

The Failed State - Implications for Military Operations

**A Monograph
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ABSTRACT

THE FAILED STATE - IMPLICATIONS FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS
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Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, the United States has embarked upon many military operations that were not bound by the traditional framework of revolution or insurgency. States formerly held together by the political logic and financial support of bipolar international relations were under increasing assault from within their borders. This complicated environment has required the U.S. Army to conceptualize the strategic environment in a comprehensive way to inform doctrine and provide commanders direction in applying military forces in post-Cold War crises.

This monograph defines the model of intra-state conflict as described by historian and social scientist Crane Brinton. His book, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, provides a useful framework to understand the nature of intra-state conflict. Brinton analyzed the English, American, French, and Russian revolutions with his "conceptual scheme" to identify common traits among these four examples that would offer the reader a deeper understanding of the process of revolution.

After describing Brinton's work, this monograph introduces the concept of the failed state, which affords Brinton's model fundamental differences in the initial stages of intra-state conflict. The failed state concept may reflect a revolution that has been too successful, thus destroying vital elements of the state system that makes the country vulnerable to future internal threats. This outcome spawns new actors that impact on the viability of the state, the well-being of the people, and on the strategy and tactics of an intervening military force.

The monograph then explores two contemporary case studies of intra-state conflict. The Somalia intervention of 1992-1994 demonstrates the path of a country that leads to virtual failure. The state could not withstand the constant struggle for power between the clans, and collapsed under its own weight. The Indonesia/East Timor crisis of 1999 offers an example of the trajectory of a country suffering from the slow decay of a false revolution. The hollow promises of national unity by corrupt autocrats and the extraordinary presence of the military in all facets of society prevented the full growth of institutions that would allow for peaceful debate and transfer of power.

After employing Brinton's model and the failed state concept to examine the case studies, this monograph studies U.S. Army doctrine to identify the existing shortcomings in describing the state of the environment in stability and support operations (SASO), the emerging description of military operations other than war (MOOTW). The monograph demonstrates the necessity to understanding the antecedents of an intra-state conflict in order to accurately identify the state of the environment. This description of intra-state conflict offers the military planner the tools to identify a crisis, forecast possible outcomes, and contemplate appropriate strategies and tactics to resolve the conflict.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, the United States has embarked upon many military operations that were not bound by the traditional framework of revolution or insurgency. States that were formerly held together by the political logic and financial support of bipolar international relations were under increasing assault from within their borders. Problems associated with the inability of the state to provide for and protect its citizens manifested in various political, economic, and social crises. Violence became the means for various groups to fill the void of order and control formerly maintained by the state. This complicated environment has required the U.S. Army to conceptualize the strategic environment in a comprehensive way to inform doctrine and provide commanders direction in applying military forces in these difficult situations.

This monograph defines and operationalizes the concept “failed state” in order to determine if U.S. Army doctrine fully informs the military planner in understanding the state of the environment in stability and support operations (SASO), the emerging description of military operations other than war (MOOTW). It is the assumption of the author that U.S. Army doctrine in FM 100-23 *Peace Operations* does not adequately describe the full strategic environment that impacts SASO. More importantly, this failure will lead to the development of future doctrine that will continue to take a narrow approach to the state of the environment as a framework for understanding the antecedents of an intra-state conflict.

The monograph begins with an explanation of Dr. Crane Brinton's framework for revolution as described in his work *The Anatomy of Revolution*. The monograph then employs contemporary theory and case studies of intra-state war to establish a definition of the failed state, which offers either a validation or refinement of Brinton's framework. The monograph employs the results to identify the variables, stages, and outcomes of intra-state conflict. Finally, the monograph analyzes FM 100-23 and emerging U.S. Army doctrine (FM 100-20) to determine if this concept is properly addressed. The standards that the author uses to evaluate U.S. Army doctrine and concepts are:

- Has the doctrine or concept established a clear and comprehensive explanation of the socio-political environment as a part of a strategic framework?
- Does the doctrine or concept address the relationship between the socio-economic-political environment and the military states within that environment?
- Does the doctrine or concept address the relationship between the socio-political environment and military ends, ways and means?

In response to the changing environment of the post-Cold War, the U.S. Army incorporated new concepts and emerging doctrine to provide new direction for the force. The U.S. Army updated FM 100-5 *Operations* in 1993 and addressed the changing strategic environment that the force would face. The manual introduced the concept of Operations Other Than War (OOTW) to describe the range of military actions we may employ to address a host of issues and crises throughout the world. FM 100-5 defined OOTW as "activities during peacetime and conflict" that either affect world events or

prevent a situation from devolving into war.¹ The three concepts of peacetime, conflict, and war represent “states of the environment” within a particular region and pose unique challenges for a theater commander.² While the manual made great progress in addressing the new circumstances that would challenge military operations, the description of the state of the environment was limited only to the military conditions of war, conflict, and peace.

The U.S. Army expanded upon OOTW with the publication of FM 100-23 *Peace Operations* in 1994. This manual made strides in expanding the understanding of the state of the environment, which illuminated the complexity of such military operations. The manual recognized the complication of dealing with not only foreign governments, but also “loosely organized groups of irregulars, terrorists, or other conflicting segments of a population and predominant forces.”³ The manual identified the requirement of a United Nations mandate to operate in an environment with limited consent and dubious objectivity on the part of the principle actors in a crisis area.⁴ The manual succeeded in introducing socio-political factors as part of problem set in peace operations, but failed to deepen the reader’s understanding of the complex nature of the state of the environment.

U.S. Army FM 100-7 *Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations* (1995) introduced the term Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) that provided a clearer description of the role of the force during peace and conflict activities. The manual emphasized the military would operate as one of the four national instruments of power either in concert, as the lead instrument, or in a supporting role to the diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of power. Additionally, the military would also operate along with non-governmental, private, or international organizations.⁵ The

military now knows that it will likely not be alone while conducting MOOTW. U.S. Army FM 100-8 *The Army in Multinational Operations* (1997) reinforced the assertion in FM 100-7 that the U.S. military would not always take action alone; multinational forces should be an element of MOOTW to leverage critical strengths within a coalition or alliance and reinforce political legitimacy throughout the operation. What still remained undefined were the social, economic, and political pressures within the operating environment that would impact the operation. This missing element is essential for commanders and staffs to contemplate the realm of the possible in MOOTW.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the political science community has attempted to conceptualize the new global environment. The concept of "failed state" has enjoyed increased attention by academia as it attempts to describe the factors that degrade stability, control, and order in countries. Some have attempted to modify models like Brinton's framework for revolution to explain the devolution of the state. This model may reflect only one of many scenarios of contemporary intra-state crisis. The post-Cold War environment requires a new look at old models to assess their usefulness in understanding contemporary intra-state conflict.

The reason why the U.S. military conducts MOOTW is because the state has lost its ability to provide for its citizens. Natural or man-made disasters threaten to plunge the country into anarchy, which might threaten U.S. national interests. It is vital for the U.S. Army to incorporate a comprehensive description of the failed state in the forthcoming FM 3-0 *Operations* and FM 100-20 *Stability and Support Operations* which would allow for a clearer forecast of the variables that affect the problem, the stage at which an existing crisis exists, and the possible outcomes of the crisis. This understanding would

provide the necessary description of the socio-economic-political environment, allowing for focused and effective planning and execution of military operations. Without this understanding we run the risk of indefinite, incomplete or failed operations because our actions had unintended or ineffective consequences.

CHAPTER TWO

BRINTON'S THEORY OF INTRA-STATE CONFLICT

Historian and social scientist Crane Brinton wrote the revised and expanded edition to his 1938 work, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, which provided a practical framework to understand the nature of intra-state conflict. He analyzed the English, American, French, and Russian revolutions with his "conceptual scheme" of internal conflict to identify common traits among these four case studies that would offer the reader a deeper understanding of the process of revolution. He employed the metaphor of a fever to describe the trajectory of the revolutions as it relates to the state and key actors in question. This tool is an appropriate starting point to understanding the nature of contemporary intra-state conflict.

The first stage in Brinton's concept is Prodromal, or the period where preconditions for revolution are manifest. He describes these preconditions not as symptoms, but as signs to the patient observer that a malady is enroute.⁶ The state can be characterized as undergoing a period of acute structural deficiency. In particular, the government is usually in the throes of a financial crisis. This occurs while the greater society is enjoying economic vitality.⁷ This incongruent economic forecast causes certain sectors of society to stir.

The prosperous sectors of society feel threatened by the government's situation. The concern is that the state's financial problems will prevent continued economic success that they currently enjoy.⁸ Citizen concern about the government's economic weakness becomes manifest in new economic policy. The government responds to its insolvency

by imposing taxes upon the citizenry, incurring its wrath. Groups of citizens determine that this change runs against their economic interests, which animates discontent.⁹

This societal discord also results from acute political weakness in the state. Groups in society view the cumbersome, inefficient nature of governance in the state as the prime reason for the botched state economic policy.¹⁰ This observation leads to demands for institutional reforms that would remedy the state weakness while maintaining economic stability in society. The discord in society at this point is focused on fixing the governmental machine.¹¹ At this point key actors begin to introduce themselves into the process.

