

July 2000

FORCE STRUCTURE

Army Is Integrating Active and Reserve Combat Forces, but Challenges Remain



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Contents

Letter

3

Appendixes

Appendix I: Other Army Integration Initiatives	38
Appendix II: Major Units Involved in Integration Initiatives We Reviewed	40
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology	42
Appendix IV: Units Participating in the Integrated Bosnia Task Forces Through 2003	45
Appendix V: Dates of Force XXI Redesign and Limited Conversions	46
Appendix VI: Comments From the Department of Defense	48

Figures

Figure 1: Composition of Army Combat Force (Fiscal Year 1999)	7
Figure 2: Locations of the Integrated Division Headquarters and Enhanced Separate Brigades	9
Figure 3: Locations of the Army's Four Divisional Teams	11

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Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense



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For nearly three decades, the Department of Defense has had a “total force” policy in place aimed at maintaining the smallest possible active duty force and complementing it with reserve forces. As the military downsized in the 1990s, it increased its emphasis on the total force concept and sought new ways to use both active and reserve components effectively. The Department of Defense has emphasized the importance of integration as one way to do this, but without clearly defining integration.¹ In its broadest sense, integration could be considered as any arrangement or event that brings members from two or more components together for a common purpose. It can include formal arrangements to share information or joint participation in training exercises and overseas deployments.

The majority of the Army’s forces reside in the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve,² and the Army depends heavily on these reserve forces as it plans for missions ranging from peacekeeping to two major theater wars.³ In 1999, the Army Chief of Staff said that completing the full integration of the active and reserve components was one of his six main objectives. However, like the Department of Defense, the Army has yet to define what it means by full integration.

The Army recently began to focus on efforts to integrate active and reserve combat units. Previously, most reservists who deployed with active forces came from support units, not combat units. This changed in March 2000,

¹For example, in 1997 the Secretary of Defense issued a two-page memorandum that called for “a seamless total force” and the elimination of all residual barriers to effective integration. While the memorandum included four basic principles of integration, such as “leadership by senior commanders—Active, Guard, and Reserve—to ensure the readiness of the total force,” it did not contain measurable results-oriented goals to evaluate the services’ integration progress.

²Throughout this report, we use the terms National Guard and Guard to refer to the Army National Guard. We use the terms Army Reserve and Reserve to refer to the U.S. Army Reserve and the term reserves (lower case) to refer to the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve together.

³The national military strategy calls for the Army to be able to respond to any contingency up to and including two major wars that occur nearly simultaneously in separate theaters.

when an Army National Guard combat division assumed headquarters responsibilities in Bosnia for the first time. This headquarters is commanding U.S. Army active and reserve troops, as well as multinational forces. The integration of this combat task force in Bosnia is one of the Army's key integration efforts. It also has a number of other integration initiatives underway.

As agreed with your offices, this report focuses on four of the Army's largest ongoing initiatives integrating active and reserve combat units: (1) integrated divisions, (2) Force XXI heavy division redesign, (3) teaming, and (4) the integrated task force in Bosnia. Specifically, we assessed the effects of these efforts on the Army's total costs, force structure,⁴ personnel tempo,⁵ and risk in carrying out the national military strategy. This is the fourth in a series of reports issued in response to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, which requires us to review the adequacy of the Army's forces in carrying out the national military strategy.⁶

Results in Brief

The Army's ongoing efforts are increasing the integration of active and reserve combat forces. However, because the Army has not clearly defined its goal of fully integrating its active and reserve forces, it cannot precisely measure and fully evaluate the effects of these efforts. Nonetheless, we found that integration generally affects the Army in the following ways:

- It adds to the Army's total costs. Due to their part-time status, reserve forces are less costly to maintain than their active counterparts, but integration raises the Army's total personnel costs when reservists deploy to peacekeeping missions and are paid for more than 39 days of

⁴The numbers and types of units that comprise the force, their size, and their composition (i.e., divisions and brigades).

⁵In general, personnel tempo is the time spent away from home. Sometimes the term is narrowly defined to mean only the time spent deployed overseas. In this report, we use the broadest definition, to include overseas deployments, training and exercises away from home stations, and increased work requirements at home stations.

⁶The other three reports were *Force Structure: Army Support Forces Can Meet Two-Conflict Strategy With Some Risks* (GAO/NSIAD-97-66, Feb. 28, 1997); *Force Structure: Army's Efforts to Improve Efficiency of Institutional Forces Have Produced Few Results* (GAO/NSIAD-98-65, Feb. 26, 1998); and *Force Structure: Opportunities for the Army to Reduce Risk in Executing the Military Strategy* (GAO/NSIAD-99-47, Mar. 15, 1999).

service (the norm for reservists that do not deploy). Integration also increases transportation costs, as active or reserve forces travel to participate in integrated training. Since the Army is implementing integration in a piecemeal fashion, it has not collected comprehensive figures to measure the cost of integration, has not established cost goals, and has not determined what cost increases would be acceptable to achieve a totally integrated force. Further, many aspects of the integration initiatives are unfunded—as a result, resources are being taken away from other reserve requirements, and in some cases, soldiers are shouldering higher transportation costs.

- It creates new force structure requirements, as new units are established and the numbers of positions within existing units increase. To date, these new requirements have been small, and the Army has reduced requirements in other areas to compensate for these new requirements. However, as integration and the roles of the reserves increase, new requirements could grow significantly, and the Army would have to make major force structure adjustments to maintain its authorized force structure level. The Army's current approach of pursuing integration on an initiative-by-initiative basis, without an overarching plan to guide its efforts, may make it difficult to evaluate the merits of these initiatives. None of the Army's integration plans discuss the current operational environment, in which the Army is short on the forces it needs to conduct two major theater wars, while its personnel level remains constant. Nor do these plans set forth evaluation strategies that would enable the Army to assess whether reserve forces are properly structured to carry out new roles.
- It generally increases the time personnel must spend away from home. As deployment requirements shift, some active forces spend less time away from home, while reservists spend more time deployed away from home. Although integration just shifts deployment requirements from active to reserve forces, it generally increases training times for both active and reserve forces. The Army has yet to assess fully the effects of integration on the time personnel spend away from home or on retention.
- It could reduce the Army's risk in executing the national military strategy in the long term by increasing the training and readiness levels of both active and reserve forces, as the Army expects. However, Guard wartime support to active forces may not be as strong as expected. Mobilization times may limit Guard support to early-deploying active forces. Geographic separations of more than 1,000 miles between some Guard units and their active partners, as well as Guard equipment that is older and incompatible with active equipment, may also limit the

Guard's support to active units. Without clearly established goals for its overall integration efforts, the Army will have difficulty measuring progress toward its objective of a fully integrated force. Integration initiatives may even run counter to other major Army objectives such as ensuring that first-to-fight combat divisions are filled with qualified personnel (such as medics).

We are recommending that the Secretary of the Army develop an overarching plan to guide the Army's integration efforts and examine whether the forces, equipment, and training priorities assigned to the National Guard are consistent with its increased roles. We are also recommending that the Secretary of Defense review current conditions, in which reservists incur increased transportation costs, to determine whether changes should be initiated so that reservists could be reimbursed for their transportation costs. In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense (DOD) agreed with our recommendations concerning the need to review priorities assigned to the National Guard and the need to examine transportation costs incurred by reservists but did not agree with the need for an overarching integration plan. It stated that integration guidance and principles can be found in several Army and DOD documents and that a variety of organizations are available to oversee the integration effort. We retained our recommendation calling for an overarching integration plan because none of the documents DOD cited contain measurable goals or the firm criteria necessary to guide and evaluate integration efforts. Also, none of the existing oversight bodies has provided a clear integration strategy for the Army to follow.

Background


The Army has a number of efforts⁷ underway to integrate its active and reserve forces. We focused on four division-level⁸ integration efforts that could affect a large portion of the Army's combat forces: (1) integrated

⁷Appendix I contains information about some of the Army's other integration initiatives. Appendix II lists the units that were involved as of April, 2000 in the major integration initiatives that we reviewed. The units that we visited are listed in our objectives, scope, and methodology section in appendix III.

⁸A division is usually made up of three combat brigades, and a brigade is usually made up of two or more battalions. Combat divisions are largely self-sustaining organizations that are capable of independent operations. They can vary significantly in size, depending on their purpose, but typically contain more than 10,000 soldiers. The Army's 10 active and 8 National Guard combat divisions are classified as armored, mechanized, medium, light infantry, airborne, or air assault, depending on the type and mix of units and equipment.

divisions, (2) Force XXI heavy division redesign, (3) teaming, and (4) integrated task forces for Bosnia. The methods of integration vary among and even within the four integration efforts. Some involve integration of all three components (Active Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve), while others involve only forces from the Active and Guard components. The Army Reserve contains over one-fourth of the Army's total support forces, but its combat units are limited to one infantry battalion and two Apache helicopter battalions. All of the Army's combat brigades and combat divisions reside in the active Army or the National Guard. (See fig.1.)

Figure 1: Composition of Army Combat Force (Fiscal Year 1999)



Source: Army National Guard Bureau.

Two of the major initiatives that we reviewed (the integrated divisions and teaming) currently integrate only National Guard and active Army units but may involve Army Reserve forces in the future. The Force XXI heavy division redesign, and to a limited extent the Bosnia task forces, integrate forces from all three components, but Reserve involvement is limited mainly to the integration of individuals rather than units. Below are brief descriptions of the four initiatives.

Integrated divisions. In October 1999, the Army created two integrated divisions, one heavy⁹ (the 24th Infantry) and one light (the 7th Infantry). Each division was formed by joining a newly created, small, active division headquarters¹⁰ and three existing National Guard enhanced brigades.¹¹ During this initiative's 2-year evaluation period, the active headquarters are expected to provide guidance and oversight to improve the training and readiness of the enhanced brigades. When viewed as composite units, these divisions are integrated. However, active and Guard soldiers within each division are separated both organizationally and geographically. The division headquarters are staffed with active Army soldiers,¹² while the enhanced brigades are staffed with National Guard soldiers. The active headquarters are located in Colorado and Kansas, while their enhanced brigades are located in Oregon, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Georgia, and North and South Carolina. (See fig. 2.)


