Core Values in Conflict: United States Security Policy and Islamic Extremism in Afghanistan
Abstract
The United States has consistently misjudged the influence of Islamic extremism since the 1979 Iranian revolution. This paper examines the background of contemporary Islamic extremism and American national security responses thereto using Afghanistan as a model. The United States became heavily engaged in Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan War. In the last major surrogate East-West conflict, America supported a variety of opposition groups within Afghanistan, including Islamic extremists who viewed the conflict as a jihad against apostates and unbelievers. Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the West's victory" in the Cold War, United States interest in and understanding of Islamic extremism in Afghanistan waned. As a result, America was again unprepared for the neo fundamentalist Taliban victories in the mid-I 990s and Taliban support for Islamic extremist Usama Bin Ladin, identified by the FBI in 1999 as one of the 10 Most Wanted Persons for terrorist acts against US citizens. This paper examines the dynamics of US security policy towards Afghanistan, identifying missed opportunities, and the underlying American misunderstanding of the deep motivations among Islamic extremists and their supporters. The paper demonstrates that the United States' approach to Islamic extremism has been consistently shortsighted and reactive, has failed to recognize core value differences, and has ceded the initiative to the extremists. The paper also provides recommendations for short-, mid-, and long-term national security policy measures to regain the strategic initiative against threats posed by Islamic extremists.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 08, 2000
- Accession Number
- ADA380134
Entities
People
- Kevin V. Wright
Organizations
- United States Army War College