The “Old Regime”, or ruling class, begins to divide. At the onset of this discord over economic policy, the intellectuals begin to make their voices heard. Civil society exists in these examples of revolution as a critical component for the movement of intellectuals from the ruling class to “pressure groups.” It is in the salons, clubs, and society halls that men begin to confront the government’s economic problems and their effects on society. Over time these groups develop as their purpose the necessity for fundamental change in political activity in the government.¹² It is also here that the intellectuals begin to forge the ideals that would reflect those fundamental changes in government.

Brinton is quite clear in the importance of ideas to a revolution. Ideas are an essential building block of revolutions; they cannot occur without them.¹³ Through ideas sectors of society can identify the wrongs in the present day and can see a brighter future. The Old Regime is responsible for the present shortcomings. They are soon exposed as inept, divided, and decadent.¹⁴ This moribund class has not only mishandled the government, but has prevented outside influences from affecting the social status quo.

The economic freedom enjoyed by many is shunted by a sense that class barriers have prevented the full realization of their efforts.¹⁵ The outcome of the Prodromal stage is a awareness that the sense of discord, and of opportunity, is omnipresent. This “feeling in the air” has animated all of society with a sense of fear and hope.¹⁶ While the onset of a revolution is not yet a foregone conclusion, the necessary preconditions are now in place to facilitate the progression of the fever.

Brinton’s second stage is the arrival of Full Symptoms. Once a situation reaches this stage, the fever has arrived. This stage normally begins with some economic, political, or social crisis. The key similarity in Brinton’s findings is the act of the state attempting to collect new taxes from those who refused to pay.¹⁷ This event exposes the aforementioned weaknesses of the Old Regime, who are now vulnerable to the organized intellectuals. The opposition converts sectors of civil society into “illegal governments” which stand in direct opposition to the Old Regime. These forces represent two clear entities: the party of the Old Regime and the party of the revolution.¹⁸ The final ingredients in this stage of intra-state are the introduction of the peasant masses and the military.

The illegal governments mobilize the masses through an appeal to the hope of achieving the ideals of the revolution. The revolutionary concepts have appeal to all walks of life; the party of the revolution provides the hope for a better tomorrow for everyone, including the lower class. Brinton describes this rising of the masses as a “collaboration between men and nature” when the ideas planted by the party of the revolution begin to sprout among the masses.¹⁹ This mobilization of society reaches a crescendo as the party of the Old Regime fails to counter with the military. Another

critical commonality Brinton highlights is the inability of the Old Regime to employ effectively the military and police forces to thwart the revolutionary forces.²⁰ The Old Regime's ineptness leads to their final demise and ouster from government. The party of the revolution is now victorious and begins to consolidate on the political seat of power.

The fever is fully established as the party of the revolution begins to take control of the government. It is here when the trajectory of revolution seems to mirror itself in some regards. The party of the revolution is composed of two major groups. The Moderates form a patch quilt group within the movement. This group is the more numerous but less homogeneous and disciplined to the revolutionary cause.²¹ They form the new bureaucrats for the revolutionary state. Their ambivalent characteristics relevant to the revolutionary cause places them at odds with the second major revolutionary group. The Extremists are characterized as a small, disciplined, and expressly committed to the revolutionary ideal.²² The struggle for power transitions to an internal struggle within the party of the revolution for absolute control.

The state has now endured a shift from the Right (Old Regime) to the Center (Moderates). The moderates immediately become vulnerable because of their aforementioned characteristics and their inept leadership. After the ouster of the Old Regime, the Moderates attempt to get the state running again. The Moderates are also weakened by their affiliation with the Old Regime and their inability to deal with the Extremists either peacefully or by force²³. The Extremists take measured steps to attack Moderate weaknesses. They retain an illegal government apparatus unencumbered with the task of governance, undermining the moderates' efforts at rebuilding the nation. Their

realistic vision of conciliation and compromise comes too soon in the fever of revolution and is quickly and boisterously rejected by the Extremists.²⁴

Once the Extremists take power by a *coup d'etat*, the fever has reached crisis stage. The government has now moved from the Center (Moderates) to the Left (Extremists). The crisis is manifest in the nature of governance and control within the state and among the polity. This period is characterized by centralized dictatorial control, marginalization of opposition forces from power, and a refusal to employ a plebiscite as a means of validation.²⁵ For the Extremists, power and revolutionary zeal are the credentials for legitimate power. The end of the coup results in a small, highly capable, and dedicated cadre capable of exerting control within the state. This period in the crisis is noted by intense violence and rabid adherence to revolutionary ideology.

The Reigns of Terror and Virtue engulf the country as the new ruling elite attempted to achieve their version of Utopia on Earth by supplanting Christianity with the new revolutionary faith.²⁶ Brutal violence becomes the tool to convert society to this new faith. The recent history of violence, reality of ongoing external wars, the difficulties of centralized government, economic crisis, class struggles, violent nature of political competition, and the fanatic zeal of religion and ideology all contributed to the wanton violence and chaotic nature of this period.²⁷ At some point the Extremists begin to exhaust their push for "heaven on Earth" and settle down to the practical issues that face the nation. With that, the fever breaks and recovery begins.

Thermidor is the next stage in Brinton's conceptual scheme. This period is marked by a slow return to normalcy within government and society. This movement occurs because the engine for the revolutionary ideal has lost steam. The country is more

affected by the excesses of the Reigns of Terror and Virtue and the aforementioned internal and external pressures. The time comes for a one-man autocrat to take control and steer the country back onto a course to deal with these issues. One of the most significant indicators of the shift to normalcy is the granting of amnesties for the “politically proscribed.”²⁸ Those survivors from the Old Regime and the Moderates are brought back to political life, bringing with them the skills necessary to get the state running effectively again. These men form a “new-old regime” of disparate men, while the very extreme are either sent into exile or are put to death.²⁹ These men must now face a different economic landscape, one that has wrought havoc in society as well as the government. The austerity plans of the day brought great hardship the poor; any threat of an uprising is now tempered with the ability to use force effectively.³⁰

Another feature of this period is the rise of nationalism as the new rallying cry for the country. This change in the spirit to animate the people puts the revolutionary ideal to rest.³¹ This also allows for the resurgence of the Church in society. Christianity regains its place as the center of religious faith.³² The Church serves to reinforce the policy of nationalism, thus no longer threatening the power of the political leadership. Finally the “new-old regime” returns to the style of living that evoked memories of the Old Regime prior to the revolution. With the lifting of the shadow of rigid ideology, society could return to a state of “moral looseness.”³³ The government makes its final shift from the Left through the Center back to the Right. Thermidor progresses on a roller-coaster ride of openness and repression as the revolution winds down. In time, the suffering ends and the fever has ended.

Brinton's final stage is Recovery. He identifies a number of changes that has occurred as a result of the revolution. First, the revolution ends the worst abuses of political power: government inefficiency.³⁴ Throughout the struggle, the focus was always at making the state run more smoothly for the benefit of the country. That struggle continued at each stage of the revolution, and eventually caused the end of the revolution because the process itself became inefficient. Economic power transferred from the Old regime to a new ruling class formed by those previously outside the halls of power.³⁵ This group could now ensure that the policies of the state would compliment the prosperity of the economically-mobile classes.

Brinton emphasizes that the broad spectrum of society was only slightly affected by the revolution. The Thermidor backlash towards the mobilized poor classes returned them to their social, political, and economic standing of the pre-revolutionary period.³⁶ For them, hope is dashed and no one remains to lead them to their version of Utopia. It is back to the drudgery of the daily struggle to survive. What does remain is the history of the revolution, which composes the new national mythology.³⁷ Everyone can take pride in their role in the great struggle in their country; it is there that the ideal still breathes life, albeit tempered by nationalism and pragmatism.

One of Brinton's more essential observations is that the revolution did not result in a death of the nation-state. In each case the foundation of traditional culture and institutions withstood the ravages of the fever.³⁸ The revolutionists were sufficiently skilled and powerful to destroy the Old Regime, but could not eradicate all vestiges of the past. The body politic was inoculated and the state was stronger.³⁹ This process was not only important to sustain internal economic prosperity, but also to equip the country for

the economic challenges in the global market. The Industrial Revolution influenced action to ensure that the country was prepared to modernize and compete around the world.⁴⁰ Brinton's framework allows this revolutionary logic to reveal itself and to be compared against other intra-state conflicts. Armed with this explanation of Brinton's framework of intra-state conflict, the paper will now explore post-Cold War theories of intra-state conflict.

CHAPTER THREE

CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF INTRA-STATE CONFLICT

The concept of the failed state affords Brinton's model fundamental differences in the initial stages of intra-state conflict. The failed state concept may reflect a revolution that has been too successful, thus destroying vital elements of the state system that makes the country vulnerable to future internal threats. These differences present a different progression through the stages of conflict with varied outcomes. Political scientist and professor Robert Jackson first introduced the concept as "quasi-states." He defines Third World states as "territorial jurisdictions supported from above by international law and material aid."⁴¹ His work emphasizes the hollow nature of states formed as a result of geopolitical changes and the security challenges these quasi-states present to the international community. After the end of World War II, fifty countries signed to form the United Nations. Currently the ranks of the UN have swelled to one hundred eighty five and growing.⁴² These new countries have little experience in the trappings of statehood nor of their role in the international community, but are nevertheless empowered by international convention to exist as a state with its attendant rights and privileges.

