

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

**INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION AND NEGOTIATING
POSITIONS OF CYPRUS' REGIONAL CONFLICT AFTER
THE 1974 TURKISH INVASION. OBSTACLES AND
PROSPECTS TO A SETTLEMENT**

by

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June 2000

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
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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

Cyprus represents one of the most enduring and problematic regional conflicts. Since Cyprus' independence in 1960, the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots have been in conflict, culminating in the arrival of the UN Peace-keeping Force (UNFICYP) in 1964 and the 1974 Turkish invasion. The regional concerns of Greece and Turkey and their proclivity to protect and advance the interests of their related ethnic communities on the island have played serious roles in the maintenance of the conflict. The thesis illustrates the weakness of the international mediation effort and the obstacles to a settlement. Although third parties, such as the UN, the USA and the EU, are pressing the issue, a solution ultimately depends on the four key actors, the two Cypriot communities and Greece and Turkey, coming to a mutually acceptable agreement. More recently, the EU has become involved in the issue because of the intended accession negotiations for Cyprus, and its special relations with Greece – as an EU member – and Turkey, as an EU-membership candidate following the 1999 EU summit in Helsinki. Both the EU and USA calculate that a political federal solution of Cyprus' problem will benefit both Cypriot communities, improve Greek-Turkish relations, and formalize Turkey's European status.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Cyprus is the third largest island in the Mediterranean. Its history goes back nine thousand years. The Cyprus regional conflict represents a category of protracted social conflicts, which defy resolution and constantly endanger international peace and security. This thesis will examine the background of the Cyprus regional conflict. The geopolitical nature of Cyprus, subject to so many conflicting interests, from the communal to regional and the international level that makes the conflict so apparently intractable. Besides the co-existence of the two communities there were two different self-contained ethnic groups divided along linguistic, religious, and cultural lines. The political division and attachment of the two groups to their motherlands reinforced the ethnic cleavage. At the same level, it is critical to remember the different political roles of Greece and Turkey in the repeated crises in the decades of 60s and 70s. In the end, the interests also of Britain and USA as partly represented through NATO, have added a final layer of global security considerations and worries to an already complicated situation.

In this thesis I will explore the conditions under which a negotiated peace settlement failed to guide the disputing parties in an effective process of peace building. The focus of this thesis will be on peace settlements where a third party, notably the UN, have been actively involved not only in peacekeeping but also in post-conflict peace building. The UN peacekeeping operation in Cyprus has been one of the longest of its kind, and has been aimed at aiding the two community parties to escape their security

dilemmas. A new factor, the probable acceptance of official Cyprus state in the EU gives new dynamic to the problem of the island. While accession negotiations are under way, and Cyprus prepares to become a full member of the EU, efforts to reach a political settlement on the island are intensifying. The UN, the EU and the USA are all making concerted efforts through the method of the international mediation to break the impasse.

The framework will address the description and prescription of: (1) the role of third party interveners in the period following 1974 Turkish invasion; (2) behaviors and interests of the disputing parties; (3) the structural characteristics of the conflict process; (4) the changing dynamics of regional and international power relationships; (5) the investigation of the conflict environment; and (6) the selection of an ideal procedure of conflict resolution according to the special conditions and characteristics of the island. The thesis will investigate contemporary theories of solving regional ethnic conflicts and the various conflict resolution options available, and in the end, the investigation of the impediments for the settlement of the problem.

The study will be organized in six chapters. In the first chapter, the background of the conflict, a brief history of the conflict (historical approach) with the reference of the serious effects of the 1974 Turkish invasion. It will provide for a short historical narrative of Cyprus regional conflict. In the second chapter, a theoretical framework will be developed for a deep analysis of the conflict, and for the research of conflict resolution methods. This will be the result of the study of the following issues: a review of the literature on mediation as an instrument of conflict resolution, on the proper mediation process, the anticipation of the ethnic conflict by the international community in the

present time, and on the role of UN as a mediator. In the third chapter, the thesis will focus on Greek and Turkish involvement, the causes, process and consequences of American, British and Soviet involvement, as well as on the interests of the parties in this regional conflict. The fourth chapter will be a development of the 1974 mediation efforts. The fifth chapter will be an analysis of the conflict, a justification of the weakness of international mediation and the reasons-obstacles to a settlement of the problem. It will provide also with the necessary requirements of a future serious attempt by a third party mediator with richly resources and primarily with strong desire or interest to contribute to the final settlement of the Cyprus problem. In the end, it will be a development of a process with flexibility that satisfies the interests of the disputant parties and assure for the island a viable with duration solution. It will be after a strategic assessment of the existing situation on the island, a few only months after the entrance of the new century.

Finally, the analysis of the conflict will share both an optimistic and pessimistic view of the problem, two different situations, about the settlement or the future perpetuation of the problem. According to these options the critical variable, Turkish party and his foreign policy for the next years, will influence greatly the issue. With the European orientation of this country, especially after its official acceptance as a candidate member of the European Union, Turkey is obliged to follow the directive of the EU about a positive contribution to a final settlement of the Cyprus problem. Its post- Cold war expansion into southeastern Europe could bring not only economic benefit but also a radically new and constructive political framework with the eventual entry of Cyprus and Turkey into the Union. It is a deep desire of this thesis, even with the indication of the

problems or difficulties for this option, to accept this process. In any occasion, it will present the benefits of this settlement

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT. THE RESULTS OF 1974 TURKISH INVASION

The Cyprus regional conflict can be divided into three phases. Until 1960, it was a colonial issue that was settled with the granting of independence and the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. From 1960 until 1974, the problem was basically an internal dispute between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots in which external powers were involved. The third phase covers the period from 1974, the dominant element of the problem being the de facto division of the island and the continuing military occupation of North Cyprus by Turkey. By the summer of 1996, there had already been several indications that the petrified stalemate in Cyprus was breaking up. Internal and external developments combined to re-open what many had come to regard as a closed issue. Once again, it became clear that enforced partition does not consist a solution of the Cyprus problem.¹

The prevalence of liberal ideas in Europe and the rise of nationalism in the 19th century, were transmitted in Cyprus into a call for freedom, self-determination and unity with the Greek state. The complication of the Cyprus problem was a result of changing circumstances, international developments and foreign interventions. The transfer of power in 1878 from the Ottoman regime to British rule allowed the national movement in Cyprus to grow, culminating in the 1931 uprising and the 1955-59-liberation movement.

¹ Hitchens C., *Hostage to History: Cyprus, from the Ottomans to Kissinger*, pp 9-15, Verso London -New York, 1998.

After more than 300 years of Ottoman rule, the island came under British administration in 1878, though Turkey formally transferred sovereignty to Britain in 1923. British colonial administration continued on the island until 1960 when a joint bi-communal state, the Republic of Cyprus was founded on the basis of international treaties, signed by Britain, Turkey, Greece, and representatives of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. The state of affairs created by the 1960 agreements set up a political partnership between the two national communities, which would enable them to share power and work together within a bi-communal state.

In 1960, Cyprus was declared an independent Republic on the basis of so-called Zurich-London agreements. However, the Constitution that was imposed contained divisive provisions, which encouraged confrontation and dissent between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots (80 percent and 18 percent of the population respectively). In addition, the rights granted to Britain, Greece and Turkey, as guarantor states, embroiled the young state in the antagonisms among the great powers and in the clashes between various economic and strategic interests in the region. The inflexible constitution of 1960 not only denied the 80% of the population who were Greek Cypriots their legitimate right for self-determination in the shape of that long-desired union with the Greece, but in practice even denied the great majority of population the possibility of effective self- government and internal democracy. The result was a continual political discontent between the two ethnic communities. The sentiments of Greek Cypriots were fuelled by the Turkish Cypriot political leadership's obstruction between 1960 and 1963. The two communities

were soon locked into a constitutional crisis, which became even more serious when Turkey rejected proposals by President Makarios for an amendment of the 1960 constitution. From December 1963 until 1968 intercommunal violence caused grave suffering to both communities as a product of mutual suspicion and fear stirred by Turkey's policy of dividing the two communities. The United Nations in an effort to mediate the problem finally sent a peacekeeping force in 1964. Turkey, with a view to promoting her expansionist and partitionist plans; found ways and means to mobilize Turkish Cypriot extremists to prevent the smooth functioning of the state, which led to the intercommunal clashes of 1963/64 and 1967.²

Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots instantly rejected the UN mediator's report (Galo Plaza, former President of Ecuador) on 26 March 1965 about the problem. It considered the 1960 solution as a constitutional impasse, which could not be maintained against the will of the majority. At the same period, Turkey threatened to invade Cyprus. She was only restrained from so doing by UN Security council involvement, and mostly by President Johnson's direct and harsh intervention in 1965 and again in 1967. Indeed, during this period in order to pre-empt a Turkish invasion a Greek regular army of 12000 men (one Greek Army Division) was moved to Cyprus. But with a renewed threat of a Turkish invasion, this force after international diplomatic activity securing a Greek-Turkish peace settlement was withdrawn at the end of 1967. The political leaderships of two communities were persuaded to begin the interminable process of inter-communal negotiation for a just settlement of the Cyprus question but without any serious result.

² Hitchens, C., pp. 29-60.

The two communities with fears and aspirations blocked any agreement, which would deny Turkey partition of the island or which would ensure the preservation of an independent non-aligned Cyprus state.³

The study of the historical facts of this period introduces some useful assumptions. The lack of ethnic and political ties prevented the development of a common Cypriot political culture and the creation of a strong and independent state. With the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, the ethnic and political divisions and differences of the past were fully developed into the State function and the political process. Ethnicity was brought into the political environment and the political game was transformed into an ethno political struggle between the two Cypriots communities. The ethnicity obtained a strong politicization, which was facilitated by the fragmented political framework of the state and the 1960 constitution. The psychological distance and the demand for political autonomy of the two ethnic groups were the next consequences. This greatly facilitated by the different and conflicting national, religious, ethnic, and cultural values and practices of the two communities. Thus, the two ethnic groups transformed into two separate political conflict groups.⁴ The two groups were tempted to use the state institutions and political process at the expense of the other and for the satisfaction of group interests. The Turkish Cypriot minority made extensive use of its

³ Kyle, K., *Cyprus, in Search of Peace* pp.9-16, MRG Press, 1984.

⁴ There is an argument about the role of culture in ethnic conflict. Future research should nest cultural variables within capacity-based and decision making models of ethnic conflicts. Generally the cultural variables should be recognized as important correlates of war. Henderson, A.E., "Culture or Contiguity," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, V.41, No 5, pp.648-667, October 1997.

legal and political safeguards and avoided negotiations.⁵ Instead, it used intransigence attitude as a measure of defense and sought political autonomy and secession. In this occasion the communal elites usually fail to co-operate in counteracting the effects of ethnic and political fragmentation.

The repeated crises in the 1960s and 1970s showed that Cyprus, at that time, was logistically beyond the range of Greece's defense capability. Therefore, it can be drawn that ethnic constraints and considerations- especially the strong ethnic ties with the Greek Cypriots and the age old ethnic rivalry with Turkey- have determined the attitude, policy and role of Greece on Cyprus. From the other side's point of view Turkey's role on Cyprus had and have to do with strategic considerations. Ethnic considerations, the presence of Turkish minority to the island, and strategic factors have been congruent and mutually reinforcing in causing a permanent Turkish involvement in Cyprus, which eventually led to the invasion in 1974. Co-operation between the two motherlands and their respective Cypriot communities has been close and constant, except during the period of military rule in Greece when Athens - Nicosia improved political contradictions.⁶ This co-operation took the form of tight alliances in the political,

⁵ The Parliament had 35 Greek Cypriots and 15 Turkish Cypriots deputies. Eight (8) Turkish Cypriots members could defeat a bill voted by the other members (separate majorities). The problem is one of simple mathematics. In 1960 Greeks Cypriots made up 80% of the population, and the Turks 18,4%. A minority of 18% was given 30% of the House of Representatives and all governmental, administrative and state posts.

⁶ The deteriorating relations between President Makarios and the junta in Athens coupled with the development of a terrorist opposition to the President of Cyprus on Cyprus. Moreover, as Richard Holbrooke, the Ambassador of the USA in the United Nations, declared on 11 November 1997 during a mediation's effort: "American history in this area is not entirely clean. There are some things that precious American Administrations did...particularly between the mid 1960s and 1977 which I think were shameful." He was referring specifically to the USA's support for the Greek junta, who were able to derive from this the impression that it was with US approval that they could move against Makarios. Kyle, p.16.

diplomatic, and military fields. The two countries were involved in military operations on Cyprus while playing a major role in international diplomacy dealing with the ethnic conflict.⁷

On 15 July 1974, a coup d'état against President of Cyprus, Makarios took place, backed and organized by the ruling military junta in Greece. On July 20 1974, Turkey, alleging the right of unilateral even military intervention following the provisions of the Zurich-London agreement guarantor of the 1960 Constitution, and due to the reluctance of Britain as guarantor nation to actively engage in the conflict, invaded in Cyprus. As its excuse to invade, it used that it was undertaking a "peace operation," which aimed to the elimination of the danger directed against the very existence of the Republic of Cyprus, and the restoration of the independence, territorial integrity and security of the island. When the UN Security Council intervened, negotiations on the situation began in Geneva among Turkey, Greece, Cyprus and the UK, Turkey tried to impose its views and also gain time for a second military operation. Thus, Turkey instead of restoring the state of affairs and protecting the human rights of all the people of Cyprus, as was her duty and alleged justification, massively extended her invasion to occupy 36,4% of Cyprus, driving out well over 170.000 Greek Cypriot refugees and moving her army to the named "Attila line." The occupied area is the richest of the island, representing 70% of its resources. This operation took place on 13-14 August 1974, while the talks in Geneva were still going on. This action obviously had not any legal justification according to the right of

⁷ Markides, C. *The Rise and Fall of Cyprus Republic*, pp.1-35, Yale University Press, 1977, and Kaloudis, G., "Cyprus: The Enduring Conflict," *International Journal of World Peace*, V. 16, No 1, pp.3-12, January 1999.

this country from the Zurich-London agreements. Besides this, on 14 August 1974, the coup collapsed and a democratic government was restored in Greece. The political environment was absolutely different from that of the first invasion. Since then, the northern territory has metamorphosed from a provisional administration to an autonomous administration, and finally in 1983 to the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" which is still internationally unrecognized other than by Turkey. The Security Council in its resolution 541 of 1983 condemned this pseudostate.⁸

With 37 percent of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus, 70 percent of the natural resources were concentrated under Turkish administration. One third of the population, about 200,000 Greek Cypriots, has been displaced from the occupied northern sector where they constituted 80% of the inhabitants. At the same time, the Turkish Cypriots who lived in the southern areas of Cyprus were forced by their leaders to move to the northern areas. The ascertainment of the fate of the missing persons is still pending. Only 481 people out of the original 20,000 at the end of 1974 remain in their occupied villages living under conditions of oppression, harassment and deprivation. The Turkish occupation army about 35,000 soldiers, armed with the latest weapons and supported by land and sea forces, are stationed in the occupied area, making it, according to the UN Secretary-General, one of the most militarized regions of the world.⁹ Turkey also has been brought about 85,000 Turks to colonize the occupied area with the aim of changing

⁸Joseph, S.J., *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics*, pp. 17-33, St.Martin's Press, 1997.

⁹ "Protecting" the so-called TRNC two infantry divisions, 300 main battle tanks, eight aircraft and 12 helicopters. Wyllie, J., "Turkey-Adapting to New Strategic Realities," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, " V. 4, No 10, p.450, October 1992.

the demography of the island and controlling the political situation. The hermetically sealed “Attila line” (“Operation Attila” was the code-name Turkey gave to the invasion of Cyprus) artificially divides the island and its people and prevents Cypriots from moving freely throughout their country. According to Turkish-Cypriot sources, about 50,000 Turkish Cypriots emigrated from the occupied area between 1974-1995 because of the economic, social and moral deprivation, which prevails there. As a result the Turkish Cypriots who are left are today outnumbered by the Turkish troops together with the colonists.¹⁰ The illegal regime in the occupied area is deliberately trying to eradicate every trace of a 9,000-year-old cultural and historical heritage. Turkish ones have replaced all Greek toponymes. Churches, monuments, cemeteries and archaeological sites have been destroyed, desecrated or looted. Priceless religious and archaeological treasures, part of the world’s cultural heritage, are stolen and smuggled abroad, and illegal excavations and dealings in antiquities are taking place.¹¹

Another terrible effect from the Greek and Turkish involvement in Cyprus was the widening of the conflict across the Aegean, which had a devastating influence on the

¹⁰ Kyle, pp.17-21.

¹¹ A comment by Hitchens emphasizes the results of 1974 Turkish invasion: “ Many Turks feel the EU is, so speak, culturally and historically biased against them. The memories of Lepanto and the gates of Vienna, the catchphrase ‘Terrible Turk’ to describe obnoxious children in nursery rhymes, all these and more have created an impression of something fearful and brutish lurking in Anatolia. There is also the strangeness of Islam to most Europeans, and the vivid, terrifying accounts of what happened to Christian Bulgaria and Armenia under Turkish rule. Greeks, in particular, have a national memory of Ottoman subjugation and it is not difficult to find strong views among them about the shortcomings of Turks as a people. All of this is deplorable. But there is no need to draw upon ancient prejudice in examining what the Turkish army did in August 1974. The record is a clear one, compiled for the most part by neutral outside jurists, and it shows that Turkey employed deliberate means of terror and indiscriminate cruelty. It did not do because of something in its nature or because of the inheritance of some presumed streak of barbarism. It did so for the very modern and cold-blooded reason that it wanted territory without inhabitants. Hitchens, C., p. 102.

bilateral relations of the two countries, though allies in NATO. The revival of old rivalry and animosity severely damaged Greek-Turkish relations in the economic, diplomatic, cultural and social areas. Deterioration in bilateral relations and intermingling of ethnicized domestic and external politics had, in turn, a serious effect on Cyprus. The ethnic tension and passion of the three countries hindered the practice of diplomacy and created conditions conducive for the use of force. This rivalry also reflected in the impediment of international diplomacy and mediation. The parties involved very often rejected or undermined initiatives undertaken by third parties for a peaceful settlement of the conflict through a continual bargaining of different sides. So the diplomacy through the way of international mediation did not run its full course. The Turkish side continues unpunished and indifferent to the calls of the international community, as expressed in dozens of UN resolutions, to maintain the occupation and the artificial division of the island. Thus, it has not shown until now that an absolute political will to really solve the problem. The official Cyprus government is firmly committed to finding a viable solution through negotiation based on the UN resolutions. This solution would safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, ensure the withdrawal of Turkish troops and colonists, secure the human rights and basic freedoms of all Cypriots, safeguard the future of the Cypriot people as a whole in conditions of peace, prosperity and progress, in a united, federal and probably demilitarized state within the European Union.

B. SECURITY PROBLEMS AND RECENT EVENTS

Events in Cyprus over the last couple of years have sharply reminded the international community of the interdependence of the island's problems and the wider Greco-Turkish conflict. The relatively low number of killings in Cyprus since 1974, due largely to the presence of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the impermeability of the UN-controlled buffer zone, has given world public opinion the impression that Cyprus is an outrunning conflict, characterized by the perpetual search for a compromise solution – one that must accommodate the diverse range of strategic wishes generated at the local, regional and international levels.

In October 1993, Greece declared Cyprus - after almost 20 years of stagnation of the problem- as an integral part of Greece's sphere of defense, and the two governments worked together to conclude a defense agreement with the title "Greek- Greek Cypriot joint defense doctrine." Since then a growing involvement of Greek and Turkish military personnel and hardware in Cyprus' military affairs has been apparent. Greek warplanes participated in the exercise of the Cypriot National Guard in "Nikiforos 97" and, for the first time ever, Turkish military aircraft were reported to have tangled with Greek military aircraft within Nicosia's FIR. During the annual military exercise in the north of Cyprus- "Toros 97" (involving the Turkish armed forces and the Turkish security forces)- Turkish military aircraft attacked mock strategic targets and Turkish Special Forces made airborne and amphibious landings on Cyprus for first time since 1974.¹²

¹² Bruce, J., "Heightened Tensions Over Cyprus," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, "V.8, No. 7, .306-308, July 1996.

By summer 1996, there had been serious indications that the petrified impasse in Cyprus issue was interrupting. There were three main changes: First, the European perspective. The application of the Republic of Cyprus for full accession to the EU had the effect of reviewing the whole Cyprus issue on the international agenda. Second, the end of the Cold War, and the events in former Yugoslavia, had the effect of deepening the contradictions between Greece and Turkey. The two countries were less tied with the alliance discipline and with opponent political stances against issues like Bosnian war, Albania or FYROM. The old dispute over Aegean Sea control was rejuvenated by a Turkish challenge to Greek sovereignty against the Imia islets. War was escaped only in the last minute, and a new arms race began, which is going until the present days. And third, the internal status quo met a watershed with the worst period of intercommunal killings for 22 years concentrated in the increasingly and dangerously under-resourced buffer zone.¹³

A Berlin motorcycle rally, in August 1996 of this year, was an innocuous starting point for what became a violent chain of events. Protesting over the impermeability of Cyprus' border relative to those of Europe, the motorcyclists' final section of their transnational ride was to concentrate on the UN buffer zone in southern Nicosia. Despite the effort of the Greek Cypriot Government to call off the event, protestors proceeded to make incursions. Over 40 Greek Cypriots demonstrators and 19 UNFICYP soldiers were wounded in clashes, and at Dherinia Turkish Cypriot police and counter-protestors beat a Greek Cypriot to death. Three days later, another Greek Cypriot was fatally shot while

¹³ Kyle p.30, and Streissguth, T., *Divided Island*, pp.84-90, Cerner Press, 1998.

trying to lower a Turkish flag in the buffer zone. The killing of four Greek Cypriots in the buffer zone during this year not only refocused attention on the role of Turkish troops on the island, but also brought into question the Greek Cypriots' patience for a peace solution. Following these events, the UN, the UK and the USA reintroduced a proposal for the smoothening of the explosive situation.¹⁴

Arms imports had constituted a destabilizing factor in Cyprus' intercommunal clashes even before 1974, but they appear to have been overshadowed by a more recent surge in activity. The decision also by the Greek Cypriot Government in January 1997 to buy Russian S-300 P surface-to-air missile system for the defense of the island raised new stakes with Turkey and ultimately exposed the fragility of the de facto peace.¹⁵ Arguably following US pressure, the official Cyprus government initially made assurances that no part of S-300 systems would be deployed for another 16 months. The continual postponements of the matter had a final ending, the transfer of these systems to Greece and deployment on Crete in September 1999. Greek Cypriot side also supported that these developments were connected with his proposal about the demilitarization of the island, a fact that had met a continued rejection by the Turkish Cypriot side. Although the S-300 purchase has clear implications for the Turkish Air Force, the Greek Cypriots would still expect a 48-hour wait for Greek troops to reach the island – in contrast to a

¹⁴ Special Report No 17, "Instability in the Eastern Mediterranean: A Cypriot Crisis in the Making, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, pp10-16, 1998.

¹⁵ In the last few years Nicosia has become one of the highest defense spenders in the Middle East, trailing only Kuwait and Israel on a per capita basis. Bruce, J., pp.306-308 and Dorsey, M. J., "Mounting Communal Tensions Increase Need for Cyprus Settlement," *Washington Report On Middle East Affairs*, V.15, No. 7, p.29&91, March 1997.

theoretical six-minute flight time from the Turkish mainland. Sea transport remains a feasible alternative, with the Turkish mainland only 40 miles away and open ports available at Kyrenia and Ammohostos. At the same time the Turkish Army keeps a six-to-one superiority in tanks stationed on the island. This system is mainly defensive but Turkey claims that the S-300s can be converted to surface-to-surface weapons and proclaims an intention to hit them. Its concern over such a deployment has been visible ever since, demonstrated by the largest capabilities ever obtained by the Greek Cypriot side. Clearly the missile purchase gave a new strengthening to the TRNC-Turkish alliance. Turkish Cypriot side and the Turkish government signed a joint defense concept soon after it was announced, with the claim that any attack on the TRNC would be regarded as one launched on Turkey.¹⁶ Turkey's bellicose threats have met with repeated diplomatic answers from the Greek side. Athens always reaffirms that any attack on Cyprus would set into motion the joint defense doctrine between Greece and Cyprus and constitute a "casus belli". The motive of this doctrine is to stop the international community from being indifferent about the Cyprus issue. Athens declared that the missile purchase was a purely defensive measure while Turkey repeatedly the matter as a bargaining advantage.¹⁷

¹⁶ Taylor, J.W., and Barrett, M., "Ominous Threats to Peace on Cyprus," *Washington Times*, 25 June 1998, and Europe issues, "Greek-Cypriots to Boost Defenses Despite Threat," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, V. 28, No 14, p.18, 8 October 1997

¹⁷ Truesdell, A., "Nicosia Raises the Stakes on Cyprus," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, V. 9, No.4, p.168-169, April 1997.

