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**EUROPEAN SECURITY DEFENSE IDENTITY:
A ROMANIAN PERSPECTIVE**

BY

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EUROPEAN SECURITY DEFENSE IDENTITY: A ROMANIAN PERSPECTIVE

by

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ABSTRACT

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NATO established the European Security Defense Identity (ESDI) at the 1994 Summit in Brussels. Since then there has been considerable debate on both sides of the Atlantic on the implications of developing ESDI and how to structure it. For fifty years the major focus of European military effort has been through NATO. This effort will continue because NATO has always been a partnership between America and Europe. But the recent events in the Balkans increasingly emphasized that this partnership has become unbalanced. The quality and ability of forces contributed by European nations has not been sufficient set alongside the input of the United States. European states have to shoulder a greater burden for their own security. NATO has opened itself to the East by creating at first the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and in 1994 the Partnership for Peace program and later, the Euro-Atlantic Cooperation Council. In addition the Alliance has remained open to membership of other European countries. To date, twelve nations have asked to join NATO and three have already joined the Alliance. In the meantime, the European Union Member states "reactivated" the Western European Union (WEU) in an effort to establish a European Security Defense Identity.

Romania has not succeed in convincing NATO that it should be part of the first wave of entrants into the Alliance. In the last days of 1999, Romania has been invited along with other European states to start the negotiations with European Union. From this perspective Romania encouraged a stronger, more capable Europe. So what Romania got from Helsinki Summit, held in December 1999 is a new arrangement for its own security, not as an alternative to NATO, which still remain a strategic goal, but a faster integration into western civilization, economically and militarily.

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PREFACE

Every crisis presents a challenge and an opportunity. Certainly this aphorism applies to Romania as a country situated in Southeastern Europe, in the wake of the conflict in Kosovo.

In the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict, Southeastern Europe as a whole and Romania as a country are at a crossroad. Today's historic opportunity is to create a zone of security and stability in a region that has known little of either in the last century. Otherwise the Balkans and along with them Romania, will become a permanent black hole in the heart of Europe. If Southeastern Europe does not advance toward integration with Euro-Atlantic community, it risks being permanently consigned to renewed ethnic tensions, dangerous instabilities and backward economies. The conflict in Kosovo and its consequences have had the effect of reordering perceptions and readjusting priorities, both for Romania and for the European Union member states. Without stability in its Southeastern part, there can be no peace in Europe as a whole. Stability, moreover, requires an adequate level of economic prosperity. After Kosovo, many of the European leaders have come to understand that Europe cannot face the future with confidence as long as the Balkans remain a festering problem. The European nations realized that they must commit themselves to far-reaching political, security, economical and social reconstruction and change in Southeastern Europe.

Like all other nations in the region, Romania has emerged from Kosovo conflict with a new and clear desire to integrate itself with Western Europe into the European order of the 21st century.

The coming years are seen by Romanians as a time for further economic reform and fuller political integration with the West. For Romania this means joining the Western institutions which are the greatest importance to its future, and these are clearly perceived to be NATO and European Union.

The cooperation and assistance Romania gave to NATO forces during the Kosovo conflict and the willingness of Romanian political leaders and government to accept serious economic and political costs as the result of this support, has created high expectations regarding future economic assistance, defense ties, political relationships, and prospective integration into Western institutions.

Romania has not succeed in convincing NATO that it should be part of the first wave of entrants into the Alliance. On the other hand, in the last days of 1999, Romania has been invited along with other European states to start the negotiations with European Union and from this perspective Romania encouraged a stronger, more capable Europe.

Romania's officials welcome the European Union plan to create a strong force capable of taking military action in crises zone like Bosnia or Kosovo. But the events in Kosovo, have once again demonstrated that Europe has to rely on NATO to take charge of operations.

Analysts, authorities and Romanian people assume that no country, not even United States, and certainly not any of European state nor Romania, can ensure its security alone. The goal of establishing an European Security Defense Initiative (ESDI) as part of European unification and integration is a legitimate political aspiration.

But to be an active part of the integrated system Romania has to accept responsibilities and challenges in the years to come.

Having stood by NATO during the Kosovo conflict at considerable economic cost and subjecting itself to domestic political criticism the actual government of Romania has earned respect within the Alliance.

Romania is firmly on the road to entry the European Union, even if considerably later in this decade.

Supported by Great Britain, Italy and France, Romania started the negotiations for accession to the European Union. In the last meetings at the European Council in Helsinki Romania's political leadership and Ministry of Foreign Affairs have given a great deal of early and sustained thought to reconstruction of the Balkans. The largest and most populous country in the region, Romania has promoted a coordinated strategy for Southeastern Europe that gives highest priority to integration with the rest of the continent.

The approach focuses on regional infrastructures projects such as transportation and the energy field, incentives for foreign investments, and economic growth.

Romania's main challenge in the next few years will be to further reform its economic structures and build a more viable and robust national economy, without which its aspirations for entry into NATO and European Union will be handicapped and its security will be at a stake.

EUROPEAN SECURITY DEFENSE IDENTITY: A ROMANIAN PERSPECTIVE

THE FUTURE OF EUROPE AND ROMANIA'S SECURITY

Adapting its new Security Strategy to the new realities in Europe, Romania tried to identify the significant variables and to answer the questions: What kind of Europe is now emerging? What are the effects of the new security arrangement on Romania's security? At this time nothing is very clear; everything is still evolving. Romania considers it is likely that Europe's future and subsequently, Romania's security will be determined by the interactions of three basic shaping factors:

- the degree of European unification and the efficiency of ESDI
- the posture of United States
- the posture of Russia.

EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

Successful unification of Europe could come to pass if the European Union strengthens and democratizes and turns European Union into a true federation. The culmination of such a system would be coherent, forceful foreign and security policies. This trend will take a long period of time, and according to Romanian assessments is described as "the integration project of the next decade".

The difficulties of creating a genuinely European defense system is attributed to the European Union's lack of a Common Foreign Policy, in the face of crises (Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo) and the falling investments in European defense spending. The problem is one of political will. Europe has not the military might of United States but, taken as a whole, Europe's defense potential is not inconsiderable, and dealing with Kosovo type crises should certainly be well in its capacity.

