War II. NATO, the Military Assistance Program, and the Greece-Turkey Aid Act had collectively deterred the Soviets on the European continent. In Asia, strong resistance by U.S. and UN forces had prevented the overthrow of South Korea. Consequently, following the Korean War, significant reductions could be made in the funding level of military assistance. Emphasis was shifted to economic and developmental assistance to thwart Communist influence and to advance American foreign policy, (national interests), in the developing world.¹¹

From 1964 to 1973, the war in Vietnam dominated U.S. foreign policy considerations. The Vietnam War also profoundly affected U.S. domestic support for military assistance programs. The American public protested strongly against U.S. involvement in this conflict. However, the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon Administrations saw the war as the ideal case to show that appropriate levels of military aid could enable a developing country to withstand a significant threat of external aggression or internal subversion. Thus, it was this war, perhaps more than anything else that drove military assistance program funding. In the case of Vietnam, military assistance was provided under a special Military Assistance Service Funds (MASF) account. The account was totally separate from the regular Military Assistance Program (MAP), the former grant aid program. The U.S. provided more than \$13 billion to South Vietnam as grant military equipment, services, and training between 1966 and 1975.¹² With such a sizable expenditure, one has to wonder why the Administrations associated with the Vietnam War were unable to fulfill their thesis, which essentially stated that substantial levels of military aid could enable a developing country to withstand a significant threat of external aggression or internal subversion.

Yet, despite the sizeable expenditure of U.S. resources to help shore up the South Vietnamese Government, a persistent and determined enemy still prevailed. This is one of the principal examples cited by opponents of security assistance to argue that it is not a viable instrument of foreign policy.

Prior to the Vietnam War, our concern with containing Communism superceded questions by critics regarding proper conduct of governments receiving our aid. The Vietnam experience brought this practice into a new focus. We saw our military aid enable the military of recipient nations become the dominant political force; and then, use that same aid to subdue domestic opposition. These practices gave rise to increased Congressional concern about the wisdom of direct U.S. military involvement in developing nations, and an even stronger aversion toward the United States assisting or becoming identified with non-democratic regimes, regardless of their anti-Communist stance.¹³

From about 1974 to the present, FMS superceded the former grant MAP program as the largest component of U.S. security assistance. This shift occurred because the improved economic posture of recipient nations enabled them to purchase defense materiel and services. During this same period, the Middle East displaced Asia as the leading regional recipient of U.S. military assistance. These shifts were consistent with the U.S. Government view that to the extent possible, allied and friendly nations should be "weaned" from grant assistance and encouraged to assume greater responsibility for individual and collective defense.¹⁴

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) which does not require U.S. Government funding, has been consistently viewed by the executive branch as a key instrument in support of U.S. foreign policy goals. To put this in perspective, records show that annual FMS sales have consistently exceeded annual congressional allocations of all U.S. security assistance programs combined.¹⁵ FMS contributes to a strong U.S. defense industrial base. The sale of defense goods and services through FMS can lengthen production runs, which result in potentially lower costs for DOD purchases, while creating jobs for Americans.

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the subsequent oil embargo were precursors to a shift in military assistance to the Middle East. Regional instability resulting from the fall of the Shah of Iran, the ensuing Iranian revolution, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, all occurring in 1979, provided the impetus for increased involvement in the region. Specifically, President Carter, who had early in his presidency, sought to curtail the globalization of conventional arms transfers, and to broker a lasting Middle East

peace, found himself both enunciating a U.S. commitment to oppose any attempts to deny access to the oil resources of the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, and agreeing to upgrade the military capabilities of both Israel and Egypt. Six years after signing the Camp David accords, the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, the two signatories became the leading recipients of U.S. security assistance in the world. This assistance has continued under all subsequent U.S. administrations.¹⁶

Critics of security assistance ask why the United States continues to support Israel and Egypt with a combined annual amount of about \$5 billion? Some of these critics are especially concerned that the greater portion of the funds provided go toward the purchase of military hardware. So why do we provide this much security assistance to Israel and Egypt? The short answer is because it serves our national interest. It is in our national interest for regional stability that a democratic, stable, economically and militarily strong Israel, at peace with her neighbors, exists. Security assistance enables the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) to maintain a qualitative edge in the regional balance of power, thus enhancing Israel's security and building confidence necessary to take acceptable risks for peace.

