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**INTELLIGENCE IN SUPPORT OF PEACE OPERATIONS:
THE STORY OF TASK FORCE EAGLE AND
OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR**

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**Intelligence in Support of Peace Operations: the Story of Task Force Eagle and
Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR**

by

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ABSTRACT

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Peace operations such as Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, the NATO peacekeeping mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, pose significant challenges for conventional military forces. A complex threat environment, the dominance of political factors in military decision-making, and multinational operations complicate mission execution. As a result, OJE intelligence operations were exceedingly complex. The nature of the mission and the primacy of political factors blurred distinctions between strategic, operational, and tactical levels of intelligence. Intelligence operations were both joint and combined, integrating national and theater capabilities into a tactical structure and requiring the sharing of information outside NATO. Missing from US intelligence doctrine and its related tactics, techniques, and procedures were the guidance and skills necessary for supporting peace operations. This strategic research project focuses on three primary areas that illustrate how intelligence in support of peace operations differs from doctrinal intelligence procedures developed to support conventional military operations: the nature of the threat and operating environments and their impact on intelligence operations; the importance of political factors in peace operations and their implications for intelligence professionals; and the implications of conducting intelligence operations in a coalition.

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INTELLIGENCE IN SUPPORT OF PEACE OPERATIONS: THE STORY OF TASK FORCE EAGLE AND OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR

In November 1995, US diplomatic pressure on the major Balkan regional power brokers forced a peace accord on the Bosnia-Herzegovinan warring factions, ending three and a half years of internecine factional strife and years of frustration and humiliation for the UN in trying to bring peace to the region. The agreement hammered out at Dayton, Ohio, also set the stage for a NATO-led peacekeeping mission, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. NATO operations in and around Bosnia produced numerous "firsts" for the alliance. Prior to the Dayton Accords, NATO air strikes to pressure the Serbs into entering negotiations represented the alliance's first offensive actions in its history. JOINT ENDEAVOR served as NATO's first-ever "out of area" operational deployment, its first major ground operation, and its first combined operation with non-NATO countries. Of particular note is the fact that JOINT ENDEAVOR integrated Russian forces serving loosely under US leadership, underscoring in as dramatic a fashion as possible the changes in the world wrought by the end of the Cold War. Also noteworthy was the first time participation of the French as part of a NATO-led operation, with the French assuming one third of the Implementation Force (IFOR) area of operations.¹

Peace operations, such as JOINT ENDEAVOR, pose significant challenges for military forces trained for war. To quote former UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, "Peacekeeping is a job not suited to soldiers, but a job only soldiers can do."² Commanders must operate in an environment where political factors are preeminent and dominate military decision-making. Most importantly, commanders find themselves thrust into the role of statesmen, with tactical and operational decisions having major strategic implications. In addition to threatening or employing force to contain hostile military forces, soldiers in peacekeeping are confronted with a host of unfamiliar tasks such as coordinating civil affairs, dealing with scores of nongovernmental and private humanitarian organizations, delivering humanitarian supplies, providing a secure environment for political processes, securing or even assuming police functions, and building infrastructure such as bridge and road repair. Nor are peace operations conducted in a permissive environment without threats. While Bosnia proved to be more peaceful than expected, IFOR was nevertheless confronted by numerous threats.³ Such threats included snipers, innumerable mines, rioting by civilians inspired by provocateurs, terrorists and extremists, unsafe roads and mountainous terrain, and extreme weather conditions. Furthermore, JOINT ENDEAVOR was complicated by its multinational nature, where NATO and non-NATO units served under IFOR command and control, but without established interoperability procedures and without having trained together.

Intelligence operations in support of JOINT ENDEAVOR were exceedingly complex. The nature of the mission and the dominance of political factors blurred distinctions between strategic, operational, and tactical levels of intelligence. The influence of other international actors required an expansive area of interest well beyond the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and even outside the Balkan region. The

operational environment was complex, encompassing numerous factions that changed over time; a nonlinear, 360° battlefield; a non-standard and evolving order of battle; and an exceedingly large area of operations, much of it difficult or impossible to negotiate with ground troops. Intelligence operations were both joint and combined, integrating national and theater capabilities into a tactical structure and requiring the sharing of information outside NATO. Collection capabilities integrated a myriad of sources, both traditional and non-traditional, from technical sensors to thousands of troops “in contact.”

While intelligence operations during JOINT ENDEAVOR generally receive high marks, they clearly illustrate the challenges associated with adapting procedures designed to support military operations against a known threat, the Warsaw Pact. During the Cold War, US and NATO intelligence structures and techniques were oriented on collecting against known Warsaw Pact military capabilities and analyzing threat maneuver, courses of action, and order of battle. National intelligence systems were organized, staffed, and equipped primarily for indications and warning and sensor-to-shooter targeting.⁴ US intelligence doctrine at the outset of JOINT ENDEAVOR was well developed to support mid and high intensity warfighting, whether on the plains of central Europe or the deserts of the Middle East. Missing from such doctrine and its related tactics, techniques, and procedures were the guidance and skills necessary for supporting peace operations. The Task Force Eagle After Action Report summarizes the relevance of current doctrine: “None of the key field manuals (FM 34-3, FM 34-7, FM 34-130, or FM 100-23) addressed how to verify treaty compliance issues such as those laid out in the General Framework for the Agreement of Peace [sic] (GFAP).”⁵ Doctrine such as intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and indications and warning (I&W) were completely inadequate to the task at hand, and had to be modified and retailored by the forces in the field. Doctrine also failed to address adequately the multi-service, multi-agency, and multi-national nature of operations in a coalition environment. Task Force Eagle intelligence personnel adapted conventional military intelligence doctrine to find solutions appropriate for the mission and the operating environment in which they found themselves. While US intelligence personnel were largely successful in adapting doctrine designed for a different “war” and a different operating environment, their experiences underscore the necessity of integrating their “lessons” and revising doctrine to better support intelligence operations in a changing world. The story of the Task Force Eagle intelligence personnel illustrates areas where tactical intelligence doctrine and training require adjustment to ensure continued intelligence successes in the “New World Disorder.”

This strategic research project will take a detailed look at the intelligence challenges found in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, using them to illustrate how intelligence in support of peace operations differs from doctrinal intelligence procedures developed to support conventional military operations. It will focus on three primary areas: the nature of the threat and operating environments and their impact on intelligence operations; the importance of political factors in peace operations and their implications for intelligence professionals; and the implications of conducting intelligence operations in a coalition.

OVERVIEW OF THE ARRC AND TASK FORCE EAGLE

No language can describe adequately the condition of that large part of the Balkan peninsula—Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina—political intrigues, constant rivalries, a total absence of all public spirit... hatred of all races, animosities of rival religions, and absence of any controlling power... nothing short of an army of 50,000 of the best troops would produce anything like order in these parts.

—Benjamin Disraeli, 1878⁶

The nature of the NATO peace enforcement mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the multinational task organization comprised of representation from numerous coalition partners, and the size of the US-led Task Force Eagle had significant implications for intelligence operations.

The General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) negotiated at Dayton established that NATO would provide the military force required to ensure compliance with the agreement. This multinational force, led by NATO, but integrating non-NATO elements, was called the Implementation Force (IFOR). Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), the overall military authority, delegated command of IFOR to Admiral Leighton Smith, Commander Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH). IFOR executed Transfer of Authority (TOA) with the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) on 20 December 1995, assuming command and control of all NATO and non-NATO forces participating in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, including former UNPROFOR units who traded in their blue helmets for camouflage. All ground forces, numbering close to 60,000 were placed under the command of the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), commanded by Lieutenant General Sir Michael Walker.

The ARRC, a NATO corps-level headquarters built around a British framework, was comprised of three multinational divisions (MND) occupying three sectors which encompassed all of the Bosnia-Herzegovina land mass: MND-North built around the 1st (US) Armored Division; MND-Southwest built around the 3rd (UK) Armored Division; and MND-Southeast built around the 6th French division.

This command and control arrangement, illustrated in figure 1, with multinational divisions subordinated directly to a NATO corps headquarters represented a significant change from previous NATO doctrine and operating procedures. The ARRC was a relatively new headquarters. Prior to its activation in 1993, divisions in NATO were national formations subordinated to corps of their own nation. Under that system, interoperability issues were not a factor at the division level and division staffs were not expected to deal with them, nor were they prepared to do so. Furthermore, NATO doctrine regarded intelligence as a national responsibility, with reporting chains going through national channels. The lowest level at which national intelligence pipes could be expected to terminate was at corps or even army level.




FIGURE 1 IFOR COMMAND AND CONTROL

However, with the activation of the ARRC as a multinational corps and its assumption of the IFOR land forces mission, the division G2 assumed the responsibility for resolving interoperability and integrated intelligence architectures issues. Throughout the planning and preparation phase, the division G2 was confronted with a host of issues associated with what US intelligence was releasable to other nations and what had to be safeguarded as US-only.⁷ The division was also left with the responsibility for determining the means for providing intelligence support to non-US brigades, a situation which became acutely sensitive once the Russian brigade was added to the task organization. Solving the problems of coalition warfare which traditionally had been handled at either corps or army level, had now been pushed down to the division staff for resolution. The details of how the 1st Armored Division addressed these issues are discussed below, but suffice to say that making coalition intelligence operations work efficiently posed a major challenge during the planning process. Multinational Division-North's task organization, illustrated in figure 2, brought together 15 brigade sized elements from 12 nations, creating a task force of close to 25,000 soldiers. The US component of MND-N was known as Task Force Eagle (TFE). The base organization of TFE was the 1st (US) Armored Division with two armored brigades, and aviation, artillery, engineer, and support brigades. To create Task Force Eagle, the 1st Armored Division was rounded out with the six separate brigades of V (US) Corps; engineer, intelligence, military police, signal, medical, and support. Finally, MND-N included a Russian Airborne brigade, a Turkish brigade, and the




FIGURE 2 MULTINATIONAL DIVISION-NORTH

Nord-Pole Brigade with Nordic battalions, a Polish battalion, and platoons from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.⁸ Although this much larger multinational configuration and the expanded AO (discussed below) significantly stretched the division's span of control, the 1st Armored Division staff continued to function with relatively little augmentation.

