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SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION OF AGRICULTURE IN THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC (1949-1957)

-Communist China-

By I. Korkunov, et al

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SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION OF AGRICULTURE IN THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC (1949-1957)

[Following is the complete translation of the book Sotsialisticheskoye preobrazovaniye sel'skogo khozyaystva v KNR (1949-1957), by I. Kerkanov, V. Kurbatov, A. Mugruzin, and G. Sukharchuk of the Institute of Sinology, Academy of Sciences USSR; Eastern Literature Publishing House, Moscow, 1960, pages 1a-207.]

NOTE: Footnotes are contained at the end of each chapter.

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PREFACE

An analysis of the socialist transformation of a Chinese village is of great theoretical and practical interest. The experience gained during the Chinese revolution has once again shown the universal significance of the main consequences of socialist transformation of agriculture, as stipulated in the Leninist cooperative plan. At the same time, the experience also substantiated anew the fact that concrete manifestations of the general consequences are always different and are dependent upon the historical evolution and political state of the country. Therefore, the success of a socialist transformation of a village, to a great extent, depends on proper creative leadership by the Marxist-Leninist Party.

The following work endeavors to familiarize the Soviet reader with the process of socialist transformation of agriculture in the Chinese People's Republic. Particular attention is devoted to producer's cooperatives, which were stages in the Chinese villages' progress from farming by individual farmers, based on individual ownership of the means of production, to the socialist agricultural collectives, with a common ownership of the basic means of production.

The Introduction, Chapters I and II, and the Conclusion were written by G. D. Sukharchuk; Chapters III and V by I. N. Korkunov; Chapter IV by I. N. Korkunov and A. S. Magruzin; and Chapter VI by V. P. Kurbatov. The Bibliography was compiled by L. A. Volkov.

INTRODUCTION

The aim of the People's Democratic Revolution in China was the liberation of the country from the domination of foreign imperialism, liquidation of the semi-feudal social structure and the creation of an independent democratic state.

The struggle for agrarian reforms was one of the most important elements of this revolution; the basic motivator of this struggle was the peasantry.

Only by determinedly developing the agrarian revolution, arousing the masses of working peasantry for the struggle against oppression by the landlord class, was the working class able to receive the support of a great majority of the people. On the other hand, the peasantry was able to rout the landowners and appropriate their land only under the leadership of the proletariat, whose interests coincide with those of all the working humanity. The Communist Party of China was able to neutralize the national bourgeoisie and even force it into agreement with the proletariat only by depending on and guiding itself by the powerful union of the proletariat with the peasantry.

For that reason, the Chinese Communist Party's agrarian policy during the democratic revolution was directed at the establishment of a firm alliance with the broad masses of the working peasantry, the achievement of a leading role in this alliance by the proletariat, and, hence, a proletarian leadership of the People's Democratic Revolution as a whole. The Party's agrarian policy was aimed at the development and extension of the agrarian revolution. During various stages of the revolution this policy had to undergo certain variations, which depended on the existing historical conditions, but its goal was always the liquidation of the remnants of feudalism and the winning of the peasants over to the side of the proletariat. The agrarian policy of the Communist Party gained the firm support of the people throughout the entire course of the revolutionary wars.

Direction of the working class during the democratic revolution, the establishment of a people's democratic dictatorship, the union of workers and peasants, and the formation of the state and cooperative sectors of the national economy assured the development of socialism in China after the victorious revolution.

Establishment of the Chinese People's Republic in October 1949 basically completed the democratic stage of the revolution and signified that the Chinese people have, under the direction of the Communist

Party, transferred to the socialist stage of the revolution, which frees the productive forces from the webs of capitalism and the limitations peculiar to small-scale production, destroys exploitation, and opens the way for the building of a socialist society. After the establishment of the people's democratic dictatorship, it became possible to complete the liquidation of feudalism and to bring to completion the revolutionary, democratic agrarian reforms.

By mid-1950, agrarian reforms had been conducted on territory having an agricultural population of over 160 million persons.[1]

The reform was conducted on the basis of the 1947 law, which stipulated that all land belonging to the landowners, temples, monasteries, churches, schools, etc. (except forests and pasture lands), as well as all confiscated property belonging to the landowners, was to be divided among the peasants.

The Law of 1947 provided for the confiscation of surplus land, cattle, equipment, grain, etc., from the kulaks, so that the land allotment remaining in their possession did not exceed the size of peasant plots.

On 28 June 1950, the Central People's Government of the KNR (Kitayskaya Narodnaya Respublika -- Chinese People's Republic) passed a new "Land Reform Law" which proclaimed the abolition of the landowners' right to possess land. In accordance with this law, the land, cattle, equipment, and other possessions of the landowner was confiscated and transferred to the landless and small-holder peasantry in private ownership.

After the formation of the Chinese People's Republic, the kulaks, convinced of the power of the victorious people, began refusing active support to the counterrevolutionary activities of the landowners. This explains the new policy toward the kulaks, which differs from the one that was conducted on the basis of the 1947 Agrarian Reform Law. According to this latter law, lands which were cultivated by the kulaks themselves or with the help of hired farm hands, as well as their other property, remained inviolable. The kulaks retained the right to lease their land in small plots to the peasants. The plots rented by the kulaks, however, could not be larger than twice the average amount of land available for each person of the total population of the particular area. The remainder of the kulaks' land was requisitioned.

The law assured the inviolability of land and other property belonging to the middle peasnat (including the wealthy peasant).

In contrast with the Soviet Union, therefore, the land was not being nationalized. The principal portion of the cultivated area became the peasants' property. Virgin lands, large irrigation systems, rivers, forests, suburban areas, etc., were nationalized. In over-all figures, however, the total area nationalized amounted to approximately 93% of the total land area of the country. The concentration of such large land masses in the hands of the government permitted the planning and the most expedient arrangement of industrial

enterprises, and the building of new cities, railways and highways, without the expense of purchasing land from private landowners. In addition, with the better land-cultivation techniques and increased mechanization of agriculture, the government became able to cultivate additional tens of millions of hectares of land, which was impossible for the individual farmers. While promoting the necessity for the redistribution of land, the Chinese Communist Party took into consideration the fact that the practice of buying and selling land and the private ownership of land has existed in China for many centuries, and attachment to a private plot of land had become an intrinsic characteristic among the masses of peasants. During the period of feudal oppression and a landless peasantry, the most cherished desire of the peasnats was the realization of the slogan "Land to the Tiller."

Lands taken away from the peasnats by the landowners for debts or bought by them at low prices during famine of natural disasters was always regarded by the peasnats as illegally appropriated and they aspired to repossess them.

Many peasnat uprisings have occured throughout the history of China as a result of the struggle for land. At a time when the immediate nationalization of land could have weakened the alliance between the peasnats and the proletariat, under conditions then in existence in China, the distribution of landowners' plots among the peasnats (who comprised 80% of the country's population) during the course of the agrarian reforms, helped to establish an ally for the Communist Party and to assure the success of the revolution.

Also, the immediate abolition of private land holdings could have caused waivering in or the alienation of the unstable part of the national and small-city bourgeoisie, which also participated in the struggle on the side of the working class and the peasantry.

The experience of the Chinese People's Republic and the European People's Democracies substantiates the fact that it is possible to commence the building of a basis for socialism without nationalizing the arable land areas. This, however, by no means eliminates the necessity for the transformation of the land into common property, as without the elimination of private property it is impossible to eliminate exploitative practices. In China, where the cultivated land was not nationalized, the transformation of it into common property is being carried out in th course of the gradual creation of agricultural cooperatives.

By October 1952, agrarian reforms within the country were completed within a territory containing an agricultural population of over 420 million persons.[2]

Agrarian reforms were being conducted under conditions of an acute class struggle. Landowners hid and destroyed grain and cattle, set fire to buildings, organized armed bands which raided peasant unions and local government organs and murdered rural activists. In order to combat counterrevolutionary activity, the peasants united into self-defense detachments. Much help was given to the peasants by

student, worker and employee brigades, which moved from the cities to the villages.

The conduct of agrarian reforms in China had great political significance. These reforms routed the feudal system of land ownership and created a premise for the gradual socialist transformation of agriculture. As a result of the reform, 300 million toiling peasants received 47 million hectares of confiscated land and were freed from the land tenancy system under which land rental payments by the peasants to the landowners amounted to some 30 million tons of grain per year.

The revolutionary agrarian reforms liberated the productive forces of the Chinese village from all remnants of feudalism, and 60-70% of the villages' population received direct gain from the redistribution of land, including the poor peasants, farm laborers, and middle peasants. There was a basic change in the class relationships within the villages: the landowner class was destroyed, the economic power and political influence of the kulaks was seriously undermined, and the leading political position was assumed by the impoverished and middle peasants.

In this manner, the revolutionary agrarian reforms established a system of petty land ownership by the peasants in the Chinese village.

"Individual property belonging to peasants who conduct their farming independently...is apparently the most normal form of land ownership for small-scale production...," said Marx.[3] The agrarian reforms led to this very type of normal conditions. The combination of the peasant with land and other means of production created a certain increase in the productivity of labor. Agriculture in China was reconstructed. Production, however, remained petty, and was the scattered output of millions of isolated individual peasant households which accounted for 83% of the gross national product for 1949.[4] With small-scale farming it is impossible to manage land or manpower properly, to improve agricultural techniques, to introduce the use of new agricultural tools on a wide scale, or to fight natural disasters. "Small-scale ownership, by its very nature, prevents the development of the productive forces of labor, common forms of labor, common accumulation of capital, cattle breeding on a large scale, or a progressive application of science."[5]

All this clearly shows the inability of agricultural production based on small land ownership to expand regularly, and also prevents the majority of the peasnats from ever being able to free themselves from the yoke of poverty and exploitation. At the VIII Congress of he KPK (Kommunisticheskaya partiya Kitaya -- Communist Party of China), Liu Shao-ch'i said: "Because of the fact that there is little land in the villages, but many people, and because on the average for each peasant in the country there is only 3 mou (about 1/5 hectare) of arable land -- in many places in the south only one mou or less -- the poor and lower-level middle peasantry still comprise 60-70% of the village population."[6]

The agrarian reform, therfore, having solved the land problem, did not free the productive forces from limitations peculiar to small-scale farming, did not completely eliminate exploitation or the existence of poverty. This was its limitation as a measure of the bourgeois-democratic revolution.[7]

Because of the fact that small scale production was incapable of assuring the systematic and rapid development of agriculture, a disproportion occured between agricultural and industrial production levels in the country. Agriculture, whose development depended on the individual property of the peasants, lagged farther and farther behind the development of socialist industry and the disproportion made itself felt in the differing rates of growth in industrial and agricultural production, which invariably acted as a deterrent on the entire national economy. This disproportion reflected the contradiction between common, socialist ownership of property, which became a fact in the cities and was a leading form there, and the petty, individual ownership of property by peasants in the villages. National development could not be based on these two different forms -- major socialist industry in the city and small-scale, individual farming by the peasnats in the villages.

Considerable growth in the productivity of labor and in crop yields, as well as a sharp increase in agricultural productivity, is possible only with large-scale farming, modern machine technology, and the use of the latest developments of agrotechnological science.

Contemporary society is aware of two types of large-scale agricultural farming: the capitalist farm, which is located on private land and which uses farm laborers -- proletarians; and the large-scale cooperative or state socialist method of farming, which is based on universal or group ownership of the means of production. The large-scale plantation-type of farming, based on slave or semi-slave labor, created by the imperialists in subjugated countries, is not considered here.

One of the tendencies of budding small-scale production is its propensity to give rise to capitalism "constantly, daily, hourly, spontaneously, and on a mass scale."[8] This is due to the fact that small-scale farming is similar to capitalism by its economic nature, and the peasant himself is on the one hand a worker and on the other a property owner.

"The peasant as a toiler tends toward communism," said Lenin, "and the peasant as a bread salesman tends toward the bourgeois, towards free trade..."[9]

That is why small-scale farming leads to the development of capitalistic relationships in the village. In these situations groups of powerful kulaks -- exploiters -- emerge from the ranks of the small-scale producers and get rich at the expense of the majority of the peasants.

In the northeastern part of the country and in certain parts of the old liberated areas of northern China, for example, kulak-owned

farms had appeared over a period of two to three years after the national liberation, and the division of the village into classes was in process.[10]

In pointing out similar situations, Professor Ch'en Po-ta stated that they were characteristic for hina as a whole,[11]

The peasnat, however, is not just a property owner, but a toiler as well, as long as he makes his living by means of his own labor and exploits no one. As a toiler the peasant is naturally interested in the liquidation of capitalism, which threatens him with ruin, and in the building of socialism, since the socialist city can provide him with machines and the necessary goods on a basis of comradely aid, teaches Lenin. As atoiler he is a friend and an ally of the working class. That is why the peasantry is capable of accepting the leadership of the working class and of following the course of socialism. In his work Problems of Cooperation in Agriculture, Mao Tse-tung wrote the following: "The impoversihed peasantry and the lower levels of the middle peasants, including old and new members of the middle peasant class, all aspire to chose thesocialist way, as long as they contimue to experience economic hardships (meaning the impoverished peasantry) and even though the conditions may have somewhat improved, perhaps, by comparison with theperiod before the liberation of the country, their life is not yet secure (meaning the poor middle peasant class)."[12]

The socialist transformation of small-scale farming may be accomplished only as a result of collectivization, which, in turn, may be attained only with the establishment of village cooperatives.

"Masses of peasants have been engaged in individual farming for thousands of years, under which each family, every household, is a separate farming unit. Such dispersed, individual production is the economic basis of a feudal state; it condemns the peasants to eternal poverty. The only means of eliminating this condition is
tivization, and the only way towards collectivization is through cooperation, taught Lenin"[13] — thus Mao Tse-tung defined the significance of the Leninist cooperative plan for China already in 1943.

In the struggle for the creation of agricultural cooperatives, the Communist Party, as in the previous stage of the revolution, depended on the indestructable alliance of the working class with the peasantry.

The revolution in China was moving from the village to the city during both the second and third civil revolutionary wars. The Communist Party enjoyed immense authority in the villages and did not share its influence with any other "peasant" party. As a result of a series of circumstances (which were partly due to the underdeveloped capitalist system) there was no kulak-peasant party in China of the socialist-revolutionary type that had existed in Russia. In pointing this out, Mao Tse-tung, in his report to the VII Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1945, stated: "China does not have a party which represents the peasants' interests exclusively. National bourgeois parties

do not have a radical agrarian program. That is why only the Communist Party of China, which has developed and is putting into practice a radical agrarian program and is truly fighting for the interest of the peasant class, and which has won over to its side the broad masses of the peasantry as its great ally, has become the leader of the peasant population and of all the revolutionary-democratic forces."[14]

Before the basic completion of the agrarian reforms, the Communist Party conducted a policy of reliance on the poverty-stricken groups of the village, a firm alliance with the middle peasnats and the elimination of the kulak, as the principal agrarian problem at that time was the struggle against landowners for their lands.[15]

During the socialist stage of the revolution the peasant problem became the matter of cooperatives. Up until the basic completion of the cooperative program, the peasantry continued its struggle against the kulaks and other capitalist elements in order to achieve a socialist development in the villages. This signifies a change in the economic basis of the alliance of the working class with the peasantry.

In connection with this, the Sixth Plenary Session, Seventh Convocation, of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China noted that: "The new relationships in the alliance of the workers with the peasants and the leading role assumed by the working class in this alliance must all be further strengthened on the basis of coordination between the socialist industry and the agricultural cooperatives."[16]

A significant new group of middle peasants appeared in the Chinese village after the agrarian reform (these were formerly the impoverished peasants who, after having recieved some land during the reforms, acquired some wealth). The majority of the new middle peasants, however, as well as a part of the peasants who were formerly in that category, still experienced certain difficulties in their economic position and were close to impoverishment. Life for all these groups could improve only through the establishment of cooperatives. "That is why they are undertaking the establishment of the coopera tives."[17] The degree of their activity in this matter, however, is different.

At the same time, new kulaks began to appear in various areas and a form of social differentiation within the villages was taking place. Taking into consideration the arrangement of the class forces within the village, the Communist Party conducted a policy of relying on the impoverished peasantry, a firm alliance with the middle peasants, and a gradual limitation of exploitative activities of the kulaks, with an aim of eventually liquidating the kulak establishments completely.

The socialist reorganization of the Chinese village means, primarily, the substitution of old producer relationships, which are characteristic for small-scale production, by the socialist producer relationship by means of the gradual incorporation of the individual

peasant farms into cooperatives. This is the principal content of the socialist upheaval in the villages. Another aspect of the socialist transformation of the Chinese village is the substitution of the old techniques and routine methods of land cultivation with new machine technology and scientific agricultural methods. This constitutes the technical upheaval in the villages.

Pointing out the indivisible tie between the sociological and technical upheavals, Mao Tse-tung stressed the fact that under conditions prevalent in China, "...it is at first necessary to create cooperatives in agriculture -- only then will it become possible to apply extensive technological measures."[18]

The wide-scale development of producer's cooperatives prepared a broad market for agricultural machinery and tools, beginning with ploughs, seeders, cultivators, and simple irrigation equipment as well as complex, modern agricultural equipment.

The increased agricultural output, which occured as a result of the establishment of cooperatives, was one of the most important conditions in the broader industrial development.

The most important principle of the Party's policy for the establishment of cooperatives in the villages was voluntariness.

In its resolution for the development of producers' cooperatives in agriculture, adopted on 16 December 1953, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China stressed the following: "In bringing about the producers' cooperatives in agriculture it is always necessary to be guided in every action by the principle of voluntariness. The use of administrative methods which expropriate the peasants' means of production are nothing less than criminal actions, undermining the alliance of the working class with the peasantry and the alliance of the poor peasants with the middle peasants."[19]

The principle of voluntariness was derived from the proper Marxist comprehension of the peasants' nature as a small-scale producer, who has learned not to trust the city, which has always exploited him, and evolved methods of convincing the peasant.

A concrete, practical method is the best means of persuasion. V. I. Lenin said that the peasnat "...is practical and realistic; we must furnish concrete examples as proof of the fact that 'communization' is best of all."[20]

Particular attention must be devoted in approaching the middle peasant who, by virtue of his position in the scale of production, is hesitant.

The VIII Congress of the Communist Party of China reiterated, once again, on this subject: "The Party not only prohibits compelling the middle peasant to join cooperatives, but directs that the poor peasants and lower-level middle peasants be the first ones to be drawn into the cooperatives in the first stages of the movement, without inducing the wealthier middle peasants into these cooperatives."[21]

The Chinese Communist Party conducted a gradual inclusion of the broad masses of the rural population into cooperatives. The Com-

munist Party fully utilized those forms of organization which were naturally adaptable to the people and were most comprehensible close to the peasant population. The Party gradually enriched those forms with new content, and promoted their development and growth by combining their work in this field with constant propaganda pointing out the advantages of cooperatives and of collective labor for the peasants themselves and by continuing their struggle against exploiters.

A mandatory condition for the proper development of a mass movement among the people is the principle of active leadership. Active leadership means the timely perception of tendencies within the mass movement during any given stage, and the achievement of a position of leadership, leading the masses forward as well as the ability to correlate demands of the mass movements to the problems at hand concerning the building of socialism in the country. "Active leadership means that Party leadership must not lag behind the demands of the masses and the requirements of national growth."[22]

Active leadership presupposes all-inclusive planning and the reinforcement of existing cooperative organizations in the village, as well as the development and support of initiative among the masses for the creation of new cooperatives.

The importance of active leadership grew in accordance with the inclusion of broader masses of peasants, and particularly of the middle peasants, into the cooperative movement on the one hand, and on increased resistance by the kulaks on the other. The peasant population was able to overcome the kulaks' resistance and to reinforce the cooperatives only with the active leadership of the Party and the working class.

A concrete method of converting the small-scale, individual-farming economy to a socialist system, as worked out by the Communist Party of China on the basis of the Leninist cooperative plan, with consideration taken for the peculiarities of Chinese historical evolution, was the gradual consolidation of the farmers. At first, temporary mutual aid teams were organized, which already contained a certain division of labor and specialties among the peasants, and property was communized to a degree. The gradual conversion to agricultural cooperatives was being effected. The peculiarity of the mutual aid teams was that land was consolidated entirely, except for the preservation of sufficient land by the peasant as his own property to provide himself with subsistance, and the presence of a large amount of common property within the group. The next step was the conversion to socialist cooperatives, based on group ownership of the means of production.

"Facts point out that the method of consistent forward progress, withwas the Party's method, was expedient, inasmuch as the development of cooperatives gives the peas ts a series of advantages and allows them gradually to become accustomed to a collective form of production, quite painlessly and successfully to renounce private land

ownership and other basic means of production, and to convert to collective property," observed Liu Shao-ch'i at the VIII Congress of the Communist Party of China. "By these means he is able to avoid or, to a large extent, prevent any loss which could have occurred due to the sudden change."[23] Generalizing on the experience of socialist transformation, the VIII All-China Congress of the Communist Party of China (September 1956) observed that the program of socialist reconstruction of the village, developed by the Communist Party of China was already basically completed by the time the Congress met.

1 Mo Yueh-ta, Development of Cooperative Agriculture in Our Country, Peiping, 1957, page 29 (It should be noted that this work is published in Chinese. For a full description of this work see the bibliography.)

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8 V. I. Lenin, Detskaya bolezn' levizny v kommunizme (The Children's Disease of Leftist Tendencies in Communism), Collected Works, Vol 31, 4th edition, pages 7-8.

9 V. I. Lenin, Privet vengerskim rabochim (Greetings to the Hungarian Workers), Collected Works, Vol 29, 4th edition, page 359.

10 Ching-chi Yen-chiu, No 1, 1955, page 41.

11 Ch'en Po-ta, "The Socialist Reforms in Agriculture," Druzhba (Friendship), 3 March 1956.

12 Mao Tse-tung, Voprosy kooperirovaniya v sel'skom khozyaystve (Questions of Cooperativization in Agriculture), Moscow, 1955, page 8.

13 Mao Tse-tung,"Organizuytes" (Organize!), Collected Works, Vol 4, Moscow, 1953,page 287.

14 Mao Tse-tung, O koalitsionnom pravitel'stve (On Coalition Government), Collected Works, Vol 4, pages 535-536.

15 At several stages of the democratic revolution, under special conditions, the party even had to lead the peasantry against the kulaks (during the period of the agrarian reform of 1947-1949). See Most Important Documents on the Liberation War of the Chinese People in Recent Time, Harbin, 1948, page 4; and Liu Shao-ch'i, "On the Agrarian Reforms in China," pages 36-37.

16 Reshenive Shestogo (rashirennogo) plenuma TsK Kommunisticheskoy Partii Kitava sed'mogo soszva po voprosu o kooperirovanii v sel'skom khozyaystve (Decision of the Sixth [Enlarged] Plenum of the Central Committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Seventh Convocation, on the Question of Cooperativization in Agriculture), Moscow, 1955, page 4.

17 Mao Tse-tung, Questions of Cooperativization in Agriculture, page 15.

18 Mao Tse-tung, Ibid., page 20

19 Decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Development of Agricultural Producer's Cooperatives (contained in Agrarnyye preobrazovaniya v narodnom Kitaye [Agrarian Reforms in People's China], Moscow 1955), page 368.

20 V. I. Lenin, VIII Congress of the Workers-Peasants Party (bolsheviks) (report on work in the village), Collected Works, Vol 29, 4th Edition, page 187.

21 Liu Shao-ch'i, "Political Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the VIII All-China Congress of the Party," page 15.

22 Decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Development of Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives, pages 385-386.

23 Liu Shao-ch'i, "Political Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the VIII All-China Congress of the Party," page 15.

CHAPTER I

THE MUTUAL AID TEAMS

Prior to the victory of the people's revolution, agriculture in China was very primative and backward. The peasantry of the pre-revolutionary, semi-feudal village was composed about 50-70% of impoverished peasnats who, by their economic situation actually were semi-proletarian.[1] The basic tools of the Chinese peasants were wooden p oughs and hoes; the motive power was supplied by oxen, mules and, in scattered areas of the north, by horses.

Old Chinses statistics yield confused and muddled data regarding the number of head of cattle and agricultural implements available in the country as a whole and in the various regions. Figures given by different statisticians and statistical experts vary greatly on the same subjects.[2] Even the optimim figures, however, show a great lack in draught animals and those primative tools which have been used for centuries for the cultivation of the land of China.

During the thirties of the 20th Century, therefore, there was on the average one horse for every 80 peasant households, one mule (or donkey) for every 90 households, and one head of horned cattle (oxen, buffaloes, cows) for every three peasant households.[3]

It is obvious then, that Chinese peasants, as a rule, lacked draught animals and the basic tools for the cultivation of land; there was only one head of beef cattle for every three or four households. It is quite correct to assume that only three or four of the poorest peasant households in combination possessed a sufficient number of draught animals and agricultural implements necessary for subsistence production, even in the old, unalterable and very modest amounts. Therefore, in many areas of the country the mass producer, who was the impoverished and, on the whole, average peasant, tenant farmer, or independent farmer was always compelled to depend on the aid of his neighbors and relatives.

The necessity for this type of cooperation was particularly evident during hardship years. Cooperation among several peasant households for the purpose of mutual assistance in labor, cattle, tools, and occasionally, experience, was becoming a regular practice and a necessary condition for production. Several neighboring households would usually band together their efforts, means of production, etc.

for the purpose of accomplishing urgent or difficult work. The tradition of mutual aid was particularly well established in the provinces located at the lower and middle parts of the Yangtze River, where over half of the Chinese agricultural population was located.

Mutual aid in labor was principally practiced by the poorer peasants and the poor middle peasants. The poorer peasants paid for the use of their neighbors' animals and tools with their own labor. The kulaks, as a rule, did not participate in any form of mutual aid; they were able to hire help and had a sufficient amount of the necessary tools on hand.

Therefore, the mutual assistance organizations in the old semi-feudal China were organizations of the poor.[4] This was their primary and most important peculiarity.

Mutual aid teams were mainly small, and consisted of two or three households, occasionally of as many as five; very rarely were there eight or nine households in cooperation (for example in the cultivation of mountainous areas or land around lakes in the T'ai Hu water-system area). During the course of a single year, peasants frequently joined in various combinations for the execution of certain agricultural work, which is explained by the various peasants accumulating specialized equipment which, in combination with the equipment belonging to others, could serve to complete a variety of projects requiring use of specialized equipment. Being temporary in nature, these organizations for mutual aid were distinguished by extreme instability and irregular membership. The small size and the instability of the organization of these mutual aid teams was, then, their other peculiarity.

The mutual aid teams usually contained young and healthy workers. There was a widely accepted rule "to place a soldier before a soldier, a general before a general."[5] This meant that persons of approximately equal physical qualities and experience entered into the teams. This method of selecting participants eliminated any rational distribution of labor. The strong and healthy members of the team frequently had to perform work that could easily have been done by old people or women, and there was a great waste of labor. A similarity in the physical qualities of the team members and, as a result, a considerable waste of manpower, was the third peculiarity of the mutual aid organizations in old China.

Mutual aid, therefore, was an outcome of the Chinese peasants' poverty and agricultural backwardness. At the same time, the consolidation of separate households for mutual aid was the result of the Chinese peasants' tradition for collective and joint labor which was more effective than individual work by the impoverished peasants.

There existed many "societies for mutual labor aid," "brigades for land cultivation," as well as "cooperatives for joint utulization of tools and draught animals," as far back as the Second Civil Revolutionary War, at the revolutionary strongpoints in Fukien, Kiangsu, and other provinces of southern and central China.[6] For the first time in many centuries they were being organized by the peasants on

their own land.

The activities of these organizations, as well as of the consumer cooperatives which were widespread at the time, was conducted in support of agricultural production, under conditions of fierce combat and enemy blockade.

The mutual aid organizations received a wide development in the liberated areas and at various strongpoints during the course of the Chin ese people's struggle against the Japanese invaders (1937-1945).[7]

As is well known, the Communist Party of China, with the beginning of the anti-Japanese war, shifted from a policy of confiscating land belonging to landowners to a policy of lowering land rent by one quarter in order to promote a consolidated front for the struggle against the Japanese imperialists. It was established that the amount of rent paid by a peasant must not exceed 37.5% of the crop yield for the year; interest rates were also lowered. The people's government and mass organizations actively defended the peasants' civil and economic rights. All this considerably improved the economic position of the impoverished and, to a certain degree, the middle peasant.

There was a marked over-all increase in labor productivity by the peasants in the liberated areas during 1942-1943. The growth of agricultural production was, however, deterred by a lack of draught animals, agricultural tools, and manpower. An increase in productivity under these circumstances could be achieved only by the consolidation of labor efforts. "The central link in the development of production is the organization of the labor force," pointed out the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in a 1943 directive on the lowering of rental payments for land.[8]

Mao Tse-tung addressed the population of the liberated areas and the strongpoints ofanti-Japanese resistance in the name of the Party, with a call to "Organize!" The Party called for consoldiation of the inhabitants of all the liberated areas for the purpose of increased production. The creation of mutual aid teams in agriculture was emphasized.

The pioneers and the core of the mutual-aid movement were the Communists and village activists from the ranks of the impoverished and middle peasants.[9]

Therefore, the movement for the establishment of mutual aid teams in the liberated areas was being developed with the constant support and guiding leadership of the Party and the people's government.

"These forms of collective mutual assistance were evolved by the masses themselves. In the past we have utilized the experience of the masses in organizing collective forms of mutual aid in Chiang-hsi Province and now we have utilized such experience in the northern part of Shensi Province," said Mao Tse-tung in 1943.[10]

The 1943-1945 period was signified by the conversion from the system of establishing scattered teams for mutual labor aid to a

system for their wide-scale establishment.[11]

Over 50% of the peasants were organized into mutual aid teams at the Shen-fu and Hsing-hsiang provincial districts in the north-eastern part of Shensi Province during 1943-1944.[12]

Mutual aid in the liberated areas took different forms. Individual householders frequently joined into cooperatives in order to engage in other than agricultural activities. At the Special Border Area, the transportation of salt by artels, which was one of the non-agricultural forms of mutual aid, was widely practiced.

Organization of the entire population in the struggle for higher production brought about a considerable growth in the productivity of labor.

The peasants re-apportioned 600 thousand mou (1 mou at that time equalled 1/16 of a hectare) and restored and put in order 69 thousand mou of arable land over a period of two years (1943-1944) throughout the entire border areas of Shensi, Kansu, and Ningsu. In the spring of 1944 alone, 420,000 mou of land were ploughed.[13]

"In organizations such as these," observed Mao Tse-tung on the growth of labor productivity within the mutual aid teams, "three now do as much as four did previously."[14]

The experience gained in developing the mutual aid teams, accumulated during the preceding years, was widely utilized by the Communist Party of China after the victorious people's revolution.

Temporary Mutual Aid Teams

The Communist Party and the People's Government of China devoted much attention to the restoration of agricultural production, after the routing of the Kuomintang armies during the years of the agrarian reforms. The wide-scale movement for mutual aid and cooperation in labor became one of the most important links in the solution of this important problem.

Together with the land, the peasants received many agricultural tools, seed, fertilizer, etc., in the course of the agrarian reforms. This, however, was insufficient for instituting adequate production in the villages.

Data regarding the amounts of agricultural implements and draught animals available in certain areas of the country during the thirties of the 20th Century were given earlier. During a 15-year period preceding the revolutionary victory conditions in this area not only failed to improve, but deteriorated considerably. During the course of the war, agricultural productive forces, cattle, and tools were systematically destroyed. By 1949, the total number of cattle decreased by 16% in the country and the number of agricultural implements decreased by 30% as compared with the prewar figures.[15] The Kuomintang forces destroyed entire irrigation systems "for strategic reasons." All this led to a catastrophic drop in agricultural production. By 1949 the gross grain harvest decreased by 25.4%, the cotton harvest

by 47.6% by comparison with the prewar period.[16]

The agrarian reform did not destroy all the causes of poverty among the peasants. Here are several typical examples in this regard: The agrarian reform in Henan Province was conducted before it was introduced in any other privince of south-central China, but even here the poorest elements of the villages were still in a position of economic hardship. In the Shan-hsien District of this Province, 30% of the poor farm-laborer families experienced production difficulties, and 5% of these households were in dire need. The Wang-chen provincial district of Hsi-hui area yielded a bountiful harvest during the first year after the agrarian reforms, but after that there occured a serious shortage of draught animals -- a year following the reforms there were 29 draught animals less than the minimum required for the area; on the average there was only one water wheel for every two households; 43 households were not assured of an adequate food supply for the year.[17]

Even greater hardship existed in the areas where the agrarian reform was completed in 1952.

It was possible to surmount the existing difficulties, to protect the peasants from exploitation by the kulaks, and to assure the restoration of agricultural production only with an adequate organization of the peasant households for combined labor.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, denoting the line of restoration and increasing of agricultural productivity, pointed out in 1951 that, "In all areas where agrarian reforms have been completed the People's Government must organize the peasants and all available manpower which can be used in agriculture and make the development of agricultural production and of the subsidiary industries its main issue. In addition, it is necessary to draw the peasants into various types of mutual aid organizations and producer's cooperatives, all of which must be gradually put into effect in accordance with the principle of voluntariness and mutual advantage."[18]

In the reformed village developed the primarily temporary form of mutual aid which had prevailed in the old liberated areas. "In the newly liberated areas this form also is appropriate for wide utilization, because it corresponds to the traditional forms of peasant mutual aid."[19]

The peasants joined into groups for the purpose of sharing one another's draught animals, agricultural implements, and irrigation systems, and to take measures in the event of drought, to exterminate pests and to pool their labor. Various forms of mutual aid teams existed for such purposes as the joint purchase of draught animals or of agricultural tools on credit granted by the government.[20] The peasants organized groups for other than agricultural work as well.

The provision of the peasants with land, their emancipation from the landlords and exploitation through rental payments on their land, was a strong impetus for the creation of mutual aid teams. The impoverished peasants and farm laborers, having received their land,

joined the traditional mutual aid groups. In Hunan Province in 1953, for example, 30-40% of the peasants pooled their labor in groups, a practice that was becoming progressively more widespread.[21] According to data of an investigation in Chi-shou area, Ch'ang-sha District, in 1951, 298 households, comprising 53% of the peasant households of the region, that is, 40% more than in 1948 before the land reforms, joined in mutual aid of the old type.[22]

With the wide-scale development of the mutual aid program, progressively more teams, organized by the local cells of the Communist Party of China, began appearing. The Party gradually expanded the framework of the mutual aid movement, changing it from a partial and one-sided type of aid (such as groups for digging wells during droughts or groups organized for the common use of a plant-spraying machine) into a many-sided form of mutual aid in field projects.