C. METHODOLOGY

The thesis is divided in three main parts. The first part of the thesis includes a brief historical overview of Cyprus regional conflict until the present time, with the purpose of defining the domestic aspects, the international effects and the presentation of implicated parties to the island's problem. Then, a review of the literature on mediation, which is then used as the basis for the theoretical analysis of the disputants' views and the significance of these positions for the process of the international mediation of Cyprus problem. The second part will investigate the particular aspects of the conflict and will signify its interaction to the international politics. Six variables; analytical contexts are defined to guide the study of the subject. They are the following: (1) identification of the conflict. Interests of the parties; (2) the influence of Greece and Turkey; (3) The influence of superpower politics; (4) the role of the NATO; (5) the United Nations with its two contributions, peacemaking operation in Cyprus and the continual efforts for the resolution of the conflict; and (6) the European Union and its posture to the conflict. The third part will be an analysis of the events that surround and explain the Cyprus regional conflict, justify the weakness of international mediation, the requirements of an effective conflict management, the efforts of main third-party-mediators until now (UN, USA and EU), and in the end the obstacles to a settlement of the problem. The assumptions of this procedure will guide the thesis to a proposal of conflict resolution with flexibility, which could give a permanent solution to the problem of the island.

The study will prove the value of a successful international mediation. The perspective that the healthy mediation and peace building process would greatly facilitate

the solution of the Cyprus issue. The success of this process is dependent with the prior clear and objective identification of disputants' views. Additionally, the Cyprus issue can greatly benefit the qualities, techniques and capabilities of a third party intervention, with resources in his disposition. However, the analysis, with the respect to the official negotiating positions of the disputants parties, must also refer that the anticipation of the mediation's obstacles and the peacekeeping operation to the island at the present time is exceptional difficult, as well as the desirable solution.

D. UTILITY

The Cyprus problem has been on the international agenda for many years and most prominently since Turkey's 1974 invasion.¹⁸ The island, especially after his independence, is a place of friction and violence caused by the conflicting interests and intentions of the two local communities and the three guarantee forces as well NATO allies- Greece, Turkey and Britain. The strategic location of the island, have also provoked the intervention of superpower forces, USA and the former Soviet Union. In the

¹⁸Turkey violated, especially and more clearly with the 2nd act (13-14 August) the article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee (London-Zurich agreements). This article did not authorize "force" when it authorizes "action." There is no mention of the word "force" in the Treaty. Then, Cyprus as a member of the UN since 1960 follow the Charter of the UN. Thus, all provisions of the Zurich-London agreements in conflict with or inconsistent with the Charter became null and void pursuant to article 103. This article states: "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the UN under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under present charter shall prevail." If an interpretation of article IV of the Treaty of guarantee could be made to justify the use of force the all or part of article IV used to justify force is in conflict and inconsistent with the article 103 of UN Charter. In the end there is violation of article 2(4) of the same Charter, which states' shall refrain... from the treat or use of force. Article 51 authorizes the use of force for purposes of self-defense only. But, Turkey avail she of article 51 since the country was not attacked nor was she threatened with attack. Rossides, T.E., "Cyprus and the Rule of Law," *Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce*, V. 17, No 1, spring 1991.

end, the Cyprus regional conflict is always a threat to international peace and security, and for this reason the involvement of UN and EU was and is inevitable.

Not content with occupation of part of the island, Turkey has during the last decade of the past century embarked upon new campaign of treats against the part of Cyprus, which remains free. The new Turkish threats were the following: eventual official annexation of the occupied territories as a Turkish province, colonization of Varosha, and intentions of further build-up of the island. Trying to anticipate somewhat the overwhelming military imbalance, the official Cyprus government has undertaken an effort to upgrade its defence capabilities with the acquisition of modern armaments. But Turkey considers that Greek Cypriots should not be allowed to buy weapons in order to defend themselves against a new attack. At the same time, Turkey still remains an occupation army well equipped on a 100% level of readiness on the island. From the other side, war designs from either Greece or Cyprus against Turkey are unreal. Nobody can seriously argue that one of the two states intend to undertake an invasion of Turkey.¹⁹

Years of negotiation and international initiatives have foundered on the barrier of Turkish party's intransigence. Its stance facilitated by the fact that the country possesses high geopolitical significance in the Middle East region. Thus, Turkey continues to maintain political advantages and occupies a serious part of the island. The international community remains unwilling to apply in a consistent manner the pressure that is necessary in order to enforce UN Security Resolutions. So Turkey and Turkish Cypriot

¹⁹ As Hitchens illustrates: " Cyprus remains as the symbol of unresolved Greek and Turkish conflict. It symbolizes, for the Greeks, what a former Greek Prime minister has called the 'the shrinkage of Hellenism'- the pushing of Greeks and Greek life out of Asia Minor and Constantinople that took place in living memory." Hitchens, p.156.

leadership have repeatedly refused to negotiate seriously, either refusing talks on one pretext or another, or setting impossible preconditions in order to guarantee the failure of the talks.

The successful conflict management, through the peacefully way of international mediation, will secure the security and peace to this island. A new failure would set a very dangerous precedent for the security of all small states in the world and a confirmation of UN validity. In contrary, a just and viable solution of the problems caused by the 1974 invasion would lead to a substantial improvement in relations between Greece and Turkey. An optimistic option is that the decision-makers of the two countries would promote further bilateral issues. A timely and viable resolution of the Cyprus problem is a strategic imperative for the NATO. The eastern Mediterranean is located at the centre of a volatile regional triangle comprising South-eastern Europe, the Middle East and the Caucasus. Given that stability in this sensitive region is impossible without a viable Cyprus solution that satisfies NATO's strategic interests. It will also facilitate the further strengthening of Turkey's relations with the EU, the European integration, NATO expansion and the issue of peace in the Balkan area.

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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.

A. THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

The international mediation is indicative of an attempt of understanding and approach to the multinational relationship between third parties, the disputants' parties and the conflict environment. One point of clarity emerges from the literature on peace making is that the mediation and negotiation are well-used diplomatic tools that are occasionally effective and are relied upon because, although imperfect, they are the best we have at our disposal.²⁰ Mediation is an extension or elaboration of the negotiation process that involves the intervention of an acceptable third party who has limited or no authoritative decision-making power, but in any occasion the mediator is acceptable to both sides. It is in other words the continuation of negotiation by other means.²¹ Thus, the mediation consists a traditional form for the anticipating of conflicts, not so easy to apply with certain methods or procedures in every case because of the complicated variables.

²⁰ Richmond, P.O, *Mediating in Cyprus*, p.4, Frank Cass, 1998. Other definitions of mediation. A voluntary process in which those involved in a dispute jointly explores and reconciles their differences. The mediator has no authority to impose a settlement. His or her strength lies in the ability to assist the disputants in resolving their own differences. The mediated dispute is settled when the disputants themselves reach what they consider a workable solution (Cormich, "The Theory and Practice of environmental Mediation," 1980). A third party assistance to people who are trying to reach agreement in a controversy. There are hundreds of things a mediator can do to help, ranging from simply being present at a joint discussion to thinking up new ideas and arguing for them vigorously (Kressel and Pruitt, "Mediation Research: The Process and Effectiveness of Third-Party intervention," 1987).

²¹ Moore, C., *The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict*, p.8, Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco, 1996.

During mediation, there are two separate phases. First phase covers the investigation and understanding of the conflict issue, and second one deals with the production of a compromise settlement.

A gifted and expedient mediator ought to bring the disputants together, to control the process of communication, to offer incentives and guarantees during the mediation process and in the end to act as a medium for face-saving. Richmond points out that the desired compromise is dependent upon the qualities and resources of the mediator and the nature of the dispute environment. The effective result will greatly facilitate with one of the two possibilities: one is the existing will or need of disputants' parties for agreement and the other is the mediator's ability to act in a directive fashion. Success is often taken as a compromise, and in the long run mediator's resources must reinforce the agreement.²² An expedient mediator must also have the capability to offer a reward or exert pressure on disputants to participate in the process and to bring them to a settlement that avoid the recreation of the conflict in a short time. The success also may be product of the exhaustion of the disputants bargaining positions and a painful impasse, or a prevention of a further conflict from breaking out without the alteration of the status quo at the certain time.²³

Kaufman and Duncan advance that mediators alter disputants' perceptions of key elements of their decision processes. Manipulation of the information and negotiation processes has the effect of altering the following four elements: (1) the set of alternative

²²Richmond, P.O., p.31.

actions perceived by each disputant to be individually available to themselves and to the others; (2) the set of consequences as perceived by each disputant; (3) the individual perceptions of the chance of events that may affect the conflict, including the chance attached to choices of the opponents; and (4) the preferences over consequences like costs or gains, including the value disputants place on each other's gains or losses.²⁴ It is evident that mediation is vital in a modern world where violence is no longer an accepted means of diplomacy. The entrance of the new century was accompanied with a record of mediation operations all around the world. It is the era not of peace but of peace making and the techniques of mediation receive a great significance to states, communities, institutions or even the individuals. So, Mitchell emphasizes that the third party-mediation is involved in a direct or procedural effort to find a solution to a conflict along the lines of a compromise in which concessions are exchanged according to the needs and relative resources of each disputant.²⁵ This is particularly illustrated in the Cyprus issue where the concessions as a required element for the success of mediation is usually absent from the diplomatic game. The UN mediation does not always operate as a technical form of mediation, but the objective is the same and in a lot of occasions is the only one that can accomplish the mission of organizing an impartial negotiation process. Debates also about the intentions or advantages of mediation consist of the qualities and assets of the

²³ Hopmann, P. T., *The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts*, pp. 99-101, University of South Carolina Press, 1996.

²⁴ Kaufman, S., and Duncan, T.G., "A Formal Framework for Mediator Mechanisms and Motivations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, V.36, no 4, pp688-691, December 1992.

²⁵ Mitchell, C., *The Structure of International Conflict*, p. 287, Macmillan: London, 1981.

third party, the conflict ripeness, and the level of conflict's intensity and in the end to the nature of the issues in the conflict.²⁶

Other arguments about the mediation endorse the element of cooperation between the disputants, in that the process must raise the levels of mutual dependence to such an extent that escalation of the conflict becomes a poor option for both sides.²⁷ Young believes that the mediation does not involve force and is intended to favor one party above another but aims to improve communication between the opposing sides, endeavoring to change their images of each other, leading to conciliation through the disputants' realization of their common and overlapping interests.²⁸ But, on the other hand, the mediators may often suggest compromises and may negotiate and bargain in an attempt to induce the opposing sides to change their stand.²⁹ The above elements introduce clearly the mediator's obligation to open new channels of communication, to guide the disputants' parties to the understanding that their beliefs may be flawed and they must give up their intransigent attitudes. It will provide an external insight into a complex situation that the sides engaged in the conflict cannot objectively approach. The mediation process includes the reorganization of the balance of power in a manner that is

²⁶Kleibor, M, "Understanding the Success and Failure of International Mediation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, V. 40, No.2, p.362, 362.

²⁷ Kriesberg, I., *International Conflict Resolution*, p.2, Yale University Press, 1982.

²⁸Young, O.K., *The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises*, p.35, Princeton University press, 1967.

²⁹Trouval, S and Zartman, I.W, *International Mediation in Theory and Practice*, p.7, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982.

acceptable to both sides, so creating stability in their relationship, peace and security in the conflict environment. It is based on the trading of concessions, assumptions of rationality and satisfaction of interests. While a change in the perception of the conflict as zero-sum would be the optimum outcome, it is more likely that the two sides will be increasingly motivated by the need to alter the balance of power in their own favor, in the process changing the stakes into items that can be used to benefit both parties.³⁰

The main intention of each side in the negotiation game is the maximization of advantages but from the other side a certain degree of confidential and truthful conditions are vital and at least a minimum level of trust must be created.³¹ There are two basic methods for negotiating teams to overcome agreements: the first is step-by-step, building agreements through mutual compromise and concessions. The second is to establish a formula governing the main disputed issues and then work out and elucidate the details. But first of all the negotiator must follow a "symmetrical process" in the sense that every tactic is theoretically open to both sides, depending on their respective power relationships.³² The negotiator must be able to anticipate the opposition, control the procedure and use his experience. If the success is dependent on the building of trust, he must improve a good working relationship and understanding between the two sides, otherwise he will not exercise control to the conflict environment.

³⁰ Zartman, I.W., and Berman, R. D., *The Practical Negotiator*, p.130, Yale Univ. Press, 1982.

³¹ The two Cypriot communities are characterized by the lack of trust and a continuing enlarging gap between their official political positions

³² Richmond, P.O., p.9. In the Cyprus case it is difficult to identify asymmetry without analyzing the influence of internal and external parties in the conflict, including UN.

Fisher and Ury, with the experience of a lot of international negotiation efforts, suggest the method of “Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In: Getting to Yes” in order to facilitate the future efforts: (1) separate the people from the problem; (2) focus on interests, not positions; (3) invent options for mutual gain and (4) insist on using objective criteria.³³ Clearly no negotiating method can guarantee success and one of the realities of negotiations is that one party may have a far stronger bargaining position than the other. At time the weaker party may be tempted to accept a deal simply to put an end to the matter. A negotiating party’s ‘bottom line’ is a way of deciding in advance what is the worst acceptable outcome to them. However bottom lines can be rigid and not sufficiently flexible to take account of information learned in the negotiations or possible creative outcomes. Moreover bottom lines can be somewhat arbitrary, and they might prevent a negotiating party from agreeing to a solution which it would be wise to accept because they could not do better elsewhere. People negotiate to produce something better than the results they could obtain without negotiating- that something is the ‘Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA)’. A BATNA affords the advantage that is more flexible than a bottom line and can be changed in the light of new information. A BATNA is the standard against which a proposed settlement should be measured. It can also be improved that increases the party’s bargaining position. It is also important to consider the other party’s BATNA since there is no negotiated agreement with the occasion that both parties have attractive BATNAs.

³³ Fisher, R., Ury, W., and Patton, B., *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving in*, pp 14-200, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991. It will be analysis of this method to the Cyprus regional conflict on chapter V.

The above elements introduce to the assumption that continual effort of negotiation or better mediation process is to avoid in any way to reach in a stalemate. At the same time he must assure the symmetry of the procedure and to retain his impartial role. The origin of stalemate by Richardson is: "neither side having sufficient resources to overcome the other without incurring unacceptable losses. As a stronger party would tend to view the mediator as a stumbling block to victory, then stalemate appears to be a necessary precondition for mediation to begin."³⁴ This stalemate may provide the mediator with opportunity to find a settlement, but also there is the option that it may postpone an open conflict. However, the existing of a stalemate for a long time will guide the conflicting parties to an effort to change the balance of power with military or political means and the conflict will receive new dimensions.³⁵ The example also of the Cyprus problem introduce the international politics with the case of a perpetuating stalemate that can exist without equality between the disputants and with an enlarging difficulty of finding a settlement. The efforts of international mediation until now did not succeed to a solution that confines the objectives and resources of conflicting parties.

B. ETHNIC CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Ethnic conflict includes disputes over the sovereignty and the rights of ethnic minorities and communities. It is created by the existence of discriminatory political

³⁴ Richmond, P.O., p. 19.

³⁵ As examples we refer the acquisition of modern armaments and the improvement of diplomatic activities to the international communities. Cyprus is the most militarized region of the world. The acquisition also of Cyprus National Guard with new weapons, in 1996, created new tensions to the Cyprus problem.

institutions, exclusionary national ideologies, inter-group politics, or elite politics.³⁶ Generally, conflict is a process in which one group perceives that its interests are being opposed or negatively affected by another party. Everything from partition to redistribution of power to the groups has been proposed to resolve the conflict. It is fact that the international system works uncomfortable, since the required diplomatic compromise and all the attempts to resolve an ethnic conflict improve in a inter-state level with the sensitivity by the disputants parties that is an illegal intervention to matters that have to do with the domestic jurisdiction and sovereignty of the state. Thus, the reconciliation between the ethnic disputant actors and the international system is necessary through the way of international mediation.

For present purposes, the important point is the assumption that the conflict is motivated by rational calculations of gain. From the other point, it is relative that no benefit is considered a gain unless it comes at the expense of an opponent group. It is also argued that one or another factor is the key element in ethnic conflict, like a common historical past, religion or language and that its absence is what pulls them apart. Thus, to categorize, to synthesize, and to discriminate the various kinds of conflicts we must collect the required data, to definite clear criteria and to ask prudential judgment. The ethnic groups that emerge, as participants in ethnic conflict is really difficult to define their own boundaries, which may or not may not match those of outside observers or mediators. Mutual exclusive demands create continual political debates and very often the

³⁶ Brown, E.M refers to the four causes of internal conflict in Brown, E.M, Cote, O, Lynne-Jones, S and Miller, S., "Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict" Cambridge, MIT Press, 1977.

violence is inevitable. The presence also of foreign forces to a state complicate more the existing problem.³⁷

A critical assumption is that efforts to ameliorate ethnic conflict must be preceded by an understanding of the sources and patterns of the conflict. In this effort, it is useful to note that there is a mix of attributes that denotes group's identity. However, it is not the attribute that makes the group, but the group's differences that make the attribute important. In Cyprus case, the identification of is usually more closely with the presumed origins of the group and the ethnic element and hence is felt to be more fundamental to group identity. Pneuman and Bruehl identify the four main different sources of conflict: cultural, educational, experience and in the end differences in values and beliefs.³⁸ In brief, conflict resolution workshops are packages of procedures intended to influence both cognitive (understanding) and affective (sentiment) factors. Because there are so many elements it is difficult to know what is responsible for observed effects, either short- or long term. For example while learning about the other side's values, may be a subject of later negotiations. Negotiating success may be a result of the understanding achieved or due to the separation and, to some extent, isolation of underlying values. This

³⁷ It is apparent to the Cyprus case since there are British, Greek and Turkish military forces on the island, according to the London-Zurich agreements.

³⁸ Pneuman, W. R., and Bruehl, E. M., *Managing Conflict*, p.36, Prentice-Hall Press, 1982. All these sources are present in the Cyprus regional conflict.

comes along with the order of Fisher and Ury and Patton's method: "focus on interests, not positions" that facilitates the conflict management.³⁹

Saaty and Alexander propose a method with the following preliminary steps that a mediator could establish in order to understand the nature of a particular conflict: (1) Identification of the conflict; (2) identification of the objectives, needs, and desires of each of the parties; (3) identification of possible outcomes of the conflict of possible solutions; (4) assumptions about the way in which each party views its objectives and, in particular, its view of the relative importance of these objectives; and (5) assumptions about the way in which each party view the outcomes and the way in which a given outcome might meet the objectives. They support also that there is no single formula for universal application. Much is left to intuition and the experience. In general the mediator must not expect the disputants to give a full and fair picture of the situation. Their interests enforce them to emphasize their own concerns and views. Thus the necessity of the third party will examine with the question of how it can takes in account the interests and grievances of both parties.⁴⁰

There have been improved a lot of theories about the conflict resolution of ethnic conflicts. The thesis believes that Nordlinger and Lijphart and Mitchell De-escalation model could have an ideal application to the Cyprus issue. First, Nordlinger enumerate the "Six successful conflict regulating practices": (1) stable coalition; (2) proportionality;

³⁹ Druckman, D., Benjamin, J.B., and Kopper, H. S., "Value differences and Conflict Resolution," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, V.32, No3, 426-430, September 1988.

⁴⁰ Saaty, L. T., and Alexander, M. J., *Conflict Resolution*, p.11, Praeger Press, 1992.

(3) mutual veto; (4) an agreement to keep government out of the most contentious issues, "depoliticization;" (5) compromise, either on particular issues or on a package of issues; and (6) concessions, which differ from compromise in that they are not reciprocated.⁴¹ Second, Lijphart, with his belief to the strength of democracy proposes: (1) grand coalition of all ethnic groups; (2) mutual veto in decision-making; (3) ethnic proportionality in the allocation of certain opportunities and offices; and (4) ethnic autonomy, often expressed in federalism.⁴² Additionally, the major determinant of the effectiveness of measures to reduce ethnic conflict is the content of measures adopted. But before examining the results of these policies two other matters warrant consideration. First the motives of policy-makers and the proper decision-making process and second the timing of policy innovation for a comprehensive settlement that needs reciprocal concessions.⁴³

Mitchell defines the problem of escalation and de-escalation as a function of the life cycle of a conflict. In protracted regional conflicts, like the Cyprus issue, and he remarks: "protracted conflicts can pass through a wide variety of stages in their 'life-cycle.' Moreover, this progression may not be linear, in the sense that some conflicts circle back to earlier stages and might pass through both malign and benign cycles of

⁴¹ Nordlinger, E., *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies*, p.21, Univ. Press of America, 1982.

⁴² Lijphart, A., *Democracy in Plural Societies*, p.35, Yale Univ. Press, 1977.

⁴³ Williams, P., "Crisis Management," p.71, John Wiley & Sons, 1982.

interaction several times” (See Figure1).⁴⁴Basic trial of a serious mediation effort for the Cyprus problem will be the building of trust of the two Cypriot communities with the organization of a proper pre-negotiation process. It is the only way that may guide to reciprocal concessions and withdrawal of the impasse.




Figure1: Dynamic Protraction Model of Conflict, Mitchell.

The success of this model applies mostly to the “negotiating flexibility” that the mediator must have. It is indicated by a willingness to move from initial positions, and by an observed shift from rather rigid and tough bargaining postures toward an agreement. The effects of a number of situational variables on decisions to be flexible or inflexible were explored in different international occasions. So, Druckman improves four negotiating-stages, each consisting of a particular combination of variables, different for each case. The analysis of these variables revealed trajectories of factors leading to

⁴⁴ Mitchell, R. C., “Problem –Solving Exercises and theories of Conflict Resolution,” in *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*, edited by Sandole, J.D., and Merwe, H., p.87, New York: Manchester University Press, 1994.

agreement or to a stalemate for a certain conflict. Both Mitchell and Druckman emphasize the value of a successful prenegotiation stage.⁴⁵

Stages	Variables	References
A. Prenegotiation planning	a. Positions linked or not to political ideologies. b. Representing your government as either the primary representative. c. Planning as either strategizing or studying the issues. d. Familiarity with opponents. e. Amiable or antagonistic relations among parties.	Druckman & Zechmeister 1973, Bass 1966, Hammond et al. 1966, Druckman and Broome 1991, Hopmann and Walcott 1973.
B. Setting the stage	a. Location of talks at either a central or peripheral location. b. Format of meetings as formal or informal. c. Seeking either comprehensive or partial agreements. d. One party has a power advantage or a power disadvantage. e. The b, d, and e variables of A stage are also repeated in this stage.	Galtung 1964, Fisher 1964, Hopmann 1986, King 1979.
C. The give and take	a. The existence or no coordination points. b. Other parties make many or few concessions. c. Conference leadership is innovative or not. d. Media coverage is light or heavy. e. The variable d of B stage is repeated in this stage.	Shelling 1960, Benton and Druckman 1973, Siegel and Fouraker 1960, Bartos 1974, Brown 1977.
D. The endgame	a. A deadline either exists or does not exist. b. There is or is not an attractive alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA). c. A solution is suggested by a mediator or by the other parties. d. The variables a and d of C stage are repeated in this stage.	Pruitt and Drews 1969, Bass 1966, Druckman and al. 1991, Fisher and Ury 1981, Thibaut 1968, Pruitt 1981.