⁹Heavy divisions are larger and are built around a nucleus of armored vehicles; light divisions are smaller, contain less heavy equipment, and can deploy more rapidly.

¹⁰Each headquarters contains less than 150 positions, almost half of which came from other active units that train reserve forces.

¹¹There are 15 National Guard enhanced brigades. They are included in the Army's war plans, and each contains over 350 more positions than a standard brigade. Enhanced brigades have approximately 4,100 to 5,000 positions, depending on whether they are infantry, armor, or mechanized infantry.

¹²A small number of full-time National Guard soldiers serve as liaison officers in the headquarters.

Figure 2: Locations of the Integrated Division Headquarters and Enhanced Separate Brigades



Source: Army.

Currently, the integrated divisions are not intended or able to deploy.¹³ However, in October 2001, after examining the training and readiness levels of the enhanced brigades, the Army will decide whether to (1) expand the

¹³A substantial increase in personnel and equipment (such as an aviation brigade, division artillery, and a division support command) would be needed to make the divisions deployable.


integrated divisions into deployable war-fighting divisions, (2) maintain them as a means of enhancing training and readiness, or (3) disband them.

Teaming. This initiative is the most flexible, least clearly defined integration effort that we reviewed. It began in October 1998 with two teams (each made up of one active and one Guard division) and was later expanded to include two additional teams.¹⁴ According to the Army, teaming should increase its ability to respond across the full spectrum of military operations by establishing or strengthening the training and operational relationships of the teamed divisions. Teaming activities include joint training at the National Training Center, as well as support during deployment training and preparation. The initiative is being implemented differently by each team, and the teams have wide discretion to adopt whatever approach they think is best, as long as the teaming relationship is mutually beneficial. The headquarters usually coordinate teaming exercises and activities, but actual integration generally occurs at lower organizational levels—at the company and even individual level.¹⁵ Although geographic proximity was one of the factors the Army considered when it established the teams, only one Guard division is located near its active division partner. The other three Guard divisions are located between 530 and 1,550 miles away from their active teaming partners. (See fig. 3.)

¹⁴The Army also has plans to team combat and support forces from all three components over the next few years.

¹⁵Battalions are made up of companies, which are divided into platoons, which are divided into squads made up of individual soldiers.

Figure 3: Locations of the Army's Four Divisional Teams



Source: Army.

Force XXI heavy division redesign. Under this initiative, the Army is conducting a series of war-fighting experiments to create a more deployable force that uses emerging technology to increase its capabilities. By using digital information to quickly identify and transmit the locations of friendly and enemy forces,¹⁶ the Army found it could reduce the size of its heavy divisions while also increasing the area covered by those divisions. Also, by integrating reserve forces into the new design, the Army found it could reduce the number of required active personnel. The Force XXI heavy division redesign is the Army's most complex integration initiative because it (1) involves all three components, (2) integrates personnel at all levels throughout the division, and (3) entails changes in equipment, force structure, and number of personnel in the division. Furthermore, the test division for the redesign (the 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Texas) is also involved in the Army's teaming initiative.¹⁷

Although the Guard was required to fill 257 positions and the Reserve 258 positions in the 4th Infantry Division, the two reserve components approached integration differently. The Guard provided some large units (such as a multiple-launch rocket system battery), while the Reserve assigned individuals (primarily junior soldiers with little or no prior service experience). About one-quarter of the Army Reserve positions were designated for soldiers who agreed to serve full-time for 2 years with the division. The Army planned to use the 4th Infantry Division's integration as a model for the Force XXI redesign of its other heavy forces.

Bosnia Task Force. The Army Chief of Staff considers the Bosnia task force one of the service's top integration efforts. Reservists have participated in Bosnia task forces since operations began in 1995. However, in 1998, the Army altered its staffing philosophy when it tasked the 49th Armored Division, Texas Army National Guard, to be the division headquarters for the seventh Bosnia stabilization force rotation. During that rotation, which will last through October 2000, the 49th will command active Army and multinational forces, as well as other Guard forces. Appendix IV shows the other Guard and active units scheduled to lead and participate in future integrated Bosnia task forces through April 2003.

¹⁶The Army refers to this as situational awareness.

¹⁷The Army planned to field its first digitized division (the 4th Infantry) in fiscal year 2000 and its first digitized corps (III Corps) in fiscal year 2004. Full fielding of the 4th Infantry Division is now expected to be delayed.

Integration Has Increased Costs, but Funding Priorities Are Unchanged

Integration is not free, but the Army has not precisely quantified its cost. It is difficult to determine the cost of individual integration efforts because expenses are tracked at different levels in separate Guard and active accounts. It is even more difficult to determine the Army's total integration costs because the Army is pursuing integration in a piecemeal fashion and has not collected or consolidated the costs of individual integration efforts. As a result, the Army has not fully assessed the cost impacts of integration on each component. Despite data limitations, there is evidence that integration leads to higher costs for the Army as a whole, primarily through increased reserve personnel costs. It is also evident that funding priorities have not been fully updated to reflect the increased use of Guard and Reserve forces in training and operations. While the Army has provided some funding for integration efforts such as the integrated Bosnia task force, it has left other efforts largely unfunded. This means that some costs of integration are being absorbed by Guard and Reserve units themselves or even by individual soldiers.

Historically, Reserve Forces Are Less Costly Than Active Forces

The Army's total force policy, which is designed to maintain a small active force that can be augmented by reserve forces in a war, helps the Army minimize its costs because reserve units generally cost less than comparable active units. Pay and allowances are generally much lower for reservists (who are usually paid for only 38 or 39 days per year)¹⁸ than for full-time active soldiers. Operation and maintenance funding is also generally much lower for the reserves because they train less. For example, operation and maintenance funding for the California Army National Guard's 40th Infantry Division was based on 112 miles per tank in fiscal year 2000, compared with the 800 tank miles that are normally allocated to active heavy divisions.

¹⁸Both Guard and Reserve soldiers usually participate in 24 drilling days—typically 48 4-hour training periods—each year, performed during one weekend per month. In addition, Guard and Reserve soldiers usually participate in 14 and 15 days of annual training, respectively, each year.

The Army currently allocates resources on the basis of a unit's placement in the war plans, and reserve combat units are generally not among the "first-to-fight" units that receive the highest resources. For example, the Guard's combat divisions have historically been in the bottom tier of the Army's four-tier resourcing model because they are not apportioned to either the first or second major theater war.¹⁹

Use of Reservists Increases the Costs of Integrated Peacekeeping Missions

The integration of Guard forces in peacekeeping missions such as in Bosnia significantly increases the cost of those missions, challenging the premise that Guard and Reserve units are a low-cost option for the Army. Active Army soldiers receive the same basic rate of pay, whether they deploy to peacekeeping missions or remain at their home bases. Therefore, deploying active soldiers to peacekeeping missions has little effect on the Army's total pay and allowance costs.²⁰ However, disbursements from Guard or active Army pay and allowance accounts increase any time reservists train or deploy for more than 39 days in a year.²¹

Had the Texas National Guard not been given the mission to lead the integrated Bosnia task force in 2000, it is likely that Guard soldiers in the 49th Armored Division would have received 39 days of pay in fiscal years 1999, 2000, and 2001, for a total of 117 days. The 49th Armored Division estimates that its deployed soldiers will average 378 days of pay over that period.²² Therefore, total Army pay and allowances will rise by 261 days for each of the more than 500 soldiers from the 49th Armored Division deployed to Bosnia.

¹⁹Units in the first tier deploy earliest and receive the highest priority for equipment and people. Lower tiers receive increasingly less priority for such resources.

²⁰Although pay does not increase, some allowances do increase.

²¹The fact that pay for training comes from Guard accounts, while pay for mobilized Guard soldiers comes from active Army accounts, or the fact that peacekeeping missions are financed through supplemental appropriations does not change the fact that total Army costs increase any time Guard soldiers exceed their allotted 39 days of pay in 1 year. Regardless of which account pays, increased Guard participation increases total Army costs because all the Army's active soldiers are still being paid, and Guard soldiers are being paid more.

²²By the end of the mission, the average soldier in the 49th Armored Division will have been paid for 108 days of mission-related training (fiscal years 1999 and 2000) and 270 days of mobilization (fiscal years 2000 and 2001).

The integrated Bosnia task force commanded by the 49th also includes 143 soldiers from the 111th Engineer Battalion of the Texas Army National Guard, 105 soldiers from the Maryland National Guard, and other smaller groups of Guard and Reserve soldiers, all of whom were mobilized for 270 days. In total, the cost increase from the Guard's participation in this integrated task force exceeds 190,000 man-days of pay and allowances.

The use of reserve forces for peacekeeping missions can also lead to higher equipment costs. Procurement costs can increase if the Army upgrades reserve equipment to make it compatible with that of deploying active units. Operation and maintenance costs can also increase when reserve equipment is used for more than the normal 39 days per year or when equipment is transferred from one unit to another. For example, the Guard's 49th Armored Division incurred additional equipment costs when it borrowed more than 20 intelligence analyst workstations from the intelligence school at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, to prepare for deployment to Bosnia. The borrowed equipment did not add to procurement costs, but it added to total equipment costs because it cost approximately \$400,000 to install the workstations and load the required software.²³ After the 49th Division deployed, the workstations had to be disassembled and shipped back to Fort Huachuca because the 49th, like all Guard divisions, is in the bottom tier of the Army's resourcing system. The Army is likely to incur additional equipment costs as the Guard's 28th and 29th Infantry Divisions prepare to deploy to Bosnia.

Integration Increases Costs in the Force XXI Heavy Division, but Reserve Soldiers Bear Some Cost Increases

The integration of reserve soldiers into a previously all active division increases total Army costs. Declines in active positions within the division did not result in cost savings because active personnel levels throughout the Army remained the same.²⁴ However, increases in reserve positions increased costs because the Army Reserve recruited some soldiers specifically for 2-year full-time positions in the active 4th Infantry Division. In addition, transferred reservists traveled further to Fort Hood (the 4th Infantry Division location) than they traveled to their previous reserve units, thus increasing their out-of-pocket expenses.

