Restoring the Health of the Merchant Marine: A Prerequisite for Operational Sustainment
Abstract
The U.S. Merchant Marine is in trouble. It lacks the infrastructure, the ships, and the personnel to perform the mission laid out for it in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. National policies have largely ignored the importance of this vital asset, and now it is time to readdress the issue. The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 calls for the merchant marine to act as a "naval and military auxiliary in times of war or national emergency." Certainly, the 1990-91 Gulf War was such an emergency but if one infers from the wording of the Act that this naval auxiliary's task is to carry the majority of war materiel to the battle zone, then one must conclude that during the Gulf War the merchant marine fell grossly short of its mission. In time of national crisis, the operational commander will need force sustainment. That sustainment will rely on ocean-going cargo ships. The first wave of those ships is rightly placed in government ownership, but the bulk of the materiel needed in a crisis must be moved on U.S. merchant ships. The United States will not fight its next major war against a cooperative enemy, nor will we fight it with virtually the whole world on our side. Our potential future adversaries have learned well the lessons taught by the Gulf War; they will not repeat Saddam Hussein's mistakes. We must solve the merchant marine problem soon, or we will not be able to sustain the fight on our own in a major war.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 16, 2000
- Accession Number
- ADA381628
Entities
People
- Douglas W. Young
Organizations
- Naval War College