The historic decisions taken in Helsinki have provided a roadmap which will steer a clear path on this issue over the next years.

The commitment of European Union to develop an effective Common Foreign and Security Policy which touches at the very heart the sovereignty of the nation state has required considerable vision by many national leaders and the recognition that collective influence at the European level is the only way to respond to many of the global challenges of our times.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy can be effective only if it is backed up by effective instruments. The European Union has a wide range of instruments at its disposal, particularly in the economic sphere. The commitment taken in Helsinki is to complement these with an effective security capability.

The EU reached an agreement on a common headline goal on military capabilities. This contains specific objectives, to be reached within agreed deadlines. This is essential if EU is to be credible internationally.

"Alliance work will proceed on the Washington Summit agenda, on an ongoing basis, taking into account the evolution of relevant arrangements in the EU. In this regard, we note the results of the European Council meeting in Helsinki on the strengthening of the common European policy on security and defense and on the development of modalities for EU/NATO relations, which represent a major contribution to the process of reinforcing our Alliance and its European pillar. We acknowledge the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. We note that this process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army.¹

The EU would set up a military staff near the size of the NATO military staff in Brussels, but no more than 400 officers, according to French, German and British officials. The 60,000 troops earmarked for European use in a crisis would be ready by the end of April, 2003.

The EU agreed also on the structures which will be necessary to ensure the political control and strategic direction of these capabilities. The new European defense structure would include a military committee of chiefs of national defense staff to advise the European leaders, who would decide when and where to send troops.

These have to fully respect the sovereign right of Member States to decide whether or not to contribute their national assets to an operation, but they have also to provide for the effective and rapid management of operations.

The EU states have agreed on the need for sound and transparent procedures for consultation and cooperation with non-EU countries, and with NATO.

The decision at Helsinki has been misrepresented in some quarters as the first step in the establishment of a European army, or else as an unnecessary "militarisation" of the EU. As Dr. Javier Solana stated, the European Security Defense Policy -ESDP- is not about collective defense.

NATO will remain the foundation of the collective defense of its members. We are in no way attempting to duplicate the work of NATO. In fact the improvements in European military capabilities will be a significant gain for the Alliance. Nor does ESDP attempt to undermine the right of Member States to retain their own specific security and defense policy. The fact that all Member States, including the neutral countries, have been able to endorse the Helsinki decision, should provide sufficient reassurance on this point.²

The Helsinki meeting established a process which will enable EU Member States to assume full responsibility across the whole range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks. Over the last forty years, the European Union has become one of the most sophisticated and advanced examples of regional integration in the world. The EU is now the largest trading bloc in the world and a major actor across the whole range of global, financial and economic arena.

A Common Foreign and Security Policy without the necessary tools is a hollow shell. The EU can bring its economic weight to support the political objectives. As the European Union enlarges, and as it face new challenges it has to be prepared to take more responsibility for regional security, particularly in those areas bordering the European Union where its direct interests are at stake. The EU also has to be prepared, where necessary, to use all legitimate means to project security and stability beyond its borders and it needs to be able to assert the values of humanitarian solidarity and respect for human rights in all areas where peoples' lives depend on relief assistance, because they are the victims of natural catastrophes, or of man-made crises. Those actions are necessary if EU wants to promote peace and stability in the region and to protect its own interests.

At Helsinki the EU member states have committed themselves to deploy a corps level military operation within 60 days, and to sustain it for at least one year. This capacity will be coupled with the development of command, control and intelligence capabilities, as well as all the necessary support services to sustain an operation of this scale. This is the first of the basic building blocks of an effective Security and Defense Policy. This commitment to a viable operational capacity is a sign of EU determination to be credible in the eyes of its own public, of its partners, and in front of the international community as a whole.

EU member states have endorsed the establishment of new permanent political and military bodies within the European Council to ensure both adequate political accountability, and rapid and effective decision-making procedures for the day-to-day management of operations.

It is essential that the decision-making process be kept as short and flexible as possible to ensure a quick response in the event of a crisis. The appropriate input from the Member States' Chief of Staff to provide an adequate level of military expertise is considered an important requirement for the success of any type of operation that will be carried by the EU military forces. The European Military Committee will have a key role in the decision-making process. These structures will take some time to set up and will require amendments to the existing treaties. This reality required the EU Council to establish interim bodies able to prepare for the future functioning of the Security and Defense Policy.

EU has also taken steps to ensure that appropriate measures are put in place for the consultation and cooperation with non-EU European allies, and with NATO.

The relationship between EU objectives and NATO's own have caused the most apprehension. A careful reading of the Helsinki text should help providing reassurance. The message bears repeating: the strengthening of EU it is in everyone's interest, on both sides of the Atlantic. A stronger Europe is more assertive in its reactions to international crises.

We do not intend to duplicate the work of NATO. We do not want to, and do not need to. In any case, in a world of tight defense budgets, we cannot afford unnecessary duplication. Helsinki therefore makes clear that the Union has as its objective the capacity to conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises, but only where NATO as a whole is not engaged. This will remain a guiding principle.³

Developing the capacity to achieve this objective will involve increasing cooperation between Member States on very practical issues such as the interoperability of respective forces. This will help strengthen NATO's own capabilities. It will also enhance the ability of those Member States who are members of NATO to play a more effective role in NATO-led operations.

When NATO is not engaged, but the European Union launches a military operation, it should if necessary have recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. This means that full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO will have to be developed and this area is a particular priority to EU.

Specific arrangements covering the consultation and possible participation allowing third countries to contribute to EU military crisis management are under debate, EU cannot afford to be exclusive because the member states, according to the recent published documents are committed to establishing structures which allow for full and transparent dialogue.

If the Union decides to launch an operation using NATO assets, the non-EU members of NATO will have a right to participate. The precise arrangements will need to be looked at carefully. EU-led operations can only be enhanced by wider participation, and that this also will in turn help strengthen the effectiveness of NATO.

The European Union states support the idea to develop a security system, not simply a branch of NATO. The vehicle has been at hand for decades and has recently been put under debate: the West European Union (WEU), which was set up in 1948, the year before NATO came into being, and was then largely forgotten. It currently has ten West European members-Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. They pledged to defend West Europe and promote its integration. Its secretariat formerly located in London and now in Brussels since January 1993, has none of NATO's integrated command structure, and the WEU has been little used. The WEU is now mentioned as a useful entity because unlike NATO, the WEU has no prohibition on using military forces "out of area", should its members wish.