Mutual aid teams were being organized primarily for the purpose of accomplishing large-scale work requiring much manpower; the smaller, less important projects were handled on an individual basis by the farmers.

All the members of a team received individual benefits from their participation in the team.

Taking into consideration the fact that traditional peasant mutual aid groups usually consisted of three or four households, the Communist Party of China proposed the establishment of small teams at the beginning of the movement.[23]

Here, for example, is how a mutual aid team was organized at the Shang-fan village in the Yung-fu provincial district of Kwang-si Province.[24]

The peasants of the village were compelled to join the mutual aid team in 1951; this team proved to be ineffective and soon disintegrated. The leadership of the Yung-fu Provincial District sent party cadres to Shang-fan to organize a more effective mutual aid team and, by later using it as an example, to promote the movement on a broad scale throughout the entire district.

The Party cadres assigned to the village first of all appointed a leader for the proposed team. But poverty-stricken Liao Chi-yung, who was picked for that position, exhibited an attitude of great distrust, giving last year's failure of the team as an excuse. There were four members in Liao Chi-yung's family, only two of whom were capable of working. To make ends meet, Liao Chi-yung worked at a nearby sugar refinery during the winter of 1951. The family, however, still lacked four dan of grain in order to subsist until the next harvest (one dan at that time equalled approximately 60 kilograms). Representatives of the provincial party committee told Liao Chi-yung about the mutal aid team led by Liao Hsaio-huai, whose members the previous year, by utilizing the advantages of collective labor, were able to relieve eight members from field work and send them to a factory to earn additional income. These eight peasants received 140 ching of rice (1 ching at that time equalled approximately 600 grams). Subse-

quently the party workers analyzed the reasons for the disintegration of the mutual aid team at the Shang-fan village and indicated that the team disintegrated due to improper labor accounting within the team.

Finally, during the general preparatory meeting, representatives of the provincial party committee familiarized the peasants in great detail with the system of labor accounting by the team. In Liao Hsiao-huei's team, the amount of labor required for the various operations was computed ahead of time, and every member's labor potential was calculated in terms of a certain number of labor units. Liao Chi-yung was again chosen to be the leader of the newly created mutual aid team in the Shang-fan village.

The team was joined by four households having a total of 23 persons. The total area of the members' combined land was 78 mou (or which 60 mou were irrigated). The team had five draught animals. From February to May includive (according to the Chinese agricultural calendar) the team had in all 1600 man-days. Approximately 620 man-days were required for the cultivation of all the land (8 man-days were required for each mou of land), and it was estimated that 100 man-days would be required for the preparation of fertilizer. Considerations were also made for various members of the team to engage in extra outside work, by turns, in order to provide themselves with sufficient provisions to last until the new harvest.

It was decided to base all labor calculations on the system used by Liao Hsiao-huei's team. In addition, the computation of labor units was based on the difficulty of the assignment and speed of execution. One man-day was assigned to work rated at 10 labor units; for the good execution of the project a higher category was assigned to the assignment, for poor execution it was lowered.

Mutual aid within the group was to be governed by the following principles:

1) Subordination to those appointed as leaders and the completion of all assignments.

2) Subordination to the decision of the majority.

3) Recognition of the need to work according to plan.

4) Unselfishness and personal honesty.

5) Unbiased accumulation of labor units and an honest determination of work norms.

6) Meetings every evening for summing up and evaluating work accomplished during the day.

7) Inadmissability of hidden criticism; all dissatisfactions to be brought out openly during group meetings.

The productive plan adopted by the team at the meeting contained the following points:

1) To save six dan of seed by reducing wedding and religious expenses.

2) To extend irrigation ditches and to irrigate fields in a more thorough manner during the dry seasons.

3) To plough the fields in an exemplary fashion and to exterminate field pests.

4) To allow 400 man-days for members of the team to engage in outside work for additional income, so as to assure the group with sufficient provisions to last until the new harvest.

5) To prepare 500 dan of straw and 40 dan of grass to be used as fertilizer, and to mix in 50 ching of lime into every mou of sugar cane.

6) To sow jointly the early crops: 1 mou of peanuts, 1 mou of pepper, 800 tou of tobacco (one tou is equal to 1/10 of a dan),[26] to cultivate 2 mou of virgin land, to raise two pigs, 20 ducks, and 30 chickens in common (point six of the production plan points out the inception of common property and labor in the group).

7) To establish a system of aiding the poorer members of the group.[27]

A study of the activities of Liao Chi-yung's team gives a general idea of the structure and work of the mutual aid teams in general.

The concept of mutual aid, even in its early, temporary forms, was responsible for a certain increase in agricultural production. Even simple cooperation in labor led to an increase in its productivity. About 20-30% less labor was expended in work done by the teams than in the same work done by individuals.[28]

Comradely competition which occured during joint work also helped to raise the productivity of labor and to increase crop yields. In Szechwan Province, for example, Ho Liang-p'u's mutual aid team (Mien-yang district of the T'ang-fan area) 1/3 less man-days were required in 1953 for reaping, transporting the sheafs, and thrashing the summer harvest than was used by the team members in individual, independent work (four men and ten women) before their consolidation. Kao Fu-hsing's mutual aid team (Pei-hai area, Lien-shan district) harvested 103 dan of rice in four days, saving 40 man-days.[29]

An increase in the productivity of labor permitted the improvement of land cultivation methods, and provided an increased supply of fertilizer. Therefore, 26 households, participating in six mutual aid teams, introduced 1,500 ching of fertilizer into every dan of field, when the individual households were able to introduce only 200 ching of fertilizer into every dan of field.[30]

A total of 35,199 households combined into 4,762 mutual aid teams in nine areas of the Kweichou district, Kweichow Province and harvested 1,354,412 t'iao of grain crops in 1952, which was 162,129 t'iao or 13.6% more than in 1951. These areas also contained 4,552 individual households which gathered a harvest of 118,977 t'iao in 1952 -- only 3,005 t'iao or 2.59% more than in 1951.[31]

The harvest yielded from the fields cultivated by members of the mutual aid team therefore exceeded the yield of fields that were cultivated by individual farmers by 11%.

Particularly important was the role of the mutual aid groups, even temporary ones, in the struggle against natural disasters.

"In Heng-nan in the northern part of Anhwei _ and Kiangsu Provinces, in privincial districts and in areaswhich are located along the Huai He, mutual aid teams were organized in order to combine the solution of problems inherent in the development of agricultural production and the regulation of the Huai-he River," noted the Ministry of Agriculture of the KNR.[32] In 1952 alone, 2,300,000 peasants participated in harnessing theHuai-he.[33] It is evident that such a mass diversion of manpower for the construction of irrigation systems was made possible only as a result of the development of the mutual aid movement.

In the temporary mutual aid teams the peasants pooled their labor and means of production for a specified period of time only, for the execution of certain individual projects; the land they cultivated and their tools remained their private property, and each team member conducted his own household separately.

Temporary mutual aid teams have undoubtedly helped the development of agricultural production. As a result of some coordination of labor, the individual poor and middle peasants were able to solve their production problems, to reise their crop yields and, to a certain degree, escape the threat of intimidation by the kulaks after the agrarian reforms.

Joint labor, even within the framework of the temporary mutual aid team, has proven its advantages. The temporary mutual aid team was the first step toward the establishment of producer's cooperatives in the Chinese village.

After surmounting production difficulties, however, this form of cooperation exhausted its advantages. In the old liberated areas of the northeastern and northern parts of China, the agrarian reform occured during 1946-1949 and the People's Government had been in existence there for 10-12 years. In this area the peasantry was moving up into the middle-peasant category before it was in the other areas of the liberated countrysids. As indicated by surveys conducted by the provincial party committee, 82.5% of the peasants in six villages of the Wuh-hsiang provincial district of Kiangsi Province, or 86% of the total population of that area, were members of the middle peasant class; they owned 89% of the land, approximately all of the draught animals, and 82.5% of all the sheep.[34] In 13 of the villages surveyed in Chahar Province, 1,319 (over 78%) out of 1,688 households were in the middle peasant class.[35] Of these, 600 became members of the middle peasant class after the agrarian reforms in their area.[36] Over 90% of the households in the villages surveyed in Hopeh Province in 1950 were middle peasant households, which controlled over 90% of the draught animals and agricultural tools in the area and accounted for 90% of the over-all agricultural production.[37]

New kulak cliques, which appeared as a result of the new class differentiations within the villages, served as an example of enrichment at the expense of others. The kulaks struggled against the mutual aid teams. They organized their own groups for "mutual

assistance" which used farm laborers. Infiltrating the peasants' mutual aid teams, the kulaks attempted to attribute an exploitative characteristic to those mutual aid teams.

With an increase in the number of middle peasants in the village, there was a noticeable decrease in interest in the mutual aid team movement, which was caused by the fact that agriculture was restored, difficulties caused by a lack in the basic means of production were essentially overcome, and the middle peasant was now naturally interested primarily in his own household.

Jen-min Jih-pao reported that approximately 1,000 mutual aid teams were surveyed in the Wuh-hsing provincial district of Province. It was observed that almost all these groups had a decreased level of productive activity and many collapsed completely. "Production is improving with every year, but the matter of 'organization' deteriorates with every year," explained the peasants.[38]

In describing the process of development of the mutual aid team movement in Hopeh Province, the newspaper Hopeh Jih-pao pointed out that after the peasants acquired a basically adequate number of draught animals and agricultural implements, in 1949, many mutual aid teams decreased their activities and some of them disintegrated.[39]

It was therefore necessary to convince the peasants that the mutual aid teams, even after the elimination of primary production problems with their help, would continue to promote production and contribute to the creation of a higher standard of living and that it was more advantageous to work together rather than separately.

An important landmark of the mutual aid team movement's productive activities was a resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China regarding mutual labor aid and producer's cooperatives.[40]

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China coordinated the experience gained during this movement and outlined a course for its further development. The Central Committee also noted that unbridled development of the mutual assistance program could lead to a "growth of capitalistic tendencies in agricultural producer's cooperatives, to an increase of production difficulties among the needy peasants, and to more peasants selling their land," particularly "in areas where agricultural production has achieved a comparatively high level of development and where the middle peasants constitute a majority of the peasant population.[41] The Central Committee pointed out the need for a more active leadership in the mass movements.

Demands to renew mutual assistance promotional programs could be heard from the peasants themselves. In the Tzu-chun-t'un village of the former Sungkiang Province, for example, a group of peasants who had already acquired some material security were interested in expanding their fields by cultivating adjacent virgin land. Individually, however, they were unable to accomplish this task and to acquire the necessary additional agricultural equipment that would be necessary, and they therefore decided to purchase the equipment jointly. The

organization for the acquisition of new agricultural implements to expand agricultural areas is apparantly something other than the earliest temporary team, which was established as a measure of protection against possible attempts at intimidation by the kulaks. The new mutual aid organization which could successfully solve the problems at hand were the permanent mutual aid teams.

Permanent Mutual Aid Teams

The permanent mutual aid teams evolved, as a rule, from the temporary mutual aid teams, but occasionally individual peasants, prompted by examples of the successful work accomplished by the mutual aid teams, organized spontaneously into mutual aid teams of a permanent nature.

Permanent mutual aid teams were generally larger that the temporary variety, and they united 10-12 or more peasant households. A reasonably complex system of organization sprang up in the permanent teams, which controlled an extensive pool of labor. This provided opportunities for the division of labor according to the abilities of the various members of the team.

Members of the permanent teams perform different types of work, and some of them frequently work on other than agricultural projects on a temporary basis.

The peasants work together throughout the year in the permanent mutual aid teams. They till one another's fields, weed cultivated areas and harvest, as well as engage in trade activities, together.

The various production processes which require the participation of a great number of different physical abilities and experience needs aclearly defined organization and a particularly precise method for computing labor requirements and expenditures by all members of the team. That is why the systems for such computations are developed far better in the permanent teams than in the temporary mutual aid teams.

In the temporary mutual aid teams, where everyone was engaged in basically the same work (today Chang San helped Li Ssu cultivate his field, and tomorrow Li Ssu together with Chang San ploughed the third member's field), labor expenditures and requirements were computed very simply: one day's work by Chang San on Li Ssu's field equalled one day's work by Li Ssu on Chang San's field. This was referred to as "an exchange of workdays" or an "exchange of labor," "a day for a day," "a day equals a day"

Occasionally, seasonal mutual aid teams divided their workdays into several parts of unequal value for a more detailed computation of time used, such as the morning hours before the noon meal and the afternoon hours.

These primitive methods of labor accounting did not suit the existing conditions within the permanent mutual aid teams, where

considerably more people were involved. Permanent teams occasionally utilized a system where each member of the group was placed into a certain labor category, i.e., his work potential was estimated in terms of a permanent and unalterable number of labor units, depending on his physical strength, experience, and the type of work he could perform.

In one of the mutual aid teams of the Ning-te provincial district of Fukien Province, "those who could plough, harrow seedlings, and furrow a fieldare rated at 10 labor units; those who know only how to furrow, plant seedlings, and carry fertilizer in baskets -- 9 units; those who can merely furrow and pick rice -- 8 units; and for those who merely can furrow -- 7 units."[42]

This method of computation was in widespread use in the old liberated areas. Members of Liu Yu-hua's mutual aid team in the Ch'ang-p'ing provincial district of Hopeh Province who possessed the most skill received 13 ching of rice per day; the partially skilled workers received 5 ching of rice per day. Once established, the labor categories for each member of the team remained unchanged throughout the work season.[43] Such a method of computation was adopted in the seasonal mutual aid teams and, partially, in the permanent teams.[44]

In 1952, the Fukien Party Committee said that "This method is at the present time used partially by the permanent mutual aid teams and by some temporary mutual aid teams. It may be recommended for widespread use by the temporary mutual aid teams..."[45]

This system of accounting for labor was conducive to a further strengthening of the temporary mutual aid teams and to their conversion into permanent teams; another system, however, was better suited to the needs of the permanent mutual aid teams: the computation of work units based on the evaluation of work accomplished. In this case, the work of every member was appraised in terms of a certain number of labor units depending on the type of physical work involved and the worker's experience. For poor work the possible number of units was lessened and for exemplary work, they were increased. Changes in the appraisals could be made only after joint discussion.

The use of this method of computing labor factors allowed enough flexibility for the proper division of labor and the classification of the various worker's specialties, which is a decisive factor for a steady increase in the production output.

The technical complexity involved in the use of this method for computing labor factors demanded a very clear-cut organization of the group, as well as a higher level of conscientiousness. Due to the profound influence of old established family traditions (particularly in the central and southern parts of the country), all examinations and, occasionally, the consequent reevaluations of work, were considered by the peasants involved as expressions of distrust and suspicion. "At the present time, as a result of the economically underdeveloped state of the village, it is not yet easy to put into

effect a proper system of agricultural economics. Very frequently members of a team encounter considerable difficulties in surmounting close friendships and family ties...In computing labor factors and in conducting general labor accounting, the peasants are frequently reluctant to compare one another's work, even though, basically, they are often dissatisfied with the accounting results."[46] The necessary level of conscientiousness could only be gradually achieved, after a long period of participation in collective labor and extensive educational conditioning.

This method of computing labor factors was utilized by comparatively stable, permanent mutual aid teams in the old as well as in the newly liberated areas.[47]

Permanent mutual aid teams, which were being established in order to raise the agrotechnical levels and farming techniques, assured the continuing growth of agricultural production.

The temporary mutual aid team led by Chang Fu-ling (Chiu-kou-lun provincial district, former Sung-kiang Province) consisted of six households which consolidated in 1948 for the purpose of using their draught animals in common. In 1950, the team began to extend its mutual aid activities over the three agricultural seasons (spring, summer and autumn), and by 1951 it expanded to 12 households and began to combine its labor in field work and in cooperative trade activities.

The following data indicates the rate of increase in bean harvests from fields belonging to members of the team during various stages of its growth and development:

	1949	1950	1951
Average yield per mou[49] in ching	170	260	568
Percent compared with 1949	100	153	334

Table 1

The increased crop yields from the fields belonging to members of Chang Fu-ling's team exceeded the production level achieved by the individual farmers. The average yield of beans per mou for this village was 319 ching, the yield per mou from the fields belonging to members of the team was 568 ching (78% more); the best possible harvest for an individual household was 350 ching per mou, whereas 648.4 ching per mou was normal for members of the team (85% more).[50]

This large difference was explained by the fact that the team members seeded their fields five days before the local individual farmers, with high grade seed (most of which was loaned by the provincial district's agricultural department), on well cultivated fields. Good care for the fields was assured throughout the summer by a number of special women's brigades, which weeded the fields, etc., twice as frequently as the fields belonging to individual farmers were weeded.[51]

The newspaper Chieh-fang Jih-pao, 21 December 1953, published an extensive collection of correspondence from the provincial district

of Man-ho in Kiangsu Province, which compared the agricultural results achieved by two mutual aid teams over a period of years with the results attained by two wealthy, individual farmers. Farmer Yeh Tsuan-sheng had 23 mou of land, a windmill and a full assortment of agricultural implements. He had always been considered one of the most experienced and best farmers by all the villagers. His social position was that of a wealthy middle peasant.

How much higher the crop yield was from the fields belonging to members of the mutual aid team than from the fields of Yeh Tsuan-sheng may be seen from the following table:

Comparison of Crop Yields from Fields Belonging to Team Members and an Individual Farmer*

(Ching per Mou)

Crop	Team Members				Individual Farmer			
	1951	1952	1953	Average	1951	1952	1953	Average
Cotton	60	85	120	88	50	65	80	65
Rice	320	450	440	403	350	400	380	377
Wheat	120	200	225	182	100	150	200	150

Table 2

* Chieh-fang Jih-pao, 21 December 1953

Middle peasant Hsu Chia-ts'uan left the mutual aid team after becoming dissatisfied with the newly introduced method of early planting of cotton. The differing results yielded by the fields belonging to team members and to individual farmer Hsu Chia-ts'uan may be seen in the following figures (in ching per mou of land):[52]

	Team Members	Individual Farmer
Cotton (short-staple)	100	70
Cotton (long-staple)	130	110
Rice	440	390

Table 3

The production indices of the permanent mutual aid teams were considerably higher than those of the temporary teams. This is what convinced the peasants of the advantages of the permanent type of team over the temporary variety.

The advantages of joint labor and the consolidation of agricultural implements for the execution of field work assured the development of the mutual aid movement in the villages on a broad scale.

According to data published by the Ministry of Agriculture of the Chinese People's Republic, it appears that in 1951, 55% of all peasant households in the northern part of China participated in mutual aid teams; 70% of all the households in northeastern China were members of some type of mutual assistance organization. In eastern China, there were 700,000 mutual aid teams in existence, and 167,000 in northwestern China. In 11 provincial districts of Honan Province there were 114,000 teams, which consolidated 40-50% of the peasant population of these districts.[53]

There was an estimated total of 4.3 million mutual aid teams in China by 1951, containing 20% of the total peasant population of the country.[54] By the end of 1952, the country had 8.3 million mutual aid teams. These consolidated 65% of the peasant households of the old liberated areas and 25% of the households in the newly liberated areas.

On the whole, 42% of all Chinese households participated in the mutual aid team movement by 1952,[55] 43% by 1953,[56] and 58% by 1954.[57]

The capable leadership and guidance of the village Communists, the growth in production of the permanent mutual aid teams, and an increase in the farmers' individual incomes led not only to increase the number of peasant households participating in the mutual aid teams, but to a marked increase in the number of permanent mutual aid teams. Even though as late as 1951 the temporary mutual aid team was the principal form of labor organization in China, the middle of 1952 was the turning point, as evidenced by the fact that on the one hand the number of permanent mutual aid teams increased at a greater rate than the temporary teams, and on the other, that the number of agricultural producer's cooperatives could be counted in the thousands instead of dozens and hundreds as before.

In pointing out this change, the Ministry of Agriculture noted in 1952 that "...There has definitely been an improvement in the organization of the mutual aid teams as well. The past year has taught our leading workers of all categories much, and they spent their spare time between the spring and summer sowing in readjusting the mutual aid teams, in the solution of problems pertaining to matters of leadership within these teams, problems of a balanced labor exchange, the matter of mutual advantages for the cooperating households and production planning having a direct bearing on the further strengthening of the teams.

"As a result of this the mutual aid teams in many areas not only did not disintegrate during the summer field operations, but a certain increase in their average size was noted. If, in 1951, only 10% of all mutual aid teams were organized on a permanent basis, then by the current year [1952] their number has increased to 40%. The increase in the number of permanent teams and the decrease in the tem-

porary teams is the basic characteristic of the mutual aid movement for this year."[58]

The more complex and perfect the organization of the mutual aid team becomes, the better are their chances of raising the productivity of labor. Since in even the simplest, temporary variety of these teams (for instance, the detachments formed during natural disasters -- **pin-chun-tui**) labor efforts are consolidated only under extreme conditions and on a temporary basis, and in the seasonal mutual aid teams the peasants work together only from time to time and only on large projects, the permanent team should then certainly achieve a far more complete consolidation of labor. The peasnats work jointly throughout the year and not only at the basic field projects, but also at certain allied trades. Within the temporary mutual aid teams the division of labor is merely outlined, but in the permanent-type team this matter receives a considerably more detailed and thorough treatment.

There is an appearance of common ownership of property in the permanent-type mutual aid teamss.

Common property originates within a team from irregular, common contributions, or with the overhaul of equipment belonging to various households at common expense, which equipment then remains available for common use; or the use of small portions of the common earnings from outside trade activities for helping the needy members of the team (with slight interest charged or, often, with no interest at all), or use of the outside earnings for the acquisition of additional equipment. Finally, occasionally a small herd of animals is acquired in common, or new agricultural implements (usually with the help of a consumer supply and credit cooperative, or with funds borrowed from the government), or virgin lands are cultivated jointly and then become common property (as in the case of Chiang Tsai-ch'iu's team in **Kwangsi** Province).[59] There is a higher degree of social consciousness among the team members as a result of their joint labor.

All this, then, is the process of development of the socialist elements within the mutual aid teams. At the same time the need for a change from the mutual aid program to the agricultural producer's cooperatives was evident, as individual farming on dispersed shreds of land becomes an obstacle in the way to increasing crop yields and peasants' incomes.

"The joint utilization of improved and new agricultural tools, the division of labor and further specialization, and in certain cases, collective reconstruction of the irrigation systems and the cultivation of wastelands, all brought about the necessity for a method of combined use of the available lands," pointed out the resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 1951.[60]

In the mutual labor aid teams, individual farms were managed with the help of common labor. This brought about a conflict between joint labor of the team and private ownership of the means of produc-

tion, primarily that of the land, by the team members. In the temporary mutual aid teams, where the consolidation of labor is still incomplete, this conflict is not expressed in sufficiently strong terms. Within the permanent-type team the consolidation of labor is relatively complete, and the contradiction between the common nature of the labor and the private ownership of the means of production begins to act as a deterrent for the further development of production and slows down the creation of common property.

The most characteristic manifestations of this conflict are the constant disagreements among members of the team as to the periods alloted for cultivation of their own plots. Having limited facilities the group is often unable to service all plots of the individual members at the best possible agrotechnical moment.

This situation is most aptly illustrated by the circumstances which occured in the team led by Hsin Tse-hsui, of the Hsieh village, which is located in the O-shan district, Honan Province.

This team was organized in 1950. By 1951 it contained 13 households. "Even by 1951, however, there appeared difficulties common to the mutual aid team. The draught animal owners, without any consideration for the other members of the team, used their animals to plough their own land first. As the time for furrowing and ploughing approached, each member insisted that his plot of land should receive first preference. During the harvest ripening season (during summer and autumn), every household endeavored to delay the harvesting on its own plot in order to let the crops ripen fully. But after the crops reached maximum ripeness, every member wanted to harvest his own field first, being afraid of winds and rains."[61]

The type of organization that is able to solve these conflicts of interest between common labor and the individual management of the [individual] households is the agricultural producer's cooperative, which is organized on land that remains the private property of the participating farmers. Exactly because the agricultural producer's cooperative, without basically affecting the concept of private ownership of land by the peasants themselves, allowed a conversion to the collective system of farming, its significant role in the gradual conversion to producer's cooperatives in the village was determined "There appears a possibility of eliminating certain discrepancies with the institution of the agricultural producer's cooperatives, which are difficult to eliminate in the mutual aid teams, in particular the conflict between collective labor and the individual control of farming, thereby creating movement for a wide scale establishment of mutual aid teams and agricultural producers' cooperatives, which have already achieved a certain degree of development."[62]

The mutual aid teams, which were developed under the direction of the Communist Party of China, out of the old, traditional form of mutual aid among the peasants, were organizations of individual households

for joint labor and joint use of agricultural implements for certain important agricultural projects.

The consolidation of the labor forces and agricultural implements within the mutual aid teams led to a certain increase in the productivity of labor. This permitted the team members to surmount the difficulties associated with a lack of the necessary equipment in the individual households, and also to achieve an increase in the agricultural production (particularly within the permanent mutual aid teams.)

In other words, participation in a mutual aid team permitted a fuller utilization of the limited opportunities for the growth of labor productivity which exists in the individual households of the Chinese peasants.

The consolidation of the peasants into teams would protect them from exploitation by the kulaks, and to a certain degree, prevent any great social differentiations from arising in the villages.

Joint labor demonstrated the advantages of collective labor. Collective property was gradually beginning to appear in the teams.

All the above characteristics of the mutual aid teams acted as an introduction to the eventual consolidation of the peasants into producers' cooperatives and also allowed the Communist Party and the People's Government to utilize them as the first step towards that goal.

1. Istoriya ekonomicheskogo razvitiya Kitaya 1840-1848 gg (The History of Economic Development in China, 1840-1848), Moscow, 1958, page 245.

2. Figures contained in the book by Ku Mo, Economic Problems of the Chinese Village, Shanghai, 1933, published in Chinese. These figures indicate that there were approximately two million head in Shantung Province. The table contained in Wang Yu-lin's book cites a figure of 4.7 million head; see Wang Yu-lin, Statistical-Economic Survey, Peiping, 1935, published in Chinese.

3. Ku Mo, ibid., page 99.

4. "Oh'iung pang ch'iung" -- "The poor help the poor" -- was the peasants' apt definition of mutual aid.

5. Ping tui ping, chiang tui chiang; (see: Jen-min Jih-pao, 9 October 1950.

6. Hsin-hua Yueh-pao, 1955, No 52, page 161.

7. The liberated areas existed throughout the country, from north China to the island of Hainan. By 1945 the total liberated area equalled approximately 950,000 square kilometres. The population of the liberated areas, during the course of the Anti-Japanese War, was from 80 to 90-95 million persons (1944 -- 86 million persons). Conditions in the Liberated Areas During the Anti-Japanese War. A Series of Materials on Modern Chinese History, Peiping, 1953 (in Chinese).

8. Mao Tse-tung, "Develop the movement for lower rental payments, for the development of production and the support of authorities and a feeling of concern for the population." Selected Works, Moscow, 1953, Vol 4, p 246.

9. See Conditions in the Liberated Areas during the ---, pp 107-108.

10. Mao Tse-tung,"Organizuytes!"; Izbrannyye Proizvedeniya, Vol 4, p 288.

11. See Chieh-fang Jih-pao, 9 March 1952.

12. Conditions in the Liberated Areas during the ---, p 107.

13. ibid.

14. Mao Tse-tung, "Study Agricultural Labor", Izbrannyye Proizvedeniya, Vol 4, p 436.

15. Narodnyy Kitay (People's China), Peiping, 1952, No 19, p 28.

16. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, Peiping, 1954, No 19, p 32.

17. Ching-chi Chou-pao, 1952, No 23, p 450.

18. See "Decree by the Central Committee of the KPK on Mutual Aid Teams and Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives", Agrarnyye preobrazovanyya v narodnom Kitaye, p 343.

19. ibid., p 344.

20. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1952, No 8, p 15.

21. The Movement for Mutual Aid and Cooperation at a given Stage, Hankow, 1953, published in Chinese.

22. Ch'ang-chiang Jih-pao, 29 April 1952.

23. See "Decree by the Central Committee of the KPK ---", Agrarnyye preobrazovaniya v Narodnom Kitaye, op. cit., p 344.

24. See "The Report of the Provincial Committee of the Provincial District of Yung-fu", Ch'ang-chiang Jih-pao, 26 April 1952.

25. It is obvious that no one would have dared assume this obligation, which is contrary to the old accepted customs, without the collective.

26. The authors have in mind the area from which 800 tou of tobacco can be harvested.

27. The work of assisting the poverty stricken consisted, for example, in the cultivation of land for families who lost their men in the revolutionary war or as soldiers in Korea, collection of relief funds, etc.

28. Chung-kuo Jih-pao, 1953, No 24, p 28.

29. ibid.

30. ibid.

31. Hsin-hua Jih-pao , Ch'ung-ch'ing, 20 March 1953.

32. Chung-kuo Jih-pao, 1952, No 8, p 15.

33. Ching-chi Chou-pao, 1953, No 6, p 15.

34. Jen-min Jih-pao, Peiping, 9 October 1950.

35. Chahar Jih-pao, 3 August 1950.

36. ibid.

37. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, Vol 2, folio 4, 25 January 1951.

38. Jen-min Jih-pao, 9 October 1950.

39. "A Survey of Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives in

the Ta-ming Provincial District", from Material on Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives During the Reconstruction Period 1949-1952, Peiping, 1957, Vol 1, published in Chinese.

40. "Decree by the Central Committee of the KPK ---", Agrarnyye preobrazovaniya ---, op. cit., pp 342-360. This resolution was being put into effect beginning with the last part of 1951, and was officially published on 16 February 1953.

41. ibid., pp 350-351.

42. Handbook for the Agricultural Mutual Aid Brigades, Peiping, 1952, pp 31-32, published in Chinese.

43. Handbook on Problems of Mutual Aid and Cooperation in the Village, Paoting, 1952, published in Chinese.

44. Hsin-hua Jih-pao, Ch'ung-ch'ing, 20 December 1952.

45. Handbook for the Agricultural Mutual Aid Brigades, op. cit., p 32.

46. ibid., p 30.

47. See Hsin-hua Jih-pao, 20 December 1952; Nang-fan Jih-pao, 9 September 1953; Handbook on Problems of Mutual Aid ---, pp 23-25.

48. Experience in High Crop Yields, Shen-yang, 1952, pp 65-66, published in Chinese.

49. In the Northeast one mou equals 0.1 hectare.

50. Experience in High Crop Yields, op. cit., p 66.

51. ibid., pp 67-70.

52. See Chieh-fang Jih-pao, 21 December 1953.

53. Selected Articles on Chinese Economics, Peiping, 1953, published in Chinese.

54. Hsin-hua Yueh-pao, 1954, No 2, p 161.

55. Liu Shao-ch'i, op. cit., "Political Report of the Central Committee ---", p 14.

56. Hsin-hua Yueh-pao, 1954, No 2, p 161.

57. Liu Shao-ch'i, op. cit., "Political Report of the Central Committee ---", p 14.

58. Jen-min Jih-pao, 31 August 1952.

59. Handbook for the Agricultural Mutual Aid Brigades, op. cit., p 10.

60. Agrarnyye preobrazovaniya v narodnom Kitaye, op. cit., p 345.

61. See Ch'ang-chiang Jih-pao, 17 April 1952.

62. Agrarnyye preobrazovaniya v narodnom Kitaye, op. cit., p 365.

CHAPTER II

BASIC LEVEL AGRICULTURAL PRODUCER'S COOPERATIVES

Formation of the Cooperatives

Agricultural producer's cooperatives first appeared in the liberated areas. In 1951 there were 300,[1] toward the end of 1952 -- 3,663, and in 1953 -- 14,900, uniting 275,000 peasant households.[2]

The mass development of labor exchange, and supply and marketing cooperatives, as well as financial and organizational measures taken by the people's government, prepared the basis for transition from Mutual Aid Teams to a higher form of peasant organization -- the basic level agricultural producer's cooperative. At the same time, the beginning of a vast systematic economic structure in 1953 exacted a significant increase in agricultural marketability. Under these conditions the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued the "Decree on Agricultural Producer's Cooperatives" on 16 December 1953, in which the meaning of rural production was emphasized, and in which the methods and forms of managing the cooperative movement were set forth.

In organizing the mass increase in cooperatives, the party assigned new Communist manpower to rural areas for purposes of propaganda and explaining the general line of the Communist Party of China. Widespread political work was conducted among local leading workers; and the staffs for cooperatives were trained.

On the eve of the spring field work in 1954 there were 100,000 agricultural producer's cooperatives in the country. After the summer harvest of 1954 their number had grown to 220,000[3] and, according to the data for February 1955, there were about 600,000 cooperatives in the country. The agricultural producer's cooperatives united 15 million farms, or 13% of the country's peasant farmsteads. Furthermore, in the former liberated areas

of northeast and northern China more than 30% of the peasant households were included in them.[4] In the summer of 1955 there were already 650,000 cooperatives, in which were located 15% of the peasant farms.[5]

These were basic level cooperatives, which were usually formed as a result of the incorporation of the land holdings of peasants, members of one or several mutual aid teams. However, such cases (before the mass increase in producer cooperatives in the fall of 1955) were rare. As the newspaper, Jen-min jih-pao, announced, from 80-90% of all cooperatives were formed on the basis of the mutual aid team.[6]

The land which the peasants turned over to the cooperative upon joining was considered to be their land share. In order to determine the size of the land share, an evaluation of the plots depending on their quality and location was made beforehand. As a basis the conventional or tax mou was adopted.[7]

According to the code of regulations of the agricultural producer's cooperatives, each member of the cooperative had the right to retain a plot of land for the purpose of raising fruit and vegetables for the use of his own family. However, the size of the plot could not exceed five per cent of the average amount of land acquired by each resident of the village.[8]

The methods of incorporation of livestock and heavy agricultural equipment into the cooperatives were extremely varied, but they all had as their basis the same two principles: the incorporation of the means of production into full ownership or lease to the cooperative.