²³The 49th did not take these workstations to Bosnia because workstations were already in place there.

²⁴While costs do not decline, the Army may gain efficiencies if personnel are moved to more critical positions.

Officials at the 4th Infantry Division and III Corps cited travel costs as one of their main Force XXI resource concerns. According to 4th Infantry Division records, 89 percent of reserve soldiers in the division list their homes of record as being more than 100 miles from Fort Hood. However, reservists traveling to Fort Hood must fund all transportation costs themselves because Joint Federal Travel Regulations prohibit the Army from reimbursing soldiers for expenses incurred traveling to and from their normal monthly training sites.²⁵ Officials at both the 4th Infantry Division and the III Corps said they expect reserve retention rates to drop if soldiers are not compensated for their travel. They requested relief from the travel regulations, citing the DOD instruction that defines 50 miles as a reasonable commuting distance.²⁶ The Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel recommended pursuing other options, and the Army is now considering paying soldiers an extra allowance to offset some travel costs. However, this allowance would go to all reservists in the division, regardless of the distance they travel, so while the allowance may help some reservists, it is not an equitable solution to the problem.²⁷ The same challenge will face other heavy combat divisions and brigades as they attempt to implement the Force XXI redesign because less than 5 percent of the National Guard's armories are located within 50 miles of the Army's active heavy forces.²⁸

Teaming Increases Costs and Takes Resources From Other Requirements

The teaming initiative, which is not scheduled for funding until 2002, is being supported at the expense of other requirements in some Guard units. The U.S. Army Forces Command has funded some costs for teaming exercises and activities, but reserve pay and allowances for training must

²⁵Joint Federal Travel Regulations part G, U7150C.

²⁶DOD Instruction 1215.18 defines a reasonable commuting distance as the maximum distance service members may be required to travel involuntarily between their residence and their inactive duty sites for training. The normal distance is 50 miles each way, but the distance can be expanded to 100 miles if the reservists are provided meals and lodging.

²⁷The designation of the 4th Infantry Division as a high-priority unit allows the Army to pay each soldier \$10 per drill period (there are usually four drill periods per weekend). Based on a mileage rate of 32.5 cents per mile, the \$40 weekend drill allowance would fully compensate soldiers whose round trip travel to Fort Hood is 123 miles. Soldiers traveling further would be undercompensated, and soldiers traveling less would be overcompensated.

²⁸The Army's heavy forces in the United States are located at Fort Carson, Colorado; Fort Riley, Kansas; Fort Hood, Texas; and Fort Stewart, Georgia.

be paid from reserve accounts. The National Guard Bureau has provided extra pay and allowances to Guard divisions that participate in teaming rotations to the National Training Center, but the divisions themselves must fund the extra training necessary to prepare for the rotations. This affects other division requirements. For example, the California National Guard's 40th Infantry Division reported that it cost over \$2 million to support the teaming initiative in 1999, with nearly \$700,000 coming from the division itself. Division officials told us that in the absence of teaming, the \$700,000 could have been used for other needed training such as crew certification. In January 2000, the 40th Infantry Division had less than one-fourth of its required number of certified M1 tank crews.

Other Guard and active divisions have also reported increased costs to support the teaming initiative. For example, the Texas Army National Guard's 49th Armored Division reported that between November 1998 and May 2000, it cost more than \$1.1 million to support its teaming partner, the 1st Cavalry Division.²⁹ Reserve pay and allowances accounted for most of the cost increases, but transportation costs also increased. Cost increases for active divisions have been smaller than those for Guard divisions because active personnel are already paid for full-time service. The active 4th Infantry Division reported spending only about \$15,000 for teaming in fiscal year 1999 and expected to spend about \$50,000 in fiscal year 2000. The active 1st Cavalry Division reported that it spends approximately \$20,000 on teaming events each year.

²⁹The National Guard Bureau and the 1st Cavalry Division spent an additional \$664,000 to support teaming events that involved the 49th Armored Division and the 1st Cavalry Division during this period.

Army Plans Have Not Dealt With Cost and Funding Issues

Integration is increasing the costs of maintaining Guard and Reserve forces because the Army is asking these forces to do more. This trend is likely to continue, as indicated by plans such as the Reserve Component Employment Study 2005, which is studying ways to enhance the role of the reserve components in the full range of military operations. While current Army integration plans are consistent with DOD's goal of making greater use of Guard and Reserve forces, they have not altered basic resource allocations or even identified the level of funding necessary to achieve this goal. For example, the four Guard divisions involved in the Army's teaming initiative have remained in the fourth funding tier,³⁰ with the same basic resource allocation level as the other four Guard divisions that are not teamed.

The same is true for the six Guard enhanced brigades in the integrated divisions. They have remained at the same resourcing level as the other nine enhanced brigades that are not involved with the integrated divisions. Because of this situation, some Guard officials have questioned whether the Army is fully committed to integration. The commanding officer of one Guard unit, for example, said that lack of integration funding could seriously jeopardize the success of his unit's integration initiative. He said the initiative was unfunded under his predecessor and is scheduled to remain unfunded during his entire time in command, and that by the time the program is finally funded in 2002, it may be too late for successful implementation.

Because the Army has not estimated the costs of its integration efforts and does not collect comprehensive figures to measure their costs, it is difficult for the Army to assess accurately the funding needs of affected units. Without a better understanding of integration's costs, it is also difficult for the Army to weigh effectively the merits of funding integration instead of other priorities.³¹ If it continues to view integration from a piecemeal perspective, rather than in the context of a broad overarching integration strategy, the Army may also find it difficult to assess the validity of funding requirements for integration. For example, directing the Guard's 49th Armored Division to return the intelligence workstations borrowed from

³⁰Tier 4 units such as Guard divisions had only 36 percent of their full-time active guard positions funded in fiscal year 2000.

³¹Other priorities include shifting from heavy and light to medium brigades and reducing the shortfall in support forces.

Fort Huachuca may be reasonable if the division's deployment to Bosnia is a one-time event. However, if the 49th is expected to assist in future peacekeeping operations, or if DOD's Reserve Component Employment Study 2005 determines that Guard divisions should be apportioned to war plans, then it may be more cost-effective for the 49th to have its own work stations so it can sustain future training.

Integration Could Alter Force Structure Significantly

Integration has led to new force structure requirements, as the Army has created new units and increased the size of some existing units. The Army has limited these new requirements by (1) shifting positions from one component to another, (2) assigning units more than one role (known as dual-missioning), and (3) assigning individuals responsibilities for more than one job (dual-hatting). Since force structure levels are remaining constant, the Army is adjusting other requirements to compensate for the small increases currently associated with integration. Over the long term, however, Army integration could lead to larger increases in new requirements, which would require more significant force structure adjustments. Such adjustments could be problematic for Army leaders because the Army is already experiencing shortfalls in the forces needed to conduct two major wars. Any force structure increases that result from integration would have to be offset by decreases elsewhere throughout the force, because Army end strength is not increasing. To date, Army plans have not addressed this issue.

Force XXI Redesign Adds Reserve Positions to Formerly All-Active Divisions

Under Force XXI, the Army is reducing the size of its heavy divisions and integrating them by setting aside positions for all three components. The design was modified several times during planning and testing, and reserve positions peaked at 515 in 1999. Later, however, the 4th Infantry Division recognized that active forces were better suited for some of these positions and requested, and received authorization, to convert 40 reserve positions back to active positions. Although the original plan was to replicate the division's design in other active heavy divisions, the next division scheduled to convert to the Force XXI design—the 1st Cavalry Division—will adopt a modified design based on the experiences of the 4th Infantry Division.

Most of the 515 reserve positions in the 4th Infantry's test design did not add to the division's force structure because they were not new positions but simply replacements for former active positions. One dual-mission unit (a multiple-launch rocket system battery from the Guard's 49th Armored

Division) accounts for about one-fifth of all reserve positions in the 4th Infantry Division. This unit replaced one of the 4th Infantry Division's active artillery units and at the same time maintained its 49th Armored Division responsibilities. Guard and Reserve positions also replaced active medical, aviation support, and staff positions without adding to the division's force structure. However, the dual-mission general support aviation battalion from the Guard's 49th Armored Division did add 65 positions to the 4th Infantry Division's force structure because it added capability rather than replacing an active unit. Increasing ambulance crews from two to three people by adding one Reserve soldier to each crew also added to the division's force structure.

Force Structure Increase in Integrated Divisions Is Small but Could Increase Substantially

Although integration has created few additional positions so far, if the Army decides to transform the two integrated divisions into deployable war-fighting units in 2001, these could have a much greater impact on force structure. The Army used 285 new active positions to create the headquarters for the two integrated divisions. However, 86 of these new positions were filled by dual-hatted personnel with responsibilities both in the integrated divisions and on the active bases where they serve. For example, the commander of the 7th Infantry Division is responsible for overseeing the training and readiness of the division's three enhanced brigades in Oregon, Oklahoma, and Arkansas, but he is also base commander at Fort Carson, Colorado. As such, he is responsible for supporting active forces at Fort Carson, Colorado, including the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment that deployed to Bosnia in the integrated task force led by the Guard's 49th Armored Division.

In some cases, the new active positions were created at the expense of other units. For example, the Army transferred 140 active duty positions into the new divisions from units that were supporting reserve training under the Title XI program.³² As a result, the integrated divisions' enhanced brigades will receive more support from the active Army, but other reserve

³²Section 414 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal years 1992 and 1993 (P.L. 102-190, Dec. 5, 1991, as amended by P.L. 102-484, Oct. 23, 1992, section 1132, title XI) provides for a pilot program for active component support of the reserves and requires the Secretary of the Army to provide at least 2,000 officers and 3,000 warrant officers and enlisted members to serve as full-time duty advisers to reserve units for organizing, administering, instructing, or training such units. This is sometimes referred to as the Title XI program.

forces will lose some of the assistance they were receiving under the program.