Security assistance to Egypt serves vital U.S. national interests. Egypt remains a strategic ally in our efforts to contain Saddam Hussein and Iraq. Egypt's growing economy represents an expanding market for U.S. goods and services. U.S. assistance through the Economic Support Fund (ESF) promotes key economic reforms in the private sector to spur export-oriented growth. The aim of this endeavor is to promote faster, sustained economic growth and employment generation, thus enhancing Egypt's ability to play its pivotal roles as leader in the Arab world, Africa, the Muslim world, and the Mediterranean Basin.¹⁷

Since the mid-1970s, Middle East countries have dominated U.S. security assistance expenditures. But the next largest share has been provided to countries that grant U.S. "basing-rights" privileges. Traditionally these included Turkey, Greece, Spain, Portugal, and the Philippines. The purpose of the assistance was twofold: to upgrade the military capabilities of our allies and to maintain continued access to and use of important military facilities.

Security assistance in Africa has been almost consistently low. As previously mentioned, U.S. foreign policy is inextricably intertwined with U.S. national interests. Sub-Saharan Africa ranked extremely low in priority in this regard. Thus, the limited aid to Africa during the 1970s and 1980s in places like Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya, was generally linked to military base access agreements.

Security assistance in Latin America until the late 1970s and early 1980s, was used primarily as symbolic support for anti-Communist regimes or to meet defense needs at the low threshold deemed appropriate for the region by American policymakers.

During the Reagan Administration, the U.S. took a somewhat different approach than previous administrations in the security assistance arena, specifically, regarding the transfer of conventional arms. Whereas previous administrations had viewed security assistance as an “exceptional foreign policy instrument,” Regan took a more pragmatic view. The new Conventional Arms Transfer Policy he announced in July 1981, stipulated that arms transfers are an essential element of our global defense policy and an indispensable component of U.S. foreign policy. The policy asserted that the U.S. could not alone defend its western security interests. Therefore, the U.S. would consider security assistance provided to friends and allies, as contributing to U.S. global or regional security and, as a complement to, rather than an alternative to a U.S. commitment or capability.¹⁸

There was virtually little departure from the Reagan security assistance policies for the Bush Administration. However, the occurrence of several significant world events, impacted U.S. foreign policy and security assistance. In 1989, the Berlin Wall and the “Iron Curtain” collapsed. Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, and a U.S. led coalition subsequently liberated Kuwait in early 1991. Also in 1991, the Soviet Union was dissolved. These events resulted in: the provision of foreign assistance (including grant military assistance) to the emerging democracies of former Warsaw Pact countries; a tremendous boost in the overall level of FMS agreements (about \$12 billion worth of new sales and deliveries during the Gulf War alone); and an impressive marketing effort for future sales of U.S. arms and equipment because of its success during the Gulf War.¹⁹ Unfortunately for the Bush Administration, security assistance and related foreign policy matters were overshadowed by the domestic economic woes that had a severe grip on the country through the remainder of his term in office.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND FOREIGN POLICY OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION:

When President Clinton took office in 1993, he faced a number of significant domestic and foreign policy challenges. The U.S. economy was flat, unemployment, crime and drug use were at record highs, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina raised an international outcry, and U.S. military forces were engaged in a deteriorating humanitarian assistance mission in Somalia. The administration's policy on security assistance was affected both directly and indirectly by its decision to give priority to restoration of U.S. domestic strength. Consequently, there was little departure for Clinton from the Bush Administration's adherence to Reagan policies.²⁰