Table1: The package of the scenarios and questions constructed for each of the Four stages, Druckman.

⁴⁵ Druckman, D., "The Situational Levers of Negotiating Flexibility," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, V.37, No2, pp. 236-276, June 1993.

C. DIFFICULTIES OF INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Two are the serious factors that have to do with the application of the international mediation to the international politics. The first refers to the nature and legitimacy of mediation, and the second to the context provided by the international system. The international system lends wings to the factor of ethnicity according to its state-centric structure or the existing threat for “the balance of power.”⁴⁶ There is need for a detailed examination of the immense amount of information and variables since all the past efforts, mainly by international organizations such as UN, has rarely been successful unless the disputants themselves have shown a clear and unequivocal commitment to the process. The successful third party mediation was the result of flexing military, political or financial muscles on the part of the mediator who had great resources in his disposition.⁴⁷ Berridge supports that a settlement of this kind is a result of two basic preconditions: “ripe moments” and “hurting stalemates.”⁴⁸ In other words, the disputants will arrive to a settlement or a compromise because they have exhausted all zero-sum options or they are satisfied by the third party proposition, which assure great benefits or rewards for their future. Except in rare cases where there is strong interest by foreign forces to inject capital into a regional conflict to persuade or enforce the disputants to

⁴⁶ Martin Wight distinguishes different meanings of the term. Some of them: (1) the existing distribution of power; and (2) the principle of equal aggrandizements of the great powers at the expense of the weak. It is from “International Relations,” Penguin Reference, 1997, p.41.

⁴⁷ See the example of Camp David agreement between Egypt and Israel. It have been focused on the mutual respective relations of disputants, and gains from, as well as a strong third party mediator, the USA.

⁴⁸ Berridge, R., *Diplomacy and Practice*, p.22, Hemel Press, 1995.

arrive to a settlement, focusing on preserving the certain status quo for its own purpose, the alternative and more common arrangement, it could be of the sort illustrated by the Cyprus case, in which the conflict is contained indefinitely, but the international community will not invest enough resources and there is not the existing and richly in resources third party mediator with individual interests to bring the two parties to a final solution.

The end of the Cold War enforce the international community to evaluate its system in the light of violent, latent ethnic disputes, the shifts towards regionalism and the inability of the system to satisfy both the interests of the states and the interests of ethnic groups. The changes have produced by the fact that states are unwilling to relinquish their dominant rights and a reaction by ethnic groups- minorities, which find themselves trapped in states and desire to vindicate new political, social and economic rights. New threats aroused to the post-WW II international states system, based to the power of the permanent Security Council members and the supporting of the basic principles of sovereignty, non-intervention, and the inflexible territorial control of states. To this era, the international mediation has tended to result mainly in fragile non-permanent compromises and always in acceptance by the interests and resources of great powers that expressed their intentions in regional and systemic stability. The post Cold War conflict management concentrated in a UN's wide utilization peacekeeping operations to stabilize regional conflicts and experimental efforts of peace-enforcement in order to rebuild and sustain failed states. This procured the lack of credibility to the

mediation process, in particular, in regions where the international community does not have sufficient interests at stake to intervene.⁴⁹

A serious assumption is that system is happy to isolate and stabilize, but have abandoned attempts to bring a harmony or solution to regional intractable conflicts. This term refers more to the failure of its efforts to make decisive progress. Intractable disputes have nonetheless been significantly advanced by third party mediation. This is because the international system is status quo oriented and the mediators finding themselves often able to do little since the disputants improve devious objectives and efforts of reaping benefits by the third party. Thus, the third party is content to sustain the status quo and ignore the existence of the disputants' devious objectives. But if during the time of procedure the devious objectives are identified, the third party must act immediately otherwise the negotiations will continue on a futile level and the conflict will not recede, like the since 1964 Cyprus case.⁵⁰

In more of the cases the international mediation has merely attempt to prevent a further deterioration of the states system and the associated regional and global situation. The mediation in ethnic disputes favors more representative power- sharing arrangements within states and avoid the creation of new states or even an alteration of the international system.⁵¹ In the case of Cyprus the international community retain an official state according to the treaties of the independence of the island. This framework justifies the

⁴⁹ Hopmann, P.T., pp.195-210.

⁵⁰ Richmond, R. O., p.61.

application of international law and norms. The intervention also in the form of mediation occurred very late, did not succeed to prevent the further violence, and after twenty-six years aim at producing a power-sharing arrangements within a new federal state in a future period. From the other side the reinforcement of Turkish Cypriot community by the Turkish intervention and interests and new security dilemmas- because of the different military capabilities of the disputants- enforced the Greek Cypriot side to move their position to a single state, but with two relatively autonomous administrations.⁵²

The new century entered with the problem of the spillover of ethnic internal conflicts into other states, with new threats for the peace and security of the international system and an indication of the declining legitimacy of the current form of the state. As Ryan emphasizes it is extremely difficult for the international community to apply objective judgment and to resolve conflicting claims of historical legitimacy, self-determination, economic viability and regional security.⁵³ There are a lot of arguments about this matter. Can it allow such states to split into new separate states or at least autonomous units within a state, or no? Kaufmann has argued that the only answer to ethnic conflict is the separation of failed states into separate defensive enclaves to prevent hardening of ethno-nationalist rhetoric because of atrocities, and the security dilemma a

⁵¹ The case of former Yugoslavia does not follow this principle for separate reasons. But the cases of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia or the Croats in Bosnia accept that that the concept of secession is far less opposed in the present international system.

⁵² Lund, M., *Preventing Violent Conflicts*, pp.3-27, United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996.

⁵³ Ryan, S., *Ethnic Conflict and International Relations*, p.38, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1990.

provided by the intermingling of populations.⁵⁴ But Touval argues that the international community should remain very reluctant to sacrifice the principle of territorial integrity to self-determination, and should avoid admitting unstable entities into statehood. He mentions also the danger of a territorial reform to turn an ethnic conflict into an international one, and therefore that a simpler option is greater observance of group and minority rights.⁵⁵ The mediators to these situations have immense problems since each party can invoke separate international principles to support its positions. In a ethnic conflict the best the mediator can achieve is to bring the disputants to an agreement amongst themselves about any modification of the sovereignty or the lessening of demands for ethnic self-determination, assuming that it can establish a credible position while trying to maintain a cease-fire status quo with the dismissal of the third and more harder alternative of mediation result, the war-drawn situation (the other two alternatives are reconciliation and separation).

D. THE UN AS A MEDIATOR OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS

The Charter authorizes the UN to function in a mediator capacity in order to undertake to bring conflict situations that fall beyond the domestic jurisdiction of a state to a settlement.⁵⁶ The disputants in these cases perceive the role of UN as impartial with

⁵⁴ Chaim Kaufmann in Brown, M., Cote, O., Lynne-Jones, S., and Miller, s., "Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1977)" p. 266.

⁵⁵ Touval, S., *Gaining Entry to Mediation in Communal Strife* p.266, Rutledge, London, 1993. The contradiction between Kaufmann and Trouval positions creates the three different solutions- options of Cyprus problem: De facto partition, reintegration and maintaining of the status quo.

⁵⁶ Article 2(7), UN Charter. The UN has no authority to intervene in such cases, unless under circumstances covered in Chapter VII. Nor has a state any obligation to submit to UN involvement. The involvement is only in cases with danger to the international peace and security.

no interests at stake other than those outlined in the Charter. In the Cyprus case the weakness of the UN mediation lies on the nature of the conflict and in its lack of resources to enforce disputants towards agreement to a permanent solution. The organization, with the means that has in his disposition, asks moral pressure and organizes the communication process, on procedure and on the trust and the political will of the disputants. Therefore, it seems that the UN mediator have positive contribution when operates in coalition with one or several of the members of the Security Council. The superpower involvement assures for the organization a level of international consensus and provides the necessary means for the accomplishment of his mission. The latest with its ability to provide legitimacy, donates the organization with capabilities to identify grounds for conciliation and to minimize the required time for a settlement between the disputants.⁵⁷ Instead the USA as an independent mediator disposes the required resources for a dynamic settlement of the dispute and the history of Cyprus regional conflict can prove it.⁵⁸

⁵⁷Mediation and good offices consist instruments of conflict management for the UN. The organization for this reason must have flexibility and mutual respect with the disputants' parties. Article 3 of Chapter 2 of the UN Charter requires that all members of the organization to settle their disputes peacefully and without endangering international peace, security and justice. Article 33(1) of the Charter calls all members of the UN to settle their disputes through mediation. Article 33(2) gives to the Security Council the power to call on the parties to the dispute to use such means to settle the dispute. Chapter VI of the Charter gives to the Council the power for maintaining of the international peace through the ways of recommendation and search and Charter VII with the power to enforce its resolutions. The latest measures in conjunction with peacekeeping operations establish the organization as a perfect mediator in order to attempt to prevent or to resolve conflicts.

⁵⁸ See Johnson's appeals, 1963. Following the outbreak of violence in December 1963, the US President Lyndon Johnson appealed to the leaders of the two Cypriot communities to cease military attacks. A new US mediator effort in September 1967 saved a danger of a new Greek- Turkish confrontation for the island's issue.

General custom and practice has seen the Secretary-general's office playing the role of facilitator but this intervention critically depends upon the support of the permanent members of the Security Council. In the post Cold war system, the complex decision-making process within the Security Council means that building and then maintaining a consensus behind a particular mediatory stance may be difficult. The nature of the consensus in the most of the cases is extremely difficult. Roberts and Kingsbury have argued that the UN's contribution is viewed as "being less in the field of peace between the major powers, than with respect to defusing regional conflict, advocating self-determination, assisting desalinization, codifying international law, protecting human rights and providing a possible framework for social and economic improvement."⁵⁹

The UN needs two conditions for intervention of ethnic conflicts before become violent: first authority and second humanitarian and military resources on constant readiness. The options for action include the application of diplomatic pressure, humanitarian relief, observation and monitoring, good offices, economic sanctions. The aim is to restore order, end violence, relieve suffering, initiate negotiations that lead to agreements and settlements, apply international law and norms, promote human right and democratic government, punish oppressive regimes. The action must be also cohesive, determined, occur at the beginning of crises or when players are exhausted and they are persuaded to honor the conditions that the international system dictates.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Roberts, A., and Kingsbury, B., *United Nations: Divided World*, p.19, Oxford University Press, 1996.

⁶⁰ Stack, F.J., and Hebron, L., *The Ethnic Entanglement: Conflict and Intervention in World Politics*, pp26-30, Praeger Press, 1999.

III. THE DISPUTE'S PARTIES AND CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT

A. IDENTIFICATION OF THE CONFLICT

The post-colonial problem of Cyprus can be divided into two phases. The first phase covers the period from the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus until 1974. During this period the conflict was basically internal between the two Cypriot communities in which external powers became involved. The disputes had a bicommunal character of Cypriot society, inherent with in the state-building process. The political situation became different with the improvement of three different factors: (1) The external intervention,⁶¹ (2) the different ethno-political orientations of Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities and (3) the provisions of the 1960 settlement of the colonial problem under the London-Zurich settlement.⁶² Britain's refusal to the Greek-Cypriot demands for self-determination and union with Greece in 1954, provoke not only the five-year Greek-Cypriot uprising against colonial rule, but also the introduction of Turkey with Britain's aid as a party of equal standing in the Cyprus issue in the 1955 London Conference. The purpose of this British action was to blunt the Greek and Greek-Cypriot pressures. Briefly, as it was also referred to the first chapter of this thesis, a great

⁶¹ We talk about confrontation between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, the former colonial power that tried to protect its interests and the superpower involvement at the political level. The island was added on the list of peripheral points of Cold War friction. The Cyprus problem introduced to the regional, ideological, political and military considerations of external powers.

⁶³ The agreements consisted of a series of treaties, which laid the foundations of the political governance of the republic of Cyprus. These treaties were the treaty of establishment, the treaty of alliance, the treaty of guarantee, and the agreement on the basic structure of the Republic of Cyprus. With the establishment of these treaties the island became independent.

part of the provisions were not only awkward and unworkable, but also rigid and created greater differences between the two communities. The constitution prohibited from hid construction any amendment of its provisions. Thus, there was no possibility or the two communities to negotiate, to adjust their positions, and seek common ground to bridge their differences. For this reason it was characterized as “a constitutional oddity”⁶³ and “a constitutional straitjacket precluding that adaptation essential to the growth and survival of any body politic.”⁶⁴ A confrontation between the two communities was inevitable because of a state without experience in self-government, conflicting ethno political aims, mistrust, and insecurity sentiments between the two Cypriot communities.⁶⁵ The social activities of the two Cypriot communities were closely related to distinct religious beliefs and practices, ethnic holidays, and cultural traditions. Especially, the separate ethnic celebrations, with the use of the motherland’s national anthems and flags, reminded the members of the two communities of its different ethnic lines, roots and loyalties and that the Cypriot state did not fulfill their ethnic aspirations. These were reasons for the failing of building a working state, despite the great effort of the Greek Cypriot government side, since the other, Turkish Cypriot side, gained for the first time after the colonial era

⁶³ According to the report of Mediator Galo Plaza to the UN, 26 March 1965.

⁶⁴ Glend Camp, “Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus,” *Political Science Quarterly*, vol.95, p.49

⁶⁵ In the professional field and party organizations, the two communities were largely self-sufficient. They had separate political parties, professional organizations, and labor organizations with uni-ethnic membership. Ethnic contradictions also undermined the establishment of a university and a educational unity of the two communities. The textbooks and the programs of education imported from the two motherlands. The two communities had their own newspapers and publications that were mostly presenting biased ethnic views and conflicting positions. Publications imported from Greece and Turkey emphasizing the antagonism and created mutual bias and fears. Intermarriage was extremely rare, since it carried with social and religious stigma. In the end, there were language problems to the intercommunal communication. The public documents were printed in three languages: English, Greek and Turkish.

privileges and rights that they could not wish to miss. Thus, the Turkish Cypriot community imposed continually confrontational tactics and continual blame casting, with the covering of the constitution. All the rest, including violent fighting, gradual segregation, further complications and external involvement followed almost naturally. The sequence of events was neither pleasant nor justified. Concern over the impact of the Cyprus dispute on the cohesion of NATO's southeastern flank, and the possibility of a Greco-Turkish war over Cyprus, provoked the international initiatives on the part of the USA, NATO and UN in the decades of 1950s and 1960s

By 1974, the problem was entered in a new phase with the nature of the problem changing dramatically. Main characteristic is a state of stagnation, basically consisting of the clashing claims and concerns of the two local communities, Greece, Turkey, Britain and the two superpowers. The Turkish invasion added new elements to the problem without removing the old ones. The forced movement and exchange of population, which led to ethnic segregation, have been widening with the gap between the Cypriot communities and undermining efforts and prospects for reunification. The new dominant elements and parameters of the problem since 1974 are the de facto partition and the military occupation of the northern part of the island by Turkey. But the initial problem of establishing a viable state for all Cypriots has been further complicated by fourth parameter, which is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Turkish Cypriot leadership in 1983.⁶⁶ The UN and other international organizations had deplored this as

⁶⁶ The declaration of the independence of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" was made on 16 November 1983. On 13 Feb 1975 the Turkish Cypriots had unilaterally proclaimed the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus."

legally invalid, and no other country besides Turkey has recognized the statehood. The Turkish Cypriot community has been putting more priority on succession and the creation of a second state on the island rather than on the efforts to settle the problem on the basis of a single state with a bizonal and bicomunal federal state.⁶⁷ The official Turkish political position denies a settlement based on a unified federal Cyprus. Looking at the efforts of the Turkish side to secure recognition for a separate state in the northern part of the island, there is the impression that there is no minimum goal shared by the two sides. Despite the rhetoric declarations about a settlement that would reunite the island as a federal state clearly for political reasons, Turkish policy intends to divide the island along ethnic lines.⁶⁸

B. GREEK CYPRIOT PARTY

Greek Cypriots felt that the London–Zurich agreements deprived them of their rights and that they were unjustly imposed on the will of majority. By 1963, the Greek Cypriot continual demand is the revision of the Constitution's articles that could facilitate the functioning of the Cypriot state.⁶⁹ This was for this party the main objective of intercommunal talks of the period 1968-74. The official position was the establishment of

⁶⁷ The Resolution 541 of Security Council, on 18 Nov 1983, condemned the unilateral declaration as following: (1) deplores the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported succession of part of Cyprus; (2) considers the declaration referred to above as legally invalid and calls for the withdrawal; (3) calls upon all states to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of Cyprus; (4) calls upon all states not to recognize any Cypriot State other than the Republic of Cyprus.

⁶⁸ Kaloudis, G., p.5.

⁶⁹ Kyriakides. A., *Constitutionalism and Crises Government*, p.66, Pennsylvania Univ. Press, 1966.

a unitary, sovereign, and independent republic of Cyprus, with majority rule and minority rights, with a sufficient revision of the 1959 constitution, due to these above mentioned reasons. This Greek Cypriot political scene was radically changed by two serious historical events: the Greek-sponsored coup against the government of Cyprus and the following Turkish invasion, 1974. The question in the aftermath of 1974, was how to restructure Cyprus into a viable federal zone, and territorially into a bi-zonal system, especially after the 1975 population exchange, and the expulsion of nearly all Greek Cypriots from the occupied areas. Basic also party's intentions the unity and territorial integrity of the state, the protection of human rights of all the Cypriots, and the departure of all occupied military forces from the island. They express also their indignation for the presence of tens of thousands Turkish mainland settlers brought in Cyprus, after the 1974 invasion.⁷⁰

The official Cyprus government faced serious security dilemmas since 1974.⁷¹ The military threat from the north enforced the government to make some serious concessions without the reciprocal action from the Turkish Cypriot side since 1977.⁷² This was extremely painful according the difficult negotiating position of Greek-Cypriot

⁷⁰ The idea of federation as a solution appeared as a viable alternative. This had been rejected prior to 1974, not by the official Cyprus government, but from political personalities like Lord Radcliffe in 1956, the UN mediator Galo Plaza, as an unworkable solution for the island.

⁷¹ Boyne notes that Greek Cypriots are spending, on average, US \$2 million a day on armaments. There is no intention of attacking in the north. They want sophisticated weaponry so that they will be able to hold off the aggressors long enough to allow the international community to intervene in any occasion that they will accept attack from the north side of the island. Boyne, S., "Moves to Settle the Cypriot Problem," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, V.7, No 9, p.405, Sep 1995.

⁷² It is the four guidelines included in the communiqué issued of the meeting President Makarios and Turkish -Cypriot leader Raouf Denktash, on Feb 12 1977. It was formally accepted the principle of federation and the bi-zonal territorial character, but before the beginning of negotiations.

side in that period.⁷³ To the international forum the party had only verbal support as the victim's side that accepted violations of international law, justice and morality. In the political field there were two main intentions: the resettlement of the refugees, and a dynamic economic development. But the good economic results procured and serious negative consequences. It allowed some degree of rationalization of the consequences of the Turkish invasion by the international community. However, the refugees remain a major pressure group in the Cypriot political scene, motivated by their strong attachment to their land and properties. Thus, every Cypriot government since 1974 support that any viable solution must account the return of refugees to their homes and the three basic freedoms –human rights: free movement, the right of having property and the right of settlement for all the habitants of the island.⁷⁴

The Greek Cypriot leadership is still recognized as the legitimate government of the "Republic of Cyprus (1960)." Therefore, it has been enjoyed almost all of the foreign aid, especially from the EU, and it is representing the whole island on international platforms. The Greek Cypriot leadership wants to rule the island according to the fact that it possesses the majority of the island's population. For this reason, what the Greek Cypriot side support to the table of negotiations as the best solution is to have a "unitary state," to maintain its power of self-rule and sovereignty. But they know well according to the international situation that is very difficult to put the Turkish Cypriots in a minority

⁷³ We note: 40% of the Greek Cypriot population unrooted, about 5000 had died and about 1600 persons were still listed as missing.

⁷⁴ Koufoudakis Van: "Greek Cypriot politics and the Peacemaking Process," in Salem, Norma: "Cyprus a regional Conflict and its Resolution," Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Ottawa: St Martin's Press, 1989 p. 26.

status in a unitary state. So the current status remains the same. The recent concerns, such as the dynamic effort of entering the EU with some progress to the problem of the isle or the increasing number of North Cyprus' population due to the immigrants from Turkey, might have a driving force to the attitude of the Greek Cypriot leadership towards a negotiated solution, i.e., to negotiate with the Turkish Cypriot leadership for the establishment of a bi-communal federation, including strong central powers, certain territorial concessions from the north and the removal of Turkish troops from the island. However, for the time being the current status quo is the Greek Cypriot side's BATNA.

C. TURKISH CYPRIOT PARTY

The Turkish Cypriots are the heirs of the Ottoman bureaucracy and land-owning class since 1571, the year of conquest. A part of their power remained during the years of British colonial rule, since the governors continued to use them in administrative positions. Turkish Cypriots have a strong cultural, historical, and nationalistic attachment to Turkey.⁷⁵ Their reaction to the EOKA -the union of Greek Cypriot fighters for liberation of the island from the British colonial government- was the creation of the KTP- Turkish party of Cyprus- with held as ideology the partition of the island into different ethnic zones. In the period between 1960 until 1963 they participate to the bi-communal government of Republic of Cyprus. Their leader, the Vice-President Dr Kucuk, supported a partition ideology. The Turkish Cypriot part of government worked

⁷⁵ Turkish Cypriots are Sunni Muslims. The original Turkish Cypriot settlers were principally drawn from the Lala Mustafa Pasha's soldiers, thirty thousand of whom were given fiefs on the island by Sultan Selim II. Salih I H., *Cyprus: The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on a State*, p. 4, University of Alabama Press, 1978.

for the interests of its respective community. Thus, the two communities offered different solutions or policies for each concrete situation and the Republic broke down. Since 1963, this party excluded from the administrative force of the island and gathered in their regions in towns. This isolation brought them a certain political homogeneity. It has also serious economic consequences since they didn't participate to the economic development and the luxury of full-fledged statehood.

The majority of the Turkish Cypriot community has the experience of the intercommunal dispute of the first years of the Cyprus Republic, the division of the island into two different zones and the exchange of population, which followed the 1974 Turkish invasion. All these elements provided this party with a political space of their own and the first aim of the party's leadership has been the consolidation of the present situation, with the creation of a new state with political nationalist and the economical development. What counts for the Turkish Cypriots is the right to administer their own affairs, on their own piece of land under the effective guarantee of Turkey. These are the main principles of this party during the past and present intercommunal talks. It would not be wrong to suggest that the solution envisaged by this party is theoretically nearer to a confederation than a fully constituted federation, or in other words a bi-zonal state with political equality. It is also fact that the citizens of the unrecognized "TRNC" are getting worried about their political isolation from the outer world.⁷⁶ This situation makes it hard

⁷⁶ A report of Omestad for the U.S News magazine refers the following points about the difficult position of Turkish Cypriots in the present time: " Time is another foe working against reunification. Settlers from mainland Turkey have been arriving in numbers that now rival the native Turkish Cypriots. At the same time, Turkish Cypriots, unable to find work, are rapidly departing: more now reside in Britain than in Cyprus...Economic tensions play a role in perpetuating enmity. While international aid has poured into the booming south, the years of partition and sanctions have hammered the northern Cyprus economy.

for them to become economically self-sufficient and instead depending on Turkey. The fact that they ruled themselves for 30 years with serious economic capabilities may influence the negotiations in the future. In any way, just like the Greek Cypriot leadership, the current status quo is the Turkish Cypriot leadership's BATNA. As an assumption one can state that the two communities in the Cyprus conflict have been seeing the issue from the realist perspective. For them, all states want to maximize their gains and they act according to their own interests. The nature of the conflict is the interaction for power and scarce resources. In this perspective, the two sides always took inflexible and tough positions in the negotiations and mediations with the UN Secretary General.