The impact the size of this task organization had on intelligence operations was enormous. Aside from the obvious implications of requiring intelligence sharing in a multinational environment, the sheer size of the task organization imposed tremendous burdens on the TFE G2. Under the division's normal task organization, the division staff could expect to support six brigades and two separate battalions, or eight major subordinate commands. Even at corps level, the Corps G2 could expect to support 2-3 divisions and six separate brigades, or 8-9 major subordinate commands. The TFE task organization doubled the size of organization a G2 is doctrinally expected and staffed to support. The result had a profound impact on the TFE G2's responsiveness and agility in handling dissemination and managing requirements from subordinate commands.

TFE's mission planning was based on a thorough analysis of the Dayton Accords with its specified tasks and timeline. The mission statement for Task Force Eagle was: "On order, Task Force Eagle deploys to AOR Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina and conducts peace enforcement operations to implement the military provisions of the Peace Accord; ensures force protection."⁹ Peace enforcement operations are by definition the application of or threat to use force in order to compel compliance with the provisions of a peace agreement by the contending parties.¹⁰ But inherent in that process is the prerequisite to

monitor and evaluate such compliance. Indeed, the core requirement for IFOR was to monitor both the Bosnian factional military situation and factional compliance with the provisions of the GFAP.¹¹ As a result, TFE experienced an inversion of the doctrinal relationship between operations and intelligence. Ordinarily, intelligence operations would be driven by the need to provide support to maneuver requirements. However, during JOINT ENDEAVOR, ground operations were driven by the imperatives of the monitoring mission and planned and conducted in support of intelligence collection requirements. The execution of reconnaissance and surveillance planning at all levels came to dominate the missions conducted by the maneuver forces.

THREAT ENVIRONMENT & INTELLIGENCE CHALLENGES

Bosnia is a country of hatred and fear. It is hatred, but not limited just to a moment in the course of social change, or an inevitable part of the historical process: rather it is hatred acting as an independent force, as an end in itself.

—Ivo Andric¹²

The threat environment in peace operations and the associated intelligence challenges are significantly different from those experienced in conventional warfighting operations. A commander's intelligence needs during peace operations "are in some ways more complex than those of the commander conducting combat operations in war."¹³ Simply defining the threat during JOINT ENDEAVOR was not as easy as one might have expected. The interaction of national, regional, and global influences on the former warring factions mandated that intelligence personnel define the area of interest in very broad terms and made it difficult to define with any great specificity. The size of the sector, its difficult terrain, and the prevalence of mines complicated the process of collecting intelligence. Factional order of battle was ten times that normally confronted in conventional operations and in a constant state of flux as the former warring factions (FWF) adhered to the demobilization provisions of the Dayton Accords. Implementation of the military tasks in accordance with the GFAP timeline added new intelligence tasks over time and caused analytical requirements to grow. The nature of the environment in which IFOR found itself required intelligence personnel to deal with a myriad of information requirements that were not specifically military in nature. Finally, the multinational and multiorganizational nature of peace operations requires the ability to integrate an exceedingly diverse array of collection assets and agencies.

Simply defining the contending factions in Bosnia-Herzegovina's bitter and protracted war was not easy. While the three factions internal to Bosnia are often described as being differentiated by ethnicity, they are all ethnically Slavs. Nevertheless, differences of language, religion, and culture divide the inhabitants of Bosnia into the basic three groups of Serb, Croat, and Muslim.¹⁴ However, ethnic

identity has not always determined on which side an individual would fight. Bosnian Croats fought in the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) and Bosnian Serbs served in the Muslim Army (BiH), in some cases at rather high levels. Furthermore, events within Bosnia have been influenced just as much by external actors, most prominently Croatia under Franjo Tudjman and Serbia under Slobodan Milosevic. Bosnian Croat (HVO) military forces are heavily influenced by and dependent upon the Croatian Army (HV). Likewise, the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) has strong ties to the Yugoslav military (VJ) which exerts a profound influence on its ethnic ally. Nor are the Bosnian Muslims free from external influence. The Bosnian Muslim Army (BiH) received extensive aid and support from Iran during the war and depending upon whether its officers see themselves as moderate secularists or fundamentalists, looks either to Turkey or Iran for guidance and support. Furthermore, during the course of the war, the actions of both the UNPROFOR, widely regarded as partisan in favor of the BiH, and the Croatian Serbs (RSK) in the neighboring Krajina had an influence on events within Bosnia.¹⁵ The pervasiveness of external influences served to further complicate an already knotty and intractable situation, adding greater analytical challenges for intelligence personnel. While the primary focus of Task Force Eagle intelligence personnel was inside their sector, they had no choice but to closely monitor the linkages to Serbia, Croatia, Iran and other Islamic states, and to follow the progress of events in the neighboring Krajina. As one commentator has noted, intelligence analysts "had to cast a wide net, far beyond the theater of operation, to grasp the influences in the area,"¹⁶ in order to discern not only regional, but also global factors affecting internal Bosnian conduct, attitudes, and perceptions.

In addition to analyzing regional and global factors impacting within the AO, Task Force Eagle analysts also had to maintain situation awareness of what was happening throughout the entire country by tracking activity and trends in the other multinational division sectors, illustrated in figure 3. While each division sector had its own unique and intractable challenges, activity within each tended to impact the others. The British MND-Southwest included the Bihac pocket; the area around Prijedor with numerous reported war crimes; Muslim-Croat friction points around Jajce, Livno and Travnik; and Banja Luka, the largest and most significant Bosnian Serb city. Sector Southeast incorporated Sarajevo; the divided Muslim-Croat city of Mostar; Pale, the capitol of Republica Srbska, which served as the focal point for Serb radical nationalism and the home of indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic; and the requirement to establish a Muslim corridor to the former UN safe haven of Gorazde. MND-North acquired the strategically important Posavina corridor and the city of Brcko, whose status had been left undecided by the Dayton Accords. In addition, the site of the former UN safe haven, Srebrenica along with the bulk of the largest suspected mass gravesites lay within MND-N's AO. MND-N also contained the Mount Zep complex at Han Pijesak, headquarters of the Republica Srbska army and home to indicted war criminal Ratko Mladic. MND-N acquired the longest stretch of the Zone of Separation (ZOS) and the largest order of battle of the former warring factions (FWF). At the juncture of the three sectors in central Bosnia, all

three MNDs had to contend with an area of suspected *mujahadin* and Islamic extremist activity.





FIGURE 3 MND SECTORS

Task Force Eagle's sector, illustrated in figure 4, was far larger than anything that doctrinally would be assigned to a division, encompassing approximately one third of the landmass of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The sector covered an expanse of 144 kilometers by 144 kilometers, an area approximately the size of the state of New Hampshire. Snaking throughout the sector was a 1675 square kilometer Zone of Separation (ZOS), requiring constant monitoring. This stretch of ZOS was the longest among the three MNDs because in the TFE AO it doubled back on itself as it wound around the Ozren pocket. Adding to the length of the ZOS that TFE monitored were two additional segments, which delineated the Bosnian Croat pockets of Orasje and Odzak. The difficult nature of the terrain caused compartmentation within the sector, making movement difficult and limiting line of sight for communications and intelligence equipment. Terrain and adverse weather, particularly in the winter months placed severe constraints on mobility and the use of aviation assets. Most significantly, the sector contained well over a million mines arrayed in over 10,000 minefields and 4,000 associated mine belts.¹⁷ While these mines were most often encountered in the vicinity of the Zone of Separation, they also existed in areas where the former lines of confrontation had shifted during the course of the war. Difficult terrain and the prevalence of mines



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FIGURE 4 TASK FORCE EAGLE SECTOR

placed serious constraints on where ground forces could conduct patrols and reconnaissance. The size of the sector also stretched the capability of maneuver forces to carry out reconnaissance missions. Task Force Eagle compensated for these problems by exploiting its robust aviation assets and relying heavily on aerial collection systems such as the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and Airborne Reconnaissance-Low (ARL).¹⁸

Within that extended area were positioned military forces of all three former warring factions, with an order of battle (OB) in excess of 150 brigade-sized or larger elements. Many of these units were too small to have been considered brigades in the conventional sense, but implementation of the GFAP required TFE intelligence personnel to track them as they were reported by the Bosnians. Whereas doctrinally in conventional mid-intensity operations a divisional G2 could expect to track 12-18 separate entities from army to regimental level, the order of magnitude of the OB in the TFE sector represented ten times that amount. Compounding the magnitude of the task associated with tracking this sizable force was the fact that it changed as the factions went through the process of reorganization and demobilization

required by the Dayton Accords. Demobilization mandated by the GFAP ensured that it was impossible to develop a baseline order of battle that remained consistent throughout the operation. Although the Dayton Accords required the factions to declare their unit designations, strengths, and locations to IFOR, the MNDs had the burden of assessing and verifying those declarations as correct, posing a major challenge in the TFE sector.