In the beginning stages, the system of leasing prevailed. There were two types of leases. In the first instance the leased livestock remained in the owner's keeping. On the decision of the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China it was recommended that livestock be leased or rented for the first couple of years (while still economically weak) of the cooperative's existence. The keeping of the livestock, according to this decision, was to be left in the hands of the owners.[9] "This method," as was noted in the regulations, "was usually adopted for the beginning period of the organization of the cooperative,"[10] since it solved the problem of security of cooperative economy by means of production, and at the same time fit the economic means of the newly organized cooperative. This explains its widespread use.

In the second instance rented work animals were kept by the cooperative.

Heavy agricultural equipment and means of transportation (ploughs, pumps, carts, boats) were also leased by the cooperative.

Sometimes the cost of the means of production was added to the value of the land share of their owners and increased its value. For example, in the Ta-ming District of Hopeh Province, when wells which were on the land or irrigation equipment were incorporated into the cooperative, the plot of land was considered irrigable and, consequently, increased the value of the land share. On the other hand, if irrigation equipment and constructions were given separately, a separate lease payment was made in the method used by the cooperative, and the land was considered arid.[11] It is understandable that in the latter case the value of the land share was less.

The strengthened cooperative gradually accomplished the buying back of livestock from the owners. The period of redeeming the livestock was set at three years, with a maximum of five years.[12] The buying back of heavy farming equipment was carried out on the same basis.[13]

Tools and equipment for subsidiary production, which by its nature was convenient to conduct collectively in the cooperative,[14] had to be given over by the peasants to the cooperative or put up for lease or repurchase by the cooperative. The Communist Party considered the middle peasant to have more equipment for production than the poor peasant, and therefore to be reluctant to enter into a cooperative with poor peasants. In order to make it easier for the middle peasant to enter a cooperative, it was decided to take peasants into a cooperative on equal terms. With this in view it was established that each peasant farmstead must contribute to the collective fund a share the size of which was usually determined by the number of able-bodied workers. The share could be given in the form of an assessment on land, agricultural implements (for which an evaluation was made), and also in cash. The middle peasants usually had more means of production than they gave to the cooperative as their share. This surplus was bought up by the cooperative according to the average market price and the money for these purchases was taken from the sum which the poorer peasants had to contribute as their share. Insofar as the poorer peasants seldom had money, the state made loans to them at reduced rates.

"If the poorer peasants do not have the means of paying the necessary share for entry into a cooperative, they may obtain a loan from the state," it was decreed in the decision of the Sixth Plenum of the Central

Committee of the Communist Party of China.[15]

In 1956, 40 million poor households, or more than 30% of all farmsteads received these loans, for a total of 600 million yuan.[16] If the poor peasant could not pay his share in full even after receiving the loan, the cooperative had the right to defer payment of his debt or to decrease it.

The Communist Party fought against infringing on the interests of the middle peasants, i.e., against devaluation of livestock being bought up,[17] agricultural implements, and fruit crops, and against excessive extention of periods of payment for them, etc.

Thus, the party endeavored not to violate the interests of the middle peasants and to strengthen the bond between the poor and the middle peasants. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China also condemned the occasional collectivization of individual fruit trees and of certain domestic animals which, in accordance with the regulations of the cooperative, should have been left in the peasants' possession.[18]

The state treated differently the kulaks and former landowners whose means of production were not bought up. On taking these individuals into the cooperative, the means of production which they retained after payment of their share went into supplementing the indivisible fund and the general welfare fund.

Such an approach to the kulaks' property, as Liao Lu-yen, Minister of Agriculture of the Chinese People's Republic, remarked, is explained by the fact that "the Chinese kulak class is semi-fudal in character and in the past was very closely related to the landowners."[19] The share of each cooperative member was registered in his name and was returned in the event he left the cooperative.

Small agricultural implements (sickles, hoes, shovels, etc.) remained, as before, in the hands of the cooperative members and were not collectivized.

In addition to the shares, the cooperative members could make deposits in cash or raw materials which would be returned in the agreed period of time. For cash deposits the producer's cooperatives paid the same rate of interest as borrowers paid on loans from the cooperative. Such type of individual investments were beneficial both for the cooperative, since they strengthened the material-technical basis of the economy, as well as for individual members.

The cooperatives were governed by a board, which was chosen in general assembly. The board usually con-

sisted of a chairman, deputy chairman, and representatives for the various areas of work. In the larger cooperatives there were bookkeepers on the board who were also responsible for keeping labor records. The board was elected annually and was accountable to the general assembly. The management of cooperatives was based on the principles of democratic centralism. In smaller cooperatives the chairman and members of the board usually participated directly in the work of the cooperative, but in payment for their work the time spent in administrative duties was taken into account. In the larger cooperatives the chairman had no other duties and he was paid for his work according to the set workday norm. According to the regulations, the usual salary of a cooperative chairman should be somewhat higher than that of the members of the cooperative, and a bookkeeper should receive approximately as much as the average cooperative member.[20]

Distribution of Profits

Profits received by the cooperative, after the deduction of taxes and other payments to the government, were divided into three parts. One part was used for the continued operation of the farm, another for the payment of shares, and the third for labor. The size of deposits made yearly to the general fund from the first part of the profits usually fluctuated between one and five per cent of the gross profits, but was occasionally larger.[21]

According to the regulations (article 64), deposits to the general fund in the initial stage of the cooperative's activity must not exceed five per cent, but later, with growth in production, they could be increased to ten per cent of the cooperative's gross profits.[22]

As was established in the decree adopted in 1953 by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the development of agricultural producer's cooperatives, cooperative members had the right to withdraw an appropriate part of the general fund on leaving the cooperative.[23] With the development of the producer's cooperative and the strengthening of cooperatives, resolutions were made on many of the leading farms to make the general fund indivisible.[24]

The indivisible fund consisted of two parts. Its basic part -- the collective accumulation fund -- was made up of from five to ten per cent of the annual deductions from the gross profits and was reserved for the needs of the growing collective farm. The remaining

part -- the welfare fund -- was made up of from one to three per cent of the annual deductions, and was reserved for the aid of needy cooperative members. The means for cultural and educational needs also came from this fund.

This situation was strengthened later in the decision of the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the question of cooperatives in agriculture, adopted 11 October 1955, and included in the regulations of agricultural producer cooperatives.

The cooperative members' profits were divided according to labor and land share.

Two methods of payment of land shares were used. In one, the profit to be paid off was determined according to land and labor; in the second, the fixed amount of profit was determined by land share.

In the beginning, the most widespread method was that of proportional payment, which was more suitable to the level of awareness of the peasants who had recently entered the cooperative. Article 20 of the regulations states that in the beginning period of a cooperative's existence, especially in those places where crops are unstable, the method of proportional distribution or some other transitional method may be used temporarily.[25]

In speaking of the distribution of profits according to land and labor one should keep in mind the important fact that, as a rule, only profits made from cultivating the land were distributed in this manner. Profits received from extraneous enterprises, in the main, were paid out entirely according to labor (after deduction of interest or other forms of dividends from owners of means used for the development of extraneous enterprises in the initial stages of the cooperative's existence). Therefore, the part of the profits divided according to labor was in fact higher than was established by proportion. For example, in the cooperative of the village of Ch' uan-Ti the relation of profits according to labor and land was six to four; in 1951, 62.5% of the profits was paid according to labor, and 29.5% according to land (eight per cent was deposited in the general fund).[26]

In those cooperatives already on a more stable basis, the method of a flat fee paid for land was most often adopted. The decision of the Sixth Plenum of the Communist Party of China, the Seventh Convocation, stated that this method helps more to promote the raising of enthusiasm for labor among the members of the cooperative.[27] As early as 1955 the method of flat fee paid for the land share was in use by the majority of agricultural coopera-

tives.[28]

The size of the flat fee decreased in the event of short crops or natural disasters (even to the point of no payment at all for the land).[29] Thus, this method guaranteed minimum payment for labor. If the crop harvested by the cooperative exceeded the expected amount, the "excess" was divided according to land and labor in a set proportion and, as a rule, the balance was in the favor of labor (the so-called premium system of payment of labor).

For example, in several cooperatives of the Ta-ming District of Hopeh Province the set crop equalled 300 chin per mou. The first 50 chin above the 300 were divided in the proportion of eight to two. Anything above 400 chin was divided entirely according to labor.[30]

With the strengthening of cooperative economy the amount of collective production which went for the payment of land decreased in size, and the amount divided for the payment of labor increased. The steady increase of the amount of profits which were divided according to labor was a law of development of agricultural producer cooperatives since, in this way, the steady increase of socialist elements in the cooperatives was guaranteed. This prepared for the transition to the socialist form of cooperative.[31]

In 1953-1955, the most typical distribution proportion for basic level agricultural producer's cooperatives was six to four in favor of labor and, less usual, five to five.

In comparison with mutual aid teams, the larger farms, such as the basic level agricultural cooperatives, required more complex as well as precise forms of labor organization.

Organization and Accounting of Labor

There were several methods of organization and accounting of labor in the agricultural producer's cooperatives.

1. Organization of Temporary Production Brigades for Certain Jobs. This form of organization was adopted by the peasants naturally and easily since the large mutual aid teams frequently broke up into production brigades. The temporary production brigade is characteristic of the first period of a cooperative's development when it included just a few farms and when it was necessary to manage with a comparatively small number of workers.

There was just such an organisation, for example, in the cooperative in the village of Hsin-Chuang near Peiping, which consisted of 23 farms. All the peasants there joined together in two brigades -- one engaging in agriculture, and the other in subsidiary industry. During periods of heavy work in the fields both brigades worked there, but special plots of ground were not assigned to them. Two-week plans were initiated in the cooperative. The members responsible for production divided the work among the brigades in accordance with these plans.[32] The temporary brigades, formed for the completion of separate tasks were a transitional form of the better, seasonal brigade.

2. Organization of the Seasonal Production Brigades. In the given instance the personnel of the brigade and its leader did not change during the course of the season. The brigades were usually chosen with a view to the physical capabilities and experience of the workers. This form of organization increased the responsibility of the brigade members who already constituted a relatively stable cooperative. This form of organization also favored the introduction of work planning.

In 1953, producer brigades were organized according to this principle in one of the foremost producer cooperatives, headed by the Hero of Labor Li Shun-Ta. "The system of reinforcing certain land sections for the season with individual brigades was introduced in the cooperative. Depending on the peculiarities of the soil and location of the plot, the expenditure of labor for working the plot was determined, keeping in mind its average crop yield over a period of several years. At this point the production tasks were also assigned."[33] From 1953-54 the seasonal brigade was the predominant form of producer organizations.[34] 3. The Permanent Production Brigade. A determined amount of the cooperativ's fields and as many work animals and implements as possible were assigned to the permanent production brigade which was formed for the period of one year. This form of organization allowed for the detailed planning of the brigade's work for the whole year, from planting preparation to harvesting (and even made it possible to gather notes for the following year), and created conditions for better division of labor within the brigade. The permanent production brigades, as a rule, were found on the larger, more stable cooperatives. These brigades also existed in 1954-1955 in the suburban cooperatives, comparatively large for that time, in the villages of Chang-Kuo-Chuang and Huang-T'u-Kang near Peiping. In the Chang-Kuo-Chuang cooperative

(388 farmsteads and 651 workers) there were seven brigades, each of which was assigned 600-1300 mou of land. In the Huang-T'u-Kang cooperative (455 farmsteads, 229 members) there were five production brigades and one truck garden detachment. The largest brigade (55 men) was assigned 133 mou of arable and 261 mou of arid land. The smallest brigade (24 men) was assigned 111 and 213 mou respectively. In addition, the producer brigades had use of the work animals and farm tools belonging to the cooperative.[35]

The so-called system of "declarations for work" (Lao-Tun Tz'u-Pao-Chih), first adopted in the advanced cooperative managed by Kim Su-ching (Yen-chi district of Kirin Province) was a somewhat original form of work organization for cooperative produce work brigade organization.[36] The essence of this system lay in the following: all the cooperative lands were assigned to the producer brigades. Each brigade, proceeding from the general producer plan, calculated in detail how many work days would be needed for the spring ploughing, the summer planting, and the autumn harvest. The brigade also determined labor needs for the alloted period of time into which the season is divided (in the Kim Su-ching cooperative these periods were 20 days in length). The cooperative members then announced how many days they would be able to work in the cooperative economy during the course of the coming period. After examining and confirming these claims, the brigade worked out a plan which set down the time, amount, and quality of the work,

If, according to the plan, there was an excess of workers on the brigade, the cooperative's board -- under the centralization system -- sent them to help brigades which had fallen below their production assignments.[37] A similar system was used in 1953 by three large cooperatives in the Ting-hsien District of Hopeh Province, including the famous cooperative, Keng Ch'ang-So.[38]

The advantage of this form of organization lay in the fact that it permitted reducing to a minimum all possible unproductive uses of labor, gave reign to the initiative of the rank and file cooperative members, and raised their work responsibility, making them accustomed to the everyday running of the cooperative.

The production brigade was the basic form of organization, the cooperative's main production detachment. The brigade made possible direct production planning and arrangement of manpower. It effected the accounting of labor and, most important, was in charge of the basic farm implements and land assigned to it -- be it

for a short or long period of time.

In order to put the socialist principle of equal payment for equal labor into practice in the cooperatives ("He who works more and works better receives more; he who works less and works worse receives less...The labor of men and of women must be paid equally, taking into account the quantity and quality of work performed")[39] it was necessary to calculate accurately the labor performed by the workers. A transitional form, used by the mutual aid teams, was the accounting of labor by work units on the basis of previous evaluation of the size of the work force, and depending on quantity and quality of the work performed. "Before the determination of work norms and payment according to various types of work, the cooperative may temporarily employ the method of "setting flat work units and values according to the actual amount produced," i.e., for each member a fixed number of work units depending on his capabilities and qualifications is established."[40]

In cooperatives having complex production organizations, comparatively large unified farms were run and a rather large amount of manpower was used. Therefore, the labor accounting method, which originated with the mutual aid teams under the conditions of collective labor and individual management of farms, was possible only to a very limited degree and for a short period of time on the cooperatives.

The main deficiency in this method consisted in the fact that it allowed equal compensation for varying expenditures of labor, equal payment for unequal work and, consequently, was unable to act as a stimulus for raising the labor activities of the masses. This was discovered to be especially true in the cooperatives. Thus, if one group of cooperative members was engaged for a whole day in heavy labor and another in light labor, it was necessary to award all the members of both groups, provided they were up to full working power, with 10 labor units (in the mutual aid teams where everyone worked together this was usually no problem). Evaluations made within the individual production brigades possibly might not correspond even if the brigades were performing the same kind of work. For example, in a cooperative of the Hai-kou volost in Shansi Province in 1953 ten units each were given to four groups for weeding 1.5 mou of wheat and to one group for weeding one mou.[41] It is very difficult to evaluate manpower correctly and to calculate labor units when there are no established norms of work, "and the brigade members do not want to disrupt the

friendly relationship with their neighbors."[42]

The basic deficiencies in the accounting of labor according to physical strength and experience of workers lead finally to wage leveling, which goes against the socialist principle of equal pay for equal work.

The situation which developed in 1953-1954 in two suburban cooperatives (in Chang-Kuo-Chuang and Juang-T'u-Kang) near Peiping is characteristic. Each production brigade broke up daily into several groups which did different work. No one of the brigade members, except for the few with whom a given worker worked today knew how any of the other members worked.

The lack of definite criteria for calculating labor units created an atmosphere of mutual suspicion. This did not at all facilitate strengthening of the cooperatives. Appraisal meetings were most disorderly. In the spring of 1954 in Chang-Kuo-Chuang it was decided to give not more than seven units for a working day. Soon the maximum reached 7.5. Then all workers, with the exception of women and children, began to receive 7.5 units per day, and finally even many children "fought" for a full norm.[43] As a result of this wage leveling, labor efficiency and productivity was lowered. No matter how hard you work you will still receive 7.5 units, said the cooperative members in Chang-Kuo-Chuang. Truckers, for example, when preparing manure would load the trucks only half full. When sifting crushed stone (one of the side industries of these cooperatives) two cooperative members would produce half as much per day than two independent peasants.[44] A similar situation developed in the cooperative in the village of Hsin-Kuo-Chuang.

"The problem of improving labor accounting methods has become the decisive link on which depends the strengthening and development of the cooperative," Chao Kang and Liu Hung-Ts'ai stated in their report on the study of labor organization and cooperatives near Peking.[45]

The piecework system of labor accounting better suited the socialistic principles of compensation. In changing over to the piecework system the quantitative and qualitiative production norm was set slightly higher than the average output of the average worker.[46] For example, before the introduction of the piecework system of labor accounting five work units were paid for cutting 400 chin of straw per day in the cooperative in the village of Chang-Kuo-Chuang. After the introduction of piecework the norm for cutting straw was set at 500 chin.[47] Depending on the season, weather conditions, and other factors the norm for a certain type of work could change.

The norms were categorized according to the technical complexity and labor capacity of the operation.[48] For example, in the village of Chang-Kuo-Chuang all the yearly tasks were divided into eight categories. In calculation of yield for the fulfillment of the norm, the difference between each category equaled approximately 0.5 work units.[49] This served as a stimulus for the raising of labor productivity.

By their nature some agricultural tasks demand, as is known, the work of several men in a single work process. In such cases the most expedient form of labor accounting proved to be group piecework. For example, in the cooperative of the village of Hsiao-Sun (District of Ch'ang-cheng, Shansi Province) the men worked together in groups of five in planting hemp. The collective norm constituted 15 work units per mou.[50] The distribution of work units between the members of the group depended on the complexity and weight of the individual tasks which they performed, or on the basis of calcuation of physical strength and work experience according to the unit calculation system.

The piecework system of labor accounting raised the cooperative members' activity sharply. For example, after introducing the piecework system in the cooperatives of the villages of Ch'uan-Ti and Shi-Kou (Shansi Province), the workers occupied in transporting manure began to earn as many as 24 work units per day, i.e., 2-2.5 times more than previously.[51] The usual norm for pulling millet sprouts was previously five to six work units. After changing to the piecework system, women engaged in this task began to earn 11-12 units.[52]

The piecework system of labor accounting lead to a fuller realization of the principle of equal pay for equal work of men and women.[53] As a result women in the cooperative began to play a permanent part in agricultural tasks. For example, after changing to the piecework system, a large majority of the women in Huang-T'u-Kang cooperative were working.[54]

Labor standardization was a necessary condition for the realization of the piecework system of accounting. Determination of labor volume needed for the execution of all tasks in the cooperative (calculation of general work requirements) permitted the rational use of the cooperative's man power.

As a result of introducing the piecework system of labor accounting it was possible to pay the agricultural producer cooperative members on a work-day basis.

In conclusion, we must examine the system of "assignment and responsibility for a set cycle of work," which

is widespread in the cooperatives and closely connected with the piecework system.[55] Group piecework by its nature presupposed the joint fulfillment of each work cycle by a given group of workers. This group could be selected specially for a given occasion or be more stable (a producer detachment or brigade), working over a comparatively long period of time on an assigned plot of land (for example, the weeding of millet for the summer, etc.). Sometimes a whole work cycle in a given field would be assigned to a production brigade. It would usually be assigned to a permanent brigade in a large cooperative. Labor accounting necessary for the fulfillment of tasks of a certain quality during a set period of time and norm of yield was done beforehand, since it was related to the piecework system of accounting. Thus, an assignment was evaluated on the basis of four indexes (quantity and quality of work, amount of time taken for completion of the task, and the norm of labor expenditures). It received the title of "system of assignments and responsibility for a set work cycle according to four (or three in case the volume of work was not specifically set) indices" -- "ssu-ting pao-kung ssu-ting pao-kung fu-tse chih." Some Soviet authors call this the contract system.

It was pointed out in the regulations for agricultural producer's cooperatives: "In order to join the piecework system of labor with the system of individual responsibility in labor organization, the agricultural producer's cooperatives must put the contract system into practice.."[56]

The organization of labor used in the agricultural producer's cooperative in the village of Ch'uan-Ti is an example of combining the assignment system with the group piecework system. For each season the cooperative board divided among the producer brigades all the work the volume of which was determined by the location of the brigades' plot of land, difficulties of tillage, or crop being sown, etc. In case the brigade which was in charge of a given plot spent more labor on it than had been foreseen by the norm no compensation was received for the overexpenditure, and if less labor was spent on the task the brigade received credit only for the set norm of expenditures. Thus, the principle of material interest was put into practice. Within the brigade the distribution of the work of each person in terms of work units, depending on quantity and quality of work performed, and the physical strength and experience of the peasants. Mutual interest in one's neighbor's good work strengthened the sense of responsibility for work of each brigade member.[57]

The further development of this system was the

assignment of an area of work to a brigade with the stipulation that a certain result be achieved. This system was called "work assignment with production guarantee." The difference lay in the fact that in addition to the four indices there was the stipulation of results which the brigade must guarantee. The introduction of this sharply raised the interest of cooperative members in the crops of their assigned plot of land. This can be seen by the example of one of the detachments of the cooperative in the village of Ch'uan-Ti. A blight occured on this detachment's land. As a result a very small crop was harvested. This, however , was not at all reflected in the profits of the detachment members, since they had cultivated their land in accordance with the assignment. Furthermore, they were not concerned with fighting the blight because no labor expenditures had been provided for this.[58] The situation changed with the introduction of the volume of production index. If the planned results were not attained (and if this occurred not because of natural disasters), the brigade members bore the material loss. At the same time, a production portion which exceeded the set volume was divided between the brigade and the cooperative in the ratio of six to four. Thus, direct interest in the battle for crops by both individual workers and the cooperative as a whole was created.

The complex production organizational structure, the precise system of calculation and payment of labor, which distinguished the growth of large-scale cooperative farming did not develop all at once, but gradually, step by step, according to the growth of the cooperative, complexity of intercooperative relations, and the intensification of labor distribution.

The small, newly formed cooperatives were not broken up into producer brigades. They were run directly by the administration, and labor accounting was done according to physical strength and experience, as in the mutual aid teams. They were, strictly speaking, a kind of "collective mutual aid team", in the highest form.[59] The experience of three cooperatives, as was indicated in the report of Chao Kang and Liu Hung-ts'ai, showed that "in cooperatives where there are up to 30 farmsteads it is best for the administration to exercise direct control over production, and the producer brigade system of organization with premanently assigned plots of land is not a necessity..."[60] Therefore, in the period 1952-1954 when cooperatives consisting of 20-30 farmsteads were being formed, the most widespread form was the temporary and seasonal brigade, the former in the

newly organized cooperatives and the latter in the older, stronger cooperatives.

However, with the growth of the cooperative and expansion of its economy, the lack of precise production organization slackened the pace of economic progress and impeded the strengthening of the cooperative. In the larger cooperatives there developed the permanent producer brigades, which in turn split up into detachments.

The more progressive forms of labor calculation and compensation developed just as gradually. For example, in 1953 in the cooperative village of Huang-T'u-Kang the individual piecework system was introduced for 30 kinds of basic agricultural tasks. By autumn of 1954 the piecework system was being used for 63 types of work.[61] The collective piecework system was also used along with the system of labor unit calculation according to physical strength and experience. In general all three basic types of labor accounting were used jointly in the cooperatives. For example, the group piecework system and system of calculation of units according to strength and experience were used for basic field work. The individual piecework system was used for secondary crafts and for odd jobs (usually on the basis of experience of peasant day-laborers' "piecework," etc.)[62]

Increase of production and peasants' profits in the agricultural producer cooperatives.

In the basic level agricultural producer's cooperatives crop yield and peasants' profits increased significantly.

At the end of 1953 there were 2,242 cooperatives in Shansii Province (four times more than in 1952) uniting 52,822 farms (98,000 peasants).[63] Thus, on the average, each cooperative consisted of from 23-24 farms and contained 43-44 workers. The total area planted in grain equaled 852,000 mou, or an average of 380 mou per cooperative. In 1953 the grain crops exceeded those of 1952 by 27.6%, and the cotton crop was 20% larger. At the same time, the grain crop per unit of land exceeded by 21% the level attained by the permanent mutual aid teams in the same location, and exceeded by 38% the level attained by individual farms. In 1953 the average crop per unit of land in the cooperatives was 38.8% higher than the average according to province, and the better cooperative members exceeded by many percent the average and better individual farmers and mutual aid team members. Thus, in 1953 the crop in the cooperative managed by

Feng Hai-K'e in the Hu-Kuan District for the whole area of 345 mou exceeded by almost 200% the crop harvested in 1950 by the mutual aid team on the basis of which the cooperative was formed. In Ch'ang Keng-Keng-Tu's cooperative in the Ho-Chin District the average grain crop in 1953 (the cooperative had been in operation one year) for an area of 35 mou exceeded the 1952 crop by 109%, and exceeded by 155% the average crop in that area.

For 1953 the profits of 50,181 farms (making up 95% of all the farms of Shansi Province) which had joined cooperatives either exceeded or were on a level with the profits of 1952.[64]

As for the five percent (a total of 2,641 farms) whose 1953 receipts were lower than the previous year, the profits of these farms as a rule were still higher than those of the local mutual aid teams and individual peasants. Also, the lowering of profits usually stemmed from the fact that the basic workers received salaries elsewhere.[65] One must consider the fact that participation in a cooperative made it comparatively easy for these people to leave the village without damage to their farm. It is clear then, that if one adds the salary made on the side to the agricultural profits, the total salary, as a rule, was not lower than in the previous year.

In 1954 80% of the agricultural producer's cooperatives of China strove to raise the gross crop yield of agricultural products by 10-30% (there were 650,000 cooperatives in the country at this time).[66] Several hundred cooperatives which had been in existence from three to four years raised their production by 60-100%.[67]

What was the cause, then, of such increase in production and peasants' profits in the basic level agricultural producer cooperatives in comparison with the mutual aid teams and individual farming?

The unified use of land made possible the proper crop-rotation, the planning of crops, and harvest. In order to satisfy the needs of his family, the independent peasant usually planted several crops at once on his small plot of land. He was forced to ignore the peculiarities of the soil and to spend much labor unproductively. In the village of Tsao-Yang-Ts'un (District of Wu-hsiang, Shansi Province) cooperative member Wang Mang-hai raised four crops on his six mou plot of land in 1950 before joining the cooperative. In 1951 the cooperative planted Wang Mang-hai's land with hemp, a crop better suited for this particular soil. The size of the crop, thanks to this, was five tou.[68]

The cooperative in the village of Ch'uan-Ti (Shansi Province) united into four plots 18 mou of land which had formerly been divided between 11 individual owners (0.5 mou was gained from boundry strips). Fifteen working days less were needed for the tilling of these four fields than were required for working the old 11 plots of land, and the crop yield increased by 195 chin.[69]

In comparatively large cooperatives it was possible to carry on work for the improvement of the soil, to construct the necessary buildings, and to adopt better agricultural methods.

In 1951 the cooperative in the village of Wang-Chia-Chuang (Shansi Province) improved a 24 mou area of soil (it took more than 20 man-days for each mou). This type of work was impossible both for the independent peasant and the average mutual aid teams. This same cooperative had an experimental plot in which ten varieties of millet were planted for testing.[70]

Of the 2,242 cooperatives of Shansi Province studied in 1953, 90% had experimental plots. In the producer cooperatives of the province more than 80% of the workable land was ploughed, and more than 90% was thickly sown, while in the usual manual aid teams the method of thick sowing was used on less than half the land, and on independent farms on ten per cent of the land. Moreover, the cooperatives, as a rule, used 20-30% more fertilizer per unit of land than the mutual aid teams.[71]

Centralized use of the labor force with the application of progressive farms of calculating labor allowed a detailed specialization and division of labor.

As a result of the rational organization of labor and the growth of its productivity, each worker in the cooperative in the village of Wang Chia-Chuang received 10 more of arable land, while formerly the human limit had been eight mou. In 1951 the productivity of the cooperative's land was 30% higher than that of the village (1.3 tou to 1 tou).[72]

In Shansi Province in 1953 labor productivity grew about 10% in comparison to 1952.[73]

The greatest advantage in large farms was the possibility of using new agricultural equipment on a large scale and more effectively. The independent farmer cannot use the new equipment alone. It is difficult to use on the small plots of the independents and in general is impossible for them to use. According to data cited in the journal Chung-Kuo Nung-pao, each set of new agricultural equipment[74] in the 43 cooperatives of the Hua-

Ch'uan District in the North-East worked, on an average, 33 shang[75] (one shang in the North-East = one hectare), and in the mutual aid teams 6.8 shang.[76]

In 1952 in the North-East, as a result of introducing new agricultural equipment, a significant increase in production occurred in 46% of the regions. In 48% there occurred a slight increase, and only in six per cent of the regions did there occur a decrease in crop yield because of lack of knowledge in using new equipment.[77] A particularly large increase in crop size due to the introduction of new equipment was observed in the northern regions, where cooperatives at that time were on a more solid basis than in the south.[78]

The unification of independent farms in agricultural producer's cooperatives made possible the setting aside of a certain number of workers for collective subsidiary industry. The small agricultural organization, such as the independent farmstead, was forced to expend much energy unproductively on a large number of uncomplicated tasks and operations. In the cooperatives the private interests of the individual members were joined with the common interests. A cooperative member's profit depended on the total harvest and not on the harvest of his own particular plot, as was the case with the mutual aid teams. If previously, in the mutual aid team, he was preoccupied with his own participation in working his fields out of fear that, without him, his neighbors might work in his fields haphazardly, the situation in the cooperative was different. This situation created very favorable grounds for the development of collective subsidiary industry.

In the cooperative of the village of Wang-chia-chuang ten men out of 27 systematically engaged in subsidiary industry.[79] In 1951, in the District of Ch'ang-chih, in the ten cooperatives studied, there was a surplus of 6,465 man-days (one man-day being equal to the amount of work performed by an adult male in the course of one day). Of these excess man-days 2,523 were used for improvement of land appendages (irrigation, fertilizing of soil, leveling of uneven parts, etc.), and 3,242 were used for subsidiary industry, which brought in a 41,506 yuan profit.[80] Subsidiary industry brought considerable profits to the agricultural producer cooperatives. In 1953, in the cooperatives of Shansi Province, profits from outside occupations and subsidiary industry amounted to 1,080,000 yuan, i.e. about eight percent of the total profits. In some cooperatives profits from outside occupations were even higher.

Thus, the basic level agricultural producer's cooperatives had the basic advantages inherent to collective farming, which conditioned the considerable increase in labor productivity and agricultural production.

Along with this, however, this type of cooperative had limited means for the development of production forces. It did not completely solve the contradiction between the collective character of production and the private form of appropriation. The basic level agricultural producer's cooperative was founded on a contradictory socio-economic basis: on the one hand there existed in it common property in the form of land plots, which were their land shares, and in the case of others private property was preserved in the form of production media.

The presence of privately owned production media along with collective property in the cooperative, and the necessity from this of apportioning a certain amount of the cooperative's profits for distribution according to private property, retarded the development of production forces.

"In connection with the fact that in the basic level cooperatives," Mao Tse-tung wrote on this subject, "there is still preserved a semiprivate-property character of appropriation. This form of ownership, at a certain stage, begins to impede the development of production forces."[31]

The basic level agricultural producer's cooperative, as a rule, was a small producing organization, encompassing 20-30 farmsteads. Mao Tse-tung wrote that it is easier to form these cooperatives than the larger ones. Their managers and rank-and-file members quickly gained experience in operating collective farms. But such small cooperatives, in which there were few people, little land, and very limited amounts of money, could not farm on a large scale and were not in a position to use machinery. Mao Tse-tung concluded that "Small cooperatives cannot last long and must gradually unite."[32]

The basic level agricultural cooperative originated and developed under the conditions of the country's extremely weak industrial basis, and its means of production consisted mainly of plain hand tools. "Mechanical power" was that of livestock and partly human. Privately owned production media and the cooperatives' weak technical production basis were closely related.

However, even in the very contradictory organization of the basic level agricultural producer's cooperatives, the foundations were laid for transition to a higher, socialist form of producer cooperative, the agricultural artel.

The transition to a socialistic form of farming was directly related to the increase of the influence of socialist elements in the agricultural producer's cooperative in the course of expanded production. The cooperative member could not make use of his land or plow, etc., at his own discretion.[83] His property rights served only as a basis for receiving a set sum of profits from the cooperative as compensation for land, etc.

Just as the private ownership of property in the cooperative was not a basis for private engagement in agriculture, so the relatively large increase in profits of some cooperative members in comparison with others did not lead to differentiation. On the contrary, each increase in cooperative members' profits due to development of collective farming contributed to its organizational and agricultural strengthening and served as a stimulus for attracting new members into the cooperative.

The cooperative's indivisible fund grew in the process of accomplishing expanded production. If the indivisible fund increased only in an absolute way during the first years of the cooperative's operation, then after the cooperative had become sufficiently strong the size of interest bearing deposits to the indivisible fund were re-examined.

Cooperative members' socialistic awareness grew in proportion to the development of cooperative farming and increase in labor profits. This created a basis for the collectivization of work animals and other tools. After two to three years of the cooperative's existence these tools were redeemed from their owners.[84]

A decrease in payments for land gradually occurred in the course of expanded production. Under the system of fixed rates of payment for land shares the amount of profit which the cooperative members received for their land share decreased with the increase in crops. This situation created favorable conditions for re-examination of the proportions of profit distribution in favor of increasing payments for labor and the abolition of private ownership of land.

In speaking of abolition of private ownership of land in the agricultural producer cooperatives it is necessary to keep in mind the following situation.

Difference in size of cooperative members' land shares was not too important, since as a result of the agrarian reform the amount of land owned by separate farms, upon calculation, was almost equal for each individual. It is not a problem of kulaks or well-to-do peasants, who, at the time of the basic level cooperatives' formation,

usually either did not participate at all (the kulaks) or participated to a very small degree (the well-to-do peasants).[85]

Each cooperative member, on the one hand, participated by his labor in the overall productivity of the cooperative, which went to the payment of his land share. On the other hand, as an owner of land, he received from the cooperative's produce a certain part as compensation for the land share which formerly belonged to him.

In other words, each cooperative member, to a certain degree, paid himself as a landowner, i.e. part of his compensation for land was a converted form of payment for labor of persons who received this compensation. Since difference in size of land shares generally was not great, only an insignificant part of the cooperative members, who owner comparatively large shares, received profits from the labor of others less well-off in land.