In February 1995, almost two years after assuming the Presidency, the Clinton Administration issued its U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD 34). The policy represented the first release of a formal policy statement on conventional arms transfers, or security assistance, since the Reagan Administration issued its Conventional Arms Transfer Policy on 8 July 1981. The unclassified version of PDD 34 was released as a White House Press Secretary press release. Two themes emerge from the policy. The first is that the concept of security assistance (the transfer of conventional arms and defense items), is essentially reinforced as a "legitimate instrument of U.S. foreign policy, and is deserving of U.S. government support, to include support for the industrial base."²¹ The second theme is that, "U.S. conventional arms transfer policy promotes restraint, both by the U.S. and other suppliers, in transfers of weapons systems that may be destabilizing or dangerous to international peace."²² One might ask, what did the administration hope to achieve with this policy? Was it even necessary? The administration's stated goals for the policy can be paraphrased as follows:

- 1) To ensure that U.S. military forces maintain technological superiority over potential adversaries.
- 2) To promote interoperability with U.S. allies and friends, while helping them deter or defend against aggression;
- 3) To promote regional stability in areas critical to U.S. interests, while preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
- 4) To promote peaceful conflict resolution and arms control, human rights, democratization, and other U.S. foreign policy objectives;

5) To enhance the ability of the U.S. defense industrial base to meet U.S. defense requirements and maintain long-term military technological superiority at reduced costs.²³

Release of PPD 34 was followed over the next succeeding days by a series of speeches by several officials of the Clinton Administration. These included the Secretary of State, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, and the White House Press Secretary. The obvious purpose of these presentations was to set forth the framework in which the administration would use security assistance as a foreign policy tool, now that it had achieved a relative degree of success with some of the domestic challenges it had faced when assuming office in 1993. Additionally, the successive pronouncements by various Clinton officials, portrayed a theme of consistency by the administration to the public on the policy of conventional arms transfers. The timing of the release of PDD-34 was a planned event by the Clinton Administration. Its purpose appears to have been a calculated move to portray how the administration intended to handle the issue of transferring conventional arms in the pursuit of national security and the conduct of foreign policy.

The NSS of the Clinton Administration states that "Engagement" is its overarching imperative. The three core objectives of the strategy are: 1) To enhance our security; 2) To bolster America's economic prosperity; and 3) To promote democracy abroad.²⁴

The foreign policy objectives of security assistance as found in the Department of State's, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, are clearly designed to ensure that this strategy can be executed. They are stated as:

"The principal means of ensuring American security is through the deterrence of potential aggressors who would threaten the United States or its allies. Our military strength alone is not enough. Our security assistance programs help U.S. allies to become capable coalition partners as well as to defend their own security. By strengthening our alliances, building cooperative military relationships, and stabilizing regional military balances, security assistance programs protect American security and reduce the likelihood of war. The United States has a strong stake in helping its allies and coalition partners to strengthen their defense so they can share the common defense burden."²⁵

What are the costs and benefits associated with security assistance? Who gets what and who pays for it? Earlier, I talked about the difficulty in defining security assistance. Here I will address the various components (major programs), of security assistance and what the administration perceives to be benefits of these programs for U.S. national security.

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and FMS Construction are both non-Congressionally funded programs that permit eligible foreign governments to procure defense articles, services and training. The recipient country bears all costs. FMS has been the largest security assistance program since the 1970s. Between 1988 and 1998, FMS and FMS Construction Sales had combined total sales of more than \$150 billion. Besides the positive impact on the U.S. economy and job market, this program supports national security and foreign policy objectives by strengthening bilateral defense relations, enhancing interoperability, and supports building of coalitions.²⁶

The Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP) enables key allies and friends to improve their defense capabilities and helps them become capable partners by financing the acquisition of U.S. military articles, services, and training. Eligible recipient countries receive loans and grants. The FMFP has been instrumental in the formation of several coalitions working together in Central Europe, Asia, Southwest Asia, and Africa. Assistance is also provided to support multilateral peacekeeping operations that do not come under United Nation auspices. This support improves the ability of other nations to participate in regional peacekeeping operations, and reduces the requirements of U.S. participation²⁷. Fiscal year 1999 FMFP allocations were as shown in Table 1:²⁸