Although force structure growth in the integrated divisions has been small, this initiative could have the greatest force structure growth of any integration initiative, depending on the Army's decision at the end of the 2-year evaluation period. If the Army transforms either or both of the test divisions into deployable war-fighting divisions, training and logistics requirements will increase, and the active headquarters positions may require full-time rather than dual-hatted personnel. In addition, missing divisional structure such as an aviation brigade, division artillery, and division support command would need to be added.³³ To pursue this alternative, the Army would need approval from the Secretary of Defense to add to its current 18-division structure (10 active and 8 National Guard). However, if the Army maintains these divisions as a means of improving the training and readiness of the enhanced brigades, the current small headquarters and dual-hatting arrangement might continue with no further force structure changes. If the Army decides to disband the integrated divisions, the active Army would regain the positions from the two small headquarters units.

Guard Deployments Could Be Helped by Proposal to Increase Divisional Intelligence Forces

To date, the participation of Guard divisions in peacekeeping missions has not required increases in reserve positions. However, the 49th Armored Division's assignment as headquarters to the Bosnia mission highlighted shortages within its intelligence force structure, and the Guard has proposed adding about 900 new positions to its divisional intelligence forces. Although the proposal is designed to better position the Guard to respond to the full spectrum of operations, not just peacekeeping, an increase in divisional intelligence forces would make it easier to staff future Guard deployments to Bosnia. If the Army accepts the Guard proposal, it would increase the size of three National Guard division military intelligence battalions from their current cadre status to the full-strength levels characteristic of their active counterparts by adding about 300 positions to each battalion.³⁴

³³A portion of this additional structure could possibly come from the enhanced brigades, which would be part of a division rather than separate units that deploy independently.

³⁴Guard officials told us that other units will draw down to balance the increase in divisional military intelligence.

As it prepared for its rotation in Bosnia, the 49th Armored Division found that its military intelligence battalion was not properly structured for the mission. Because of the mission's large force protection and human intelligence requirements, the division had to draw people from several different units. It took some intelligence personnel from its own small cadre military intelligence battalion, some from the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment—the major active Army unit involved in the mission—and the bulk from the Guard's 629th military intelligence battalion, part of the Guard's 29th Infantry Division. The 629th is the only Guard division military intelligence battalion with the same force structure level as active military intelligence battalions.

The next Guard division scheduled to command the integrated Bosnia task force (in October 2001) is the 29th Infantry Division. However, the 29th will not be able to use its own 629th Military Intelligence Battalion because Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up authority³⁵ is limited to 270 days per operational mission, and the 629th already mobilized for 270 days for its current deployment to Bosnia with the 49th Armored Division. Therefore, like the 49th Armored Division, the 29th Infantry Division will have to draw its intelligence resources from several other units. The current Guard proposal to add about 900 soldiers to Guard division military intelligence battalions could reduce the number of units involved in future peacekeeping rotations and could help the Guard deploy its intelligence battalions with their parent divisions in the future. However, it is unlikely to eliminate the need to draw some personnel from other units because intelligence battalions are structured for war-fighting, not peacekeeping. Even fully structured active units do not have all the human intelligence and force protection personnel needed for peacekeeping.

Current Approach to Integration May Hamper Future Force Structure Decisions

The Army's current method of pursuing integration on an initiative-by-initiative basis, without an overarching plan to guide its efforts, hampers its ability to evaluate force structure proposals within the context of overall force structure needs. For example, if the Army continues to look at the integrated divisions separately from other integration initiatives and from the Army's other major objectives, it could decide to increase the size of the

³⁵10 U.S.C. Section 12304. The authority limits reserve participation in operational missions to 270 days. Thus, the 629th Military Intelligence Battalion cannot be mobilized for the Bosnia Stabilization Force mission again after it returns from Bosnia in the fall of 2000 because it will have already served its maximum 270 days under the Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up authority.

integrated divisions to that of full war-fighting divisions without adequately addressing the effect this would have on Army units that would lose personnel. Individual integration plans do not currently specify how integration will help move the Army toward its goal of maintaining the smallest possible active force while maximizing the effectiveness of its reserve forces.

Integration Provides Deployment Relief for Some Active Forces but Increases Reserve Personnel Tempo

Integration provides relief to some active forces by decreasing their deployment times, but reserve deployments must increase to offset this decline in active deployments. In addition, integration has increased training requirements for both components. Current shifts and increases in personnel tempo could affect both active and reserve retention for years to come. Yet the Army cannot precisely quantify the effects of integration on retention, and current plans do not specify what retention effects the Army would consider acceptable as it pursues its overall integration goal.

Integration Increases Personnel Tempo at Home Bases and Training Sites

Because active soldiers usually work on weekdays and reserves on weekends, both have had to make some adjustments to support integration. Integrated training often adds to a unit's normal training requirements, thus requiring personnel to spend additional time away from home. Furthermore, even when active and reserve forces are able to satisfy their normal training requirements by training together, the requirement to train at a common site may cause either or both to spend additional time away from home. One officer summed up the situation thus: "Integration means active soldiers must work more weekends, and reserve soldiers must put their civilian careers and education on hold more often."

Two categories—dual-hatted active soldiers in the integrated divisions and Guard soldiers in the teamed divisions—illustrate this point. Dual-hatted active soldiers at Fort Carson are required to work some weekends to support reservists in the division's enhanced brigades. This sometimes involves travel to the enhanced brigades in Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Oregon. However, this does not change requirements that these dual-hatted soldiers support active units at Fort Carson, such as the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, during the week. Guard soldiers in teamed divisions often participate in major training exercises, particularly National Training Center rotations, in support of their active division partners. Whenever these exercises last more than 15 days (the usual annual training period), personnel tempo increases, requiring support from families and employers. Reserve personnel tempo may also increase because many of these major exercises have training requirements that must be met before the exercises themselves begin. Although these personnel tempo increases are not particularly large, some Guard officials believe they could affect retention because the Guard is being asked more frequently to participate in active unit National Training Center rotations throughout the year, with relatively short notice.³⁶

Reserves in Integrated Task Forces Provide Deployment Relief to Some Active Forces but Not to Others

Guard forces deployed in Bosnia provide relief to some active forces. However, some heavily used forces, especially those in short supply, do not see much relief. The Bosnia task forces have focused attention on Guard forces and the relief they provide to active forces, which as a result need to deploy less frequently. In particular, the Guard's 49th Armored Division is relieving strain on the active division headquarters that commanded previous Bosnia deployments. However, some heavily used occupational specialties are in short supply in both the active and reserve components, or they tend to be concentrated in one component or the other. These include military police and specialists in fire support, petroleum supply, ammunition, intelligence, and medicine. As a result, personnel that need the most relief from frequent deployments are the least likely to be helped by integration.

³⁶Guard units usually conduct National Training Center rotations in the summer and plan for them years in advance. Active units sometimes have only a few months' notice before their rotations, and Guard units that are called to participate in them must adjust their schedules accordingly.

Additionally, those active troops that deploy with Guard units may actually spend more time away from home than before. For example, the leaders of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment trained for their Bosnia deployment during the week with their active soldiers at Fort Carson, Colorado, then sometimes flew to Texas on Fridays for weekend training with the Guard's 49th Armored Division.

Increased Deployments May Affect Reserve Retention Rates

One of the primary reasons for creating the integrated Bosnia task forces was to reduce deployments of active forces and thus hopefully increase their retention rates. However, the Army has not quantified the expected effects of integration on retention rates among active forces, and integration's possible negative effects on retention among reserve forces could offset any positive effect that may be achieved.

On the basis of a DOD survey of 66,000 active duty military personnel, we noted in March 2000 that satisfaction dropped significantly among personnel who were deployed for more than 5 months in 1 year.³⁷ We also showed that satisfaction and intent to stay in the military are strongly linked. While the results of the survey are not projectable to reserve soldiers, some Guard officials told us they believe peacekeeping rotations will have a negative effect on employer and family support, leading to decreased retention rates. Guard officials in South Carolina told us that their upcoming 3-week rotation at the National Training Center had adversely affected retention for more than a year prior to this scheduled rotation. They expected retention to drop further if their units were assigned Bosnia or Kosovo missions.³⁸ Several Guard officials said their soldiers were ready and willing to fight in a major war, if needed. However, they also said that their soldiers would have joined the active Army, had they wanted to spend most of the year on active duty participating in peacekeeping missions.

Concerned about the potential effects of long deployments on retention, the Army and Joint Staff set a goal in DOD's Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Plan to have no Army units deploy for more than 120 days (4 months) a

³⁷*Military Personnel: Preliminary Results of DOD's 1999 Survey of Active Duty Members* (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-110, Mar. 8, 2000).

³⁸Shortly after the interviews, the 218th enhanced separate brigade in South Carolina was notified that it would be tasked to provide a portion of its forces for the Bosnia mission beginning in October 2002.

year. The 49th Armored Division's current 9-month deployment far exceeds the goal, but in March 2000, the Army announced that it would limit future overseas deployments to 179 days (6 months).³⁹ Although these future deployments are planned to be much shorter than the 49th's deployment, they will still exceed the goal by 59 days.

Army Lacks Retention Information but Plans to Increase Integration

The Army is moving ahead with plans to deploy Guard combat units to all Bosnia deployments in the next 3 years, despite a lack of hard data on the effects of long peacekeeping deployments on reserve retention rates.⁴⁰ Some Army officials believe that spreading out deployments over a larger portion of active and reserve forces will increase overall retention. However, until the 49th Armored Division returns from Bosnia, this theory will remain untested. Because the cost of replacing soldiers has almost doubled since 1986,⁴¹ it is important that the Army understand the effects of its policy decisions on retention. Likewise, the Army has not evaluated the effects of its other integration initiatives, or of integration as a whole, on its ability to retain soldiers. These effects are important because "manning the force" is another of the Army's six major objectives.

Integration Has Mixed Effects on the Army's Level of Risk in Carrying Out the National Military Strategy

In the long term, the Army expects integration to reduce its risk in carrying out the national military strategy because it expects forces to be better trained and more ready. In the short term, however, personnel shortages and the inappropriate use of reservists to fill certain positions under the Force XXI redesign have increased the Army's level of risk.⁴² This higher short-term risk may be offset by other aspects of the Force XXI redesign and by the integrated Bosnia task forces. However, these integration efforts are still in their early stages and do not have established trend data. Therefore, it is difficult to measure any risk reductions that may have already occurred. As for teaming, it may reduce risk less than expected.

