Protecting Satellites Without Weapons - Is it Logical
Abstract
Satellites are a critical vulnerability requiring protection against attack. The question facing U.S. planners is how this can be done. Two broad options are available to protect satellites: offensive and defensive means. On the surface, offensive weapons seem to offer the capability of deterring adversaries by threat of retaliation. Proponents claim the weapons will allow commanders to prepare the battle space for war by denying the enemy satellite connectivity. Furthermore, it seems like the United States would only be keeping pace with numerous rogue states that are already developing offensive Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weapons. However, offensive weapons are not the answer. They will not deter aggression, provide information dominance in the battle space, or protect satellite assets. Offensive weapons will only serve to encourage others to accelerate ASAT research, alienate allies, encourage the weaponization of space, and waste limited funding. The correct solution is defensive measures. Granted these are riskier, more costly, and in direct contradiction to military training, but these measures offer an ability to realistically protect assets without alienating allies or weaponizing space. Treaties, system redundancy, quick launch platforms, leased assets, and physical defenses will protect assets at a much reduce political and moral cost.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 16, 2000
- Accession Number
- ADA381646
Entities
People
- David Matawitz
Organizations
- Naval War College