GRANTS	AMOUNT	OTHER	AMOUNT
ISRAEL	\$1,860.00	ACRI (**)	\$5.00
EGYPT	\$1,300.00	Enhanced PKO init.	\$7.00
JORDAN	\$45.00	East Africa Reg.	\$5.00
EUROPE (PfP*)	\$41.00	Administration	\$29.91
BOSNIA	\$4.00	Unallocated	\$13.09
NIS (PfP*)	\$13.00	CE Loans	\$167.00
DEMNING	\$35.00	(Subsidy)	(\$20.00)
CARIBBEAN Reg.	\$3.00	Total:	\$3,497.00
MOROCCO	\$2.00	*Partnership for Peace	
TUNISIA	\$2.00	**Africa Crisis Response Initiative (PKO)	\$ In Millions

TABLE 1 FY 1999 FMFP ALLOCATIONS

International Military Education and Training (IMET), has been often deemed one of our most important investments. It is a relatively low cost, yet highly efficient program that provides training on a grant basis, annually to over 8,000 students from allied and friendly nations. IMET establishes lasting military-to military relationships that are beneficial in coordinating regional stability activities with recipient

nations. This program exposes international students to U.S. professional military organizations and procedures, while advancing U.S. ideals on democracy, human rights, and civil-military relations. The resulting close friendships have on occasion proven instrumental in how the U.S. has dealt with some foreign militaries during various military operations, activities, or periods of unrest. Clinton Administration officials believe that IMET has been such a success because it provides the opportunity for foreign military students to learn advanced military leadership concepts arm in arm with their U.S. counterparts. In 1991, the scope and purpose of the IMET program was changed to allow foreign military and civilian officials from ministries other than Defense, such as Foreign Ministry, to participate. This new focus is called Expanded IMET.²⁹ IMET Funding for fiscal years 1993 through 1999 were as shown in Table 2.³⁰

	FY 93	FY 94	FY 95	FY 96	FY 97	FY 98	FY 99
Funding levels	\$42.5	\$22.25	\$26.35	\$39.0	\$43.475	\$50.0	\$50.0
No. of Countries	109	102	114	119	117	116	126
No. of Students	4,448	3,540	4,227	6,920	8,060	8,840	8,744 est.

(\$ In Millions)

TABLE 2 FY 1993-99 IMET PROGRAMS

Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) is licensed under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), and is a sale made by U.S. industry directly to a foreign buyer. Congress must approve all sales, but no government-to-government agreement is required. Civilian contractors and businesses tend to derive the principal benefits from DCS.³¹

The Economic Support Fund (ESF) was formerly the Security Supporting Assistance program. The ESF is a flexible instrument made available on a grant basis to provide economic assistance such as balance of payments support, infrastructure, and other capital and technical assistance development projects. The ESF also provides for programs aimed at primary needs in health, education, agriculture, and family planning.³² The primary objective of this program is to promote long-term political and economic stability in areas in which the United States has specific security interests. FY 1999 ESF allocations are shown in Table 3.³³

Country	Allocation	Regional Program	Allocation
ASEAN Reg. Forum	\$0.250	Admin of Justice/ICITAP	\$ 10.000
ASEAN Environ. Init.	4.000	Africa Regional	15.000
Burma	3.500	Asia Regional	2.300
Cambodia	10.000	Great Lakes Initiative	25.000
Cyprus	15.000	Holocaust Victims Trust Fund	10.000
Education	10.000	Human Rights/Democracy	9.000
Egypt	775.000	Iraq Opposition	3.000
FY 99 Supplemental [Tanzania and Kenya]	50.000	Latin America Regional	13.000
Guatemala	25.000	M. E. Regional Democracy	2.500
Haiti	70.000	M.E. Multilateral Working Groups	3.000
Ireland	19.600	M.E. Regional Cooperation	6.000
Israel	1,080.000	S. Africa Dev. Community Initiative	2.000
Jordan	150.000	S. Asia Regional Democracy	2.750
Lebanon	12.000	s. Pacific Fisheries	14.000
Thailand/Indonesia		West Bank and Gaza	75.000
Financial Tech. Assist.	5.000	Unallocated	14.000
		Total (\$ In Millions)	\$2,436.600M