The WEU served as West Europe's military coordinator in the Persian Gulf and in the initial "peacekeeping" in ex-Yugoslavia. In 1992, the EU designated the WEU as its defense arm. Could the WEU really become an effective, integrated force like NATO, but without US leadership? That is what some West Europeans want; but without the United States, who will lead the WEU? Germany? France? Few Europeans want either.⁴

EU will we need to develop a culture of complete transparency with WEU. The expertise and specialized resources of the WEU have to be put fully at the disposal of the European Union. The WEU has completed its audit of the collective and national force capabilities. This is an invaluable basis for setting out the package of capabilities which the EU will need to carry out effective operations across the whole Petersberg⁵ spectrum.

EU has to identify where improvements can be made in decision-making structures.

Before and after Helsinki meeting the analysts have inevitably focussed on military capabilities. This aspect of crisis management is of course new for the EU but equally important are the non-military aspects. Many of the tools for this are available and in some cases are already being used in response to crises. Individual Member States, as well as the Union, have developed considerable expertise in this area. Resources and experience already exist in the fields of civilian policing, humanitarian assistance, electoral and human rights monitoring.

The EU Council agreed that it is necessary to identify the inventory of resources. The established action plan must ensure that EU is able to respond rapidly and more effectively with non-military tools to emerging crisis situations if crises can be defused through non-military means.

Recent experience has shown that there will be situations where military means have to be deployed.

In these cases, EU member states have to have the capacity to act militarily, either with or independent of any civilian action.

The European Union, more so than many international organizations, is already in a strong position to use its longstanding experience and considerable resources on the non-military aspects of crisis management. This is one area in particular where the EU can offer added value. But it still needs to strengthen the coordination, responsiveness and efficiency of decision making process and the capabilities necessary to implement these decisions.

The Helsinki European Council has defined concrete targets in order to establish a rapid reaction capability for its collective non-military response to international crises. The Helsinki conclusions are thorough and comprehensive but there are no references in them to resource implications.

The effective use of existing Member State resources could answer the question "how would the Europeans pay for this?". It is obvious that all this implies an increase of resources. This is a sensitive question to ask, both to European Treasury masters and to European public opinion. Defense budgets cannot benefit from a post-Cold War peace dividend and it is too early to benefit from a CFSP-dividend. The post-Cold War dividend has not public support from any of EU member and it is too early and the issue is too complex for the governments to try to explain the benefits of such an investment.

The threat of a global and ultimately totally destructive conflict has apparently receded but Europe does not live in a trouble-free world. A proliferation of more limited and regional security threats have been observed in the last decade. In a world which is increasingly interdependent, the European Union cannot ignore these crises, and cannot ignore their terrible fall-out in terms of human suffering and regional instability. The EU member states believe that they do not necessarily need new resources to respond to different crises, but they must adapt the existing ones as a first step. The development of a European Security and Defense Policy offers this opportunity not only for western European countries but for Europe as a whole. Europe has to rationalize its existing resources.

There are certain capabilities which Europe needs but does not yet have - Helsinki made this clear. But there is also considerable scope for much more effective use of existing resources. Europe needs to ensure that European defense industries restructure.

Greater cooperation and harmonization of planning requirements and procurement policy is necessary. In short, Europe needs better value for money. If they can achieve this, they will go a long way in building an effective ESDI and in helping to reinforce NATO's own Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI).

The full realization of a European Security and Defense Policy requires much further work. Helsinki has set the European Union on track and all "European Power" (Germany, France, United Kingdom) are determined to help ensure that the momentum is maintained.

The beginning of the new century was defined as an age of increasing globalization. In this environment, many are insecure, feeling threatened by events over which they consider they have little if any control. Western Europe cannot respond to this by pretending these problems do not exist. Transnational problems require transnational solutions.

Romania sees the development of an effective ESDP as an important contribution. It will give Eastern Europe the ability, where appropriate and whenever necessary, to show that this part of Europe is prepared to take actions in the face of crises and to share responsibilities.

SECURITY CHALLENGES AND RISKS

Romania has been officially invited to start the negotiations with EU for future integration in February 2000 and from this perspective it has to adapt at a national level to face these new challenges. Romania shares a common concern with all democratic countries in Europe, to address in an effective manner new challenges which, without respect for national boundaries present a serious threat to quality of life and which neither of us can overcome alone. Romania is determined to pledge its resources and actions to meet together with its partners and neighbors the challenges of international crime, terrorism and drug-trafficking, mass migration, degradation of the environment, nuclear safety and diseases control.

The security challenges and risks which Europe faces are different in nature from what they were in the past. The threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO's European fronts has effectively been

removed and thus no longer provides the focus for Allied strategy. Particularly in Central Europe, the risk of a surprise attack has been substantially reduced, and minimum Allied warning time has increased accordingly. In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess. NATO must be capable of responding to such risks if stability in Europe and the security of Alliance members are to be preserved. These risks can arise in various ways. risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe.

Romania like all other countries in the region has to face similar potential threats and risks. The tensions which may result, as long as they remain limited, should not directly threaten the security and territorial integrity of members of the Alliance, nor of the other East European countries. They could, however, lead to crises detrimental to European stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the security of the Alliance. In the particular case of Russia, the risks and uncertainties that accompany the process of change cannot be seen in isolation from the fact that its conventional forces are significantly larger than those of any other European State and its large nuclear arsenal comparable only with that of the United States. These capabilities have to be taken into account if stability and security in Europe are to be preserved on medium and long term. For the short term, another area of concern is former Yugoslavia . Two conclusions can be drawn from this brief analysis of the strategic context.

The first is that the new environment does not change the purpose or the security functions of WEU or NATO, rather it underlines their enduring validity. The second, is that the changed environment offers new opportunities for the Alliance and European Union to frame a strategy for all Europe within a broad approach to security. Therefore Romania considers itself as a legitimate part of the new security environment and seeks to maximize its participation in it. Other European institutions such as the European Council, Western European Union and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe also have roles to play, in accordance with a broad approach to security.