Other authors have expanded this notion of quasi-states to demonstrate the overall weakening of the international system. This weakening does not come from a difference in the new states from the old, but rather a chronic weakness in the structures and institutions that form the state. Political scientist and professor Stephen Krasner observed that the Westphalian state model has always been an ideal that has seen many

permutations throughout history.⁴³ Krasner identifies territoriality and autonomy as the primary components of the model and notes that conventions, contracting, coercion, and imposition have compromised Westphalia throughout history.⁴⁴ It is a result of these pressures on the form of governance that assures territorial integrity and autonomy that has challenged the world with instances of intra-state conflict.

Most who write about intra-state conflict after the Cold War will agree that the fundamental reasons for internal strife are not novel, it is the context in which these crises unfold that are different. Two important factors have contributed great complexity in the formation of states since the end of World War II. The first is the legacy of colonialism in newly formed states. Academic journal editor and professor Amitai Etzioni notes that the urge for self-determination is as fundamental now as it was throughout history to forge a new beginning for a country. What is different in contemporary crises is that self-determination is not a holistic expression of the needs and demands of all of society, but of the myopic aims of the nascent ruling elite.⁴⁵ The rush to independence for many countries has been at the expense of a unifying ideal that would encompass the hopes and desires of a society.

Former U.S. ambassador Gerald Helman and foreign service officer Steven Ratner illuminates the notion that the logic of Cold War geopolitics also contributed to new tensions in intra-state conflict. The infusion of political, economic, and military influence within newly formed states altered the trajectory of internal conflicts in the name of external ideological struggles.⁴⁶ The Cold War conveniently defined nations, regions, and alliances as communist, democratic, or non-aligned. Intervention by any nation or group of nations was in the name of the defense of one ideology over another, or the

prevention of a neutral or non-aligned country from bolstering the ranks of an adversarial ideology. This only served to suspend the internal issues at hand and provide unequal development of essential institutions that would afford a peaceful method for conflict resolution.

Helman and Ratner also note the problem of countries who no longer have the economic and political support of the U.S. or Soviet Union. The lack of traditions of governance and institutions for governance have diminished some states to the point of incompetence.⁴⁷ This suggests that many of the new states are not capable of being viable members in the international community because they are ill-equipped to deal with the issues that reside within their borders. This is an important difference in Brinton's model, as the states in his study only suffered an acute weakness. In the end, the state remained resilient and became stronger as a result of the struggle and the improvements in the bureaucratic machinery.

Another important difference in contemporary intra-state conflict is the difference in the formation of the old regime, and of the opposition. Political scientist and professor I. William Zartman observes that those who form the vanguard of the independence movement tend to represent one interest group immediately after gaining power. Colonialism or super power intervention introduced cleavages in society, dismantling long traditions of societal institutions and norms.⁴⁸ New indigenous regimes tended to maximize the opportunity for its group instead of dealing with the task of governing its people. This bred numerous opposition groups advocating their particular cause, which presented a volatile political atmosphere ripe for conflict at the smallest crisis.

The military tends to be the more viable of the weak state institutions, making its involvement in political conflict irresistible. The indigenous military initially existed as a critical support group of the new regime, but quickly became disenchanted as a result of unacceptable political and economic policies. While not sufficiently strong to wield total power throughout the country, the military was a potent instrument for coups as a way to promote political change.⁴⁹ This narrow contestation for power is still insufficient to address the needs of society, so new and insidious groups grow to carve out their niche to protect their interests.

Political scientists and professors Lionel Cliffe and Robin Luckham provide a detailed discussion of not only the failed state but also the fate of states. The authors identify the root cause for a state's failure, not just the resulting symptoms. Tracing the origins of complex crises allow the authors to explain them in context as well as by occurrence.⁵⁰ This is an important theme that serves a greater understanding of the utility of the concept for doctrine. The authors proceed to detail and categorize dimensions of state collapse and each variable that is associated with a given dimension. The result is a dizzying array of cross-referenced data points. The study is useful to note the countries investigated and categorized as a quick reference. It is unwieldy as a useful tool for doctrine.

The fact that the state system, those that oversee the system, and those who wish to take over the system have dismal prospects for representing the need of everyone in society influences the masses to fend for themselves. Political scientist and professor Augustus Richard Norton discusses this aspect as it related to the breakdown of the rule of law. Individuals will find some rallying cry or means to express their interests, and

will turn to ethnic, regional, religious, or family based groups for order and security.⁵¹ Through these associations people find a mechanism that provides for and protects the members of the group, and defends and administers their territory. These groups also break the monopoly of organized violence normally reserved for the formal military by raising their own army. Two aspects of these armed groups exist that provide a different problem set in modern intra-state conflict. One is that they tend to hold their own in their own territory against opposing force. Second is that these forces do not feel compelled to follow standard conventions of warfare. Writer and former U.S. Army officer Ralph Peters refers to this new “warrior class” as fighters who have “acquired a taste for killing, who do not believe rationally according to our definition to rationality, who are capable of atrocities that challenge the descriptive powers of language, and who will sacrifice their own kind in order to survive.”⁵² This dynamic poses a dilemma for intra-state conflict at the outset, as the lack of ideals reduces those in arms to use violence for its own sake.

Crime becomes a pervasive complexity in the violent failed state. The previous passages have identified chronic deficiencies throughout the state and society. Criminal elements have fiat in ways that were unthinkable of in the past. Crime flourishes because of the breakdown of the rule of law and due to the inability, or unwillingness, of the state to deal with law enforcement.⁵³ Crime also grows as a result of the cleavages in society, where people outside an interest group are not to be trusted and violence is the means of choice for conflict resolution. This is yet another obstacle for true change to occur and cumulative effect of these factors have a distinct effect on the trajectory of intra-state conflict.

While Brinton assured the reader that he was not out to seek the truth, he did not shy away from illuminating the uniformities that stood out in his investigation as immutable. He stated unequivocally that revolutions absolutely required ideas to form a coalition to bring down the old regime and bring change to the state machinery. Intellectuals played the decisive role in the formation and propagation of those ideas. Contemporary intra-state conflicts lack this important factor at the outset because of the gap in civil society formation. Norton recognizes, as does Brinton, the unifying and organizing component of associations, movements, parties and other organizations that countered the raw power of the state.⁵⁴ Again, colonialism or superpower intervention short circuited or weakened civil society formation that reflected indigenous norms and culture. These fragile groups prove to be inadequate to unify society or challenge the ruling elite. Civil society produces a spirit of unity and cooperation through its use of membership, civility, and citizenship.⁵⁵ Within this construct, intellectuals flourish and become the enlightened leadership destined to make life better for society. Without this construct, intellectuals are mere individuals who become a victim in a contest where violence is championed over ideas.

CHAPTER FOUR

MODERN INTRA-STATE CONFLICT - SOMALIA

The previous passages established the theoretical underpinnings of modern day intra-state conflict. The critical differences from Brinton's observations in the initial stages of intra-state conflict are quite significant. The state is persistently fragile, thus utterly unable to bear its responsibilities in the international system or for its people. Therefore it serves as a poor means for national identity and personal survival. The old regime exist only to realize the desires of its identity group. This group also tended to be poorly trained, inheriting the reigns of power from external powers (colonial or ideological). Ideas do not exist as a result of the lack of civil society, which acts as a foil to the actions of the state. Deep cleavages exist, making opposition forces fragmented and ineffective in fomenting a broad-based opposition movement. The United Nations can act as an intervening force, but has proved to be equally adept at exacerbating a conflict as providing the setting for conflict resolution. Finally, the formal armed forces do not have the monopoly of arms, as each group has formed their own self defense forces. Any individual force is unable to exert complete military control over the entire country. An exploration of two intra-state conflicts will reveal how these important differences affected the trajectory of intra-state conflict that plagued each country.

The Somalia intervention of 1992-1994 remains a harsh reminder to US policy makers and military leaders of the complex environment that is presented to forces in MOOTW/SASO. One of the contributing factors to our failure in the country was a superficial understanding of the nature of the environment and the trajectory of conflict

inside the country. The state of Somalia is a product of British and Italian colonial rule that began at the end of the nineteenth century. Somalia gained independence in 1960 after a merger of British and Italian Somaliland.⁵⁶ Somali political and cultural traditions that provided the logic for governance and conflict resolution dissolved during the colonial and protectorate period. Somali code of conduct, known as *heer*, provided the framework for conflict resolution through its emphasis on interdependence and inclusiveness.⁵⁷ British and Italian influence in the country sought to destroy this social pattern through influencing individual groups through economic incentives to do their bidding.