³⁹This does not include the time reservists spend at their mobilization station, in transit, transitioning between units, on leave, or at their demobilization station.

⁴⁰DOD is currently surveying Guard and Reserve soldiers, but survey results are not yet available.

⁴¹In 1986 it cost about \$5,300 to recruit each soldier. Today the cost is about \$10,000.

⁴²Risk in executing the national military strategy increases when force capability is removed and declines when capability is expanded.

Force XXI Redesign Increased Short-Term Risk at the 4th Infantry Division, but Modifications Limit Risk at the 1st Cavalry Division

Reserve components have not been able to fill all their assigned positions in the 4th Infantry Division as it implements the Force XXI redesign. Should the division need to deploy, these shortages could increase the Army's risk in executing the national military strategy. The Army Chief of Staff has made filling active combat divisions one of his top priorities. In January 2000, officials at both the 4th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division told us that they were staffed above 100 percent of their active authorizations, although not by grade and military occupational specialty. However, at that time, the reserve components had filled only 68 percent of their allocated positions in the 4th Infantry Division.⁴³ Both reserve components had shortages, but the Army Reserve was responsible for most of the shortages.

Officials at the 4th Infantry Division said that risk increased not only because of unfilled reserve positions but also because of the inappropriate replacement of some active positions with reserve positions. The division requested that 40 of its reserve positions, mostly for combat medics and petroleum supply specialists, be converted back to active positions. Division surgeons at both the 4th Infantry and 1st Cavalry divisions and other medical officers said that placing reservists in independent medic positions increased risk for a number of reasons. First, reserve medics are generally not available to train with active units on weekdays, and thus the Army cannot follow its basic principle to train as it fights. Second, no one is available to replace the reservists during weekday exercises, increasing risk for soldiers injured during these exercises. Third, the medic positions in question are junior positions⁴⁴ that tend to be filled by reservists with no prior service experience who do not generally have civilian jobs in the medical field. The medical officers contended that these reservists generally have not had the breadth of experience necessary for independent duty. As for petroleum specialists (who provide aviation support), 4th Infantry Division officers said that daily requirements in the aviation support battalion were so high that reservists could not possibly meet mission needs.

⁴³The reserve components were scheduled to fill those positions by October 1999.

⁴⁴Most of the positions are for soldiers at the E-4 pay grade. There are nine enlisted pay grades, E-1 through E-9.

Although the Army originally planned to replicate the 4th Infantry Division's integration in its other heavy forces, the next Force XXI division (the 1st Cavalry) will be less integrated than the 4th Infantry Division. In March 2000, the Army dramatically reduced its integration plans for the 1st Cavalry Division, after division and III Corps officials raised concerns about the reserve components' ability to support a second division in the same geographic area as the 4th Infantry Division.⁴⁵ Guard positions in the 1st Cavalry Division were cut from 257 to 233, but Army Reserve positions were cut from 258 to 3. As of May 2000, the Army had not yet determined whether the right mix of Army reservists and guardsmen would be available in the regions surrounding its other active heavy forces in order to integrate those units. However, there are no National Guard armories near the Army's heavy forces overseas, and less than 5 percent of the Guard's armories are within 50 miles of active heavy forces in the United States.⁴⁶

New Positions in Force XXI Redesign and Integrated Peacekeeping Task Forces Decrease Short-Term Risk

Integration added some new capabilities to the Force XXI heavy division and should thus reduce the Army's short-term risk in carrying out the national military strategy. For example, the dual-mission general support aviation battalion from the Guard's 49th Armored Division added 8 UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, crews, and support personnel to the 4th Infantry's 24 Black Hawks. A third (reserve) medic was also added to some ambulance crews that previously had only two active Army soldiers.

The deployment of Guard divisions for peacekeeping missions also helps reduce risk because it increases the readiness of Guard divisions, which must be certified in war-fighting as well as peacekeeping tasks before they deploy. It also frees active divisions to train for their primary war-fighting tasks. This second benefit may be strictly short term because Guard units can only deploy for 270 days per operational mission under the Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up authority.⁴⁷

⁴⁵Both divisions are headquartered at Fort Hood, Texas, but the 4th Infantry Division has only two maneuver brigades there compared with three in the 1st Cavalry Division, thus making it even more difficult for the Army to integrate the 1st Cavalry Division with reservists from that geographic area.

⁴⁶Fort Stewart, Georgia; Fort Riley, Kansas; Fort Carson, Colorado; and Fort Hood, Texas.

⁴⁷10 U.S.C. Section 12304.

Integrated Divisions May Offer Some Benefits, but Long-Term Risk Reductions Are Difficult to Measure and May Be Less Than Expected

Army officials expect the active headquarters of the integrated divisions to improve training in the divisions' National Guard enhanced brigades, thus allowing the brigades to deploy more quickly and reducing the Army's risk in carrying out the national military strategy. Officials at the enhanced brigades we visited said that although the headquarters are small, they still provide significant benefits in preparing the brigades for deployment, especially in training battalion and brigade staffs. The active headquarters also helped spotlight Guard equipment modernization and compatibility issues that previously had been raised only by the National Guard chain of command. One brigade attributed the accelerated fielding of new radios,⁴⁸ at least in part, to the influence exerted by its active headquarters.

Several factors have made it difficult for the Army to evaluate the effectiveness of its integrated division headquarters in improving the training and readiness of their enhanced brigades.⁴⁹ First, measures of effectiveness to gauge improvements were adopted only in March 2000. Second, the commander of one division has questioned the reliability of his enhanced brigades' baseline readiness data, saying the brigades were not as ready as their baseline data indicated. Third, the three enhanced brigades in the heavy integrated division are undergoing Force XXI "limited conversions." These conversions reduce the brigades' capabilities by removing a full company of equipment and personnel from each of the maneuver battalions within the brigades. These reductions were originally scheduled to coincide with the arrival of new, more capable, digital equipment. However, under the limited conversions, the maneuver battalions must give up a company before they receive their digitized equipment. Appendix V contains a table showing the dates that units are scheduled to undergo limited and full Force XXI conversions.

Teaming May Not Reduce Risk as Much as Expected

Officials expect teaming to help the Army reduce its level of risk in carrying out the national military strategy by improving the readiness of teamed divisions. Army officials said that teamed divisions can provide three types of support to their deploying partner divisions. First, they can "push out" the deploying divisions by providing transportation for equipment,

⁴⁸Single channel ground and airborne radio system radios are arguably the most important piece of communication equipment in the Army. They can automatically change frequencies and provide secure communications not available with older radios.

⁴⁹The 2-year test period for the divisions is scheduled to end in October 2001.

administrative support for deploying soldiers, and replacement personnel to meet home station responsibilities. Second, soldiers from the partner divisions can be “plugged in” the deploying divisions to fill personnel shortages. Finally, partner divisions can “plus up” deploying divisions by providing units that add to the deploying divisions’ capabilities.

The Army describes teaming as a mutually beneficial relationship, and our discussions with both active and reserve partners have confirmed that both sides have achieved benefits. However, most of the benefits have centered on training and pre-deployment events, rather than on actual operations. In the event of a major theater war, support would flow primarily from Guard divisions to their active division partners. Any support the Guard divisions could provide to their active counterparts would certainly reduce the Army’s risk in carrying out the national military strategy, but several factors are likely to limit this support:

Time constraints. Guard forces need time to mobilize, making it difficult for them to support early deploying active forces on very short notice. These difficulties are greatest when active teamed divisions deploy as part of a division alert force. A division alert force is maintained at an enhanced level of readiness, whereby it can deploy an initial-ready company in 18 hours and a division-ready brigade in 72 hours.⁵⁰ When an active teamed division is assigned division alert force responsibility, the amount of push-out support that its partner Guard division can supply is severely limited. Active divisions that deploy later in a conflict are likely to receive much more support from their Guard division partners, which will have time to mobilize.

Geographic constraints. Geographic separation affects the amount of support that Guard divisions can provide to their active teaming partners, particularly the amount of “push out” support. The 49th Armored and 1st Cavalry Divisions are located close to each other and both train at Fort Hood. Because the 49th is headquartered within commuting distance of Fort Hood, it could easily provide Fort Hood with replacement personnel to meet home station responsibilities when 1st Cavalry Division soldiers deploy. It could also provide transportation assets and other push-out support on relatively short notice due to its geographic proximity to the 1st Cavalry Division. The other Guard divisions are all located at least

⁵⁰The details of this deployment sequence are found in the Army’s Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade Field Manual 71-3, appendix G.

500 miles from their active division teaming partners and would have to overcome transportation challenges before they could push out their partnered active divisions.

Equipment compatibility problems. Equipment and weapons used by reserve and active forces are often different or incompatible. This can create problems as the components train together, and where equipment differences are very large it could delay or even prevent Guard units from filling or augmenting their active partner divisions. Officials at the 40th Infantry Division (California Army National Guard) told us that none of their major equipment was compatible with that of their teaming partner, the 4th Infantry Division. They estimated that they were about 10 to 15 years behind the 4th Infantry Division in modernization. They still had M1IP tanks with 105-millimeter guns, compared with their partner's state-of-the-art M1A2 digital tanks with 120-millimeter guns.⁵¹ These disparities prevent 40th Infantry Division tank crews from plugging into 4th Infantry Division tank crews and make it unlikely that tank crews from the 40th would even fill a plus-up role for the 4th Infantry Division. One officer from the Guard's 40th Infantry Division summed up the situation saying that during a visit to the 4th Infantry Division's museum he saw museum equipment that was more modern than the equipment his soldiers are currently operating. However, Guard divisions, including the 40th Infantry Division, are receiving upgraded equipment from active forces and Guard enhanced brigades that are downsizing under Force XXI limited conversions.