The new situation in Europe has multiplied the opportunities for dialogue on the part of NATO and WEU with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including an intensified exchange of views and information on security policy issues. Through such means Romania will seek to make full use of the unprecedented opportunities afforded by both the New Strategic Concept and growing interest of the European Union in stability and prosperity of the region and develop greater mutual understanding of respective security.

The Romanian military were the first who proved that it can help to overcome the divisions of the past, not least through intensified military contacts and greater military transparency, but by participating along with other forces in peacekeeping missions and humanitarian operations in the region.⁶

GUIDELINES FOR DEFENSE

PRINCIPLES OF ROMANIAN MILITARY STRATEGY

Romanian strategy will continue to reflect a number of fundamental principles. Romania has a purely defensive strategy. None of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defense, and it does not consider itself to be anyone's adversary. Romania will develop and maintain military strength adequate to convince any potential aggressor that the use of force against its territory would meet effective action. The diversity of challenges now facing Romania requires a broad approach to security. The transformed political and strategic environment enables Romania to change a number of important features of its military strategy and to set out new guidelines, while reaffirming proven fundamental principles. The Romanian Armed Forces must therefore be able to defend Romania's frontiers, to stop an aggressor's advance to maintain or restore its territorial integrity.

The role of the Romania's military forces will expand in the future thus contribute to peace and stability in Europe. The achievement of the Romania's objectives depends critically on the economical progress and on the equitable sharing of roles, risks and responsibilities, with European security organizations as well as the benefits, of a rapid integration into European security arrangements. These arrangements are and

would be based on an integrated military structure as well as on co-operation and co-ordination agreements. Key features will include collective force planning; common operational planning; multinational formations; the stationing of forces outside home territory, where appropriate on a mutual basis. At present Romania participates in crisis management and reinforcement arrangements; procedures for consultation; common standards and procedures for equipment, training and logistics; joint and combined exercises; and infrastructure, armaments and logistics co-operation.

National defense plays a major role in the Strategy of National Security.

The fundamental changes of the past decade in the area of military strategies, call for the reform of the Romanian Armed Forces, to make them capable of defending national independence and integrity. The reform process, for 2000-2005 aims at giving a new dimension to the military, modernizing and restructuring the armed forces, in accordance with the requirements of the international environment and the level of the available resources. At the end of this process, the Romanian Armed Forces will be better trained, better equipped with a high status of readiness and with a high percentage of professionals within its structures.

The Romanian participation in collective defense arrangements integrated in military structure, including multinational forces, will be essential. Integrated and multinational European structures, as they are further developed in the context of an emerging European Defense Identity, will also increasingly have a similarly important role to play in enhancing the Romanian Armed Forces ability to work together in the common defense. Practical arrangements will be developed to ensure the necessary mutual transparency and complementarity between the European security and defense identity and Romania National Security.

Romania considers the presence of North American conventional and US nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe, which is inseparably linked to that of North America. As the process of developing a European security identity and defense role progresses, and is reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, the European members of the Alliance will assume a greater degree of the responsibility for the defense of Europe.

The logical steps Romania should take, though they may overlap are as follows:

1. build and modernize the "new" armed forces
2. develop a system of alliances
3. develop a special relation with USA: military contacts, education, military assistance, acquisition of US military equipment.

The new security structures of Europe are based on a new logic, where all partners benefit from their status of security and confidence providers. In this spirit, the priority of Romania's alliance policy is, in the short, medium and long term, integration with NATO's defensive structures and the EU membership⁷.

THE REFORM OF THE ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES

The reform of the Romanian Armed Forces is part of the general restructuring process of the Romanian society. Romania's political willingness for WEU and NATO integration generated changes in the concept of national security, the structure, strength and equipment of the armed forces as the main component of the national defense. The military policy consists of shaping the military forces according to the new geo-political situation on the continent and the Romania's integration within the European and Euro-Atlantic security system as a guarantee of national security.

Romania's military has already downsizing the personnel and armament; restructuring the armed forces, modernizing the equipment, changing the system of training and combat techniques, close cooperation with other armed forces and increased relations with NATO military structures. According to the limits established by Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Romania is entitled to a total military strength of 230,000, 1375 tanks, 1475 artillery pieces, 2100 armored vehicles, 430 fighters and 120 attack helicopters.

Of course the size of the Armed Forces has been at the center of our attention. In 1989 we had 340,000 in uniform, at the beginning of 1998 we had about 200,000 and now we have about 180,000 with further reduction planned. Armed Forces reduction will continue with the aim of having about 140,000 to 145,000.⁸

The principles governing the restructuring process of armed forces are:

- Maintaining The Combat Readiness During The Reform Process;
- The New Structure Allows The Armed Forces To Carry Out Their Mission In The Absence Of A Military Alliance;
- The Reform Concerns The Military Structures, Training, Equipment, Education;
- Downsizing Should Not Generate Unemployment And Negative Social Effects;
- Balanced Distribution Of Military Bases Across The Territory ;
- Adequate Facilities For Participating In The Partnership For Peace Program
- Effective Participation In UN /OSCE Peacekeeping And Humanitarian Operations.
- Achieving The Interoperability Of The Romanian Armed Forces With NATO/WEU Structures

THE PRESENT STAGE OF THE MILITARY REFORM

Civilian control: The civilian control of the armed forces has been firmly established since March 1994. The ministry of defense and the command structure of the armed forces has been reorganized after the pattern common in most NATO countries.

The minister of national defense and the undersecretary of state for defense policy are civilians.

Civilian control of the military is carried out through these positions in the leadership of the armed forces and through the structures under their direct control as well as through other democratic organizations (the Security, Public Order and Defense committees of the Parliament). More than 600 positions in the Ministry of National Defense are occupied by civilians. The governing program for the next five years stipulates that the number of officials without uniforms will increase along with their power of decision-making and control on defense related issues. At present national defense issues are addressed by: the Parliament, the Presidency, the Supreme Council of National Defense, the Government, the Ministry of National Defense, and the local administrative authorities responsible with defense matters, according to their specific responsibilities. The system of national defense comprises: defense authorities, command and control system, defense forces, national resources and infrastructure. According to the Constitution, the President of the country is the commander in chief of the armed forces and the chairman of the Supreme Council of National Defense.

THE NEW STRUCTURES.