Independence in Somalia did not result from a classic armed struggle between Somalis and external forces, but from a peaceful process of withdrawal and removal of Italian and British control and influence in the country. The men that inherited the reigns of power in 1960 were not the visionaries that Brinton observed in his work, but men who were forever tainted by greed embedded in colonial rule. The desire to gain position and power for personal or group goals outweighed the larger, and vitally important, issues of building a viable state system in Somalia.⁵⁸ Despite the veneer of democracy and spirit of unity that followed independence, the Somalis suffered from faction infighting from the very beginning. Clan identity became the rationale for political party identity; debate raged over issues that reflected clan and regional biases.⁵⁹ The 1969 election demonstrated the chaos of faction democracy, as more than sixty parties put forth over one thousand candidates for only one hundred twenty-two seats.⁶⁰ The scramble was on to gain a foothold in the only place to ensure economic security for one's people.

The rampant political corruption and introduction of armed forces to back up fraudulent victories led to the formal introduction of the military in politics and the coup as the means to transfer power among opposition forces. Major General Mohamed Siad Barre, responding to the chaos in the Somali political structure, seized power in a bloodless coup in 1969.⁶¹ Recognizing that the state offered little economic incentive as a source of domestic wealth, Siad Barre used his position as state leader in the international community to garner funds. He began by courting the Soviet Union, signing a treaty of cooperation with the communist power in 1974.⁶² Armed with the latest military equipment, Siad Barre began to heed nationalistic demands to support Somalis living in Ethiopia. The ensuing war with Ethiopia led to a reversal in Soviet policy, which resulted in Moscow's support for Ethiopia and an embarrassing defeat for Somalia's military.⁶³ Undaunted by the turn of events, Siad Barre turned elsewhere to fuel his war machine, and line his pockets.

The United States became the logical ally for Somali interests in the 1980s. The West had deep pockets and would gladly support any effort to stem the tide of Soviet influence wherever it existed. By 1982, the United States treated Somalia as a partner on the front lines against Soviet aggression. In short time the Somali military received both economic and military aid; the US received basing rights that would support contingency operations in the strategically vital Persian Gulf.⁶⁴ This support from the US was not enough to stave off the mounting internal crisis in Somalia. The country was on a path to destruction, and a few million dollars could not halt the momentum.

The Somali economy was based on subsistence agriculture and exports of agricultural products. Specifically, the production came from a traditional pastoral

lifestyle, which produced over eighty per cent of the livestock for export.⁶⁵ During stable times, this trade was sufficient to keep the state floating. In the age of international markets and under the pressure of internal strife, exports and revenues dwindled.⁶⁶ The Siad Barre regime was badly discredited because of its failure in the war against Ethiopia. Various opposition groups began a siege on the Siad Barre regime, which exacerbated the country's economic plight. Siad Barre's sacking of the treasury completed the bankruptcy of the state.⁶⁷ There existed little reason for competing clans to vie for political power, as the state was ruined. By the beginning of the 1990s, Somalia existed in name only.

1991 began with the last struggle for political control. A military coup ousted Siad Barre and his supporters in January. With his ouster, the last vestiges of legitimate institutions crumbled under its own weight.⁶⁸ Somalia spiraled into rampant lawlessness. This state of affairs coupled with the collapse of the agricultural sector led to the hunger crisis, which caught the attention of the United Nations. By the time the UN took action, little remained on which to give support or to rebuild. The politics of violence had won a grand victory. Where were the intellectuals and the support structure to counter the gross inefficiencies of the state and the general that stoop on watch? The weight of political and economic collapse in Somalia drove many of the country's best and brightest into exile status, supporting who they could through income earned overseas.⁶⁹ Those that remained fell into the category of the "peaceful and the weak", unable to voice opposition against the violent clans nor establish a grassroots movement to unify the country.⁷⁰ The efforts of the UN or the US failed to establish the environment where civil society could take root again, and ideas could lead the Somalis on a new, unifying path.

The Somali case study offered many examples of the new trajectory of intra-state conflict. At the outset of independence, the country suffered from a state system that required the careful guidance and nurturing from enlightened leadership. Instead the fragile structure suffered from neglect at the hands of men who were only interested in siphoning the treasury, and foreign donors, of corrupting money. The state could not withstand the constant struggle for power between the clans, and collapsed under its own weight. The military became politicized in the vacuum of effective governance, and became the means for the transfer of power. Soon the armed forces were nothing more than another demand group groping for the spoils of political power. Other clans equipped themselves for protection and to propel themselves to power. The coup that ousted Siad Barre brought an end to what one would recognize as government in Somalia.

The chaos that would ensue resulted from the inability of the Somali people to rally around any coherent group or institution that had the ability to get the country back on its feet. They inherited a state system that was a poor copy of a western system and offered no linkages to the unifying traditions of *heer*. The old regime was corrupt and in exile. The opposition was too fractious to do more than add to the chaos. Civil society did not exist; intellectuals or other who could promote some unifying ideals were in hiding, exiled, or dead. Somalia had little to build on from the beginning. With each passing day, they country slips further and further down the abyss of anarchy.

CHAPTER FIVE

MODERN INTRA-STATE CONFLICT - INDONESIA AND EAST TIMOR

The crisis in East Timor offers the reader a fresh opportunity to view the nuances of an intra-state conflict to determine uniformities with conflicts old and new. This case offers elements of both: a beginning reminiscent of Brinton's examples, and an end more in line with contemporary conflicts. Indonesia began as an amalgamation of kingdoms that struggled for dominance. The Buddhist kingdom of Srivijaya on the island of Sumatra extended from the Malay Peninsula to West Java as late as the fourteenth century.⁷¹ The Hindu kingdom of Majapahit rose to power in eastern Java and conquered what is currently modern Indonesia as well as much of Malaysia.⁷² The Majapahit's hold on power would not last, as others challenged the kingdom's ubiquitous rule. Foreign trade brought power and Islam to those who opposed the Majapahit, and the dynasty collapsed in the sixteenth century.⁷³ The region would suffer under fractious fighting until the discovery and colonization by the Dutch.

European colonialism began to extend its reach towards Southeast Asia in the beginning of the sixteenth century. The Portuguese were the first to stake a claim in this region as a result of Vasco de Gama's voyage to India at the end of the fifteenth century. The Portuguese wanted to break the dominance of the spice trade by the Muslims and Venetians; they therefore set out to the Indonesian archipelago to establish their own portion of the trade.⁷⁴ The Portuguese established their area of influence near the Timor island. The island offered little for the colonists initially except for sandalwood and trade

for finished goods.⁷⁵ Pressure from the Dutch would alter Portuguese influence in the region, bringing Timor more formally into the tiny collection of Portuguese possessions.

The arrival of the Dutch in Indonesia rapidly altered the state of colonialism in the region. The Dutch intended to monopolize the spice trade and sought out to wrest Portuguese territories and colonize what had been left unsettled. Invading Indonesia proper (Sumatra and Java) proved easy in light of the debilitating nature of fractious kingdom infighting.⁷⁶ Controlling Timor proved another matter. Although the Dutch succeeded in controlling the western portion of the island, the east proved insurmountable. The combination of difficult terrain, stiff resistance offered by the East Timorese, and military equipment support from the Portuguese compelled the Dutch to consolidate their gains in the west and leave the east under the control of Portugal.⁷⁷ Each country continued to effect colonial rule over their possessions until World War II, when Indonesians had yet another conqueror with which to contend.

World War II signaled the beginning of an independent Indonesia. The invasion by the Japanese encouraged the growth of an indigenous movement for independence. The push for independence began to take root in the early part of the twentieth century, as Indonesians began to tire from Dutch hegemony. World events such as the secularization of Turkey and the Russian Revolution encouraged the creation of an Indonesian national identity, thereby initiating Indonesia's Prodromal stage of revolution. The national consciousness focused on the diversity of the Indonesian society, and Dutch repression forged disparate groups into a unified opposition.⁷⁸ From this movement intellectuals found their voice and began to lead the cause for a free Indonesia.

Intellectuals found refuge in a flourishing civil society in the early twentieth century. Islam served as a natural place for intellectuals and ideas to move freely. Muslim merchants formed the Islamic Traders Association in 1909 to counter encroaching Chinese influence.⁷⁹ Islam later extended its influence throughout society, as exhibited by the dramatic enrollment of 360,000 members in the newly formed Islamic Union.⁸⁰ The Indonesian independence movement also gained leadership from universities, political parties, and civic organizations. Indonesia's first president, Sukarno, was the most prominent from this group and spent time in prison during the 1920s for subversive political activities.⁸¹ During World War II, the Japanese supplanted the Dutch as the external force that stood in the way of Indonesian freedom.

The situation on East Timor resembled the same type of tension between the Portuguese and the Timorese as existed between the Dutch and Javanese in Indonesia, but under a different framework. Efforts by the Portuguese to extend formal control over the island met with resistance by the well-established social structure on East Timor. Kinship exchange provided the social logic for the Timorese, and colonial system such as plantations, forced labor, redistricting of kingdoms, and a head tax on all males between the age of eighteen and sixty failed to break the societal bond.⁸² The Portuguese were forced to impose a socio-political and economic system that simultaneously met the needs of colonial rule and Timorese traditions. The effect on the Timorese was minor, and traditional Timorese society remained intact.⁸³ A strong, independence-minded Timorese national identity and social structure would bode well for the island and its people during the Japanese invasion and occupation during World War II.