FIGURE 5 FACTIONAL OB

By D+90, the GFAP required the factions to submit declarations of all military forces and military sites. Factional forces were required to withdraw into declared barracks and cantonment sites and place heavy weapons into storage sites approved by IFOR. The result of this requirement was that the MND's assumed an additional intelligence requirement of analyzing and assessing the declarations, recommending approval or disapproval, and verifying the accuracy of the declarations through on-site inspections. Once declared sites were approved as non-threatening, the MNDs were responsible for the continuous monitoring of them. Within the TFE sector, the FWF declared 435 sites at D+90. By D+120, errors, duplication, and additional declarations brought the level of declarations up to a total of 555 sites.¹⁹ By both consolidating sites and correcting errors in the data, the final tally of declared sites requiring periodic monitoring by TFE leveled off around 350, ninety six of them containing heavy weapons. The numbers of sites declared in the TFE AO far surpassed those in the other two MNDs. This was due to several factors. First, at the end of the conflict, the TFE AO contained a higher volume of factional units and weaponry than appeared in the other sectors, largely due to the presence of the strategically decisive Posavina Corridor and the city of Brcko. The extended length of the ZOS discussed above also contributed to the large numbers of forces and hence, the higher number of military sites. Finally, TFE demanded a higher level of resolution in the declarations, requiring that any military site,

regardless of use, be declared. The result was that TFE had a monumental intelligence task of monitoring a massive and ever-changing order of battle.

Nor could Task Force Eagle intelligence personnel confine their efforts to tracking conventional military order of battle. The nature of the mission with IFOR forces operating in a 360°, nonlinear battlefield and surrounded by the former warring factions mandated the tracking of potential terrorist threats from extremist elements among the entities. Situation awareness also required the analysis of emerging power brokers, most of whom built their power bases on organized crime or the support of the local military and paramilitary forces, or both. There were also the activities of provocateurs and discontented elements within the entities, with the potential to destabilize the situation. As factional military units demobilized, their members simply transitioned into the local police forces, assuming only a thin veneer as civil authority and essentially retaining paramilitary functions. Indeed, the factional police, who in theory should have served as a force for stability, often functioned as uniformed thugs and served to implement the agendas of whichever factional political party was dominant in the local area. The political aspects of the GFAP required the analysis of factional political parties, their platforms and campaign tactics, and the trends for voter turn out and factional movements during the elections; refinement of mass grave site locations and continuing monitoring of the sites; and the objectives and projected patterns of displaced persons resettlement by the factions. The intelligence tasks within Task Force Eagle went well beyond tracking factional order of battle.

The operating environment had a profound impact on information requirements and how they were managed. A classic example is the situation in the Nord-Pol Brigade sector, encompassing the Maglaj finger, the Ozren salient, and the city of Doboje. The brigade's AO, the largest within TFE, was 100 kilometers at its longest point and 70 kilometers across. Within that area, the Nord-Pol Brigade dealt with multiple challenges: two Croat pockets, the Zepce and Usora, within the predominantly Muslim Maglaj finger; the relatively isolated Serbian Ozren salient protruding into Muslim territory and bordered by both Muslims and Croats; two hot beds of extreme Serb nationalism around Teslic and Doboje, with renewed attempts at ethnic cleansing; large numbers of discontented Muslim refugees pushed into the Maglaj finger; the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism, centered around Zavidovici; and the establishment of a *mujahadin* training camp opposite the Croatian Zepce pocket. The brigade routinely dealt with a diversity of threats posed by ongoing Croat-Muslim friction around the pockets, Muslim-Serb clashes; overt threats against IFOR and the US expressed by the *mujahadin*, Serbian ethnic cleansing, and displaced persons trying to make mass movements across the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL). As a result, the breadth of the brigade's order of battle tracking consisted not only of factional military forces, but also included police forces, politicians and government officials, black marketers and criminal elements, and population demographics.

The above illustration demonstrates that in peace enforcement operations, intelligence personnel must approach their task, not from the perspective of simply analyzing the enemy, but of knowing and truly understanding the environment. US joint doctrine asserts that intelligence analysis "must often

address **unique and subtle problems** not often encountered in war."²⁰ In peace operations, the traditional paradigm of Mission-Enemy-Terrain-Time-Troops Available (METT-T) has to be modified so that our understanding of the *E* becomes environment, encompassing -- but not limited to -- the enemy. While military factors are a key component of that environment, additional factors such as social, political, economic, cultural, population demographics, religion, and history are all crucial to understanding the environment. Such analysis requires "a depth of expertise in (and a mental and psychological integration with) all aspects of the operational environment's peoples and their cultures, politics, religion, economics, and related factors...." However, it is not enough to simply know the facts about a particular society. The intelligence professional must also get inside the minds of the target people through "an understanding of the values by which people define themselves."²¹

The complex nature of the Task Force Eagle peace enforcement mission and the diverse nature of the operating environment had an impact on the development and management of information requirements. Doctrinally, commander's Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) are identified in wargaming during the military decision-making process and are tied to specific decision points.²² Typically, PIR ask specific questions, usually limited in number, enabling the commander to make a decision at a set point in time. However, Task Force Eagle's mission mandated the development of several sets of PIR to support decision-making in three discrete areas; TFE force protection, factional treaty compliance, and actions to protect mission accomplishment. The extraordinarily broad scope of the decisions the TFE commander faced dictated that the PIR were numerous and varied, covering a broad range of issues.²³

The task force's information needs and associated intelligence tasks became cumulative as the mission progressed, illustrated in figure 6. The timeline and the methodical approach to the military tasks




FIGURE 6 CUMULATIVE NATURE OF INTELLIGENCE TASKS

outlined in the Dayton Accords meant that intelligence tasks increased as each milestone was reached. For example, as the ZOS was cleared at D+30, a new requirement emerged to monitor the ZOS continuously. As Air Defense Artillery weapons were placed into designated storage sites, the new requirement was to monitor those sites on an ongoing basis. Likewise, the declaration of barracks and cantonment sites at D+90 and the occupation of those sites by D+120, increased rather than lessened the intelligence mission. At the same time, implementation of the GFAP's civil tasks also added to the intelligence requirements. Establishment of freedom of movement across the IEBL and the Dayton Accord's promise of refugee returns led to attempted mass movements, demonstrations, civil disturbances, and flare-ups of ethnic attacks. The approach of elections and the related task of securing them while ensuring freedom of movement created a whole new host of collection requirements. National political objectives such as supporting the efforts of the International Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in collecting evidence and bringing war criminals to justice also added to the mix of requirements. The result was that the requirements for collection planning, processing and database management, and analysis became increasingly diverse and varied as the size of the problem grew.

A further factor adding to the complexity of the intelligence mission was the challenge of integrating and exploiting the diversity of collection assets typically available in a peace operation. According to US joint doctrine, intelligence operations for peace enforcement must leverage the wide range of information and knowledge resident among the participants in the peace enforcement contingent based on their unique capabilities and access.²⁴ In addition to the task organization of dedicated military intelligence assets illustrated in figure 7, there was a multitude of nontraditional sources available within the MND-N




FIGURE 7 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE TASK ORGANIZATION

sector. Agencies such as civil affairs, psychological operations (PSYOP) and military police units; public affairs; the TFE political advisor (POLAD); the Joint Commission Officers (JCO's); UN agencies, e.g. the International Police Task Force (IPTF) and the International Crimes Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia (ICTY); international organizations, e.g. the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); and nongovernmental (NGO) and private organizations (PVO) were both sources and consumers of information.²⁵ The nature of the Task Force Eagle task organization also provided a myriad of nontraditional sources available for exploitation. Task Force Eagle made extensive use of the robust aviation assets within its task organization, exploiting AH-64 Apache gun camera tape and OH-58D film footage. The Signal Corp's Combat Camera unit also routinely provided invaluable imagery products, often shot from UH-60 Blackhawk platforms.²⁶ By exploiting debriefs and SALUTE reports of all TFE soldiers who moved throughout the sector, the potential existed to increase Task Force collection assets by almost 25,000 "troops-in-contact."²⁷ Setting aside reporting from specific intelligence collection assets, the integration of nontraditional sources and methods generated a significant flow of information, all of which had to be processed and assessed for validity and utility before being integrated into the overall picture. The result was a flood of reporting which at times could be overwhelming for intelligence personnel. Not only did this flood inundate poorly resourced battalion and brigade level-S2 shops, the requirement to leverage this wealth of human intelligence collectors also created a need for non-Military Intelligence officers at lower echelons to take on the role of intelligence debriefer or coordinator. Many of these junior officers, who were untrained in the field and not well prepared to assume these duties, did contribute valuable "eyes on" reporting of activity throughout the sector.

In short, the intelligence operating environment within MND-N was one of tremendous complexity and ambiguity requiring intelligence personnel to adjust to a whole host of challenges. The threat environment was a 360° battlefield shaped by a tangled web of nationalist, regional and global policy objectives. Threats covered a spectrum of former factional militaries, land mines, snipers, nationalist extremists, international terrorists, civil disturbances and riots, organized crime, hostile attitudes shaped by local media and factional propaganda, IFOR local national employees exploited by factional intelligence services and local power brokers, and extraordinarily rugged terrain and harsh weather conditions. Intelligence tasks included the continuous monitoring of former warring faction military units, weapons storage sites, barracks, cantonments, the Zone of Separation, mass grave sites, and the friction points caused by freedom of movement issues, resettlement pressures, and inter-ethnic tensions, as well as ensuring the protection of IFOR elements within the AO. Intelligence operations had to adjust to the multinational nature of IFOR operations, an expanded US task organization integrating collection capabilities far more robust than doctrinally found in a division, and a myriad of nontraditional collection assets. That the intelligence system in Task Force Eagle was able to adjust and meet the challenges imposed by the mission, environment, and task organization is a testament to the professionalism, dedication, and initiative of TFE intelligence personnel.