Let us examine a characteristic example from materials of the investigation in the village of T'ien-Chia-Fu (Hopeh Province). Out of 41 cooperative farmsteads 25 (61%) gave from 0.1 to 15% of their labor in payment for other lands, 13 farmsteads (31.8%) lived entirely by their own labor or used the fruits of the labor of others from 0.1 to 15%, three farmsteads (7.2%) lived mainly on their own land shares.[86]

Even with as high a level of compensation for land as 50% of the profit (after deduction of sums going for the reimbursement for production media used, deposits to the indivisable fund and payments for credit), actually only 30% was paid for land, since the agricultural tax entered into the payment of land shares.[87] This means that for the part of the land share for which the cooperative members with large landholdings received compensation, they received a maximum of 30% of the profits which this land produced in the average year.

If one takes into account the profits from collective subsidiary industry, the labor profits of the cooperative members in the village of T'ien-Chia-Fu (Hopeh Province) in 1954 constituted 70-90% of the profits. Labor profits of 63% in the cooperative in the village of Lung-Ch'uan-Hsi made up 55-75% of their profits. Only on individual farms did profits from the land exceed those of labor; included in this number were the farms of invalids and those not capable of doing heavy work, etc.[88] Also in the village of T'ien-Chia-Fu, 90% of the cooperative members' farms' (in the village of Lung-Ch'uan-Hsi 63%) profits received from cooperative farming equaled

85-115% of the labor expended by them in cooperative industry.[89]

In the process of expanded production on the basic level agricultural producer's cooperatives there occurred an increase in the labor profits both in absolute and relative terms.

As for the aged and cooperative members not capable of heavy labor, their interests, in accordance with the gradual decrease in profits received from land, were made all the more secure through the general welfare fund.

These conditions greatly facilitated the abolition of private ownership of land in the agricultural producer's cooperatives.

As an example let us examine the transformation of the basic level agricultural producer cooperative into a socialist cooperative.

In February 1952 an agricultural producer's cooperative headed by Han En was formed in the village of Pa-San-T'un (District of Chia Ou-he, Kirin Province).[90] The peasants who joined it were all poor. After three years the standard of living of the 85 cooperative members reached the level of the average and well-to-do peasants. The cooperative's indivisible fund contained 4,000 yuan. The value of collective property increased by four times the cooperative members' contributions to the artel.

Compensation for land decreased from 1.2 tan per mou of the best land to eight tou, i.e. by one third. The size of payments for the use of horses and carts decreased by 56.7%. In 1954 expenditures for payment of land shares constituted a total of 4.6% of the cooperative's total expenditures.[91]

All these phenomena made possible the transforming of basic level cooperatives into socialist producer's cooperatives three years after their formation.

* * *

In the basic level producer's cooperatives, "members' private ownership of land and of some vital production media are preserved to a considerable, or even to a very considerable degree, and production media belonging to cooperative members are not subjected to immediate collectivization."[92] However, some of the means of production are held as collective property, and privately owned land and other means of production are used by the

cooperative jointly. The right of land ownership in the cooperative was separated from the right of land disposition. Private property no longer served as a distinction in the village. The cooperative members received a set payment, a fixed amount of the collective produce for land and other production media. The bulk of the year's produce was divided up according to labor. This was a characteristic feature of the basic level agricultural producer's cooperative was a transitional form between light, independent agriculture and the socialist form of agriculture.

1. Ching-chi Yen-chiu, 1955, No 1, p 58.

2. "Bulletin of the State Statistical Administration of the Central People's Government on the Results of the Development of the National Economy and the Fulfillment of the State Plan for 1953"; "Bulletin of the SSA on the Restoration and Development of National conomy for 1952", Narodnyy Kitay, 1954, No 22, Supplement, pp 7, 15.

3. Jen-min Jih-pao, 10 March 1955.

4. ibid.

5. Pravda, 26 October 1955.

6. Jen-min Jih-pao, 7 May 1955.

7. A conventional mou is a plot of ground, the crop of which is equal to the average yield from one mou in an average year in a given locality; a tax mou is a plot of ground which was compared to a mou of land during the agricultural tax calculation. /See Hsiao Hung-lin, Agricultural Mutual Aid Teams and Cooperation in the CPR, Peiping, 1954, (in Chinese); "A Survey of Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives in the Ta-ming Provincial District", op. cit., Material on Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives During the Reconstruction Period 1949-1952./

8. Regulations of Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives in the Chinese Peoole's Republic, Peiping, 1956, p 14.

9. Reshenive Shestogo (rasshirennogo) plenuma ---, op. cit. p 15.

10. Regulations of Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives --, op. cit., p 20.

11. "A Survey of Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives ---", in Material on Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives During the Reconstruction ---, op. cit., p 92.

12. Regulations of Agricultural Producers' ---, op. cit., p 21.

13. ibid., pp 21-22.

14. ibid., p 23.

15. Resheniye Shestogo ---, op. cit., p 19.

16. Ching-chi Yen-chiu, 1958, No 1, p 32.

17. TsK KPK pointed out that mistakes of this type caused in some places "evidences of negligence towards domestic animals on the part of members of the cooperative", Resheniye Shestogo ---, op. cit., p 16.

18. "The directives of the TsK KPK and the State Council on strengthening production leadership and organizational construction of agricultural producers' cooperatives", Druzhba, 20 December 1956.

19. Materialy tret'yey sessii Vsekitayskogo sobraniya narodnykh predstaviteley (Material on the Third Session of the All-China Congress of People's Representatives), Moscow, 1956, p 55.

20. Regulations of Agricultural Producers' ---, op. cit., p 36.

21. See Hsiao Hung-lin, op. cit., p 117.

22. Regulations of Agricultural Producers' ---, op. cit., p 42.

23. See Jen-min Jih-pao, 26 March 1953.

24. For example, here is the way in which the members of a cooperative of the village Ch'uan-ti (P'ing-shun District of Shansi Province) changed their opinion on the indivisibility of the general fund: "In the initial period after formation of the cooperative they (the

members of the cooperative) were in favor of taking their share of the general fund on leaving the cooperative, and now 99% are against this. In the course of discussion those who were for the divisibility of the general fund put forth only one argument. They said that just as the general fund and common property had been created by the labor of all the members of the cooperative, so does each member possess a certain share, and on leaving the cooperative he has the right to claim his share of the general fund. If this was not so, then the right of private property would be violated. But the majority of members considered that 1) since the general fund and common property are created by the collective labor of the cooperative, they do not belong to any one individual, must be common property and must not be divided; 2) during his time in the cooperative, each member takes advantage of the fruits of his labor, his life improves, and his land also improves. They considered that a member, when leaving a cooperative and taking his land and private property, receives a large profit and should not presume to receive more than this; 3) the collective labor of the cooperative members is not the only source of accumulation of the general fund, but also the aid of the government economic sector and supply and marketing cooperatives; therefore, separate individuals cannot withdraw their shares from the general fund; 4) the dispersal of the general fund and common property inevitably undermines the basis of expanded production, decreases the possibility of conducting various socially beneficial undertakings, and is reflected unfavorably in the development of the cooperative." [Fan Ch'ang-chiang, The Agricultural Producers' Cooperative in the village of Ch'uan-tu, Peiping, 1952, pp 55-56, (in Chinese).

25. Regulations of Agricultural Producers' ---, op. cit.,. pp 15-16.

26. Fan Ch'ang-chiang, op. cit., pp 49-50.

27. Reshenive Shestogo ---, op. cit., p 13.

28. See Ching-chi Yen-chiu, 1955, No 2, p 94.

29. Hsiao Hung-lin, op. cit., pp 112-113.

30. "A Survey of Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives ---",

op. cit., in Material on Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives During the Reconstruction ---, p 92.

31. See "Decree by the Central Committee of the KPK ---", Agrarnyye preobrazovaniya ---, op. cit., p 375.

32. See Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1954, No 13, p 9.

33. "Complex Agricultural Producers' Cooperative, Headed by Li Shun-ta", in Agrarnyye preobrazovaniya ---, op. cit., p 291.

34. Hsiao Hung-lin, op. cit., p 120.

35. See Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1954, No 13, pp 9-10.

36. Hsiao Hung-lin, op. cit., p 121.

37. Description of the "declaration system" borrowed from Hsiao Hung-lin, op. cit., p 121.

38. See Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1953, No 4, p 24.

39. "Decree of the TsK KPK on the Development of Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives", op. cit., p 375.

40. Regulations of Agricultural Producers' ---, op. cit., p 35.

41. See Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1954, No 21, p 13.

42. ibid.

43. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1954, No 13, p 11.

44. ibid.

45. This report was recommended by the Ministry of Agriculture of the KNR as a handbook for leaders of work brigades. The ministry emphasized that the matter of aid to agricultural producers' cooperatives in the organization of labor and calculation of work has, at the present stage, become one of the deciding links in strengthening the development of agricultural cooperatives. (Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1954, No 13, p 11.

46. See Regulations of Agricultural Producers' ---, op. cit, p 34.

47. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1954, No 13, p 12.

48. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1954, No 2, p 13.

49. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1954, No 13, p 12.

50. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1954, No 21, p 14.

51. ibid.

52. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1954, No 13, pp 10, 12.

53. "Many men are very dissatisfied with this. They still think that women are credited with more units than they deserve. To prove this, Chang Yui-ling competed with some women in tying bunches of radishes. He tied 600 bunches, but some of the women tied 800 of them. At this, Chang gave up his argument." (Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1954, No 13, p 12).

54. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1954, No 13, p 12.

55. See Sotsialisticheskiy pod"yem v kitayskoy derevne (Socialist Rise in the Chinese Village), Moscow, 1956.

56. Regulations of Agricultural Producers' ---, op. cit., pp 36-37.

57. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1953, No 3, p 26.

58. ibid.

59. Hsueh-hsi, Peiping, 1952, No 4, p 30.

60. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1954, No 13, p 10.

61. ibid., p 11.

62. Hsiao Hung-lin, op. cit., p 125; Ch'en Ch'ih, On Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives (Lectures), Shenyang, 1954, p 28, (in Chinese).

63. Agrarnyye preobrazovaniya v narodnom Kitaye, op. cit., p 319.

64. ibid., pp 321-322.

65. ibid., pp 322-323.

66. Mao Tse-tung, op. cit., Voprosy kooperirovaniya ---, p 23.

67. See Narodnyy Kitay, 1955, No 8, p 14.

68. Hsueh-hsi, 1952, No 4, p 32.

69. ibid.

70. ibid.

71. Agrarnyye preobrazovaniya v narodnom Kitaye, op. cit., p 325.

72. Hsueh-hsi, 1952, No 4, p 32.

73. Agrarnyye preobrazovaniya v narodnom Kitaye, op. cit., p 324.

74. Into this went the following: four single-plowshare plows, a harrow, a seeder, two rollers (for sealing the moisture into the soil), and a harvester.

75. One shang in the Northeast equals one hectare.

76. See Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1953, No 23, p 33.

77. ibid.

78. ibid.

79. Hsueh-hsi, 1952, No 4, p 32.

80. ibid., p 32. Here and elsewhere sums of money are given as calculated on the exchange value of 1955.

81. Sotsialisticheskiy pod"yem v kitayskoy derevne, op. cit, p 470.

82. ibid., p 453.

83. According to the regulations of agricultural producers' cooperatives, an owner could not sell his cattle to a second party without the consent of the cooperative (Article 26, point 1). See Regulations of Agricultural Producers' ---, op. cit., p 20.

84. See Resheniye Shestogo ---, op. cit., pp 15, 17.

85. ibid., p 8.

86. Ching-chi Yen-chiu, 1955, No 4, p 96.

87. Ching-chi Yen-chiu, 1955, No 2, p 95.

88. ibid., p 96.

89. ibid., p 97.

90. Li Shun-ta, The Agricultural Producers' Cooperative Headed by Li Shun-ta and Seven other Cooperatives and Mutual Aid Teams, Shanghai, 1952 (in Chinese).

91. Ching-chi Yen-chiu, 1955, No 1, p 15.

92. Reshenive Shestogo ---, op. cit., p 12.

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CHAPTER III

CLASS STRUGGLE IN THE VILLAGE AND LIQUIDATION OF KULAKS AS A CLASS.

The socialist reorganization of agriculture in China was developing in the form of a severe class struggle.

The poor peasants (bednyak) and the lower middle-class peasants, which constitute 60-70% of the agricultural population, were the leading power that supported the movement for a socialist reorganization of the village.

The Communist Party, relying on the poor peasant, endeavored to strengthen the union with the wealthy serednyaks and, uniting thus more than 90% of the peasarts in one wide front of struggle for socialism, tried to bring into existence successful co-operation in the field of agriculture.

The wealthy serednyaks in China formed a mere 20-30% of the agricultural population. Having at their disposal a comparatively large quantity of land, manpower and inventory, they were receiving relatively high returns and income, and some of them exploited hired labor to a small degree. The wealthy serednyaks hesitated between the two roads of development of the village: that of socialism and that of capitalism.

Until the mass rise of the cooperative movement in the second half of the year 1955, certain agricultural workers, seeing that some wealthy serednyaks had more means of production and better agro-technical experience, tried to get them into the cooperatives by all means, sometimes even violating the principle of voluntary agreement.

However, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China condemned these acts and emphasized that first of all, the cooperatives should invite the bednyaks and the lower middle-class peasants, and only then, strictly adhering to the principle of voluntary agreement, wealthy serednyaks should be admitted.

Under the conditions of a revolutionary movement

in the Chinese village and under the influence of the growth of the agricultural production and income of peasants in the cooperatives, the upper sections of the serednyaks began to turn to the socialist side.

In the second half of 1955 and in 1956, wealthy serednyaks finally stopped hesitating and, next to bednyaks and lower groups of serednyaks, started actively to join the cooperatives.

The socialist reconstruction of agriculture inevitably requires a liquidation of kulak holdings, but in various countries the means of liquidation may vary in conformity with the respective historical conditions and the relations of class forces.

In the Chinese People's Republic, the Communist Party has used peaceful methods in accomplishing the socialist revolution both in the city and in the country. One of these peaceful methods of liquidating the kulak holdings was that admitting kulaks into the agricultural cooperatives with the final goal that of their re-education through labor.

In old China, under the conditions of the semi-colonial and semi-feudal systems, capitalism did not develop in industry or agriculture. The kulaks formed only about 5% of the agricultural population and they possessed 10-20% of the total arable land.[1] As a result of the insufficient development in industry and transportation, predominance of primitive agriculture in the village, constant wars among militarists, and absence of a common market, the income from commercial agriculture was less secure than the natural land rent. For that reason many of the kulaks did not operate their farms in a capitalist manner but gave their land on lease and, receiving income in the form of rent, occupied themselves with usury and business transaction. On the eve of the agrarian reform, the results of investigation in villages of Hunan Province showed that 48% of the entire kulak land was leased out, and in Honan Province -- 33%.[2]

The Kulaks used almost no agricultural machinery for land cultivation and practised agriculture by backward methods, using manual labor and farm animals. Consequently, the kulak farms in China cannot be considered completely capitalist; they had, to a considerable extent, a semi-feudal character.

As a result of the agrarian reform, the kulaks were weakened economically when they lost a part of the land which they had been leasing. The peasants were freed from debt obligations toward the landlords and kulaks. Moreover, the kulaks found themselves in

political isolation. "The agrarian transformation did not only destroy, in the sphere of economic relations, the landlord class and weaken the position of the kulaks, but it also completely destroyed the landlords and politically isolated the kulaks. Vast masses of the thinking peasantry looked upon the exploitation by the landlords and kulaks as a shameful thing."[3] At the moment of the basic completion of the agrarian reform in China, the kulak farms formed 3.6% of the country's total agricultural units, and they represented 6.4% of China's arable land.[4]

In the first period after the agrarian reform, there was noted a tendency toward a certain revival of kulak farms. Kulaks were buying land from needy peasants, granting high-interest loans, etc.

The initial movement for agricultural cooperation was bound to provoke an aggravation of the class struggle in the country. The cooperative movement appeared to be at the same time a process of a gradual restriction and liquidation of the kulaks as a class.

The kulaks and the former landlords reacted with an embittered resistance against the socialist reconstruction of the village. They committed acts of sabotage and arson, murdered activists, spread false rumors, etc. In the village Sinfa of the Yunnan Province, shortly after a cooperative was established, enemies set fire to it, destroying all homes and buildings of the local population.[5] In I-t'ung Uyezd of Kirin Province, kulaks poisoned the cattle belonging to the cooperative.[6]

Wherever kulaks penetrated the mutual aid teams and the cooperatives, they took the leading positions into their hands and exploited other members of the organization. We might mention as an example the false mutual aid team of Li Yu-kuei. This kulak suddenly became a partisan of the new movement in the country and organized a "mutual aid" team which was joined by 12 farms. Li Yu-kuei had 12 horses and several hundreds mou of land, and among the members of the group there were eight who had no horses at all. The following order was established in this group: from the beginning, the peasants were cultivating the land of Li Yu-kuei, and only later, when the times for sowing or harvesting were almost past, were they permitted to attend to their own land.[7] The result of similar acts of kulaks was discrediting to the very idea of cooperation.

The kulaks also tried to propagate the slogan of "equality" when organizing mutual aid teams and cooperatives which consisted in joining the wealthy to the wealthy

and the poor to the poor. They formed "mutual aid" teams into which they accepted only kulak farms. In two villages in In-hsien Uyezd of the Province of Chekiang, five kulak farms formed a mutual aid team which did not admit any bednyaks or serednyaks.[8] In the report of Mao Tse-tung at the Conference of Secretaries of the Provincial, City, and Rayon Committees of the CPC, on July 31, 1955, it was stated that in some villages of the Heilungkiang Province exist the following unhealthy conditions: "the strong seek the strong and shun the poor peasants", and "kulaks and wealthy farmers are taking advantage and establishing basic level brigades, or in other words, kulak cooperatives."[9]

When basic-level cooperatives began to be formed, kulaks tried to infiltrate and occupy the key positions in order to undermine the cooperatives from within. Where they were successful, they intentionally increased the profit shares, for which the acreage was a basis, exploited bednyaks, stood in the way of increasing the indivisible funds, hired laborers who worked for them in the cooperatives, etc. In other cases the cooperatives disintegrated as a result of the undermining activities of the kulaks and other reactionary elements.

In the volost of Kyanchan in She-hsien Uyezd in Hopeh Province, the management of cooperatives was in the hands of kulak elements. Out of 27 presidents, vice-presidents, and chief cattle-breeders of the cooperatives, only one was a bednyak. These "leaders" were increasing the income paid according to the acreage and the number of farm animals, fixing exorbitant rates on shares, etc.[10]

In some cooperatives, the principle of concentrating on the poor peasants was ignored. In such cooperatives they thought that since the bednyaks were not powerful, it was a better policy to attract wealthy farmers to the cooperative. In 1955, in the village of Peishangao of the Shantung Province, 98 bednyaks applied on several occasions for admission to the cooperative but every time they were refused.[11] In the Hai-lun Uyezd of the Heilungkiang Province a majority of serednyaks and bednyaks were often put into such a position that they were unable to join the cooperatives. The kulaks who penetrated the cooperatives began to deal in usury. In one of the villages of the Uyezd, out of 134 households 53 received loans at 50% p.a., and in certain cases, even at 100% p.a.[12]

The question of the leading positions in the cooperatives was of great importance; actually, it underlay the existence of this form of organization. A cooperative in which leadership was in hands of the kulaks could

become a counter-revolutionary factor.

The people's government directed the struggle of the peasants against the destructive activities of the former landowners and kulaks who stood up against cooperation. Until the beginning of the mass development of the cooperative movement, former landowners and kulaks were denied admission to the mutual aid teams and cooperatives. It was forbidden to admit to the mutual aid teams those persons who leased large quantities of land,[13] to cede land to the group without active participation in the production process,[14] and to hire farm labor.

The Party policy in the village, after the agrarian reform, concentrated on the restriction and gradual liquidation of production, marketing, speculative, and usurious activities of the kulak class. Buying and selling of land, hiring or labor, trade, and granting of loans were permitted only to a certain extent. The development of kulak farms was subject to control by the people's government, which defined the conditions for hiring of labor, rent, buying and selling of land, maximum interest charges on loans, etc. The taxing policy also represented a means of curbing kulak power. Kulaks contributed in the form of taxes, up to 30% of their total production -- approximately twice as much as the serednyaks.[15]

Government financial aid to the peasants had a great significance in the establishment of the cooperative system and the restriction of kulaks, as well as in the development of credit and market cooperation in the village.

The growth of the national income enabled the government to grant credit to cooperatives and individual bednyaks for payment of shares when they joined cooperatives.

The volume of the agricultural credit was increasing as follows:[16]

(in million yuan)

Year:	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956
	302.2	693.2	1127.1	1134.	1434.	3200.

An extraordinarily great number of loans was given to poor peasants for payment of shares in the period of the expansion of the cooperative movement. Thus, in 1956 loans amounting to 600 million yuan were granted to 40 million bednyak farms, i.e. more than 30% of all farms in China.[17]

The government fought against the kulaks' usurious

activities also through bank loans to peasants and a general development of credit cooperatives.

The establishment of a broad credit cooperative network made it possible to concentrate the free and dispersed funds and utilize them for the expansion of agricultural production and the liberation of peasants from the usurers' oppression.[18]

Since the peasants could get a loan in the credit cooperative at a low interest charge, they ceased to apply to the kulak-usurers, and the latter were gradually forced to discontinue their usurious activity and bring their capital to the credit cooperatives in the form of shares.

For instance, an investigation of 57 villages of Shansi and Kirin Provinces in 1955 showed that 287 usurers of these villages deposited 30,000 yuan in the credit cooperatives.[19]

The result of an investigation of 159 villages in seven provinces proved that in 1953 (before the organization of a credit cooperative in these villages) the usurers were patronized by 2570 farms, whereas in 1954 (after foundation of credit cooperatives) - by 80 farms.[20]

Credit cooperatives which enjoyed a great popularity among the peasants, who called them "our little banks", granted in 1956 loans in the total amount of 1500 million yuan. Peasants' savings in interest charges for the period of only six months of the year 1956 (compared to what was usually charged by the usurers) amounted to 300 million yuan. This money could buy two million tons of grain.

The number of the credit cooperatives was growing fast. By the end of 1956, they existed in 97% of the total volosts in the country and they comprised 77.2% of all peasant households.[21]

An important role in the development of the cooperative movement and the restriction of kulaks was played by supply-and-services cooperatives.[22] Through the supply-and-services cooperatives, the government trade organizations supplied the peasants with merchandise at reduced prices and bought agricultural products and raw materials. The purchases and retail trade volume of the marketing cooperatives was continually increasing (%).[23]

	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954
Volume of purchases	100	341	775	1125	1612
Volume of retail trade	---	100	295	508	891

In addition, the number of supply-and-services cooperatives was growing, and between 1949 and 1956 their membership increased from 10.6 million to 162 million, i.e., almost 16 times.[24] Organizing the contract system in compliance with the government price policy, the supply-and-services cooperatives movement helped the government to obtain the necessary quantity of raw materials for industry and food for the population.

Beginning in November 1953, the government gradually introduced the system of planned purchases and distribution of grain, cotton and certain other basic agricultural products.

The peasants pledged to sell to the government organizations surpluses of grain, oil-bearing crops and cotton at prices fixed by the government.

The introduction of the planned purchases system led to a rapid growth in the volume of agricultural products purchases. This measure dealt a critical blow to the kulaks, as the possibilities of their enrichment through market speculation were sharply curbed.

The government, by controlling the sphere of circulation, protected the working-peasants from exploitation and ruin. However, the mental weapon in the struggle against the progress of capitalism in the country were producer's cooperatives. This is confirmed by the diminishing quantities of land that were sold, which was due to the development of production cooperatives. In 11 uyezds of the Hopeh Province, farmers sold 7199 hectares in 1951, 5714 ha in 1952, 4903 ha in 1953, 2265 ha in 1954 and 518 ha in 1955.[25]

The rapid development of socialist reforms contributed to the isolation and gradual liquidation of the remnant of the capitalist class in the village. In the end a situation arose when, to use the words of the kulaks themselves, "you wanted to hire a man and there was no one to be hired; you wanted to offer a loan and there was no one to take it."[26]

As early as in 1954, Liu Shao-chi mentioned in the report "On the Draft of the Constitution of the C.P.R." "that the kulak farms do not develop in an ascending but a descending line.....each kulak as an average has only twice as much land as the average peasant. The majority of old kulak farms hire very little labor if any at all, the usurers' activity has abated, and their influence in the sphere of commerce is considerably limited."[27] The kulak farms constituted in 1954 2.1% of all farms in the country.[28]

The enormous development of the producer's coopera-

tive movement, growth of the supply-and-services and credit cooperatives, and the centralized purchasing and selling system which was put into practice, were seriously undermining the positions of capitalism in the village. This resulted in an increasing resistance of the kulaks and a part of the wealthy serednyaks to these measures. Some of the local leading workers, frightened by the aggravation of the class struggle and hesitation of the wealthy serednyaks, began to assert that the organized cooperatives could not be consolidated, that the pace of cooperatives development was too rapid. Maintaining that it was necessary to slow down the pace of the development of cooperatives, they followed the right-wing opportunist course, that of an absolute reduction of the farmers' cooperatives.

Thus, in the province of Chekiang, out of 53,000 cooperatives, 15,000, totalling 400,000 farms, disintegrated at once.[29]

The right wing deviation was subjected to severe criticism in the resolutions of the Sixth Plenum of the CC of the CPC which convened in October 1955.[30]

The plenum pointed out that the right-wing deviation expressed the demands of the bourgeoisie and impulsive capitalist elements in the country. The workers who supported this right-wing deviation, decided the plenum, had surrendered to the elemental capitalist forces in the country, became estranged from the masses, forgot about the firm resolution to bring onto the road to socialism the bednyaks and a large part of the new and old serednyaks whose material prosperity could be strengthened only through cooperatives. The plenum brought out the task of increasing the active leadership in the movement for producer's cooperatives and worked out organizational principles which became foundations of the model regulations of the agricultural producer's cooperative.

The criticism in the Sixth Plenum of the right-wing deviation, the policy of further development of the cooperative movement, and the consolidation of the leadership in this movement incited a rapid rise of cooperatives in all the villages in the country.

Experience has clearly proved the correctness of the conclusions of the Sixth Plenum of the CC of the CPC that the majority of peasants want to take the socialist road, and the task of the Party is to encourage this initiative. In all provinces of the country, peasants, especially bednyaks and lower sections of serednyaks, stood decisively on the road of cooperation.

In the summer of 1955, producer's cooperatives

included 16.9 million farms,[31] but at the end of 1955 they embraced 75 million (almost 63%) farms in China.[32] By the end of 1955, China already had 1,900,000 cooperatives, i.e. almost three times as many as before the fall harvest. They cultivated more than 1 billion mou, or approximately 64% of the total arable land of the country.[33]

In January, 1956, the producer's cooperatives included 80% of all farms; one month later - in February - 87%, and in March about 90% of all farms.

Under such conditions, a clear differentiation could be observed among the kulaks. Only a few pursued their hostile or wait-and-see policy when the great majority of former landowners and kulaks were forced to accept the socialist reconstruction of the village and began to apply for admission into cooperatives.

Taking into consideration all these circumstances, the Central Committee of the CPC presented in January 1956, in the "Draft of the Fundamental Features of the Plan for a Development of Agriculture Between 1956 and 1967", concrete methods for the liquidation of kulaks by other than forcible means. In the plan it was pointed out that it is possible to admit into cooperatives kulaks and former landowners divided into three categories. Those who renounced exploitation and observed all laws of the national government were permitted to become members of cooperatives and could change their social status and call themselves peasants. Others who advocated the passive or neutral policy were admitted as candidates for membership in cooperatives. Finally, the negatives ones received the opportunity to rehabilitate themselves through labor, under the supervision of the members of the cooperative. In regard to all these persons, the principle of "equal reward for equal work" was adopted. Nevertheless, none of them would be permitted to assume a position of authority for a definite period. All means of production belonging to the kulaks became collective property without any remuneration.

Permitting kulaks to join the cooperatives, the Party embarked practically on the policy of complete liquidation of kulaks as a class.

During 1956 almost all kulaks and former landlords were permitted to join cooperatives or work in them under citizen supervision. According to statistical data, in the early liberated areas 50% of the kulaks and former landlords were admitted to membership of cooperatives, 40% as candidates, and 20% worked under the people's supervision.[34]

The peaceful liquidation of kulak farms does not signify that they were developing into socialism. This solution presented itself as a result of a severe class struggle in the village, a struggle with the attempts of the kulak to hamper and wreck the cooperative movement. Combining the flexible policy of labor-educating the wavering and loyal kulaks and the policy of strict punishment and compulsion of hostile elements not responsive to persuasion, the Party achieved a great success in the liquidation of the last expoliting class in the village.

The rapid pace of socialist reforms in the village enabled acceleration of the socialist reconstruction of capitalist industry and commerce, as well as that of cottage industry.

1. Narodnyy Kitay, 1957, No 2, p 10.
2. Mo Yueh-ta, Development of the Cooperative Movement in Agriculture in our Country, Peiping, 1957, p 145 (in Chinese).
3. Liu Shao-ch'i, "Political Report of the Central Committee ---", op. cit., in Materialy VIII Vsekitayskogo s"yezda ---, pp 13-14.
4. Mirovaya Sotsialisticheskaya sistema khozyaystva (World Socialist System of Economy), Moscow, 1958, p 176.
5. Delyusin, L., Velikiye peremeny v kitayskoy derevne (Great Changes in the Chinese Village), Moscow, 1957, p 139.
6. ibid.
7. Pravda, 11 September 1953.
8. Kuang-ming Jih-pao, Peiping, 4 January 1955.
9. See Mao Tse-tung, op. cit., Voprosy kooperirovaniya --, pp 29-30.
10. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1955, No 3, p 12.
11. Druzhba, 26 November 1955.
12. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1954, No 24, p 13.
13. The amount of owned and rented land of those entering

mutual aid teams could not exceed twice that which its owners could till without outside help.

14. This was not valid for those incapable of working, widows, and the families of workers and public servants.

15. Li Ch'eng-jui, "The Agricultural Tax in New China", (Narodnyy Kitay, 1953, No 22, p 13).

16. Together with unpaid balances of loans granted in previous years. Razvitiye ekonomiki stran narodnoy demokratii Azii (Development of the Economies of the Asian People's Democracies), Moscow, 1957, p 174.

17. Jen-min Jih-pao, 27 December 1957.

18. Jen-min Jih-pao, 12 September 1955.

19. ibid.

20. ibid.

21. Narodnyy Kitay, 1957, No 2, p 15.

22. In Old China the peasants usually sold their produce to middlemen, who stood between them and the consumer, and who paid for this produce only 25-30% of its market value.

23. Zhamin, V. A., Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskiye preobrazovaniya v sel'skom khozyaystve KNR (Social-Economic Transformations in Agriculture in the CPR), Moscow, 1958, p 190

24. Kokarev, N. A., Sotsialisticheskoye preobrazovaniye sel'skogo khozyaystva v Kitayskoy Narodnoy Respublike (The Socialist Transformation of Agriculture in the Chinese People's Republic), Moscow, 1958, p 65.

25. Materialy tret'yey sessii Vsekitayskogo sobraniya narodnykh predstaviteley, op. cit., p 48.

26. Druzhba, 5 March 1957.

27. Liu Shao-ch'i, O proyekte Konstitutsii Kitayskoy Narodnoy Respubliki (On the Planned Constitution of the Chinese People's Republic), Moscow, 1954, p 26.

28. Mo Yueh-ta, op. cit., p 147.

29. See Mao Tse-tung, op. cit., Voprosy kooperirovaniya --, p 11.

30. Resheniye Shestogo ---, op. cit.

31. See Mao Tse-tung, op. cit., Voprosy kooperirovaniya --, p 6.

32. "Bulletin of the State Statistical Administration ---", op. cit., (Narodnyy Kitay, 1956, No 14, Supplement, p 3).

33. ibid.

34. Mo Yueh-ta, op. cit., p 149.

CHAPTER IV

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCER'S COOPERATIVES OF A HIGHER (SOCIALIST) ORDER

Basic characteristics and features of the agricultural production cooperative of the higher order in the KNR.

The first agricultural production cooperatives of the socialist type appeared in China in the period of the restoration of the public economy. They were not numerous, were of an experimental character, and more often than not were set up on state (including unused) lands. The government supplied these establishments, comprising up to 500 households, with draught cattle and agricultural implements.

The first large-scale higher order cooperative "Hsinhuo" was created in 1951 in the former province of Sungchiang at a distance of 20 km from the city of Chiamussu.[1] By the end of the following year, 1952, there were already ten such cooperatives[2] in China, mainly in the north-east. The whole country closely followed the development of their public economies and rendered them support.

Cooperatives of the higher order also sprang up in the first part of the first five-year-plan. This usually occurred in the case when each of the peasants transferred to the cooperative roughly equal amounts of lands and other means of production as, for example, was seen in the village of Sanmoku in the Huan-yao Uyezd of the province of Shansi.[3]

A radical turning-point in the movement toward the socialist reconstruction of the villages led in the second half of 1955 to a rapid growth in the number of higher order cooperatives. Beginning in 1956 they became the basic form of the production grouping of peasants in the country.

All basic means of production in cooperatives of the higher order, as in the kolkhozes of the Soviet Union,

constituted collective property.[4]

The presence of public property among the means of production signified the liquidation of conditions for the origin of exploitation. All members of the cooperative filled, in production, positions of equal standing; the relations among them were founded on principles of mutual aid and collaboration.

The distribution of incomes in the higher order cooperative was carried out on a labor basis, i.e., in accordance with socialist principles. The cooperatives kept before themselves the goal -- to provide a prosperous and cultured life for all their members on the basis of improvement in production.

In the KNR private property of the cooperative members existed in the form of small agricultural implements, domestic cattle and fowl and so on. There was apportioned to the members of the cooperative personal plots of land, whose area must not exceed, for one member's family, ten percent of the land area which was the average of the holdings of each member of the given village.[5]

At the same time there existed definite differences between the socialist cooperatives of China and the kolkhozes of the Soviet Union, relating to the specific features of the building of the agrarian and socialist transformation in the Chinese village and to concrete historical conditions in the development of agriculture in China.