The Japanese invasion and occupation of Indonesia provided opposition forces another opportunity to deepen their lore of fighting against external aggression and for their people's freedom. East Asia was vital to the Japanese war effort. Indonesia provided twenty five per cent of Japan's oil, and this supply had to be maintained to have a hope for victory.⁸⁴ The Japanese invasion quickly routed Dutch and Portuguese forces. The Japanese transitioned rapidly to occupation operations designed to maintain order and security in the region, facilitating Japanese efforts to extract vital resources from the land.

During Japan's three year occupation of Indonesia, the Indonesian opposition leadership existed as a *de facto* government for the indigenous population. For the first time, Indonesians became a significant force in the political and economic structure of society. The personnel vacuum that resulted from the internment of European bureaucrats, businessmen and military personnel afforded numerous Indonesians opportunities that were previously unknown.⁸⁵ As the war progressed, the Japanese began to militarize the Indonesians. By the end of the war, the Indonesians contributed over fifty-seven thousand reserves and paramilitary forces to augment Japanese forces preparing for an Allied invasion.⁸⁶ The relative ease of the occupation duty on Java and Sumatra islands was not replicated in East Timor.

Allied operational decisions, coupled with the independence-minded Timorese identity, radically affected the nature of Japanese occupation in East Timor during the war. The decision to use the island as a forward base for the defense of Australia resulted in a bitter struggle between the Japanese and Dutch and Australian commandos, who were supported by the Timorese population.⁸⁷ The Timorese felt the wrath of the fighting

by both sides, and ultimately by the Japanese when they completed the occupation of the island. The resulting atrocities accounted for the death of over sixty thousand Timorese, destruction of most major towns, and the loss of two thirds of the livestock on the island.⁸⁸ The Timorese resistance against the Japanese provided yet another chapter to their legacy of struggle against external forces, which deepened their sense of national identity. The strength of Timorese social networks prevented the total devastation of society, and the people quickly rebounded under Portuguese rule after the war.

The Indonesians took advantage of the power vacuum immediately after the war to seize the reigns of power. Led by Sukarno and Islamic leader Mohammed Hatta, the Indonesian elite declared independence three days after Japan's surrender to the Allies in 1945.⁸⁹ Despite their weak position in the region, the Dutch did not sit idly by while the Indonesians secured their independence. The Dutch attempted to reassert their control over the islands, but were met with strong resistance from a politically and militarily potent Indonesian opposition.⁹⁰ The National Revolution ensued and lasted from 1945 to 1949. The Dutch fought a number of "police actions" against Indonesian forces, which resulted in tactical victories but swift condemnation by the newly independent Asian countries and the United Nations.⁹¹ Colonial rule lost its luster in the wake of a world war fought against totalitarian rule. The Dutch finally transferred sovereignty to a federal Indonesian government in 1949.⁹² Free from external control, Indonesia began to chart its own path and extend its power in the region. From this point, Indonesia seemed to follow a path similar to Russia's, where the revolution appeared to continue despite the departure of the Dutch.

Indonesia quickly began to organize itself as a functioning government as a result of a well articulated socio-political structure and an ideal that would provide the logic for this diverse, heterogeneous collection of islands. As was the case with Somalia, Indonesian leaders governed not to promote any national purpose, but to continue the logic of power and greed established under colonial rule. Parliament was divided among the various political parties that existed before the war, and it was initially difficult to reach consensus on many issues. Sukarno introduced the concept of Pancasila to the Indonesian people, which espoused a basis for a unified, independent state. The basic principles are belief in God, humanitarianism national unity, democracy, and social justice.⁹³ He develop this belief over the years and it proved to be the galvanizing ideal for this expansive island-country. While Sukarno worked to unify the country, he also looked beyond Indonesia's borders to expand their influence in a period of great opportunity. Irian Jaya became a part of Indonesia in 1963, and was formalized in 1969.⁹⁴ The concept of Pancasila was a stretch at best with the disparate union of social groups. Any addition of territory would bring another set of socio-political tensions to this new country.

Sukarno's hold on political control suffered from excesses in power and communist influences in his policy decisions. Frustrated with the ebb and flow of party politics, Sukarno instituted Guided Democracy. He sided with the Indonesian Communist Party and the Indonesian military in a failed bid to keep the fractious nation united.⁹⁵ This unholy alliance suffered from absolute differences in perspective with regard to national policy. One of the critical decisions that led to the failure of this era was the decision to create and arm a "Fifth Column" of radical supporters to do Sukarno's bidding.⁹⁶ The

military felt its monopoly in arms and organized violence would be challenged. As a result, Major General Suharto led a bloody coup that resulted in the repudiation of the Left, the ouster of Sukarno, and the elevation of Suharto as leader of Indonesia.⁹⁷ Instead of putting an end to Indonesia's version of a Reign of Terror, Suharto sought to bring order to the country through repression by the Right. This period would also usher in an increased political role for the military, placing Indonesia on a collision course with East Timor.

The military enjoyed increased prominence under Suharto's rule. He instituted the concept of "dual function", which authorized Indonesian military involvement in domestic and foreign policy, as well as direct involvement in the government at all levels.⁹⁸ Under Suharto's New Order policy, foreign policy shifted from sympathy toward communism to an informal alignment with the West. Indonesia intended to court the West for economic aid, and succeeded in receiving support from major Western nations and multinational organizations like the World Bank.⁹⁹ This shift in policy also meant increased military aid. Indonesia's strong anti-Communist position influenced the United States to provide military aid to Indonesian forces. The military became a more potent force as a result of foreign assistance and increased influence and control over Indonesian society.

East Timor became a point of contention as a result of an interpreted threat to Indonesian interests in the region. Indonesian forces routinely conducted border patrols along the West/East Timorese border to thwart the flow of contraband in the area. The concept of Pancasila preached unity, but also meant the integration of territory, and its people, under the Indonesian banner. East Timor fell under the eyes of Indonesian

integrationists in the military, and a movement began to explore opportunities to incorporate East Timor within Indonesia.¹⁰⁰ The forces of East/West geopolitics propelled Suharto forward on an aggressive strategy to seize East Timor at the first opportunity. The war in Vietnam had just ended and the world was not interested in additional losses to Communist forces in the region. The time was ripe for Suharto to seize the territory and fulfill a long-standing strategic objective.

East Timor became the twenty-seventh province of Indonesia in 1975 as result of inaction by Portugal, the United Nations, and the United States. Portugal's weak colonial rule finally gave way in 1974 when a military coup in Lisbon resulted in the Portuguese government disbanding their string of colonies in the world.¹⁰¹ This decision gave the East Timorese the opportunity to chart their own course. The Timorese elite quickly formed three parties that proposed the proper path for the island. Two parties competed for popular support of their pro-Timorese plans for the future, while the third existed to represent Indonesian plans, with support from the Suharto regime, for inclusion in the archipelago country.¹⁰² Portuguese forces left abruptly in 1975 before a transition government or process was firmly established. The pro-self determination party FREITLIN took control of East Timor and offered the Indonesians an excuse for direct intervention. This communist political party's success so close to Indonesian territory alarmed the Suharto regime.¹⁰³ The political and military leadership had a long memory of communist subversion in Indonesia, and sought to prevent FREITLIN from taking power in East Timor.

Efforts by the Indonesian government to defeat FREITLIN through support of opposition forces on East Timor did not bear fruit. FREITLIN leadership felt that an

Indonesian intervention was inevitable, so they took the initiative and declared independence in spite of external negotiations about the island's future.¹⁰⁴ Suharto pulsed the international community to gauge opposition to Indonesian intervention in East Timor. Indonesia was delighted by the Portuguese rejection of an independence plan for East Timor.¹⁰⁵ This gave Suharto confidence that the petition for independence would not gain advocacy in the United Nations. Australia did not act on reports of preparations for an invasion by Indonesian forces.¹⁰⁶ United States President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger completed a visit of Indonesia only hours before the invasion of East Timor.¹⁰⁷ Indonesia received the assurances it needed to intervene and seize East Timor in 1975, and did so with ferocity.

Indonesia's reign in East Timor is noted for its brutality of East Timorese, subjugation of opposition groups, and free use of the military to keep the peace or quell any disturbances. The Timorese fought in vain to maintain their sense of national identity and territory in the face of yet another external force. The twenty-four years of occupation resulted in over two hundred thousand deaths.¹⁰⁸ The Indonesian military fought against FREITLIN's military arm, which numbered between six hundred and eight hundred guerrillas and approximately fifteen hundred "reserves".¹⁰⁹ The East Timorese civilians suffered the overwhelming majority of the casualties as a result of Indonesian oppression. The most tragic example of Indonesian atrocities was the Santa Cruz Massacre of 1991. Indonesian troops fired on a group of East Timorese protesters who wanted to voice their demands for independence during a visit by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture. Over two hundred seventy persons were killed, and a few

hundred more were wounded.¹¹⁰ This dark day in Indonesia's period of occupation of East Timor would illuminate their brutal treatment of the populace to the world.