The main elements of the Ministry of Defense are: the Defense Policy Department; the General Staff; the Procurement Department and the General Directorate of the Ministry of Defense.

All the operational forces are under the command of the General Staff led by the Chief of General Staff.

The Army, Navy and Air Force and Air Defense Staffs are subordinated to the General Staff.

The Directorate of the Ministry of National Defense has duties on the line of inspection and evaluation. Its conclusions are useful in the decision making process.

Based on the Romanian Government's decision, a European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Directorate has been created within the Ministry of National Defense, which is technically subordinated to the defense minister. It gathers the structures with responsibility in this field existing in the Ministry of National Defense.

The main areas of responsibility of this new directorate are:

Analysis and evaluation of concepts and strategies on European and Euro-Atlantic integration, at European and NATO level;

Creating and updating of the "The Concept of Romanian Armed Forces Integration into European and Euro-Atlantic Military Structures";

Coordination of the MOD specialized structures activity regarding the elaboration of defense related documents concerning integration in NATO and the WEU.

The programs for participation in Partnership for Peace; coordination of the interoperability programs, training and equipment for units and formations assigned for participation in NATO and WEU missions;

Cooperation with the Inter-Agency Ministerial Council for NATO integration and coordination of Romanian military representatives effort within NATO and WEU structures;

Coordination of technical-financial resources provided by the Romanian MOD for the Romanian military representatives to NATO and WEU structures.

With the approval of the Romanian Supreme Council of National Defense, the Ministry of National Defense started setting up a Rapid Reaction Force within the Romanian Armed Forces. That will comprise 20,000 troops and will be operational by 2005.

The Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) is designed to be the core of future Romanian Armed Forces. It may be assigned to join NATO members' forces in conflict prevention, crisis management and international peacekeeping operations.

Paratroops, mechanized, armored, and artillery units will make up the RRF. Formations are structured and designed to meet NATO standards, capable of operating effectively within CJTF type multinational forces.

MODERNIZATION OF EQUIPMENT AND COSTS

The most difficult part of the reform is the modernization of the equipment. The process is long with different levels of priority. All programs are focused on three major objectives:

1. Equipment upgrading to render them compatible with the NATO equipment;
2. Acquisition of new systems that cannot be produced with actual Romanian capabilities; and
3. Purchase and integration of new technologies.

Romania is seeking about 12 new multi-role aircraft for entry into service early this decade. One ambitious equipment program is the \$ 1.5 billion plan for Romanian Airspace Industry (IAR) to produce 96 Bell AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters under the designation AH-1RO Dracula.

Currently we have 20 procurement projects during the next 5 years. The airforce needs new aircraft, attack helicopters and missiles, but we need improvement in every field. We have adopted an intermediate solution of modernizing our existing aircraft, tanks and artillery, but buying new modern high performance equipment will not be delayed for to long.⁹

It is estimated that the new structures, forces redistribution, equipment acquisition and the implementation of the new e training system will meet the interoperability requirements by 2005. The Romanian Armed Forces will be capable of operating properly to defend the country. A continuous effort will be done to achieve the levels of compatibility and interoperability with the NATO structures and Western European Union Forces through an appropriate and updated program.

MANAGEMENT OF CRISIS AND CONFLICT PREVENTION

In the new political and strategic environment in Europe, the success of policy of preserving peace and preventing war depends even more than in the past on the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy and successful management of crises affecting the continent.

Any major aggression in Europe is much more unlikely. In these new circumstances there are increased opportunities for the successful resolution of crises at an early stage. Romania could become a key player in the coordinated effort of preventing and managing potential crises, including those in the military field. The potential of dialogue and co-operation within all of Europe must be fully developed in order to help to defuse crises and to prevent conflicts since Romania's security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe. The past few years witnessed solid evolutions in Romania's ties with Ukraine, Hungary and Bulgaria. Dialog started with basic political treaties and then focused on entering upon partnership relations relying on confidence, cooperation and communication. The privileged relationship with the Republic of Moldova, based on the intensified political and cultural dialogue has been enriched lately with an important economic and financial dimension. The fraternal relations between the above mentioned states will enter a new stage after the basic treaty is signed.

Romania will resume the natural and friendly relationship with the Yugoslav people, as well with a democratic Yugoslavia. The instability area on the South -Eastern Europe should quickly become an area of cooperation where Romania may actively participate.

The new security strategy emphasizes the policies that promote Romania as an important player of stability in Central and South - Eastern Europe. Several trilateral structures of regional cooperation initiated by Romania proved to be valid and stimulated a real interest from the large decision-makers around the world. Romania consolidates its presence in many institutionalized regional bodies ,dedicated

to European security and had decided to become an active vector for stability and security in the complementary area of Central Europe, South Eastern Europe and the Black Sea. Romania is the second largest country in the region, after Poland, and has the second largest military force. As an active member of "The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe" Romania promotes good relation between Western European countries and Central and Eastern European countries. It has numerous initiatives to improve the relations between Turkey and Greece, FYROM and Greece, Bulgaria and Greece. Through its geographical location, Romania acts as a "bridge" between Western Europe and Middle East and has a great potential to develop further cooperation with Western Europe using Danube River and its access to Black Sea. Also, geographically Romania is the key link between the Northern and Southern flank of NATO to protect the crossroads of Southeastern Europe. NATO launched in April 1999, at the Washington Summit, The South East Europe Initiative(SEEI). NATO's EESI aims to strengthen cooperation among regional states on defense and security issues. In the context of Partnership for Peace other countries have been invited to contribute to stability and security through different consultative forum. Within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, an Ad Hoc Working Group has been created to undertake initiatives ranging from civil emergencies to regional airspace management. Romania is working with Southeast Partners in the Southeast Europe Defense Ministerial and has established a multinational peace force and is also preparing other initiatives. All these political, diplomatic, military and administrative processes have to be coordinated along the two major strategic targets- integration with the European Union and NATO- which continue to be endorsed by the citizens, to a high percentage. The road towards these two objectives is land-marked by several intermediary stages, extremely important to the global framework of Romania's international activity and national security.

NATO will take a decision on the second enlargement wave no sooner than 2002.