THE PRIMACY OF POLICY

When whole communities go to war—whole peoples, and especially *civilized* peoples—the reason always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is always due to some political object. War, therefore, is an act of policy.

—Carl von Clausewitz²⁸

The military strategy of small wars is more directly associated with the political strategy of the campaign than is the case in major operations.... Small war situations are usually a phase of, or an operation taking place concurrently with, diplomatic effort. The political authorities do not relinquish active participation in the negotiations and they ordinarily continue to exert considerable influence on the military campaign. The military leader in such operations thus finds himself limited to certain lines of action as to the strategy and even as to the tactics of the campaign.

—USMC Small Wars Manual²⁹

Peace operations are by their very nature inherently political. US joint doctrine on peace operations asserts that political objectives drive military operations at every level from strategic to tactical. Commanders are expected to adopt courses of action and plans that support the overarching national political objectives of the mission.³⁰ The political aspects of such operations significantly affect how intelligence is conducted. First, if they are to be effective, intelligence personnel must understand the US political objectives underlying the mission and be able to advise on how such objectives will affect the indigenous parties to the peace agreement. Although US doctrinal publications fail to address it, intelligence personnel must also be able to analyze the factional political objectives which precipitated the conflict and how they may either be modified or pursued using alternate ways and means once peace is imposed. If intelligence personnel are to be effective in analyzing intentions or conducting predictive analysis, they must understand the objectives underlying the conflict and project how the factions will continue to seek "victory" through non-military strategies. Finally, the political nature of peace operations pushes the military towards supporting diplomatic, civil and political institutions, requiring intelligence personnel to analyze a variety of political issues. Military commanders become involved in shaping the political-military environment, either through direct intervention or by ensuring stability and security so that the political conditions necessary for peace can develop and flourish.³¹ The result is that intelligence analysts must be particularly attuned to the political environment, understanding the nuances of political issues that normally would fall well outside the realm of conventional military intelligence analysis. Although few tactical intelligence analysts have much if any background in political analysis, they must be fully prepared to conduct it.

According to US joint doctrine, the military's role in peace operations is to support US national strategic and policy objectives and their implementing diplomatic activities.³² Yet as one senior US

intelligence officer has pointed out, intelligence personnel in peace operations face the challenge that the objective may not always be obvious or clearly defined.³³ As the US Marines discerned well over fifty years ago, the commander may have to “deduce his mission from the general intent of the higher authority, or even from the foreign policy of the United States.”³⁴ But today’s modern mass media has the ability to bring the horrific scenes of internecine warfare directly to the American public with an immediacy that can shape the national policy debate apart from the objectivity of clearly defined national security interests. As a result, foreign policy based on the reflex of national conscience can result in poorly developed and even conflicting policy objectives.³⁵

Unfortunately, US political objectives in Bosnia were contradictory, creating a situation of strategic ambiguity where both allies and factional entities were unsure of US sincerity and acted in response to their perceptions of reality, which may or may not have matched US intent. Although the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) defined the political and military objectives which IFOR was to implement, its negotiation and subsequent implementation was overshadowed by previous US policy, which can be generally characterized as inconsistent, partisan and frequently at odds with that of our European allies. Significantly, the results hammered out at Dayton fundamentally differed from preceding US policy, leading to frustration, confusion and mistrust on the part of the factional signatories. Prior to the initialing of the Dayton Accords, official US policy statements supported the United Nations and European Union attempts to seek a negotiated resolution to the conflict. Yet US statements also advocated the restoration of a unified, multi-ethnic Bosnia, something probably not achievable under a negotiated settlement.³⁶ And US actions in the region told yet another story as the US appeared to actively promote a Muslim victory while punishing the Serbs by attempting to unilaterally lift the arms embargo and advocating NATO bombing.³⁷ To further complicate matters, the Dayton Accords, while providing for a negotiated cessation of the fighting, created separate Muslim/Croat and Serbian entities, effectively ruling out any hope for a unified, multi-ethnic state and leaving many of the factional territorial gains intact. In one of the most ironic twists of all, Dayton stopped the fighting at a point where the Bosnian Federation armies, in conjunction with the Croatian army, were seemingly on the verge of a decisive battlefield victory over the Serbs. In essence, the US negotiated a peace settlement that ruled out the very objective for which the US had seemed to be actively working, at least in the short term.³⁸

Rebecca West’s trenchant summary of Western attitudes toward conflict in the Balkans clearly underscores the underlying problem with US policy in the region, which was to leave IFOR with a legacy of mistrust and animosity.

English persons, therefore, of humanitarian and reformist disposition constantly went out to the Balkan peninsula to see who was in fact ill-treating whom, and, being by the very nature of their perfectionist faith unable to accept the horrid hypothesis that everybody was ill-treating everybody else, all came back with a pet Balkan people established in their hearts as suffering and innocent, eternally the massacrée and never the massacrer.³⁹

Like the "English persons" of West's comment, the US insisted on viewing the Bosnian conflict as a struggle between victim and aggressor, good guys and bad guys, good versus evil. The result was a situation where the US gave up any appearance of impartiality while ultimately committing itself to insert combat forces into the midst of the feuding factions.

Intelligence professionals must base their judgments "on an understanding of the political end-game...."⁴⁰ In the immediate aftermath of Dayton, intelligence personnel attempted to analyze the outcome from the factions' perspective and to determine how they would respond to it, especially upon first contact with US forces. Of particular concern was the resentment engendered among all factions by the inconsistency of US policy. US actions, while embittering the Bosnian Serbs who saw the US as an aggressor against them, also frustrated the Muslims, who felt that the US had snatched victory from them by prematurely imposing a cessation of hostilities. Likewise, the Bosnian Croats, already unwilling partners in the Federation, were disenchanted by the results of Dayton. Clearly, each of the factions considered themselves to be losers in some fashion. Neither the Croats nor the Serbs had been allowed to negotiate for themselves, leaving the bitter impression of having been "sold out" by their sponsor nations. While the Serbs deeply resented the "train and equip" program which benefited the Muslims overall, the Muslims saw themselves as having been stymied at a critical juncture on the path to victory. At the same time, the Croats, chafing as junior partners in the Federation, regarded themselves as territorial losers, particularly around the key areas of Mostar and the Posavina. IFOR's challenge was to implement an agreement which satisfied none of the affected factions and which each viewed as a betrayal. At the same time, IFOR had to overcome the legacy of previous policies in order to present itself as impartial, even handed and apolitical.⁴¹

IFOR's understanding of factional objectives and war aims was essential for assessing factional behavior and conduct, conducting predictive analysis, and formulating strategies and responses. Since the Bosnian war was driven by factional policy to achieve specific political objectives, IFOR commanders could not plan or act in ignorance of the underlying objectives of the FWF. Furthermore, as commanders went about the business of ensuring a stable security environment by shaping the political-military landscape within their sectors, they had to be cognizant of the causes of hostility and the policy objectives of the factions which drove them to war. Indeed, as IFOR quickly learned, the end of open hostilities did not lead to abandonment of such objectives, but rather to adjusting factional strategy using other ways and means.

The end of the shooting war and the implementation of the Dayton Accords caused each of the factions to focus on consolidating gains and continue to pursue their original objectives within the strictures of the GFAP. IFOR confronted this reality early in the operation as it prepared to oversee the transfer of the five Serb suburbs around Sarajevo to the BiH. Since promoting an integrated, multiethnic Bosnian state was a major objective under Dayton, IFOR endeavored to encourage the Serb residents to

remain in the transferred areas. The Contact Group for the former Yugoslavia hoped that the transfer would serve as a demonstration that the former adversaries could live together harmoniously.⁴² The objective was to ensure the pre-war multiethnic character of Sarajevo was preserved in a stable environment. Instead, the suburbs erupted in violence as a program of beatings and arson forced the vast majority of the Serb residents out. IFOR had expected that many Serb residents, fearing Muslim vengeance, would flee of their own accord and initiated measures to encourage them to stay. Naively, some in IFOR assumed that the residents would stay if they only knew the details of the transfer plan and the Dayton requirement that the rights of all citizens, regardless of ethnicity, had to be safeguarded by the government.⁴³ On the basis of this assumption, IFOR mounted an information campaign to disseminate the details of the transfer and reassure the Serb residents. IFOR also assumed that the BiH government, which was the primary advocate for a multiethnic state, would want the Serbs to remain in the Sarajevo outskirts. However, IFOR was taken by surprise when young Serb thugs, acting in accord with local Serb police, initiated a campaign of intimidation, in essence ethnically cleansing the suburbs of their own people.

Knowing that the Serbs had vigorously defended these suburbs throughout the war, and that the Serbs had fought ruthlessly to secure Sarajevo itself, IFOR was unprepared for what seemed to be completely irrational and illogical behavior on the part of the Serbs. Furthermore, IFOR was surprised by indications that BiH and VRS authorities actually acted in concert to force the flight of the Serb residents. What would have caused these bitter enemies to act in collusion, seemingly abandoning what each had fought for; the one physically abandoning territory it had bled to defend and the other morally abandoning its stated reason for existence? In reality, the changed nature of the battlefield caused both factions to see it as in their best interest to drive the Serbs out. Once the factions could no longer pursue their objectives through combat, they shifted to using refugee displacements and population demographics as the primary weapon for consolidating their hold on the territory they received under the GFAP. The long term survival of the VRS depended on consolidating the Serb population in former Muslim territory which had been ethnically cleansed, while an ethnically Muslim Sarajevo was far more important to the BiH government than any rhetoric about a multiethnic state. One commentator, who was involved in the psychological operations campaign to stabilize the Serbian population in the suburbs, blames the outcome of the suburb transfer on an inadequate Contact Group policy.⁴⁴ However, the real problem was that the Contact Group's objective ignored the realities of factional objectives and no amount of IFOR psychological operations could have overcome that fact.