Indonesia's false revolutionary ideals began to show its weaknesses in the latter part of the 1990s. The unifying principle of Pancasila that Sukarno initiated and Suharto continued was a thin veil covering a vicious autocratic state. Indonesian tradition is rooted in regional control through island kingdoms, so successive Indonesian governments have used force to compel the country to exist as one republic. Power rested with the leader and, after the ascension of Suharto to the head of state, the military. Corruption and patronage were the rules of politics, and opposition groups were contained to maintain order and control in the country. Indonesia invested hundreds of millions of dollars into East Timor, and corrupt military and civilian officials siphoned as much as thirty per cent of the annual budget into their accounts.¹¹¹ The majority of East Timorese never benefited from the honest or dishonest funds that flowed in the island. Pancasila only benefited the Old Regime, and the military brutalized East Timorese opposition to maintain the status quo.

Maintaining East Timor became important as a result of Indonesian interest, pride, and greed. Losing one province could incite others to declare their independence, initiating the breakup of the state.¹¹² The Indonesian military has little interest in giving up this prized territory. They had already spilled their blood on the island in defense of their country.¹¹³ Finally, the Indonesians in East Timor benefit from the bloated bureaucracy and rampant corruption that resulted from national investments on the island. These government kickbacks came so easily because of the extensive multinational investments in gas and oil mining in the Timor Sea, which has the seventh largest gas and

oil reserves in the world.¹¹⁴ The Old Regime had much to lose if they let East Timor become autonomous. The Indonesian military existed to prevent that from happening. Their dual political/military role in society remained an impediment to change on the island.

The Asian economic crisis of 1997 was the catalyst for change in Indonesia. Inefficient and corrupt economic policies were always present. As in Brinton's model, an acute financial crisis exposed the Old Regime and gave new voice to opposition forces. The Asian economic crisis, coupled with the worst drought in fifty years and falling prices for oil, gas, and other exports, resulted in mass protests and demands for Suharto's resignation.¹¹⁵ B.J. Habibie assumed power after Suharto stepped down. Keenly aware of the international attention focused on Indonesia's next move, Habibie promised to bring change to Indonesia. To demonstrate his resolve to address long-standing national issues, Habibie promised elections in East Timor on the issue of self determination. When the East Timorese voted resounding for independence, anti-independence forces responded in an orgy of violence.¹¹⁶ The world reaction was in sharp contrast to the muted protests in 1975. Indonesian inaction and complicity in the violence led to the 1999 UN intervention and current peacekeeping mission.

While Indonesia and Somalia suffer from many of the same maladies, Indonesia also exhibits the tensions of a continuing revolution that are similar to the Russian case described by Brinton. The Indonesian state has been characterized by iron-fisted autocrats, who wield power over all facets of life in the country. Opposition groups cannot vie for power in the political system because that right rests only with a small elite. Opposition groups either became co-opted under the logic of political patrimony, or

suffered from oppression by the military. The military became deeply articulated in Indonesian politics. The coup became the mechanism for transferring political power. While it has only been used once, the threat of a military coup coupled with the positioning of active and retired military members in every facet of government assures that the military has a strong voice in domestic and foreign policy. This may serve as a source of future conflict as those outside of government continue to demand a place in the halls of power. The military exists to ensure only the right people participate in government. They also exist to prevent ostracized regions from striking their own path as a separate nation.

The East Timor conflict is one example of the regional, ethnic, and religious tensions that exist throughout the country and will continue to stretch Indonesia's ability to maintain sovereignty over the archipelago. At first glance, Indonesian demographics do not offer indications of societal differentiation, but geography tells another story. Over sixty percent of Indonesia's population resides on the islands of Java, Bali, and Madura.¹¹⁷ The rest of the population is scattered throughout six thousand islands in the archipelago. The major ethnic group is Javanese and the major religion is Islam. Upon leaving the dense islands, the cultures, traditions, languages, and ethnicities become quite distinct. Clashes are quite common between different groups, but the Indonesian military only intercedes on the behalf of the Javanese majority. The military failed to stop violence between Christians and Muslim on the Spice Islands.¹¹⁸ Indonesian forces have also clashed with opposition groups and protesters from westernmost Aceh to Irian Jaya in the east.¹¹⁹

The traditions, cultures, and historical experiences that guide each Indonesian ethnic group have little in common with those of the Javanese majority. There exists little common ground for any exchange of ideas, much less real reconciliation and unity, only the long history of neglect and repression. Unlike the examples in Brinton's work, opposition forces do not see their future in a unified Indonesia; they envision better prospects as autonomous or independent states. As long as Pancasila does not reach every island in the archipelago, Indonesia will continue to teeter on the brink of disintegration. With an increased international sensitivity to this area, the military may find it difficult to wage its campaign of terror and violence on its population.

CHAPTER SIX

HOW DOES DOCTRINE HELP FRAME THESE CONFLICTS?

The previous case illustrate the deeply complex nature of contemporary crises. We benefit from technological innovations that provide the military planner information about the four corners of the globe at the push of a button. One often-mentioned concern about the information age and military operations is the ability of leaders to use the stream of data that modern technology provides to inform military plans. The phenomenon of intra-state conflict does not require any fancy new gadget. What the military planner needs is a conceptual framework to better understand the location, trajectory, and possible outcomes of intra-state conflict. Doctrine should be the first place to gain such insight.

As earlier mentioned, what current doctrine has provided the military planner is a brief description of some of the variables that exacerbate internal conflict or bring about a crisis. Chapter Three in FM 100-23 *Peace Operations* describes planning considerations for Peace Operations. The chapter identifies the campaign plan as an essential tool for the planner to establish a “clear, definable path” from the mission to end state.¹²⁰ In order to contemplate a pathway to success, the planner must understand the capabilities and limitations of friendly forces, adversarial forces, and the effects the environment might have on the operation. The environment must not only describe the military conditions, but also the social, political, and economic conditions that will bear on the operation.

The manual also states that the planning process is the same as for other types of operations, but that considerations and emphasis may vary.¹²¹ The type and scope of

intervening variables introduced in the manual, as well as others highlighted in the case studies, merely add to an extensive list of data. The Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield for Peacekeeping emphasizes a change in focus, degree of detail, and demand for demographic analysis.¹²² Additional factors that should be considered include political groups, the media, third nation support to belligerents, food and water source and distribution points, religious beliefs, cultural traditions, and the like.¹²³ This instruction aids the planner in determining what to consider, but falls short of providing a framework to assist in not only analysis, but also synthesis of the problem. There is no method offered to understand relationships between the social, political, economic and military conditions nor of the impact of social, political, or economic factors on military ends, ways and means. The military planner is left with the daunting task of inventing a method for synthesizing reams of information to provide the commander a comprehensive understanding of the operational environment and to assist the commander in making critical decisions.

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, *Force XXI Operations*, provided the U.S. Army in 1994 an assessment of military conditions as we approached the twenty-first century. Chapter Two addresses the future strategic environment, offering key insights on the creation of future doctrine. This chapter does an effective job of not only offering a comprehensive description of the strategic environment, but also effectively relates society, politics, economics, and the military. This explanation provides a comprehensive understanding of the operating environment. The chapter discusses nine elements of instability: balance of power, nationalism, rejection of the West, competition, demographics, ungovernability, technological acceleration, environmental risks, and information technology.¹²⁴ These

concepts go a long way in explaining the core challenges that face the U.S. Army in future conflicts. Specifically, the discussion of ungovernability succinctly identifies and codifies the phenomenon previously identified as the failed state.

The chapter continues with a description of future adversarial forces we may face. This description includes non-military threats that will still impact military operations as well as “nonnational forces” such as ethnic conflict, international organized crime, or terrorist activities that pose a specific threat to our operating forces¹²⁵ The chapter’s discussion of the new warrior class is reflective of Peter’s findings, and explains the interrelationship of the socio-political and economic environment to the military force. This document should be a springboard for meaningful, useful doctrine for SASO. The coordinating draft of FM 100-20 *Stability and Support Operations* attempted to convert the future strategic setting into relevant doctrine for the field.

The 1996 draft of FM 100-20 *Stability and Support Operations* offers some insight on the direction the U.S. Army took with regards to describing the SASO environment and offering the planner a useful tool for developing plans in SASO. Upon reading the draft, one is struck by the attempt to describe, rather than prescribe, SASO and the environment in which SASO might take place. This suggests something different to the planner. One must contemplate each crisis on its own terms rather than applying a pat solution to SASO. One important contribution in the draft was the attempt to define the terms that would become part of SASO lexicon. The author discusses the concepts of peace, conflict, participants in conflict, and the state to begin the description of the SASO environment.¹²⁶ The author compliments this discussion by tying in the concepts to the instruments of power framework.¹²⁷ This is a useful demonstration of how the SASO

environment forms a system, and how society, politics, economics, and the military interact to make that system so complex and durable. The author also addressed the failed state as a component of this environment:

Internal conflicts reflect a society that is not organized to provide the benefits its citizens demand. Somewhere in the scale of political, social, and economic values, the organization of the state fails to meet expectations. Extreme frustration may lead to aggression in the form of insurgency or revolution...Only political, economic, and social action can bring the society back into balance.¹²⁸

The manual appeared to be heading in the right direction by addressing the difficult task of describing an approach to gain a full appreciation of the SASO environment. The author clearly benefited from the work published in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5. Although it never became official doctrine, the intellectual effort remained intact, which could assist succeeding doctrine writers in postulating a framework for the SASO environment.

