Deterrence Effects and Peru's Force-Down/Shoot-Down Policy: Lessons Learned for Counter-Cocaine Interdiction Operations
Abstract
This paper analyzes the counter-cocaine air interdiction campaign against trafficker flights from Peru to Colombia from 1989 through 1997. We show that once the rate of interdiction of trafficker flights exceeds a threshold, which depends upon the severity of consequences of being interdicted, other pilots are strongly deterred. A modest Peruvian Air Force with U.S. intelligence, detection, and monitoring support interdicting only 3 percent of potential flights under a lethal threat thwarted 80 to 90 percent of potential flights. Immediately following such action in 1995, Peruvian coca prices collapsed. By 1999 farmers abandoned 66 percent of their fields, and residual cultivation concentrated into smaller areas. As Colombians have attempted to replace lost sources, they have further concentrated cultivation in their southwest, creating another lucrative transport interdiction target. We also show that the cocaine market structure amplifies source-zone price increases by a factor of 100 as the product reaches U.S. streets 4 to 5 months later. Consequently, successful source-zone interdiction operations immediately damage source-zone coca markets and later raise street prices and lower street purity of cocaine.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 2000
- Accession Number
- ADA381193
Entities
People
- Barry D. Crane
- Robert W. Anthony
- Stephen F. Hanson
Organizations
- Institute for Defense Analyses