The above vignette, which occurred early in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, illustrates the importance of being able to analyze how political objectives will affect factional behavior. Serb conduct regarding the transferred suburbs should not have caught IFOR by surprise, but few in IFOR were able to perceive how the factions would modify their courses of action while continuing to pursue long-term strategic ends. The Dayton Accords did not, indeed could not, change factional strategic objectives, but they did force the factions to change the means by which they pursued them. The result was that the

locus of conflict shifted from the battlefield to using displaced civilians and population demographics as a weapon.⁴⁵ Implementation of the Dayton Accords did not end the war in Bosnia; it simply caused the nature of the Bosnian war to shift from armed conflict to a struggle dominated by economic and political aspects.⁴⁶

In addition to analyzing the relationship of Bosnian factional political objectives to factional courses of action, intelligence professionals also had to understand the influence of external political dynamics on the Bosnian entities. In some cases, the broader Croatian and Serbian political objectives would actually override internal Bosnian factional desires. During the planning phase of JOINT ENDEAVOR, Task Force Eagle assessed the factions' most likely and most dangerous courses of action, illustrated in figure 8. This analysis assumed that Croatia and Serbia would both influence their respective clients to publicly adhere to the GFAP. Although subsequent factional behavior during IFOR's deployment validated the assessment in almost all respects, TFE's assessment of the Bosnian Croat's (HVO) most likely conduct indicated vocal discontent and possibly a lack of cooperation from the Croatians in the Orasje pocket. Had this occurred, it could have complicated 1st Armored Division's initial deployment, which involved bridging the Sava River into the pocket and transiting it to the south. This part of the assessment was based on intelligence that the Bosnian Croat commander of Orasje had vowed to fight to link the Orasje and Odzak pockets, which the Dayton Accords had separated by a kilometer of Serb territory. During the deployment and river crossing, the Bosnian Croats in the Orasje pocket actually proved to be perfectly cooperative and expressed no opposition either to IFOR or to implementation of the Dayton Accords. The discrepancy between this part of the assessment and what actually occurred was largely due to underestimating the impact of Croatia's political objective -- achieving the acceptance and support of the Western nations. As a result, Franjo Tudjman ensured the compliance of the Bosnian Croats, regardless of what their local aspirations were. Recognizing this relationship was particularly important because it enabled Task Force Eagle to use US national channels to effectively leverage Serbian or Croatian influence on their Bosnian brethren.

FACTIONS' COURSES OF ACTION

<u>FACTION</u>	<u>LIKELY</u>	<u>DANGEROUS</u>
VRS	Public adherence to accord; military challenges to assert sovereignty	Initiate hostile actions in Serb pockets within Federation territory
BiH	Warm reception, with later disillusionment	Provocation of VRS; "deniable" fires along the ZOS
HVO	Vocal discontent in Orasje Brcko area	Hostilities with BiH Federation breakdown

FIGURE 8 ESTIMATE OF FACTIONS' COURSES OF ACTION

The dynamics of peace operations, with their inherently political nature, inevitably draws commanders away from a strict military-only approach to a more comprehensive, integrated political-military approach. IFOR commanders, operating at all levels, were intimately involved both in shaping the Bosnian political landscape through the measured and focused application of military capabilities and in providing support to civil, diplomatic, and political authorities.⁴⁷

TFE intelligence operations supported an integrated political-military approach. During the planning and preparation phase of the operation, the TFE intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) integrated political, economic, historical and demographic data with military and terrain analysis. The resulting product, illustrated in figure 9, identified eight separate "hot spot" or flashpoint areas assessed either to have the greatest potential for violence or to be the most critical over which to maintain control.⁴⁸ The Task Force Eagle methodology was later adopted by the ARRC and applied to an IPB of the entire country. It should be noted that the initial IPB conducted by the G2 followed the doctrine in FM 34-130, but the standard doctrinal approach of terrain, weather, and threat proved inadequate, showing little more than factional military forces "frozen in time", and was not predictive in nature. To make the process more relevant, TFE analysts broadened the factors integrated into the analysis of the battlefield environment and sub-divided the overall area of operations into smaller, more homogeneous areas based primarily on terrain and demographics.⁴⁹




FIGURE 9 ASSESSED FLASHPOINTS

By D+60 or mid-February 1996, a majority of the military implementation tasks had been completed and TFE intelligence personnel began to assess what the state of affairs would be in the sector at D+120 and beyond. This "Battlefield at D+120 and Beyond" IPB was designed to focus the commander on upcoming events that would have an impact on task force operations and prepare him for potential shifts in mission. The D+120 IPB was an assessment of political-military factors and did not incorporate weather or terrain data even though conventional IPB doctrine prescribes that such data is always included.⁵⁰ The view of the battlefield at D+120 and beyond analyzed the impact of a variety of factors, illustrated in figure 10. These factors included military activity, arms control activity, the scheduled Bosnian elections, activities by outside organizations such as the ICTY investigation of mass grave sites, and outside political considerations such as the Russian and US national elections. While implementation of the military provisions in the GFAP were on schedule, the civilian provisions were well behind schedule and the lack of civil-military coordination had the potential to threaten the mission. The overall assessment clearly showed the commander areas requiring increased military participation and projected future tasks in support of the civil processes such as support to the upcoming elections. It also projected that human rights would become the central issue in the spring and summer causing ethnic polarization to increase, rather than decreasing as the Contact Group and the UN High Representative hoped. The D+120 IPB is a perfect illustration of the type of political-military analysis required in support of peace operations.⁵¹




FIGURE 10 D+120 AND BEYOND IPB

Intelligence personnel provided political intelligence to commanders at all levels and analyzed issues that were largely political in nature, ranging from war criminals to refugee returns to elections support. Analysts looked for indicators of potential instability or unrest, which usually had more to do with political activity than with military activity. They also prepared products to predict refugee resettlements and projected civil demonstrations, enabling commanders to develop courses of action to prevent violence and defuse situations before they got out of control. During the Bosnian elections, they prepared assessments identifying the most likely locations for violence and opposition to the election process.⁵²

While the Task Force Eagle mission was stated in military terms, commanders' intent statements at division and brigade acknowledged the political aspects of the operation and directed subordinates to "set the conditions for long-term success," and to "facilitate non-military efforts toward infrastructure development, economic growth, and democratic practices."⁵³ The manner in which Task Force Eagle set the conditions for long term success of the mission was to aggressively facilitate implementation of the civil aspects of Dayton, particularly as the military tasks were completed. In the absence of a well-organized or effective civil implementing authority,⁵⁴ Task Force Eagle found itself as the only organization capable of organizing and synchronizing civil rebuilding activities during the first six months of JOINT ENDEAVOR. Acknowledging that "there will be no lasting peace unless there is progress to resolve political, economic, and social aspects of the conflict," Task Force Eagle created Civil-Military Working Groups to coordinate civil, military, economic, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operations within the sector.⁵⁵ Such efforts were designed to promote the reconciliation of the civilian population. The experience of the battalion task force commander responsible for the Brcko/Posavina Corridor area illustrates how the military became involved in the non-military aspects of "peacebuilding" out of operational necessity; ensuring the overall success of the mission by preventing violence and protecting friendly forces.⁵⁶ Intelligence personnel from battalion through division supported civil-military planning by providing information to commanders, ranging from analysis of "hot spots" and the interrelationship of power brokers and criminal activity to biographic and economic data. They also supported staff elements and civilian agencies involved in civil-military operations such as the Joint Military Commission, G5, Civil Affairs and PSYOP units, the IPTF, and the UNHCR.

Understanding the nuances of political issues and the implications of policy objectives is essential for intelligence personnel supporting peace operations. Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR demonstrates the necessity of comprehending national policy objectives and their impact both on friendly mission planning and on the former warring factions. It also illustrates how important it is for intelligence analysts to understand the factions' own political objectives and the strategic adjustments that the factions will use to pursue them within the strictures of the peace agreement. Finally, Task Force Eagle's experience exemplifies the need for ongoing political analysis in peace operations and the manner in which intelligence must support commanders involved in shaping the political-military environment. Unfortunately, tactical intelligence analysts, trained for hard targeting-based analysis in support of

conventional military decision-making and course of action development, are less well prepared for "softer" analysis of the policy implications of the mission and its associated political issues. Soft analysis, for which there are no doctrinal templates, is more challenging and difficult and places greater demands on intellectual and analytical flexibility.⁵⁷ Task Force Eagle analysts succeeded largely by setting aside the doctrine and applying innovative approaches that they dreamed up.

TWELVE NATIONS PLUS AN ARRC

When the United States has common political or strategic objectives with allied and friendly nations, **some situations may require that their military capabilities act in concert as a single and seamless force or as one operable system against an adversary.**

—Joint Pub 2-0⁵⁸

When conducting multinational operations, sharing information with allies may in itself become an issue.

