Operation ALLIED FORCE: Operational Planning and Political Constraints

Abstract

Analysis of the Kosovo crisis and the NATO operation reveal that no matter how highly effective and superbly executed, ALLIED FORCE was politically constrained nearly from start to finish. This paper will attempt to argue that while the tenets of operational planning existed, they were not followed during ALLIED FORCE planning. This was due in part because of political constraints, poor operational coordination, and mismanaged resources to achieve ill-defined policy objectives. From March through June 1999, NATO air forces conducted Operation ALLIED FORCE in response to continued aggression against Kosovo Albanians by Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) forces under the direction of their President, Slobodan Milosevic. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operation was to be an air-and missile-only campaign to stop Milosevic's forces from cleansing ethnic Albanians from the Kosovo region and forcing Milosevic to capitulate to NATO and United Nations (UN) demands.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Feb 08, 2000
Accession Number
ADA378603

Entities

People

  • Tom Munson

Organizations

  • Naval War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Air Platforms
  • C4I
  • Counter WMD
  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Aerial Warfare
  • Air Force
  • Air Power
  • Air Strikes
  • Foreign Relations
  • Lessons Learned
  • Military Operations
  • Military Organizations
  • National Security
  • Nato
  • Sectarian Violence
  • Security
  • Treaties
  • United States
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare
  • Yugoslavia

Fields of Study

  • Political science

Readers

  • International Relations and Conflict Resolution
  • Military History / Militaries and War Studies