Conclusions

Although the Army's integration efforts have increased interaction between the active and reserve components, the current state of integration is unclear. DOD and Army officials have both articulated the need for a fully integrated force, and they have increased the Guard's participation in military activities, from training at home stations to peacekeeping abroad. Despite this increased participation and the Army Chief of Staff's emphasis on "the full integration of the active and reserve components" as one of his six major objectives, the Army has not clearly defined what constitutes full integration. It also has not determined the level of resources available for integration or assessed the effects of integration on other important

⁵¹The 40th Infantry Division had begun fielding M1A1 tanks with 120 millimeter guns at the time of our visit. However, only 15 of the 91 tanks it had received were operational, and none of them had single channel ground and airborne radio system radios.

objectives such as time members spend away from home or retention. Without an overarching integration plan to define roles, set measurable and results-oriented goals, and clearly articulate a framework for a fully integrated force, the Army will continue to have difficulty measuring the progress or effectiveness of its integration efforts.

Because integration currently involves a series of individual efforts that are being implemented on a piecemeal basis, the Army has not fully considered integration's impacts on its costs, force structure, personnel tempo, or ability to carry out the national military strategy. As a result, integration has led to unintended effects: reservists have had larger out-of-pocket expenses when participating in training, medical support for the 4th Infantry Division has declined, and personnel tempo has increased for some active forces. In addition, reserve combat units have faced significant personnel and equipment challenges as they have attempted to increase integrated training and deployment times while remaining at the same low-priority funding levels under the Army's tiered resourcing system. Finally, a piecemeal approach to integration has prevented integration objectives from being coordinated with the Army's other major objectives, such as manning combat divisions at 100 percent of their authorization levels. This lack of coordination has caused one active heavy division to be staffed below its authorization level and—should this division need to deploy—would increase the Army's risk in carrying out the national military strategy.

Recommendations

Given the Army's current emphasis on active and reserve integration as a means of maximizing the effectiveness of its total force, and given the inherent limitations of pursuing integration on a piecemeal basis, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army develop an overarching plan to guide the Army's integration efforts. This plan should establish the Army's strategy, goals, policies, and resources for achieving full integration and should include milestones and performance measures for gauging progress. Further, it should fully consider how the integration of active and reserve forces can be achieved consistent with the Army's other primary objectives, including the full staffing of its combat forces.

In light of the Army National Guard's increased responsibility in peacekeeping operations and the Army's desire to reduce deployment burdens on active forces by substituting reservists, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army examine whether the forces, equipment, and training priorities assigned to the National Guard are commensurate with its

increased role and make whatever adjustments are needed, considering the overall needs of the Army.

Because some reservists are incurring significant increases in their transportation costs as they integrate with active forces located farther from their homes, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense determine whether the benefits of Army active/reserve component integration warrant a change in current travel regulations that prohibit travel reimbursement related to inactive duty training.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense agreed with our recommendation concerning the need to review priorities assigned to the National Guard. It stated that “the equipping issue will remain problematic” because resources are not available to fully modernize all units simultaneously, and said that units with the most current equipment will continue to transfer the equipment to other units with an immediate need. DOD also agreed with our recommendation concerning the need to examine transportation costs incurred by reservists, and stated that it will conduct a comprehensive study of reserve component duty and compensation, including transportation costs. DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix VI.

DOD disagreed with our recommendation concerning the need for an overarching integration plan. It stated that the September 4, 1997, memorandum from the Secretary of Defense defined integration and contained DOD’s integration goal and specific sub-goals, which provide an excellent framework for measuring integration progress and results. In addition, DOD believes that the Army’s white paper, America’s Army—One Team, One Fight, One Future, along with the Army’s Transformation Campaign Plan and the declaration by the Army’s current Chief of Staff are guiding active and reserve component integration. DOD also said that the Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee, the Reserve Component Coordination Council, the Reserve Forces Policy Board, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs oversee integration efforts. Finally, DOD stated that precise measurable effects will become more apparent as integration initiatives mature, and the current Bosnia mission shows that integration efforts are on target.

We do not agree that DOD has a framework for measuring integration progress and results. This report acknowledges that the Secretary of Defense’s memorandum is a starting point for looking at integration.

However, the Secretary's statement defines integration in terms of conditions of trust and leadership confidence, rather than defining it in measurable terms. In addition, DOD's "seamless total force" goal, and sub-goals such as "leadership by senior commanders," are not specific or measurable and require subjective evaluations. Therefore, they are not the types of measurable, results-oriented goals that should be used to measure progress toward important organizational objectives. Further, with respect to the activities of the cited oversight bodies, each body provides some oversight of the Army's integration efforts, but none has comprehensively assessed Army integration in terms of the Secretary of Defense's overall integration goal and sub-goals. During the course of our review, we met with representatives and former members of these bodies and reviewed the minutes of their meetings. On the basis of these discussions and reviews, we believe that these organizations have been primarily reactive, by dealing with issues and problems as they arise, rather than proactive and providing a clear integration strategy for the Army to follow. This report clearly acknowledges the groundbreaking efforts of the 49th Armored Division's integrated Bosnia task force, and we believe that these efforts present the Army with an opportunity to examine how it can best set clear, measurable goals. For example, because one major objective of the task force was to reduce active component personnel tempo, and thus increase retention, the Army could set measurable retention goals for units or military occupational specialties affected by integrated task force deployments.

We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, and the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army. We will also make copies available to others upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512- 5140 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report were Gwendolyn R. Jaffe, Michael J. Ferren, and Irene A. Robertson.

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List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable John Warner
Chairman
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Tim Hutchinson
Chairman
The Honorable Max Cleland
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Personnel
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd D. Spence
Chairman
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

The Honorable Stephen E. Buyer
Chairman
The Honorable Neil Abercrombie
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Military Personnel
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

Other Army Integration Initiatives

Multi-component units. This initiative involves units that are authorized to include personnel from more than one component (Active Army, Army National Guard, or U.S. Army Reserve) on a single authorization document. The Army lists the objectives of multi-component units as improving readiness and resource allocations, optimizing component-unique capabilities, improving documentation, and enhancing the total integration of active and reserve forces. Multi-component units go to war as a single integrated entity. Since they are included on a single authorization document, all portions of the unit (both active and reserve) have the same priority with respect to equipment fielding and modernization.

Integrated light infantry battalions. This initiative was designed to make more effective use of reserve forces by involving them in a 2-year test of the Army's old round-out and round-up concepts¹ beginning in October 1999. The round-out portion of the test was to be conducted with an Army National Guard light infantry company replacing an active company in a battalion of the 1st brigade of the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, New York. The round-up portion of the test was to involve one company that was added to the 1st brigade of the 25th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington. The test was not carried out and the Army decided to reject the round-out concept and pursue the round-up concept. As a result, one National Guard anti-tank battalion will be added to the 10th, 25th, 82nd, and 29th division.

Training support XXI. This initiative created training support divisions under the operational control of both the U.S. Army Reserve Command and the Continental U.S. Armies. The initiative was designed to increase reserve component readiness levels by providing "synchronized, integrated, and effective training support to priority and other reserve component units," thus helping units achieve pre-mobilization training goals and reducing post-mobilization training requirements.

Active component associate unit mentor relationships. This initiative centers on the sharing of professional experience and coaching. Senior active component commanders assist in reserve component training. Senior mentors (corps- or division-level active component commanders)

¹ The round-out concept replaces an active unit with a similar reserve unit (company for company, battalion for battalion, etc.) thus maintaining capability. The round-up concept increases capability by adding an additional reserve unit to a standard active configuration. For example, it would add a company to a battalion or a brigade to a division.

provide reserve commanders with leadership and advice on training matters. Peer mentors (unit commanders of like-sized active components) share experience and information on implementation of training requirements with reserve component commanders.

Active/reserve component battalion command exchange program. This initiative involves the exchange of active and reserve (Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve) battalion commanders. Active component commands will fill key command and senior staff positions within the Army National Guard, while the Guard and Reserve will fill key command and senior staff positions within the active component. The initial tours are for battalion commanders, brigade and battalion executive officers, and operations officers. In accordance with a memorandum of agreement between the components, the positions are considered career enhancing, and reserve commands carry the same weight as active commands.

Major Units Involved in Integration Initiatives We Reviewed

Integrated Divisions

7th Infantry Division Headquarters, Fort Carson, Colorado (active)

39th Enhanced Separate Brigade, Little Rock, Arkansas (National Guard)

41st Enhanced Separate Brigade, Portland, Oregon (National Guard)

45th Enhanced Separate Brigade, Edmond, Oklahoma (National Guard)

24th Infantry Division Headquarters, Fort Riley, Kansas (active)

24th Infantry Division Headquarters Forward Element, Fort Jackson, South Carolina (active)

30th Enhanced Separate Brigade, Clinton, North Carolina (National Guard)

48th Enhanced Separate Brigade, Macon, Georgia (National Guard)

218th Enhanced Separate Brigade, Newberry, South Carolina (National Guard)

Teaming

4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Texas (active)

40th Infantry Division, Los Alamitos, California (National Guard)

1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas (active)

49th Armored Division, Austin, Texas (National Guard)

3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia (active)

28th Infantry Division, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania (National Guard)

10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York (active)

29th Infantry Division, Fort Belvoir, Virginia (National Guard)

**Appendix II
Major Units Involved in Integration
Initiatives We Reviewed**

**Force XXI Heavy
Division Redesign**

4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Texas (implementing)

1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas (planning stage)

See appendix V for a schedule of units involved in limited conversions.

**Integrated Bosnia Task
Force**

49th Armored Division, Austin, Texas (National Guard)

3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Carson, Colorado (active)

629th Military Intelligence Battalion, Maryland (National Guard)

111th Engineer Battalion, Texas (National Guard)

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report is the fourth in a series of reports issued in response to the 1996 National Defense Authorization Act, which requires us to review the adequacy of the Army's forces in carrying out the national military strategy. This review focuses on the Army's efforts to integrate its active and reserve combat forces. Specifically, we assessed the effects of these efforts on the Army's (1) total costs, (2) force structure, (3) personnel tempo, and (4) risk in carrying out the national military strategy.