In 2003, Romania could become a member of the Security Council. In the next 5-10 years Romania could become a member of the European Union. All these are promising and certainly will provide better security arrangements for Romania. But for immediate and medium term Romania has to seek and provide solutions for national security relying on its own resources and means.

The first phase, according to the guidelines provided by Romania National Security Strategy, will consist of "consolidated resources to rebuilt a credible force able to deter any aggression against national territory.."10

SECURITY AND STABILITY- ROMANIA'S CONTRIBUTION

As a stability pole in the region, Romania contributes to the creation of multi-dimensional structures and partnership. Thus, Romania settled special and enhanced partnership with Hungary and Poland and actively participated in several cooperation schemes with Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey, Ukraine, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Austria.

Romania does not consider regional and sub-regional cooperation as a substitute of its integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures, but as useful and efficient instruments of facilitating its integration into consolidated security systems. The goal of Romania is to consolidate these co-operation schemes for the future development of peaceful and friendly international relations. For Romania the neutrality, historically speaking, was not a feasible solution in both, WW I and WW II.

The regional and sub-regional alliances did not work for Romania. The realistic solution is to join NATO and the European Union and Romania is preparing for this.

History proves us that every time Romania tried to be neutral it has not succeeded. The danger as a neutral of waking up in an uncomfortable position is too great to be considered again

A SOLID TRIANGLE -THE UNITED STATES, ESDI AND ROMANIA

The facts proved that the effort in Kosovo would not have succeeded without US leadership. The real question for Romania at this time of transition that needs a stringent answers is : Is this the story with European security in general? Does nothing get done without US leadership?

But if the United States does not take the energizing and leading role in Europe, who will? .

Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott emphasized the US support for ESDI and encouraged the Europeans to use NATO assets and capabilities:

As regarded the European Security Defense Identity, I think I should repeat what I said a moment ago. There should be no confusion about America's position on the need for a stronger Europe. We are not against; we are not ambivalent; we are not anxious; we are for it. We want to see a Europe that can act effectively through the Alliance or, if NATO is not engaged, on its own. Period, end of debate¹¹.

At Washington Summit the NATO member states reached a basic understanding. NATO is defined as the preferred institution to act "wherever possible." At the same time, they recognized that the Alliance might not act. And in those circumstances, they agreed to make NATO assets and capabilities available to the European Union. In the past, American officials have discussed ESDI in terms of "the three D's": no decoupling of Europe's security from that of its North American Allies; no duplication of effort or capabilities; and no discrimination against those Allies who are not EU members. But Lord Robertson has come up with another formulation: "the three I's" - indivisibility of the Trans-Atlantic link, improvement of capabilities and inclusiveness of all Allies. The concept binding them together should borrow the motto of those famous three heroes of French romantic literature: "One for all and all for one."¹²

US supports the ESDI and Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) and considers both of these as top future priority.

The two key issues for Romania's future security are the implementation of the new Strategic Concept agreed in Washington and NATO enlargement. The Strategic Concept is now being translated from theory to practice. It is being incorporated into military guidance for NATO planners. The Strategic Concept is not allowing NATO to focus on only lower-end missions. Kosovo is clearly one type of mission envisioned under the Strategic Concept. Would the United States again be willing to station considerable forces in Europe? In the present national political climate, such a likelihood appears doubtful, but historically the American nation has always responded to a leadership when the threat demands it. The official positions do not let the slightest doubt to interfere in the issue:

Kosovo underlined the need, stressed by our leaders in Washington last April, for military forces that are mobile, flexible, survivable, sustainable and capable of operating effectively together. Kosovo demonstrated that there is a wide gap between U.S. and European military capabilities. It is in the interests of each nation represented here that this gap be narrowed. Two efforts - both pre-dating the Kosovo conflict and reaffirmed during the Washington Summit - will, if pursued vigorously, help us move towards a solution. These are NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) and the effort to establish a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). The United States is committed to seeing both succeed¹³.

Regarding NATO enlargement, Romania sees the US as one of its main supporters for the integration.

Today Central Europe is secure, because of NATO enlargement. It has always been the US position that NATO enlargement is not one-time event, but an on-going process. Our leaders committed to review enlargement again at our next summit, no later than 2002...Our goal should be to work as closely as possible with all aspirants to help each of them become strong candidates.¹⁴

At this time Romania builds an important pillar of its Defense Strategy based on special partnership with United States. In Romanian officials view, US urged the Western European to give a special status in the European Union's negotiations for integration and in security and defense deliberations because of Romania's commitment in Kosovo crises and because of its readiness to contribute to regional stability and security.

RUSSIA AND ROMANIAN SECURITY

The first risk in terms of immediacy, geographic proximity and magnitude is represented by the potentially growing tensions or military conflicts existing in Southeastern Europe and Caucasus Region, as well as the uncontrolled accumulation of forces and military equipment within the area of Romania's strategic interest.

According to the polls, the Romanians mostly fear that the military conflicts might expand in the region. Russia might collapse entirely into the hands of a dictatorship which behaves aggressively and attempts to recover by arms or threats the "near abroad" (the now-independent republics that were once part of the Soviet Union) and the satellites of its former empire in Eastern Europe. This scenario, Cold War II, would call back into life the original purpose of NATO, this time with NATO's borders shifted eastward with the addition of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.

Romania considers itself as a favorite candidate for the next wave of NATO expansion to East, but the speed of changing in Russia and the uncertain future admission into NATO initiate hard and complex decisions for Romanian authorities.

This scenario of a future aggressive Russia is far from imaginary. Already, many observers have written off Russia's experiment with a market economy and democracy. Some speak of "Weimar Russia," a shaky republic ready to collapse into the hands of authoritarians. After the collapse of the ruble in 1998, even optimists have remained silent. Foreign loans and investment flow reluctantly, as other countries and corporations have already lost billions, much of it siphoned by private "oligarchs" into Swiss bank accounts.

The question is how far an economy can collapse before the political system also collapses. Economic data from Russia are terribly unreliable--much of Russia's economic life is off the books, on the black market--but guess estimates suggest that Russia's per capita gross domestic product has shrunk by one-half to three-quarters since the 1980s. Russian economic privatization is better termed "piratization." Billions of dollars are stolen and hide abroad. Once a middle-income country, Russia is now poorer than many Third World lands. Pensions, child care, and health and dietary standards have plunged as a result of national impoverishment. Many, including the Russian military, have been paid only late and desultorily.