TABLE 3 FY 1999 ESF ALLOCATIONS

Peacekeeping Operations is the last of the major security assistance program. This program provides funds to assist friendly countries and international organizations for peacekeeping programs which further U.S. National security interests.³⁴ FY 1999 Funding for peacekeeping operations were as shown in Table 4.³⁵

(\$ in Millions)

African Regional (Rwanda)	\$4.00
Africa Crisis Response Initiative	15.00
Haiti	4.40
Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Force	1.00
Multinational Force & Observers (Sinai)	15.00
Org. of American States (Haiti)	1.60
OSCE (Bosnia and Croatia)	25.00
OSCE (Kosovo)	10.00
Total Voluntary PKO	76.50

[Annual UN CIPA plus arrearages] [\$256.00 + 475.00]

TABLE 4 FY 1999 VOLUNTARY PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

In addition to the six major programs, there are four other programs or authorities that fall under the rubric of security assistance. These include the leasing of defense articles, the sale or grant transfer of excess defense articles, emergency drawdowns, and third country transfer of U.S. origin defense equipment.³⁶ These four programs complement the other six, by giving the President authority under certain conditions, to lease, sell, give away, and approve the transfer of defense articles from the original

recipient to a third country. The overriding factor for execution of any of these programs is, as usual, whether the outcome supports U.S. national interests and foreign policy.

COST VERSUS BENEFITS:

Now with a better understanding of what tools comprise the program, the question to be answered is, "Have the costs associated with execution of these programs, been justified by the derived benefits?"

Table 5 shows the funded security assistance programs for fiscal years 1999 and 2000:³⁷

	<u>FY 99</u>	<u>FY 00</u>
FMFP	\$3,497M	\$3,350M
IMET	50M	52M
ESF	2,437M	2,389M
PKO	77M	130M
TOTAL	\$6,061M	\$5,921M

TABLE 5 FY 99/00 SECURITY ASSISTANCE FUNDING (APPROPRIATED/REQUESTED)

The Clinton Administration and proponents, such as the defense industry, who would like to see the United States continue to lead the way in international arms sales, would answer affirmatively that the benefits more than justify the cost. But there are critics who counter that security assistance is a concept that has long outlived its usefulness in the context of U.S. foreign policy. In some respects, it is difficult to quantify fully the benefits that have accrued from security assistance. The criteria for measuring success of the effectiveness of security assistance, can be ambiguous. Therefore, others, oftentimes view what constitutes success in the eyes of this administration, in a quite different fashion. Nonetheless, the Clinton Administration, not unlike its predecessors, has used security assistance sufficiently as a foreign policy tool to help improve bilateral relationships between the United States and recipient nations, provide the U.S. with political influence in order to gain the support of friendly nations on major international issues, enhance the military effectiveness of the United States and its allies, and to bring economic gain to U.S. industries. Some of the readily identifiable benefits can be categorized as follows:

Political-Military Benefits:

- 1) Security assistance helps create regional strategic balances and maintain stable balances of power in volatile regions of the world.

- 2) Security assistance strengthens U.S. ties with and influence over other nations, fostering a climate in which specific objectives can be pursued. For example, the U.S. led coalition could not have achieved the success of Desert Storm without the security assistance agreements concluded with the countries of the Arabian Peninsula, many years before Iraq invaded Kuwait.
- 3) Security assistance serves as a vehicle for gaining access to key leaders or leadership groups.
- 4) Security assistance helps promote a Pro-U.S. orientation in politically or strategically important countries.
- 5) Security assistance helps promote more effective contributions by recipient countries to the cohesiveness and defense capabilities of alliances and coalitions.
- 6) Security assistance helps improve the ability of key allied nations to defend themselves, and thus reduce the likelihood of direct U.S. forces involvement.
- 7) Security assistance enhances interoperability among U.S. allies and coalition partners.
- 8) Security assistance has allowed the U.S. to obtain basing rights and use of facilities.