In the USSR land is the property of the state and is given to the kolkhozes for perpetual use. In China after the victory of the revolution the landlords' land was divided among the peasantry and given to them as property. Therefore, there was also set aside in the higher order cooperative temporarily recompensation for the land of persons who had lost the capacity for work and who had in the past existed by means of income from lands given in lease. Persons who worked and resided in the town were periodically paid off in determined renumeration by the cooperative for their land holdings.[6]

Upon the alienation of the cooperative's land under state construction the state usually paid compensation in the amount of two to four yearly harvests from this land (depending on the fertility of the land and the living standard of the peasants).[7]

One of the characteristic features of the movement towards cooperation in the Chinese village was the fact that it significantly left behind the process of forming a material-technical basis for socialism in the agriculture of the country. The productive basis of the cooperative was quite work; all agricultural work was carried

basically with the aid of draught animals and with laborious hand labor.

The level of the development of the productive forces in the higher order cooperative lagged behind advanced socialist production relations, and the existing material-technical basis did not correspond to the demands of the socialist method of production. In the beginning of 1958 there was cultivated only 2,8 percent of the land worked, with the aid of machines.

However, these cooperatives were able to show their obvious superiority over the small peasant holdings. This is accounted for by the fact that the cooperation of the peasantry labor, the unifying of land into one holding, and the addition of simple implements of production gave rise to a new and higher productive force.

Other features of the cooperatives in China also existed, related to the specific character of their formation and the socialization of the means of production. In the latter there can be considered the establishment of a firm share of the expenses of each individual peasant household entering into the cooperative and also the purchase by the cooperative of draught cattle and the large-scale agricultural tools of their members.

In China the peasants entering into a higher order cooperative did not make payments into an indivisible fund (excluding the kulaks and the former landlords). The formation and the replenishment of the indivisible fund was carried out mainly as the result of the cooperative's purchase of means of production, which remained with the peasants after entering a share of the expenses, as a result of the deduction from the gross income in the form of money and in kind, and also by means of the replenishment of the public property which was constructed by the collective labor of the cooperative members.

In the Chinese cooperatives, as a rule, a fund also was formed for the betterment of the public welfare, which was intended: 1)for the delivery of grants-in-aid to the aged and non-working members of the cooperative, allowances in the case of illness or mutilation, and also allowances for pregnancies and births; 2) for the upkeep of schools, kindergartens and nurseries; 3) for the financing of mass-cultural work.

Thus, the common funds of the higher order cooperatives in China were comprised of share payments (by tax and by inventory, and so on), an indivisible fund and a fund for the betterment of public welfare.

If during the first period after the formation of the cooperative there was, as a rule, for the most

part a share fund, then subsequently its size did not change (if one does not consider its replenishment upon the introduction of new members into the cooperative), but the indivisible fund grew from year to year.

The Management of the Cooperative's Affairs

The basic principles of the management of the affairs of the cooperative were these: the election of all authorities, the right of the cooperative members to elect and be elected to these authoritative bodies, the accountability of the chairman and the board to the general meeting of the cooperative members, or to the meeting of their representatives.

The higher organ of the cooperative was the general meeting of the cooperative members or the meeting of their representatives, which met not less than twice a year and fulfilled the following functions:

1) it confirmed the regulations of the cooperative and made corrections in them;

2) it elected the chairman of the cooperative, the vice-chairman, the members of the board, and also the chairman and the members of the revision commission;

3) it evaluated the working cattle, agricultural tools and the timber plots transferred to public property, and it set the size of payments into the share fund;

4) it examined and confirmed the production plan and the accounting estimate presented by the board;

5) it confirmed the amount of the remuneration and allowances to persons occupied with the work of the management of the cooperative affairs;

6) it studied and adopted the plan for the distribution of annual incomes, and in-kind and monetary advances;

7) it examined and approved the account of the work of the board and that of the revision commission;

8) it carried out the admission of new members to the cooperative;

9) it decided questions of the large-scale bonuses to cooperative members and the imposition of serious penalties on others, and also questions of the deprivation of the title of member of the cooperative and the restoration of this title;

10) it adopted decisions on other important questions of the activity of the cooperative.[9]

In the large-scale cooperatives (upwards of 100

households) functions of the general meeting were realized by the meeting of representatives elected by the cooperative members.

The number of the representatives, as a rule, was not very large -- from 20 to 40 persons. In order for the assembly of the representatives to have a truly representative character, they were elected in definite proportions from various categories of cooperative members: from the adult population, the youth, the aged, the women, the poor peasants, the moderately successful and the prosperous middle peasants. If there were in the cooperative representatives of national minorities or Chinese emigrants returned to the homeland, then from these there were also elected representatives.[10]

To the system of the meeting of the representatives there was supplemented the periodic gathering of old peasants who had rich experience in agricultural production. All this afforded the broad masses to develop initiative.

For the guidance of all affairs and the economic activity of the cooperative the general meeting elected a board, the chairman of the board, his deputy, and also a revision commission.

Usually 9-19 persons belonged to the board (depending on the size of the cooperative). The board was divided into six to seven divisions (divisions of grain crops, vegetables, animal produce, general welfare, supplementary business, the preservation of general order and so on), each of which were under the direction of the members of the board, and each of which consisted of seven to eight of the most active peasants, who were recommended by the general organization. The divisions occupied with questions of production set themselves the objective of the study and the inculcation of advanced scientific experience and the improvement of agricultural products on this basis. The task of the division on general welfare was to provide aid to families who were experiencing hardships and also the organization of mass-cultural work in the village. In some cooperatives there were formed divisions in charge of planning questions (which constituted production, financial, and other plans, and the verification of their fulfillment), and also divisions for the betterment of agrotechnics. The divisions for the maintenance of general order were occupied with questions, in particular, of the re-education of the kulaks and the former landlords who were working in the cooperative.

In such a way, besides the 9-19 persons of the board, there were drawn into the supervising establishment 40-50 of the most experienced and active peasants, who took part in the various positions. This accounted for the fullest carrying out of a policy of democratic management, and cultivated in the peasants, not long free from a yoke of feudalism, a feeling of being the authentic masters of the cooperative.

The revision commission was composed of five to eleven persons. As a rule, representatives from all the production brigades participated also in the revision commission. The revision commission periodically gave an account before the general meeting of the cooperative members.

The election of the chairman of the cooperative, of the board members, the chairman and members of the revision commission was set for once a year.

The Communist Party and the People's Government of China repeatedly in their resolutions emphasized the necessity to enlist the initiative of the cooperative members, to attract them to the management of the affairs of the artel, and to widen a cooperative democracy.

After the radical change which took place in the village when there was a replacement of the 100 million superfluous small peasant holdings with about 750 thousand large-scale cooperatives, the main portion of the Party's work in the village was the strengthening of the cooperative economy, the consolidation and development of democratic centralism in the cooperative.

Certain rural cadre workers did not realize that under the new conditions there was required a yet greater development of democracy, a still wider and more consistent realization of a policy of support by the masses in order to "draw from the masses and bear to the masses ..." Thus, in individual cooperatives there was observed the emergence of an administration and bureaucracy which inadequately took into consideration the opinions of the lower levels; frequently the cadre workers drew apart from the masses, and sometimes evidenced such misuse of means that the members of the artel did not know of the incomes and the expenditures of the cooperatives.

Opposing these errors were the instructions of the Tsk KPK which all party committees were directed to publish regarding three measures in the field of the democratic management of affairs in the cooperatives.[11]

All financial affairs of the artel farm must be conducted on lines of wide publicity. The board is ob-

ligated to regularly communicate to the members of the cooperative a balancing of the income and expenditure. If during the time of the discussion a majority of the cooperative members declared against some expense, it must be stricken off. There was stated in the instructions that a broad discussion by the masses of the financial affairs of the cooperative would preclude mismanagement and would dissipate the remaining doubts of the cooperative members.

In the second place, it is necessary to consult with the masses in the resolution of all questions in the cooperative or in the production brigade. The creation of a large-scale socialist farm enabled the continuous improvement in agrotechnics, a change in the system of land cultivation, the employment of new varieties of seed, and the utilization of new agricultural implements. However, the Tsk KPK emphasized that before the inculcation of these innovations, it is necessary to discuss them jointly with the masses, and to take into consideration local soil, seasonal and other features. The Tsk KPK recommended that each cooperative organize an agrotechnical improvement commission to which must belong old peasants possessing valuable production experience. Furthermore, in each production brigade it followed that one consultant should be selected from a number of the most experienced members in order to utilize to the fullest extent the profitable experience of the masses.

In the third place, the Tsk KPK suggested that the leading workers of the cooperative occupy themselves with productive work, giving to it a considerable part of their time. The personal participation of the leaders in field work allowed them to maintain closer contact with the masses, to gain a deeper understanding of concrete questions of production, and to better and more functionally direct the farm. Furthermore, the participation of the leading cadre in production facilitated the curtailment of administrative expenses.

After the publication of these resolutions there was unfolded in many regions work toward the publishing of information on the financial status of the cooperatives. Thus, in the province of Hupei the local party and governmental organs during the first half of 1957 sent to the cooperatives upwards of 6000 persons, who were versed in financial and accounting work in order to provide aid to the cooperatives in verifying bookkeeping accounts, the inventories of property, and to present the data obtained before the members of the cooperatives. By the middle of 1957 88% of the cooperatives in the provinces

had already published cooperative accounts and information on the artel property.[12]

Planning the Productive Work of the Cooperatives

The gradual amalgamation of small peasant farms was at first into mutual aid teams, and then in cooperatives. It signified more and more favorable conditions for the advance of agriculture in the country on the rails of governmental planning. If in the reformed villages it was difficult for the government to direct the production of the uncoordinated small peasant farms, then the socialist cooperatives, founded on collective property, established themselves as the simpler basis for planning.

The methods of government planning in agriculture differ from the methods in the planning of industrial production, since in the cooperatives the basic means of production and the resultant products were the property of the cooperatives and not of the government.

In order to utilize more fully the production reserves and to unleash a firm initiative in the broad masses there was established for the cooperatives independence in production and management of the farm upon reserving the guiding role to government plans.

The Central Committee of the KPK emphasized that in the spring and summer of 1956 errors were evidenced in the planning of agriculture; planning indices were reduced without an account of concrete activity. Thus, for example, there were composed, on occasion, common schedules of field work which called for sowing and harvesting in similar, pre-established periods in all cooperatives, even those operating under dissimilar conditions. Of such leaders the peasants remarked: "iron purposes, rocks for brains"[13]

In certain regions unrealistic and overestimated plans were used, as a result of which they lost their guiding capacity. Sometimes the higher organs, not having consulted beforehand with the cooperatives, confirmed superfluous details which did not correspond to the needs and possibilities of the cooperatives' plans of distributing land area among various crops. Similar planning methods stifled a firm initiative in the masses.

The Tsk KPK and the State Council of the KNR emphasized, in striving to overcome these inadequacies, the necessity to establish greater production and economic independence in the cooperatives in the planning of

guidance for them on the part of the government.

Arising from these tasks in areas corresponding to concrete conditions, various methods were employed in the planning of agricultural production, which basically amounted to the following:

1. The governmental organs determined only the volume of the agricultural taxes and imposts. The cooperatives, in accordance with their needs and the possibilities, independently worked out their own production plan under the condition that they make payments of agricultural taxes and fulfill the tasks in the central purchases and the observance of the contractual obligations.

2. The central organs reduced the planned assignments in the production of basic kinds of agricultural produce.[14] Subsequently the uyezd organs as occasioned by local conditions gave to each cooperative instructions relating to the size of the production of basic kinds of agricultural produce, but all the other indices were worked out by the cooperatives themselves.

3. The governmental organs established the extent of the sowing areas for basic agricultural crops. The remaining portion of the area was employed by the cooperative independently.

In the planning of subsidiary industry in the agricultural cooperatives an important role was played by supply-market cooperation. Supply-market and production cooperatives concluded mutual contracts for the purchase of produce from the subsidiary industry and for the supply to the village of industrial goods; the uyezd union of supply-market cooperatives occasioned by the needs of the government plan and by market inquiries worked out plans for the development of the rural secondary businesses for each volost.[15]

Thus, in T'ung-nan Uyezd in the province of Szechwan up till the end of 1955 the subsidiary industries had been neglected and the cooperatives did not know what goods would be needed by the government and the markets and whether the produce obtained would be marketable. In several cooperatives the secondary businesses were regarded as being much bother but slight in income returns. The union of supply-market cooperatives of the T'ung-nan Uyezd was provided backing for the development of the subsidiary industries; a broad distribution was effected for a system of mutual contracts. From December 1955 to March 1956 the union of the supply-market cooperatives in the uyezd concluded mutual contracts with more than 1700 agricultural cooperatives. The peasants remarked that: "After signing the contracts, it became clear what products could be

marketed and which goods it was necessary to produce." With the development of the subsidiary industries there was brought about an increase in the incomes of the peasants. Thus, a study of the volost of Tafu indicated that after the introduction in actuality of the planning of secondary businesses in 1956 the income from these rose by 28 percent in comparison with 1955 and stood at 30 percent of all the income of the peasants.[16]

With the establishment in the cooperatives of a definite economic independence, importance was gained by the production planning within the cooperative.

The cooperatives, as a rule, had a comprehensive long-term plan for periods of from three to ten years which were worked out in accordance with the program of agricultural development in the KMR for a twelve-year period and in accordance with concrete conditions. Furthermore, each cooperative formed its own yearly production plan, which was discussed in detail and confirmed in the general meeting of the cooperative members. This plan was usually inclusive of the basic indices of the development of the cooperative's production.

In the production plan the cooperative brought also the plan for labor organization and the expenditure of workdays, determining the number of workdays necessary for the production of all work during the course of one year and the number of workdays which the members of the cooperative were able to turn out. Such planning enabled the working force to be equitably distributed and brought about corresponding corrections in the production plans.

Thus, in the large-scale cooperative "Aikuo" in the province of Shantung there were about four thousand able-bodied workers. During the course of a year they were able to turn out more than 500 thousand workdays. In the field of agricultural production, in irrigation and other capital construction, etc., 410 thousand workdays were required. Thus, there remained about 100 thousand workdays. In order to utilize the existing work-force surplus, the cooperative decided to develop subsidiary industries: in deserted mountainous regions were established 40 thousand fruit trees; mills, creameries, an oven for baking pottery and various sheds used in swine-production and poultry-farming were built. As a result, from hog-raising alone more than 70 thousand yuan of net profit were realized.[17]

The plan for the development of subsidiary industries determined which kinds of subsidiary industries in which it was possible to engage, the size of the necessary

working forces, the purchase prices for the produce, the size of the net profit, etc.

The plan for capital investments envisaged the replenishment of the draught animals and agricultural implements, the construction of production buildings, irrigation systems, the transformation of arid plots into irrigated, and the establishment of forest plantations, etc.

Simultaneously with the making of a yearly production plan the management of the cooperative worked out a yearly income-outgo account and presented it for the examination and confirmation of the general meeting of the cooperative members. In cases of need the producer's cooperative was able to request from the credit cooperative or the bank a granting of loans. The Tsk KPK repeatedly emphasized the important value of principles of economy and thrift and the need to calculate carefully all expenses and the effectiveness of each capital investment in order to manage the farm more rationally.

Yearly production tasks for the brigades were specially formed in which was indicated the composition of the brigades, their allocations of plots of land, of working cattle and implements and the planned productivity, and was calculated the number of workdays necessary for the fulfillment of the plan.

Labor Organization and Wages

The transition to the higher order cooperatives was facilitated by the improvement of the organization of labor in agriculture, and the formation of a yet broader opportunity for the comprehensive division of labor.

The basic form of labor organization in the higher order cooperative was the permanent production brigade. Such brigades were formed in various fields of cooperative production -- in field work, in animal produce, in gardening, in fishing, etc. In the brigade were gathered members of the cooperative who had earlier specialized in this field and possessed specific experience. In such a way the labor of each cooperative member was utilized to the fullest in accordance with his qualifications, experience and physical fitness. The cooperative organized the labor of less able-bodied members, who found employment in the subsidiary industries,etc. Certain cooperatives formed youth field brigades, which attained

considerable success in the development of production.[18]

If there were qualified artisans in the cooperative, specializing in the production of specific products, they were gathered into handicraft trade brigades. The members of such brigades often organized their own work independently, kept an account of profits and losses, and were able to work on their own. The cooperatives in times of need commissioned these brigades to repairs and different kinds of work, granting them compensatory remuneration.[19]

Sometimes for some reason the handicraft trade brigades (or sections) were not organized. In this case the cooperatives dispatched qualified masters to the subsidiary industries to work independently and provide them aid in obtaining raw materials and in marketing their products. The masters assigned a fixed percent of their income into the indivisible fund of the cooperative.

The size of the brigade depended on which fields they were occupied in and what means of production they employed. The permanent field brigades were composed of 20-40 households.[20] In the average cooperative there were eight to twelve of such brigades, to which there was allocated each in turn (usually for several years) a definite plot of land, draught animals and agricultural tools.[21] This enabled them to gain stability in the cooperative work. Furthermore, the allocation to the field brigades of land, cattle, and implements provided the opportunity to the brigades subsequently to carry out their own plots the process of complete crop rotation.

In the cooperatives in China the realization of the so-called "system of allocating responsibility for specific cycles of work"--the contract system acquired a very great significance. The contract system, which has played an important role in fortifying personal and material incentives, has been continually developed and improved. The first period of the cooperatives activity when they were still acquiring economic experience, saw the implementation usually of "the contract system under one index." The production brigade (or section) had to guarantee to carry out all necessary production work on the plot of land assigned to it for a moderately long period of time (season or a year). Subsequently the cooperatives passed into the "contract system under two indices." In this instance the volume of agricultural production was also planned, which the brigade had to obtain working on the plot of land assigned. However, in practice it was indicated that this system did not always

guarantee the observance of the principles of economy and thrift and the decrease of the cost of the produce. The majority of the higher order cooperatives adopted the "contract system under three indices." The peasants called it: "three guarantees," since the production brigade was obligated to the carrying out of all agricultural work in a period that was in accordance with agrotechnical requirements and to obtain the planned volume of produce at a determined cost (the expenditure of labor was not included in this cost, but only the cost of seed, fertilizer, the repair of agricultural tools, weed killers and insecticides, fodder, etc.)

In 1957 in the uyezd of Ch-ien-hsien in the province of Hopeh 2981 cooperatives (about 50%) used the contract system under three indices; 1937 cooperatives (33%) -- under two (from the first two) indices; 1074 cooperatives (17%) -- under one (the first) index.[22]

Individual cooperatives especially concerned with growing commercial crops (cotton, hemp, tea, etc.) introduced a "contract system under four indices." The production brigade under four indices was obliged to guarantee also to obtain produce of a determined quality.

The contract system was closely combined with the bonus system of wages. Usually the production brigade which overfulfilled the harvesting plan was credited with a supplementary amount of workdays.[23] If as a result of poor and neglected work the brigade did not reach in its harvesting a level of 90% of that planned, a corresponding number of workdays was deducted from the earning of the brigade members.[24]

The indices for the guaranteed volume of production by the brigade were usually established below the average normal level in order to overfulfill the plan and to obtain bonuses.[25] This raised the labor level of the brigade members. As a rule, the majority of the production brigades fulfilled and overfulfilled their tasks. Thus, in the special region of Ch'ien-hsi'en Uyezd in Hopei Province in 1957, out of 30 thousand production brigades 16 thousand overfulfilled the plan in harvesting, eight thousand fulfilled it, and only six thousand did not.[26]

The premium wages method mobilized the brigade members in the struggle for higher harvests on the plots of land assigned and raised the material incentive and the work level of the peasantry.

Thus, the production work in the higher order cooperatives was organized usually under a system of responsibility.

If in the first period of the activity of the basic

level cooperatives this system was introduced for individual kinds of work for definite periods of time, in the higher order cooperatives, as a rule, a system of collective and individual responsibility for all the processes of agricultural production in the course of one year was realized.

In the higher level cooperatives a permanent check on the quality of work was maintained. With this end in mind special control groups were formed in which, besides the members of the brigade, leaders of the cooperative and of the brigade belonged, and elderly peasants who possessed great experience. In case the quality of the members of the production brigade or section was recognized as inferior, the cooperative was able to demand that the work be redone or be counted as fewer workdays than that set for the particular kind of work. If the production brigade in the course of working overcame great difficulties and attained considerable su cess, the cooperative paid it for more workdays.

The field brigades usually worked in sections. A definite plot of land was assigned to a section consisting of seven to eight households.[27]

If all the brigades were rewarded for overfulfilling the plan, the specially distinguished section or workers received more; if there were deductions from the brigade workdays for poor work, then the poorest work of the section or individual members of the cooperative had more workdays taken from them.[28]

At the head of the sections were section leaders who assisted the brigade leader in planning work and supervising production. After fulfillment of the tasks the section leader verified the quality of work and recorded the section members for the corresponding number of workdays they had established in accordance with the working norms, or passed out work receipts.

Sometimes in the cooperatives individual households were commissioned to raise specific agricultural crops (for instance, the raising of sweet potatoes and fruit trees in certain cooperatives in the uyezd of Ch'ien-hsi'en in the province of Hopei.[29]

In the first period of the mass formation of the higher level cooperatives, at the end of 1955 and in 1956, their management was given extremely broad privileges.[30] This fettered the firm initiative of the masses and decreased their capacity to operate.

In 1956 in individual cooperatives occurred instances where, as a result of extremely centralized leadership, valuable plots of land remained unploughed

of which no-one knew; gathered grain on the threshing floors grew mouldy and decayed, but no-one was worried about it.[31]

The Central Committee of the KPK directed that the basic principle of the organization of production in the cooperatives must be the combination of centralized leadership with firm initiative of the masses, with the establishment of definite rights for the production brigades.

The production brigades in the cooperatives had not only duties but concrete rights. As a result, the cooperative determined only the kinds of crops to be raised by the brigades and determined the size of the sowing area and the volume of the harvest, but the brigade itself determined which of the plots of land assigned to it were to be used in growing this or that crop.

Each brigade which fulfilled the production tasks set by the cooperative had the right to develop virgin and fallow land. Ninety percent of the income from these lands went to the members of the brigade, and 10% was apportioned to the general funds.

Under the condition of fulfilling the production task each brigade could engage in subsidiary industries. The income from these industries was divided up in the following manner: 30% went to the brigade in the form of compensation, and 70% went to the cooperative for distribution among all members according to workdays.

The production brigades were allowed, within definite limits, to correct the work norms and to carry out certain changes in the various agrotechnical measures (while observing a single production plan).[32]

In the higher level cooperatives was realized, based on the collective ownership of the members of the cooperative of the means of production, the socialist principle of work. The implementation of this principle allowed the personal interest of each member to be combined with the general, since the amount of material benefits which accrued to each worker was in direct proportion to his degree of participation in the general production and to the amount and quality of the work done by him.

However, the setting of work norms and the evaluation of work in terms of workdays were not easy tasks. In the first period after the mass formation of the higher level cooperatives there was still an insufficient amount of experience in the field of labor organization and the elaboration of working norms and their evaluation in workdays.[33] Work norms in agriculture, contrary to those in industry, depended to a considerable degree on

local conditions. The provincial and uyezd organs established approximate norms to aid the cooperatives, but obviously uniformity was impossible. In determining the work norms for each kind of work in the cooperative there was considered the principle that they must be accessible for each person of an average working capacity in active work during the course of a whole day. Increasing of norms lead to the lowering of the work activity of peasants, decreasing to the depreciation and waste of work days.

In fulfilling the same work under different conditions it was possible to set various production norms. In plowing or harrowing, the draught cattle could be strong or weak, the loamy or sandy plot could be located near or far from the village, etc. In rice harvesting, it was taken into account whether the ears lay down or not, the quantity, the distance of the plot from the village, etc. In field irrigation, the size of the lot, kinds of crops, season of the year, etc. were taken into consideration, as well as the water level.

In the Hsia-jang village cooperative in ChuCh'a-hsien County in Kwangtung Province which grew seven different crops (rice, sweet potatoes, soybeans, sugar cane, hemp, beans, and wheat) 115 kinds of work had to be performed, and consequently, 487 work norms were adopted. Out of these, 115 norms fell on the fundamental jobs (i.e. one norm to one job). The cooperative first of all worked out these 115 norms practically, and the remaining norms, which at one time numbered one thousand (including related jobs), were relatively easily computed on the basis of the fundamental norms.[34]

Because of lack of experience in individual cooperatives, setting of norms was sometimes complicated, so that the number of norms needed for cultivation alone reached a total of 180, and even more.

The work norms were established in compliance with concrete production conditions by the management of the cooperative and later were criticized in detail (and after amendments) approved by the general assembly of the members of the cooperative.

Establishing production norms for individual kinds of work, the cooperative usually took into consideration the previous production experience, the completed agrotechnical improvements, actual production in the leading local cooperatives and similar factors.

In cases where production norms in agriculture directly depended on natural conditions, the cooperatives changed the existing norms when the conditions changed. Production brigades were entitled to correct norms within

certain limits; the total number of workdays falling on the brigade, working on a shift system would, however, remain basically unchanged.

Work norms necessarily provided for a definite quality of work performance. Quality control was entrusted to special commissions, and sometimes a mutual control method for teams or brigades was also adopted.

Work norms were usually established as constant for the time of the full sowing cycle. The cooperative also fixed the number of workdays for fulfillment of the work norms.

Enabling to realize most completely the socialist principle "From each according to his abilities - to each according to his work", increasing the material interest of the members of the cooperative in the growth of production, the piece wage on the basis of workdays helped to bring into harmony the personal interests of individual members of the cooperative with the public interest.

Another advantage of the piece wage was the fact that the planning of production was facilitated, for under this system it is easy to calculate the number of workers necessary for performing certain work. For that reason an absolute majority of cooperatives of the higher type in the country organized the work of their members on the basis of the piece wage work.

In spring of 1956 about 90% of the cooperatives in the Shensi Province introduced the work norms and the piece wage system. As a result, work discipline improved, peasant labor increased, and the productivity of work, compared with the preceding year, grew by 20 - 40%.[35]

In the higher level cooperatives as well as in the basic level cooperatives existed two kinds of piecework: group and individual. Principally, they did not differ from the systems accepted in the basic level cooperatives, but they were worked out more precisely and were adopted on a larger scale.

The indroduction of the individual piece-work had an especially great effect, one production brigade in the cooperative "Hung-hsing" in Kua-ning County in the province of Kwantung shifted to individual piece-work in planting of rice sprouts, as a result of which the norm per person reached .72 mou daily. Another production brigade used the old methods. In this brigade each worker planted sprouts on an area of mere .45 mou.[36]

All types of work were classified into categories according to their complexity, difficulty and required qualification of workers. The first category contained

the most difficult kinds of work, having a decisive significance for production, which had to be performed by the average member of an artel (e.g. planting of rice sprouts, maintenance of a certain water level on the irrigated fields etc.). Second-rate jobs of the lower category could be performed even by people with a low work capability (hulling of soybeans, sorting of seeds, collection of fertilizers, etc.)

The number of categories depended on the size of the cooperative, availability of experience in the organization of work, etc. If there were too few categories, this led to wage-leveling. In individual cooperatives of Kwantung Province, the difference between some categories amounted to only .05 work unit, and between the higher and the lower categories it was only 50%. The other - opposite - deviation, was that of too many categories and an excessive difference in remuneration. As a result of this, members of cooperatives often did not want to fill jobs of the lower category.[37]

All work in cooperatives were primarily broken down into the following groups: (1) field work; (2)auxiliary projects; (3) capital construction; (4) other work. Each of the above groups was divided into categories. For instance, the group "field work" could include the following categories, depending on the local conditions: 1st category (the most complex and difficult jobs) - plowing, sprout planting by hand, digging of irrigation ditches and similar; 2nd category - harrowing, threshing, cultivating; 3rd category - weeding, transportation of fertilizers, etc.; 4th category - sorting and selection of seeds, collection of fertilizers etc.

Cooperatives also fixed the number of workdays presupposed for fulfillment of the daily norm of work relating to a specific category. The average unit (the amount of work which could be produced by one person with an average work productivity in one day of active work) was usually one workday. For instance, in cooperatives of the Wang-hsien County of the Hopeh Province, in which all jobs in field-crop agriculture were divided into five categories, the following remuneration in workdays for a daily production norm was established:[38]

Category of work	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th
Number of workdays for a daily norm of production	1.3	1.05	.9	.8	.7

Consequently, the difference between the 1st and

the 2nd category was .25 workday, between 3rd, 4th and 5th - .1 workday.

Numerous cooperatives in the People's Republic of China gradually began to practise the advancement of their members. For example, a majority of cooperatives of the Shansi Province, beginning with the year 1957, proceeded to pay advances to the members of the artel.[39]

About 90% of the rural population in old China was illiterate. A low peasant cultural level undoubtedly had a serious obstructive effect on the correct organisation of accounting. Owing to the fact that it was difficult to find a person acquainted with accounting in some districts, former landowners, kulaks, and other alien elements were penetrating the cooperatives and taking positions of book-keepers and accountants.

During the period of upsurge in the development of the cooperative movement, the personnel question appeared especially critical; owing to the lack of book-keepers and accountants the establishment of new cooperatives was hampered. For instance, in the village Wu-feng of the En-shih County in the Hupeh Province it was anticipated that four cooperatives would be founded, but since only one accounting clerk was available, only one cooperative was formed.[40]

Coordination of the financial-accounting work assumed a particularly great significance in the period of the large-scale formation of big cooperatives. Where the standard of book-keeping was poor and the members of the cooperative doubted the reliability of the records of workdays, the work activity of peasants would taper off. For that reason, the People's Government of the CPR faced a serious task in assisting the producer's cooperatives to prepare a large number of book-keepers and to coordinate the financial-accounting work in the cooperatives. In China, several resolutions concerning this question were published. As far back as 1954, the Ministry of Agriculture of CPR published a resolution regarding the establishment of courses for book-keepers for agricultural producer's cooperatives on a nation-wide basis. In the beginning of 1955 was approved a joint resolution of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Central Committee of the National-democratic Youth Union concerning the preparation and training of book-keepers and technical workers for agricultural producer's cooperatives.[41]

A great number of book-keepers were trained to render significant help to cooperatives in consolidating the financial work. A major part of the students in these courses were young people, graduates of secondary

and elementary schools, who had been working in agriculture. According to incomplete records, by January 1955, in the provinces of Shansi, Shantung, Honan, Liaoning, Szechwan, and others, over 270,000 accountants for cooperatives had been or were being trained.[42]

The publishing of simple and understandable textbooks on book-keeping and on preparation of instructors capable of supervising the book-keeping work in the field also received great consideration.

Due to the extreme industrial backwardness of Old China, mechanization of agriculture in China requires a considerable period of time. Under these circumstances, all measures aiming at the growth of agricultural production rest mainly on the live work resources. For that reason the problem of utilization of manpower in cooperatives became particularly significant.

According to certain calculations, 143 million able-bodied men and 119 million able-bodied women who live in agricultural areas of the country are able to produce 25.1 billion workdays per year (men - 19.2 billion; women: 5.9 billion).[43] These vast resources of manpower, undoubtedly, are the country's wealth. In old, semi-feudal China, however, these immense labor resources were not used. The villages had a critical agricultural overpopulation. Under conditions of severe exploitation of peasants and their lack of land and other means of production, and underdeveloped city industry, the agricultural population could not find adequate application, and as a result was used uneconomically and disproportionally. In many areas of the Yellow and Hual-ho Rivers men worked only 100 days a year.[44]

Before the cooperative period there was also a surplus of manpower, for individual peasants, because of lack of means of production and money, could not use their work economically, could not put into practice some detailed agro-technical improvements in order to increase the crop-capacity, and the industry of the country was not in a position to offer jobs for them. In the provinces of Hunan and Szechwan 10 - 20% of the manpower in the rural areas (and in remote districts even 60%) was "superfluous".[45]

Particularly poor was the utilization of women's work. In certain areas of the country women did not work in agriculture at all. In villages of Northern China, women worked in the field only 30 days a year.[46]

An important result of the socialist reconstruction of the village was the nation-wide introduction of women into cooperative production. In the spring of 1957,

over 110 million women were working in cooperatives.[47] In those areas in which the production was well organized, more than 90% of the women were actively participating in productive work.[48] Many women took up leading positions. The Communist Party of China promoted the following appeal: "In every cooperative a woman should become president or vice-president."[49]

Women became a great power in the village. Nevertheless, the Chinese press observed some deficiencies in the use of woman labor. Sometimes women were assigned to rather heavy jobs. Not in all cooperatives were conditions formed for participation of women in auxiliary projects (cooperative and domestic), and some managers tried to lower payments to women.[50]

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China emphasized the necessity of observing labor protection in cooperatives, the inadmissibility of the ungrounded lengthening of a working day, and the issuing of work instructions without taking into consideration the physical potential of members of the cooperative, etc. Special attention was given to labor protection of women members of cooperatives. The Ministry of Health of CPR published on April 2, 1957, the "Edict on the protection of female labor in the country, intensification of the promulgation of knowledge concerning health of women, establishment and operation of nurseries, and health-protecting works".[51]

An important part in the large scale introduction of women into the agricultural production was played by they realization of the principle "To each according to his work", attention of the party organizations with respect to the questions of utilization of women's work, and the forming of kindergartens and nurseries in the rural areas during the period of intensive field work.

To liquidate the surplus of manpower in the Chinese village was impossible right away. According to Chinese statistics, between 1955 and 1956 there was still a surplus of manpower in agriculture, particularly in those cooperatives in which auxiliary projects were developing slowly. In six cooperatives in the counties of T'un-hsien, Hsien-ho, Shun-i of the Hopeh rovince there was 26% excess manpower.[52] After the production plans in 18 cooperatives of the Shansi Province were worked out, it became evident that 30% of the manpower remained without use.[53] The manpower surplus in the 497 investigated cooperatives in the Wu-hsi County in Kiangsu Province amounted to 17% of the total number.[54]

The existence of a surplus of rural manpower in 1955 was confirmed even by examination of 26,000 coopera-

tives, which showed that each able-bodied peasant averaged only 96 workdays per year.[55] If we take one workday (trudoden') for one day of work, we find that more than half of the time was used not for productive work in communal economy.[56] This was partially connected with the underestimation of subsidiary industries observed in 1955.

