Operation Allied Force a Theoretical Review of Doctrine & Airpower
Abstract
In March of 1999, NATO engaged in Operation Allied Force (OAF), an operation widely touted by military and political leaders as successful. However, the means used and the expected duration required, in achieving " the victory" provides many operational art learning points. Moreover, the strategy implemented caused many top US officials, during the first weeks of the campaign, to doubt any victory without a significant adjustment in strategy. This paper provides an analytical review of the doctrine, objectives, and strategy used in the Kosovo conflict and summarizes some of the ramifications. Furthermore, there are significant issues concerning the use of air power to win a conflict that includes military doctrine, centers of gravity, decisive force, legality, and force structure for future operations and budgets. The four questions" from operational art concerning the ends, ways, means, and risk provide a framework to evaluate the appropriateness of the planning and execution for this conflict. An examination of the operational art aspects indicates that planning and strategy were flawed at the strategic and operational level due mostly to political constraints and limitations with the selected course of action. Finally, recommendations for avoiding similar shortfalls are outlined, including recommendations for future force structure and employment requirements.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 08, 2000
- Accession Number
- ADA378404
Entities
People
- Richard A. Hand
Organizations
- Naval War College