Arms Control Benefits:

- 1) Security assistance provides the U.S. with some degree of influence over the uses to which transferred arms can be put, including retransfers to third nations.
- 2) Security assistance under peacekeeping operations, helps prevent or bring to an end conflict. For example, the Multinational Forces and Observers (MFO), mission in the Sinai.
- 3) Security assistance helps to discourage the proliferation of indigenous arms production capabilities.

Economic Benefits:

- 1) Security assistance, particularly Foreign Military Sales and Foreign Military Sales Construction has contributed significantly (several billion dollars annually) to the U.S. balance of payments.
- 2) FMS enables the U.S. to recoup a portion of the research and development costs of weapon systems.
- 3) FMS helps sustain a diverse U.S. defense industrial base and contributes to the continuing technological equipped superiority of U.S. Armed Forces.
- 4) Security assistance contributes to higher employment levels in the United States.

5) Security assistance promotes access to critical raw materials and other natural resources.³⁸

CRITICISM OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE:

As reflected above, the rationale for security assistance is quite broad. The predominant reason usually given for executing specific security assistance agreements with various recipient nations has been that it served U.S. national interest and foreign policy. But how does the American public feel about the United States being the worlds leading arms supplier? In public opinion polls, American's have tended not to favor either economic or military aid. A 1982 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations survey found that the public wanted the U.S. government to invest more in domestic social programs, and to cut back on foreign assistance.³⁹ "In 1996, the State Department noted that although foreign assistance is a real bargain for American taxpayers, recent polls suggest that the American people think that up to 25 percent of federal spending goes to foreign assistance. Their solution: cut it to a maximum of 8 percent. In reality, less than one percent of the total federal budget is spent annually on foreign assistance.⁴⁰ This kind of thinking reflects the lack of understanding of security assistance by the average American. Now whether that is a function of a failure by the administration to clearly convey to the American public the specific what, why, and how of security assistance and U.S. foreign policy; or, simply a lack of interest by the public, is a matter of opinion.

During the Cold War, when there was a clearly definable threat, there tended to be broad support from the public and Congress for security assistance. More recently Congress and the public have decried the continued expenditure of resources when the Cold War threat no longer exists. In reality, Foreign Military Financing (FMF), the largest funded security assistance program, has consistently declined in value over the last twenty years. It has gone from about \$9 billion in 1984 to less than \$3.5 billion today.⁴¹ The principal recipients are still Israel and Egypt.

Congressional and public concern over security assistance centers around the following areas, which are in some respects, the converse of the rationale used by supporters of the concept.

- 1) Security assistance promotes instability by creating an environment for the proliferation of conventional arms.

- 2) Security assistance over commits the United States to the recipient country, thus minimizing U.S. foreign policy flexibility.
- 3) Security assistance affects the readiness of U.S. forces by transferring equipment abroad that is more advanced than that in the inventory of our forces.
- 4) Security assistance provides arms to prop up repressive and abusive regimes.
- 5) Security assistance places the U.S. in the morally undesirable position of being the world's largest arms supplier.⁴²

These criticisms in some respects have a ring of truth to them. For instance, the M1A2 Abrams Tank sold to Kuwait, was a more advanced version tank than was found in most active U.S. Army armor units. However, even though these criticisms should be given proper consideration before a security assistance agreement is concluded, they still do not provide absolute reasoning to discard security assistance as a foreign policy tool.

CONCLUSION:

Security assistance is a term subject to different interpretations by different audiences. It has long been an essential element of U.S. foreign policy. During the Clinton Administration, it has continued to come under public and Congressional scrutiny as a concept that has perhaps outlived its intended purpose. Yet despite the criticism, there is little doubt that security assistance has allowed the United States to maintain its status as a world leader, able to exert its influence abroad, develop and maintain strong alliances and coalitions, and in the end, ensure that U.S. national interests are served. The importance of security assistance as a foreign policy tool cannot be overemphasized. Eric D Newsom, Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs, perhaps summed up its importance best in this way:

"Rather than viewing diplomacy and force as opposing ends of the spectrum of national policy – with one used when the other fails – it is important to recognize that each must seamlessly support the other. This has meant seeking the right balance between foreign policy and defense interests and strengthening defense relations through such foreign policy 'tools' as **security assistance**, military education and training programs, arms transfers, security dialogues, and confidence-building measures. All of these efforts pay off with stronger security relationships with allies and other countries – which have proven critical in international responses to conflicts such as those in Iraq and Kosovo."⁴³

WORD COUNT = 6,058

ENDNOTES

¹ William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, D.C.: The White House, October 1998), 8-9.