D. GREEK PARTY.

The interest of Greece in Cyprus issue derives from the ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural ties linking the majority of the population of the island. The Greeks arrived in the B.C. years, settled, proliferated, and never departed. The Greek independence movement that united Greece as a liberal state would have concluded the island had it the necessary resources, especially military capability to achieve it. During the last century, Greece has suffered attack, occupation, civil war, and mixed democratic and authoritarian periods of government. Besides, he tried to liberate regions in Middle East, according to

Turkish Cypriots complain angrily about their isolation, saying it is driving them into the arms of Turkey and forcing friends and family to emigrate. The EU has barred Turkish Cypriots exports of citrus and other crops and levied prohibitive tariffs on the area's manufactured goods. To evade the sanctions, Turkish Cypriot businesses funnel Europe-Bound products through Turkey. Mail and phone connections also run through Turkey. The only foreign tourists who don't have to pass through Turkey are day-trippers staying in the south. Tourism remains the south's No.1 industry but lags in the north, despite fine beaches and Greco-Roman antiquities. Turkey has had to bankroll the north, covering half its annual budget. Omestad, T., "The Perils and Benefits of a Separated Cyprus," *U.S. News*, 15 December 1997.

its Byzantine historical heritage. After this adventure, it could be extremely dangerous to expand its sovereignty to an island hundred of miles to the east. The underestimation of eastern neighbor and his adventure in 1924 created fears for a repetition of a same mistake.⁷⁷ During the decade of the 1950s, Greece tried with political means to succeed the demand of the Greek Cypriots for a political union with the motherland. By the end of this decade the Greek government realized that the intention of a union was excessive and prejudicial for its foreign policy, within the NATO area. With the Britain's enforcement the government followed a deal with the Turkey, publicly forsaked the union- 'enosis'-, and instructed the leader of Greek-Cypriot majority to accept the limited achievement of independence for Cyprus without a political union with Greece.

The Greek governments of 1955-63 and from 1974 on until present time subordinated the accommodation to the wishes of the Greek-Cypriot leadership to avoidance of conflict with the eastern neighbor, though an aroused Greek public required Greece to sponsor anti-British resolutions before the UN S.C in the middle and the late 1950s, and to withdraw Greek forces from NATO's integrated military structure in 1974. The Greek military junta was to collapse soon after the 1974 failed coup d'etat in Cyprus, but a conference in Geneva involving the three guarantors –Britain, Greece and Turkey- broke down in August of the same year, signaling the resumption of the Turkish forces' offensive. Greece' complicity in these events is self-evident, yet Turkey's involvement has undoubtedly produced the greatest impact on the present structure of intercommunal relations on the island. Briefly, Greece has concluded Cyprus as an integral part of

⁷⁷ Bitsakis, E., "Nationalism and Compliance," *Ta Nea*, 21 Jan.2000.

country's sphere of defence and with the Greek Cypriot government there is a strong political and military cooperation. In the last years of past century there was a rapidly growing involvement of Greek and, for that matter, Turkish military personnel and hardware in Cyprus' military affairs with participation of the two countries in separate annual military exercises. Basically, Greece does not want a strong Turkish power in the island since most of the population of the island identify themselves as Greeks (the Greek Cypriots). This is an advantage in Greece's side, even though Cyprus is 600 miles away from mainland Greece- in comparison to its distance of 40 miles from Turkey.⁷⁸

Greece is fundamentally a status quo country in a part of the world where the status quo is being challenged from many directions. Worried about the instability on its northern frontier, it also perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity emanating from Turkey. However Greece has a strong interest in the economic development and political stability of Turkey and intends the improvement of good relations and cooperation in various activities. The continuing problem of Cyprus affects directly the two countries, the military build-up on both sides, and the repeated threats of war from Turkish generals and politicians are not "figments of the otherwise fertile imagination of the Greeks."⁷⁹

⁷⁸ A former prime Minister of Greece had observed that the relation of Turkey and Greece is like a triangle and the third corner of it is the USA. Greece a lot of times recognized the stabilizing role of USA for the region. One new factor about the tragedy of Cyprus have maybe added, especially after the editing of the memoirs of former Secretary of State Kinsinger at the time of the invasion, the Watergate. It provoked a temporary problem of governance in the USA. This fact was exploited with a lot of audacity by the Turkish side. Kaphis. P, "Our Gently Blindness," *Ta Nea*, 18 December 1999.

⁷⁹ Tsoukalis, L., "Greece Like Any Other European Country," *The National Interest*, No. 55, pp.65-74, Spring 1999. Greece is now receiving praise from European and American political leaders for its moderation in the foreign policy field, its stabilizing role in the Balkan area, its cooperative stance in dealing with the internal crisis in Albania, the problem of Kosovo, the non-deployment of the S-300 missiles on Cyprus, his substantial contribution of acceptance of Turkey as a candidate member of EU and in the end for its admission to European Monetary Union by the 2001.

E. TURKISH PARTY

The interest of Turkey in Cyprus likewise derives from the religious, linguistic ethnic and cultural ties linking the Turkish Cypriot population. Their policy applies mostly to the contention that Turkish Cypriots is one the two communities sharing the island and only this count more than the size of the population of the each ethnic community. The constitutional recognition in the settlement of 1960 and sufficient representation in Republic's bureaucracy and governance was a first step to the country's intentions. Dobell emphasizes more this diplomatic achievement with the ascertainment that there has never been sizeable individual Greek-Turkish bilingualism, or statistically significant cultural intermarriage during any period of Cypriot civilization and history. Nor has there been frequent civil war. During the British rule Muslim and Christian citizens lived at peace.⁸⁰

The Turks as the heirs to the Ottoman Empire improve any claim on the island from their conquest of the island in 1571, but its validity was never brought into question under international law.⁸¹ They entered again to the diplomatic game with the discreet prompting of the British government, it was reasserted as a counter to the Greek Cypriot liberation movements. It is under question if the Turkish Cypriot community could have ever obtained power for a bi-communal constitution without the 1960 British-Turkish involvement. The Turkish military force in Cyprus (650 soldiers according to the

80 William Dobell: "Cyprus as a Regional Conflict," in Salem, Norma: "Cyprus a Regional Conflict and its Resolution," Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Ottawa: St Martin's Press, 1989 p. 49.

81 Turkey renounced sovereignty over the island officially in 1923 according to the Treaty of Lauzanne.

involvement. The Turkish military force in Cyprus (650 soldiers according to the settlement package) was increased or decreased by many thousands as different crises took place. On occasions where the prospect of a unitary Cypriot constitution or the implementation of union seemed imminent, Turkey threatened military intervention. This occurred in 1964 and 1967 even before the since 1974 full-scale invasion. In the last date the historical facts donate them with an ideal opportunity to extend their domination of the northern Cyprus with the justification that they protect the Turkish Cypriots.

For Turkey, Cyprus has an abiding strategic interest. Their proposition to the island's settlement is the autonomy of the Turkish Cypriot community, now controlled by Turkey, under conditions, which would prevent the recurrence of a Greek-Cypriot political domination. Turkey's strong desire for a full-membership in the EU enforces them to present incentives for this direction. But at the same time they support that it is forbidden for them to withdraw their troops from the island and to leaving 150, 000 Turks with 600,000 Greeks without sound guarantees. It is also necessary to refer to the belief of a serious part of Turkish Public opinion that criticize with a austere way the political and economic costs of Turkey's commitment that are indeed high.⁸²

There is now recognition in Turkey that its strategic position has a new value for its important Western allies. Rather than a bulwark against Soviet communism, there is today an emphasis on its role as a bridge to, and stabilizing influence upon an even more uncertain and unpredictable Middle East. But Ankara appreciates that this game is risky.

⁸² We note the unpleasant complications with the principal Western allies, the forsaken American aid due to the after 1974 embargo, the continuing efforts of Greek lobby as well as the interaction to the international public opinion and the application of international law.

Mismanagement of the changed strategic environment could decrease the value of its Western connections, but to adopt too Western a perspective on Middle Eastern issues could exacerbate Turkish internal strains and diminish its regional influence.⁸³ However first priority of its policy at this time is the western orientation. For more than 40 years following Turkey's accession to NATO, the strategic interdependence of Turkey and the North Atlantic powers sustained close foreign policy alignment. Despite the Cyprus issue and occasional Western qualms over the character of Turkish domestic politics, the mutually beneficial strategic relationship was never blown off course. Today, and especially because of the acceptance of Turkey as a candidate-member of EU, the circumstances are different, national interests are diverging, and Turkey's political establishment is no longer confident that Turkey's Western orientation of the past era is best for the future. The new political and strategic environment makes it inevitable that Turkey's political leadership will pursue a more distinctive, nationalistic foreign policy, not always compatible with the interests and preferences of its old North Atlantic partners.⁸⁴

F. THE SUPERPOWER POLITICS TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM

The exploration of the causes, process, and consequences of American and Soviet involvement in the Cyprus issue has shown that the role played by the two superpowers in shaping developments on and around Cyprus was extremely sufficient. They were also

⁸³ Wyllie, J., "Turkey-Adapting to New Strategic Realities," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, V. 4, No 10, p.451, October 1992.

⁸⁴ Wyllie, J., "Turkey-Renationalizing Foreign Policy," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, V. 7, No 2, pp. 74-75, February 1995.

preoccupied by considerations emanating from their global political, military, economic, and ideological objectives and responsibilities, found themselves contesting for control and influence over Cyprus and the region. The US attitude reflected the containment doctrine that was the driving force behind American foreign policy since WWII. As a Cold War protagonist, the USA intervened to prevent expansion of Soviet influence and protect vital western security interests in the region. The main American aim was to bring Cyprus under Western Control and protect the unity of NATO by preventing a Greek-Turkish war. The Soviet Union, thinking and acting along similar lines, intervened to counteract American policy and goals, and benefit from the conflict that involved American allies. The undermining of Western strategic interests through NATO disruption and the maintenance of an independent Cyprus were Moscow's basic goals.⁸⁵ Britain, in the end, has serious responsibilities about the maintaining of the conflict since its plans for the settlement of the Cyprus dispute favored and enhanced the separation of the two communities.⁸⁶ However the main point is that during the Cold War, as well as throughout history, Cyprus has been strategically important because of its location at the crossroads of three continents and the major routes connecting the West with the East. Because of its proximity with the region, Cyprus can serve as a base of support for large-scale land, sea and air operations in the Middle East. The British bases

⁸⁵Joseph, S., p.72.

⁸⁶ Some of Britain's efforts promoted partition of the island. Lord Radcliff's plan in 1956 as well as Macmillan's two plans in 1958 encouraged external interference in the internal affairs of the island, opposed the creation of separate institutions for each community, and made possible the existence of separate goals and objectives. The more serious action was during January of 1958, when British governor in Cyprus, Sir Hugh Foot, visited Turkey to discuss conditions in Cyprus, and thus permitted Turkey to

should also be available to all the Western allies. It could be seen also as a secure neutral ground with regard to the polemics surrounding the major oil-producing region of the world.⁸⁷

In carrying out their policies, the two world forces took initiatives of their own or attempted to use local and regional proxies directly involved in the conflict. Despite some fluctuations in their attitudes and relations towards these proxies, Washington and Moscow remained attached to the promotion of strategic and ideological goals. Intervention by coercive diplomacy, threat and military aid were the major means of their attitudes. The USA turned to its junior allies, Greece and Turkey, and sought to resolve the conflict through means of diplomacy. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, to which it provided support through diplomacy and military aid. Superpower involvement in Cyprus was manifested during periods of crises. The threat of escalation of the conflict was especially alarming for the USA, while the Soviet Union expressed concern over the possibilities of a Western settlement of the problem by diplomacy or by force. The resolution of repeated crises could be largely attributed to superpower intervention in the form of mediation or balancing confrontation. It should be also noticed that the resolution of crises was not the result of superpower co-operation, rather it was largely the product of American intervention aimed at the containment of the conflict. Instead a parallelism can also be made here with the balancing effect of superpower confrontation at the global

enter to the "Strategic game," for first time since island's independence. Hitchens, pp 51-60, and Kaloudis, G., pp5-6.

⁸⁷ Adams, T., and Cottrell, J.A., *Cyprus Between East and West*, Studies in International Affairs, No7, Johns Hopkins University Press, p.56, 1968.

level that sustained equilibrium and a relative order in a bipolar world system during the Cold War. The basic assumption is that despite some adjustments in superpower attitudes dictated by the complexity of conflicting local, regional, ethnic, strategic and ideological interests involved in Cyprus, both the USA and the Soviet Union steadily pursued tactics and goals reflecting to their global rivalry and the bipolar international world system.⁸⁸

The year 1974 was a determinant for the US policy. US association with the multiple crises –coup against the president of Cyprus, Turkish invasion, Cypriot refugee problem, fall of Greek junta- compounded the policy dilemmas, drawing the USA deeply into the region. The aftermath of the 1974 crisis led to an unprecedented intensification of American efforts toward Cyprus and the active involvement of the Congress in policy formulation.⁸⁹ Since 1979, Cyprus has returned to an earlier phase of low-moderate importance for the American foreign policy. Since that time, the US supports generally UN mediation efforts. Additionally, the US has sometimes undertaken independent initiatives such as the American-British-Canadian comprehensive plan of 1978. A consistent theme of all administrations until the present time was and is to ensure the independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of Cyprus.

The Greek junta-sponsored coup of 1974 was not a surprise to the Soviet Union. Moscow denounced the coup and demanded the restoration of democracy. To Moscow's dismay, during the crisis two rounds of crucial negotiations took place in Geneva,

⁸⁸ Windsor, P., "NATO and the Cyprus Crisis," *Adelphi Papers*, No 135, pp.19-20, summer 1977 and Joseph, S.J., pp57-61.

⁸⁹ The US Congress adopted a direct action with the establishment of an arms embargo on Turkey on Feb 5, 1975, that lasted until August 1978.

exclusively between members of NATO and outside the scope of the Security Council, which was the desire of Soviet policy. However, in the UN Security Council the Soviets did not condemn or even mention Turkey, even after the second phase of the invasion. As Attalides notes: "even criticism when it came was directed vaguely towards NATO rather than the immediate perpetrators."⁹⁰ Generally, and after the end of the Cold War, Russia - as the successive state of the former Soviet Union- recognizes the Greek-Cypriot government as the legitimate government of Cyprus, the existence of two distinct communities in Cyprus, but it has denounced any political framework that would partition the island, and thereby increase the potential for the enlargement of NATO's presence there. In 1983, the USSR was also quick to denounce the move as contrary to UN-Security Council Resolutions and inconsistent with the search of a settlement.

G. THE ROLE OF UNFICYP IN THE CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT

The UN has been involved in the Cyprus problem since the eruption of violence in 1963. The Security Council and the General Assembly have been especially influential actors throughout the various phases of the problem. The mission of the organization was twofold: peacekeeping and mediation duties. UNFICYP was established on March 4, 1964 to halt violence between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities and to help maintain order on Cyprus. Since then his role was present to all the phases of the problem. Concern and involvement of the world organization have been directly directed

⁹⁰ Attalides, M., *Nationalism and International Politics*, p.179, St.Martin's Press-New York, 1979. An explanation is giving by Joseph: "By 1974, close political and economic ties were established between Moscow and Ankara, where US-Turkish relations were becoming more strained (p.147)." We note also the strong economic agreement in energy-related projects between the two countries in 1979.

towards the restoration of peace, the containment of the conflict, and the search for a settlement of the dispute by pacific means. With the consent of the government of Cyprus, the guarantor powers established a peacekeeping force. The peacekeepers secured a cease-fire, and established a neutral zone. In the face of escalating conflict, the three guarantor countries agreed to expand the UN peacekeeping role. Since that time peacekeepers have played key roles in enforcing a buffer zone between the territories, overseeing the cease-fire, providing humanitarian and police services, and assisting the movement of people across the line. However, UN forces have had no success in demobilizing the opponents or in persuading them to normalize conditions.⁹¹

Political motives and objectives coupled with diplomatic expediency prompt the Greek Cypriots to request UN intervention. They used the organization's Charter (Article 103) to strengthen their diplomatic position and to gain international support for their positions. Emphasis was placed to the international affects of the problem, especially to the threat and to the use of force by Turkey against an independent country, being a member of the UN. The Cypriot government used the UN institutions as instruments of national policy. In this regard, the UN provided a ground for diplomatic maneuvering, a platform for political debate, and a means for mobilizing foreign governments and world public opinion in support of the independence and unity of Cyprus. The presentation of the problem in the context of foreign interference brought into play the UN principles of

⁹¹ Boyne, S., "Moves to Settle the Cypriot Problem," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, V.7, No 9, p.404, September 1995. UNFICYP continues to monitor a buffer zone of 180 Km. The area between the two lines varies in width from 7 Km to only a few meters, and makes up three per cent of the island. The strength of the force is now at an all-time low level of just over 1200. Austria, Argentina, and UK are the main contributors. Nicosia remains divided in two, the last divided city in the world after the unification of Berlin.

self-determination, equal sovereignty of states, and non-intervention. As a result, the global condemnation of Turkish policies favoring external intervention, resort to force, and partition of Cyprus proved crucial for the Greek Cypriots in the after of 1974 period. With the UN involvement, and the use of UN forums and principles, the Greek Cypriot government can still hope for a negotiated settlement of the problem on the basis of a unified federal republic with two ethnic zones.⁹²

As the Cypriot case has shown, the effectiveness of the UN as a guardian of peace, or as an instrument of national policy, is limited because of its inability to implement its resolutions. In detail, there are two arguments about the success or failure in the peacekeeping operation of UNFICYP. The first one is to question the nature, the functions and the tasks of operation. In the present case these were restore and maintain law and order, to avoid communal fighting and to restore normal conditions of life. The force did not accomplish its mission and moreover, the situation ended up worse that it was in 1964. In this point two considerations should be made: firstly, new developments confronted UNFICYP with problems it was not prepared to face; secondly, the failure of UNFICYP is more a failure of those countries engaged in the situation than one of the UN itself. The second or maximal approach is that of claiming that the UN did not solve any kind of problem confronting the two communities.⁹³

During the period 1964 to 1974, the force was often overwhelmed by its efforts to keep peace between the two Cypriot communities, and often found it difficult to maintain

⁹² Jacovides, J.A., "The Cyprus problem and the UN."
[<http://www.kypros.org/UN/jacov.htm>]. September 1999.

⁹³ Joseph, S.J, pp.112-114.

impartiality at the sides, while these parties improved opposed positions over its mission. But the force has increasingly suffered from serious funding difficulties, and had reached the point of collapse in the 1990s. In 1993, following then UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's financial reassessment, UNFICYP was drastically reduced in size by 44 per cent, and the Greek Cypriot and Greek governments decided to contribute one third of the force's costs. Even so, with the total cost of supporting UNFICYP now approximately US \$50 million per year and voluntary contributions to the special account for UNFICYP, there is a deficit currently in excess of US \$200 million. The incidents also at the 'Green Line' in 1996 found the force seriously overburdened. Additionally one must not ignore the fact that the continuation of the post 1974 status quo was more comfortable with the presence of the UNFICYP and its relative success in preventing incidents across the Green Line. UNFICYP has been always an important element of the status quo on the island.

An assumption is that final success must be measured according to the political will of all parties concerned, to solve the problems and to reach a durable solution. The UN role, in this regard, is to provide for the minimum requirements for the political discussions to start (the continual resolutions of the organization). But at present we must not ignore the offer of UN. One should not overlook the fact that the organization can play a role in the process of world politics as a dispenser of collective political and moral approval of the policies and actions of states.⁹⁴ Finally, UNFICYP could help enough with the creation of peace building activities. They increase mutual understanding,

provide opportunities for meaningful dialogue, involve co-operative ventures that increase mutual confidence, and build constructive, trusting relationships over the long term. A number of peace building activities have occurred during the history of the Cyprus conflict, but these events have generally not been well documented or publicized. They had little impact on the overall relationship between the two Cypriot communities.

⁹⁴ Lund, S.M, pp.195-201, and James, A., "The UN Force in Cyprus," *International Affairs*, V.65, No 3, pp.481-500.

IV.THE AFTER 1974 MEDIATION EFFORTS OF CYPRUS PROBLEM

A. UN AS A MEDIATOR OF CYPRUS REGIONAL CONFLICT

The second mission of the UN to the Cyprus issue refers to the mediation process. Since 1974, there have been numerous efforts to reach a negotiated settlement, but without serious result. In this period we remark a great a positive and constructive attitude of the Greek Cypriot side about an arrangement of the problem, and to this direction they made serious concessions.⁹⁵ All through these years, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots have systematically undermined the initiatives of the U.N. Secretary General, leading them to an impasse Turkey's alleged support for a bicommunal - bizonal federation has proved to be completely insincere.⁹⁶ The statements made at intervals by the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot leaders, as well as the official positions adopted by the latter during the intercommunal dialogue, show that the Turkish side merely wishes to achieve recognition of the pseudo-state it has set up in the north. In exchange, Turkey supports the prospect of achieving later, at some unspecified date, a very loose confederation of two separate

⁹⁵ The continual concessions of the Greek Cypriot party refer during the following diplomatic actions: Working Points 1984, Integrated Documents 1985, Draft Framework Agreement 1986, Procedural Formula 1987, Outline for an Overall Agreement 1988, Set of Ideas 1992, Confidence - Building Measures 1993. Migdalovitz, C., " Cyprus: Status of UN Negotiations." [[http:// www. fas.org/man/crs/ 89-140.htm](http://www.fas.org/man/crs/89-140.htm)]. May 1999.

⁹⁶The declarations of the Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesman on 28 December 1997 make this quite clear: Mr. Utkan said that two states exist on Cyprus and that the only issues remaining to be solved are those of (a) compensation for property, (b) the achievement of mutually satisfactory security guarantees and (c) the drawing of a definitive border, after minor adjustments. In this way, Turkey will have achieved its long-standing aim of consolidating the status quo. A second declaration about this matter from Turkish Prime Minister Mr. Yilmaz also said in November 1997, Turkey's vital interests are not vested only in the Turkish Cypriot community but in Cyprus as a whole. Source: Cyprus News, 29 December 1997.

states.⁹⁷ Ever since the beginning of the intercommunal dialogue, whenever the Secretary General submitted any concrete proposals leading to a bicommunal - bizonal federation, the Turkish side rejected them or obstructed any progress, even when the proposals included provisions, which were difficult for the Greek Cypriot side to accept.⁹⁸ Every January seems to herald the birth of yet another "Year of Cyprus Settlement."

After 26 years of stagnation and de facto partition, a tendency has been developed to recognize practically for negotiating reasons two separate politico-territorial entities on the island. To a large extent this is an implicit assumption of the UN-led mediation for a "federated state", which began soon after 1974. In 1989 the UN Secretary General as the basis for advanced negotiations put a "Set of Ideas" forward. The ideas were subsequently reformulated and endorsed by SCR 774 (1992) in August 1992. For the purposes of the ensuing discussions, these proposals were provisionally accepted by the Greek Cypriots but were rejected by the Turkish Cypriots.⁹⁹ However, the semantics of federalism, or

⁹⁷ James Wolfe: "The United Nations and the Cyprus Question," in Salem, Norma: "Cyprus a Regional Conflict and its Resolution," Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Ottawa: St Martin's Press, 1989 pp. 227-241, and Joseph, S.J., pp.94-112.

⁹⁸ The Secretary General in his report dated 14.11.92, pointed out that "the positions of the Turkish Cypriot side are, in a fundamental way, outside the framework of the Set of Ideas", while the Security Council in its Resolution 789/92 expressly attributed the responsibility for the failure to the Turkish Cypriot side and called upon it to revise its position. Another report on May 30 1994 referred to the lack of political will of the Turkish Cypriot side for the achievement of any solution as a "well-known scenario". Kyle, pp.26-29.

⁹⁹ The "Set of Ideas" foresaw a federal Republic with a single international personality and a single citizenship. There would be political equality and sovereignty and a single citizenship. There would be political equality exercised through the effective participation of both communities in government and administration- though without numerical equality. The federated states would have equal powers and functions and there would be safeguards to prevent the federal government from impinging on them. The federal government would control foreign affairs, defense, federal judicial and police matters, central banking, customs and immigration, posts and telecommunications, patent and trademarks, health and environmental standards, and protection of natural resources. The states would have responsibilities in all other matters: education, religion, cultural affairs, local security and justice. The federal executive would

rather the functional practicalities of recognizing a border, where that border lies, and who can cross it, remain fiercely contested to this day. Apart from two significant intercommunal high-level agreements in the immediate post-partition period, the UN-sponsored search for a solution has been plagued by failure.¹⁰⁰ The Secretary General and the Security Council noted the Turkish Cypriot negative attitude.