Russia's emerging foreign policy is also a threat to many neighboring countries: a nationalistic hardening and attempts to recover the near abroad, neutralize any Western threat, and regain allies and clients in the Third World. In addition to an open hostility over NATO expansion, Kosovo, and arms sales to Iraq and Iran, Moscow wants to play major power while begging for alms.

Belarus is already partially reintegrated back into Russia; it never really left. Ukraine, with several economic advantages, a few years ago dreamed of joining Europe. After catastrophic economic mismanagement, however, Kiev edges closer to Moscow. Although some once feared a Russian-Ukrainian war, the old paradigm applies: two Slavic/Orthodox kin-countries do not fight each other. Indeed, the odds that the Slavic core countries of both the tsarist and communist empire will again come together are good. This, apparently should not bother Romania, nor the west. All three have been reluctant to adopt Western models of economy and democracy. (Poland, as a Slavic country, in sharp contrast, has shown no such reluctance and has made a success of both.)

At any rate, there is nothing the West can do to prevent the reintegration of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. Some argue this was always the purpose of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), founded in late 1991 with uncertain powers and headquartered in Minsk, Belarus¹⁵.

The reintegration of Central Asia and the Caucasus is a trend of maxim interest for Romania. These republics are not the Slavic core of the Russian state but more recent conquests. Much of Central Asia (mostly Turkish speaking) was added at roughly the time of the Romanian Independence War (1877). Many of these peoples have never been happy under rule by Russians, whether tsars or commissars. Even territories legally inside Russia present problems. The recent uprising of Chechens, answered by the leveling of Grozny by Russian artillery, is but the latest manifestation of revolt, which has now spilled over into Dagestan.

Central Asia (to the east of the Caspian Sea) and Azerbaijan (to its west) have one chance to escape Moscow's tutelage: run their oil and gas pipelines so as to escape Russia's control. Little noticed initially

by civilized west, the pipeline politics of the Caspian region concern not only trillions of dollars but the independent existence of several countries, Romania included¹⁶.

Building up the existing northern corridor through Russia means this bounty stays under Moscow's control. (It is also vulnerable to dissident Caucasian groups.) A western corridor, favored by Washington, leads through Turkey but must first traverse the Caucasus, through Azerbaijan (which recently fought Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh) and Georgia. This region is unstable and still under Moscow's influence. A southern corridor, through Iran, is the one that makes the most geographic, economic, and political sense but is precluded by a Tehran-Washington fight that serves no useful purpose. Without a US-Iranian reconciliation, the petroleum and natural gas of the region may flow largely through Russian hands to Europe, giving Moscow great leverage over both Europe and the Caspian region. Pipeline politics to some extent will determine whether Central Asia will be reintegrated back into the Russian empire.

Romania will never return to Russia. Like Poland and Hungary, Romania looks westward. The people enjoyed brief independence between the world wars and since then threat has been perceived as coming from East. Indirect Russian pressure on Romania would be easy: shut off the petroleum and natural gas lines from Ukraine a scenario that let few alternatives for Romania.

The recent accession of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to NATO was easy.

In contrast, Romania accession to NATO, is an explosive issue linked to US - Russia relations. But NATO and especially US may eventually have to make such a choice. A plausible scenario: The authoritarian leader who recently took over in Moscow is dedicated to the recovery of the near abroad. He puts economic and military pressure on the Ukraine to join and to press westward, a first step to restoration of the Russian/Soviet empire. Romania will cry out to the West for help. What will the West do? That would be a very tough question.

The United States would be encouraged to keep several divisions in Europe, now positioned farther east than before. The bad news is that the Europeans, burdened by their welfare states, are extremely reluctant to spend on defense, and the Americans are not at all sure they wish to play global leader. The outlines of a hostile, expansionist Russia are already visible. Still, Russia is and for a long time will be terribly weak, both economically and militarily. Could history, as Karl Marx once proposed, repeat itself, "the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce"? This is the truly unhappy scenario for all and especially for Romanians. Europe does not come together, at least not enough to look after its own security; none of the "European powers" are capable of providing leadership; and a hostile Russia claims to settle some gains in the near abroad.

Under these circumstances one of the important variable for Romania's long term security is Russia.

A weak, leaderless Europe can get by if Russia is no threat. Though, in a long term, much of Romanian leaders attention must focus on Moscow's capabilities and intentions.

No one wishes to restart the Cold War, but a strengthening, hostile Russia facing a weak, disunited Europe would set up the same power imbalance as prevailed in the late 1940s. Romania consider an imbalance that can be redressed only by major US participation in European security.

ESDI AND NATO ADAPTATION

NATO new Strategic Concept and the process of adaptation generated splendid opportunities for Romania. The new strategic environment encompasses profound political changes in Central and Eastern Europe. The new wave of Eastern European countries that have been invited to start the negotiation for admission into European Union, have radically improved the security environment in which the North Atlantic Alliance seeks to achieve its objectives. As a former satellite of USSR, Romania have fully recovered its independence and sovereignty. Old territorial disputes with neighboring countries have been settled through negotiations and sound political agreements. The fact that the countries of the European Community are working towards the goal of political union, including the development of a European security identity; and the enhancement of the role of the WEU, are important factors for Romanian security. The strengthening of the security dimension in the process of European integration, and the enhancement of the role and responsibilities of Romania are positive and mutually reinforcing. The CSCE process, which began in Helsinki in 1975, has already contributed significantly to overcoming the division of Europe. As a result of the Paris Summit, it now includes new institutional arrangements and provides a contractual framework for consultation and co-operation that can play a constructive role, complementary to that of NATO and the process of European integration, in preserving peace.

The historic changes that have occurred in Europe, which have led to the fulfillment of a number of objectives, have significantly improved the overall security of the region. The monolithic, massive and potentially immediate threat which was the principal concern for the last forty years has disappeared. On the other hand, a great deal of uncertainty about the future and risks to the security of Europe remain. The new Strategic Concept looks forward to a security environment in which the positive changes referred to above have come to fruition. The implementation of the Strategic Concept will thus be kept under review in the light of the evolving security environment and in particular progress in fulfilling these assumptions. Romania assumes that further adaptation will be made to the extent necessary.