It is necessary to emphasize the fact that a surplus of manpower existed chiefly in the periods of non-intensive field work, whereas during the busy time a lack of manpower was felt. In the cooperative "Yung-heng" of Fa-hsien County in Hopeh Province, the daily average was 190 people but in the spring 366 workers were required, in the summer -- 276 workers, in the fall -- 108, and in the winter -- 102.[57]

Cooperatives had to solve the problems of utilizing the manpower surplus during the seasons when no field work was done. Having this objective in mind, cooperatives developed subsidiary industries, built irrigation systems for fighting drought and floods, and extended the acreage of repeated sowing. All this comsumed a great quantity of labor. A great significance in the problem of utilizing surplus manpower in the rural areas waw given to the resolutions of the Communist party of China about the nation-wide development of local industries. In some provinces certain small and seasonal plants and also mines signed agreements with agricultural producer's cooperatives, according to which the cooperatives would send their people during the slack periods for an agreed-upon remuneration.[58] At other times cooperatives formed production brigades for the cultivation of virgin land and remote areas which suffered from lack of manpower.

Centralized distribution of manpower in larger diversified cooperatives allowed a more substantial use of labor in the construction of irrigation systems, sussidiary industries, animal husbandry, gardening, bee-keeping, handicrafts, and in a more careful cultivation and fertilization of soil, etc. All this brought a fuller utilization of manpower, a solution of the problem of agrarian overpopulation, and led to a growth of agricultural production in cooperatives and to an increase of their members' income.

Thus, the main ways of utilizing the surplus manpower were the following: development of capital construction, improvement of agro-technical methods, and also diversified character of economy, and growth of auxiliary projects. Cooperatives set as a task the elimination of floods and brought which had been always the scourge of

Chinese agriculture.[59]

As a result of cooperation there arose conditions allowing a complete utilization of manpower in the rural areas. As an illustration we may present data concerning the number of days put in by men and women of the Ho-Chien County of Hopeh Province over a period of one year:[60]

	Men:	Women:
Individual farms	110-120	30
Basic level cooperatives	170-180	70-80
Higher level cooperatives	270	230

Owing to the introduction of a larger amount of manpower into production in higher level cooperatives, the yield of crops grew considerably.

A maximum introduction of work resources into production was the most important means toward a rapid development of agriculture in China.

Distribution of Income

The gross national product, having left the sphere of production, is subject to distribution and re-distribution, the forms and proportions of which are determined by the conditions of production. A part of the national product goes for replacement of losses of the past work, a part for consumption, and a part for accumulation. The size and proportions of these parts are determined primarily by the level of development of the production and production forces.

To secure a continuity of production, the cooperatives had, first of all, to compensate the cost of the exhausted means of production (seeds, forage, agricultural fertilizers, chemical weed-killers, depreciation of agricultural implements, machinery, buildings, and work animals).

The largest proportion in these expenditures was taken by the seed fund and fertilizers, for under the conditions of intensive agriculture in China, the maintenance of soil fertility is an exceptionally serious task.

The cost of means of production which were consumed by the cooperative during the year, and which are subject to replacement, may be considered a part of the so-called production expenses of the cooperative, i.e. the annual production consumption, usually not taking into account the depreciation of agricultural implements (basically rather primitive and inexpensive), buildings and work cattle.

The budget did not have a special depreciation provision, and these expenditures were covered, as a rule, by deductions from the indivisible fund.

The volume of production expenditures determines the share of gross output going for accumulation and personal consumption, other conditions being equal. The lower the production expenditures, the larger part of the crop can be distributed according to the number of workdays and utilized for accumulation.

According to the results of investigation in 26,935 cooperatives in 1955, the production expenditures represented as an average 25.3% of the gross output. In 202 of these cooperatives they equaled 30.1% of the gross output, the result of which was that only 53.2% of the gross output was distributed among the members.[61]

In 1956 the majority of cooperatives in China reduced the production expenditures to a certain degree. This means that the share of the materialized past work was lessened, and the newly produced value, which after deduction of the portion going for accumulation and public consumption, was distributed according to the number of workdays. For instance, in 180 cooperatives in P'ingshun County in Shansi Province, the production expenditures in 1956 represented as an average 14.5% of the gross output, which allowed distribution of 72.56% of the gross output according to the workdays.[62]

The reduction of production expenditures had a great significance in the struggle against isolated examples of thriftless management, inevitable in the first stage of the development, when the newly established cooperatives, consisting of individual farmers did not have any experience in managing collective farms. At the same time, it is proper to point out that the reduction of the share of the production expenditures may serve as an indicator of economic management to a certain degree and only as long as the production is developing basically on the old technical basis. With complication of the technical methods and mechanization of the production processes the share of the materialized past work in the total gross output is growing.

It is necessary to distinguish the gross production of the cooperative from the total gross income which is received after the deduction of the business expenses, i.e. losses of past work. The gross income (value, newly produced by the work of the members of cooperatives during the year) is distributed according to work among the members of the cooperative, and also used for common needs and accululation with the purpose of extension of produc-

tion.

From the income of cooperatives the part reserved for agricultural tax was first deducted.

In accordance with the decree of the State Council regarding the imposing of an agricultural tax beginning with 1953, the rates were fixed, and as a basis served the area under seed and the average production over a period of a number of years. The tax was imposed on each farm in compliance with the volume of income from agriculture. In order to curb the development of kulak farms, the system of a progressive tax was preserved. The tax for the poor farmers represented approximately 10% of their income, the top medium-size farmers up to 15% of their income, and that of kulaks up to 25%. The tax was imposed on income produced in agriculture and animal husbandry; subsidiary industries of the peasants' families were not subject to this tax. In areas where technical crops were grown, there was an additional tax because these plants yielded a higher income.

After the fundamental completion of the cooperative transformations in 1956, many areas began to impose the tax on cooperatives as units of economy. The rates were the same for cooperatives and individual farmers. The agricultural tax was paid chiefly in kind (in 1956, 86% of tax was paid by grain, 7% by cotton and oil-producing plants, 7% by cash[63]), which enabled the government to concentrate in its hands a quantity of market grain essential for supplying cities and stabilizing market prices.

From 1953 till 1957 the receipts from the agricultural tax remained on the level of the year 1952, and they did not exceed (when converted to the price of grain) 38 billion chin. Since the tax volume was fairly stable, each year it represented a different share of the production. In 1955, the agricultural tax equaled 11.54% of the annual production, in 1956 - 10.72%, and in 1957 - 11.3%.[64]

Owing to the fact that the agricultural tax was imposed according to the average productivity of the land of the cooperatives, the additional income of the cooperatives which received a higher production was not practically affected by the tax. This served as a stimulus for achieving an increased productivity, using all means.

In cooperatives which had high productivity indexes, the ratio of the tax to the gross output was considerably lower than in backward establishments. In 121 cooperatives in the Chia-hsing region of Chekiang, the tax in 1956 represented as an average 12.7% of production, and in cooperatives of Hai-ning, Yu-hang, and Wu-k'ang Counties only 7-9%.[65]

The agricultural tax is one of the most important sources of the government's income. In 1956, receipts from the agricultural tax constituted 10.1% of the income part of the government budget, and in 1957 - 9.5%.

In June 1958 the system of levying the agricultural tax was altered. The tax was imposed according to the income of cooperatives from the agricultural production and amounted, on the average, to approximately 15.5% of the annual production. An additional tax of 10-50% could be imposed on individual farmers.[86] This tax was to be paid also by those members of cooperatives who had their own lots of land. Income from the production of grain and technical plants, gardening, etc. was taxable.

The social structure of the CPR determines the substance of its government tax policy. A part of the income of the cooperative, in the form of the agricultural tax, represented labor for the benefit of society. By paying the tax, the cooperatives were participating in the industrialization of the country, strengthening its defense, raising the welfare and cultural level of the whole nation. From the stock established with receipts from the agricultural tax, insurance funds designed for the assistance to the inhabitants of the areas which had been afflicted by natural calamities were formed.

A considerable part of the income which the government received in the form of taxes was spent by fiscal authorities as an aid to the peasants. For 7 years, from 1950 til 1956, the government assigned 3070 million yuan for construction of irrigation systems and distributed 1310 million yuan in financial aid to the population suffering as a result of natural catastrophies, and 1280 million yuan for improving agricultural methods, performing agro-technical ameliorations and fighting against agricultural pests and plant diseases. The total of 5660 million yuan constituted over 30% of the aggregate, 18.6 billion yuan, which were received by the government in payment of agricultural and additional taxes. In addition, the government granted peasants over 8 billion yuan in low-interest loans.[87]

Thus, the tax policy of the government, practised in the interest of a mobilization of funds for the industrialization of the country, supports at the same time the development of agricultural production and the improvement of the peasants' life.

The accumulation fund existed in the form of payments into the indivisible fund and was meant for increase of funds going for the needs of production, i.e. for extension of seed and forage stock and replenishment of the

basic funds of the cooperatives. In addition to this, cooperatives were building accumulations, concentrating the offerings of their members who were coming with voluntary deposits - cash (bearing interest) and in kind (as a rule, without interest). The terms of these loans to the cooperatives were specified on the basis of a mutual agreement.[68]

In cooperatives an insurance fund was also sometimes formed. However, in the initial period of the cooperative movement, the government assumed the function of insurer, granting cash and grain loans to the areas afflicted by disasters. The plan of agricultural development for 1956-1967 put before cooperatives the task of building during these twelve years reserves of grain sufficient for a period of 3-6 months to one and a half years (taking into account home reserves of the members of the cooperatives). Special attention to the establishment of such reserves was given in areas with unstable crops and poor transportation network.

The accumulation fund served also for replenishing the depreciation fund, but the major portion was used for acquisition of draught cattle, agricultural implements and other means of production, as well as for capital construction (especially irrigation) and soil improvement.

In the beginning, payments into this fund (including payment of loans for capital construction) as a rule did not exceed 8% of the annual income of the cooperative. In cooperatives which specialized in growing technical plants and receiving a higher income than the grain-growing cooperatives, deductions into the accumulation fund increased to 12%.[69]

The size of the accumulation fund is basically determined by the level of the development of production but of no small importance is the attitude of peasants to the property of the cooperative, the level of their socialist consciousness.

In 1956, the first year after the mass collectivization was completed, the principle "to keep less and distribute more", was observed in compliance with the resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the distribution of the summer crops of 1956. In order to achieve an increase in income of 90% of the members of the cooperatives, 60-70% of the cooperative's gross income was distributed among peasants according to their work.

During this period it was important for the cooperatives to consolidate organizationally and economically and convince the peasants through their own experience that

the cooperative system is more advantageous than individual farming. The fixed proportion for accumulation purposes made it possible for the income of a substantial percentage of the poor peasants to be increased and the income of a majority of middle peasants, who joined cooperatives with a great deal of hesitation, to be maintained.

In the cooperative "Min-chu" of the Chou-chen district of Hai-hing County in Szechwan Province, it was originally decided to reserve 6.32% of the total gross income for accumulation. However, this would mean that the income of 13 families would diminish and for that reason only 4.5% of the gross income was used for accumulation. As a result of this decision the income of these 13 families did not decrease but on the contrary grew larger.[70]

In 1956 a majority of Chinese cooperatives put into the indivisible fund and the public welfare fund, on the average, approximately 5% of the gross income.[71] This proportion of accumulation basically corresponded to the achieved level of economic development of the cooperatives which had had good crops in 1956 did not leave a necessary part of production for the public needs. This was reflected in their work.[72]

Next year, in 1957, many cooperatives evaluated the deficiencies which originated in the distribution of income the preceding year, and increased the share for accumulation. For instance, peasants of the cooperative "Ta-chung" of the Khuanmeytuntsyao district of Hopeh Province distributed for workdays in 1956 too much, which caused a deficit of 3210 yuan for production expenses. The cooperative had to apply for a loan to the government bank and the credit cooperative, by means of production in the marketing cooperative on credit, and take an advance on the basis of contracts. Because of a lack of fertilizers and seeds, the productivity dropped to 100 chin per mou. After surveying the mistakes of 1956, the members of the cooperative decided to increase the number of work animals, agricultural implements, quantity of fertilizers and proceed to capital construction. To realize this program they needed 13,170 yuan - some 3190 yuan more than in the preceeding year. The gross production of agriculture and auxiliary projects in 1957 amounted to 110,000 yuan which were used in the following way: business expenditures - 15,000 yuan (13.6% of gross production); agricultural tax - 11,467 yuan (10.4%); accumulation fund - 6600 yuan (6%); administration expenses 550 yuan (.5%); fund of raising the level of public welfare 2200 yuan (2%). The remaining 74,183 yuan (67.5% of the gross production of the cooperative) were distributed according to work which secured an

increase in income of 89% of the members of the cooperative.[73]

Enormously important for a correct distribution of the income of cooperatives was the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China concerning the democratization of the cooperative management and the campaign for a socialist education of the agricultural population. Peasants began to feel in charge of the cooperatives and found out that their welfare depends on themselves. The facts of everyday life convinced them of the necessity to expand the public accumulations fund.

The Permanent Committee of the All-China Assembly of National Representatives decided on January 6, 1958, that the share for the accumulation fund may exceed 8% of the net income of the cooperatives (or 12% of the income of the cooperatives growing technical plants). In bad harvest years the share could be reduced and in the years of a good harvest it could be increased.[74]

The increase of accumulations serves as a factor in the rapid growth of production. However, it is evident that in the socialist system of economy the growth of accumulations cannot be practised at the expense of the reduction of consumption. On the basis of an expansion of production and in relation to the pace of its development, it was necessary to increase both accumulations and the peasant standard of living. In 1956 80% of the cooperatives in China increased their income. In 1957, the harvest was only average but income also increased; in approximately 30% of the cooperatives the income of the members of the artel reached or exceeded the level of income of the rich middle peasants. Understanding the inter-relation between the growth of accumulations, expansion of production and the subsequent growth of income, peasants in many cooperatives enlarged the share of the accumulations. An examination of 2559 cooperatives in Honan showed that in 947 cooperatives, the proportions for accumulation exceeded 8 and 12%. In the T'ung-hsien, County of Hopeh Province in all cooperatives they were over 8% and in some over 15%.[75]

The expansion of public accumulations, ensuring the realization of an enlarged reproduction, strengthens the system of collective property and socialist production relations in the village.

The part of the gross production which remains after replacing of the used-up means of production, payment of the agricultural tax and payments into the indivisible fund, is assigned for consumption. This part of the gross production after deductions of administrative

and business expenses and withholding of the part destined for the public welfare fund was distributed according to workdays.

In compliance with the regulations of the higher-level agricultural producer's cooperatives, the administrative and business expenses of the cooperatives (excluding recompense for the administrative work) must not exceed .5% of the total annual gross production, and the number of workdays worked by the administrative and business employees must not total more than 2% of workdays put in by all the members of the cooperative.[76] In cooperatives, 50 - 70% of the gross production was usually distributed according to workdays, and the total cost of administration represented 1.5% of the total gross production of the cooperative.

In 1956, the cost of management in many cooperatives was too high.[77] If the cost of management grew disproportionally, the share of income going for the individual consumption of the members of the cooperative dropped considerably. It happened most frequently when the rank and file members of the cooperative did not know the actual situation and could not exercise their right to participate in the management of the cooperative.

Of decisive importance to the reduction of the cost of management were the resolutions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on a democratic administration of cooperatives and on a compulsory participation of management in production (in 1957).

The fund for raising the level of the public welfare, in accordance with the regulations, was meant for a development in cooperatives of cultural services and improvement of the welfare of the members of cooperative. It was not permitted to use this fund for other purposes. The share going to the welfare fund should not exceed 2% of the annual income of the cooperative.

This fund served to assist those members of the cooperative who were no longer able to work and who did not have anyone to support them. Cooperatives assumed the duty of supplying them with food, clothing, fuel, took care of the education of their children and provided for a funeral when they died (the so-called "five provisions").

In accordance with the enactments of the government, cooperatives paid from the fund for raising the level of the public welfare various allowances to the members of families of heroes killed in action and war - disabled persons unable to work, in order to ensure that their standard of living would not be lower than that of the

rank and file members of the cooperatives.

Payments into this fund in 1956 and 1957 actually totalled 1-2% of the income of cooperatives and were very small. Owing to the limited size of the fund, the cooperatives could not build clubs, hospitals, etc. But with the growth of production, the fund for raising the level of the public welfare was increasing both absolutely and relatively and was better utilized for the purposes of education, health services and culture.

Public funds were also often used for organizing schools (from various courses with a variety of programs and a duration through secondary school).

A characteristic example is the evening technical school attached to the cooperative. "Hsin-huo" of the Hsi Chang-ch'i district of the Che-liu county of the province of Shansi. It was established in 1953. The occupation was basically placed into a period of time when no work in the field was done, and the program was closely connected with the tasks of the production. Peasants not only learned how to read and write, but also learned the methods of fighting agricultural pests, operating new machines, etc. The compensation of instructors was practised so that the pupils contributed a small part of their workdays (approximately two workdays a year), and the cooperative paid the balance (from 5 to 12 workdays a month). Other expenses of the schools for each group of students did not exceed 3 yuan a month. They were covered one half by the public welfare fund and one half by the fees of the pupils.[78]

The public welfare fund served as a material basis for the satisfaction of growing spiritual needs of the members of cooperatives and the raising of the level of their welfare.

The part of the gross income which was distributed among the members of cooperatives represented that part of the work which they expended for themselves. It was distributed according to the principle "To each according to his work", that is, in compliance with the quantity and quality of work.

The size of the personal consumption fund and, consequently, the income of the members of cooperatives are determined by the development of the collective farm, whose rate of growth in turn depends on accumulation. Thus, an expansion of accumulation is in harmony with the fundamental interests of the peasant class, being a condition of growth of production and a guarantee of a further increase in income. Consequently, here the collective and individual interests coincide. On the other hand,

however, the larger the proportion of business expenses, taxes, accumulation, smaller is the individual consumption fund and therefore, also the income of the peasants. From an analysis of the distribution process it is evident that the individual consumption fund presents itself as the last of a long series of deductions, after each of which the share which could go for consumption becomes less and less. In the meantime, from the viewpoint of the producer, the purpose of production is chiefly the personal consumption, and the fund of personal consumption should be larger, if possible. In this lies the material ground for the non-antagonistic contradictions between the public and individual interests, between the government, the cooperatives and the members of the cooperatives.

These contradictions were solved, first of all, through a development of production which is the main condition of growth of the individual consumption fund and secondly, by maintaining specific correlations which correspond to the actual situation, between accumulations (of the government and the cooperatives) and consumption, between the agricultural tax and the personal consumption fund. Mao Tse-tung pointed out: "It is necessary to keep a correct balance between the taxes collected by the government, the accumulations of the cooperatives and the individual income of peasants, and constantly to see that the contradictions existing in this area are regulated."[79]

As shown by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council, the share of individual consumption corresponding to the level of production achieved in 1956-1957 represented approximately 60 - 70% of the income of the cooperatives. A real guarantee of the growth of the personal consumption fund is the growth of production. If a cooperative could not increase production, it did not increase the income of the peasants, even after distributing 60 - 70% of its income. When sometimes individual cooperatives tried to increase the income without accumulation and through reduction the share of the production expenses, this undermined the foundations of the reproduction and destroyed the collective enterprise.

Of serious importance in the conditions of China was the question of the correlation between the amount of pay for one workday and the income of each peasant or household. In certain cases, the gross income of a cooperative and, consequently, of a household, could grow, but the workday rate would remain the same or even drop. It was usually the case when a cooperative was making capital investments in the land (collection and removal

of fertilizer, building of irrigation systems) which amortizes slowly. Here are, for instance, the data of an examination in 1956, of 118 cooperatives of the Chia-hsing region of Chekiang Province:[80]

Average number of workdays per worker	Less than 100	100-120	121-150	151-200	Over 200
Number of cooperatives	12	26	41	26	13
Daily wage in yuan	1.48	1.27	1.29	1.12	1.60
Average income of one household in yuan	276.71	313.53	343.38	341.38	366.07

From the above table it is evident that if there is a direct relation between the number of workdays produced during a year and the income of a household, such a relation does not exist between the workday pay and the income of a household.

A certain reduction of the workday pay would appear, at first sight, as a falling off of the productivity of collective work in the cooperatives. It is, however, necessary to bear in manpower. To employ it, even though in the initial period with a lower productivity of work than the average achieved at that time, meant to expand production power. Through a more economic application of manpower it was possible to achieve a considerable growth of production. It follows from this that cooperatives had to try to utilize the labor reserves to a larger extent, even if it led to a certain lowering of the workday pay.

In practice there were cases in the cooperative movement in China where in some artels there was a tendency to raise only the workday pay, and the peasants were prevented from putting in more workdays. The administration scorned the "chase after the workday," and a "waiting system" was established. In such cooperatives the labor of women and youth was not used at all.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council repeatedly pointed out the necessity to use manpower in a more complete measure, especially in capital construction. Capital investment was realized not only in the form of irrigation, improve-

ments, and construction of production facilities, etc., but also in the form of work expenses leading to land improvement. As early as 1956 peasants taking part in a nation-wide movement for collection of fertilizer achieved a very important labor investment in the land. In 180 cooperatives in P'ing-shun County of the Shansi Province, 13.8% of the workdays were spent on capital construction. In the Hsing-t'ai region of the Hopeh Province, as an average, approximately 20% of the total of workdays in the first six months of 1956 were used in capital construction. In 1957 and especially in 1958 during the movement for collection of fertilizer and for irrigation, enormous capital investment in capital construction was made.

However, labor consumption in capital construction is usually justified only after a number of years. The workdays spent in capital construction were considered in some cooperatives a public obligation and were not paid. This gave rise to a righteous dissatisfaction among the peasants. In the majority of cases, these workdays were paid in the respective year only partially and the remaining part had to be taken into consideration by distribution during the following years. In 473 cooperatives of the Chia-hsing region in Chekiang Province, 366,000 workdays were spent in capital construction. Out of them, 186,000 was paid. In any case, whether all the workdays spent in capital construction were paid in the respective year or not, a credit of enormous size by the cooperatives took place for the work of the peasants. In this may be seen the fundamental difference between the socialist and bourgeois principle of material incentive. The bulk of the peasants were convinced that the result of their work would reach them eventually, because they were the masters of the cooperative.

Socialization of the basic means of production did not destroy certain distinctions in the situation and level of income of individual categories of peasants. One of the basic distinctions consisted in the fact that the households of poor peasants, as a rule, had an average of fewer working people. Here are, for instance, the data on the manpower situation in the farms of peasants of the first cooperative of the Yu-ch'eng District, Hai-yang County, Chekiang Province.[81]

In addition to this, many poor peasants could not work in cooperatives permanently. They could not wait till the distribution of the harvest, as they did not have any reserves and did not have the time and means to work in the subsidiary industries and cottage industry. Their

	Number of people in household	Number of work units per household[82]	Number of workdays per household
Poor peasants	3.3	7.9	166.2
New lower middle-peasants	4.3	15.3	280.4
Old lower middle-peasants	4.7	16.6	287.8
New higher middle-peasants	4.7	20.9	371.8
Old higher middle-peasants	7.0	23.9	517.8
Average	4.7	16.0	318.6

income from cottage industry was also considerably lower than that of other peasants.[83] All this compelled the poor peasants to look for additional income, to take various odd jobs. As a result of this, they were joining cooperatives less than other peasants.

To the existing contradictions among the needy poor peasants, according to the resolutions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council, it was necessary to help by means of loans; the cooperatives proceeded to advance members of the artel and part of the poor peasants assistance under the "Five Provisions." All these measures were applied in order to keep peasants in collective work and to achieve the realization of the principle "From each according to his abilities."

Income of part of the rich middle peasants somewhat dropped when they joined cooperatives. They had more land for farming (and at the same time, more fertile) and more means of production than fell on each household in the cooperative. According to the results of an examination of 270 cooperatives in 28 districts of the Chiahsing county in Chekiang Province, in 237 farms of former rich middle peasants, the proportion was 2.95 mou of land per person, but in cooperatives it was only 2.46 mou or 20% less. Besides, the rich middle peasants usually had more mulberry, bamboo, fruit groves and inventory

fish ponds, etc. The value of the agricultural implements on the farms of the rich middle peasants per mou of land equalled, according to the results of the examination of seven districts in five counties of Chekiang Province, 10 - 14 yuan, whereas in cooperatives it was only 6 - 9 yuam.

The newly organized cooperatives in which the main body of members consisted of poor peasants and lower groups of medium-size peasants did not yet succeed in forming the necessary basical production fund, and they did not have enough draft cattle and agricultural implements.[84]

According to the results of the research carried out in various areas of China, the harvest from a unit of land was 20% higher with the rich middle peasants than in the cooperatives.[85]

Since a majority of cooperatives did not reach the level of production and the income of the rich middle peasants, the income of the latter, was naturally bound to go down after they joined the cooperatives. This was the reason for their hesitation and sometimes hostile attitude toward the cooperatives.

In order to attain a union with the middle peasants, the Communist Party practised the policy of "Mutual advantage." The socialized means of production which formerly belonged to the middle peasants, which exceeded the necessary limit of share for admission into the cooperative, were purchased by the cooperatives on the basis of market prices, and a part of the orchards, fish ponds, etc. remained in their use; the income from this property went completely or partly to them as well. In certain cases they were compensated for the expenses involved in improving the soil, in irrigation, etc. These concessions to the middle peasants effected to a certain degree the interests of other members of the cooperative and a positive agreement of the interests of the poor peasants and the middle peasants was required (mutual advantage).

The only way to remove all these contradictions devinitely was to expand the production. With a growth of labor productivity, peasant income increase, and the rise of their welfare, the heritage of disparate standards of living was being erased.

As has been mentioned before, members' of cooperatives houses remained under private ownership, as well as under private ownership, all household goods, small domestic animals and fowl. In addition to this, a household was entitled to the crop harvested from the private plot.

Cooperatives helped their members to raise livestock and fowl, and to occupy themselves with handicrafts,

the collection of medicinal herbs, hunting, etc. The income from domestic occupations contributing to the total income of the members of cooperatives was different from case to case. In 600 households of five cooperatives in Hopeh and Shantung Provinces, 60-82% of the total income originated from the regular workday wages. The sources of the remaining income were the individual plot, animal husbandry, projects of cottage industry, etc. According to data in the county of Chia-hsing, of Chekiang Province, the annual income of one household from cottage industry amounted in 1956 to 50 yuan or to 15% of the average annual income (350 yuan).

Cottage industry made it possible to utilize manpower and other means of production to a better extent, which, from the social point of view means an increase of means of production.

However, the nature of peasant labor in cottage industry differed from that of the cooperative. In the first case he acted as a private person, a small manufacturer and worked for his individual profit whereas in the second case he was a socialist worker. The compensation that the peasants were receiving from their workdays from the cooperative where they were spending the main part of their working time had to represent an adequately fundamental part of their income, and the necessary minimum of standard of living had to be respected. Otherwise the cooperative ceased to be voluntary and advantageous institutions for the peasants.

Sometimes peasant cottage industry became their chief occupation. In 1957 in 150 farms of the cooperative "Yeh-chiang" in the Ta-pa County of Szechwan Province, the income from cottage industry exceeded the income from cooperative labor. The same phenomenon was noted in 33 farms of the "Hsi-hu" cooperative in the Hsien-t'an County of Hunan Province.[56] It is quite understandable that in such cases cottage and subsidiary industry was very close to speculation. The interest of peasants in the collective form of labor was falling off.

The contradiction between the collective and individual forms of labor was partially solved by curbing cottage industry. However, the main form of solution of this contradiction remains the growth of collective farming and a steady increase of income of peasants achieved by this method.

1. Chun-yang He-tso T'ung-hsun, 1955, No 7, p 12.

2. Osnovnyye pokazateli razvitiya narodnogo khozyaystva

Kitayskoy Narodnoy Respubliki (Basic Figures in the Development of the Economy of the Chinese People's Republic), 1958, No 3, p 51.

3. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1954, No 21, p 6.

4. The regulations of the agricultural producers' cooperatives (higher level) of the Chinese People's Republic characterized the upper-level cooperative as a socialist collective economic organization of the laboring peasantry, created under the leadership and with the help of the Communist Party and the people's government on the basis of voluntar ness and mutual aid. (Regulations of gricultural Producers' Cooperatives of the Higher Type in the Chinese People's Republic, Peiping, 1956, p 3.

5. Originally, Article 16 of the Regulations for Higher-level Cooperatives provided that the private plot should not exceed 5% of the average land holding, based on the population of a given village. However, in practice it became apparent that the limited size of the private plots was holding down the development of subsidiary industries, such as hog raising. Therefore, on 25 June 1957, the Permanent Committee of the All-China Assembly of People's Representatives revised the regulations, doubling the private plot per head in the village. (Compendium of Laws and Provisions of the Chinese People's Republic, January-June 1957, Peiping, 1957, p 263). If one considers that there is an average of 0.22 ha of arable land per inhabitant of rural areas in China, the private plots would average 0.02 ha person.

6. Under the conditions that the owner of the land would be in difficult material circumstances and no member of his family remaining in the village worked.

7. In payment of compensation for confiscated land, it was taken into consideration whether the land had orchards, fish ponds, bamboo groves, tea plantings, mulberry trees for the cultivation of silk-worms, tung plantings, reservoirs with lotus, reeds, or cane. /See Resolution of the State Council of the CPR "On the Methods of Land Use under State Exploitation" (Jen-min Jih-pao, 7 January 1958)./

8. Jen-min Jih-pao, 7 January 1958.

9. Regulations of Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives of the Higher Level in the KNR, op. cit., p 31.

10. The number of brigade leaders elected as representatives could not exceed 1/4 of the total number of representatives.

11. Jen-min Jih-pao, 15 March 1957.

12. Druzhba, 3 October 1957.

13. Druzhba, 5 January 1957.

14. By May 1957 the number of basic crops had been decreased from 25 to 9 (grain, cotton, beans, pork, oil plants and some technical crops).

15. The marketing-supply and producers' cooperatives drew up three types of contract: 1) an anticipatory contract for the purchase of produce; 2) a contract for the supply of industrial goods; 3) a mutual contract for the supply of industrial goods and the purchase of subsidiary industry production. Until 1955, the marketing-supply cooperatives bought agricultural products (including grain and cotton) from cooperatives at the direction of the state. After large cooperatives with well-developed, complex economies had been created as a result of a great surge in the cooperative movement in the country, the state directed the marketing-supply cooperatives to purchase finished and semi-finished products of subsidiery industry, and the obligation to purchase agricultural products was transfered to organs of state trade.

16. Dissertation on Purchasing, Peiping, 1956 (in Chinese).

17. Druzhba, 4 January 1957.

18. According to statistics, there were more than 150,000 such brigades at the beginning of 1956, including more than 4 million persons. The productivity of the youth brigade fields in the district of Chen-chieh was 11% higher, and that in the district of Chiang-ting even 44% higher, than the average productivity in the district. (Jen-min Jih-pao, 12 March 1957).

19. Jen-min Jih-pao, 15 September 1957.

20. Druzhba, 28 March 1957. In mountainous regions the size of the brigades was smaller. Shortly after the creation of large higher-level cooperatives, production brigades sometimes included more than 100 hpuseholds, or 300-400 persons. It was extremely difficult to head such brigades. The TsK KPK indicated that the size of brigades should not be large.

21. The Setting of the Earnings and Labor Remuneration Norm in Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives, Peiping, 1956 (in Chinese).

22. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1957, No 23, p 11.

23. In some cooperatives 70-80% of the above-plan crop yield was divided among the brigade members, and 20-30% was given to the cooperative. In cooperatives near Peiping, 80% went to the brigade and 20% to the cooperative. In the provinces of Heilungkiang and Kiangsu, this proportion was 70 and 30% respectively. (Druzhba, 18 May 1957). In the cooperatives of Ch'ian-hsiang District in the province of Hopeh, 80-90% of the extra production went to the brigade and 10-20% to the cooperative's social fund (Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1957, No 23, p 11). However, in most cooperatives above-plan production, after coming to the brigade members, was reckoned into work-day units.

24. Sometimes (for example, in the special region of Ch'ian-hsiang District in the province of Hopeh) the brigade members, in case they were responsible for the non-fulfillment of their production task, were obliged to compensate for 40-50% of the losses out of their own pockets (Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1957, No 23, p 11).

25. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1957, No 23, p 11.

26. ibid.

27. Druzhba, 28 March 1957.

28. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1957, No 13, p 14.

29. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1957, No 23, pp 10-11.
The TsK KPK recommended the practice of transmission of work to the link and to the individual members of the cooperative, according to the concrete local conditions (Hsin-hua Pan-yueh-k'an, 1957, No 19, p 136).

30. Druzhba, 18 May 1957.

31. ibid.

32. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1957, No 12, p 11.

33. Because of the difficulties of effecting the piece-work system on the basis of work norms, upper-level cooperatives sometimes partially or fully returned to the system of anticipatory evaluation of the labor force with a subsequent calculation of labor which was actually expended.

34. The Setting of the Earnings and Labor ---, op. cit., p 4.

35. Druzhba, 28 December 1956.

36. The Setting of the Earnings and Labor ---, op. cit., p 4.

37. ibid., p 22.

38. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1956, No 6, p 40.

39. Hsin-hua Pan-yueh-k'an, 1958, No 4, p 71.

40. Jen min Jih-pao, 19 February 1955.

41. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1955, No 2, p 19.

42. Narodnyy Kitay, 1955, No 7, p 37.

43. Under the condition that one work-day unit equals one actual working day. Chia-cu-hsueh Yui Yen-chiu, 1957, No 2, p 12.

44. Huang Nan-sen, Wang Ch'ing-shu, The Objective Reasons for the Rise of the Chinese Agricultural Cooperative Movement, Shanghai, 1956 (in Chinese).

45. ibid., p 2.

46. Hsueh Mu-ch'iao, General Information on the Economy of the Chinese Village, Shanghai-Ch'ung-ch'ing, 1947, p 95 (in Chinese).

47. Druzhba, 9 March 1957.

48. Jen-min Jih-pao, 26 March 1957.

49. Druzhba, 9 March 1957.

50. Jen-min Jih-pao, 26 March 1957.

51. Collection of Legislative Acts of the Chinese People's Republic, Peiping, 1957, pp 333-335.

52. Chia-ou-hsueh Yui Yen-chiu, 1957, No 2, p 12.

53. ibid.

54. ibid.

55. ibid.

56. ibid.

57. Chao Ching, Use of the Labor Force in Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives, Shanghai, 1957, p 68 (in Chinese).

58. Jen-min Jih-pao, 13 April 1958.

59. Under conditions in China, land irrigation allows a 50-200% productivity increase, as well as two or three harvest a year in the Southern and Central regions.

60. Narodnyy Kitay, 1956, No 22, p 17.

61. Hsin-chian-she, 1957, No 7, p 3.

62. ibid., p 4.