In recent time, the intercommunal dialogue was again launched under the auspices of the UN, in the summer of 1997. Two meetings took place, in Troutbeck and Glion, at this period. A further meeting held on the 26th of September 1997 to discuss security issues failed because of the Turkish Cypriot refusal to discuss a new proposal for the gradual disarmament and demilitarization of the island as a means of reducing the dangers of destabilization and thus leading to the improvement of the general climate. President Clerides has called on Turkey to discuss how to implement this measure but,

consist of a President and a Vice-President elected from different communities, each with a right of veto. The Council of Ministers would be composed 70% Greek Cypriots and 30% Turkish Cypriots. The same analogy would be with the federal legislature in the lower level and from an equal percentage 50% in the upper level. Matters of importance, such as foreign affairs, defense and the budget, would require majority voting among the representatives of each community. The constitution could not be amended without the agreement of both sides. In the end, Mr. Ghali prepared a non-map that would have reduced the northern territory to just over 28 % of the island, returning to Greek-Cypriots the Varosha district of the eastern port of Ammohostos, the north-western citrus-growing area of Morphou, and 34 other villages. McDonald, R., "Cyprus: A Peacekeeping Paradigm," *The World Today*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, V. 49, No. 10, pp.182-184, October 1993 (See Appendix A).

¹⁰⁰ They are the 1977 Makarios-Denktaş Meeting and the Kyprianou-Denktaş Communiqué. In 1977 they agreed: (1) Cyprus will be an independent, nonaligned, bicomunal federal republic; (2) territory under control of each administration will be addressed in light of economic viability, productivity, and property rights; (3) principles such as freedom of movement, settlement, and property will be discussed; and (4) powers and functions of the central federal government would safeguard the unity of the country. In 1979 they agreed to the same basis and address territorial and constitutional issues, giving priority to Varosha; to abstain from actions that might jeopardize the talks, accept the principle of demilitarization, and eschew union in whole or part with any other country.

unfortunately, Turkey has not accepted so far.¹⁰¹ The resumption of the Intercommunal Dialogue in 1998 has so far proved impossible, because Mr. Denktash, with the full support of Ankara, has put forward preconditions, which cannot be accepted and have been rejected by the international community.¹⁰² These are the recognition of the pseudostate in the area occupied by Turkish troops, the freezing of negotiations for the adhesion of Cyprus to the EU, and an end to the so-called embargo on exports from the areas occupied by Turkish troops. In June of 1999, the G-7 and Russia urged Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders to hold new peace talks in late 1999, saying that neither side should set any preconditions.¹⁰³ Finally the new effort of UN mediation is continuing with the intervention of USA. The first circle of negotiations began on December 1999 of the past year and the new circle will begin in May 2000.¹⁰⁴

B. THE ROLE OF NATO

The outbreak of inter-communal violence on Cyprus in 1963 marked the beginning of a disintegrating process of the southeastern flank of NATO, which

¹⁰¹ A Greek- Cypriot proposal on June 19 of 1998, addressed a letter to UNSG on disarmament based on UNSC Resolution 1146/97 Para 7, which has been once more confirmed by Para 6 of UNSC Resolution 1178/29.6.98. The international community has welcomed this courageous proposal.

¹⁰² The latest UN Security Council Resolution (1179/98), which reaffirms the validity of all previous UN Security Council Resolutions. We refer also that the US Presidential envoy for Cyprus Mr. Holbrooke, put the blame for the failure of his mission to Cyprus in early May 1998 on the preconditions put forward by the Turkish side.

¹⁰³ Boyne, S., "Cyprus: Divisions are Deep 25 Years on," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, V. 11, No 12, p.16, December 1999. Denktas in his interview with the same author declared: "Inter-State talks, I am ready to continue, and all we can talk about is a confederation between two states, an agreement on how to co-operate. Other wise it is no use. That is where we are now."

¹⁰⁴ Crossette, B., "Greek and Turkish Cypriots Agree to Reunification Talks," *New York Times*, 15Nov 1999.

culminated in the Greek withdrawal from the alliance's integrated military structure in 1974. Greece and Turkey, acting under ethnic constraints and in support of conflicting conceptions of their national interests, intervened in Cyprus to support their respective ethnic groups. The two countries demonstrated attachment to ethnic commitments and insensitivity to commitments deriving from their membership in NATO. Ethnic factors rather than NATO bonds and principles proved to be determinants of their objectives and attitudes. The confrontation of the two countries over Cyprus was pursued in both the political and military areas and repeatedly brought the two countries to the brink of war. The two leading countries with major interests in the region -USA and Britain- tried to bring NATO into the conflict as an instrument of peacekeeping and mediation.¹⁰⁵

The failure of NATO initiatives on Cyprus did not come as a surprise for three additional reasons. First, no other ally, except the UK and the US showed any enthusiasm about becoming involved in a conflict that they considered a British post-colonial problem. Second, the conflict was politicized in the broader context of East West antagonism, and the Soviet Union resisted an intervention by the Western alliance. Third, the Greek side, fearing a favorable treatment of Turkey, was hesitant to endorse NATO offers for peacemaking operations. So the strategy of the organization aimed to establish Western control over Cyprus and to eliminate the danger of escalation because of the Greek-Turkish friction over the island. However, the attempt of NATO's intervention showed that the alliance could not play a constructive role in containing or resolving the

¹⁰⁵ Windsor, P., "NATO and the Cyprus Crisis," *Adelphi Papers*, The Institute for Strategic Studies, No 14, pp.3-16, November 1964.

problem of the island. It is also a fact that the significance of the NATO dimension in Greek-Turkish relations was probably no greater than during the events in Cyprus in the 1960s and the 1970s, when the USA, the USSR and the UK were inextricably involved with the neighbors' diplomatic relations. The Cold War confrontations continued until 1989 and to some extent persist in Russia's repeated calls for an international conference on the conflict, its informal links with Cyprus as an outlet for Russian economic interests, and more recently, with its arms sales (tanks and missiles), which Turkey interprets as an attempt to get a Russian foothold in the Mediterranean. In addition, with the geostrategic developments in Central Asia, the USA and the UK are reticent to alienate Turkey, possessing the second largest armed force in NATO, and occupying an important geographic position. Turkey has exploited this fact in order to promote its interests and to promote its western orientation.¹⁰⁶

It was the conflicting visions of a future Cyprus that led to Greece's refusal to take part in a NATO manoeuvre with Turkey in 1955. The Greeks' absence from NATO's integrated military structure from 1974 to 1980 further demonstrated both their belief in the Cyprus cause, and later, Turkey's belief that its own security concerns in the Aegean deserved further consideration. In the recent years, awkward relations between Greece and Turkey within NATO have continued, affecting Aegean exercises, infrastructure funding and troop assignments.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶ Joseph, S. J., pp.79-92.

¹⁰⁷ McDonald, R., "Greece: The Search for a Balance," *The World Today, Royal Institute of International Affairs*, V.44, No. 6, pp.100-103, June 1988 and Danopoulos, C., "Regional Security Organizations and National Interests: Analyzing the NATO-Greek Relationship," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, V. 16, pp.264-275, fall 1988.

The membership of both countries in NATO has decreased chances of war, but the ongoing Greek-Turkish disputes have brought the alliance itself into serious harm. The disputes have already affected the planning and operation of NATO's engagement in Bosnia. A lot of projects are blocked and the implementation of the full-integrated NATO principal subordinate command structure had been delayed for years. Finally, following the endorsement of NATO's new command structure at the Washington summit, 1999, with the parallel reorganization of NATO joint Sub-Regional Headquarters in Izmir and Larissa, the situation has changed in a smoothed way. One can also refer that the collapse of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact removed a common threat, leaving the two countries relatively free to pursue their national objectives. In addition, internal political situations have led the two countries to use the disputes for domestic political advantage, and have made the two governments less flexible.

C.THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE CYPRUS PROBLEM

Cyprus is at the threshold of the EU and preparing to become a full member in the new century. The EU, which has repeatedly expressed its concern over the lack of a settlement on the island, is now in a unique position to play a role in bringing about permanent peace and stability on the Mediterranean island and in the region. The EU has taken a clear and firm position on the question of Cyprus and the EU has always considered unacceptable the status quo created by the Turkish invasion of 1974. The EU can greatly influence the Cyprus issue since the parties involved are either part of, or have special relations with, the EU and can appreciate and support a European Union initiative on Cyprus. Greece is a member of the EU, and Turkey is engaged through a customs

union. The Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots are faced with a unique challenge and an opportunity to resolve their differences, reunite their island, and become part of the European integration process that will offer them the security and stability they have been longing for. In this effort the institutions, legal order, principles and policies of the EU can provide a conducive framework in the search for a stable political settlement in Cyprus.

By the time an agreement to proceed with a Cyprus-EU customs union by 2002, had been struck in May 1987, Turkey had formally applied to become a full member.¹⁰⁸ For Turkey also the EU had become a main political target. The Customs Union Agreement between Turkey and the EU was finally agreed upon in March 1995, but with key Turkish concessions. These included the eligibility of Cyprus for EU membership being reiterated, with the EU to consider Cyprus in the forthcoming round of enlargement. The Greek Cypriots and Greece naturally view the EU accession as a significant tool for levering apart the increasingly united defense of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. The crucial question, however, is whether early accession to the EU could act as a catalyst for an internal political settlement between the two communities on the island or whether the internal settlement should be considered as a pre-condition for accession. Generally, the EU-Cyprus accession negotiations came across to Turkish

¹⁰⁸ Turkey's main considerations about EU are the following: (1) a belated desire to respond to the challenge of Greek entry into the EU; (2) a feeling that EU membership is a natural continuation of a process, after the Turkey's entry to NATO and to the Council of Europe; (3) a desire among Turkish industrialists to gain access to European markets; (4) a somewhat vague hope in some circles that the EU could be a second solution for Turkey's internal cultural and political conflicts and safeguard the country against a takeover by Islamic fundamentalism or another military coup. Islam fundamentalists are the main opposing group of the EU. See Barchard, D., "Turkey's Troubled Prospect," *The World Today*, *Royal Institute of International Affairs*, V. 46, No. 6, p.107, June 1990.

Cypriot side as an unacceptable pressure tactic, an arrogation by Cypriot Greeks of decision-making authority over the Turkish Cypriot community, and a defacto merging of Greece and official Cyprus' government within the framework of the EU to the exclusion of Turks.¹⁰⁹ Then, the EU question is not purely political. In Cyprus, the economic asymmetry on either side of the UNBZ heralds a problematic integration of the north with both the south and the EU in general, and although the EU and the USA are most often quoted, it is not yet possible to predict who will fund the necessary restructuring. Though small, the economy in northern Cyprus is fragile and largely Turkish-funded, unsupported as it is from international sources.¹¹⁰

Cypriot Communities	GDP (Bill. \$)	GDP-Real Growth rate (%)	GDP-Per. Capita (\$)	Population (thousands)
Greek Cypriots (Cyprus Republic)	9,75	2,5	15,000	645
Turkish Cypriots (TRNC)	1,44	1,44	8,000	200

Table 2. Indicators of Republic of Cyprus and TRNC, Source: Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Finance, Dep. of Statistics and Research, 1997.

In July 1994 the European Court of Justice effectively banned TRNC-produced exports of citrus fruit and potatoes to the EU, as they had to be certified by the "Republic of Cyprus", and the TRNC government reacted very strongly. Since then Denktas'

¹⁰⁹ Wilkinson, M.J. "Moving Beyond Conflict Prevention to Reconciliation. Tackling Greek-Turkish Hostility," A report to Carnegie Corporation of New York. Preventing Deadly Conflict, pp10-24, June 1999.

¹¹⁰ Boyne observes that the Turkish Cypriots would prefer an agreed federal solution before Cyprus accedes to the EU, and they are also adamant that Cyprus should not join without Turkey also becoming a member. There would be many advantages for the TRNC in forging a settlement with the south to form a unified, federal republic within the EU. Boyne, S., "Moves to Settle the Cypriot Problem," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, V.7, No 9, p.406, Sep 1995.

relationship with the EU has all but ended; indeed, further integration between the EU with Turkey, both economic and political, has proven more attractive. In July 1997 the EU took note of Turkey's eligibility and confirmed that Turkey will be judged by the same objective criteria as other applying countries. There were also recommendations – for example that Turkey should give a firm commitment to resolve its regional problems and the Cypriot issue. In addition, the veto of Greece threatened to complicate the situation yet further. Greece would block the entire EU enlargement process if Cyprus were in any way treated “unfairly”, and has repeatedly sought to link the Cyprus issue with the establishment of the EU customs union with Turkey (accordingly blocking an ECU 600 million financial protocol with Turkey). As a proof, Greece was a key force in the European Union's decision in December 1997 not to consider Turkey's application for membership. Greece has also blocked the release of funds for Turkey. During the Cardiff summit (June 1998) and the Vienna summit (December 1998) Greece followed the same policy.¹¹¹ But, during the Helsinki summit (December 1999) Greece withdrew its veto. It was result of two factors: first political pressure from USA and European powers on Greece, and a new policy that hopes to enforce the Turkey to contribute according the western norms. It will also facilitate the entrance of Cyprus as a full-member in the EU.¹¹² The final point is that within the Cyprus-EU accession, the EU is

¹¹¹ Riemer, A., “Turkey and the EU. A Never Ending Story.”
[[http:// www.Columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/isa/ria01/](http://www.Columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/isa/ria01/)]. August 1999.

¹¹² Zaman notes for this point: “Ignoring Turkish objections, the EU has started accession talks with the Greek Cypriot administration, recognized by the rest of the world as the legitimate government of Cyprus. In what has been viewed as a major concession to Greece, EU leaders used deliberately vague language that appeared to leave the door open to full membership for Cyprus in the absence of any

bringing extra power and hope for conflict resolution and a final settlement of the problem.¹¹³

President Clinton, during an official visit in Turkey on 16 November 1999, addressing the Turkish parliament, leavened his comments by acknowledging that Turkey has made some progress in improving its human rights record though there is a need of enlarging effort in the future, and he stressed his support for the country's application to join the EU. The 15-nation EU, which has opposed Turkey's application publically for most because of its poor support of human rights, finally accepted Turkey with a candidate membership status at the Helsinki summit in December 1999. At Clinton's urging, the island's Greek and Turkish leaders agreed on 14 November 1999 to resume UN-sponsored negotiations in New York beginning December.¹¹⁴

settlement with the Turkish Cypriots." Zaman, A., "Turkey Pledges To Meet EU Terms," *Washington Post*, 29 Jan. 2000.

¹¹³ In that direction the European Court of Human Rights took a very important decision in the case *Loizidou v. Turkey*. The case originated in an application by Loizidou, a Greek Cypriot woman who owned property in Northern Cyprus and she supported that Turkish troops had prevented her from returning to her land, where she had planned to build flats, including one as a home for her family. The court condemned Turkey for this continuing violation and its attribution to the human rights. This decision confirmed the illegality of Turkish invasion. Rudolf, B. "International Decisions, *Loizidou v. Turkey*" *American Journal of International Law*, 18 Apr. 2000.

¹¹⁴ Babington, C., "Cypriot Leaders Agree to Talks," *Washington Post*, 14 November 1999 and "Improve Rights record, Clinton Urges Turkey," *Washington Post*, 16 November 1999.

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V. ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT

A. WEAKNESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION

The early negotiations and mediations by the Secretary General in the 1960s and the early 1970s were more voluntary. It was the time of the early stages of the conflict, and the external parties were already involved. The Turkish Cypriots were more willing to negotiate, because they thought they were the losing party and they were trying to gain benefits. This pre-1974 phase of negotiations, conducted under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General, centered on giving up certain Turkish Cypriot rights and separatist provisions entrenched in the 1960 constitution, in exchange for Turkish Cypriot local autonomy. The 1974 invasion created a new situation. Before 1974 the intercommunal talks were focused on a unitary state with local autonomy for Turkish Cypriots, whereas after 1974, they have focused on a federal solution, but with different interpretation by each side. A series of high-level negotiations has taken place in the decade of 70s with proposal for an independent bicomunal federal republic. After that, subsequent negotiations, although proclaiming adherence to the proceeding two high-level agreements. Greek Cypriots envisioned a unitary federal state with a strong central government and no internal borders, and they fully support the three fundamental freedoms of movement, settlement, and ownership of property. Turkish Cypriots envisioned a decentralized or weak federation or confederation with clear territorial boundaries for security reasons, and provisions for gradual progress to a customs union.

In the end, the willingness for the negotiations of the Turkish Cypriots has decreased since the late 1980s and early 1990s because they were interested first of all to improve international relations for the new "TRNC." So the mediation processes of the UN were no more voluntary in this period. The UN started to put more pressure on both sides in order to coerce them to give up their unwillingness to negotiate a solution.¹¹⁵

Past negotiations have been highly formal, legalistic, rigid and narrow in agenda of matters. The emphasis has been placed on procedural matters and publicity rituals. Thus, in almost every mediation/ negotiation on the Cyprus Conflict, there has been a debate on the title of the leaders of the two communities.¹¹⁶ However, a solution was always negotiated and each party entered into the mediation/ negotiation as "the leader" of his community. But this debate has always created a tense situation in the parties before the beginning of the works. Besides that, each party has certain positions that they don't want to talk about. For example, the Turkish Cypriot side states that they would never accept an agreement that would not provide Turkey with the "right of unilateral intervention," according to the 1960 Agreement Treaty and the Greek Cypriot side wants to have a guarantee agreement which will eliminate Turkey's unilateral right as a

¹¹⁵Migdalovitz, N., pp.3-15.

¹¹⁶ A characteristic example is in the sponsored talks of October 26, 1992, that were doomed from the beginning because Turkish Cypriot leader refused to show at his scheduled meetings with the Secretary General and the Greek Cypriot leader in protest for not being addressed as President. Before any negotiation initiative the Turkish Cypriot leader demands "Substantial Equality," and first of recognition of his pseudostate.

guarantor state to intervene into the problems of the island. For the Greek Cypriot community the guarantees should be international and multilateral.¹¹⁷

The method of Fisher and Ury "Getting to Yes" as it was improved in the Chapter II of this thesis points out with clarity the stalemate in the Cyprus mediation. The involvement of various mediators has illustrated that each international mediator has been able to do little more than strengthen the local and emerging status quo, which reflects the common BATNA of the two Cypriot communities according to the same method of analysis. First it was an effort "to separate the people from the problem." This has failed to happen to the Cyprus issue. Usually the parties in this issue find the best way to avoid compromises by resorting to blaming the other party for the failure of establishing a consensus. Leaders of different parties with declarations to the press to public places created a hostile environment. The mediator, usually the Secretary General, also attributed the failure of the negotiations to the position of a leader party or both parties to the Security Council. And sometimes this gave a good tool for the negotiators to blame the Secretary General to cover up their own behaviors in front of their people.¹¹⁸ Another point is that the two communities have opted frameworks with bases on international

¹¹⁷ Richmond, P.O., *Mediating in Cyprus*, pp.232-239.

¹¹⁸ A study about this matter supports that there is strong interaction between domestic political structures, domestic political conditions, and international political conditions at the time of the mediation. It affects also the willingness of parties to take advantage of opportunities for gains through the mediation process. Very often there is also influence of the domestic political situation of the opponent party. Leeds A.B., and Davis R.D., "Domestic Political Vulnerability and International Disputes," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, V.41, No6, pp.827-833, December 1977. Besides this fact, the leader of Turkish Cypriot side used the new cycle of mediation process that begins on May 23 as an advantage for the second round of presidential elections to his party and he declared: "The people placed their trust in me again. I'll be stronger to fight for (Turkish Cypriot) cause on May 23 new talks." From Tribune News Service, "Second Round Needed in Presidency Vote," *Chicago Tribune*, 16 April 2000.

norms that appear legitimate and rational but if there will be interaction between them the result will be a mutual catastrophe. Second, the effort of “focusing only on interests not in positions,” was also a failure. It lies here to the fact that during the last three decades, many interests of the parties were not the same at any time. It is one of the most important factors of the conflict that none of the parties want to acknowledge. For example, the Greek Cypriot leadership has moved from a pursuit of union with Greece in the 1950s, to the unified state-federal state in the 1990s. The Turkish Cypriots have modified their position from local autonomy within a unitary state in the 1960s to a bizonal federation in the late 1970s, to a loose confederation with demands for a right of secession even after an agreed federal solution in more recent years.¹¹⁹ It is also a consequence of the devious objectives of the disputants related to the rewards they attempted to gain from the third party. The mediators preferred to consolidate the explosive in many historical times situations. It may be preferable to any alternative in order to avoid the clash of state sovereignty, basic element of the international system.¹²⁰ Third, it was the effort “of inventing options for mutual gain.” This has not really happened, either. Since 1963, and especially since 1974, the dispute’s parties presented many options. For example, a “federal republic” was introduced into the conflict and, on paper, all parties accepted that as the basis for a future federal “Republic of Cyprus” (1977 and 1979 summits). But, each community has different interpretations of the type of a Federal Cyprus Republic. And the

¹¹⁹ Truesdell, A., “Nicosia Raises the stakes on Cyprus,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, V. 9, No 4, p.167, April 1997.

¹²⁰ Thomas M. Frank and George Nolte, “The Good Offices Function of the Secretary General,” in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, *UN: Divided World*, pp 179-180, Oxford University Press, 1996.

fourth part of the method, which also failed, was "the insistence on using objective criteria." Until the 1990s, when the pressure of the UN increased on both sides to sit for the negotiation, due to the above reasons, most of the time none of the sides had come up with objective criteria for a detailed solution. Basically, both sides played a "reactionary" policy: instead of providing detailed objective criteria, they only reacted to the former policy of the other side. This is because the two communities have always regarded themselves as separate. It was a characteristic oddity of behavior in a game where the Greek/ Greek Cypriot alliance use to abuse continually the Turkish Cypriot side and the Turkish/ Turkish Cypriot alliance makes the same thing with the Greek Cypriot side. The motherlands always influenced. Their related communities with irredentist theories and provide political, cultural, military and economical support.¹²¹

One must also emphasize some other serious assumptions of these negotiations. There has been a perceived power imbalance between the two communities. Turkish Cypriots claim that the recognition of the Greek Cypriot side as the only legal government of the isle, give it the chance of making "one sided propaganda." According to the Greek Cypriots, the presence of Turkish troops in the Northern Cyprus makes the Turkish Cypriot position stronger on the table. Another assumption is that sometimes one side threatens the other side by saying that they will not participate to the following negotiations, if the other side does not act in a certain way. Such behavior creates tension. However, the parties usually attended to most of the mediations to which the UN invited them. That was not because they wanted to attend to the mediation (more for the Turkish

¹²¹ Richmond, P.O., *Mediating in Cyprus*, pp.168-171 and 215-219.

Cypriot side), but rather because they felt obliged/pressured by the UN, or they did not want to confront the consequences- for example, sanctions or embargoes- for their unwillingness. However, the parties showed their unwillingness during the process, by rejecting every idea of the other side; by postponing an answer; or by using special tricks to avoid deciding. From all the above remarks one can conclude that a healthy environment that is necessary for smooth and effective negotiations was always absent from the Cyprus diplomatic table.¹²²

Two important issues have tremendous impact on the overall failure of the previous attempts to solve the Cyprus conflict: Lack of trust and the growing gap between the two communities. In an optimistic aspect, these two issues are the requisites of the successful mediation/ negotiation processes that will open the way for a detailed, fair solution, a solution that will be acceptable to both sides and more importantly a solution that will be worked out by the two communities without foreign imposition. Both communities lived together a long time under British domination. After the events in the 1960s and 1970s, old and new generations of Cypriots of the two communities have been fed with hate, anger, and distrust for 30 years. Turkish Cypriots see the Turkish army as the guarantee of their safety. Greek Cypriots see the same matter as a threat. They have been continuing to arm themselves by spending \$300 million on the new military equipment per year. The debate is continuing with Turkish Cypriots who claim that the Greek Cypriots are not buying arms for the defense objectives but for their future offensive purposes. That is the psychological state of mind of the leaders who sit for

¹²² Hampson, F.O., *Nurturing Peace*, pp.35-53, United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996.

mediation / negotiation whether it is the reality or a deliberately created vision. The leaders also, since they are politicians, transmit the masses with these visions, or appealing the national emotions in order to support their intensions. The fact that the two Cypriot communities don't have political, social or even economical contact facilitates the easy manipulation of the people by the political elite of each party. Thus, ethno-nationalist rhetoric is perceived as being the safest option in terms of security, both for the island and for its political readers; but this ironically results in an increase of insecurity.¹²³ As it was also referred in the previous II Chapter as an assumption, Brown's four main factors that create internal conflict and are all present to the Cyprus issue: discriminatory political institutions as a product of the 1960 constitutional arrangement, exclusionary national ideologies, intergroup separate politics and elite politics.