² The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, The Management of Security Assistance, 19th Edition (Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, 1999), 53-54.

³ *Ibid.*, 54.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 54-55.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 56

⁶ Andrew J. Pierre, ed., Arms Transfers and American Foreign Policy (New York: New York University Press, 1979), 17.

⁷ Alvin J. Cottrell, Robert Hanks, and Michael Moodie, Arms Transfers and U.S. Foreign and Military Policy, Significant Issues Series, CSIS, (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 1979), 17.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 18.

⁹ The Management of Security Assistance 19th Edition, 25-26.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 29.

¹¹ Alvin J. Cottrell et al., Arms Transfers and U.S. Foreign and Military Policy, 20.

¹² *Ibid.*, 20-21

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ The Management of Security Assistance 19th Edition, 30.

¹⁵ "DSCA (Facts Book) Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts." Linked from Desk Book; available from <<http://web.deskbook.osd.mil/rflib/DDOD/001EN/001ENdoc.htm>>; Internet; accessed 11 February 2000.

¹⁶ The Management of Security Assistance 19th Edition, 33-38.

¹⁷ Madeleine K. Albright, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, FY 2000 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1999), 544-49.

¹⁸ The Management of Security Assistance 19th Edition, 34-37.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 38-39.

²⁰ Lora Lumpe, "Clinton's Conventional Arms Export Policy: So Little Change", Arms Control Today, May 1995, 9.

²¹ William J. Clinton, Presidential Decision Directive, PDD-34, "Conventional Arms transfers", 17 February 1995.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, iii.

²⁵ Albright, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, FY 2000, 937.

²⁶ The Management of Security Assistance 19th Edition, 57.

²⁷ Ibid., 58.

²⁸ "Security Cooperation: A Key policy Tool for the XXI Century"; available from <<http://129.48.104.198/dscaoverview98/tsld001.htm>>; Internet; accessed 11 February 2000.

²⁹ The Management of Security Assistance 19th Edition, 59-61.

³⁰ "Security Cooperation: A Key policy Tool for the XXI Century"; available from <<http://129.48.104.198/dscaoverview98/tsld001.htm>>; Internet; accessed 11 February 2000.

³¹ The Management of Security Assistance 19th Edition, 59.

³² Ibid., 61.

³³ "Security Cooperation: A Key policy Tool for the XXI Century"; available from <<http://129.48.104.198/dscaoverview98/tsld001.htm>>; Internet; accessed 11 February 2000.

³⁴ The Management of Security Assistance 19th Edition, 61-62.

³⁵ "Security Cooperation: A Key policy Tool for the XXI Century"; available from <<http://129.48.104.198/dscaoverview98/tsld001.htm>>; Internet; accessed 11 February 2000.

³⁶ The Management of Security Assistance 19th Edition, 62-63.

³⁷ "Security Cooperation: A Key policy Tool for the XXI Century"; available from <<http://129.48.104.198/dscaoverview98/tsld001.htm>>; Internet; accessed 11 February 2000.

³⁸ Albright, 1111-1114.

³⁹ Larry A. Mortsof, "Only Yesterday: Security Assistance Over the Past twenty Years", The DISAM Journal, Spring 1997, 15.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ "Security Cooperation: A Key policy Tool for the XXI Century"; available from <<http://129.48.104.198/dscaoverview98/tsld001.htm>>; Internet; accessed 11 February 2000.

⁴² Lumpe, 9-14.

⁴³ Eric D. Newsom, "Security Assistance: The Bridge Between Diplomacy and Use of Force", available from <<http://www.usia.gov/journal/itps/1299/ijpe/newsom.htm>>; Internet; accessed 11 February 2000.

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