63. Druzhba, 4 August 1957.

64. Druzhba, 4 August 1957, 15 September 1957; Druzhba, 1958, No 10, Supplement, p 13; Sovetskoye kitayevedeniye (Soviet Sinology), Moscow, 1958, No 1, p 128.

65. Hsin-chian-she, 1957, No 7, p 3.

66. Jen-min Jih-pao, 5 June 1958.

67. Druzhba, 15 September 1957.

68. Regulations of Higher-level Agricultural Producers'

Cooperatives in the CPR, op. cit., pp 13-14.

69. ibid., p 43.

70. Hsin-chian-she, 1957, No 7, p 3.

71. ibid.

72. Druzhba, 18 May 1957.

73. Nung-ch'un Kung-tso T'ung-hsin, 1957, No 11, p 22.

74. Hsin-hua Pan-yueh-k'an, 1958, No 3, p 79.

75. ibid.

76. Regulations of Higher-level ---, op. cit., pp 21, 23-24.

77. Ching-chi Yen-chiu, 1958, No 1, p 28.

78. Hsin-hua Pan-yueh-k'an, 1958, No 4, pp 137-138.

79. Narodnyy Kitay, 1957, No 13, Supplement, p 14.

80. Hsin-chian-she, 1957, No 7, p 5.

81. ibid.

82. The labor of each was evaluated in work units; 10 work units comprise one conditional labor potential.

83. Jen-min Jih-pao, 20 November 1956.

84. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1958, No 3, pp 35-36.

85. Jen-min Jih-pao, 11 October 1957.

86. Jen-min Jih-pao, 13 February 1958.

CHAPTER V

THE ORGANIZATIONAL - ECONOMIC CONSOLIDATION OF THE COOPERATIVES AND THE INCREASE IN THE INCOMES OF THEIR MEMBERS. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURE IN THE COUNTRY.

Consolidation of the Cooperatives. Development of the Material and Cultural Levels in the Life of the Peasants.

The VIII Congress of the Communist Party of China took place in September of 1956. In the political report of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the Congress, Liu Shao-ch'i remarked that the difficult and complex problem of conversion of the private ownership of the means of production into socialist common property has already been basically accomplished, the question of "who will overcome whom" has been irrevocably solved in favor of socialism.[1]

"This, however, does not mean," underlined Liu Shao-ch'i, "that the problems of the party in the area of socialist reorganization of the village have been solved completely. It would be necessary, first of all, to consolidate the cooperatives of the higher type, the predominating majority of which were organized in an unusually short period of time (autumn and winter of 1955 and 1956), to achieve an increase in agricultural production and in the peasants' incomes.

The work of consolidating the cooperatives was a complex and difficult matter. Members of the cooperatives did not yet have the experience for organizing the large scale multi-sectional agricultural economy, or the experience in directing the productive activities of dozens and hundreds of households, the common funds of the cooperatives were not large, their material-

technical basis was very insignificant.

The conduct of reorganization in the village meant an upheaval in the consciousness of hundreds of millions of Chinese peasants, who have just recently been individual farmers. The party conducted extensive ideological work in the village and developed a sense of ownership towards the cooperatives among the peasants, in order that they would conduct their work in a thrifty and economical manner and would understand that they are indispensable for their personal welfare.

Therefore, after the creation of cooperatives of the higher type the center of activity for the party in the village became their organizational -- economic consolidation. The principal link in this work should have been the assurance of an uninterrupted growth in agricultural production and incomes of the cooperative members, as was pointed out by the VIII Congress of the Communist Party of China.

The Communist Party and the People's Government increased their material and financial support of the cooperatives in 1956. In the first half of 1956, during the spring sowing, agricultural credit extended by the state banks increased by 1800 million yuan, or 4.5 times more than for the corresponding period during the preceeding year.[2] At the same time, in order to aid in the solution of problems confronting the cooperatives during spring sowing, the state paid out, 800 million yuan, which constituted 10% to 20% of the cost of the contracted volume of production.[3]

There has also been an increase in the supply of the means of production to the cooperatives. During the first half of 1956 the marketing and supply cooperatives directed 40% more machines and tools and 65% more chemical fertilizer to the villages than for the corresponding period in 1955.[4]

The headlong development of the movement for the socialist reconstruction of the village led to circumstances under which the old type of agricultural producers' cooperatives (of the lower type) became outdated. In accordance with the new conditions it was necessary to generalize the experience gained in the building of cooperatives of the higher type, with consideration of all the problems that arose in conjunction with that.

On 30 June 1956 the third session of the All China People's Representative Conference adopted "Guiding Regulations on the Higher Type of the Agricultural Producers' Cooperative of the Chinese People's Republic"-- a document which defined the basic principles of organization and activity of the socialist cooperative. The adoption of this regulation had an important meaning for the consolidation of the cooperatives of the higher type.

The party and Government published several resolutions regarding improvements in the work of the cooperatives.[5]

These documents outlined measures for the adjustment of the multisectional agricultural economy, the creation of a democratic system of directing the cooperative affairs, organization of labor, distribution of income and other measures.

The peasant in joining the higher type cooperative expected to increase his income. An increase in his personal income strengthened his faith in the artel type of economy, stimulated his labor activity and, consequently, was instrumental in bringing about an increase in the productivity of labor and an increase in the cooperatives' productive output. Out of the need to prove to the peasants the beneficial aspects of the socialist collective farms in practice, during the very first year of their creation, the party presented the following problem to the cooperatives of the higher type: on the basis of the already increasing production in 1956, to achieve an increase in the incomes of not less than90% of the cooperative members.[6] This problem, however, was not fully resolved due to the fact that in 1956 the country was subjected to natural disasters, of an intensity unequalled in many years.[7]

On the whole in 1956 in those areas which were lightly affected or not affected at all by the natural disasters, 75% of the cooperatives members increased their incomes, and the incomes of 10 to 15 per cent of the cooperative members remained unchanged.[8] The incomes of a predominating majority of the poverty-stricken and poorer middle peasants increased, and the incomes of wealthier middle peasants and a small number of house- with many handicapped members somewhat decreased or remained at their former level. In the very first year after completion of the cooperative program the peasants' standard of living improved considerably: 20% to 30% of the peasants had some surplus of food remaining, 60% of the peasants had sufficient incomes to cover their expenses and only 10% to 15% of the peasants were in need of government aid.[9]

Growth in the productivity of labor and of the peasants' incomes in the cooperatives of the higher type is substantiated by data, cited below, obtained from a survey of 26,935 cooperatives located in 15 provinces and autonomous areas of the country.[10]

	Cooperatives of the lower type	Cooperatives of the higher type
Number of workdays worked, on the average during a year by each member of the cooperative	95.0	128.0
The amount of agricultural output on the average for each member of the cooperative (in chin)	808.0	966.0
Total value of the average output of each member of the cooperative (in yuan)	187.0	380.0
Pay per workday (in yuan)	0.9	1.58
The income of each member of the cooperative (in yuan)	86.0	202.1
The income of each household (in yuan)	274.0	413.0
The amount of marketable grain per household (in chin)	1179.0	1955.0

As evident from the cited table the result of an increase in the productivity of labor in the surveyed cooperatives of the higher type was that the income of every household was 51% higher than that in the cooperatives of the lower type, while the average number of workdays worked by each member of the higher type of cooperative was 34.7% more than those worked by members of the lower type cooperative.

Incomes from both agricultural activities and subsidiary production increased in the cooperatives of the higher type as a result of a more rational utilization of labor.[11]

	Cooperative of the lower type	Cooperative of the higher type
Incomes from subsidiary production of each member of the cooperative (in yuan)	32	57
The average income from subsidiary production in the gross income of the cooperative (in %)	7.7	11.2

The rate of capital investment increased considerably in the cooperatives of the higher type.

According to the data from the same survey, the higher type cooperatives invested 28.5% of their gross income into agricultural production, and 40.4% into subsidiary production, and the cooperatives of the lower type 21.9% and 30.3% respectively.[12].

Contributions into the common fund amounted to 8.7% of the annual income at the cooperatives of the higher type, and 1.6% into the common welfare fund; the cooperatives of the lower type contributed 5.2% and 1.4% respectively.[13].

Increase in the rate of capital investment and deposits into the common funds not only failed to lead to a decrease in real income of the cooperative members, but, on the contrary, were accompanied by their increase.

Finally, the advantages of the cooperatives of the higher type were evident in the increase of commodity production. While in 1955 the commodity production constituted 44.8% in the cooperatives of the higher type, in the cooperatives of the lower type it was 31.6%.[14].

The organisation of cooperatives in agriculture led to enormous changes in the lives of the five million member Chinese peasant population, to the liquidation of the system of exploitation in the village and to the creation of conditions for an uninterrupted and rapid growth in agricultural production.

In the old China the peasantry was cruelly exploited by landowners, kulaks, shop owners and foreign imperialists. The peasants lived under conditions of horrible poverty, many, it would seem, of the most common consumer goods, such as sugar, tea, kerosene, soap, rubber footwear etc., were unobtainable for them and were objects of luxury to them.

The position of the peasants has changed basically in the new China. The survey data cited below and obtained by the Institute of

Economics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences shows the extent to which the use of consumer goods by a peasant has grown over a period of 7 years (1949 - 1956).[15]

	1949[16]	1956	1956 in % to 1949
Grain (chin)	396.3	592.5	149.5
Oil (chin)	2.9	4.3	148.3
Pork (chin)	7.0	7.1	101.4
Salt (chin)	9.1	12.7	139.6
Sugar (chin)	0.4	2.1	525.0
Cigarettes (sticks)	94.0	192.0	204.3
Cotton fabric (ch'ih)[17]	10.0	18.3	183.0
Coal (chin)	34.8	113.0	325.6
Kerosene (chin)	0.2	1.5	750.0

From 1950 to 1956 the purchasing power of the Chinese peasants increased by 157%.[18] During these 7 years the production of grain in the country increased by 75 million tons and over half of this amount was consumed by the peasants themselves.

The disparity in prices between industrial and agricultural goods decreased. In 1950 this disparity in prices decreased by 17.2% by comparison with 1950, which meant an addition of 2 billion yuan[19] to the incomes of the peasants.

Improvement in the living standards of the peasants is also substantiated by the change in the social composition of the village as a result of the cooperatives. By mid 1956 the poor peasants constituted only 15% of the peasantry as compared with 60 - 70% during the agrarian reforms (the life of these poor peasants was much better in the cooperatives than it was previously). 85% of the peasants were middle peasants (of whom 25% to 30% were wealthy middle peasants).[20]

As an example illustrating the growth of product-

ivity and improvement in the living conditions for the peasant the leading village of P'u Su-cheng near the town of T'ai-yuan may be cited.

Before the unification of the peasants, the peasants of this village harvested only 350 chin of rice per mou of paddy. After creation of the cooperative of the higher type in 1956 the yield of rice increased to 1032 chin per mou (in 1955 the cooperative of the lower type harvested 785 chin per mou). The principal reason for such success was the drawing into production of the large labor resources of the village. In 1956 each able-bodied member of the cooperative worked on the average of 250 workdays, 13.6% more than in the cooperative of the lower type.

Whereas the labor of women was very sparsely used prior to the establishment of the cooperatives, in 1955 30 women worked in the field and by 1956 -- 89 women, and the number of workdays worked by them during the year increased from 1500 to 6319.

As a result of the growth in production the incomes of the cooperative members was constantly increasing. During 1956 the income of every household member reached 850 yuan (770 yuan from agriculture and 80 yuan from subsidiary production) and was 25% to 30% higher than during the preceeding year.[21].

The socialist transformation of agriculture is an indispensable condition for the development of the cultural revolution in the Chinese village.

Extensive success has been attained in the liquidation of illiteracy. By mid 1958 over 32 million persons became literate and over 90 million persons were studying.[22].

Since 1958 China began the new stage of building socialism in the country -- a stage of technical and cultural revolution.

The victory of the cooperative system led to a basic change in the aspect of the Chinese village, the number of schools, libraries, clubs, nursery schools and nurseries, communal cafeterias etc., increased. A national movement for the building of elementary and secondary schools with the peasants' funds was developing in the villages. From February until May of 1958 more than 68 thousand secondary schools were established in this manner, which were attended by 3 million students.[23].

The movement for sanitation and hygiene assumed very extensive proportions in China. It was being mainly conducted on the basis of a struggle against "the four evils" - rats, sparrows, flies and mosquitoes. This movement included 400 million persons.[24]. The constant increase in the material and cultural standard of living of the people on a basis of the developing productive forces is the most important goal of the socialistic revolution.

The Development of Agricultural Production.

The victory of the cooperative system in the village opened a way for constant development of the agricultural industry in China.

The best harvest prior to the liberation of the country was gathered in 1936 and consisted of 277.3 billion chin of grain (138.6 million tons).[25] Thereafter, during the many years of military action the level of agricultural production steadily declined. In 1949 only 216.2 billion chin of grain were harvested (108.1 million tons).[26]

During the three year reconstruction period (1950 - 1952) the production of grain increased by 45% and of cotton by almost three times.[27] As early as 1952 the grain harvest exceeded the maximum pre-war harvests by 9%.

The subsequent rate of increase in the production of the basic agricultural crops remained very high which is substantiated by the following figures (in thousands of tons).[28]

In 1949 there were 200 kilograms of grain for every member of the population in China, and approximately 300 kilograms in 1956.

As a result of the cooperatives the land cultivation methods changed and new agro-technical measures are being applied, soil improvement is being conducted, new irrigation systems are being constructed, there is a wider use of fertilizer and soil potential.

The growth of agricultural production in China occurs basically on account of the increased yield per unit of area.

The increased yields in the basic agricultural crops in China are shown by the following figures (in kilograms per hectare)[29]:[30]

	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955
Rice	1892	2109	2249	2411	2516	2467	2675
Wheat	642	636	748	731	713	866	859
Average grain crop yield	1029	1155	1220	1322	1318	1314	1417

	1949	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957
Basic crops.....	108,095	154,394	156,901	160,433	174,812	182,512	185,000
Including:							
Rice.....	48,645	68,426	71,272	70,851	78,024	82,480	---
Wheat.....	13,808	18,123	18,281	23,332	22,965	24,801	---
Other grain crops..	35,799	51,519	50,695	49,269	54,926	53,380	---
Soybean.....	5,086	9,519	9,931	9,080	9,121	10,234	---
Cotton.....	444	1,304	1,175	1,065	1,518	1,445	1,640
Jute and kenaf.....	37	305	138	137	257	258	308
Tobacco.....	43	222	213	232	298	399	296
Sugar cane.....	2,642	7,116	7,209	8,592	8,110	8,655	10,207
Sugar beets.....	191	479	505	989	1,596	1,646	1,557
Peanut oil.....	1,268	2,316	2,127	2,767	2,926	3,336	---
Rape.....	734	932	879	878	969	923	---

The average yield in grain crops reached 15.4 chin per hectare by the end of the first five year plan, and was 12% higher than in 1952, and 30% higher than in 1949.

As a result of the cooperatives and a better utilization of the labor resources in the country, conditions for widespread capital construction in agriculture were created.

By mid 1958 the area of irrigated land in the country was brought to 64.6 million hectares, which comprises over one half of all arable land in the country and is equal to 1/3 of all the irrigated land in the world.[31]

An increase in the irrigated areas permitted a rise in the sowing frequency index.[32] The sowing frequency index for 1956 equalled 142% and increased by 5.1% by comparison with 1955.[33] This means that the cultivated land area, consisting of approximately 112 million hectares actually increased by 42%, i.e. up to 159 million hectares.[34] The movement for two harvests per year is becoming constantly more popular in the country.

The rapid development of agriculture creates favorable circumstances for the industrialization of the country and for the increase in the material welfare of the population as well, it allows the successful fulfillment of the basic tasks confronting the Chinese People's Republic on its way to building socialism.

1. See Materialy VIII Vsekitayskogo s"yezda ---, op. cit., p 23.

2. Mo Yueh-ta, Development of the Agricultural Cooperative Movement ---, op. cit., p 142.

3. ibid.

4. Mo Yueh-ta, op. cit., p 142.

5. In April of 1956 the combined directive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council was published "On the Industrious and Thrifty Conduct of Cooperative Agriculture", Jen-min Jih-pao, 12 April 1956.
   In September of 1956 the directives of the TsK KPK and of the State Council were made public "On the Strengthening of Leadership of the Productive Activities and Organizational Development of the Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives", Jen-min Jih-pao, 3 September 1956.
   In November of 1956 the directives of the TsK KPK and of the State Council were adopted "On Some Concrete Questions of Distribution of the Fall Harvest in the

Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives", (Druzhba, 20 December 1956).
In September of 1957 the TsK KPK published three important directives: "On the Regulation of the Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives", "On the Adjustment of the Work in Directing Production in the Cooperatives", and "On the Unfaltering Realization within the Cooperatives of the Policy of Mutual Advantage".

6. Materialy tret'yey sessii ---, op. cit., p 114.

7. See "The Directives of the TsK KPK and of the State Council on some Concrete Questions ---", op. cit., Druzhba, 20 December 1956.

8. Chou En-lai, "Report at the IV Session of the All-China Assembly of People's Representatives", Pravda, 28 July 1957.

9. ibid.

10. Problemy razvitiya ekonomiki KNR, op. cit., pp 288-289.

11. Mo Yueh-ta, op. cit., p 123.

12. ibid.

13. ibid.

14. ibid., p 1 4

15. Narodnyy Kitay, 1957, No 9, p 14.

16. The figures for 1949 include the consumption by landowners and kulaks; therefore, the data showing the use of consumer goods by the peasant is in reality somewhat lower than shown in the table.
In accordance with the same survey material, the use of consumer goods by the landowners and kulaks in 1936 was 5.5 times that of the peasant, converted into cash.

17. one ch'ih equals 0.33 metres.

18. Jen-min Jih-pao, 5 May 1957.

19. Druzhba, 24 March 1956.

20. Jen-min Jih-pao, 5 May 1957.

21. Hsin-hua Pan-yueh-k'an, 1957, No 9, p 91.

22. Druzhba, 1958, No 35, p 30.

23. Druzhba, 1958, No 36, p 3.

24. Druzhba, 1958, No 35, p 24.

25. Ching-chi Yen-chiu, 1957, No 6, p 13.

26. ibid.

27. Narodnyy Kitay, 1954, No 22, Supplement, p 15.

28. Osnovnyye pokazateli ---, op. cit., p 45; Ching-chi Yen-chiu, 1957, No 6, p 13; Jen-min Shou-ts'e, Peiping, 1958, p 525; Pravda, 27 August 1959; Jen-min Jih-pao, 1 January 1959.

29. Narodnyy Kitay, 1958, No 8, p 9.

30. As a result of floods during 1953 and 1954, the average crop yield dropped somewhat.

31. Pravda, 13 September 1958.

32. The sowing frequency index is the relationship of acreage under crop to arable land expressed in percentage. In China this index increases from North to South. In the area of spring wheat in Northeastern and Northwestern China, it is 100% (i.e. only one harvest is gathered); in the area of winter wheat at the middle reaches of the Hwang-po River it is 120%; at the lower part of the Hwang-po it is 140%; in the rice and wheat planting area of the Yangtze Basin it is approximately 160 to 170%; in the Hsi-chiang River Basin and on Taiwan it is 180%. (Liu Shao-ch'i, Agricultural Geography of China, Moscow, 1957, p 65, published in Chinese). The basic aspects of the plan for the development of agriculture in the Chinese People's Republic for 1956-1957 outlines a significant increase in the sowing frequency index within the next 12 years. It must be up to 160% in the area between the Hwang-po and Yangtze Rivers and 200 to 230% further south.

33. The Great Decade, Peiping, 1959, p 113 (published in Chinese).

34. Osnovnyye pokazateli razvitiya narodnogo khozyaystva Kitayskoy Narodnoy Respubliki, op. cit., pp 43-44.

CHAPTER VI

STATE SECTOR IN THE AGRICULTURE OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

State Farms

After the victory of the People's Revolution the state created enterprises in the agriculture of China which were common socialist property; agricultural and cattle-breeding state farms (*goskhozy*), machine-tractor stations (MTS), agrotechnical stations, experimental seed and quality testing areas, breeding stations, various agricultural crop plantations, nurseries, forest preserves, fisheries and others.

The first form of state enterprises were the state farms, which were appearing in liberated areas even before the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic.

By the time the Chinese People's Republic was formed the country already had several large and a significant number of smaller state farms.

During the agrarian reform the provincial and higher agencies of the People's Government were able to "apportion part of the land for nationalization and utilization by experimental agricultural stations or for addition to state model-demonstration farms in one or more rural districts", during the distribution of the cultivated land in accordance with local conditions.[1] The Agrarian Reform Law stipulated that vacant lands, large forest areas, irrigation systems, large uncultivated mountain slopes, and those lands belonging to landowners or public organizations, as well as sandy and marsh lands were subject to nationalization.[2] Landowners' farms, nurseries, large bamboo plantations, orchards, tea and tung tree plantations, mulberry tree plantations, grazing lands etc. were nationalized.[3] The state farms, plantations, experimental and seeding areas as well as other agricultural enterprises which are common socialist property were established there. By the end of 1950

there were 1,215 state agricultural farms in China with a combined area of 155 thousand hectares including 36 large mechanized state farms with a combined cultivated area of 89.3 thousand hectares.[4]

The majority of these state farms were organized on unoccupied lands or on those that were either difficult or inconvenient to cultivate as well as on virgin lands. Out of the 10 thousand hectares of land cultivated by the state farms in 1950 in the areas south of the Great Wall, approximately 9 thousand hectares were newly plowed virgin lands.[5] Subsequently, the large state farms were established exclusively on virgin lands. This naturally required large capital outlays for irrigation and meliorative measures associated with the construction of irrigation systems, and during the first years unfavorably reflected on the development of the state farms.

Despite that, the collective forms of labor and the proper conduct of agriculture vividly demonstrated to the peasants the advantages of the leading state farms over the individual farms. The area cultivated by state farms and the number of draft animals increased and agricultural techniques improved with every year, which is substantiated by the following data:

A decrease in the number of state farms in 1955 is explained by the fact that a part of the smaller state farms in rural districts were reorganized into experimental farms. This process continued through 1956.

The Ministry of State Farms and Reclamation of Waste Lands was formed in May of 1956 in order to assure successful reclamation of all virgin land, the construction of new state farms and for the strengthening of leadership of the larger mechanized state farms, its jurisdiction extending over all mechanized agricultural and animal-husbandry state farms under central authority, farms, established by the sub-units of the People's Liberation Army of China in the south of China as well as some semi-mechanized state farms. During 1956 the Ministry organized 115 new large state farms.

By 1957, therefore, there were 454 state farms under the jurisdiction of the Ministry (including 166 mechanized state farms), out of which 331 were agricultural farms and 123 were cattle-breeding farms. The cultivated land area of these state farms was 908 thousand hectares, 356.7 thousand hectares were cultivated in 1956.[7]

The following table indicates the gross harvest of the basic agricultural crops, the land area under crop as well as the increase in the gross harvest by

	1950	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956
Number of state farms	1,215	2,336	2,376	2,435	2,242	2,219
including mechanized farms	36	50	59	97	106	166
Cultivated areas in thousands of hectares	155.0	246.9	250.8	8,294.5	394.6	587.5
including cultivation by mechanized state farms	89.3	135.8	141.3	185.5	269.3	448.0
Number of workers and employees, in thousands	43.0	97.0	111.0	137.0	134.0	206.0
including those in mechanized state farms	11.2	24.9	28.8	56.6	57.2	102.1
Number of draft animals in thousands of head	19	42	50	52	58	84
including those in mechanized state farms	4.1	8.3	7.9	13.3	13.1	28.0
Number of tractors in the mechanized state farms (rated at 15 h.p.)	1,160	1,532	1,627	2,235	2,839	4,422
Number of combines in the mechanized state farms	155	275	352	430	657	950

comparison with the preceding year at state farms of the Ministry during 1956.

In 1956 there were 114 thousand horses, 163 thousand head of cattle, 1340 thousand sheep and goats, and 325 thousand pigs on the state farms.

Area Under Crop and the Gross harvest of the Basic Agricultural Crops for 1956.*

Crop	Acreage under crop (hectares)	Gross harvest In thousands of tons	Gross harvest In % to 1955
Grain	333.3	560	200
Soybeans	72.0	68.5	160
Cotton	34.0	14.5	200

*[Note] Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1957 No. 8, page 2

The value of gross production in 1956 by the Ministry's state farms was 250 million yuan and 73.6% higher than in 1955 [9] while the grain commodity production was 75% higher. The profit received by state farms from agricultural production exceeded 3100 thousand yuan. The total profit of the state farms (including farms in Sinkiang and in South China) comprised over 43,800 thousand yuan.[10]

By the end of 1957 the number of state farms under the jurisdiction of The Ministry for State Farms and Waste Land Reclamation increased to 710, and the number of workers and salaried employees at these farms rose to 500 thousand persons. The overall cultivated area of these state farms was 1200 thousand hectares, the state farms had 1.5 thousand combines and approximately 3.5 thousand trucks, the tractor pool consisted of 10 thousand machines (rated at 15 h.p.).[11] The state farms produced 590 thousand tons of grain, 70 thousand tons of soybeans, approximately 17 thousand tons of cotton fibre.

Animal breeding was being successfully developed by the state farms. The state farms possessed 140 thousand horses, 200 thousand head of cattle, 1520 thousand sheep and goats and 450 thousand pigs in 1957.[12]

During the First Five Yeal Plan the state farms of the Ministry yielded 2 million tons of grain, 240 thousand tons of soybeans, 47 thousand tons of cotton fibre as well as a significant amount of technical crops and cattle.[13]

Over 1400 agricultural and cattle-breeding state farms, which cultivated approximately 830 thousand hectares of virgin land, or three times more than in 1957, were under the jurisdiction of the Ministry for the State Farms and Waste Land Reclamation in 1958. The grain crop harvest reached 1,085 thousand tons, i.e. it was twice as high as the harvest for the preceding year. The production of cotton fibre reached 30 thousand tons, exceeding the 1957 level by 77%. Significant development was achieved in cattle-breeding. 120 thousand pigs were raised, which comprised 270% by comparison with 1957.[14]

The state farms not only reclaim waste land and strive for an increase in production, but conduct extensive work for increasing the crop yield and lowering the cost of production as well. Due to the application of modern agricultural machinery and progressive land cultivation methods the crop yield of food and technical crops is constantly increasing in the mechanized state farms, and the formerly barren land and salt marshes are gradually being transformed into fertile fields. As

a result the wheat yield for 1952 in the mechanized state farms was 174.7% by comparison with the average national yield, 155% for cotton, 157% for soybeans and 155.7% for sesame.[15]

The average grain crop yield for all the state farms was 16 chin per hectare, many state farms attained and surpassed the indices stipulated for their areas by "The Basic Conditions of the Plan for the Development of Agriculture of the Chinese People's Republic for 1956--1967", and some farms averaged a grain crop yield of 75 chin per hectare. The average yield of cotton fibre at 91 state cotton farms was 4.8 chin per hectare, 65 farms attained or surpassed the level planned for 1967.[16]

At the small un-mechanized state farms under local jurisdiction the crop yield as a rule also significantly exceeded the yield of neighboring peasant fields.

The State farms became centers of leading agricultural production, the masses were being educated and shown the way towards productive cooperativization on a basis of concrete examples. The state farms concurrently developed a widespread program of experimental work in the testing of various kinds of agricultural crops and the selection of those best suited to the local conditions. The state farms relayed to the peasants their experience in the cultivation of the different crops, methods of land cultivation, the application of various organic and mineral fertilizers, the use of new or perfected tools and implements. Thousands of peasants bought quality seed from the state farms as well as breeding cattle, agricultural machinery and new tools.

According to incomplete data the peasants were receiving approximately 50 thousand tons of various high yield crop seeds from the state farms during the 1951 -- 1953 period.[17] The amount of quality seed distributed by the state farms increased with each year. In 1955, for instance, 19 mechanized state farms sold 25 thousand tons of quality wheat seed.[18] At the beginning of 1956 the main directorate of state farms with the Ministry of Agriculture of the Chinese People's Republic issued a directive stipulating that during 1956 all the state farms must provide themselves with a basic supply of quality seed and "supply them to the agricultural producers' cooperatives in large amounts, which is an important political and agricultural task of the state farms."[19] The state farms under central jurisdiction sold over 450 thousand tons of quality seed to peasants and cooperatives during the First Five Yeal Plan.

In order to improve the productivity of cattle and

to improve its quality certain state farms established breeding stations, which had purebred bulls.[20] In addition to that, in areas where animal husbandry is well developed state breeding stations have been established. State animal husbandry farms raised a large number of purebred cattle (a significant number of which was sold to the agricultural producers' cooperatives), and conducted research on the various problems of cattle breeding During the First Five Year Plan state farms which were under central jurisdiction sold 30 thousand head of purebred cattle to the cooperatives.

From the very first years of their existence the state farms became initiators in the application of the leading achievements in agricultural industry of the Soviet Union and countries of the People's Democracies. The state farms assimilate and widely disseminate such agrotechnical measures as deep plowing, etc. Much attention is being devoted to the study of effectiveness of the various agricultural techniques with relation to the different agricultural crops under various soil and climatic conditions. On a basis of broad experimental work the state farms develop and relay to the peasants scientifically based agricultural techniques, which assure high yield stable harvests.

The state farms have also become schools of advanced agricultural techniques and animal husbandry for the preparation of agrotechnical cadres and agricultural specialists.

Directly after the agrarian reform the state farms began to create a wide net of agrotechnical groups, which trained the peasants in the advanced methods of land cultivation and plant care. Hence, 144 state farms under local jurisdiction of the Hupei Province directed 3 thousand agrotechnical groups by the beginning of 1951, which consolidated over 18 thousand persons. In one year this province had 11.5 thousand groups, which were instructing approximately 70 thousand peasants. In 1951 60 state farms of the Shansi Province established 6,300 groups for the study of advanced agrotechnology, they included over 36 thousand persons.

The extensive significance of state farms in the development of agricultural production defined their important role in the socialist transformation of the Chinese village. The state farms stimulated the development of collective forms of labor throughout and actively assisted the peasant masses to work for collectivization.

In order for the state farms to attain a reorganizational role they had to increase their own production

systematically, to attain high yield harvests, to lower the cost of production and to unalterably increase agricultural profits. State farms showed the peasants that the advantages of the socialist system of agriculture is contained first of all in the fact that it makes it possible to achieve a constant growth in production and an increase in incomes. At the same time the state farms cooperated with the peasants of the neighboring villages in the organization of mutual aid teams and of the agricultural producers' cooperatives, and assisted them in solving the difficulties which are inevitable during the first stages of development of collective production. Hence, with the direct assistance and support of the Hua-ch'uan State Farm, established on the North-Eastern unreclaimed lands, eight basic-level cooperatives were organized and the first cooperative of the higher type in China, the Hsing-huo Cooperative, was organized.[21] The Chiu-san State Farm (Heilungkiang Province) aided the peasants in organizing the Hsin Sheng-huo Cooperative of the higher type.[22]

Many state farms systematically assisted the mutual aid groups and agricultural cooperatives which was instrumental in the further consolidation of the peasants' economu. The mechanized Fang Ch'iu-hu State Farm in Anhwei Province planted wheat for the mutual aid group in 1953. However, the tractors and agricultural machinery could not operate on the separate small land plots. In order to be able to use the machinery on a regular basis the peasants decided to combine their land to reorganize their group into a agricultural producers' cooperative.[23]

With an increase in the number of producer's cooperatives the state farms increased their aid in production to the cooperatives. In 1955, for example, 5 large mechanized state farms in the Heilungkiang Province cultivated over 1.5 thousand hectares of land for the neighboring cooperatives.[24]

After beginning the wide scale movement for cooperativization of agriculture, tens of thousands of the newly created cooperatives were in dire need of concrete aid. Together with other government enterprises and organizations the state farms fully cooperated with the establishment and consolidation of the new cooperatives. Many state farms sent their representatives to the cooperatives in order to achieve closer ties with the cooperatives and to extend the necessary aid for them to surmount their difficulties.

The state farms frequently conducted agotechnical direction of the newly created cooperatives. The Lien-hu

State Farm in the Ssu-t'u district of the Kiangsu Province, for instance, provided several cooperatives with choice seed of the most effective variety of rice for that particular region as well as of other agricultural crops and aided in conducting a more thorough cultivation of the land with observence of scientific agrotechnology. Many cooperatives in the area, as a result, reaped an abundant harvest in 1955, and the yield of the newly introduced variety of rice was 17% higher than the usual local variety. Due to aid by the state farm as early as 1956 40% of all the fields in this area were seeded with choice seeds of high yield rice.[25]

Considerable assistance was extended by the state farms to the cooperatives in the acquisition and use of the new types of agricultural tools and machinery. Specialists who have worked at the state farms instruct the peasants in the use of the new machines and tools and their maintenance.

State farm accountants visited the cooperatives regularly and assisted the peasants in preparing production plans, labor estimates, and the distribution of income. They instructed cooperative bookkeepers in the correct accounting procedures, compilation of the balance sheet execution of documents and other matters.

Some state farms, having experienced a lack of manpower in the period of hard work during harvest time, have concluded agreements with the local mutual aid groups and agricultural producers' cooperatives obligated themselves to extend labor aid to the state farms (the peasants' labor was well remunerated by the state farms), and the state farms assumed the obligation of assisting the mutual aid teams and cooperatives in increasing their production levels and to achieve high crop yields.

By working in the state farms the peasants had an opportunity to familiarize themselves with the latest agrotechnical measures and to introduce them to their own fields.

An important measure for stimulating the development of production at the cooperatives was labor competition between the state farms and the neighboring cooperatives. The competition agreements included yields of food and technical crops, number of head of cattle and other indices. The labor competition agreement between the state farm of the P'i-Hsien Provincial District (Szechwan Province) and 38 agricultural producer's cooperatives stipulated 26.75 chin of wheat per hectare and 17.75 chin of colza per hectare, to raise five pigs for every hectare of cultivated land and to fully assure a winter supply

of feed for the draft animals.[26]

The conclusion of this agreement caused an increase in the labor activity by the peasant masses. The peasants of the Hung-kuang agricultural producer's cooperatives throughout the rural district of He-hsing decided to obtain more wheat than the amount proposed by the state farm and to reap 30 chin per hectare. For this purpose they seeded an additional area with winter wheat and increased the amount of fertilizer.