B. CAUSES AND OBSTACLES TO A SETTLEMENT

A primary cause for the stalemate of the Cyprus problem is that the parties involved have so far seen the conflict through adversarial options, focusing on positions that would maximize their gains regardless of the impact on others. The lack also of a shared definition of the problem has damaged the will and confidence to negotiate and to make concessions. The Greek Cypriots present the problem as one of foreign invasion and occupation, and of violation of international law and human rights since 1974. The Turkish Cypriots see the problem as one of neglect, domination, and oppression of the minority as a result of the Greek Cypriot leadership from 1963 to 1974. Thus, their

¹²³ Richmond, P.Oliver, "Ethno-Nationalism in Cyprus", *Middle Eastern Studies*, V.35, No.3, pp. 41-52, July 1999.

political positions are antagonistic. Underlying interests and needs were often subordinated to staking out a given position. So, the needs for security, recognition, identity, equality, justice, dignity, and the three basic freedoms were addressed only in a political and legalistic context, with each side expecting the other to make compromises and concessions unilaterally. No prospect of integration could be since each party worked to fulfill its own needs while at the same time undermining those of the other. The respective positions of each party on critical issues even today appear incompatible. Such apparently incompatible positions include the role of the Turkish troops, international guarantees, the exercise of fundamental freedoms and the return of refugees. The situation is exacerbated by a preoccupation with receiving or denying prior recognition to each other.¹²⁴ This is manifested in arguments over whether a future federation should succeed the present government of Cyprus or the two de facto autonomous regions, and by reluctance to promote long-discussed measures of good will and confidence building for fear of setting precedent and prejudging the final political outcome.¹²⁵

The changes of these positions will be bridged through the current traditional course of mediation process are limited, and this because they are perceived by the parties as conflicting and soon as arbitrary and unjustified. So, each serious solution must examine carefully and first of all it will be application in a test time. The only solution to

¹²⁴ Bahcheli, T, *Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955*, p.55, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1990, and Attalides, M, p.76.

¹²⁵ Such confidence-building measures are: (1) the settlement, under UN administration, of the city of Varosha by its Greek Cypriot inhabitants; (2) the reopening, under UN administration, of the Nicosia international airport with access from both sides; (3) various military deconfrontation measures; and (4) special status areas adjacent to each other for the purpose of enhancing trust between the sides.

the problem is a third-party mediator with resources and desire to contribute drastically to a serious conflict settlement.

C. CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND MEDIATION EFFECTIVENESS

Hampson claims that there are four main schools of thought related to setting ethnic conflict. The first argues that ancient hatreds are so great that only the coercive intervention of major powers can create a stable balance of power to negate the effects of security dilemma through 'ethnic unmixing.'¹²⁶ The second argues that non-coercive intervention can bring the parties to a settlement through stalemate, ripe moments, confidence building measures, and power-sharing arrangements which should have an eye towards developing democracy, moderation, and liberal institutions.¹²⁷ The third argues that just a political order needs to be established which promotes democracy and human rights as these are the key conditions for making peace. This calls for the promotion of new norms, democratic political institutions, participatory governance structures, civil society, international tribunals and truth commissions. Disarming, repatriating refugees, building a consensus for peace under the auspices of the UN, and moderate local political leadership play a role in this method.¹²⁸ And the fourth school includes the use of conflict resolution workshops, which attempt to reduce stereotyping at the citizen level.¹²⁹ What is needed for the Cyprus issue is a contingency approach in which all these approaches

¹²⁶ Hampson, F.O., "Third Party Roles in the Termination of Intercommunal Conflict," *Millennium*, V. 26, No3, pp. 727- 730, 1997.

¹²⁷ *Idid.* pp 734-735.

¹²⁸ *Idid.* pp.736-740.

are used in sustained manner with flexibility and exploitation of the experience of past efforts.

The international mediation of the Cyprus problem until the present time did not succeed in breaking into the sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction of the Cyprus state by Greek Cypriots and of reducing the expectations of a separatist group like the Turkish Cypriots. As it was explained in Chapter II of this thesis, there is the strong argument that the international community should remain very reluctant to sacrifice the principle of territorial integrity to self-determination, and should avoid admitting unstable entities into statehood. In this international environment, it appears that both sides believe sovereignty is divisible, as illustrated by the Turkish Cypriot attempts to create a recognized separate state, and the Greek Cypriot acceptance of a federal state, where they have the primary role according to the population size. Consequently, both the option of separation into two states and autonomy within one state prove very serious matters, as both community parties can point out to a different set of international principles. Besides there is the fact that the past Cyprus mediation attempts did not have the benefit of a serious, interactive, and evolutionary process that might enable the two parties to gradually develop a new, shared vision and intercommunal discourse. The UN organs proved an inability to find a compromise that Cypriots could accept the still controversial dichotomy between secession and self-determination. It failed mainly to the perception of insecurity and fear of domination, and the fail to create the social-psychological, educational, developmental,

¹²⁹ Idid. pp .742-743.

and institutional infrastructure necessary for the two Cypriot communities to come together.

Two new dynamic elements added to the Cyprus problem during the last decade of last century: the 1996 events of the 'Green Line' and the EU issue. Thus until 1996, it can be seen that the protracted stalemate was viewed as an advantage to both sides, as it expressed the common BATNA. Then, Greeks Cypriots felt that time would enable them to bring international pressure to bear on Turkey/Turkey Cypriot axis; while the Turkish Cypriots felt that it was a proper time of pressing for an international recognition of a new state. The same happened with the EU issue. The Republic of Cyprus -representing the Greek Cypriot side- won the right to conduct accession talks with the EU with the deep desire to leave the geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean behind and escape the double minority situation. The Turkish Cypriot side and Turkey were well aware of the possibilities of such a move and were determined to prevent this because of the fact that the Turkish Cypriot side has not been included in the negotiation process. When the EU announced that Cyprus would be invited to commence accession talks, the situation has been changed, and the Turkish Cypriot side saw it as a lost of opportunity to regain the international legitimacy that they so desired. The entrance of the new century gave to the matter a new perspective with the EU organs to promote the Cyprus membership. For the first time, the new expansion's program does not require the mandatory settlement of the problem before the official acceptance of the official Cyprus state to the union. So, the EU, in cooperation with other factors, is in a unique position to play a serious role in

Cyprus' impasse.¹³⁰ Until then, the efforts of international mediation can achieve little until the Turkish Cypriot leadership has committed itself to adherence to international norms of behavior, and this itself depends on how much longer Turkey can sustain its unpopular position on Cyprus within the international community.

The Republic of Cyprus -representing the Greek Cypriot side- with a 'joint defense dogma' in cooperation with Greece, its movement towards accession with the EU, and its acquisition of high-tech weaponry has greatly influenced the stakes in the current status quo, and illustrate the fact that without flexibility from Turkey/Turkey Cyprus axis, the Greek Cypriot side may be prepared to take greater risks promoting the issue of the settlement. The diplomatic game received a new interest with the parallel effort of Turkey to enter in the EU as a full-member. The withdrawing of the veto by Greece in December 1999 at the EU summit in Helsinki was a serious effort that first intends to guarantee peace, development and cooperation in the region and second to secure and to facilitate the entrance of Cyprus to the same Union.¹³¹

¹³⁰Dorsey comments: "Some European officials believe that the prospect of EU membership negotiations with Greek Cyprus as well as glaring economic disparity between the more prosperous Greek and economically lagging Turkish parts of the island, may serve to break down resistance in Turkey to a compromise resolution. Dorsey, M. J., "Mounting Communal Tensions Increase Need for Cyprus Settlement," *Washington Report On Middle East Affairs*, V.15, No. 7, p.29&91, March 1997

¹³¹ The Prime Minister of Greece declared during the works of the summit: "The EU is a community of principles, values and rules assisting the common effort of overcoming nationalism and conflict. The EU leads to the creation of ties of friendship, it is to the benefit of Turkey, but also of Greece and the EU for Turkey to become part of this framework... we believe that the development of cooperation is necessary, we recently undertook a series of moves and initiatives to develop our relations. But Turkey's participation in the process of European integration will lead to problems if there are not clear positions on the outstanding differences." Embassy of Greece, Press office. [<http://greekembassy.org/press/pressreleases/grguaranties.html>]. Dec 1999.

A dynamic conflict resolution of the problem must follow the following steps: (1) Great power intervention, with a role of third party mediator with strong resources in his disposition, needs first to be directed primary in Greco-Turkish relations.¹³² This will deal with the security dilemma between Greece and Turkey, which is primarily responsive for the secondary Cyprus security dilemma. This would open the relations of the two countries, Greece and Turkey, placing them onto a new cooperative plane, aid both states' relationship with the EU, and also removing more of the financially draining military imperatives over which their economies receive a huge surcharge.¹³³ The two countries could persuade that defense expenditures deprive the rest of the economy of the necessary resources to grow. Defense expenditures take an exorbitant share of national budgets in two countries. Moreover, both Turkey and Greece are in a serious attempt to eliminate their international economic debt and to succeed greater rhythm of economic development.¹³⁴ Greece as a full-member of EU has mainly economic priorities, since the

¹³² A comment by Kinzer confirms this fact: "the latest quarrel -refers to a fact in June 1998 where four Greek F-16 fighter jets accompanied by two military cargo planes with the Greek Minister of Defense inside in one of the two planes, were annoyed by Turkish F-16s to their direction forward Cyprus. Finally, they landed at a Cypriot airfield. It reflected the fact that although the Cypriot dispute is ostensibly between the Republic of Cyprus and the ethnically Turkish enclave in the north, the greater conflict is between their patron states, Greece and Turkey." Kinzer S., "Greece and Turkey Revive Dispute Over Cyprus," *New York Times*, 20 June 1998.

¹³³ Botsas N Elefterios, "The U.S-Cyprus-Turkey-Greece Tetragon: The Economics of an Alliance," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, V. 16, No.2, pp.258-261, fall 1988. Botsas also notes: "Greece and Turkey derived economic benefits from the Alliance as well as from their cooperative spirit of the 1950s. Their perennial conflict has increased the cost to their economies. There is evidence of substitution of military spending for socially needed capital formation, but the perception is that they need the military spending for defense against one another rather than against a common enemy."p.261.

¹³⁴ Since the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey's defense expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) has been the highest among all NATO members and has remained unaffected by all variations of tension in East West relations. Greece and Turkey spend about 2.2% of their GNP on education, less than one-half of what the rest of Europe spends, but about three times for Greece, and two times for Turkey, as much for defense. Last year and according to NATO sources

country desires strongly to participate in the Monetary Union of Europe. Turkey, as a candidate member to the same economic and political union, more than Greece, must succeed dynamic economic performances of development. As the EU has a lot of times declared, the entrance of Turkey into the union will deeply depend from its progress in two main issues: human rights, and economic development as necessary requirement for the country to obtain the economic criteria of the union.¹³⁵ A progress or better a substantial contribution of Turkey to the Cyprus settlement will greatly ameliorate the international profile of the country, not only in Europe, but also to all the international community. As Haass also illustrates the flow of trade and investment from Greece and Turkey to their respective zones in Cyprus is considerable. But, the flow from Turkish side is especially heavy. The economically weak and isolated Turkish Cypriot side survives as a distinct entity, mostly with Turkish economical funds. To this cost one must

Turkey spent 5.7% and Greece 4.9%, Britain 2.6%, Germany 1.5%, France 2.8%, Spain 1.4% of their GNP for the defense sector. Sheehan and Moustakis also refer that Turkey have in action a 10-year US \$431 billion armament program from 1996 and Greece answered with a \$14 billion program for the period 1996-2000. Moustakis, F., and Sheehan, M., "Earthquake Heals Aegean Rift," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, V. 11, No 12, p.12, Dec 1999.

¹³⁵ The Agenda 2000 from July 1997 give an assessment of the political and economic situation. The commission states Turkey's eligibility and confirmed that Turkey will be judged by the same objective criteria as other applying countries. The same document comprises also recommendations, saying that Turkey should give a firm commitment to resolve its regional problems and the Cypriot issue. The agenda covered also the support of the democratic standards and the human rights level, and repeat the general support for Turkey and a reinforcement of the bilateral communication. Agenda 2000, "The Challenge of Enlargement," Part IV. At the same point, Fischer, German Foreign Minister, after a meeting with the leader of Turkish Cypriot party Rauf Denktas, on 15 February 2000, supported that the procedure for a settlement of the Cyprus problem will consist a positive role for the Greek-Turkish relations and he added: "In Turkey, there are some positive steps about the human rights. But, there is a lot to be done. After Helsinki, the human rights consist integral part of the strategy of approaching Turkey." Valasopoulos, P., "Positive changes," *Eleutherotypia*, 16 Feb. 2000.

also add the cost of maintaining an army of 35,000 soldiers.¹³⁶ Thus, a solution of the Cyprus problem with the parallel substantial withdrawal of this huge military force will liberate enough economic funds that could ideally be used for increasing economic development, the second basic precondition for Turkey's successful accession to the European family (See Table 3).¹³⁷

COUNTRY	AREA (000 SQ.KM)	POPULATION (MILLION)	GNP (BIL.\$)	PER CAPITA. GNP (\$)
TURKEY	781	63,5	379	6100
GREECE	132	10,5	86	8200

Table 3: Indicators of Turkey and Greece. Sources: Washington World Bank, and "The State of the World"(Geneva, UN), 1997.

(2) After the first step, new dynamic third party mediation, with the same power as in the previous attempt, is required for the island based on both Cypriot communities' endorsement of, and commitment to, international norms. A solution could be a bizonal federal state with shared sovereignty, and a really productive functioning of the State. (3) The new actor of international mediation to the Cyprus problem, the EU, with the acception of the Cyprus as a new member, would facilitate the development of a wider civil society, which would promote democracy and the civil rights through the promotion of new norms, democratic political institutions, and participatory governance structures.

¹³⁶ Haass, N. Richard, "Cyprus: Moving Beyond Solution," *The Washington Quarterly*, V. 10, N.2, p.185, spring 1987.

¹³⁷ Antonakis to this point supports: "Current conventional wisdom suggests that military expenditure may affect economic growth through the creation of additional aggregate demand, the whole host of spin-offs that result from military spending, the possible reduction of investment, and the displacement of talent from the most dynamic sectors of civilian production." Antonakis, N., "Guns Versus Butter," *Journal of conflict Resolution*, V.43, No 4, p. 501, August 1999.

In other words, the European integration process could assure the stability, the peace, the economic development, and the duration to the settlement of the problem.¹³⁸ (4) Other means: use of international tribunals and commissions, disarmament, repatriation at least of refugees that have a strong desire to return, building a consensus for peace under the auspices of the UN, and in the end confidence building measures. The experience also of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) could ideally be used in the Cyprus case. The organization aims to strengthen pluralist democracy and the observance of human rights, and to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes between its members. Through its emphasis on disarmament, confidence-building measures and human rights, the OSCE contributed in long-term conflict prevention in nine countries and is conducting seven Sanctions Assistance Missions in the countries surrounding Serbia / Montenegro. The OSCE cooperated also with NATO, the Council of Europe, and UN officials are often present at its meetings. It encompasses all the elements that can guide to an effective conflict resolution of the Cyprus problem: military confidence building, arms control, and economic, scientific, technological, environmental and humanitarian cooperation.¹³⁹ Thus, the OSCE could ideally cooperate or enforce the EU in a new mediation effort. It possesses also the advantage that it represents a forum for political consultation and cooperation of fifty-four member states that includes both a

¹³⁸ A relative comment of James M Dorsey: "Some European officials believe that the prospect of EU membership negotiations with Greek Cyprus as well as glaring economic disparity between the more prosperous Greek and economically lagging Turkish parts of the island, may serve to break down resistance in Turkey to a compromise resolution." This comment receives more significance after the 1999 acceptance of Turkey as a candidate member of Europe. Dorsey, M.J., "Mounting Communal Tensions Increase Need For Cyprus Settlements," *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, V XV, No. 7, p29&71, March 1997.

transatlantic and a Russian presence. All the above continual steps of conflict management can constitute a framework of a proper and effective framework of a third-party mediation.

D. THE EXPECTATION OF AN EFFECTIVE THIRD- PARTY MEDIATOR

As it was also observed in Chapter II of this thesis, an effective conflict resolution can be the result of two basic preconditions: "Ripe moment" and "hurting stalemate." A lack of ripeness is a frequent explanation off why diplomacy and third-party mediation efforts have failed to resolve the problem. The previous analysis justified why the two Cypriot communities are not prepared for an effective diplomatic effort of settlement. But the failure is not only product of the above two points. It also stems from the failure of a successive third party to cultivate the ripeness or at least, to provide the kinds of inducements that would carry the peace process in action. At a more fundamental level, the lack of ripeness or absence of a hurting stalemate is also due to third-party involvement in the form of peacekeeping that has kept tensions at a moderate level and reduced the incentive for the two Cypriot communities to seek a political settlement. More of the mediation efforts were made by the UN, or in the name of UN, but all of them failed. However, since 1974, the three main third-party mediators- USA, UN, and UN- have helped to prevent conflict successfully and to avoid a new war. Over the same period, they have failed to advance reconciliation. All have declared renewed efforts and assigned efficient diplomats to the mediation effort.

¹³⁹ Sperling, J., and Kirchner, E., *"Recasting The European Order,"* pp.64-67& pp74-75, Manchester University Press, 1997.

As it was also illustrated to the Chapter II of this thesis that the UN needs first of all international consensus and the provision of the necessary means for the accomplishment of its mission.¹⁴⁰ Recent mediation efforts, focused on advancing intercommunal talks between the two Cypriot communities, have a new important characteristic. Only in the 1990s Greece and Turkey had been drawn directly into and consulted about the details of a settlement. Clearly, any sort of negotiated solution to the conflict will require these two countries to agree to a settlement that is negotiated by the leaders of the two Cypriot communities. The historical record of mediation until now shows that, when a proposed settlement has not the endorsement of the one or other of the two countries, neither country has hesitated to use its influence on its representative community to undermine or stop the proposal.¹⁴¹ An additional barrier to resolution has been the obvious reluctance of USA and NATO to put real pressure to the two motherlands of the Cypriot communities to resolve their differences over Cyprus (first mandatory step of an effective conflict resolution). During the Cold War the need to maintain the unity on NATO's southern flank was paramount and superseded the objective of achieving a permanent solution to the Cyprus problem. With the end of the Cold War, the Soviet threat has been replaced by troubles in the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf. These crises have had a higher priority than Cyprus in the

¹⁴⁰ While on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, the Secretary General supported that no solution can be found and the status quo is unlike "to change on an agreed basis as long as there is, both on the island and in the region, a lack of political will for such change." He became also as specific as he could by talking about "an already familiar scenario: the absence of agreement due essentially to the lack of political will on the Turkish Cypriot side." UN doc. S/ 1994/ 629, 30 May 1994, par. 52&53.

¹⁴¹ Stearns, M., *Entangled Allies: U.S Policy Toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus*, pp. 107-116, New York, 1992.

overall concerns of NATO and the USA. With respect to the USA, the more powerful mediator is unlikely to do more than for a timely help in case of a conflict on Cyprus. Even though the USA has a strong interest to contribute to the solution of Cyprus impasse since it is directly influencing the Greek-Turkish relations, there are several reasons why the USA is likely to be reluctant to act. Despite its overall interest in peace, many of the rest of the US' interests in the region are conflicted and this is likely to lead to a degree of inaction. For USA, the safest approach is to do more of the same, using temporary solutions and equal pressure on both sides. It is a politically realistic view- no matter that it promises few or no lasting results.

As a reward for the participation of Turkey in the 1991 Gulf War, member states of the Alliance continued to transfer arms to Turkey, while Washington and European arms manufacturers endorsed Turkey's ambitious military-modernization program. The WEU extended associate membership, in 1992, and voting privileges to Turkey, in 1995.¹⁴² The primacy of post-Cold War geopolitical considerations has also encouraged Euro-USA strategists, to see Turkey's democratization process and economic modernization through the priority of military considerations. The EU ratified a customs union with Turkey in 1995 with the same consideration.¹⁴³ So, there is a strong interest of

¹⁴² WEU (Western European Union) is a military alliance to effect collective security for its member states which emerged from the Treaties of Dunkirk (1947) and Brussels (1948). It was founded in 1954, as an added forum of security and co-operation in the Europe. Increased efforts at European integration have led the WEU more effective.

¹⁴³ In assumption the strategic value of Turkey presents the following: It has a population of 61 millions, occupies one of the most strategic positions in the world, sharing borders with Syria, Iraq, and Iran, not to mention the Balkans and several countries on the southern flank of the former Soviet Union. The country supplied, as a member of NATO, bases and troops, most recently in the Gulf War. It has an overwhelming importance to USA as a strategic ally in a highly volatile Islamic region. Washington is counting on it to be a bulwark against the spread of Islamic fundamentalism into Europe. Turkey is also

the West to help Turkey in his entrance to the European family, as a serious effort to avoid the isolation of Turkey, a very important Islamic ally with borders very near to the oil regions of Middle East.^{144 145} Thus, the interest of Turkey to align with the European norms and international law could create the condition of a “hurting stalemate” for the Cyprus problem with the parallel diplomatic effort of USA, Greece and the Cyprus official government. Greece also presents the advantage that is already an active member

among the most industrialized nations outside of America, Western Europe, and Japan, and it aspires to be an economic hub for the vast region that surrounds it. Its strong historical and ethnic ties to neighboring countries, as well as its huge market and its commercial expertise, put it in a good position to achieve this aim, especially after the application of sounder budget policies and privatization of state-owned firms. It is already the largest U.S trading partner in the region, but the potential is much greater. A new direction in politics comes at a time when Turkey’s young and growing population base means that over 600,000 males annually reach military age, a number second in the NATO only to that in the United States. By maintaining the size of its Armed Forces relative to the declining force levels of other NATO states, Turkey maintains an additional advantage. The vulnerability of Turkey contrasted with its increasing importance underscores the challenge of solving outstanding issues, like the Cyprus problem, with its NATO ally and neighbor Greece.

¹⁴⁴ The strategic game at this moment favors mostly Turkey. The NATO forces believe that the Russia can not react under the present situation to the Western imposition in Central Europe, to the former zone of Russian influence (Balkans, Caucasus, Caspian Sea, former Turkish speaking Soviet Democracies), and in the region of Middle East. But after the operation against Serbia in Kosovo, Russia increased the military expenditures and decided to modernize its nuclear armory. The new Russian President Putin promises to level importantly the Russian defense spending. In response USA and its allies improve a policy with the following bases: (1) Turkey very powerful and with close connection with the EU; (2) Balkans under the control by the NATO forces; (3) Middle East with the dominance of peripheral forces Israel and Turkey. The Greek foreign policy contributes to this policy but sometimes there are some serious security issues to anticipate. Pry, V.P., *War Scare*, pp.272-293, Praeger Press, 1999, Platias, A., “The Nuclear Uncertainty,” *Ta Nea*, 21 January 2000, Betinakis, K., “The Forgotten Treat,” *Ta Nea*, 27 April 2000 and Stophopoulos, T., “Cold War Issues,” *Ta Nea*, 24 February 2000.