We met with representatives from each of the three components to obtain an overview and the current status of the Army's active and reserve components' integration efforts. Specifically, we met with officials from the Army National Guard Headquarters, Alexandria, Virginia; the U.S. Army Reserve Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia; and the Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Force Development. These meetings provided us with general information about the Army's many ongoing integration efforts and helped us focus our efforts on the Army's most significant integration efforts. Specifically, we focused on the Bosnia task force integration, teaming, the integrated divisions, and the Force XXI heavy division redesign because they all involved large numbers of people and were being implemented at the division level. Army officials confirmed that by reviewing these efforts, we would cover virtually all the important issues related to active and reserve component integration.

To determine integration's effects on the Army's total costs, force structure, personnel tempo, and ability to execute the national military strategy, we reviewed integration plans and discussed integration impacts with officials from both headquarters and operational units. At the headquarters level, we met with officials from the Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence Offices. At the Pentagon, we also met with representatives of the Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee and the Reserve Component Coordination Council. The respective groups are responsible for reporting to the Secretary of the Army on policy issues and to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army on action issues related to reserve components and the "total Army." However, most of the detailed data contained in this report came from the operational units listed below that are implementing the Army's ongoing integration efforts. Our review of integration plans and discussions with officials focused on identifying (1) what additional costs and personnel, if any, were needed to implement the initiatives; (2) how the initiatives affected the time reserve personnel would spend away from their home stations; and (3) the impact these initiatives are likely to have on the Army's risk in carrying out the national military strategy. We did not independently

verify the cost figures in the report but relied on financial officials, primarily at the U.S. Property and Fiscal Office in Texas and at the divisions we visited.

While the bulk of our effort was directed toward the units that were actually involved in the integration initiatives, we also met with officials at the U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia, and III Corps, Fort Hood, Texas. Both these organizations have oversight and resourcing responsibilities for the major integration efforts we reviewed. Following are the divisional units that we visited under each integration heading:

Integrated Divisions

7th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colorado (active)
45th Enhanced Separate Brigade, Edmond, Oklahoma (National Guard)

24th Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas (active)
24th Infantry Division Forward Element, Fort Jackson, South Carolina (active)
218th Enhanced Separate Brigade, Newberry, South Carolina (National Guard)

Teaming

4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Texas (active)
40th Infantry Division, Los Alamitos, California (National Guard)

1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas (active)
49th Armored Division, Austin, Texas (National Guard)

Force XXI Heavy Division Redesign

4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Texas (active)
1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas (active)

Integrated Bosnia Task Force

49th Armored Division, Austin, Texas (National Guard)
3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Carson, Colorado (active)

Appendix III
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

In addition, we also met with several retired senior Army generals at the Association of the U.S. Army Institute of Land Warfare, Arlington, Virginia, to obtain a historical perspective on Army active and reserve component integration.

We conducted our review from May 1999 through May 2000 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Units Participating in the Integrated Bosnia Task Forces Through 2003

Bosnia Stabilization Force rotation numbers and dates	Headquarters	Other units with significant participation
#7 March-October 2000	49th Armored Division (Texas National Guard)	3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (active) and 629th Military Intelligence Battalion (Maryland National Guard)
#8 October-March 2001	3rd Infantry Division (active)	Companies from the 3rd and 25th Infantry Division (active) and the 30th and 45th Enhanced Separate Brigade (North Carolina and Oklahoma National Guard)
#9 March-October 2001	3rd Infantry Division (active)	Companies from 3rd and 25th Infantry Division (active) and the 48th Enhanced Separate Brigade (Georgia National Guard)
#10 October-April 2002	29th Infantry Division (Virginia National Guard)	Companies from the 10th Mountain Division (active), the 29th Infantry Division (Virginia National Guard), and the 155th Enhanced Separate Brigade (Mississippi National Guard)
#11 April-October 2002	101st Airborne Division (active)	Companies from the 101st Airborne Division (active) and the 116th and 76th Enhanced Separate Brigade (Idaho and Indiana National Guard)
#12 October-April 2003	28th Infantry Division (Pennsylvania National Guard)	Companies from the 3rd and 25th Infantry Division (active) and the 218th Enhanced Separate Brigade (South Carolina National Guard)

Dates of Force XXI Redesign and Limited Conversions

The following chart shows when the Army's active and reserve heavy forces are scheduled to undergo Force XXI redesign. Units are scheduled to make the full conversion in conjunction with the arrival of new digital equipment. The limited conversions involve force structure changes that will precede the arrival of the new equipment. The home state of each National Guard unit is in parentheses.

Unit	Limited conversion	Full conversion
4th Infantry Division, 1st Brigade	Not applicable	January 1999
4th Infantry Division, 2nd Brigade	Not applicable	September 1999
4th Infantry Division Headquarters	Not applicable	October 1999
1st Cavalry Division, 1st Brigade	Not applicable	Fiscal year 2001
1st Cavalry Division, 2nd Brigade	Not applicable	Fiscal year 2002
1st Cavalry Division, 3rd Brigade	Not applicable	Fiscal year 2003
4th Infantry Division, 3rd Brigade	June 2000	Fiscal year 2004
1st Infantry Division, 2nd and 3rd Brigade	January 1999	
116th Armored Brigade (Indiana)	October 1999	
30th Infantry Brigade (North Carolina)	October 1999	
155th Armored Brigade (Mississippi)	October 1999	
48th Infantry Brigade (Georgia)	October 1999	
81st Armored Brigade (Washington)	October 1999	
218th Infantry Brigade (South Carolina)	October 1999	
256th Infantry Brigade (Louisiana)	October 1999	
31st Armored Brigade (Alabama)	October 1999	
49th Armored Division (Texas)	October 1999	
1st Armored Division, 2nd Brigade	February 2000	
1st Armored Division, 1st Brigade	April 2000	
1st Armored Division, 3rd Brigade	June 2000	
3rd Infantry Division	June 2000	
1st Infantry Division, 1st Brigade	June 2000	
40th Infantry Division, 3rd Brigade (California)	September 2000	
28th Infantry Division, 55th Brigade (Pennsylvania)	September 2000	
2nd Infantry Division, 3rd Brigade	June 2001	
40th Infantry Division, 2nd Brigade (California)	September 2001	
28th Infantry Division, 2nd Brigade (Pennsylvania)	September 2001	
34th Infantry Division, 1st Brigade (Minnesota)	September 2001	

**Appendix V
Dates of Force XXI Redesign and Limited
Conversions**

(Continued From Previous Page)

Unit	Limited conversion	Full conversion
28th Infantry Division, 56th Brigade (Pennsylvania)	September 2002	
34th Infantry Division, 32nd Brigade (Minnesota)	September 2002	
35th Infantry Divisions, 149th Brigade (Kansas)	September 2002	
38th Infantry Division, 37th Brigade (Indiana)	September 2002	
38th Infantry Division, 46th Brigade (Indiana)	September 2002	
42nd Infantry Division, 32nd Brigade (New York)	September 2002	

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the end of this appendix.



RESERVE AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1500

22 JUN 2000

Ms. Carol R. Schuster
Associate Director, National Security Preparedness Issues
National Security and International Affairs Division
U.S. General Accounting Office
Washington, DC 20548

Dear Ms. Schuster:

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft report concerning the Army's integration of its Active and Reserve component combat forces, dated May 25, 2000, (GAO Code 702000/OSD Case 2018). It is an opportunity for me to recognize the merit of some observations and recommendations, as well as offer observations and suggestions to strengthen the credibility and veracity of the final report. According to statements in the draft report, the review focuses on the Army's broad efforts to integrate its Active and Reserve combat forces, yet the audit uses a sample of four Army initiatives as the basis for its findings and recommendations. I recommend that you change the title of the final report to more accurately reflect the scope of the audit subject matter. These alternatives are offered for consideration: *Army's Efforts on AC/RC Combat Integration Are Moving Forward*, or *Army's AC/RC Combat Integration Efforts Making Progress but Issues Still Remain*.

We strongly disagree with the statement that the "Department of Defense has emphasized the importance of integration...but without clearly defining integration" (page 2). In a September 4, 1997 memorandum, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen defined integration as "the conditions of readiness and trust needed for the leadership at all levels to have well-justified confidence that Reserve component units are trained and equipped to serve as an effective part of the joint and combined force within whatever timelines are set for the unit - in peace and war."

We also disagree with the report's assertion that the aforementioned memorandum did not contain measurable results-oriented goals to evaluate the services' integration progress (page 2, footnote 1). The memorandum states that the Department of Defense's goal is "a seamless Total Force that provides the National Command Authorities the flexibility and interoperability necessary for the full range of military operations." This goal and the specific sub-goals, also enumerated in the memorandum, provided an excellent assessment framework for measuring the Army's integration progress and results. The sub-goals included:

- An environment that eliminates all residual barriers - structural and cultural - for effective integration within our Total Force.
- Clearly understood responsibility for and ownership of the Total Force by the senior leaders throughout the Total Force.

See comment 1.
Now on p. 54.

Now on p. 3.

Appendix VI
Comments From the Department of Defense

- Clear and mutual understanding of the mission for each unit – Active, Guard, and Reserve – in service and joint/combined operations, during peace and war.
- Commitment to provide the resources needed to accomplish assigned missions;
- Leadership by senior commanders – Active, Guard, and Reserve – to ensure the readiness of the Total Force.

See comment 2.
Now on p. 54.

The Army's emphasis on integrating Active and Reserve combat units dates back to August 1990 rather than March 2000, as stated in the draft report. In August 1990, President Bush ordered the first Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up for Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM. By the end of the Gulf War – six months after mobilization began – nearly 250,000 reservists from all components had been called to active duty. Over 106,000 combat, combat support, and combat service support reservists deployed to Southwest Asia. Three of the Army National Guard's separate brigades (combat maneuver formations) scheduled to deploy, did not. The lessons learned from the factors that precluded their deployment have shaped current Army combat integration policies and provide the context and baseline for assessing the Army's integration of its Active and Reserve combat forces. Using Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM as a baseline, the Army's efforts to integrate Active and Reserve combat forces clearly have improved over the past decade.

See comment 3.
Now on p. 54.

The observations regarding the cost of using reservists for peacekeeping missions are accurate in terms of the impact to the annual budget in the year of execution. Using reservists more than the budgeted training amount of 39 drill days and annual training for peacekeeping missions incurs additional pay costs. Nevertheless, it should be noted that using U.S. forces for peacekeeping missions, whether Active or Reserve, adds to the Army's total costs. The key point is that these cost increases are not associated with integration, but stem from accelerated deployment tempo.