CONCLUSIONS

Romania welcomes the idea of creating an effective European Security and Defense Identity, according to the evolutions on the continent. The chances for achieving ESDI are real as long as it will be the result of common, long-term and transparent efforts. Romania considers an appropriate and early involvement in the process of all European countries (-as of now partners or associates-) which are now working for admission into NATO and European Union, as a pre-requisite for the success of ESDI.

Romania regards the complementarity of ESDI and NATO as a measure of success and supports the idea of avoiding competition or duplication.

The vision of a free, undivided and integrated Europe in partnership with United States and Canada has become a tangible possibility as we enter a new era of peace and stability. The acceleration of globalization has meant greater growth in trade and investment, and remarkable economic integration. Southeastern Europe evidenced the multitude of opportunities and challenges we all have to face. After the European Union opened its doors to six new nations the Romania prime-minister called the invitation "a great success for Romania". This is a historical step toward a united Europe. The Iron Curtain has been definitely removed and the period of uncertainty ends".¹⁷

The invitation was another step toward a Europe that is becoming more united and more of a power on the world stage. The Europeans finalized their own defense forces, a rapid reaction force of some 60,000 troops that is expected to become operational in 2003. The European Union is seen as a pathway to prosperity by all candidate countries. Membership in the world's largest free-trade zone means markets for products, subsidies for agriculture, aid for poor regions and the status of becoming full member in Western economic society and more important, guarantees for security.

But EU membership carries a heavy price. To avoid the "breaking of the EU budget" or "casting a cloud on the club" the EU requires the applicants to deregulate and privatize their businesses, to modernize the justice system and to remain firmly committed to democratic principle. Joining the EU requires reforms much more extensive than joining NATO, which Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic did in the past.

The invitation itself it is a great step to integration into EU structures, including the security arrangements. For Romania, who actively negotiating the terms of membership, accession will take years of careful scrutiny and painful reforms. The list is long and not until those and many more concerns are satisfied can it becomes member of EU. A detached analyze showed that in 1999 the "miracle" for Romania was called Kosovo. Europe, busy until January 1999 with the largest transformation during its whole history- common currency, Common Foreign and Defense Policy- suddenly realized the dangers and risks that threatened its peripheral "fence".

Kosovo was a dreadful detonator of Europe's interest for Romania and for other countries. Europe decided that it is better for its own security and prosperity to clean itself these places from toxic residues of the communist era and to build a more safe and prosperous region.

At Helsinki the civilized European boundary marker has been removed to Romania's Eastern border Europe does not want an unstable, federalized Romania which eventually could join the destroyed Yugoslavia and a split Bulgaria between West and East, or Moldova and Ukraine which stubbornly keep on with Moscow's sphere of influence.

After a period of almost ten years, when Romania's access to European structures has been constantly denied, Europe already invested- in the first months of 2000 -, in Romanian economy more then anywhere else, except Poland.

Romanian economy will be the determinant factor for future security and defense capabilities, implied by its new status. Romania becomes a border country for EU in the southeastern part of Europe.

In ten years time-frame, in this part of the continent, Romania will be the only barrier facing the new challenges to security and stability: clandestine immigration, terrorism, weapon trafficking, drug-trafficking, radioactive material-trafficking. Because of the volatility that shepherd the ex-soviet space the West will have for many years to come a complex attitude. Romania will become a far-off deployed western post in front of ex-soviet space.

The European Union Headline Goals for its future military requirements are encouraging for Romania. The Western European countries have identified the crucial capabilities they will need for ESDI to operate effectively. Romania's desire to become an integrated part of the Euro-Atlantic security arrangements is supported by realistic programs and actions. Successful completion of these programs will allow Romania to meet the commitments. Intentions are very good and the new institutions are very useful. Romania will follow the steps described in its National Security Strategy and will consider the effort for integration into ESDI structures as a vehicle to NATO and European Union integration.

Word Count = 10,034

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Final Communiqué, NATO Ministerial Meeting, held in Brussels at NATO HQ. on 15 December 1999
- ² "The development of a Common Security and Defense Policy" .Remarks by Dr. Javier Solana, High Representative of the EU for Common Foreign and Security Policy. Berlin , 17 December 1999
- ³ "The development of a Common Security and Defense Policy" .Remarks by Dr. Javier Solana, High Representative of the EU for Common Foreign and Security Policy. Berlin , 17 December 1999
- ⁴ The Emerging Europe: New Configurations for the Next Century-Michael G. Roskin, Parameters , USAWC VOL. XXIX, NO. 4 WINTER 1999-2000
- ⁵ The Petersberg Declaration is remarkable for the broad scope of military actions it enumerates. They cover everything from use of combat forces in crises management to humanitarian operations, with a variety of peacekeeping functions in between.
- ⁶ Madeline Albright, US Secretary of State, speech delivered in Romania, 1998 at the meeting with the minister of Romanian Foreign Affairs, Adrian Severin.
- ⁷ Emil Constantinescu, President of Romania- "National Security Strategy "- Speech delivered in The House of Romanian Parliament on July 19 , 1999.
- ⁸ Romania's Defense Minister Victor Babiuc "Back to Defense Community". Defense Weekly Review 20 January, 2000
- ⁹ Romania's Defense Minister Victor Babiuc "Back to Defense Community". Defense Weekly Review 20 January, 2000
- ¹⁰ White Book of The Romanian Government- National Military Strategy, Bucharest, December 19,1999
- ¹¹ The State of the Alliance: An American Perspective by Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State North Atlantic Council December 16, 1999, Brussels.
- ¹² Lord George Robertson of Saint Ellen, Former UK Secretary of Defense, Secretary of NATO 19 August 1999
- ¹³ The State of the Alliance: An American Perspective by Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State North Atlantic Council December 16, 1999, Brussels.
- ¹⁴ NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting. "Talbot on NATO and ESDI" www.nato.htm, January 04 2000
- ¹⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilization and the remaking of World Order (New York: Touchstone, 1997), p. 67
- ¹⁶ "A Caspian Gamble: A Survey of Central Asia," The Economist, 7 February 1998. pp.7-12.
- ¹⁷ Washington Post Saturday, December 11, 1999, Former Romanian prime -minister Radu Vasile

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