¹⁴⁵ To this effort USA influenced and approved the decision of Greece to withdraw the veto that Greece had imposed to the EU against the acceptance of Turkey in the union as a candidate member. President Clinton sent warm letter to the prime minister of Greece and the American Ambassador in Athens N. Berns declared that: “I foresee that the decision of EU will inaugurate a new era in the attempts of peace solution in the Greek-Turkish problems and it will positively influence the mediation of Cyprus issue.” Papachelas, A., “Pressure of Washington,” *To Bhma*, 12 December 1999. It is also remarkable that in a previous EU leaders meeting in Cardiff (June 1998) President Clinton had tried to change the decision – veto of Greece about the entrance of Turkey in EU with the argument that “it might lead to a tension in the area.” Kinzer S., “Greece and Turkey Revive Dispute Over Cyprus,” *New York Times*, 20 June 2000.

of the EU.¹⁴⁶ So, the Cyprus problem could be connected with the peace process that has already began within this sensitive region of the world.

The latest argument that we have to examine covers the reasons that justify the interest of the EU for the Cyprus problem. The EU looks in the present time as the more efficient and hopeful mediator. Accession to the EU is a two-way relationship. Cyprus has a lot to gain from it, but it can also make a contribution in the creation of a unified Europe that will enjoy prosperity and security. Cyprus has a substantive significance as Europe's last base in the Mediterranean. The island can contribute greatly in the creation of a European security system that will safeguard the defense and security interests of the union in a region that is very near to the oil regions of Middle East. It should be asserted that Cyprus has excellent relations with all the Middle East countries. Thus, the island could serve as an economic, political, and cultural link between the EU and that important geopolitical region.¹⁴⁷ Cyprus can play a role as bridge for cooperation among Europe, the Mediterranean basin, and the Middle East. It can be added that Cyprus has already chosen by many multinational firms as a location for their regional activity, thus having

¹⁴⁶ A relative comment after the accession of Turkey as a candidate member of EU: "Ankara must apprehend that it receives a historical opportunity to escape from the cast of mind of the past and to contribute like a European country. With this way the country will solve the problems with its neighbors, but also its huge internal problems, which have guide the country to its present prick and stagnancy." Kartalis, J., "The Sighs of a New Era," *To Bhma*, 12 December 1999. An other comment: "With a nudge from the USA, Turkey early today put economic promise ahead of national pride by accepting an invitation to EU membership that might ultimately scuttle its disputed claims to Cyprus and several Aegean islands." Williams J.C., "Turkey Oks Offer for membership in E.U.," *Los Angeles Times*, 11 December 1999.

¹⁴⁷ Laipson supports that European see that their national security and stability affected by what happens in the Middle East. The more important factor is the demographics of the area. They watched warily the population bomb on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean (especially the populations of Turkey and Egypt). The second very important factor is economic interdependence and especially on dependence on region's oil. Laipson, E., "Europe's Role in the Middle East: Enduring Ties, Emerging Opportunities," *The Middle East Journal*, V. 44, No 1, pp.7-17, winter 1990

establishing regional headquarters. Wilson also comments that the commercial relations between Europe and Middle East are declining in significance. There is a little sign of any promising regional economic cohesion in the region. The trade links remain weak, labor mobility is declining, and governmental financial transfers have virtually ceased.¹⁴⁸ The entrance of Cyprus in the EU will create new perspectives. Cyprus will be a new place of economical interaction and cooperation between the two large geographical regions. Advantages of the island are besides of its location, the availability of highly educated managerial and technical staff, the excellent transportation and communication networks, and other infrastructure including a legal system based on internationally accepted principles of jurisprudence, low taxes, and special motives for the establishment of new enterprises. Thus, Cyprus offers EU in general, possibilities for enhancing their political, economic, cultural and strategic interests in this region.

¹⁴⁸ Wilson, R., "The Economic Relations of the Middle East: Toward Europe or Within the Region," *Middle East Journal*, V. 48, No.2, pp. 268-287, spring 1994. It is also characteristic that the trade of EU with the OPEC countries have a share of 7,5 % of EU exports and 8,2% of EU imports and with the Non-EU Mediterranean countries 11,1% of EU exports and 8,6% of EU imports (Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, European Union report, 1998). The percentage is low according to two factors: geographical distance and potentiality of these markets.

VI. ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION

A. STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

The thesis foresees the future of the Cyprus problem through two different scenarios, projective environments. The first scenario suggests that the international conditions will allow to the Cyprus issue to meet an interdependent, transnational, and globalized culture even if both Cypriot communities' stances on sovereignty are prevented this at the moment. This obliges the disputants to take risks and to make concessions; this also requires new frameworks. Greek Cypriots seem to be willing to move out into a new framework more contemporary but need the acquiescence of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to do so. The EU can ideally embark on a federal project for a better future and Cyprus needs also to create a suitable political culture and civil society.

A 'Federation' as a solution requires reciprocal contribution and adjustment to the separate conditions of the island. What is needed is a complex and transnational entity, in which governance is completely legitimate and is according to a much wider set of principles that will secure the anticipation of the two communities according to the percentage of population that they possess. This framework would secure the application of international norms of pluralism and multi-ethnicity, human rights and prosperity. The bad experience of the 1960 constitution could provide with a lot of lessons-learned as a serious effort of avoiding the same errors. As mentioned in the previous chapters, the success of this operation would be the resultant of the two axes: the escape of the two

Cypriot communities by the strong ethno-nationalist sentiments and the exception of the Cyprus problem from the agenda of the Greek-Turkish problems. It would probably make it easier for Greece and Turkey to accommodate each other. This would certainly facilitate Turkey's relationship with the EU and would guide to a federal solution of Cyprus stalemate with the EU sphere of influence. From this perspective, NATO will have a regional peace dividend in its southern region, and would ease Euro-American tensions associated with the EU's stance on Turkey.

The first scenario has only one option –solution of the problem: Reintegration with the parallel achievement of a sustainable peace on the island. The supporters of this option, as Prodromou emphasizes, see “institutional power sharing as a way to square the circle between democracy and nationalism by constructing a liberal politico-economic system that avoids the potential excesses of the unfettered majority (fear of Turkish Cypriots) and prevents a tyranny of the unfettered majority (as greek Cypriots fear).” It must also apply to economic mechanisms designed to give both communities a stake in the country's economic development.¹⁴⁹ Basic precondition for this settlement will consist of a new effort of the USA towards Turkey to a decisive democracy promotion with the parallel enforcement in this country to contribute to an island's problem settlement, a fact that will increase its reliability in the NATO and EU organs.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁹ Prodromou, E., “Reintegrating Cyprus, the need for a New Approach,” *Survival: IISS Quarterly*, pp.7-21, autumn 1998.

¹⁵⁰ Wilkinson, M.J. , pp10-24. Wilkinson also notes: “The USA is best placed to be the region's honest broker. As demonstrated in the Imia incident, Washington can mediate agreements that the two sides could not achieve directly between themselves. Moreover, it is only the Americans who have the a credible capability to intervene militarily in the region. The USA, of course has its own reasons to be engaged. The strategic importance of Greece and Turkey is unquestioned, given their historical ties with the United

The alternative scenario of the Cyprus issue emphasizes the point that Turkey will decide to continue to show its local power in the Eastern Mediterranean.¹⁵¹ The country will continue to exploit its geopolitical position and its Islamic character with the full coverage of the USA, since it serves a precious ally in a strategically important region. The effect of Turkey's strategic upgrade has been to maintain continuity in the West's policy towards Turkey in the immediate post-Cold war years. Furthermore, the role of the military in the domestic political scene of Turkey will be seen as a very determinant factor, too.¹⁵² Thus, Turkey's stance, with a solution of the Cyprus problem far from its

States, critical geographic location, NATO membership, and the extensive military facilities potentially available to U.S. forces in a crisis."

¹⁵¹ It is characteristic that the decision-acceptance of Turkey in the EU as a candidate member created two different schools of thoughts in this country. The first supposes that the success was product of the recognition of Turkey as a 'strategic player of Europe,' and Europe adopted the American view about the role and significance of Turkey. The second that the success was result of European activation with a little help by the USA. It is apparent that the two different schools react in a different way to the European invitation. Kourkoulas, A., "Tambere Divides Turkey," *To Bhma*, 24 October 1999. However, both of two schools share the same opinion about the position of Turkey to the borders of European and Asian continents. As the Foreign Minister of this country emphasizes: " Turkey has a geo-strategic dimension that it previously was not very conscious of. The downfall of the old Soviet order, a lot of new problems but also a lot of new chances surfaced. Something like 20 countries with whom we have historical and cultural affinities became independent states. These changes, and a growing consciousness of our European and Asian identity, have provided us with a new approach to this vast area instead of just being concentrated on one thing. That fixation was the result of a limited outlook, of feeling that we had to resolve a conflict over whether we are European or Asian. Culturally, historically and geographically, we are a global state, and now we are becoming more aware of that." Kinzel, S., "Turkey Finds New Friends," *New York Times*, 28 Dec 1997.

¹⁵² The role of military in the political scene of Turkey is a serious problem and creates a lot of doubts on Turkey's readiness to join EU. There are also a lot of anomalies in the work of public authorities, human rights are persistently violated and minorities are not treated according the EU-standards. The standards of human rights, democracy and the role of law do not follow European lines. The situation of economic , social and cultural rights is quite distorted. The rights to associate and to strike for instance are subject to a number of restriction. Freedom of expression in media is provided by Turkish legislation. In the end the governmental situation has been very unstable in the past years. Riemer, A., pp.13-17. Additionally, the following articles give the size of the problem. Zaman emphasizes: "Turkey is playing a growing strategic role as a bridge between Europe and the oil-rich Caspian Sea region, as a bulwark against hostile regimes in Iran and Iraq and a stabilizing force for in the Balkans. Many officials wonder whether Turkey will be prepared to yield huge chunks of its sovereignty to a supra-national body in Brussels. In the near future, the most delicate issue is the continuing intervention of the Turkish military in foreign and

interests, increased tensions, delayed EU accession, hurt tourism that makes a primary economic source for all the parties of the dispute, and war calculations will also improve to the strategic game of the region. The Greek-Greek Cypriot axis will respond with a new a deterrence plan, new programs of obtaining modern weaponry since there are enough economic capabilities to do so, and a new warming of a joint defense dogmas.¹⁵³ Ethno-nationalism and antagonistic tactics will arise again, and the Cyprus' stalemate will continue to exist for the future years.

There are two solutions–options in the occasion of the second scenario: status quo that consists of a common BATNA of the two Cypriot communities, and partition. The first option as already illustrated to the analysis of the Conflict, in the chapter V of this thesis, is unsustainable and irrelevant to any efforts towards meaningful peace building in Cyprus. At the same time the strong militarisation of Cyprus and the recent events, like

domestic policy... For most pro –Western Turks, both EU membership and the army's role are viewed as the most solid guarantees against the treat of Islamic militancy. Relinquishing one in favor of the other will be a tough choice." Zaman, A., " Turkey Pledges to Meet Terms," *Washington Post*, 29 Jan 2000. Generally, EU waits that the Turkish military will relinquish their decisive role that they have on politics for about 76 years now, as the guardians of the cosmic character of the Turkish State. Europe is absolute about this fact and there is no possibility to be tolerant to it. But from the other side the governors of the Turkish army are reluctant to accept it. Boudreaux, R., "Turkish Military Sees EU Entry Terms as a Threat to its Power," *Los Angeles Times*, 5 Mar 2000, and the Associated Press, "Turkey Military Discusses Election," *New York Times*, 14 April 2000. Betinakis, in the end, comments to the same point: " Turkey plans to spend for its defense spending program about 150 billions dollars until the year 2030. This huge armory program enforces drastically the Turkish generals, who don't interest a lot about democratic ideologies. Someone must persuade them that they, the real representatives of Kemal ideology, must stay in the margin in favor of what they dreamed about so much time: The attachment of Turkish State in the West." Betinakis, K., " New Scenery," *Ta Nea*, 14 Dec 1999.

¹⁵³ This situation will create new tensions and a new cycle of instability to this sensitive corner of the Mediterranean Sea. A relative comment that emphasizes the danger from Prof. Teti Frank: "The weapons don't change the strategy but change the national objectives." NS 4230/ seminar in strategic planning. . Moustakis and Sheehan also add the risk of war between the countries is real was demonstrated when Greece became a member of the WEU. The WEU states attached a protocol to the article of Greek accession declaring that the Article 5 defence guarantee would not apply to war between Greece and another NATO member. Moustakis, F., and Sheehan, M., "Earthquake Heals Aegean Rift," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, V. 11, No 12, p.12, Dec 1999.

the Imia-incident, episodes on the "Green line," arm-race, S-300 acquisition, are the most urgent warning sign of a profound change to the island's situation. The possibility of new incidents remains so high that allies of both states concerned with maintaining regional peace and stability, must constantly engage in defusing minor crises and confrontations in order to avoid real and deadly conflict.

The second solution refers to the island's de jure division along lines consistent with the de facto separation, which aggravate regional conflicts and potential hot-spots, exacerbate bilateral tensions between Greece and Turkey, and guide the arm-race to new efforts. Prodromou also emphasizes three serious consequences of the last option that affect seriously the issue of peace in the Eastern Mediterranean: First, partition would institutionalize the premise that the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities are incapable of peaceful co-existence within a unified state, thus diminishing the likelihood of long-term peace in regions with a history of intra- and inter-state conflict along ethnic lines. Second, by recasting relations between the two states in terms of hostile ethnic entities, partition would undermine the possibilities of Cyprus to become the key to a broader Greek-Turkish rapprochement. And third, the partition would send mixed messages regarding the normative and strategic importance of democracy to transatlantic peace-builders. It is more apparent on the Turkish Cypriot side, where the satisfaction of Turkey's with the parallel conservation of the same Turkish Cypriot leader since 1973 have precluded any accurate evaluation of the indigenous Turkish Cypriot's population's wishes about their future. Thus, partition creates the very outcomes its advocates want to avoid and, as such is an irrational choice for maximizing transatlantic strategic

interests.¹⁵⁴ From this point of view, a division of the island or recognition of the TRNC will be disastrous, as it would not reduce the security dilemma of the four main parties, and neither would it reduce the nationalist ideologies. The division of the island in two different states would perpetuate perceptions of injustice and continue the current security problems.

The fact is that Turkey faces major choices in its domestic and foreign politics, many of which involve cementing its relations towards the West or facing increasing isolation at least from the west. The Cyprus solution will greatly facilitate its western orientation. Since the fact that the Turkey and Turkish Cypriot sides are obviously the less flexible at the Cyprus' table of negotiations, there are some actions that could positively influence the international community. So, they could gain credibility in the West by withdrawing from parts of the land on island, apologizing for the illegal aspects of the 1974 invasion, or for the lethal brutality along the buffer zone in 1996.^{155 156}

¹⁵⁴ Prodromou, E., pp.10-11.

¹⁵⁵ We must refer that the Cyprus problem is not necessarily the first thing Europe States think about when assess Turkey's human rights record. There is more the violation of human rights from the Kurdish problem. But Cyprus has the advantage that is more directly connect with issues of NATO/Western solidarity. We emphasize also the recent official declaration of German EU commissioner Gunter Verheugen, responsible for the EU expansion's issues that Turkey will be treated by the EU just as any other candidate country, and we are not going to make discounts on accession criteria for its sake...and the EU waits a final arrangement of Cyprus issue. Associated Press: Royter, 12 Apr.2000. Another article also emphasizes the difficulties that will have the final acceptance of Turkey in Europe. It is from an ambassador from EU: "Turks say they are willing to talk about technical matters like financing and development projects, but not about political matters. When they talk to a country, they want to discuss the full range of our concerns, which in the case of Turkey means democracy, human rights, the Kurdish issue, and at this point the Ocalan trial. Since they refuse to do that, the dialogue is practically frozen." Kinzer, S., "Europe's Tie to Turkey Turns Chillier," *New York Times*, 14 March 1999.

¹⁵⁶ The strategic assessment of the position of Turkey in Europe also notes the following characteristic points: "Of all NATO members, Turkey is the most strategically located and the least secure. Turkey is experiencing Islamic movements, demographic pressures, and economic stress, secular political parties are weak and have yielded to the military's influence. Ankara's crackdowns on the Kurds in northern

B. A PROCESS WITH FLEXIBILITY FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

A process with flexibility for the establishment of a solution must first of all exclude one occasion. It will assure that first of all the ethno-nationalism and tensions caused thereby are absent from the diplomatic table. This is because a federal solution attempted in the middle of moderate or high level of bi-communal tension will instead exacerbate problems and lead to a wider conflict. The experience of a premature federal solution in 1960 is a strong proof of it. The lack of trust for the intentions of the other side, fears of domination by a more powerful adversary, the resulting high uncertainty about the prospects of amicable cohabitation and cooperation, and the actions of other party especially the distinct possibility of loss of the game take a bad turn (premature breakdown), and might make even a well-intended party reluctant to gamble anything of the make first recessions in a centralized federal solution. This is the main reason that the thesis will accept the proposal of Hadjipavlou and Trigeorgis according to this as the only way to test each other's intentions in practice without risking ruin is precisely first to try an integrated solution on a limited scale, with an option to expand in case of success and

Iraq have complicated relations with Iraq, Syria, and the EU. Turkish instability threatens U.S interests in the Middle East, Central Asia, and potentially NATO. The EU has denied Turkey the candidate status it seeks while giving it to Cyprus, alienating Turkey's leaders. Citing shortcomings in democratic development and human rights as well as the Cyprus situation, the EU is unlikely to consider Turkey for membership as long as it continues to repress Kurdish nationalists and reject a political settlement for Cyprus, and while Turks continue migrating in large numbers to Western Europe. This has alienated many Turks, who increasingly look to the Caucasus and Central Asia for markets. Turkey has a large military establishment of 639,000 troops, which includes 15 division-equivalents, 440 combat aircraft, and 37 naval combatants. Turkey is modernizing its forces and improving readiness. NATO reinforcement would be needed to defend against major aggression." Strategic Assessment, National Defense University, *"Europe: How much Unity, How Effective,"* p.77. US Printing Office, Washington, 1999.

an option to contract/ abandon with limited losses in the event of failure.¹⁵⁷ This proposal for limited application of a centralized federal solution with powerful guarantees will connect with the success of “pre-negotiation cycle” of Mitchell’s model and aims to avoid a premature breakdown of the settlement’s process. Mitchell’s dynamic protraction model of de-escalation shows how conflicts may circle back to earlier stages. But the successful and well-trained third-party mediation must apply different roles at different stages in the process of conflict management. In Cyprus’ protracted regional conflict this obtain primary significance because the history of the conflict teaches about continual breakdowns with terrific consequences.¹⁵⁸

A cooperative solution based on satisfying underlying needs and long –term interests rather than compromising on positions can be better pursued in an environment where formal negotiations are preceded by a flexible, interactive, noncommittal process of informal prenegotiation. The intercommunal contacts must first of all encourage and facilitate at all levels by an efficient third-party mediator. The rewards also for the disputants’ parties with a final settlement will also facilitate the procedure. Generally, the costs and the values of the rewards themselves have an impact on their desirability for

¹⁵⁷ Hadjipavlou, M and Trigeorgis, L, “An Evolution Approach to Conflict Resolution,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, V. 37, No.2, p.352, June 1993. The thesis will make application of the Mitchell model (Chapter II) for the conflict resolution of the Cyprus conflict.

¹⁵⁸ The London-Zurich accords of 1959, which led to the Constitutional Accord of 1960, are a striking example of a mature political settlement: It failed because: (1) it was imposed by third parties; (2) it was too rigid to address the needs and interests of the two Cypriot communities; (3) there was minimal third-party involvement in implementation, particularly when disputes arose over implementation of key provisions in the Constitution and without a controlled testing period. Thus, the accords contributed to the outbreak of conflict; the legacy of that failure has yet to be overcome. Basic effort of the thesis is to avoid a premature breakdown.

both the parties making the demand and the deciding whether they accept or reject a settlement proposition.¹⁵⁹ In addressing the challenge of creating an environment conducive to the development of mutual reassurance and confidence building it is urgent a negotiated agreement is following by steps of conciliation and testing, before the full-implementation of the agreed federal structure.

The success of a "pre-negotiation" effort (or Druckman's 'give and take' period) can connect with the creation of a "rivalry mature environment." It is based, according to a theory of Kuenne, in a prospective interaction of decisions to take place in a manner that restrains conflict through the fostering of mind-sets, institutions, and conditions that enhance cooperation. It is the required environment for the implementation of an integrated solution on a limited scale in the first period and with the intention to expand in a final period to the entire island. A state of mature rivalry is characterized by the existence of the following attributes: (1) The attainment of assured positions of eminence within the community by similarly situated rivals; (2) rapid and extensive flows of information among rivals concerning their autonomous actions; (3) an assurance of rapid responses by rivals to one's autonomous actions with the clear potential to neutralize

¹⁵⁹ We refer the offer of the USA that it must keep on the table of negotiations of an aid of \$250 millions to finance special projects that are contingent on steps taken toward the reunification of Cyprus. An also useful instrument could be the stopping of the embargo to the Turkish Cypriot party. Additionally, according to a study of Sorokin, states or parties will be more likely to accept rewards when the rewards are valuable and the demands are small. But from the other side, although offering a reward increases the probability of compliance without the use of violent methods or even the use of military force, it is no guarantee of achieving compliance mostly with political demands. The primary advantage of rewards is they are less risky than threats. Rewards yield compliant behavior with little downside: as long as the cost of the reward is relatively low, then parties should be expected to prefer the low-risk strategy to the uncertainty and high costs of military conflict. This could have an ideal application on Cyprus issue. The thesis believes that Turkey will try to eliminate the cost of occupation of the northern part of the island in the near future.

anticipated gains or render them negative in prospect; (4) Risk-averse attitudes by rivals to autonomous actions that may directly or indirectly threaten seriously their assured positions within the community; and (5) a sufficient time span of coexistence to assure rivals of the indefinite maintainability of these community characteristics.¹⁶⁰ Practically, the rivals will be the two Cypriot communities; the place of interaction will consist during the pre-negotiation stage of a common commercial zone for the two communities.¹⁶¹ It would be open without any restriction to members of the two communities at any time. The extension of this zone will depend of a common decision of the two communities with the presence of the third-party mediator. A first thought is an extension of 5-7% of the island's territory, in the beginning stage. It will be the place of testing a limited in size cooperative, interactive and centralized federal governance with the contribution of the two Cypriot communities. At the same time the two parties continue to maintain two separate, decentralized zones to alleviate insecurities, fears of domination, and initial aversion to change and mostly to maintain a fallback position. The Turkish troops could remain temporarily in the Turkish controlled zone to help alleviate Turkish Cypriot fears of insecurity, although it would be desirable if both sides reduce troops to an equal and limited level. But, the common zone must be demilitarized (See Appendix A).

Sorokin, L.G., "The Role Of Rewards in Conflictual International Interactions," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, V.40, No 4, pp. 659-677, December 1996.

¹⁶⁰ Kuenne E. R., "Conflict Management in Mature Rivalry," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, V.33, No 3, pp.554- 565, September 1999.

¹⁶¹ The first thought about this zone was also included in the proposals of UN Boutros Boutros Ghali about the confidence -building measures..” Crawshaw, N., “ Cyprus; a Crisis of Confidence,” *The World Today, Royal Institute of International Studies*, V. 50, No 4, pp. 70-73, April 1994.

In a testing period of certain time (maybe 3-5 years) the zone will receive policing and justice functions administered by the UN and proper international committees (with the auspice of EU in cooperation with the UN) with a specific area of interest that will assure and control the success of the stage in a possibly risk-averse attitude by rivals to autonomous actions with the danger of a premature break-down. All these committees during the application of the stage would be under the control of a main third-part mediator, probably from the EU, with the proper training and with the intension of establishing a healthy mediation process. These committees would temporarily change to federal ministries with a certain area of interest. The emphasis and the attention in this zone should be on creating the social-psychological, educational-developmental, economic, and institutional infrastructure and first of all to the cultivation of fruitful cohabitation and cooperation into essential application in a centralized federal system in the common zone. The establishment of a "rivalry mature environment" will be in plain words a development model toward a centralized federal system, which uses the mediation as an instrument. It is a process in a context of developing relationships; beginning before the actual bargaining and long after a mutual agreement is reached. It will improve also a continual exchange of information between the two Cypriot communities with the full coverage of Cyprus media. Providing channels of communication and verifying information facilitates the prenegotiation stage and help to prevent breakdowns in negotiation. Information is one of the most powerful instruments of influence, but the extent to which information tools can be mobilized and used to reach the rivals is a major determinant of success in a de-escalation model. The focus should be

on healing, conciliation, and gestures of goodwill to build trust and confidence, and allow the two sides in a joint search toward resolving the conflict cooperatively. The developmental process will be less structured and more flexible, permitting significant learning to occur that allows the two Cypriot communities to approach each other and to cultivate trust and reciprocity. It would also encourage the parties to move away from formal positions and to express more freely their true interests and needs with the parallel attainment of assured positions of eminence.