See comment 4.
Now on p. 54.

A more in-depth assessment would show that, if the Army were required to retain Reserve component capabilities in the Active component, the resulting costs would be much greater. When they are not deployed, part-time Reserve component forces are substantially less costly to maintain than full-time Active forces. Employment of integrated Reserve forces is a fiscally prudent approach, which reduces the personnel and operating tempo of active service members. The taxpayer savings of a force in reserve are substantial.

I share your concerns regarding the Army's efforts to provide the training and equipment resources to support greater use of National Guard and Reserve forces. In the case of the Texas Army National Guard's 49th Armor Division deployment to Bosnia, the Army ensured that the soldiers of the 49th were properly equipped, trained, and ready to go. In follow-on rotations, the costs will be reduced. BG(P) Blum, Commander of the 29th Division, assures my staff that plans are in place to perform the required training within the normal training time for the vast majority of soldiers deploying to Bosnia. This will reduce the impact on families and employers alike. The equipping issue will remain problematic until resources can be provided to fully modernize all Army formations simultaneously. Until then, both Active and Reserve units, will "cross level" the most current items of equipment to those units having an immediate need.

Appendix VI
Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 5.
Now on p. 54.

The report states that integration increases Army force structure. We disagree. Force structure adjustments due to integration will come from existing structure as part of an ongoing process to adapt to changing requirements within available resources. An objective of the Army's integration efforts is to dissolve structural and cultural barriers. For example, an AC divisional headquarters and headquarters company was created from existing authorizations to function in a RC training and readiness oversight role. Its mission is to provide an environment for AC and RC personnel to function cohesively as "one organization," sharing duties, responsibilities, and accountability to meet the required readiness posture. This adjustment underscores another key point: integration is an inherent part of force management and should not be viewed as separate and distinct from this process. In other words, integration is not approached singularly, but is systemically incorporated within routine Army processes.

See comment 6.
Now on pp. 54-55.

RC Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO) has increased and we are aware of its effects on our RC members. The day-to-day operational demands on the Military Departments have increased dramatically since the Cold War's end. We are doing more with fewer personnel. Increases in PERSTEMPO are being monitored and evaluated by commanders to reduce any adverse effects on readiness. Yet, we are finding that when soldiers are engaged in meaningful training and/or performing missions related to that training, they tend to be more satisfied and enjoy participating in the mission. Thus far, retention rates in these higher demand units have improved.

See comment 7.
Now on p. 54.

The report states that "the Army denied the request" from 4th Infantry Division and III Corps to provide "relief from the travel regulations." As detailed in Title 37 USC 404, the services lack the legal authority to effect a waiver authorizing travel pay for inactive duty training. However, we are considering a legislative proposal to address this requirement.

Now on p. 22.

We disagree with the statement that the Army is "pursuing integration on an initiative by initiative basis, without an overarching plan to guide its efforts." The report doesn't mention the well-known vision for Total Army restructuring by General Shinseki. RC integration options, as validated by the Army through its various integration initiatives, are being incorporated as appropriate in the Army's plans to achieve that vision. It is also important to note that the Army has determined that some of these integration initiatives, once tested, were not viable. In such cases, corrective measures were taken to either eliminate, or approach them in a different manner.

The report asserts that the Army has not clearly defined integration and that difficulty exists in measuring precise effects on Active and Reserve components. As various integration initiatives mature, "precise" measurable effects will become more apparent. However, with respect to measuring general effects, the Army offers the current Bosnia mission with the 49th Armor Division, Texas National Guard as testimony that their integration efforts are "on target."


In summary, maintaining the integrated capabilities of the Total Force is the key to successfully achieving the goals of shaping, responding, and preparing for the challenges and opportunities confronting the nation both domestically and abroad. Only a well-balanced, seamlessly integrated military force is capable of dominating opponents across the full range of

Appendix VI
Comments From the Department of Defense

military operations. Using the concept and principles of the National Defense Strategy and the Total Force policy, DoD will continue managing change and responding to the challenges of restructuring, streamlining, and modernizing its Total Force to ensure efficient and effective joint operations. One of our greatest challenges is balancing the Department of Defense's requirements within available resources. I am committed to continuing to work with all components of the Total Force to ensure that adequate resources are available to Guard and Reserve commanders to ensure the readiness of their forces.

The services are clearly making progress on the integration front. The Army is no exception. In addition to its analysis and recommendations, this report should reflect the many positive steps that the Army has taken to better integrate its Active and Reserve combat forces.

Sincerely,



Charles L. Cragin
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary

Enclosure
DoD Response to Recommendations

cc:
ASA/M&RA

Appendix VI
Comments From the Department of Defense

DoD Response to Recommendations
GAO Code 702000/OSD Case 2018, May 25, 2000

RECOMMENDATION 1: Given the Army's current emphasis on Active and Reserve integration as a means of maximizing the effectiveness of its total force, and given the inherent limitations of pursuing integration on a piecemeal basis, the GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Army develop an overarching plan to guide the Army's integration efforts. This plan should establish the Army's goals, policies, and resources for achieving full integration and should include milestones and performance measures for gauging progress. Further, it should fully consider how the integration of Active and Reserve forces can be achieved consistent with the Army's other primary objectives, including the full staffing of its combat forces.

RESPONSE: Non-concur. The Department of Defense supports and the Army firmly believes that it has an overarching plan to maximize the strengths of its components' capabilities while minimizing its weaknesses, all the while dealing in a fiscally constrained environment. The report should reflect the published Secretary of Defense principles and the Army's White Paper—"America's Army--One Team, One Fight, One Future," as well as acknowledge the declaration by the current Chief of Staff, Army as overarching guidance, principles, and concepts guiding AC/RC integration. Integration of the Army's components to complement respective capabilities is fully considered in all of the Army's force structure objectives, to include full staffing of its combat forces. The guidance set forth in the aforementioned documents and the Army's Transformation Campaign Plan do guide the integration process. The Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee (which reports directly to the Secretary of the Army), the Reserve Components Coordination Council (which reports directly to the Chief of Staff, Army), the Reserve Forces Policy Board (which reports directly to the Secretary of Defense), and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs oversee the integration effort and ensure the principles are being met.

RECOMMENDATION 2: In light of the Army National Guard's increased responsibility in peacekeeping operations and the Army's desire to reduce deployment burdens on the Active forces by substituting reservists, the GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Army examine whether the forces, equipment, and training priorities assigned to the National Guard are commensurate with its increased role and make whatever adjustments are needed, considering the overall needs of the Army.

RESPONSE: Concur with comment. The report correctly surmises the issues with equipment modernization and compatibility. Needed capabilities must be competed within the existing Army Total Obligation Authority. The Army has significant modernization initiatives and commensurate fielding plans that have quantified, priced, and prioritized the requirements within available funding. The Total Army Analysis process and the Army's Transformation Campaign Plan succinctly articulate this. The Army has assessed risk and taken the most prudent courses of action to ensure fulfillment of its assigned missions. The Army ensures Active and Reserve component units are properly equipped and trained prior to deployment.

Now on p. 32.

Now on pp. 32-33.

Now on p. 33.

RECOMMENDATION 3: Because some reservists incur significant increases in their transportation costs as they integrate with Active forces that are located farther away from their homes, the GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense determine whether the benefits of Army AC/RC integration warrant a change to current travel regulations that prohibit travel reimbursement related to inactive duty training.

RESPONSE: Concur. DoD has developed an initiative to conduct a comprehensive study of Reserve component duty status. Embedded in the study is an assessment of Reserve component compensation and entitlements associated with each duty status and a requirement to provide recommended changes to Reserve component compensation, entitlements, benefits and protections. A particular focus of the compensation portion of the study will be on travel and transportation expenses borne by Reserve component members when performing inactive duty training, as recommended by GAO. The results of this study will form the basis for proposing legislative and policy changes that simplify the current system in order to achieve greater efficiency and flexibility in the employment of Reserve component members and individuals, and providing appropriate compensation and entitlements.

The following are GAO's responses to DOD's comments dated June 22, 2000.

GAO Comments

1. We revised the title of our report to better reflect the scope of our review—Army combat force integration.
2. This report deals with integration only in the Army's combat forces. The numbers DOD cited included not only the Army's combat support and combat service support personnel mobilized and deployed for the Persian Gulf War, but also reservists from other services who were mobilized and deployed. The initial call-up for Operation Desert Shield did not contain any Army combat forces. While later call-ups did include combat forces, the armored brigade and two mechanized infantry brigades that were mobilized never deployed to Southwest Asia. Only two field artillery brigades deployed.
3. We agree that peacekeeping missions add to the Army's total costs, whether the missions are staffed with active or reserve personnel. However, the key point made in the report is that base pay for active forces is a fixed cost that does not change, whether active forces deploy or not. This is not the case for reservists. If reservists are not training or on active duty, they do not get paid. Therefore, integrated task forces that deploy reservists for more than their budgeted 39 days per year increase the Army's total personnel last costs. Some reserve mobilizations for peacekeeping missions last up to 270 days.
4. We agree that when they are not deployed, part-time reserve forces are substantially less costly to maintain than full-time active forces. We have modified our report to acknowledge this fact but have retained our discussion of how integration activities result in added costs.
5. We did not mean to imply that the Army would need an increase in its personnel end-strength to implement integration initiatives. We have clarified our report language to state more clearly that, because specific integration efforts create new force structure requirements, adjustments will be necessary, assuming end-strength levels remain stable. As the roles of reserve forces increase, the magnitude of these adjustments will also need to increase.
6. Because the 49th Armored Division's Bosnia deployment is the largest deployment of a reserve combat unit in years, DOD and the Army

cannot predict the effect of this 270-day deployment on Guard retention with any degree of certainty. However, as noted in our report, DOD's data shows that retention suffers when active forces deploy for more than five months.

7. Documentation from the 4th Infantry Division showed that the Army denied the request. The report has been changed to explain more accurately the Army's response to the request. The Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel recommended pursuing other options rather than endorsing and forwarding the request.

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