—FM 100-23⁵⁹

One of the hallmarks of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR was its multinational composition. Although JOINT ENDEAVOR was a NATO-led operation, the Implementation Force was comprised of military units contributed by thirty-six nations. Multinational Division-North, formed around the US 1st Armored Division, was comprised of elements from twelve separate nations, of whom fewer than half were NATO countries. To further complicate the situation, much of the IFOR and MND task organization evolved after the Dayton Accords were announced, with contributing nations being added day-by-day, making it extraordinarily difficult to work out coalition interoperability procedures in advance. Lacking any sort of a standard intelligence doctrine for multinational operations or a refined intelligence architecture, the ARRC and MND-N had to develop operating concepts that ensured intelligence support for all participants in the coalition. MND-N's operating procedures during JOINT ENDEAVOR reflect many of the principles of multinational intelligence articulated in US joint doctrine; ensuring unity of effort against a common threat, adjusting national differences among nations, coordinating intelligence sharing, operating a Combined Intelligence Center, and providing intelligence liaison exchanges.⁶⁰

Intelligence sharing is one of the prerequisites essential for ensuring unity of effort and building trust within the coalition. The commander of MND-N directed the G2 to treat all Brigades equally in terms of intelligence support, regardless of the unit's nationality. This posed a special challenge, given the large number of non-NATO nations. Most particularly, the addition of the Russian Airborne Brigade within

MND-N's sector required a dramatic paradigm shift for US intelligence professionals schooled in a Cold War mind-set.

There were two imperatives for maximizing a multinational intelligence operating system; developing a fully integrated and interoperable intelligence architecture and resolving issues of releasability. Although NATO planning for some sort of operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina had been underway for almost three years, the details of an intelligence architecture integrating the capabilities of the participating nations had never been fully fleshed out prior to the Dayton Accords. Nor for that matter had EUCOM developed a fully evolved US intelligence architecture to support US forces. After Dayton, the OPLANs for SACEUR, AFSOUTH, and the ARRC were published almost simultaneously and addressed the issues of intelligence architecture, intelligence reporting, information sharing, and national intelligence responsibilities in only the broadest and most general terms.⁶¹ Over time, two architectures emerged; a NATO one with the ARRC as the hub, culminating at the US theater-level Joint Analysis Center (JAC) and a US structure with MND-N as the hub, routed through US Army Europe (USAREUR), Forward in Hungary and culminating at the JAC. MND-N functioned in both the NATO and US intelligence architectures, pushing intelligence upward through the ARRC and using the US structure to focus national and theater support downward on division-level requirements and requests for information.⁶² Significantly, the emergent NATO architecture placed the ARRC at the focal point of NATO intelligence within the AO vice the IFOR staff, responsible for supporting the NATO theater commander. The resulting structure marginalized the IFOR intelligence staff and provided less than adequate support to COMIFOR.⁶³

MND-N developed its own multinational intelligence interoperability procedures to meet the commander's intent of providing requisite intelligence support throughout the sector. To fully implement a system for exchanging intelligence with other nations, the division had to provide communications, processing, and analytical capabilities with its three non-US brigades. Intelligence liaison teams of trained intelligence analysts were deployed with each brigade S2 and equipped with laptop WARLORD intelligence processors, linked via the US Multi-Subscriber Equipment (MSE) communications network. The division's WARLORD network enabled the rapid dissemination of intelligence to and from all brigades, providing for a common intelligence picture among all the major subordinate commands. In most cases, this system worked extraordinarily well, with the US intelligence analysts developing close working relationships with their hosts and becoming the heart of the coalition brigade S2's operation. The volume and quality of intelligence provided through this system far surpassed what the coalition commanders were normally accustomed to receiving through their own channels. In addition, the division also established a Combined Intelligence Cell, integrating representatives from the non-US brigades with the G2 Operations and enabling the direct exchange of information at the division main command post.

The other prerequisite for making multinational intelligence work was resolving the procedures for determining what intelligence could be shared. Information sharing within coalitions is difficult to do because nations must protect sensitive intelligence sources and methods. Since theater plans did not

address sanitization and releasability procedures for sensitive information, 1st Armored Division procured special guidance on how to release US intelligence to coalition members and the Defense Intelligence Agency created a new classification of intelligence, Releasable to IFOR (REL IFOR). While sensitive sources and methods had to be protected, much of the intelligence to be shared was either derived from or attributed to physical observation based on the numerous "troops in contact" throughout the sector to include patrols, checkpoints, convoy debriefs, aircraft, and low-level human sources.⁶⁴ Indeed, the very nature of peace enforcement operations with large numbers of troops serving as passive collectors significantly simplified the problem of intelligence sharing. Where necessary, national agencies simply reported using tear line procedures, providing only the facts with no sourcing data. Revised intelligence sharing procedures resulted in the US disclosing unprecedented amounts of operational intelligence to coalition members, even providing threat warning data in near real-time.⁶⁵

The Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR experience illustrates several other unique considerations that significantly alter standard intelligence procedures such as the influence of individual coalition members' national policy objectives; lack of trust among coalition members; and differences in intelligence doctrine and methodology. When planning for such operations, one can expect that each member of the coalition will act in accordance with their own national interests and apply particular biases to intelligence reporting. Within MND-N, two of the brigades represented nations that had pursued national policies in support of a particular faction in the Bosnian conflict and maintained special relationships with that entity; the Russian brigade with the local Serbs and the Turkish brigade with the local Muslim population. Therefore, decisions about sharing information had to weigh the possibility of intelligence being leaked to either the Serbs or Muslims. Furthermore, the potential existed that those brigades with national ties to a particular faction would be biased in their reporting or fail to follow-up on suspected treaty compliance violations. In several instances, US intelligence indicated situations where a brigade was not fully implementing the provisions of the GFAP in contradiction to what they were reporting. This created a situation of great sensitivity where US intelligence tipped off the MND-N commander to a potential problem, yet could not appear to undermine the credibility of the brigade. Precautions also had to be taken to ensure that national political agendas did not distort the integrity of the reporting.⁶⁶ Furthermore, national considerations affected how intelligence staffs assessed certain types of activity. In the case of the Nord-Pol brigade, several members of the staff did not want to acknowledge the presence of a *mujahidin* training camp within their sector and disagreed with the division assessment of what was located there. Even after the MND G2 personally reconnoitered the suspected training camp with brigade intelligence personnel, several members of the brigade staff continued to resist acknowledging its presence.

Not all members of the coalition will necessarily trust one another or be capable of working harmoniously together. Reporting from the Polish Battalion assigned to the Nord-Pol brigade was practically nonexistent until it was discovered that the Poles did not want to report through the Nordic staff. Significantly, the Poles were exceedingly anxious to cooperate with and support the US forces as a

demonstration that Poland was ready for inclusion in NATO. Once the division recognized these national sensitivities, they were able to bridge the gap by providing a team of Polish linguists with the capability of sending reporting directly to the MND. Often, the division would repackage the information and send it down to the brigade so that they were not in the dark about one of their battalions.

Intelligence doctrine and methodology varied widely among nations with significant differences in how the non-US brigades and US units approached intelligence operations. While the Nord-Pol brigade S2 functioned in a manner similar to the US paradigm, the Russian brigade S2 was primarily a chief of reconnaissance and did not conduct all-source reporting. Reporting by any element other than reconnaissance patrols went to the Russian Chief of Staff and was never passed to the S2. As a result, the Russian S2 did not provide all source reports, seemingly because he had no mechanism for all-source fusion or analysis. Indeed, the center of gravity for the brigade's intelligence appeared to be with the Russian Chief of Staff, who had no linkage to the MND intelligence system. On the other hand, the Turkish brigade had no professional intelligence personnel and had an S2 in name only. For all practical purposes, the intelligence channels in the Turkish brigade were nonfunctional other than what was provided by the US liaison team. Intelligence planning and execution also reflected larger operational differences among the forces. US deliberate and methodical planning contrasted with the casualness of other nations; the US reliance on decentralized decisionmaking was in sharp contrast to the centralized execution of the Russians; and the timeliness and completeness of reporting and follow-up met a wide variety of standards. There were also differing philosophies between the British, French, and Americans. The British ARRC G2 released information on a strict "need to know" basis, which ran counter to US doctrine emphasizing shared situational awareness and broadcast intelligence. While US units reported volumes of battlefield information based on "troops in contact," French reporting was minimal, reflecting only significant activity and largely ignoring order of battle. At times, these philosophical differences led to uncomfortable relationships between the ARRC and the MNDs.⁶⁷

While the US intelligence contribution to JOINT ENDEAVOR surpassed that of the other nations, one should not assume that intelligence sharing was a one way street, with the US serving as the sole contributor. Other nations brought capabilities that either augmented or enhanced what the US provided, particularly in the field of human Intelligence (HUMINT). Within MND-N, the CI/HUMINT structure incorporated two multinational NATO units provided by the ARRC in direct support of MND-N. The Joint Forces Intelligence Team (JFIT) was a British HUMINT organization, which over time, formed a partnership with the US Defense HUMINT Service (DHS), adding several DHS officers to its roster. JFIT also integrated several Norwegians, former United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) with experience among the VRS, and thereby gained access to traditionally closed areas. The other unit, the Allied Counterintelligence Unit (ACIU) was an UK-US counterintelligence unit, which developed a close working relationship with the US Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI) and Army tactical counterintelligence teams. Both of these multinational organizations made significant contributions to MND-N's collection capabilities by broadening access to certain groups among the Bosnian factions,

particularly among those who would not have been overly receptive to meeting with US personnel. Furthermore, the two NATO units did not follow the more stringent US force protection guidelines, enabling them to move more freely in the sector while maintaining a lower profile. Both organizations were full participants in the MND-N weekly HUMINT coordination meetings, accepting tasking from the G2 and fully sharing their reporting. The NATO units significantly enhanced the tactical CI and HUMINT collection capability within MND-N and provide a sterling example that coalition intelligence operations, when properly integrated and based on mutual trust, can provide broader and more diverse intelligence than could be achieved through unilateral approaches. MND-N's CI/HUMINT architecture demonstrates that multinational intelligence can become something more than just a political expediency to be endured.