During this period, distractions from implementing a federal structure and political complications should be limited. Turkish Cypriots will obtain the much-needed recognition and acceptance by the international community, an end to the economic embargo, and an improved standard of living through economic cooperation in a Cyprus that works in line with European norms. The Greek Cypriot side, in return of donating political recognition and accepting some painful realities, would obtain greater flexibility for the return of more refugees on a greater piece of land, increased security, an ideal opportunity to demonstrate in action its good intentions for cooperation and a reward of extending the centralized federal system with the proper conditions and guarantees for further development. The benefit also for the two motherlands is that they will liberate from one of the most serious problems and will direct their interest to the other issues. This joint area as an experimental nucleus of a cooperative, interactive, centralized federation that could potentially and gradually expand to the whole island on successful intercommunal action. Another proposition could be a democratic referendum after a

phase of 5 or 10 years, separately conducted in the two Cypriot communities. The result could guide the further motions.

The next Mitchell's stage is the "consolidation stage" that will stabilize the already developing infrastructure, before ratifying the full-scale resolution. Another critical point of this operation will depend from the strategy that the third-party mediator must follow during the "pre-negotiation" stage. Last's model can assure an atmosphere conducive to positive contribution of the disputants and facilitate the settlement and resolution. It will assure the success of the previous proposal-settlement. One can note, something very important for the Cyprus problem, the decreasing military role the model introduces in its application. At the tactical level of his cooperation there will be improvement of the following techniques: (1) Constabulary intervention, which deters the actions of opposing forces. UNFICYP must undertake this role with the purpose to halt or deter actions of the parties. It is mainly a defensive tactic, but its limitation is a basic requirement of settlement process. This duty must be extended to maintain rule of law over the belligerent forces, with their active consent and cooperation; (2) Go-between mediation, which prevents misinterpretation of the other side's actions, further stifling escalating violence and also to keep open communication channels. The third-party mediator acts in the presence of both parties at the same time, holding well-organized meetings. This role can help to preserve stability and enhance confidence in a congenial environment; (3) Conciliation, which consists of actions and discussions to reduce the hostility each opposing force, feels for the other. In the process, conciliation erodes

negative stereotypes that characterize conflict; (4) Education and attitude change, as a part of comprehensive strategy of reconciliation. It is also apart of Secretary General's "Set of ideas."¹⁶² This is just one of the many points at which civilian agencies and the mediation need to coordinate their activities.

It consists a basic point for the development of the federal state. Last's technique applies mostly to the effort of third-party mediator to help belligerents move beyond of a possible impasse by providing assurances and incentives. Polter also proposes the use of team negotiators under a central control of a chief/central mediator. These teams will ideally consist the committees of control according to the previous plan of organizing a common zone. From an intergroup relations perspective, their competitive orientation and low levels of cooperation and trust may impede teams. But, from a cognitive perspective, advantages should accrue to teams because more people are present to generate additional ideas, bring a greater number of perspectives to the problem, and perform strategically important roles during the negotiation. The advantage is that teams outperformed

¹⁶² A proposal was: "a bi-communal committee will be established to review the text books used in schools on each side and make recommendations for the removal of material that is contrary to the population of goodwill and close relations between the two communities, the committee may also recommend positive measures to promote that objective." UN S/ 2472 21 Aug 1992, paragraph 23. In another report the S.G report: "Both sides must work more effectively to promote tolerance and reconciliation. Both have been going in this respect... the two sides, despite their professed aim of forging an agreed settlement and creating a bicommunal and bizonal federation, carry out an endless propaganda campaign against each other that is incompatible with this objective. Even school textbooks are not exempt from that campaign." UN S/ 26777, 22 Nov 1993, paragraph 102. In that direction, an establishment of a common committee from Greek and Turkish Cypriot scholars, with the help of experts from EU and UN, for a common historical project about the political history of Cyprus and the review of the text-books of the two communities schools would help bring the two sides closer.

individual opponents and were perceived as having more power and more ideas for a settlement.¹⁶³

Briefly, principled negotiation and integrative negotiating techniques are applicable to all stages of the de-escalation model. The root of the Cyprus regional conflict is the problem of security dilemmas. Thus, any professional consultation and problem-solving workshops must adopt this target. The mediator must secure the extermination of this fear after initial segregation and before the links between communities atrophy. Basic instruments that he will use in his effort are diplomatic/political influence, the proper use of information and economic instruments. Each of these instruments can be used to influence the process of the settlement. It is also apparent that the mediation must have close cooperation and coordination with UNFICYP, which remains indispensable part of this plan. Certainly, the dividing line between the military and diplomatic responsibilities during the pre-negotiation stage will not be as sharp and clear but at the operational level, it is essential (See figure 2).¹⁶⁴

¹⁶³ Polter, J., "Intergroup Negotiations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, V. 40, No 4, pp.678-697, December 1996.

¹⁶⁴ Last, M. D., "Theory, Doctrine and Practice of Conflict De-Escalation in Peacekeeping Operations," pp.120-123, Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, 1997.




Figure2: Contact Skills and Stages of De-Escalation, Last.

The end-solution would be a federal state with the structure and function according to the proposal of UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali: A federal system in which general and local administrative units-the two Cypriot sides- coexist with shared and independent powers, neither having supreme authority over the other. With the previous thoughts Mitchell's consolidation and the final resolution (or Druckman's endgame) must conclude the following basic points: a single federal government with one international personality, dominated by Greek Cypriots but with Turkish Cypriots holding significant offices, delineated veto powers and government positions according to their population's percentage, i.e. ethnic proportionality in the allocation of certain opportunities and offices, mutual veto in decision-making; two state governments each possessing considerable autonomy (ethnic autonomy); essential bizonality, with controls

on the rights of refugees to return to their homes ;¹⁶⁵ a Turkish sector reduced from its 30 or less percent of the overall territory of the island, with the once flourishing city of Varosha and its environs returned to the Greek-Cypriot province, which means reciprocated concessions; a phased withdrawal of Turkish and Greek forces at a speed and to a level acceptable to both communities and after the mutual improvement of the confidence; continued guarantor rights for at least Greece and Turkey; activation of the official federal state in the European organs with representatives from both of the two Cypriot communities as a product of elections for this purpose and percentage of deputies according to the population of the two communities; provisions for peacekeeping forces and new duties about to monitor the provisions of the arrangement only for a certain time; a single currency; a written constitution;¹⁶⁶ a legislature and a court system that can arbitrate disputes between the different communities, which implies a strict depoliticization of the judicial system;¹⁶⁷ and at least three levels of exclusive federal responsibility, bureaucracy, international relations and taxation. The federal government will have independent power that can be increased according to the interpretation of the federal constitution. The cumulative interests of the local units tend to define the joint interests of both Cypriot communities. In the end, the mission of the federal government

¹⁶⁵ The responsibilities of federal government and the two Cypriot communities government would ideally be according to the federal proposal of "Set of Ideas " of Boutros Boutros Ghali. Maybe further research could lead to a percentage participation of the two Cypriot communities in organs like the Council of Ministers and the federal legislature.

¹⁶⁶ The United Nations Charter, the Charter of the European Union, and the European Convention on Human Rights, will become part of the New Constitution of Cyprus as is a prerequisite for membership of these organizations. The 1960 Constitution will be replaced by a new functional constitution.

¹⁶⁷ The legal system must comply with European Court of Justice and Human Rights legislation.

couches in terms of fulfilling the wishes of the inhabitants, promoting their interests and improving the level of their lives.¹⁶⁸ Priority task of this stage is the maintaining of a cooperative, non-adverbial level of relationships, the promoting of a sustainable economic growth, and in the end a peaceful integration process between the two Cypriot communities.

UNFICYP will have a very serious role in this settlement effort and can serve the following functions: to organize policing and justice functions as it was also referred in the common commercial zone; to monitor the withdrawal of mainland military forces on Cyprus and verify the demilitarization; to control and to be always in position to ask an constabulary intervention during the application of the de-escalation model; to supervise or to monitor elections and to help make sure they are fair and honest; to assist with other aspects of civil administration, in particular monitoring aspects of the post-solution government which may depend on various proportions of people from each to work; and to continue to help with coordination with the third-party mediator in such areas as it is the creation of a proper environment for the coordination of bicommunal activities. All the above functions hopefully won't be necessary after the establishment of the resolution stage (or Druckman "endgame").

The ideal guarantee of a previous solution is the full membership of Cyprus state in the EU. It will assure security for both sides; it would provide for the best-protected system against future outside interference; it would influence the trade and enhance

¹⁶⁸ The thesis to this point made an application of Nordlinger theory of "Six successful conflict is regulating practices, "and Lijphart theory of "Democracy in plural societies" to the specific conditions and characteristics of Cyprus regional conflict (Chapter II).

economic opportunities; and it would allow, with the cooperation of UN, the exercise of the fundamental human rights of free movement, settlement, and ownership by all the citizens. It can also secure the political control by the Turkish Cypriots in their zone and alleviate their fears of eventual domination by the majority the Greek Cypriots. For this reason, the EU should be involved early in the process through a consultative, facilitative and supervisory role. It should also improve the Cypriot communities' readiness for compromise by offering substantial financial and political support for both overcoming the existing division after an agreement has been reached between the two Cypriot communities. One element of that support should be a package of pre-accession aid.¹⁶⁹ The EU could also assist the Turkish Cypriot community's readiness for compromise by helping Turkey to a clear and unequivocal perspective of a full EU membership and at the same time to postpone this procedure if there is no likelihood of resolving the Cyprus problem. It is also positive the free zone to adopt the EU standards in all the spheres of activities as well as the European currency with free convertibility to the market rates these measures with additional economic assistance could reinforce the economic effort, to accommodate refugee resettlement, and in the end, to lift the north's standard of life. It is also possible, since the island fulfills all the necessary criteria, to participate in the Monetary Union. In the end, the EU could anticipate and the last problem of this project-settlement: The problem of extension of the presence of UNFICYP on the island. It would be a result of the economical problems of the organization. A solution is the replacement

¹⁶⁹ Kramer, H., "The Cyprus Problem and European Security," *Survival: The IISS Quarterly*, pp. 26-30, autumn 1997.

of the UNFICYP with a European peace building force, either under WEU-control, or as a part of the Reaction Force of the EU that is under consideration, too.¹⁷⁰

C. IMPLICATIONS AND FINAL REMARKS

The Cyprus problem has been in the international agenda not only since Turkey's 1974 invasion but also since then, with increasing importance. In the face of Turkish politics and political behavior, twenty-six years of negotiations have failed to produce a settlement. At the same time, the problem of Cyprus illustrates the inability of a deliberate third-party initiative to encourage Turkey's democratic consolidation and foreign policy behavior according to the international law. Under the previous analysis, a settlement based on a bizonal and bicomunal form of federation seems to be reasonable, feasible and viable. Reintegration versus either maintaining the status quo or formally partitioning the island is the best choice for resolving the problem. It assumes, of course, that all citizens will enjoy universally accepted rights and opportunities all over the island. Given the realities of Cyprus' geography, economy, size, distribution of natural resources, demography and the political failures of the past, a federal solution seems to be the only pragmatic way out of the impasse.¹⁷¹ The prospect of Cyprus' accession to the

¹⁷⁰Until now, WEU is limited mainly to the jobs outlined in a declaration agreed by the WEU Council of Minister in June 1992 at Petersberg, near Bonn; under the 'Petersberg tasks' military units from member states, acting under the authority of the WEU can be used for humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping and other crisis management tasks, including peacemaking, in cooperation with the OSCE and the UN Security Council. Thus, WEU cooperated with NATO in monitoring the UN embargo on Serbia and Montenegro 1993-96, helped to set up a unified Croat-Muslim police force to support the administration of the city of Mostar in Bosnia in 1994-5, and in the end helped restructure and train the Albanian police force in 1997. McCormick, J., "*Understanding the EU*," pp.209-214, St Martin's Press, 1999.

¹⁷¹ To this point the thesis recapitulates the following points: the international situation as it was improved to the Chapter II, the variables-continual steps of conflict resolution as it was improved in

European family provides a unique opportunity for all parties concerned to rise to the occasion and show their commitment to the principles and values that are vital to created the western civilization. A solution to the problem of the island must satisfy the whole population. In any occasion, there is not a solution that includes occupation armies. The Cypriots themselves, especially the Turkish Cypriot leadership, should realize that they would anticipate their problems better through pacific means, political and administrative adjustments, renovation of political thinking and with sincere conciliatory attitudes. No one can doubt that a meaningful political order that will allow the two communities to co-exist in peace and under conditions of stability and security is better than a place of continual military confrontation and dispute.

Only a few months after the entrance of the 21st century, there are some new points that drive a new motivation to resolve the Cyprus issue. As this thesis claims the beginning of the desirable solution, the smoothening of the relations between the two motherlands, is in a new hopeful process. As Kinzer emphasizes, Greek-Turkish relations had been improving slowly for about a year, but it took the harmful earthquakes in both countries to push them toward an indication of friendship. Each sent rescue teams to help the other, and their gestures were greeted by "waves of ecstatic publicity and popular emotion."¹⁷² It was the second catastrophe that added momentum to efforts to bring the

Chapter V and Turkey's acceptance of its west orientation with the introduction of Cyprus solution in the priorities of its foreign policy.

¹⁷² Kinzel, S., "A Sudden Friendship Blossoms Between Greece and Turkey." *New York Times*, 13 Sep. 1999. Two important points according to this article are: First, Nicholas Berns, United States of USA in Athens declared that: "I think we're in the middle of a new phenomenon that you could call seismic diplomacy or earthquake diplomacy. Images that people saw on TV had tremendous political symbolism, and there is an opportunity for both sides to build on that." And the second, with a great influence to the

two countries together. The war in Kosovo was the first. There was a strong cooperation in refugee problems and other matters and it "seemed to emerge with a renewed sense that if they join hands, they can have a decisive effect in shaping events in this region."¹⁷³ The more significant step was the decision of Greece that it would no longer block Turkey's application for membership in the EU.¹⁷⁴ Besides the cooperation in Kosovo and the recent earthquakes Greece acted in a good will with the following actions: (1) the country adopted the Turkish position for cooperation in issues of second significance like the establishment of new activities and cooperation in special activities - tourism, security and economic issues, environment- and decided to abandon the traditional political position that any connection or cooperation of the two countries is dependent first of all, upon progress in Cyprus and Aegean issues. (2) The support of Turkey's candidacy in EU has been made with the same precondition. (3) Greece offered

improvement of the political climate is the changing of the Turkish and Greek press, both of which have for years sought to win readers by fanning the flames of chauvinistic nationalism. According to an article of *Milliyet* a columnist Sami Kohen notes: "Turkish people and Greek people are not enemies of each other. The politicians are the ones who create the crises." Besides to it, the same newspaper sent a note to Greece after the great earthquake of Turkey "Efharisto Poli File" (Thank you my friend). And the newspaper with the largest circulation in Greece answered: "We are all Turks," an astonishing statement in light of the relations between the two countries. It is fact that the positive Greek response led to a major change in the Turkish public's perception of Greece. Moustakis, F., and Sheehan, M., "Earthquake Heals Aegean Rift," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, V. 11, No 12, p.12, Dec 1999.

¹⁷³ Kinzer, S., "A Natural Disaster Helps Draw Two Enemies Closer," *New York Times*, 22 August 1999.

¹⁷⁴ Four are the benefits that Greece expects from the entrance of Turkey in European family: (1) The adaptation by Turkey of European norms will greatly facilitate the solution of the bilateral problems; (2) the Greek enterprises and general economic activities will have a huge market for action very near to the country; (3) The activation of Greece, in a lot of domains of action, in a place where there is historical heritage, since the EU will be a place without borders with free circulation of people, goods and activities; (4) Greece with its political stance in Helsinki summit carry to the part of the Europe the responsibly of democratic transformation of Turkey and the compliance of this country with the orders of international law. Until then, Greece with the continual veto appeared as the clear European impediment of Turkey in its European orientation. However, the entrance of Turkey in EU will need a lot of time.

and will continue to offer to its neighbor technical knowledge in order to help Turkey to its difficult negotiations with the EU.¹⁷⁵

Turkey must understand that it has now a unique historical chance to obtain European identity and to facilitate not only the solution of the problems with its neighbors but also the solution of its serious internal problems that have guided this country to its present instability.¹⁷⁶ An indication, or better, a drastic action of good will by Turkey will greatly facilitate this orientation, since the thesis pointed out that the obstructionism of this party constitutes the most important obstacle to the reintegration of Cyprus. The Cyprus issue is the key-problem that will contribute in the further improvement of the relations between Greece and Turkey. Coercive diplomacy by the USA can also help this effort, in a new dynamic effort of the two motherlands and a third-party mediation effort to connect the two Cypriot communities to establish a functional state that will satisfy the interests of all the Cypriots.¹⁷⁷ ¹⁷⁸ As Crawshaw observes, it is not surprising that the

¹⁷⁵Platias. A., "The Next Motion," *Ta Nea*, 21 April 2000.

¹⁷⁶ Following this policy's direction, the former Chief of Turkish Navy, Admiral Arkagia, introduced a memorandum to the Turkish government on May of 2000. He proposes some measures that will improve drastically the Greek-Turkish relations: the abrogation of 'Aegean's Army Corps', a creative Greek-Turkish dialogue for the solution of the bilateral issues, and abolition of 'casus belli' reasons of war. The Admiral supposes all these successive motives as mandatory requirements for the final acceptance of his country in EU. Thus, all the problems with Turkey's neighbors could anticipate with success by 2004. Kourkoulas, A., "The Wings of the Proposal for the Aegean's Army Corps," *To Bhma*, 28 May 2000. Kinzer also in an article notes in three different occasions a new climate in the Turkish political scene. First, a Turkish prosecutor's announcement that he wanted to indict General Kenan Evren, as a consequence of the military coup that the General had led. The same coup also consist central topic of the two other occasions: the films "After the Wall" and "Where The Rose Wilted." Thus, the journalist points out a new tension, along with other painful episodes in modern Turkish history. They can be discussed more openly than ever before. He carries out also the belief of political leader Mr. Yilmaz that "a part of it comes from our moving closer to the EU." Kinzer, S., "Turkey Reviews the Darkest Hours in Its Painful Past," *New York Times*, 28 May 2000.

¹⁷⁷ Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USA, Greece and Turkey during a meeting in Washington on 3 of May 2000 supported: (1) Greece and Turkey must continue the effort of building good relations; (2)

Greek Cypriots should be reluctant to exchange the monopoly of sovereignty, with its huge advantages, for a constitution that involves sharing power with the Turkish Cypriots. Hope for the future must, therefore, rest with the men of moderation on both sides who recognize that reunification is in the best interests of all the Cypriot people; that sanctions and recriminations can only intensify the conflict.¹⁷⁹

The Cyprus issue also emphasizes that third-party intervention may not be enough to resolve a conflict unless regional actors and interests are included in the peace process. The failure to reach a lasting political settlement to the Cyprus crisis declares the importance of achieving unified political support for negotiations at both the regional and International levels.¹⁸⁰ At the same time, the fact that the two Cypriot communities are not at war points out, from one side, the important role of UNFICYP on the island and

The Cyprus problem consists a priority issue not only for Greece but also for Washington. Turkey must present a new approaching policy for this matter; (3) Greece and Turkey desire to improve new initiatives in the Balkans. Correspondence from New York, "Cyprus problem: Mr. Gem Search Out for a New Approximation of the Cyprus Problem," *kathimerini*, 4 May 2000.

¹⁷⁸ Thesis' proposal for solution of Cyprus problem satisfies a main U.S' national interest: "Basic assurance of international security through maintenance of a relatively stable global and regional order in which states resolve their differences without the use of force, most nations enjoy political stability, and an increasing number of nations either have adopted stable democratic institutions or are engaged in meaningful institutions or are engaged in meaningful movement for that direction." Binnendijk, H., and Clawson, P., "New Strategic priorities," *Washington Quarterly*, pp109-126, spring 1995.

¹⁷⁹ Crawshaw, N., "Cyprus; A Failure in Western Diplomacy," *The World Today*, pp.73-78, February 1984. In this direction a committee of Greek Cypriot jurists from all the political parties works for a plan about a new Constitution and new ideas about the solution of Cyprus problem. Then the National Security Council will talk and approve it. The final plan will consist the official answer of the Cyprus official government to the new mediation effort that aims to the change of the system of governance of the island. The new mediation effort proposes the establishment of a President of Republic without a lot of power in his hand, and will be alternate Greek and Turkish Cypriot. However the Greek- Cypriot side does not accept the proposal of Switcher land Cantons for three reasons: the alternative presidency with the present form, the sovereignty of cantons and the equal representation of cantons. Konstantinides, F., "Nicosia looks the alternative presidency," *Eleutherotypia*, 21 Jan.2000.

¹⁸⁰ Platias notes: "From the Thucydides' era is known that the success of the deep intentions of a state must match with the geopolitical conditions that exist in the international balance of power....In return, every

from the other side the failure of the UN mediation effort to a broader political settlement. It is also clear that a absence of the UN presence on the island, due to the fact that the donor countries have become weary of contributing troops to an operation that has no end, would provoke new political tensions and new fighting to resume.

The proposal of this thesis cannot necessarily resolve the problem. The main effort was to emphasize that any kind of healthy solution must lower the fears, increase the incentives, and enhance the chances for a conductive interaction. There is a need for a new initiative, for a cooperative process in successive phases that would allow learning, flexibility, interaction and reciprocity. Demonstrations of respect, power sharing, monitoring elections to produce interdependence of groups, and the establishment of regional autonomy and federalism are important confidence-building measures that, by promoting the rights and positions of two Cypriot communities, mitigate the security dilemmas that produce violence.¹⁸¹ The proposal is a reintegration option through political-economic power sharing that would form the basis for a long-term process of state building, rather than an unworkable state. It is primarily through the effective use of federal and local government distribution policies and an investment programme to alleviate intercommunal inequalities by fostering a "mature rivalry environment," which means a creative cross-communal competition. It would foster mostly in a liberal-


strategy that does not match with the international environment is condemned to fail." Platias, A., "Convergence of Interests," *Ta Nea*, 10 March 2000.

¹⁸¹ Lake, A.D., and Rothchild, D., "Containing Fear," *Theories of War and Peace*, edited by Brown, E. M., Cote, R. O., Lynnes-Jones, M. S., and Miller, S., pp.292-295, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, 1998.


democratic regime necessary to provide both communities with a sense of political and economic security regarding each other.

The domestic transformation in Cyprus would become a model of similar cases of ethnic conflict and external aggression. However, it is always the danger of exacerbating the conflict, especially if the necessary social-psychological preparation and institutional infrastructure are not ripe. This was the reason why the thesis pointed out the value of a healthy and well-organized pre-negotiation stage, as an attempt to emphasize the danger of a premature implementation, even one including extensive power-sharing provisions—that is, imposed on warring factions, it can exacerbate political relations. Additionally, the international mediation attempts until now had focused mostly on to stabilizing and not on an effective conflict management and a durable political settlement. The successive mediators failed to coordinate the interests at the regional and international level in order to develop a unified intervention strategy. This failure is due more to a lack of ripeness than to what mediators have or have not done. The potential for the end of the impasse should be related to mutual utility calculations. The EU is a solution—challenge, which will allow the two Cypriot communities to reunite their island into a functional state, and to solve their security dilemmas. Cyprus must be a productive part of the European integration process with the parallel safeguard of stability and security on the island.

APPENDIX A



Cyprus at the beginning of 2000.



Cyprus- "UN Non-Map, 1992" : B. Ghalil "Set of Ideas" and Common Commercial Zone.

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