Efforts to complete U.S. Army FM 3-0 *Operations* significantly impact the thrust of future SASO doctrine. As the capstone document, FM 3-0 is charged with defining the U.S. Army operational framework. SASO is a critical component of this framework. Discussion of SASO in FM 3-0 will attempt to discuss what the concept means and how it fits within the U.S. Army operational framework, while FM100-20 will address how the U.S. Army conducts SASO.¹²⁹ Despite the effort in the TRADOC publication and the 1996 draft of FM100-20, the current project is challenged by the legacy of the draft manuals that were rejected by the field.

Current efforts at writing SASO doctrine reflect the legacies of the 1996 draft and TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5. At this writing, the thrust of the doctrine is to delineate the linkage between the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy, through Joint doctrine, to FM 3-0, and finally to SASO. What currently remains intact is the

detailed discussion of the elements of instability that delineate critical concepts in SASO. What has not been incorporated at this time is a conceptual framework that allows the military planner to put a crisis requiring a SASO response in context.¹³⁰ There still remains an opportunity to inform the field with a useful conceptual framework for SASO. Staffs currently develop their own methodology for contemplating the SASO environment in order to produce operational plans and orders. The depth and breadth of issues involved puts the staff at risk of missing essential elements to the problem because they wasted time developing their own paradigm to view a particular military problem.

The challenge for any doctrinal publication is to be approachable, relevant, and applicable for the force. A comprehensive state of the SASO environment introduces the field to military operations that occur in environments as described in the case studies. The inaugural FM 100-20 must guide the planner to an understanding of all aspects of the environment that may impact SASO. The doctrine must also give the planner perspectives on how conflicts are born in the first place. Finally, the doctrine must offer the planner a method to forecast possible outcomes given the changing intra-state environment and the prospect of SASO in shaping positive consequences, not just suspending impending negative consequences.

Brinton's model of revolutionary war is a useful tool to contemplate the complexities of intra-state conflict. His fever metaphor offers a framework to view the trajectory of conflict and the variables that impact the conflict. This approach retains its usefulness because the metaphor allows the planner to see a crisis in its parts as well as the whole. The fever metaphor is also flexible enough to allow for the planner to contemplate the unique attributes of any crisis, as well as offering a means to determine uniformities

between numerous crises. In that way the planner can identify at what stage a crisis exists, where the crisis may be headed, and where he must contemplate action before the situation becomes too unwieldy for the forces at hand. The metaphor can also be reversed to allow the planner to forecast possible outcomes as a result of the use of military power.

The idea of the failed state is an important concept that must be incorporated in Brinton's model of intra-state conflict. This concept, well recognized by TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, provides the essential difference in modern intra-state conflicts. The inability of nation-states to provide for and protect its citizens as well as control its borders from internal, external, and transnational threats constitutes the primary reason for crises to occur. Very few nation states are absolutely failed; the concept nonetheless provides the planner an understanding of the underlying reason for the existence of the host of variables that complicate a crisis. The concept suggests a spectrum of a state's health; assessing a states' resiliency is an important first step in Brinton's model. His findings of state resiliency in the American, British, French, and Russian revolutions are not likely to be found in modern intra-state conflict cases. In fact, Brinton's reservations about the trajectory and outcome of the Russian Revolution offer some insight about what the planner will face in the future.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Brinton noted that the country least like the others in his study was Russia. He wondered if there existed some special attribute to Russia that accounted for its

“Permanent Revolution.”¹³¹ Post-Cold War Russia may offer the military planner the archetype failed state. The Russian Revolution not only altered the nature of the state, but also weakened the state by introducing a command system that forced the government to work instead of creating an effective governmental system. The system eventually collapsed from its own weight. Years of suspended negative consequences came crashing down in 1989. The Soviet system relied on totalitarian rule, repression of civil society and other key institutions, and a comprehensive security system and armed forces structure. None of these institutions acted in concert as part of a system of systems. Each part of society relied on the central government in order to function. The Soviet Union was a hollow state that could never get the country on track towards modernity. Currently Russia holds itself together by sheer will alone. Disparate peoples, cultures, ethnicities, and languages that have no true logic for unifying for some common purpose will seek to chart their own paths.

The new nation-states that emerged from the Cold War suffer from a number of maladies. Weak state institutions top the list of reasons why these countries have such a daunting task. Peoples have traditions of organization to provide for and protect the society. That society can take the shape of a clan, families, tribes, kin, or kingdoms. It is not necessary to have homogeneity in a nation state for it to be viable, only unity of purpose. The nation-state has to mean something to the people it purports to represent, or the people will take action to provide for and protect themselves. Many are choosing to carve out a niche of territory and give it a name. Others have become displaced, wandering the land in search of some food and safety. Many more leave altogether to find security in another land. Still others seek help from the international community.

This proves to be problematic as long as intervention only seeks to treat the symptoms with little regard to ending, or preventing, the illness.

Crane Brinton employed the metaphor of a fever to describe the path of intra-state conflict. This study has validated the utility of Brinton's model, with the understanding of key differences at the outset. The inability of the state to provide for and protect its populace effectively results in a crisis that becomes chronic. The state becomes a sickly patient, too weak to care for itself, burdening the international system with its ailments, while contributing little in return. The international system fares little better with its pat responses that do little more than prevent a conflict from getting out of control.

This study attempted to utilize theory to gain a deeper understanding of the nature of intra-state conflict, how a situation progresses to a crisis state to begin with, what elements of the social, political, economic and military environment promote positive change and what elements promote chaos. Small-scale contingencies will be engross a large amount of the military planner's time. It is incumbent upon the U.S. Army to have a clear understanding of the nature of the environment that may require a SASO response.

The U.S. Army has worked hard at understanding the nuances of that environment. Now the U.S. Army must employ a framework that allows the planner to contemplate efficiently and precisely SASO in a manner that portrays a conflict's antecedents, variables that act on the conflict, and possible consequences if left to its own devices or as a result of external intervention. Crane Brinton's framework for intra-state conflict is a valuable tool to assess the SASO environment. U.S. Army doctrine should employ this concept to aid the planner in this difficult task.

ENDNOTES

¹ Department of the Army, *Field Manual 100-5 Operations*. (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1993), 2-0.

² *Ibid.*, 2-1.

³ Department of the Army, *Field Manual 100-23 Peace Operations*. (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1994), v.

⁴ Ibid., 1.

⁵ Department of the Army, *Field Manual 100-7 Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations*. (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1995), v.

⁶ Crane Brinton. *The Anatomy of Revolution*. (New York: Vantage Books, 1965), 17.

⁷ Ibid., 29.

⁸ Ibid., 33.

⁹ Ibid., 36.

¹⁰ Ibid., 36.

¹¹ Ibid., 39.

¹² Ibid., 41.

¹³ Ibid., 49.

¹⁴ Ibid., 51-52.

¹⁵ Ibid., 62.

¹⁶ Ibid., 66.

¹⁷ Ibid., 78.

¹⁸ Ibid., 79.

¹⁹ Ibid., 86.

²⁰ Ibid., 87.

²¹ Ibid., 122.

²² Ibid., 156.

²³ Ibid., 137.

²⁴ Ibid., 146.

²⁵ Ibid., 166.

²⁶ Ibid., 196.

²⁷ Ibid., 197-203.

²⁸ Ibid., 209.

²⁹ Ibid., 210-211.

³⁰ Ibid., 212-213.

³¹ Ibid., 213.

³² Ibid., 215.

³³ Ibid., 218.

³⁴ Ibid., 239.

³⁵ Ibid., 241.

³⁶ Ibid., 244.

³⁷ Ibid., 248.

³⁸ Ibid., 258.

³⁹ Ibid., 263.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 260.

⁴¹ Robert H. Jackson. *Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994), 5. Jackson challenges the concept of "state" as applied to all countries through a discussion of sovereignty. He describes the "new sovereignty game" played by Third World countries, where they simultaneously claim the right to control territory, and the people who inhabit the territory, and a sort of international welfare, in which they should be given special treatment because of the desperate circumstances they face. Jackson posits a changed international community where states fall into two categories: the first is "positive sovereignty" and is comprised of countries that exist based on traditional understandings of sovereignty, and the second is "negative sovereignty" which comprises the countries that view themselves as both sovereign and dependent. He offers the "quasi state" as a new concept for consideration in the lexicon of international theory.