The US National Security Strategy states that US forces will operate multinationally -- when possible -- to promote regional stability throughout the world. The dictates of US policy mean that US commanders should expect to respond to crises as part of a multinational force. All aspects of the intelligence cycle are substantively affected by multinational operations. US intelligence officers must carefully plan for multinational operations, developing integrated operating systems and procedures for maximum intelligence sharing, while not compromising national sources and methods. Furthermore, it is essential that intelligence officers understand their coalition partners' national views and work to reduce potential friction. Understanding the strategic goals, doctrine and methodologies, and capabilities of each partner is an important part of the intelligence planning process.

EPILOGUE

Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain. What one can reasonably ask of an officer is that he should possess a standard judgment, which he can gain only from knowledge of men and affairs and common sense....

—Carl von Clausewitz

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the shift in US national security strategy from one of containment to engagement and enlargement, the US military continues to find itself involved in a proliferation of expeditionary operations around the world. Emerging threats to US national security as delineated in the Clinton Administration's A National Security Strategy for a New Century are largely non-traditional and unconventional. Military intelligence doctrine, developed to support conventional operations against the Warsaw Pact and ideally suited to do so, is less well suited to supporting the US military's trend towards expeditionary operations and crisis intervention. Intelligence doctrine and training techniques continue to prepare intelligence personnel to template echeloned forces arrayed on the battlefield in standardized formations, while developing targeting data continues to be the focal point of intelligence processes. The experience of Task Force Eagle during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR serves

as an illustration of how intelligence processes differ from the paradigm of support to conventional military operations when applied to the peace enforcement environment. This paper has highlighted three key characteristics of peace operations for which intelligence personnel must be prepared: differences in the threat and operating environments; the impact of political factors in all aspects of the operation, and the adjustments required for multinational operations.

Adjusting to these characteristics makes great intellectual demands on intelligence officers. The National Defense University Lessons from Bosnia asserts that while analysts were well trained for "hard targeting-based analysis supporting military courses of action", they were less well prepared for "'softer' analysis of political issues, treaty compliance...and faction and population intentions.... Since soft analysis was more challenging and difficult,...this placed high demands on intellectual and analytical flexibility."⁶⁸ To better prepare for peace operations, the traditional tactical focus of the military intelligence operator must be broadened so that he has the intellectual skills necessary to support commanders operating in an intensely political-military operational environment. One commentator has noted that intelligence operators must be "of very broad gauge to ensure that the most dangerous pitfalls are anticipated."⁶⁹ In particular, they must be able to make judgments based "on an understanding of the political end-game..." and assist commanders in maintaining a grasp on the broader, political-military strategic and operational elements of the operation, as well as the tactical."⁷⁰ Quite simply, intelligence personnel must broaden their focus well beyond the traditional tactical realm, integrating strategic and operational factors with the political. Yet just as important as broadening one's focus is developing the mental agility and intellectual capacity to think intuitively, based on insight and an innate understanding of the operating environment. To be effective in the environment of peace operations, intelligence personnel must develop the intellectual skills to operate "beyond the template," analyzing the human dimension of a particular culture. Within the context of peace operations, "the most important tools that intelligence officers have in their control are their finely-honed intuitions and intelligent professional judgment...."⁷¹ Insights into the nature of such operations, such as those that can be derived from Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, are fundamental to pushing beyond the current doctrine and refining professional judgment and intuition.

WORD COUNT=11,588

GLOSSARY

ACIU	Allied Counterintelligence Unit
AFOSI	Air Force Office of Special Investigations
AFSOUTH	Allied Forces South; designated as headquarters for the Implementation Force
AO	Area of operations
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ARL	Airborne reconnaissance-low
ARRC	Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps; designated as ground commander
BiH	Bosnian Muslim or recognized government of Bosnia
CI	counterintelligence
COMIFOR	Commander, Implementation Force
DHS	Defense HUMINT Service
EUCOM	European Command
FWF	Former warring factions
GFAP	General Framework Agreement for Peace; commonly known as the Dayton Accords
HV	Croatian national forces
HVO	Bosnian Croat
I&W	Indications and warning
ICTY	International Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
IEBL	Inter-entity boundary line
IFOR	Implementation Force
IPTF	International Police Task Force
JAC	Joint Analysis Center
JCO	Joint Commission Officer
JFIT	Joint Force Intelligence Team
METT-T	Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Time-Troops Available
MND	Multi National Division
MND-N	Multi National Division-North; under US command and control
MND-S	Multi National Division-South; under French command and control
MND-SW	Multi National Division-Southwest; under British command and control
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
OB	Order of battle
OJE	Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PAO	Public affairs officer

PIR	Priority Intelligence Requirements
POLAD	Political advisor
PSYOP	Psychological operations
PVO	Private organization
RSK	Croatian Serbs; Republic of Serb Krajina
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
TFE	Task Force Eagle; task organization of US forces in Bosnia
TOA	Transfer of Authority
UAV	Unmanned aerial vehicle
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMO	UN Military Observer
UNPROFOR	UN Protection Force; specifies UN forces in Bosnia prior to transfer of authority to NATO
USAREUR	United States Army Europe
VJ	Yugoslav forces
VRS	Bosnian Serb
ZOS	Zone of separation

ENDNOTES

¹ Larry Wentz, ed., Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience, (Washington, D. C.: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1998), xxiii.

² Johan Hederstedt, Jorn Hee, Nils W. Orum, Simo Saari, and Olli Viljaranta, Nordic UN Tactical Manual, (1992), 17.

³ The primary factor contributing to the compliance of the former warring factions with the Peace Accord was general war weariness after four years of fighting. Quite often, IFOR units found that the factions were fully prepared to withdraw from their positions once IFOR was in place. However, this condition should not be construed as applying to all peace operations. The contrast between Bosnia and Kosovo underscores this point.

⁴ Wentz, 55.

⁵ Task Force Eagle, Task Force Eagle, 28 Dec 95-10 Nov 96: After Action Report. Unpublished manuscript dated 1 June 1997 in the U.S. Army War College Library, Carlisle Barracks, PA, III-20. Hereafter cited as Task Force Eagle After Action Report.

⁶ Quoted in Wentz, 9.

⁷ In addition, several of the coalition partners provided specific national capabilities to their ground forces, often pushing national intelligence directly to the battalion level. Several of the Nordic nations units operating within the Task Force Eagle sector serve as an example. Some nations are more forthcoming with intelligence sharing than others. The implications of this are that many of the coalition partners had differing views of what was happening within sector.

⁸ While technically MND-N and TFE refer to two entirely different organizations, the terms are often used interchangeably. Despite the growth of the 1st Armored Division into this much larger multinational configuration, the 1st Armored Division staff remained intact and functioned with relatively little augmentation. As a result, the staff tended not to make any distinction between TFE and MND-N. The CG, 1st Armored Division, often was referred to as COMEAGLE when operating in his combined role.

⁹ Author's personal papers.

¹⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peace Operations, Joint Pub 3-07.3. (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 February 1999), viii. See also I-7 and III-1. Hereafter cited as Joint Pub 3-07.3.

¹¹ Wentz, 54.

¹² Quoted in Wentz, xx.

¹³ Department of the Army, Peace Operations, FM 100-23, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 30 December 1994), 45. Hereafter cited as FM 100-23.

¹⁴ See William T Johnsen, Deciphering the Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy, Strategic Studies Institute. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, November 7, 1995), 25-41, for a brief discussion of the divisions among Bosnia's factions.

¹⁵ In 1994 and 1995, 1st Armored Division G2 personnel monitoring the war in Bosnia tracked seven different factions; those internal to the conflict, VRS, HVO, and BiH; those intervening in the conflict, VJ and HV; those peripheral to the conflict with the potential to influence it, i.e. the Krajina Serbs, RSK; and UNPROFOR, caught in the middle. It may seem odd to treat UNPROFOR as a faction, but it became clear to us that their actions were a factor in the fortunes of the conflict, whether exerting pressure on the Serbs around Sarajevo as they did late in the conflict with the creation of the RRF, threatening to call for NATO air strikes, failing to defend UN safe havens, or being used as hostages.

¹⁶ Wentz, 53.

¹⁷ Task Force Eagle After Action Report, report of Major Franklin D. Ford, Assistant Division Engineer, contained in Staff Lessons Learned.

¹⁸ TFE relied on both the PREDATOR and PIONEER UAV. PREDATOR was under the tasking control of the USAF, but PIONEER was tasked directly by TFE. 1st Armored Division's Aviation Brigade flew in excess of 33,000 hours, setting a record for OPTEMPO. Because of the mine threat, the ZOS monitoring mission could not have been executed to any degree of effectiveness without the aviation missions. See Task Force Eagle, report of Colonel William Webb, Aviation Brigade commander, contained in Brigade Commanders and Staff AAR Letters

¹⁹ The statistics on military site declarations are contained in a briefing prepared by TFE G2 for SACEUR, GEN Joulwan, as of 12 June or D+180. The briefing is among the author's personal papers.

²⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War, Joint Pub 3-07, (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 June 1995), IV-2. Hereafter cited as Joint Pub 3-07. Emphasis in the original.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Department of the Army, Intelligence Officer's Handbook, FM 34-8-2, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 1 May 1998), D-1 thru D-2.

²³ Typically, TFE worked with about 16 PIR's.

²⁴ Joint Pub 3-07.3, III-9.