State farms are not only the centers of leading agricultural production but cultural centers as well. Workers and specialists at the state farms teach reading and writing to the peasants, explain the course and policies of the Communist Party and The People's Government, and familiarize the peasants with current events both in China and abroad.

In this manner the state farms extended assistance to the peasants, stimulated the transition of the peasants to collectivization and were instrumental in increasing production by the agricultural producer's cooperatives.

Machine Tractor Stations

The machine tractor stations, created by the government, were also collective socialist property.

After the victorious revolution in China there was no tractor industry, and the mechanization of agriculture was being accomplished through the importation of agricultural machinery from the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary as well as some capitalist countries. It was stipulated that the basic technical reconstruction of agriculture will be conducted after completion of the socialist transformations of the village and the creation of a powerful basis for home indsutry. It was at first planned that by the end of the Second Five Year Plan the total land area cultivated by machines would be 10% of the total cultivated land of the country.[27]

The reorganization of a widespread network of machine tractor stations was then planned for the Third Five Year Plan, when it was proposed to establish approximately 5 thousand machine tractor stations.[28] But for the realization of this program it was necessary to accumulate some production experience and to show clearly the advantages of the mechanized cultivation of land to the peasant masses. The first 11 machine tractor stations were created for that purpose in 1953.[29]

During subsequent years the number of machine tractor stations increased, and the number of tractors at each station increased as well, and the land area cultivated by them increased significantly as indicated by the following figures:[30]

	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957
The number of MTS	11	89	139	326	390
The number of tractors (rated at 15 h.p.)	113	778	2,377	9,862	12,176
The cultivated area in thousands of hectares	6	44	209	1,355	1,800

Machinery from the machine tractor stations cultivated 1.6% of all the cultivated land in China.[31]

By the termination of the First Five Year Plan machine tractor stations were established throughout the territory of China with the exclusion of Tibet.[32]

The principal machine tractor stations are situated in the basic grain and cotton producing areas. By the beginning of 1957 2/3 of the machine tractor stations were located in eight provinces (Hupeh, Hunan, Shantung, Shensi, Shansi, Anhwei , Liaoning and Heilungkiang Provinces).[33]

Particular attention was being devoted to mechanization of the production processes on the cotton fields. There were 133 stations in the cotton producing areas of China in 1956, which had 2.4 thousand tractors (rated at 15 h.p.) at their disposal. Mechanized cultivation in those areas was being conducted over an area of 600 thousand hectares.[34]

The main directorate of mechanization of agricultural production processes with the Ministry of Agriculture in the Chinese People's Republic conducted a survey of the work being conducted by the machine tractor stations in the eight provinces enumerated above. The survey established that the crop yield from the fields served by the machine tractor stations is significantly higher than those cultivated by draft animals. The wheat crop yield, for instance, was on the average higher by 2.3 to 4.5 chin per hectare, 3 to 4 chin per hectare more of corn and soybeans, as well as 75 to 100 kilograms more cotton fibre

per hectare.[35]

Surveys conducted during 1957 indicated that the mechanized cultivation of land increases the yield of grain crops by over 20%, cotton by 18% to 25%.[36]

An important advantage of mechanized cultivation of land consists of the fact that it permits the cooperatives to resolve the difficulties associated with a lack of manpower during the harvesting, creates favorable conditions for the conduct af a multilateral agricultural economy and the development of subsidiary production, which substantially increased the cooperatives' income. For instance, due to the systematic aid given by the Ch'ang-chih machine tractor station it became possible for the cooperatives to delegate 450 able-bodied workers for various subsidiary industries. As a result of this the cooperative's income increased from 26 thousand yuan (12.8% of the total income) in 1953 from subsidary industry activities to 269 thousand yuan (47% of the total income) in 1957.[37]

In striving to utilize machinery in the cultivation of their fields the peasants created agricultural producer's cooperatives and reorganized cooperatives of the lower type into the higher type.

The Ching-lung Machine Tractor Station in Heilungkiang Province, created in the autumn of 1954, cultivated lands belonging to 21 cooperatives in 1955 and by 1956 serviced 66 cooperatives, which by that time contained over 80% of all the peasants households.[38] Ten smaller semi-socialist cooperatives at the village of Ching-lung, desiring to better utilize the advantages of mechanized land cultivation, adopted a resolution by 1956 to join and establish a cooperative of the higher type.[39]

The machine tractor stations had the important role of dissemination and implementation of progressive scientific agrotechnology and agrotechnological knowledge. In working on the fields of the cooperatives that they serviced the machine tractor stations applied the latest achievements of modern agronomy and bore the responsibility for implementation. Particular attention was being devoted to the most expedient utilization of progressive agrotechnological measures.

The machine tractor stations were likewise engaged in the training of agronomical cadres. The Fu-yang machine tractor station for instance, in coordination with the agrotechnical station, organized agrotechnical study groups and aided in the training of 450 specialists in the area of agrotechnology at the cooperatives it serviced.[40]

In addition all tractor machine stations conducted the training of mechanics (tractor drivers, combine opera-

tors, maintenace technicians etc.).

During 1955 - 1957 many machine tractor stations achieved considerable success in organizing production among collectivized peasants. They aided the cooperatives to partition their arrable lands correctly, to compile annual and monthly production plans, rationally to consolidate and allocate subsidiary production activities, to utilize machinery, draft animals and agricultural tools better. The workers of the Peiping Machine Tractor Station carefully studied the concrete production conditions in the cooperatives it serviced and aided them in compiling their production plans.[41] The Shen-yang Machine Tractor Station, having established close ties with the local cooperatives, extended concrete assistance to them in the compitation of their annual production plans, labor distribution plans and financial plans.[42]

The machine tractor stations played an important role in the reclamation of virgin and fallow lands. In the north-east the machine tractor stations and the mechanized state farms plowed hundreds of thousands of hectares of fertile fields, which were transferred to the local cooperatives and the local migrants.

By 1956 ten new machine tractor stations were established in the Kan-nan and Fu-yu Provincial Districts of Heilungkiang Province for the cultivation of virgin soil and fallow land, and an additional ten tractor brigades were established in the Ku-ch'eng and Shuang-ch'eng Provincial Districts, which already contained ten machine tractor stations. Altogether there were 440 tractors of various trade names (over 1300 tractors rated at 15 h.p.) allocated for the cultivation of virgin land, which plowed 230 thousand hectares of virgin soil.[43] Large land areas were assimilated with aid of the machine tractor stations in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous area, in Kansu Province and other locations.

The machine tractor stations also encountered considerable difficulty created principally by inadequate production experience and a low technical level of the majority of the mechanics. As a result many violations of operation and maintenance rules were allowed in the utilization of the machines, which led to frequent accidents and equipment idleness.[44] Losses, which were consequently borne by the machine tractor stations were extensive. Out of 89 tractors sent by the Pei ing Machine Tractor Station during September and November 1956 to the cooperatives for autumn plowing, 12 machines were incapacitated as a result of which over ten thousand manhours were lost.[45]

The lack of production experience explained a series

of deficiencies in the organization of labor and application of technology. Thus, unproductive expenditure of fuel at 27 machine tractor stations in Hupeh Province comprised 30% of the total expenditures and up to 50% for individual stations.[46] The tractor brigades of some machine tractor stations did not have a clearly defined service area or a system of personal responsibility for machines, and the finished work was returned very slowly at many stations.

Agreements concluded between the machine tractor stations and the cooperatives, in certain instances, stipulated projects which could not be accomplished by the machine tractor stations under the existing conditions; on the other hand work was frequently being planned that was unnecessary for the development of agricultural production.[47]

Specific difficulties in work of the machine tractor stations arose in conjunction with utilization of foreign techniques. A particular feature of Chinese agriculture is the careful cultivation of soil. Irregardless of the primitive traditional agricultural implements and a low level of labor productivity with their use, the peasants achieve remarkable results in the cultivation of the land. The centuries of experience of generations of peasants accumulated in agriculture, allows the Chinese peasantry to obtain comparatively high crop yields even with the simplest implements. This of course requires the expenditure of an immense amount of human labor.

The application of machines sharply increases the productivity of labor. Foreign tractors and other agricultural machinery, however, are unsuitable in many cases, to the existing conditions of agricultural production in China. Local production of tractors began in 1958. During 1958 Chinese engineers, workers and scientists designed on a basis of experience, 240 varieties of tractors which complied with the peculiarities of agricultural production processes in the various areas. The mechanization experience accumulated by the machine tractor stations and mechanized state farms serves as a good basis for the establishment of an original agricultural technique, indispensable for a full and all encompassing mechanization of agriculture in China.

With the developing agricultural production the demands of the village for machine technology have increased sharply and the amount of work performed by the machine tractor stations was increasing constantly. Whereas at the beginning the stations performed only two or three types of work (plowing, harrowing and occasionally seeding), after a few years of existence they performed 10 to 12

types of work including cultivation, harvesting, threshing, transportation of freight and so forth.[48]

The increase in the amount of work and a better technical ability of the mechanics had an important significance in the profit making capabilities of the machine tractor stations. Whereas at the beginning of their existence the stations were losing money,[49] by the end of the First Five Year Plan many of them balanced their incomes with their expenses and gained some profit.[50] The machine tractor stations in the Shansi Province, for instance, received a 3976 yuan profit in 1956, those in Shensi 33,783 yuan, and in Honan 143,183 yuan.[51]

Over half the machine tractor stations, however, remained non-profit by the beginning of the Second Five Year Plan.[52] This is explained by a number of factors, one of which was that the officially established remuneration for the performance of mechanized work was most insignificant and in many cases did not cover the cost of operation.[53]

The Kai-p'ing Machine Tractor Station in Liaoning Province cultivated 10.3 hectares of cotton field at the Chia-Ts'ang Cooperative. Due to a higher crop yield the cooperative's gross income increased by 2,694 yuan. The machine tractor station's portion out of that amount was a sum not too much over 320 yuan (or 13%), and over 2,300 yuan was the cooperative's net profit.[54]

The He- he Machine Tractor Station in Shantung Province servicing, in 1952 the Pa-i Cooperative fields received for all its work, including threshing, only 18% of the overflow grain value which was harvested by the cooperative as a result of the mechanization of the production processes.[55]

The low pay for the execution of tractor work was primarily explained by the need to sharply increase the welfare of the broad peasant masses.

A second reason for the insolvency of a majority of the machine tractor stations was due to excessively high unproductive waste. Many of the machine tractor stations had a large personnel surplus. In 1957 there were, on the average, 4.7 persons for each machine at[56] all the machine tractor stations, and at some individual stations 8 to 10 persons.[57] The administrative-executive cadres comprised about 20%.[58] As a result of this the payroll was exceptionally high and at some stations exceeded 50% of all the production expenses (excluding depreciation of machinery).[59]

The outright sale of tractors to the cooperatives by the government began in 1957.[60] It became possible for

the peasants to utilize tractors and machinery to the fullest extent for the all encompassing development of agriculture, cattle-breeding, and its other branches as well as local industry. At the same time the group ownership of the cooperatives is another step closer to common property.

Agrotechnical Stations

After the victorious people's revolution and introduction of the agrarian reform a great significance for the restoration and development of agriculture in China was acquired by the matter of dissemination of progressive scientific agrotechnology among the great masses of peasants. One of the peculiarities of China is the fact that the area of cultivated land in the country is most insignificant by comparison with the size of the population. Hence, the only method of raising agricultural production in China is to increase the crop yield per unit of area. In order to achieve a sharp increase in this, however, it is necessary to apply progressive scientific land cultivation and plant growing methods, the introduction of more effective agricultural tools and implements, choice seed, chemical fertilizer and so on.

The Chinese peasants have centuries of experience in the growing of crops and cultivation of land. This experience represents a precious heritage of the Chinese people. In old China, however, all the achievements of the peasant masses could not have the desired effect as no-one was engaged in the consolidation and dissemination of such experience.

Mass impoverishment of the peasants under the Kuomintang clique led to a situation where even the old techniques of crop raising and land cultivating could not be utilized to their full potential, as the peasantry was unable to acquire the required amount of fertilizer, to sort the seed etc. The yield of some of the most important crops decreased sharply.

It is natural that in the new China such issues as the improvement of agrotechnology, the dissemination of beneficial experience, the study and application of leading achievements and the implementation of agrotechnological knowledge acquired primary significance.

The first agrotechnological stations were established in the Northeast in 1950 for the solution of these problems.

Agrotechnological stations from the very beginning began to play an important role in the development of producer's cooperatives in the village. Agrotechnological

stations, in assisting mutual aid teams and cooperatives to raise their crop yields and to increase income, were clearly showing to the peasant masses the advantages and benefits of collective labor and proved through examples and experiences of the peasants themselves that the proper utilization of soil and effective application of agrotechnological measures are possible only in large farms based on collective labor.

Concurrently with the development of the cooperative movement, which encompassed all the new provincial districts and provinces, the number of agrotechnological stations and workers were constantly increasing, which is evident from the following figures: [61]

	1953	1954	1955	1956
Number of stations	3632	4549	7997	14,230
Number of workers	over 28,000	35,740	51,401	76,300

At the same time their functions and spheres of activity also changed. At first the agrotechnological stations were being established in provincial districts and a single station serviced the entire district. Since mid 1955, which was the beginning of the rapidly developing movement for collectivization, the agrotechnical stations were being established in every rural area.

The decision of the Sixth (Expanded) Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, seventh convocation, on the subject of collectivization of agriculture stipulated that "agricultural organs must create agrotechnological stations in a planned order, transforming them into centers of technical aid to the agricultural producer's cooperatives on behalf of the government (for instance in the use of new types of agricultural tools, in the implementation of high quality seed, in the perfection of soil cultivation methods, in the struggle against agricultural plan diseases and pests etc.). [62] By the end of the First Five Year Plan the number of agrotechnoligical stations decreased somewhat by comparison with 1956 (there were 13, 669 stations in 1957) due to the face that a part of them were reorganized into special stations. Agrotechnological stations determined their activities, depending upon the prevailing local conditions and the agricultural specialization of the given area

(rice, cotton, tea growing or others). They closely coordinated all of their work with the work of the local state farms, experimental agricultural stations, model farms and other state agricultural enterprises. In addition to that, the stations extended agricultural aid to the smaller state farms which did not have a resident agronomist.[63]

The peasants, becoming more convinced of the usefulness of advice given by workers of the agrotechnological stations, heeded their opinions and recommendations. In addition to that, due to the successful development and consolidation of the national economy the government was able to provide agriculture with a significantly larger amount of choice seed, new types of agricultural tools, fertilizer etc. Hence, in 1956, the agrotechnological stations were assigned the task of extending aid to the cooperatives in the expedient application of various agrotechnological measures on a single plot of land, which assured a sharp increase in the crop yield.

Agrotechnological stations were to aid the cooperatives in the compilation of production plans, the consolidation of labor brigades and teams, the outlining of agrotechnological measures, etc.

In an analysis of work accomplished by the agrotechnological stations by the Ministry of Agriculture of the People's Republic of China, which was conducted in 1955, it was determined that the highest rate of production was achieved by those cooperatives which were under the direct leadership of the agrotechnological stations or were closely associated with them. In Hupeh Province 623 stations directed 5,056 basic level agricultural producer's cooperatives which had about 246 thousand hectares of cultivated land. The crop yield was on the average 30% higher than of the other cooperatives.[64]

In the Hsing-tai district of Hupeh Province, 49 agrotechnological stations directed a total of 567 cooperatives, which increased their production levels by an average of 20%, while the productivity of the other cooperatives of that district was considerably lower.[65]

At the same time the stations were successfully conducting a training program for the peasant technical cadres and disseminated agrotechnical information among the masses. According to incomplete data, for the first half of 1956 the agrotechnological stations trained over 6.4 million agrotechnological specialists in various fields for the agricultural producer's cooperatives.[66] During the same year over 500 thousand agricultural engineering workers were trained in Szechwan Province and

40 general advance agrotechnical measures were implemented into agricultural practices of that area.[67]

Due to the very extensive work by the party and the People's Government in the perfection of agricultural engineering the crops are increasing annually on a national scale.

The establishment of state agricultural enterprises was an important component of the socialist transformation of agriculture assisted the peasantry in successfully developing production and played an important role in the establishment and consolidation of the collective forms of labor.

1. See "Land Reform Law of 28 June 1950" (in Zakonodatel'nyye Akty Kitayskoy Narodnoy Respubliki /Legislative Acts of the Chinese People's Republic/, Moscow, 1952), p 133.

2. ibid., pp 134, 135.

3. ibid., p 134.

4. "Razvitiye narodnogo khozyaystva KNR" (Development of the National Economy of the CPR) in Statisticheskiye Pokazateli (Statistical Figures), Moscow, 1956, p 30.

5. Narodnyy Kitay, 1952, No 17, p 23.

6. Osnovnyye pokazateli razvitiya ---, op. cit., pp 48-49.

7. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1952, No 17, p 23.

8. ibid.

9. Chi-hsieh-hua Nung-yeh, 1957, No 1, page 1.

10. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1957, No 8, page 2.

11. Kung-jen Jih-pao, 1 February 1958.

12. Druzhba, 1957, No 10, page 35.

13. Kung-jen Jih-pao, 1 February 1958.

14. Chung-kuo Nung-k'en, 1959, No 18, page 1.

15. Hsin-hua Yüeh-pao, 1952, No 10, page 182.

16. Hsin-hua Pan-yueh-k'an, 1958, No 5, page 133.

17. Chi-hsieh-hua Nung-yeh, 1956, No 1, page 3.

18. Chi-hsieh-hua Nung-yeh, 1956, No 3, page 3.

19. Ibid.

20. Agriculture in New China, Peiping, 1953, page 46.

21. Lu Jen, "History of the First State Farm in the New China" Hankow, 1952, pages 2 and 3.

22. Agriculture in New China, op. cit., p 50.

23. Hsüeh-hsi, 1954, No 3, page 19.

24. Chi-hsieh-hua Nung-yeh, 1956, No 1, page 3.

25. Chi-hsieh-hua Nung-yeh, 1956, No 1, page 20.

26. Ibid, page 12.

27. Materialy VIII ---, op. cit., p 37.

28. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1956, No 5, page 28.

29. Hsüeh-hsi, 1954, No 3, page 16.

30. Hsüeh-hsi, 1954, No 3, pages 16 and 18; Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1957, No 14, pages 8, 10; Materialy tret'yey sessii Vostochnogo sobraniya narod. pred., op. cit, pp; Druzhba, 1958, No 7, page 25; Voprosy Ekonomiki, 1957, No 8, page 135.

31. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1958, No 3, page 8.

32. Druzhba, 1958, No 7, page 25.

33. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1957, No 14, page 8.

34. Druzhba, 22 January 1957.

35. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1957, No 14, page 8.

36. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1958, No 13, page 11.

37. "Questions of Mechanization of Chinese Agriculture", Pao ting, 1958, page 89.

38. Chi-hsieh-hua Nung-yeh, 1956, No 2, page 23.

39. Ibid.

40. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1957, No 14, page 8.

41. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1955, No 8, page 35.

42. Chi-hsieh-hua Nung-yeh, 1956, No 5, page 28.

43. Chi-hsieh-hua Nung-yeh, 1957, No 2, page 29.

44. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1955, No 8, page 33.

45. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1957, No 14, page 10.

46. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1957, No 14, page 11.

47. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1955, No 8, page 35.

48. See Chi-hsieh-hua Nung-yeh, 1956, No 5, pages 27 - 28; Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1956, No 5, page 32.

49. In 1953 the cost of soft plowing 1 hectare of land was on the average 45.05 yuan at all the MTS of Chinglin Province. In 1956 it dropped to 19.11 yuan ("Questions of Mechanization of Chinese Agriculture", page 82).

50. The depreciation of equipment and machinery was not included in the expenses. See Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1958, No 3, page 11.

51. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1957, No 14, page 10.

52. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1958, No 3, page 11.

53. Ta Kung Pao, 4 April 1957.

54. Chi-hsieh-hua Nung-yeh, 1956, No 2, page 29.

55. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1958, No 3, page 11.

56. Ibid.

57. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1957, No 14, page 11.

58. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1958, No 3, page 11.

59. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1957, No 14, page 11. It must be considered that a certain surplus of cadres at the stations was necessary as a certain number of station workers were under training, otherwise it would have been difficult to expand old stations and to create new ones. (Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1958, No 3, page 11.)

60. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1958, page 13.

61. Hsüeh-hsi, 1954, No 3, page 17; Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1956, No 5, page 26; Jen-min Jih-pao, 31 December 1953; Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1955, No 5, page 22.

62. "Resolution of the Sixth (expanded) Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, seventh convocation, on the Question of Cooperation in Agriculture", Moscow, 1955, page 24.

63. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1955, No 21, pages 29-30.

64. Chung-kuo Nung-pao, 1956, No 5, page 26.

65. Ibid.

66. Jen-min Jih-pao, 31 December 1956.

67. Druzhba, 16 January 1957.

CONCLUSION

As a result of the development of the cooperative movement during autumn of 1955 through the spring of 1956, the tempo of socialist transformations within the village as well as within the city accelerated. During the autumn of 1956 the VIII Congress of the Communist Party of China contended that these transformations had been basically completed throughout the country. The victory of the socialist revolution in the sphere of ownership of the means of production led to a profound stratification of the national bourgeois class. The role of the left wing increased significantly but was still not very numerous. A major portion of the national bourgeois class that occupied intermediate positions was uncertain. A small right wing bourgeois element maintained positions antagonistic to socialism and was awaiting a suitable moment for an attack on the Communist Party and the People's Government.

In accordance with a decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, starting with mid-April 1957 a movement for the regulation of the types of work was being conducted in the country, which began as a party measure and became a national struggle. This movement aimed at increasing Communist consciousness and bringing together the broad masses, the isolation of rightist and all anti-socialist elements.

Rightist bourgeois elements attempted to exploit this movement for a broad political and ideological advance on the gains of the socialist revolution. The attack of the rightist elements was primarily directed against the dictatorship of the proletariat and the directing role of the Communist Party of China. The rightist elements attempted to completely strike out the great successes attained by the Chinese people in their struggle for socialism and attempted to cast doubt upon the correctness of the policies of the Communist Party. The goal of the bourgeois elements was to compel the People's Government to veer from the course of socialist development to capitalism. Attacking policies of the socialist transformations, the rightists asserted that the collectivization

under conditions in China would increase hidden unemployment in the village and because of that would be a barrier to the mechanization of agriculture and an increase in the peasants' standard of living.

Meanwhile, a manpower surplus not only failed to materialize at the agricultural producers' cooperatives of the higher type, particularly in the large ones (those with over 1000 households), but, on the contrary, the matter of including a maximum number of human resources with production arose, as agricultural production in China is principally based on manual labor.

The problems associated with utilization of the rich manpower resources together with the perfection of production relationships and a transfer to the agricultural cooperatives of the higher type were not a major issue. Productive forces received considerable development at cooperatives of the higher type having socialist characteristics. This explains the growth in production under difficult conditions during 1956 and 1957. The agricultural cooperatives of the higher type were basically small (typically containing 150 - 200 households, 250 - 350 workers and having 150 - 200 hectares of useful, productive land). With almost a total absence of mechanization, this was an economically impotent agricultural organization with limited financial resources. While it was possible to assure a gradual increase in crop yields on the basis, it was beyond the capacity of the small agricultural cooperatives to develop the complex multilateral economy. This in turn meant that the very extensive productive potentials of the village were not exploited. These cooperatives were unable to resolve the thousand year old problem of irrigation, to sharply increase the preparation of organic fertilizer, conduct extensive reforestation and plant with verdure. If this task were transposed to the government it would have taken many additional years due to a lack of funds and the urgency of other even more grandiose tasks pertaining to national industrialization, and the rate of industrialization would have been considerably slower.

In other words the possibilities for the application of labor have increased considerably at the smaller agricultural producers' cooperatives, but not to a degree sufficient to solve the problem of basic reformation of agriculture with the existing level of organization and technology.

The smaller cooperatives performed a significant role in the socialist transformation of agriculture and an increase in production. First of all they were a

socialist form of economy in the village. Secondly they were several times larger than the cooperative of the lower type and had at their disposal a correspondingly larger manpower pool and financial facilities. Finally, became a good school for the training of cadres and leaders of a large socialist farm.

On the other hand, the dimensions of the agricultural producers' cooperatives, the degree of labor concentration in them, financial means and the sphere of their agricultural activities were inadequate for the most expedient utilization of all the available manpower and its most efficient expenditure in the interests of wide scale capital construction in agriculture and an accelerated development of agricultural production.

The demands of future agricultural development firmly nudged the peasants toward a consolidation of their producers' cooperatives. The extensive irrigation projects which were completed in 1955 and 1956 were possible due to wide scale cooperation among many cooperatives.

At the same time the merging of various forms of cooperatives was taking place: The marketing-supply cooperatives and the credit cooperatives merged with the producers' cooperatives, as a result of which the operation of the farms became considerably easier.

The rightists however were striving to artificially restrain the perfection of producers' relations within the village. The merger of the cooperatives in a number of cases was being suppressed, and the already existing comparatively small number of larger cooperatives were being administratively disseminated into smaller units. In the Honan Province, for instance, after establishment of socialist cooperatives in 1956, there were 26,211 cooperatives of the higher type with an average of 358 households in each, including 808 cooperatives with a thousand or more households. The rightist opportunists, having gained a foothold in the provincial committee of the party, disseminated the agricultural producers' cooperatives, increased their number to 54 thousand with 180 households in each one. There were only 495 large cooperatives left.[1]

"...During the second half of 1956 and the spring of 1957 in an atmosphere of the struggle against so called 'dashing ahead' part of the people began to have doubts regarding the course of construction 'faster, more, better and more economically', in the course of cooperation with construction, doubts in 40 basic conditions for the development of agriculture. This damaged the activity of the masses, which had a negative result on achievements during the 1957 triumphs in the area of agricultural production."[2]

The increase in industrial production was 6.9% in 1957 by comparison with 10.8% in 1956.[3] The increase in agricultural production was, on the average, 4.5% during the First Five Year Plan 4.9% in 1956, and 3.5% in 1957 (with a planned 4.8%).[4] During the period of socialist development in the village in 1955 — 1956 the irrigated areas of the country were expanded by 130 million mou (8.7 million hectares), over 50 billion tan of natural fertilizer were gathered (2.5 billion tons). Despite the serious natural disasters, the crop yield in 1956 was 15 billion chin (715 million tons) higher than in 1955. However in the winter of 1956 and the spring of 1957 the irrigated area increased by only 36 million mou (2.4 million hectares), and only 40 billion tan of fertilizer were gathered (2 billion tons), and the area under grain crops decreased by 55 million mou (3.7 million hectares).[5]

Taking into consideration the serious danger of actions and assertions on the part of the rightists to socialist construction, the Communist Party of China took determined counter-measures and in the course of a national campaign disclosed the ideological positions and true aims of the rightists.

After the uncovering and rout of the rightists, the necessary conditions for an increase in labor activity and a rapid development of all the branches of national economy in accordance with the course of the Communist Party of China was assured: "with the provision of primarily developing heavy industry, to simultaneously develop industry and agriculture, to simultaneously develop heavy and light industries; under provisions of a centralized direction, all encompassing planning, division of labor and cooperativization to develop local industry and industry under central jurisdiction and to simultaneously create large enterprises as well as those of average size and small enterprises, as well as to simultaneously develop production by means of progressive and simple measures."[6]

This course fully considers the backwardness of the material-technical basis of national agriculture in China and points out the best means for a rapid utilization of the rich manpower resources and the immeasurable natural resources of the country.

Beginning with the autumn of 1957 there was a notable new development of activity among the working masses. The dimensions of the irrigation projects increased sharply, 100 million people participated in them daily, principally peasants.[7] During the period from October of 1957 until April of 1958 the irrigated area was

increased by 380 million mou (25.3 million hectares), irrigation was improved in an area of 140 million mou (9.3 million hectares), and land improvement work was conducted over an area of 200 million mou (13.3 million hectares) of lowlands and swamp areas. In addition to that, 100 million mou (6.7 hectares) of barren lands were improved, reforestation was conducted over an area of 290 million mou (19.3 million hectares), and anti-erosion measures were undertaken over an area of 160 thousand square kilometers.[8] In a six month period an amount of work was accomplished that was equivalent to everything that was achieved over thousands of years of Chinese history.[9] During the same period 310 billion tan of organic fertilizer was prepared, 3 times as much as in 1956.[10]

All this predisposed conditions for the development of a multilateral highly productive agricultural economy in the villages throughout the country.

Considerable advantages of the new large scale organization for increasing the productivity of labor and production created definite promises for a closer consolidation and even the merger of the agricultural producers' cooperatives.

The functions of local authorities in essence coincided with the corresponding functions of direction of the larger cooperatives, inasmuch as the latter frequently encompassed entire provincial areas and even several areas.

Approximately from the end of June 1958, the merging of local state organs with the cooperatives' administrative apparatus began. As a result, combined administrative-economic cells were formed which became known as people's communes.

The movement for the creation of the people's communes developed very rapidly and during August through September 1958 it was basically completed throughout the country. By the end of September 1958 there were 26,425 people's communes in the villages of China, which replaced over 700 thousand agricultural producers' cooperatives. There were 121,940 thousand families in the communes, or 98.2% of all the agricultural households in China.

On the average there are 4,600 households in a commune which is from 20 - 21 thousand persons. In large suburban areas the average number of households in a commune may be as high as 10 thousand or more, in the Kwangtung Province there are over 9,000 households, and in the communes of the Hupeh, Liaoning, Shantung, Kiangsu, Anhwei, Chekiang, Honan, Hopeh, Hunan, as well as in the Kuang Hsi-chuang Autonomous District the communes

contained 5 to 8 thousand households. In the comparatively sparsely populated mountain areas of Kuei-chou and Szechwan and the autonomous areas of Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang there is an average of 2,000 households in each commune.

The Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China at its eighth convocation in November and December of 1958 discussed the early experience gained in the creation of people's communes. The Plenum adopted a resolution to conduct work on the regulation of the people's communes, directed at the elimination of errors which occurred during the organization of the communes.[12]

The Plenum condemned as incorrect the attempts of some local workers to force the conversion from collective property to communal property, to exchange the socialist principle of to each according to his work, for the communist principle of to each according to his needs.

In the autumn of 1958 and the spring of 1959 the adjustment of the newly created people's communes was being conducted in the country, in the course of which methods of direction and economic accounting as well as distribution of necessities according to the amount of labor performed was introduced, and larger rewards for more work were put into effect.

It was established that there are three categories of ownership of the means of production of the people's communes during the present stage. Property of the producers' brigade (the former cooperative) is considered as basic property.

The commune is a socialist producers' organization whose basic goal is a maximum increase in agricultural production.

The internal structure of a commune is approximately as follows: The entire territory of the commune is distributed among large producers' brigades which are assigned the land. Such brigades are an economic accounting unit and exercise general independence in the solution of production problems on their own territory and bear full responsibility for agricultural work. The large brigades are broken down into several smaller producers' brigades.

The joint product is distributed among members of the commune after deductions for the appropriate agricultural tax, for production expenses and payments into the reserve fund and the welfare fund. The state agricultural taxes are paid by the large producers' brigades which generally correspond to the old cooperatives. Distribution is also accomplished within the larger brigades as

accounting units of the commune. The amount of workers' incomes is determined by the income of the brigade in which they work.

All those enterprises engaged in the further manufacture of agricultural output of local and subsidiary industries, which demand considerable capital outlays, much manpower, have a considerable turnover, are property of the communes in their entirety and are directly governed by the appropriate departments of the commune. Smaller enterprises and workshops belong to the larger or smaller producers' brigades. The commune may receive a portion of the income of the producers' brigade as communal savings.

A corresponding division in the sphere of administrative control of the various trades as well as of the financial and labor resources is being conducted.

The marketing-supply and credit cooperatives formerly existing in the villages are reorganized into marketing-supply and credit departments. They represent the lower cells of the governments trade and banking systems to whom they are subordinate and accountable.

The ideological-political leadership of the lives and production in the people's communes is provided by the party organization and the committee of the Communist Party of China.

As pointed out by the VIII Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China at its Eighth convocation, the commune is a large scale organization and is engaged in a broad sphere of activity. It is in a position to plan production and distribution on the communal scale more effectively and thoroughly than was possible with the agricultural producers' cooperatives, it may mobilize and rationally apply manpower in the village and conduct construction programs which were beyond the capabilities of agricultural producers' cooperatives. The commune allows an acceleration in the tempo of agricultural development, estry, cattle breeding, subsidiary production, etc. It is instrumental in the mechanization of agriculture, an unalterable increase in the peasants' incomes, and it is conducive to the establishment of communal cafeterias, nurseries and other collective welfare institutions.[13]

As is generally know the Chinese people achieved outstanding success in all areas of economic and cultural development in 1958.

The gross harvest of grain crops reached 250 billion tons and was 35% higher than in 1957; the gross yield of cotton was 2.1 million tons and was 28% higher than

in 1957. Additional yields of other agricultural crops by comparison with 1957 were as follows: Soybeans -4%, peanuts-9%, dried tobacco-48%, jute and kenaf-3%. In the autumn and spring of 1958, reforestation was conducted over an area of 250 million mou (in an area 4 times as extensive as 1957). Gross agricultural production was 67.1 billion yuan during 1958 or 25% higher than 1957.

1. Wu Chih-p'u, On People's Communes, Cheng-chou, 1958, 23 pages.

2. "Elucidation of the Basic Conditions in the Development of Agriculture in the People's Republic of China for 1956-1967" (Pravda, 1 June 1958).

3. The Great Decade, op. cit., p 96.

4. Druzhba, 1958, No 10, Supplement, p 23.

5. Pravda, 1 June 1958.

6. Liu Shao-ch'i, "The Victory of Marxism-Leninism in China" (Problemy mira i sotsializma, 1959, No 10, p 20.

7. Hung-ch'i, 1959, No 5, p 5.

8. Pravda, 1 June 1958.

9. The amount of irrigated land prior to the liberation of China was 238,930,000 mou. In October 1957 it was 512,140,000 mou (214%), and in April 1958 -- 865,480,000 mou (362%). Hsin-hua Pan-yueh-k'an, 1958, No 11, p 96.

10. Pravda, 1 June 1958.

11. By the autumn of 1959, after the adjustment of people's communes, their number decreased to 24 thousand.

12. Problemy mira i sotsializma, 1959, No 3, pp 73-84.

13. See Pravda, 28 August 1959.

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