⁴² Robert H. Dorff "Democratization and Failed States: The Challenge of Ungovernability." *Parameters* 26, no. 2 (1996): <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/96summer/dorff.htm>; Internet; accessed 22 September 1999.

⁴³ Stephen D. Krasner. "Compromising Westphalia." *International Security* 20, no. 3 (Winter 1995/96): 115. Krasner offers a fresh perspective on the concept of state. He argues that the concept has never been an accurate description for many of the entities that call themselves states. He states that although the Westphalian state concept has been adopted and codified, history has shown that compromises through conventions, contracting, coercion, and imposition have been the norm. This argument compliments Jackson's thoughts on "quasi states" as it also explores the understanding and operationalization of sovereignty throughout history. Additionally, it buttresses the use of the term state against arguments that this western term inherently does not fit Asia and Africa.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 116.

⁴⁵ Amitai Etzioni, "The Evils of Self-Determination." *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1992/93): 22.

⁴⁶ Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner. "Saving Failed States." *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1992-3): 4.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 5.

⁴⁸ I. William Zartman. *Governance as Conflict Management: Politics and Violence in West Africa*. (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1996), 15. Zartman edited this book that examines the successes of governance in Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria, and offers the findings as evidence that chaos does not have to be the norm in the developing world. He argues that governance is the chief tool to avert internal chaos, and that West African countries that have exhibited norms and employed strategies for conflict resolution under a legitimate institutional structure have had greater success in managing internal conflict. He also offers that, lacking such mechanisms for conflict resolution, governments opt for force and repression to prevent conflicts from reaching a crisis stage. Zartman offers keen insight into a critical strength of the state that provided the resiliency to withstand the ravages of intra-state conflict.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 24.

⁵⁰ Lionel Cliffe and Robin Luckham. "Complex Political Emergencies and the State: Failure and the Fate of the State." *Third World Quarterly* 20, no. 1, (February 1999): 30. This is a comprehensive study of twenty eight countries that are categorized into a spectrum of state failure. The study takes into account each country's history of statehood, standard of civil and political society, the nature of the "complex political emergencies" that have brought the countries to a decreased level of sovereignty, and the nature of intervention in each case. This is an unwieldy process, but illustrates the complexity and uniqueness of state failure and begs a methodology for contemplating future crises.

⁵¹ Augustus Richard Norton. "Peacekeeping, Civil Society, and Conflict Regulation." *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (1993): 32. Norton provided great insight on the erosion of civil society and its impact on conflict resolution. Zartman and Norton would agree that one of many formal institutions (governance, civil society, social structures, political parties, judiciary, etc.) must be available to bring about peaceful resolution. Norton advocates the establishment and maintenance of civil society to allow the tension of political contestation to exist, avoiding violence as a means of transferring power.

⁵² Ralph Peters. "New Warrior Class" *Parameters* 24, no 2 (1994): <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/1994/peters.htm>; Internet; accessed 22 September 1999.

⁵³ Robert J. Bunker. "Failed State Operational Environment Concepts" *Military Review* 77, no 5 (1997): 90-92.

⁵⁴ Norton, 32.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 33.

⁵⁶ U.S. Department of State, *Background Notes: Somalia* (Washington: Office of East African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, 1998) http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/somalia_0798_bgn.html; Internet; accessed 22 September 1999.

⁵⁷ Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar. *Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction*. (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1995): 10.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁵⁹ *Background Notes: Somalia*; Internet.

⁶⁰ Lyons, 13.

⁶¹ *Background Notes: Somalia*; Internet.

⁶² *Ibid.*

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- ⁶³ Lyons, 15.
- ⁶⁴ *Background Notes: Somalia*; Internet.
- ⁶⁵ Lyons, 15.
- ⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 15.
- ⁶⁷ *Background Notes: Somalia*; Internet.
- ⁶⁸ Lyons, 21.
- ⁶⁹ Christopher Clapham. "Political Economy of Conflict in the Horn of Africa." *Survival* 32, no. 5 (1990): 413-4.
- ⁷⁰ Lyons, 46.
- ⁷¹ U.S. Department of State, *Background Notes: Indonesia* (Washington: Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, August 1999), http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/indonesia_899_bgn.html; Internet: accessed 12 October 1999.
- ⁷² *Background Notes: Indonesia*; Internet.
- ⁷³ William H. Frederick and Robert Worden. *Indonesia - A Country Study* (Washington: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1993): 11.
- ⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 15.
- ⁷⁵ John G. Taylor. *Indonesia's Forgotten War - The Hidden History of East Timor*. (London: Zed Books, 1991): 3.
- ⁷⁶ *Background Notes: Indonesia*; Internet.
- ⁷⁷ Taylor, 4.
- ⁷⁸ *Indonesia Country Study*, 31.
- ⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 35.
- ⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 35.
- ⁸¹ *Background Notes: Indonesia*; Internet.
- ⁸² Taylor, 11.
- ⁸³ *Ibid.*, 12.
- ⁸⁴ *Indonesia Country Study*, 38.
- ⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 40.
- ⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 42.

⁸⁷ Taylor, 14.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ *Background Notes: Indonesia*; Internet.

⁹⁰ *Indonesian Country Study*, 44.

⁹¹ Ibid., 46.

⁹² *Background Notes: Indonesia*; Internet.

⁹³ *Indonesia Country Study*, 43.

⁹⁴ *Background Notes: Indonesia*; Internet.

⁹⁵ *Indonesia Country Study*, 49.

⁹⁶ *Background Notes: Indonesia*; Internet.

⁹⁷ *Indonesia Country Study*, 57.

⁹⁸ *Background Notes: Indonesia*; Internet.

⁹⁹ *Indonesia Country Study*, 60.

¹⁰⁰ Taylor, 23.

¹⁰¹ *Indonesia Country Study*, 64.

¹⁰² Taylor, 28.

¹⁰³ *Background Notes: Indonesia*; Internet.

¹⁰⁴ Constacio Pinto and Matthew Jardine, *East Timor's Unfinished Struggle - Inside the Timorese Resistance*. (Boston: South End Press, 1997): 40. This book chronicles the personal struggle of political exile Constacio Pinto, who called attention to the situation in East Timor after escaping in 1992. Also represents one of the most recent accounts of the crisis in East Timor.

¹⁰⁵ Taylor, 37.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 40.

¹⁰⁷ John Pilger, "We Helped Them Descend into Hell," *New Statesman*, 12, no. 572 (13 September 1999), ProQuest on line.

¹⁰⁸ "The Tragedy of East Timor," *The Economist*, 362, no. 8136 (11 September 1999), ProQuest on line.

¹⁰⁹ Pinto, 246.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 191.

¹¹¹ John McBeth, "Bitter Memories," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 162, no.37 (16 September 1999), ProQuest on line.

¹¹² "The Shadow Over Indonesia," *The Economist*, 352, no. 8137(18 September 1999), ProQuest on line.

¹¹³ McBeth, ProQuest on line.

¹¹⁴ Pilger, ProQuest on line.

¹¹⁵ *Background Notes: Indonesia*; Internet.

¹¹⁶ "The Dangers in East Timor," *The Economist*, 352, no 8137 (18 September 1999), ProQuest on line.

¹¹⁷ *Indonesia Country Study*, 83.

¹¹⁸ "Insecurity Forces," *The Economist* 353, no. 8141 (16 October 1999):40.

¹¹⁹ Dan Murphy. "The Power Brokers," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 162, no 40 (7 October 1999), ProQuest on line.

¹²⁰ FM 100-23, 31.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 31.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 45.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 46.

¹²⁴ Department of the Army. *TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 Force XXI Operations* (Washington: Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1994): <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/5255fram.htm>; Internet. Document written to provide the guidance for Force XXI. The document is used extensively in the formulation of doctrine for SASO.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, on line.

¹²⁶ Department of the Army, Draft FM 100-20 *Stability and Support Operations* (Washington: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1996):1-3, 1-4, 1-5. Used by the doctrine writer as a point of departure for the new FM 100-20 *Stability and Support Operations* that will be completed in the next twelve to eighteen months.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 1-6.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 1-7.

¹²⁹ Terry Baldwin (MAJ), interviewed by author, electronic mail, 9 November 1999 School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth. He is the author of the SASO chapter in the new FM 3-0 *Operations*. The purpose of interviewing him was to determine the extent to which FM 3-0 would postulate a conceptual framework for SASO.

¹³⁰ Gib Rigg (CPT), interviewed by author, notes, 29 October 1999, Center for Army Doctrinal Development. He is the author of the forthcoming FM 100-20 *Stability and Support Operations*. He indicated a number of other reasons for the difficulty in introducing a conceptual framework for SASO.

The administrative process is an additional constraint, as he must have a number of officers concur with his work before a draft is produced. Additionally, the amount of flexibility in introducing a conceptual framework is determined by the groundwork laid by FM 3-0 *Operations*. The legacy of the rejected draft 1997 FM 100-5 as being “too academic” makes the introduction of a conceptual framework in FM 100-20 a daunting task. The manual is still many months from publication, but it seems the progress is directly tied to the progress of FM 3-0.

¹³¹ Brinton, 225.

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