²⁵ United States Army Europe, Operation Joint Endeavor: USAREUR Headquarters After Action Report, 2 vols. (May 1997), 1:88-89 discusses the integration of civilian agencies and the value they provided.

²⁶ One typical example of this was when the TFE senior terrain analyst and Combat Camera specialist overflew suspected mass grave sites in an effort to more precisely pin-point their locations.

²⁷ See Joint Pub 3-07.3, III-9 for a brief description of how information was used based on convoy and driver debriefs in so-called transportation intelligence.

²⁸ Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 86.

²⁹ Department of the Navy, Small Wars Manual (Reprint of 1940 Edition), (Washington D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, 1 April 1987), para. 1-7. Hereafter cited as Small Wars Manual.

³⁰ Joint Pub 3-07.3, I-12 and Joint Pub 3-07, I-2.

³¹ David A. Lange, "The Role of the Political Adviser in Peacekeeping Operations." Parameters (Spring 1999), 92-109, and Tony Cuculo, "Grunt Diplomacy: In the Beginning there Were Only Soldiers," Parameters (Spring 1999), 110-126. These two articles discuss the role of military commanders at two distinctly different levels, battalion and theater, in shaping the political-military landscape. For all that IFOR tried to focus almost exclusively on military tasks, IFOR rapidly became involved in both providing support to political and diplomatic officials, such as the UN Office of the High Representative and the US Embassy, and in directly mediating political issues between the factions.

³² Joint Pub 3-07.3, I-3.

³³ Michael V. Hayden, "Warfighters and Intelligence: One Team -- One Fight," Defense Intelligence Journal, 4, no., 2 (Fall 1995), 21.

³⁴ Small Wars Manual, para. 2-2.

³⁵ Hayden, 21-24.

³⁶ Charles G. Boyd, "Making Peace with the Guilty: The Truth about Bosnia," Foreign Affairs, (September/October 1995): 33. Misha Glenny, "Heading Off War in the Southern Balkans," Foreign Affairs, (May/June 1995): 100.

³⁷ Boyd, 23 and 33. See also, John E. Sray, "U.S. Policy and the Bosnian Civil War: A Time for Reevaluation," Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1995.

³⁸ In the long term, the GFAP "train and equip" program of Federation forces where the US provides modern equipment and trains Federation forces how to use it, may well achieve the ultimate objective of Muslim victory and dominance should hostilities resume.

³⁹ Rebecca West, Black Lamb and Gray Falcon: A Journey through Yugoslavia, (New York: Penguin Books, 1969), 20.

⁴⁰ Walter Clarke and Robert Gosende, "Keeping the Mission Focused: The Intelligence Component in Peace Operations," Defense Intelligence Journal 5/2 (1996), 55.

⁴¹ See Cuculo, p.123 for a description of how the US flag worn on the uniform sleeve immediately caused prejudice and bias. In particular, the Equip and Train program outlined in the Dayton Accords created resentment among the Serbs who perceived the US Army as training their Croat and Muslim enemies. LTC Tony Cuculo was the Battalion task force commander responsible for the Posavina corridor and the Brcko area.

⁴² The Contact Group consisted of the five nations sponsoring the Dayton Agreement: the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Russia.

⁴³ Steven Collins, "Army PSYOP in Bosnia: Capabilities and Constraints." Parameters (Summer 1999): 62-63. Kevin F. McCarroll and Donald R. Zoufal, "Transition of the Sarajevo Suburbs," Joint Force Quarterly (Summer 1997): 50-53. While Collins is extremely critical of the transition process and assesses that it damaged the overall peace process, McCarroll and Zoufal rate it a success because it did not derail the peace process.

⁴⁴ Collins, 63.

⁴⁵ The transfer of the Sarajevo suburbs was overseen by MND-Southeast and occurred over a period from 3 February through 19 March 1996, with the height of the activity in late February-early March. It had an immediate impact in the MND-North sector as the Serbs displaced by the transfer were moved into former Muslim housing, much of it destroyed, in areas such as Brcko and Srebrenica. MND-North G2 assessed that 60,000-100,000 Serbs would enter the sector without adequate housing available for them. By early March, MND-North G2 was assessing a new strategy on the part of all factions employing civilian movements and resettlements. G2 briefing to Secretary of the Army, Togo West, dated 5 March 1996, author's personal papers.

⁴⁶ Admiral Leighton Smith, Commander IFOR, said in the author's presence that there was no peace in Bosnia, just the absence of war. Cuculo, p. 117, states, "The factions were still at war; there was simply no fighting under way." See also Lange, p. 107 who asserts that every event was designed to further the strategic goals of each ethnic group.

⁴⁷ Lange, 95-96. David Lange was the Political Advisor (POLAD) to the Commander, SFOR, and addresses at length the inherently political nature of SFOR operations. The nature of much of the political advice that he provided closely paralleled the type of political intelligence that commanders at Division and Brigade also required and was provided by their intelligence staffs.

⁴⁸ Subsequent operations in sector validated seven of the eight of the identified flashpoints. The two flashpoint of Kladanj had been so devastated by the war and was in constricted enough terrain that it did not have an adequate population base to serve as a source of friction. Ilijas was transferred into MND-Southeast's sector and was one of the troublesome Serb suburbs of Sarajevo discussed above.

⁴⁹ A more comprehensive examination of the area of operations made it clear that it should not be treated as a whole, but that it contained sub-regions based on which ethnic group had been dominant prior to the conflict, the impact of ethnic cleansing, concentrations of dislocated personnel, and compartmentation caused by the rugged terrain. Unfortunately, weather data available during the planning phase was generic for the entire country and was not detailed enough to support this approach. This proved to be a problem during the initial months of the operations, as weather varied considerably in the different areas of the AO. The lack of detailed historical data by region made it difficult for the Staff Weather Officer to tailor his forecasts to the various regions.

⁵⁰ Department of the Army, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, FM 34-130, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 8 July 1994), 1-2.

⁵¹ Battlefield at D+120 and Beyond IPB in author's papers.

⁵² Center for Army Lessons Learned, "BiH National Elections: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures," Volume 1, Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter 98-18, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, September 1998), appendix D. See also Center for Army Lessons Learned, "BiH National Elections: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures," Volume 2, Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter 98-19, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, September 1998), appendix B.

⁵³ Quoted in Cuculo, p. 112. Emphasis added.

⁵⁴ The Office of the High Representative, responsible for the implementation of the civil aspects of the GFAP, did not even begin to organize itself until after IFOR had assumed transfer of authority from UNPROFOR and begun its deployment. Furthermore, the High Representative's mission was

complicated by not having the authority to compel the factional political entities to comply with his directives. The result was that very little progress on the civil side was made for the first six months.

⁵⁵ Task Force Eagle After Action Report, II-16.

⁵⁶ Tony Cuculo, "Grunt Diplomacy: In the Beginning there Were Only Soldiers," Parameters (Spring 1999), 110-126.

⁵⁷ Wentz, 61.

⁵⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations, Joint Pub 2-0, (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 5 May 1995), VIII-1. Emphasis in original.

⁵⁹ FM 100-23, 45.

⁶⁰ Joint Pub 2-0, VIII-2 through VIII-5.

⁶¹ Wentz, 60.

⁶² Since the ARRC was MND-N's higher operational headquarters, the MND-N G2 viewed the ARRC G2 as the higher Senior Intelligence Officer and routed all reporting directly through the ARRC, copy furnished on the US side. On the other hand, the US channel was the most expeditious means to submit requests for information, so those were addressed through USAREUR FWD, copy furnished the ARRC. This system best met the needs of the G2 and kept the ARRC fully informed, while ensuring that RFIs for which it was not well staffed to respond did not overwhelm the lean ARRC G2 staff. MND-N requirements for aerial assets did have to go through the ARRC as a NATO headquarters because the NATO Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) was the asset manager.

⁶³ George K. Gramer, Jr. "Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR: Combined-Joint Intelligence in Peace Enforcement Operations," Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, (October-December 1996), 11-14, expresses the frustrations of the Director of the IFOR CJ2 staff.

⁶⁴ Clyde T. Harthcock, Peace Operations from an Intelligence Perspective, USAWC Strategy Research Project, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1999), p. 37, describes several methods of exchanging information. See also Joint Pub 2-0, VIII-4.

⁶⁵ Wentz, 91-93. Wentz's discussion focuses on disclosure policies at national and theater levels, but procedures implemented at the tactical level by Task Force Eagle, assisted by the National Intelligence Support Team were also significant. It should also be noted that the Secretary of Defense directed the MND-N G2 to immediately release any force-protection related intelligence indicating an imminent threat to the force regardless of the sensitivity of the sources.

⁶⁶ Gramer, 14, complains that political spin was put on intelligence at IFOR to satisfy national agendas of the NATO member nations.

⁶⁷ One of the clearest doctrinal differences was illustrated by the manner in which the MNDs analyzed and approved factional weapons declarations. After plotting all the declarations, the US conducted an IPB, analyzing the road networks, distances to the ZOS, and terrain that afforded concealment, looking for likely weapons storage or hiding places that were not declared. Then, the G2 directed reconnaissance of the suspected sites to find violations. The result of the IPB produced hundreds of violations. In contrast, neither the British nor the French deliberately looked for declarations violations, resulting in a tremendous disparity within the ARRC between the US sector and the other

MNDs. After conceding that the US methodology "was brilliant", the ARRC G2 requested that it not be used for evaluating future declarations.

⁶⁸ Wentz, 61.

⁶⁹ Clarke, 59.

⁷⁰ Clarke, 55 and 49.

⁷¹ Ibid, 48.

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